Re-reinventing NATO

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RE~REINVENTING NATORonald D. Asmus

and Richard C. Holbrooke

R I G A p A p E R S

Riga, Latvia November 27 29, 2006


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2006 The German Marshall Fund of the United States. All rights reserved.No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means withoutpermission in writing from the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). Please direct enquiriesto:The German Marshall Fund of the United States1744 R Street, NWWashington DC 20009T 1 202 745 3950F 1 202 265 1662E [email protected] publication can be downloaded for free at http://www.gmfus.org/publications/index.cfm.Limited print copies are also available. To request a copy, send an e-mail to [email protected]

The opinions expressed in this publication are those of individual authors and do no necessarilyrepresent the views of the authors affiliation.


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Riga Papers

RE~REINVENTING NATO

RONALD D. ASMUSAND

AMBASSADOR RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE

Riga, LatviaNovember 27 29, 2006


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PREfAcEOver the last decade it has become a tradition to gather the worlds leading thinkers on NATO in advanceof a major Alliance summit. The German Marshall Fund of the United States, along with the LatvianTransatlantic Organisation (LATO) and the Commission of Strategic Analysis, are proud to host thisconference on the eve of the November 2006 Riga NATO summit.

This summit comes at a critical moment in NATOs history. The Alliance is deeply engaged in a dif ficultmission in Afghanistan and is at a critical juncture in terms of transforming itself for a very differentstrategic era in the 21st century. Should NATO aspire to new, more global missions in the wider MiddleEast and elsewhere? If so, then does it need new arrangements with non-NATO global partners? Whenand where should NATO seek to act and with what kinds of coalitions?

Should NATO continue to keep its door open to future enlargement to new democracies further East andSouth at a time when there are signs of enlargement fatigue in Europe? How should NATO transformitself to better be able to work together with the European Union around the world? And, what futureshould we envision for NATO-Russia relations in light of recent t rends in Russia? Last but not least, doesNATO have a role to play in new areas and on new issues ranging from energy security to homelanddefense?

These are just some of the diff icult questions that the Alliance must confront. In the spirit of stimulatingthinking and debate on both sides of the Atlantic, we have commissioned five Riga Papers to addressthese and other issues.

In Re~reinventing NATO, Ronald D. Asmus and Richard C. Holbrooke provide a bold and ambitiousAmerican view on how to overhaul the Alliance so that it may assume more global responsibility andmeet future global threats from two individuals deeply involved in NATO reform in the 1990s.

In NATOs Only Future: The West Abroad, Christoph Bertram offers a European perspective on theAlliances future from one of the foremost thinkers and writers on NATO affairs on the continent. Hewarns that the Alliance is losing the support of its members and that it must do a much better job inaddressing their real security needs by broadening its ambitions and horizons, if it is ever to regain itsformer centrality.

In NATO in the Age of Populism, Ivan Krastev analyzes the dangers of the rise in populism in Europe andthe challenge this presents for maintaining public support for the Alliance as well as effective decision-making as NATO tries to respond to new global threats. He argues that the only way NATO can go globalwithout falling victim to a populist backlash is to transform itself into a two-pillar Alliance.

In Transforming NATO: The View from Latvia, aneta Ozolia provides the perspective of a smaller,Northern European country on these issues and debates. This essay highlights the complexity of thechallenge that NATOs transformation poses for smaller NATO members as well as ongoing priority andcommitment to keeping NATOs door open for additional new members.

The fifth and final Riga Paper is entitled NATO and Global Partners: Views from the Outside. Edited byRonald D. Asmus, it consists of four essays by authors f rom Israel, the Persian Gulf, Australia and Japan.These authors explore what their countries might expect from the Alliance in the future, as NATO seeksto develop a new concept of global partnership.

GMF is delighted to offer these papers as part of the intellectual legacy of this Riga conference andsummit. We consider them a key contribution to the spirit of transatlantic debate and partnership thatit is our mission to support.

