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archived as http://www.stealthskater.com/Documents/Germ_01.pdf
read more at http://www.stealthskater.com/Science.htm
note: because important websites are frequently "here today but gone tomorrow", the following was
archived from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/weapon/ on February 9, 2007 . This is NOT an
attempt to divert readers from the aforementioned web-site. Indeed, the reader should only
read this back-up copy if it cannot be found at the original author's site.
The Living Weapon PBS / "The American Experience"
In early 1942, shortly after the United States entered World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt
received an alarming intelligence report: Germany and Japan were developing biological weapons for
potential offensive use. In response, the U.S. and its allies rushed to develop their own germ warfare
program, enlisting some of America's most promising scientists in the effort.
This "American Experience" production examines the international race to develop biological
weapons in the 1940s and 1950s, revealing the scientific and technical challenges scientists faced, and
the moral dilemmas posed by their eventual success.
As America's germ warfare program expanded during the Cold War, scientists began to conduct
their own covert tests on human volunteers. The United States continued the development and
stockpiling of biological weapons until President Nixon terminated the program in 1969. "Biological
weapons have massive, unpredictable, and potentially uncontrollable consequences," he told the Nation.
"Mankind already carries in its hands too many of the seeds of its own destruction."
Film Description
A synopsis of the film, plus film credits.
Primary Sources
Air Force charts showing scenarios for using bioweapons.
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Further Reading
A list of books, articles, and Web sites relating to the program topic.
Acknowledgements
Program interviewees and consultants.
[Narrator]: In November 1969, President Richard Nixon made a startling declaration.
[President Nixon (archival)]: The United States of America will renounce the use of any form of deadly
biological weapons that either kill or incapacitate.
[Narrator]: Nixon's announcement was widely acclaimed. Yet few Americans knew that for more than
25 years, the United States had been operating an extensive research program to harness germs
as weapons of mass destruction. Born during a terrible World War, America's bioweapons
program was fueled by fear and insulated with secrecy.
[Matthew Meselson, Biologist]: Biological weapons are designed to kill vast numbers of civilians.
[Jeanne Guillemin, Sociologist]: You couldn't have these programs out in the open because the public
should not know.
[Narrator]: American researchers would enter uncharted territory as they ran an escalating series of
experiments -- ultimately using human subjects.
[Norm Covert, Camp Detrick Historian]: I've read the day-to-day notebooks of the laboratory scientists.
They never reached an end point. They just kept pushing that point farther and farther every day.
[Martin Furmanski, Pathologist]: There is an appeal to these weapons to certain members of the
scientific community, almost being seduced by the dark side.
[Brian Balmer, Author]: It's essentially invisible. You can't see it. You can't hear it. You can't smell it.
[Richard Preston, Author]: A "biological weapon" is alive. What it wants to do is survive and
reproduce itself -- inside a host, the human body.
[Narrator]: On December 9, 1942, the U.S. Government convened a secret meeting at the National
Academy of Sciences in Washington, D.C.
Army officers had urgent questions for an elite group of scientists. America and its allies
were fighting a horrific World War. Intelligence suggested that Germany might soon target
Britain with a terrifying new weapon -- a bomb packed with biological agents.
The meeting was called to respond to a critical British request. Could the Americans create a large-scale
biological warfare program to help their allies? And do it virtually "overnight"?
[Jeanne Guillemin, Sociologist]: If you brought all that we knew about microbiology and infectious
diseases into a military context, you could develop a weapon that would be amazingly effective.
It would be dangerous. It could change the course of the war.
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[Narrator]: Only a few months before, the president of the United States had grappled with the issue of
biological weapons.
"I have been loath to believe that any nation --" Franklin Roosevelt said, "even our present
enemies -- would be willing to loose upon mankind such terrible and inhumane weapons."
Secretary-of-War Henry Stimson thought differently. "Biological warfare is ... dirty
business," he wrote to Roosevelt. "But ... I think we must be prepared."
The President approved the launch of America's biological warfare program. For the first
time, U.S. researchers would be trying to make weapons from the deadliest germs known to
Science.
[Jeanne Guillemin, Sociologist]: Once you're looking at a science not strictly for the benefits that it can
bring but for the damage it can inflict on an enemy, you're in a whole new world.
[Narrator]: Now, at the request of a desperate ally, America was entering a realm lacking clear ethical
limits where Science and secrecy would go hand-in-hand.