Craig KennedyPresident of the German Marshall Fund of the United States


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RE~REINVENTING NATO

Ronald D. Asmus andAmbassador Richard C. Holbrooke

Afterthe end of the Cold War, NATO faced a fundamental choice: reinvent itself orgradually wither away into meaninglessness. After a period of drift and indecision,NATO took two historic steps: it opened its door to enlarge and include new members;and it acted militarily beyond its borders in Bosnia and Kosovo. By so doing, NATO metthe strategic imperatives of the initial post-Cold War era: to stop ethnic cleansing inthe Balkans, anchoring new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe to the West

and building a new relationship with our former Cold War adversary, Russia.A new era began after the terrible events of September 11, 2001. Today the Alliancemust reinvent itself, yet again. Its new threats no longer come primarily from withinEurope (although some of them have active cells in Europe). Plain and simple, NATOmust become a more global Alliance, one that takes it to countries and regions beyondthe European heartland and on missions beyond the imaginations of the foundingfathers. Yet they are necessary if the Alliance is to fulfill a core mission that has notchanged much since 1949: providing for the common defense and advancing thecommon interests of its members. Some tentative steps have already been taken,notably in Afghanistan, but a formal restatement of NATOs purposes, agreed to by all

its members, is necessary and, five years after 9/11, overdue.Afghanistan is the first, but certainly not the last, mission distant from Europe inwhich NATO is fighting an unconventional war along with non-NATO and non-Europeanpartners. This mission requires a coordinated civilian and military effort pursuedtogether with institutions like the United Nations (UN) and the European Union, andperhaps the African Union.

There is no lack of crises for NATO to contribute to resolving. The United States andEurope face a growing need to jointly project stability, conduct peacekeeping andstability operations beyond the continent in general, and in the wider Middle East, inparticular. In addition to Afghanistan, the Alliance should be prepared to assist the UN

mission in Lebanon, should the situation there deteriorate. Even as the West seeksto prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, NATO should be preparing plans onhow to contain and deal with the consequences of a nuclear-armed Tehran if currentlypursued diplomacy fails. For reasons detailed below, there is still an important potentialrole for NATO in Iraq as we struggle to prevent that country from fragmenting anddestabilizing the broader region. And, if the shock of ethnic cleansing in the Balkansin the early 1990s provided an important impetus for reinventing NATO a decade ago,then the need to halt the horror taking place today in Darfur should be an equallypowerful incentive to rethink how this Alliance can be used to meet the moral andhumanitarian challenges of today.

A centerpiece of the Alliances reinvention in the 1990s was its enlargement to includenew members. NATOs enlargement to new democracies from the Baltic Sea region


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2 Ronald D. Asmus and Ambassador Rihard c. Holbrooke

to the Black Sea is now recognized as an historic accomplishment, but it was muchcriticized at the time by some liberal commentators, as well as many in NATOs oldguard (including Paul Nitze, George F. Kennan, Brent Scowcroft and General AndrewGoodpasture). But, the fears of its critics were unfounded, and NATO enlargement

paved the way for EU enlargement and the creation of a peaceful stability that CentralEurope had not seen in centuries. It is crucial that NATOs door remains open and thatthe prospect of future enlargement into Eurasia and across the wider Black Sea regionbe kept alive. This is especially true if, as seems likely, the doors of the EU are closing.NATO can play a critical role in stabilizing the Southern flank of the Euroatlanticcommunity and in the wider Black Sea and the Southern Caucasus visvisan unstableMiddle East.

There are other challenges and opportunities for NATO. Questions abound. Shouldthe Alliance assume a role in homeland security, given the fact that neither the EU norindividual nations are in a position by themselves to respond to the consequences of a

catastrophic terrorist attack? Should NATO play a role in the realm of energy security,not only visvisRussia, but also in terms of coming to the aide of threatened MiddleEastern countries whose energy infrastructure is critical for the Wests economichealth? Last and certainly not least, how should NATO respond to Russias attempts toroll back democratic developments on its borders?

To be sure, the Alliance has taken rhetorical steps towards a more global role. A visitto NATOs headquarters reveals that the Alliance is engaged in a wide range of newactivities, much of it in the form of contingency plans. But, one should not confusebusyness with strategic relevance or actual operations. Today, the Alliance is probablyless central in Western thinking and policies than at any time since its creation. Comparedto the long list of strategic challenges the West needs to address, what is most strikingis how modest and minimalist NATOs current agenda is. Most of the issues mentionedabove are not on the agenda or even part of the important conversations taking placein Brussels and Mons, and even less so at leadership levels.

Reinventing the Alliane(Again)

This is not the first time NATO has had to reinvent itself for a new era. When the Alliancewas founded in 1949 there were many, including in the United States, who thoughtthe idea of establishing and managing an Alliance that would have to bridge so manydifferent national perspectives on how to confront the then Soviet threat was fancifuland could never work.

NATO worked better than critics anticipated during the Cold War because a genericconsensus emerged on the nature of the Soviet threat and how to deal with it. Thatconsensus did not emerge automatically but came to fruition through leadership andconsultation across the Atlantic. And, when NATO had to shift strategy in response to

changing trends within the communist world, they inevitably produced major debatesand tensions within the Alliance as well, often including predictions of NATOs imminent


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demise or irrelevance. Nevertheless, this generic consensus was the strategic gluethat held the Alliance together for its f irst forty years, and which ultimately helped theWest win the Cold War without firing a single shot.