As the meeting broke up, the researchers were now warned that anyone who leaked details of
the discussion would face 40 years in prison and a $10,000 fine.
By the time of the Washington meeting, German bombs had been raining down on Britain for
2 years. The English feared that the next bomb might carry a biological payload.
[Jeanne Guillemin, Sociologist]: You can look at the British in 1940. When the Blitz is going on, that's
when they decide that they're going to start a biological weapons program. They are absolutely
at the edge. They're really desperate, and they want to seek any kind of defense that they can.
[Narrator]: In July 1942, Britain began secret trials of unconventional weapons on a small Scottish
island called Gruinard.
[Brian Balmer, Author]: It was picked because of its remoteness. Partly because of reasons of secrecy,
but also partly because there were very few populated areas around the island.
[Narrator]: The British believed they had a weapon that would disperse infectious germs into the air. In
their labs, they had evaluated a handful of lethal agents. Now in the field, they would test the
most promising -- the bacterium that causes the dreaded disease anthrax.
Led by bacteriologist Paul Fildes, the team first considered how far beyond the island wind
might spread the germs. Then they positioned their subjects -- a score of sheep purchased from
local crofters. A scaffolding held a bomb packed with hardy anthrax spores.
[Jeanne Guillemin, Sociologist]: They really have to turn to an agent like anthrax because the anthrax
spore is able to withstand the pressure of an explosion.
[Brian Balmer, Author]: This was an anti-personnel bomb. But, obviously, doing experiments with
humans with anthrax was out of the question.
[Narrator]: Over the next minutes, the cloud of germs passed over the animals.
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For several days, nothing. Then the sheep began to tremble and stagger. Blood oozed from
their bodies shortly before death.
[Brian Balmer, Author]: What Fildes' experience on Gruinard Island had shown was that an anti-
personnel biological bomb could be produced. What it did convince the allies of was that they
had a really potent weapon.
[Narrator]: A potent weapon … but one exceedingly hard to contain.
[Brian Balmer, Author]: The dead sheep were put at the bottom of the cliff with some explosives. The
explosives were let off to bury the sheep. One-or-two of the sheep were blown into the water
and floated away.
[Narrator]: Soon, animals began to die on the mainland. If word of the lethal experiment got out, Fildes
feared that the public would panic.
British security services concocted a story -- Greek sailors had tossed infected carcasses
overboard. The British reimbursed farmers "on behalf of the Greek government."
Fildes had a successful field trial but scant resources. To move into production, the British
would need American help.
[Brian Balmer, Author]: One of the advantages of bringing the U.S. into the research on biological
warfare as far as Britain was concerned was that they didn't have the facilities, the resources, the
money.
[Narrator]: A British politician of the day described the United States as a "gigantic boiler. Once the
fire is lighted under it, there is no limit to the power it can generate."
Fildes had lit the "boiler".
In Spring 1943, American scientists and staff began arriving at a sleepy airstrip in rural
Maryland. Operating under the Army's Chemical Warfare Service, Camp Detrick would
become the Top-Secret enclave for enthusiastic American biowarfare researchers.
[Norm Covert, Camp Detrick Historian]: They were passionate about their science. They were the best in
the Country. If someone said to you, "Here is an unlimited budget, here's all the equipment you
need, tell me which kind of building you want to work in and we'll build it", you would jump at
that opportunity. And that's exactly what they did. But the imperative was that "we need results
very quickly!"
[Narrator]: The American bioweapons program would embody the same security precautions that the
British had adopted.
[Norm Covert, Camp Detrick Historian]: It was the highest level of secrecy. In some cases, there were
only 4-or-5 people who actually knew the extent of what was going on at Camp Detrick.
[Mike Foster, Captain/Chemical Warfare Service]: I remember one time we had a party and somebody said,
"Hey! Lot of bacteriologists here, aren't there?" That was quickly shushed up. We were taught
at Detrick: "Don't talk about Detrick."
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[Matthew Meselson, Biologist]: If an activity is conducted in secret, people who can see the mistakes in
it or the danger in it or the false assumptions in it may not know about it -- even people within
the Government. And therefore, you might embark upon a course which is disastrous.
[Narrator]: Detrick's scientific director was Ira Baldwin, the 47 year old chairman of the Bacteriology
Department at the University of Wisconsin.
In one sense, Baldwin was an unlikely choice to lead the project.