Following the collapse of communism, NATO had to come up with new strategic glue.

An alliance whose original enemy had disappeared faced the question of quo vadis.The answer that gradually emerged after significant debate was that NATOs jobshould be to defend the peace not only in Western Europe, but in Europe as whole.Speaking in June 1993, Senator Richard G. Lugar coined the following memorable andpithy phrase: NATO would either go out-of-area or out-of-business.

It fell to President Bill Clinton to lead the drive to reinvent NATO in the 1990s. Hepushed through the Alliances decision to open NATOs door to new members throughenlargement in order to consolidate democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, alongwith the intervention beyond NATOs borders in Bosnia and subsequently in Kosovo.Over the course of the decade, NATO consolidated a new consensus on the need to

extend the security that had been established in Western Europe eastward and acrossthe continent as a whole stretching from the Baltic Sea in the North to the Black Seain the South.

With the benefit of hindsight, this strategic leap looks inevitable and self-evident. But,as veterans of the battles surrounding these decisions, we can attest to the fact thatthey were anything but easy. Some of the fiercest foreign policy fights of the 1990stook place over these issues. Interventions in the Balkans, NATO enlargement and thedecision to establish a NATO-Russia relationship were opposed by a majority of thestrategic community in Europe and the United States. But, they were the right thingto do. And, they succeeded. By the late 1990s, the Alliance started to debate whether

it should also be prepared in principle to act beyond Europe and assume a moreglobal role. In spite of American support, that effort remained stillborn. A majority ofEuropean allies at the time wanted to limit NATOs scope to issues and areas in andaround Europe.

We can now look back at the 1990s as the interwar period, as a time between 11/9 and9/11, between the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the war on terror. Sincethen, NATO has faced the question of whether it should invent itself for a new and verydifferent strategic era for the third time in its history and, if so, what such a reinventionwould entail. The consensus to re-forge NATO to face these threats appeared tomaterialize in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, when the Alliance invoked Article

five for the first time in its history and NATO allies offered to join the United Statesin Afghanistan, an offer that the Bush Administration inexplicably, and inexcusably,rejected.

This appalling decision was eventually rectif ied when the United States, stretched thinin Iraq, finally called on NATO in 2006 to take over most of the Afghanistan mission.But the Administrations failure to capitalize on that historical moment to pull NATOinto a new strategic era was a mistake. One cannot go back and recreate opportunitieslost, and the war in Iraq has made the building of a consensus for a new more globalNATO more difficult.


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Ronald D. Asmus and Ambassador Rihard c. Holbrooke

Beyond Europe

The point of departure for NATOs re~reinvention must be the recognition of the natureof the strategic challenge being faced today. The United States and Europe face aset of common threats geographically concentrated in an arc of crisis that stretchesfrom Northern Africa through the wider Middle East to Afghanistan and Pakistan intoCentral Asia. The threats posed in this region are not abstract, but current and real. Inaddition to NATOs war in Afghanistan, Iraq is in danger of disintegrating. Turkey talksominously about invading Northern Iraq. NATO in Northern Iraq would help Turkeydeal with this complicated issue together with its allies. While hostilities in Lebanonhave been halted, they could resume at any moment. Syria could still be pulled intosuch a conflict. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are under pressure from jihadists to supportHezbollah, even though both governments hate that organization. The West looks

to Central Asia as a major source for its future energy needs, but there are signs ofRussian encroachment as well as growing Islamic resistance in that region. Afghanistanaccuses Pakistan of giving shelter to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Uzbekistan, controlledby a repressive Soviet-era boss, could become the next Islamic Republic. India talks oftaking action against Pakistan for allegedly being behind recent terrorist bombings onits territory. And, above all this looms the prospect of Iran going nuclear.

The list could be continued. Indeed, a local or individual crisis in one of many potentialhotspots across this region could start a chain reaction that could spread quicklyalmost anywhere between Tbilisi and Tashkent or Cairo and Bombay. The instabilityacross this region arguably poses the greatest threat to global stability since the early

1960s and the Cuban missile crisis. Yet that crisis, while immensely dangerous, wasrelatively simple, essentially only involving two states and two national leaders. Herethe dangers and risks are spread across a much larger, highly combustible, regionwith the Wests ability to manage, control or even influence developments in theseindividual countries far more limited and open to question.