[Norm Covert, Camp Detrick Historian]: He had Quaker roots, a very strict way of living. And their
morality was that war was not the way you do things. You would think that Doctor Baldwin
would have rejected the value of using biological warfare and the ethics of using biological
warfare.
[Narrator]: Like other Detrick scientists, Baldwin struggled over his decision. But then he quickly got
down to work. It was wartime.
[Norm Covert, Camp Detrick Historian]: Not many people today can understand the mindset of 1941
when we were attacked by Japanese. The entire Nation was at war! So we had a real mission to
protect our Nation.
[Mike Foster, Captain/Chemical Warfare Service]: Do I find anything morally wrong with biological
warfare as compared with other warfare? No. I don't see where there's any difference. The
purpose is the same in every case: Kill 'em!
[Jeanne Guillemin, Sociologist]: The people who worked in the biological weapons programs were able
to convince themselves that there was a patriotic reason for doing this work. That the nation-
state would be in danger of not surviving if they did not do this work. They lived in a closed,
moral order.
[Narrator]: The British had made 2 requests. One was for anthrax. Another was for a toxin produced
by bacteria -- botulinum -- the most lethal substance ever discovered.
[Richard Preston, Author]: A person who is poisoned with botulinum toxin develops paralysis.
Doctors can watch it creep through the body. And when the paralysis reaches the center of the
chest, you have a breathing arrest and a heart attack. And you can't be resuscitated.
[Narrator]: The British provided Detrick with the botulinum recipe. Scaling it up was Ira Baldwin's
job. He built a temporary tarpaper shack. Protected by guards armed with machine-guns, it ran
24 hours-a-day, 7 days-a-week.
Researchers tested the deadly toxin on mice. But no one could say exactly what would
happen in human beings.
[Mike Foster, Captain/Chemical Warfare Service]: One milliliter will kill a million mice. Now, how much
would it take to kill a person? I can't answer that. But it's very, very toxic; very potent.
[Narrator]: A special plan provided for staff who might be accidentally killed on the job. They were to
be buried on Detrick's grounds in airtight metal caskets without any report on the cause of death.
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For decades, nations had debated the use of unconventional weapons. In World War I, many
saw Germany's use of chlorine gas -- a chemical weapon -- as an outrageous violation of the
norms of War and a corruption of Science.
[Jeanne Guillemin, Sociologist]: Wonderful things came out of modern chemistry that improved people's
lives. But unfortunately in World War I, you find that a great science can be exploited for
military purposes.
[Narrator]: In 1925 in Geneva, over 30 nations signed a protocol banning first use of unconventional
weapons -- germs and chemicals alike.
[Richard Preston, Author]: A chemical weapon is a poison. And it kills usually very rapidly. A
biological weapon is a microorganism. A biological weapon is alive. And like all other life
forms, what it wants to do is survive and reproduce itself.
[Narrator]: The U.S. signed but didn't ratify the Geneva Protocol -- an agreement which still permitted
research and production of germ weapons.
By the late 1930s as tensions rose in Europe, the door was open to the scientific creation of
new weapons of mass destruction.
[Jeanne Guillemin, Sociologist]: This war coming in 1939, 1940 was envisioned as a war of scientists
against scientists. Whoever had the best scientists was going to win this war.
[Narrator]: In 1944, V-1 rockets launched from Germany pounded London, raising British fears of a
Nazi biological attack.
The fears would prove unfounded. But not before British Prime Minister Winston Churchill
had placed an urgent order with the U.S. for half-a-million anthrax bomblets. "Pray let me know
when they will be available," he wrote. "We should regard it as a first installment."
The British request far exceeded Detrick's capacity. To fill it, Ira Baldwin began converting
an old munitions factory in Vigo, Indiana. The new plant was designed as a gigantic industrial
assembly line that could produce anthrax bacteria by the ton!
Still, critics at the highest levels of American government voiced concerns about the germ
program. Admiral William Leahy -- President Roosevelt's chief of staff -- said that using germ
weapons, "would violate every Christian ethic I have ever heard of and all of the known laws of
War."
But in a time of national crisis, Leahy's objections were not enough to slow the momentum of
the U.S. program.
In December 1944, reports came of a potential germ attack on the United States launched by
Japan. Balloons began to fall from the western skies of North America. Amid worries that the
balloons might contain a biological agent, Detrick dispatched a scientist to one of the crash sites.
The balloons contained only explosives. Still, the incident fueled the fears that kept
America's biological program moving forward.
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By August 1945, the American biological program had spent 60 million dollars. Thousands
of workers at Detrick and satellite facilities had sacrificed over half-a-million experimental
animals while investigating a dozen devastating illnesses. And soon the new Vigo plant would
be ready for its first anthrax run.
But then came surprising news from Japan. As citizens, the biowarfare researchers
celebrated the American victory. But as government scientists, they knew they had a problem.
Another unconventional weapon had proved itself in war.
[Jeanne Guillemin, Sociologist]: After Hiroshima and Nagasaki, biological weapons were put in a kind
of a shadow. They didn't look as powerful or promising as they had before the revelations about
what a nuclear weapon could do.
[Narrator]: Nuclear weapons were now in ascendance. After 3 frantic years, the U.S. biological warfare
program seemed headed for extinction.
Then an unexpected reprieve. Not long after the War's end, the U.S. received unconfirmed
intelligence of biological weapons research conducted by America's wartime ally -- the Soviet
Union.
The looming Cold War would drive the American program for decades to come.
The U.S. germ program was launched in World War II because of reports of German and
Japanese bioweapons research. Now with the war over, America dispatched investigators to
uncover the real extent of its defeated enemies' germ technology.
In Germany, the U.S. had expected to find a large biological program. But no one calculated
that Hitler -- himself wounded in a chemical attack in World War I -- would constrain the
development of a German program.
[Brian Balmer, Author]: As it turned out, the German program was very scattered, and Hitler himself
had given an order very early in the war that there was to be no offensive biological weapons
research.
[Narrator]: But in Japan, Americans were surprised by the ways that germ research surpassed what
wartime intelligence had suggested.
The name of one officer and physician kept coming up. One informant called him "the germ
man." Another said his entire career "starts with germs and ends with germs." He was Shiro
Ishii -- the driving force behind Japan's secret biological weapons program.
Ishii was interrogated by Detrick investigators in May 1947. And what came out exceeded
anything the British or Americans had imagined. Detrick researchers could now piece together
the story of Japan's no-holds-barred germ warfare program.
Its headquarters was a facility called "Unit 731" in a Japanese-controlled region of China.
The site housed 3,000 Japanese personnel and included labs, a Shinto temple, a cinema, and a
brothel.
Like his Allied counterparts, Ishii understood the need for the utmost secrecy. He operated
under a cover as "Chief of the Water Purification and Epidemic Corps."
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[Jeanne Guillemin, Sociologist]: He had tremendous access to human subjects -- mostly peasant Han
Chinese. He would just pick people up out of their homes or off the street and bring them in and
keep them captive. Then he also would perform on them really atrocious experiments equal to
anything that was ever conducted in the Nazi death camps.
[Martin Furmanski, Pathologist]: The human experiments always ended in death. Even those who
recovered from the disease were killed so that their autopsies could be completed and added to
the files. They sought the scientific information so avidly, they often did the autopsy before the
patient died so that the tissues would be perfectly fresh.
If you look at the number of people who were murdered in the facility in experiments, there
were at least 3,000 -- and more likely closer to 10,000 people.
[Narrator]: Ishii and his team infected people with germs causing plague, cholera, dysentery and
typhoid. But they had a preferred lethal agent.
[Jeanne Guillemin, Sociologist]: They conducted human subjects experiments with anthrax -- something
that the United States and the United Kingdom scientists may have theorized but they had never
brought themselves to that actuality.
[Richard Preston, Author]: If you inhale anthrax spores into your lungs, you can come down with
pulmonary anthrax. It's a very bad disease that is very hard to survive.
Your lungs fill up with fluid. Your skin turns blue. The lymph nodes inside the chest can
swell up to the size of tennis balls and can rupture. It's a very painful, grizzly death.
[Narrator]: The Japanese experiments were not just confined to the laboratory. They also took place in
Chinese cities.
[Martin Furmanski, Pathologist]: One of the weapons that Ishii developed were fleas that had been
infected with the plague bacterium. These were released from airplanes and dropped over
Chinese cities.
[Narrator]: Outside Ishii's compounds, thousands of Chinese were infected with Black Death and other
diseases spread by Japan's forces. The extent of Ishii's experiments amazed the American
investigators.
[Jeanne Guillemin, Sociologist]: The more they learned about the Japanese program, the more they
wanted to know about the Japanese program. The work that the Japanese did was beyond the
experience of those American scientists.
[Narrator]: The Japanese had crossed an ethical line.