Where is NATO in all of this? The honest answer is at the margins. This highlights thecentral issue NATO today must face. Does the Alliance want to focus on maintainingsecurity on an increasingly secure Europe or will it make the leap to become a keyinstrument in addressing these new, more global, threats beyond the continent? AreNATO members prepared to reinvent it to address the central strategic issues of our

day? For an alliance that claims that its job is to address the primary security challengesand threats to the democracies of North America and Europe, the next logical stepfor NATO is to transform itself to address this global range of problems and potentialthreats. What would and should such transformation entail?

NATOs biggest test is taking place right now in Afghanistan, where it has belatedlytaken over the command of ISAF. Afghanistan is a central theme for this Riga Summit.But, the war there is not going well and success is by no means assured. Indeed, whatis striking about this mission is how difficult it has been for NATO to generate thepolitical will and military forces required to meet its agreed objectives. There is a realdanger that more ground will be lost in this war and that the Alliance will fail if on bothsides of the Atlantic there is no political will for stepping up commitment. We cannotavoid this challenge: Afghanistan will be with us far longer than Iraq and a defeat there


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would be catastrophic for the United States and NATO. Yet, not all NATO membersshare this view.

NATO is barely present in other key hotspots along this new arc of crisis, althoughthere are ample issues and areas where the Alliance could make a real difference and

play a significant role. One of them is Iraq, which obviously poses the greatest threat toregional stability. While we should do everything possible to maintain Iraqs unity, wemust all recognize the possibility that the country could fragment or fall into full-scalesectarian fighting. This will directly affect NATO and its members, above all Turkey.

Already today in Turkey there are voices openly calling for an invasion of Northern Iraqto deal with the constant raids into Southeastern Turkey by the terrorist organizationknown as the PKK. The best way to reduce that risk would be for NATO to deploy troopsto Northern Iraq. Such a deployment would serve several other purposes. First, aspart of a deal with the Kurdish leadership that would rein in the PKK, it would be thebest way to prevent Turkish military intervention. Second, NATO troops could help

contain the spillover of an Iraqi civil war and its spread to the part of Iraq that is stillpeaceful, stable and quasi-democratic. Third, they could serve as an over-the-horizonforce should it become necessary to reintroduce troops into the broader Iraqi theater,something that will be much more difficult from neighboring Kuwait. Finally, it wouldprovide the Bush Administration with at least some political cover to demonstrate thatit had not abandoned Iraq completely.

Then there is Lebanon. NATO passed when it came to the question of what kind ofinternational force should be deployed in Southern Lebanon under the auspices of theUnited Nations. For an Alliance that has spent a decade cultivating relations aroundthe Mediterranean in anticipation of the Alliance assuming more responsibility at

some point, it is striking just how quickly the NATO option was dismissed. In manyways, the Alliances newly created NATO Reaction Force (NRF) would have been alogical resource to call on to support such a mission. Instead, the EU took the lead inassembling a European force that constitutes the core of this deployment under theUN. One can obviously envision scenarios down the road where such a force couldbe challenged on the ground and find itself in the kind of trouble that would confrontEuropean countries with the choice of calling for more muscular reinforcements orwithdrawing. If such a situation emerges, NATO may be needed, and it should beready. The parallels with Bosnia are all too obvious.

NATO today is largely moribund in its political dialogue in the Middle East (both the

Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative). To be sure, someArab countries in the region are reticent and even hostile to any expanded NATO rolein the region. Yet, there are also counties who are interested in moving further andfaster to deepen their cooperation and where it is NATO that is moving slowly. Thereis potential for deeper ties not only with Israel but with a number of other countriesaround the Mediterranean as well as several of the smaller Gulf States in the GulfCooperation Council (GCC). Here NATOs own timidity and ambivalence is holding backsuch cooperation.

Looming over all this is the danger of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. This would notonly force European allies to reexamine their own needs for theater missile defense,but could lead many Middle Eastern countries to search for ways to strengthen theirown security, including through closer ties to NATO if such an option exists. Israel isat the top of that list, but several members of the Gulf Cooperation Council may also


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seek closer security ties with the West. Rather than wait for such a scenario to becomereality, it makes sense for NATO to expand its political and military cooperation withthese countries now, so that these relationships are in place should such dangersmaterialize.

In listing these scenarios, we do not believe that the Alliance needs to go everywhereor be involved in every future conflict. NATO does not need to become globo-cop. Ourlist is designed to highlight how bold and innovative leaders could use the Alliancespotential to address some of the very real security problems being struggled withtoday. The reality is that we need an Alliance that is more flexible, more active andmore engaged in building coalitions to deal with possible contingencies in placesbeyond Europe.