[Martin Furmanski, Pathologist]: All of the work in America had been done on animals. The Japanese
data was a proof test. It showed that such a weapon could kill people.
[Narrator]: Ishii had kept what appeared to be meticulous records including autopsy diagrams and
microscope slides of human tissue.
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In exchange for his human data, Ishii wanted immunity from war crimes prosecution for
himself and his colleagues. His case came to the top allied commander in post-war Japan --
General Douglas MacArthur.
He took the matter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They gave MacArthur a free hand but
stressed the importance of hiding biowarfare information from the Soviets. By early 1948, the
U.S. understood that it was fighting a Cold War with its former ally. Americans saw the Soviet
Union -- already in control of Eastern Europe -- as a ruthless nation in pursuit of unconventional
weapons.
That March, MacArthur formally approved a highly secret deal with Ishii.
In Nuremberg, Germany, Nazi doctors had been convicted and hanged. The Tokyo War
Crimes trial would play out differently.
Not a single biowarfare case was prosecuted.
[Martin Furmanski, Pathologist]: The immunity deal was a disgrace. The Japanese workers deserved to
be tried for their war crimes. If that had happened, there would have been a precedent against
such things.
[Narrator]: Detrick researchers considered the deal helpful for the American germ program. It put
unique human data in their hands. It suppressed testimony that might have encouraged Soviet
scientists. And it offered something else just as important.
[Jeanne Guillemin, Sociologist]: The United States got secrecy around its own program. Think of it: if
the Japanese scientists had been prosecuted in Tokyo, the World would have reacted with such
horror that it would have been very difficult for Americans to move forward with an offensive
biological weapons program.
[Narrator]: But thanks to the deal, the program was advancing once again. And faster than ever!
In the early years of the Cold War, many Americans -- and Detrick workers in particular --
feared the worst from the Soviets.
[Bill Patrick, Microbiologist]: We felt very strongly that the Soviet Union had a very strong program in
biological warfare and that we were putting our lives at risk to work with all these nasty
organisms.
[Narrator]: The U.S. military concluded it had to make plans despite not knowing if the Soviets really
had germ weapons.
[Matthew Meselson, Biologist]: If they do, do you need them yourself? If you had no nuclear weapons, I
think the decision would have been that "we'd better have a biological capability". And we
would be in bad shape if we found out that they did and had nothing of that sort ourselves.
[Narrator]: Because the U.S. still had few nuclear bombs, germ weapons got a boost.
[Martin Furmanski, Pathologist]: The biological weapons program was able to step up and at least claim
that it could provide a weapon of mass destruction that would augment the atomic arsenal.
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[Narrator]: With the American biological warfare program ramping up, Detrick researchers had high
hopes for the human data from Japan.
But they were deeply disappointed.
[Martin Furmanski, Pathologist]: It turned out that Shiro Ishii was not the kind of scientist they wanted.
What they wanted was a scientist who would tell them how many airborne bacteria would infect
people a half-a-mile downwind. But there was nothing like this in the Japanese documents.
[Narrator]: The U.S. had let war criminals go free in exchange for junk science!
American bioweapons researchers now came to a sobering realization. If they wanted
reliable human data, they would have to get it themselves.
On a sticky August day in 1949, technicians from Detrick visited the Pentagon on a secret
mission. Disguised as maintenance workers, they used "simulants" -- non-infectious bacteria --
to assess the vulnerability of people inside large buildings to attack. Only a few of the
Pentagon's employees were aware of the test. A technical success, the undercover Pentagon trial
on unsuspecting personnel revealed the threat -- and promise -- of germs for sabotage.
But the American biological program had ambitions beyond workers in buildings.
[Matthew Meselson, Biologist]: The characteristic of biological weapons is the ability to cover very
large areas with windborne disease organisms. Automatically that tells you that if there is any
utility to biological weapons, it lies in the attack of civilians.
[Jeanne Guillemin, Sociologist]: This is a great change in notions of conducting war, waging war in the
20th
Century. You have to start thinking of the enemy civilian as aiding and abetting the enemy -
- as part and parcel of the aggression that you're trying to overcome. So your victory may
depend greatly on the killing of civilians.
[Martin Furmanski, Pathologist]: A series of tests were done on American cities. There was still some
doubt that biological weapons could be effective against a target the size of a city.
[Narrator]: An early trial took place in San Francisco in September 1950. Outside the Golden Gate
Bridge, a Navy ship sailed a carefully charted course. It released a plume of simulant bacteria
that dispersed like anthrax germs.