We need to think more creatively about what models of NATO involvement make themost sense. There are several viable models. One is NATO-led operations la Bosnia,Kosovo and Afghanistan. Ideally, such operations would have a UN mandate. Such

scenarios are likely to be on the periphery of Europe and involve crisis where a majorNATO role is natural. As in Afghanistan, they are likely to include non-NATO and non-European forces.

A second model is a situation like the one in East Timor in 1999, where the UN SecurityCouncil voted for a mandate for a Multinational Force (MNF) operation with a leadcountry in charge. This is not a UN peace-keeping force, although it can evolve intoone over time. Australia played this role successfully in East Timor in 1999 and in2000 the MNF became a UN peace-keeping force. The United States kept a small, butsymbolically important, contingent of troops in East Timor, under separate nationalcommand. In a third model, NATO actually offers no forces but provides limited, but

critical, assets to help it succeed. An obvious example of where this might work isDarfur, where many experts believe that if allied countries provide airlift, logisticalsupport and modern communications (and enforce a no-fly zone), UN or African Unionforces could be helped significantly to halt the genocide that is taking place.

The primary constraint on NATO actions remains the lack of agreement among itsmembers. Philosophically, NATO should not limit its future scope of operations. Inreality, however, we will be fortunate if the Alliance can successfully operate in thewider Black Sea region, Central Asia, parts of the Middle East and perhaps contributeto international missions in parts of Africa.

This will also require the United States and Europe to reach a common position on how

the Alliance can maintain its legitimacy. In the late 1990s, NATO countries were closeto bridging their different views on whether the Alliance needed the blessing of the UNSecurity Council to act beyond its immediate area. The compromise was that it washighly desirable for NATO have a UN mandate, but that the Alliance also had to keepopen the door of acting without such a mandate if necessary. The debate was primarilyover how wide the crack in that door should be and how explicit that fallback clauseshould be articulated.

With its aversion to the UN, Washington wanted the clause that NATO could act on itsown to be explicit and clear, while most European allies wanted the commitment toget a UN mandate to be explicit and clear. In spite of all the Sturm und Drang, a simple

compromise was available. As one French off icial put it at the time, the American andFrench were like feuding Protestants and Catholics. Washington wanted the right to


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act without a UN mandate to be explicit. France, he said, had a more Catholic view, inthat it wanted to aff irm the need for a UN mandate even though it knew there would beoccasions when the Alliance would act without one, as they had (with French support)in Kosovo. Asked why Paris would affirm a rule it knew it would break, he responded

that it was like affirming your belief in the Ten Commandments, even though you knewsin lay in your future. Hence, Kosovo.

Despite the Bush Administrations ambivalence toward the UN, NATO will face an evengreater need to acquire legitimacy for action in the future, if the Alliance is to makeglobal missions a central part of its work. This is in part because of the dramatic fall inAmericas global standing, and the fact that we are talking about the Alliance acting inparts of the world where anti-Americanism is often widespread. Thus, it is imperativethat we make clear it is not American policy to circumvent the UN, but rather, to workwith it while recognizing its limits. Making sure such misconceptions are not abusedor used against the United States will also be important.

The future o Enlargement

Today NATO enlargement is recognized as a key part of the successful consolidationof democracy in Central and Eastern Europe and the building a new post-Cold WarEurope that is free and at peace. NATO must continue to play a key role in the Alliancesfuture and expanding the sphere of security of the Western world.

NATO enlargement also had a broader strategic purpose, however. It was not onlyabout helping the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, as important asthat was. It was also about helping Europe heal the age-old conflicts in the Easternhalf of the continent so that a Europe at peace with itself could broaden its geopoliticalhorizons, look further afield and assume more global responsibility. In that sense,the issue of new members in Europe and new missions beyond it were, and still are,linked.

With accession of a second wave of new NATO members from the Baltic Sea in theNorth to Romania and Bulgaria on the Black Sea in the South in 2002, many observersviewed the vision of a bigger and better NATO as essentially complete, with theimportant exception of the countries of the former Yugoslavia. But, the real shift inthinking occurred with the Rose and Orange Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine,respectively. They opened the vista of a new wave of enlargement extending deeperinto Eurasia and across the wider Black Sea region. Kyiv and Tbilisi appeared on thescreen, for the first time, to get on a new trajectory that could make them crediblecandidates for NATO membership.

The potential emergence of a liberal democracy in Ukraine, the first in Eurasia, andthe creation of a liberal democratic order in Georgia, also the first of its kind in theSouthern Caucasus, contain the potential to redraw the geopolitical map of Europeand Eurasia. A successful democratic experiment in Ukraine is important in its ownright and could have echoes in a dictatorial Belarus, and perhaps even in Russia,

despite its current slide back into authoritarianism and intimidation. The greater our


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Ronald D. Asmus and Ambassador Rihard c. Holbrooke

concerns over the future course of politics in Moscow become, the more we should beinvesting in a democratic Ukraine.

Success in Tbilisi could be equally important. A sustained democratic order in theSouthern Caucasus would have implications well beyond Georgian borders. It could

positively impact pro-Western but autocratic countries like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.It will echo in neighboring Armenia where signs of a strategic orientation toward theWest are becoming more evident. The wider Black Sea region is a key to any meaningfulWestern strategy for energy security based on a diversity of suppliers as it is the criticaltransit route for Central Asian energy to the European market. Consolidating Westernvalues and stability along the Southern rim of the Euroatlantic community at a timewhen we face rising extremism and instability to the immediate South in the widerMiddle East is critical.

So the stakes are high. It is especially important to keep the Alliances door open at atime when enlargement fatigue in Europe seems to be on the rise and the EU door may

be in danger of closing. One reason why the United States embraced NATO enlargementin the early 1990s was the judgment that the EU was unable to carry the burden ofsecuring democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. We may be entering another periodwhere the EU is unable to play the lead role of projecting stability to these strugglingnew democracies. As a result, NATO could again become a key instrument in trying toanchor these countries to the West, as it has been in the past.

Both of us were early and strong proponents of NATO enlargement. As supportersof both Georgia and Ukraine, we recognize the far-reaching benefits their successfulEuroatlantic integration can produce. One must nevertheless be realistic about thesteep path that lies ahead. These countries have further to go than previous candidates

in terms of reform.In the face of intense Russian pressure, the new government in Kyiv has already officiallydowngraded its Euroatlantic aspirations. NATO continues to be a divisive issue insideUkraine and the prospect of the kind of meaningful reform needed to bring Ukraineinto the West in the years ahead is becoming less rather than more clear. Whereas ayear ago, Kyiv seemed likely to be offered a place in NATOs Membership Action Planat the Istanbul Summit, the topsy-turvy course of Ukrainian politics over the last yearhas taken that off the table. Ukraine may still move in a Westward direction, albeit ata slower pace and with more ups and downs than expected and it is in American andEuropean interests to support and maximize such steps. But, the reality is that the

country is now on a different trajectory than one year ago and we are now, at best,looking at a different timetable.

In the case of Georgia, the road ahead is especially tricky. While Tbilisi is making realand significant progress in domestic reforms at home, it is also difficult to imaginehow a country can join the Alliance with frozen conflicts and foreign troops on its soil.The resolution of these conflicts cannot be a prerequisite for Alliance membership,though. That would give Russia a back door veto over Georgias aspirations and noincentive to help resolve these conflicts, but the political reality is that we need to putthe conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia on a clear path to resolution if Georgia isto become a member of NATO.

Resolving these conflicts will require the right mix of hard work at home and diplomacyabroad. At home, Tbilisi must continue and accelerate the reform process that will make


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Georgia an increasingly attractive society. It must convince people in the separatistregions that their future is better secured in a decentralized democratic Georgian statethan in non-democratic, and often criminalized, enclaves. The Russian presence onthe ground in these conflicts has long ceased to be helpful or stabilizing. Moscow has

long ceased to be a neutral arbiter and is increasingly part of the problem, as opposedto the solution. Tbilisi cannot manage Moscow by itself. The United States and Europeneed to put more pressure on Moscow. And, the West needs to find the right wayto use the perspective of closer ties with the Euroatlantic community as part of thepackage to soften and eventually overcome these conflicts.

The time has also come for the West in general, including NATO, to reassess futurerelations with Moscow. In many ways, the assumptions guiding our current policy onRussia can be traced back to the mid-1990s. Western policy has long assumed thatMoscow was moving, in a two-step-forwards-one-step-back fashion, in a Western anddemocratic direction and that Russia could gradually evolve into a partner of the EU

and NATO on a growing number of issues. The current NATO-Russia relationship wasestablished in the late 1990s as a key part of the overall Western effort to establishand institutionalize new patterns of defense and military cooperation with Moscow.

But, Russia today is no longer on a democratic path. And, it is increasingly pursuing aset of neo-imperialistic policies aimed at de facto rolling back democratic developmentsin what it considers its near abroad. The degree to which Moscow is prepared to assistthe West in containing the North Korean nuclear threat as well as Iran is also less clearthan previously. Growing nationalism at home and high energy prices are whettingMoscows foreign policy ambitions, generating the enhanced wealth and clout forMoscow to pursue those goals in ways that run contrary to Western interests. Moscowseems ready to take advantage of U.S. weakness caused by Washingtons dependenceon Russian support on Iraq and North Korea.

To say that Moscow is becoming increasingly diff icult does not mean we are returningto some kind of new Cold War. The reality is that the Wests relations with Russia areincreasingly marked by a mix of cooperation and competition. We have an ongoinginterest in working with Russia to clean up the legacy of the Cold War and deepen ourcooperation in the area of non-proliferation and counter-terrorism. The same threats inthe wider Middle East discussed above and which pose dangers to the United Statesand Europe also threaten Moscow. In the realm of energy, Russia will remain a majorenergy supplier. But, we will compete with Moscow over access to energy resources inCentral Asia and elsewhere. The halcyon days of Clinton and Yeltsin, sitting together at

FDRs Hyde Park in 1995 to plan a joint military operation in Bosnia, are gone, perhapsforever.

NATO-Russian relations will also have to be reassessed against this new backdropand as part of an overall reassessment of Western strategy. They will in all likelihoodreflect this new mixture of cooperation, competition and perhaps even confrontationon selected issues.


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EU as a counterweight may play well domestically in some countries. But, it is a prettyfoolish policy if one wants Washington to take the EU more seriously and work with itmore closely. It is also a luxury Europe can no longer afford. For tunately, it also no longercorresponds to mainstream thinking in an enlarged European Union. The EU today

is no longer the bastion of Gaullism and anti-Americanism it once was. Recent elitestudies have shown that senior European Commission official and parliamentariansare much more pro-American and pro-NATO than European publics.

In spite of Europes disenchantment with the Bush Administration and historical lowsin American credibility in Europe, the simple fact remains that Europe needs Americaif it hopes to deal with the new strategic challenges of our era. The EU by itself is tooweak to resolve many of the major problems it faces without the United States. It, too,will need a more global NATO to help provide the muscle to back up its own aspirationsfor a more global European foreign policy. And, the further afield Washington andBrussels need to act together, the more it will be necessary for these two institutions

to find new ways to join forces. That will require us to build a closer and more strategicU.S.-EU relationship, in parallel with a more global NATO.

conlusion

Unfortunately, few if any of the issues raised here are likely to be discussed by Allianceleaders at the NATO Riga Summit. At a time when the dangers facing the United Statesand Europe are growing, the Alliance is focused on a minimalist reform agenda, which

offers few if any answers to the pressing strategic questions of our time. Bureaucratshave set the agenda, in the absence of visionary leaders.

It is time to stop pretending that everything is fine in Brussels and Mons. NATO willnever generate the political impetus and leadership to reinvent itself unless we facethat truth and openly debate what this Alliance can and should become. Can theUnited States and Europe come together to address the new threats to Western valuesand civilization? Can common ground once again be found on how best to respondcollectively? Can the Alliance make another strategic leap, one that is in many waysbigger and bolder than the renaissances that took place a decade ago, to confront thenew threats of this century? Those are the central questions that should be at the top

of our agenda.NATO leaders have thus far demonstrated neither the vision nor the political will toreinvent the Alliance. Many doubt whether the Alliance can be put back together afterthe transatlantic strain over Iraq and other issues. Some will argue that the steps wecall for are a bridge too far and should not even be attempted. Many are too ready towatch NATO issue grandiose paper communiqus, but then do little to back them up,thereby condemning the Alliance to a slow but certain descent into marginalizationand irrelevance.

Those who say NATO cannot succeed in transforming itself should remember the past.There were those who doubted the Alliance could be created in the late 1940s. Others

questioned whether it could be reinvented in the early 1990s. Today many questionwhether NATO can be put back together after the strains caused by the Iraq war.


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But, what passive or even bad policy has eroded, good policy can rebuild. And, whilethe leadership required for this task must emanate from both sides of the Atlantic, itmust start in the United States.

Even though there is little prospect that the Riga Summit will answer these questions,

it could be the place where the debate about re~reinventing NATO begins. It can be thefirst step towards the kind of renaissance necessary if the United States and Europeare to remain safe and secure and a single community in the 21st Century. At stake isnothing less than our ability to recreate the West to meet the strategic challenges ofour time.


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About the Authors

Ronald D. Asmus is Executive Director of the Transatlantic Center of theGerman Marshall Fund of the United States in Brussels, Belgium. He has

written widely on U.S.-European relations and is the author ofOpening

NATOs Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era (New York:

Columbia University Press, 2002). He served as a Deputy Assistant

Secretary of State for European Affairs in the Clinton Administration from

1997 to 2000. He has previously worked as a Senior Fellow at the German

Marshall Fund, Council on Foreign Relations, RAND and Radio Free

Europe. Ronald D. Asmus has been awarded the U.S. State Department's

Distinguished Honor Award; the Republic of Polands Commanders Cross;

the Kingdom of Swedens Royal Order of the Polar Star; the Republic

of Lithuanias Order of the Grand Duke Gediminas; and the Republic of

Estonias Order of the Cross of St. Marys Land; and the Republic of Latvias

Order of the Three Stars. Ronald D. Asmus holds a Ph.D. in European

studies from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies

of The Johns Hopkins University.

Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke is Vice Chairman of Perseus LLC, a

leading private equity firm. His most recent government role was as U.S.

Ambassador to the United Nations, a capacity in which he was also a

member of President Clintons Cabinet, from 1999 to 2001. As Assistant

Secretary of State for Europe from 1994 to 1996, he was the chief architect

of the Dayton peace agreement, which ended the war in Bosnia. Later, asa private citizen, he served as President Clintons Special Envoy to Bosnia

and Kosovo and Special Envoy to Cyprus on a pro-bono basis. From

1993 to 1994, he was U.S. Ambassador to Germany. During the Carter

administration, Ambassador Holbrooke served as Assistant Secretary

of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and was in charge of U.S.

relations with China when Sino-American relations were normalized in

December 1978. He worked on Vietnam at the Johnson White House and

was a member of the American delegation to the Vietnam Peace Talks in


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Paris, France. Ambassador Holbrooke has also served as Vice Chairman

of Credit Suisse First Boston, Managing Director of Lehman Brothers,

Managing Editor of Foreign Policy, and Director of the Peace Corps in

Morocco. He has written numerous articles and two best selling booksTo End a War, a memoir of the Dayton negotiations, and, as co-author,

Counsel to the President, Clark Cliffords memoir. He is Chairman of the

American Academy in Berlin, Germany, Chairman of the Asia Society and

President and CEO of the Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS.


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About the Organizers o the

Riga conereneThe German Marshall Fund of the United States

The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpartisan

American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to promoting

greater cooperation and understanding between the United States and

Europe. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working

on transatlantic issues, by convening leaders to discuss the most pressing

transatlantic themes, and by examining ways in which transatlantic

cooperation can address a variety of global policy challenges. In addition,

GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded

in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall

Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the

Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has

six offices in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, and

Ankara (www.gmfus.org).

The Latvian Transatlantic Organisation

The Latvian Transatlantic Organisation (LATO) is a non-governmental

organization established in March 2000 to promote Latvias full and active

membership in NATO and to work for international security and democracy

in NATO and the EU near neighborhood region. It unites members from

different social groups in terms of age and professional interests. LATO

was established with the objective of facilitating Latvias membership in

NATO. Education and information activities, aimed at increasing public

support for NATO membership, have been carried out. These activities

explained and built public awareness about the principles and values

that unite NATO member states. Since Latvia achieved its main foreign

policy goal of joining the EU and NATO, LATO has continued its work

providing information on international defense and security issues andquestions related to Latvias full participation in NATO. LATO has also


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6

become an active partner in the promotion of democratic values and the

strengthening of civil society in the neighboring region, including Belarus,

Russia, Ukraine and Moldova. The scope of LATO activities is both local

and international. Its activities include conferences, seminars, summerschools and work with partner organizations and mass media. The LATO

Information Center ensures accessibility of information and facilitates

understanding about security and defense policy questions, as well as

encouraging interest in participation in LATO activities.

The Commission of Strategic Analysis

Latvias Commission of Strategic Analysis under the auspices of thePresident of the Republic of Latvia was established on April 2, 2004,

at the initiative of the President of Latvia, Dr. Vaira Ve-Freiberga. Its

founding resolution was jointly signed by the President and the Prime

Minister. The Commissions main goal is to generate a long-term vision

of Latvias development through interdisciplinary and future-oriented

studies. The Commission of Strategic Analysis is a think tank that seeks

to consolidate Latvias scholarly potential for the benefit of Latvias futuredevelopment. It has undertaken research on Latvias opportunities as a

member of the European Union and NATO, along with Latvias place in

global development processes. The Commission also stimulates high-

quality dialogue with the countrys legislative and executive powers, as

well as the general public, on matters that concern Latvias development

and the consolidation of democracy.


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With the support of

The Riga Conference was organized by

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Re-reinventing NATO

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