If the test had been real, most of San Francisco's 800,000 residents would have been exposed
to anthrax and a large number would have been infected.
3 years later as the Cold War raged on, American planners took their secret exercises into the
American heartland. In St. Louis and Minneapolis -- 2 cities thought to resemble potential
Soviet targets -- sprayers hidden in cars dispersed invisible clouds of simulants.
U.S. citizens knew almost nothing about the American germ program. Nor did most of their
representatives in Washington. Every year, the House Appropriations Committee approved
biowarfare spending within the defense budget. However, only a few selected congressmen
were briefed on the details in closed meetings.
What the American public was told was how to respond to a biological attack.
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[Actor 1, "What You Should Know About Biological Warfare (archival)"]:
Biological warfare? What do they expect me to do about it? It's not my
headache.
[Narrator, "What You Should Know About Biological Warfare (archival)"]:
You're wrong. You had better find out the facts about biological warfare or BW!
[Actor 2, "What You Should Know About Biological Warfare (archival)"]:
There's a new poison. One ounce can kill all the people in the United States!
[Actress, "What You Should Know About Biological Warfare (archival)"]:
Germ warfare can wipe out an entire city!
[Narrator]: In a period of escalating Cold War tensions, Americans were encouraged by their
government to prepare for a germ assault by a ruthless Soviet enemy thousands-of-miles away.
Few were aware of what the U.S. had already done within its own borders. Fewer still knew
what was coming next.
In 1954, a group of American servicemen -- all volunteers -- began participating in a series of
experiments at Detrick. They stepped up to a new testing facility. The "8-ball" was a million-
liter sphere, --the largest known aerosol testing chamber in the World. Inside, a sprayer or bomb
set up a cloud of microbes.
The human subjects were Seventh Day Adventists. As "conscientious objectors", they
refused to carry arms. But 2,200 of them -- called the "Whitecoats" -- agreed to serve in
experiments including inhaling germs they knew might make them sick.
All human studies were approved by the Secretary of Defense.
[Martin Furmanski, Pathologist]: The Seventh Day Adventists presented an ideal population for testing
biological weapons. Their religious beliefs prevented them from smoking, drinking, and in
general, their religion taught them to live a healthy lifestyle. Even among healthy Army recruits,
they were perhaps the healthiest.
[Narrator]: Some Whitecoat trials evaluated new vaccines developed at Detrick. But curing disease
was not the primary goal of the studies.
[Martin Furmanski, Pathologist]: The Adventists were told that they were undergoing these experiments
in order to save lives. But in fact, they were undergoing the experiments in order to calibrate a
weapon to take lives.
[Narrator]: Bill Patrick helped prepare the germs inhaled by the Whitecoats.
[Bill Patrick, Microbiologist]: You stick your nose into a hood that's attached to a tank. You don't smell
it and you don't see it. The psychological impact of this, I think, would be very, very difficult to
take.
[Narrator]: In the Whitecoat era, Detrick scientists worked with a wider variety of germs.
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[Richard Preston, Author]: The American biowarfare program seemed to emphasize research into non-
lethal biological weapons -- weapons that wouldn't necessarily make an enemy soldier dead but
would make that person pig-sick for a long time.
A sick soldier is more damaging to an Army than a dead soldier. If a soldier is killed, all
you need to do is just leave the soldier and continue with the campaign. But an ill soldier is
going to require several people to take care of that person.
[Narrator]: Hundreds of Whitecoats would eventually inhale germs including those causing tularemia
and sandfly fever. At least half of the exposed men became sick. But all eventually recuperated.
Researchers knew that it's one thing to test disease agents in the lab but quite another to make
them work on the battlefield. So in 1955, Detrick scientists prepared for America's first outdoor
test of infectious germs on human subjects.
They arranged for a group of Whitecoats to be flown to Utah.
[Lloyd Long, Whitecoat Volunteer]: I know that they were not intentionally going to harm us in any way,
that they had our best interests at heart.
You have to remember we're 18-, 19-year-old kids. It was all kind of a big adventure.
[Narrator]: The site chosen for the experiment was the Dugway Proving Ground located on a remote
stretch of desert.
At the end of a July day, scientists prepared to release an aerosol of germs that cause Q fever
-- a debilitating infection.
Downwind, Whitecoats waited. A half-mile line of platforms held 30 men, 300 hundred
guinea pigs, and 75 monkeys.
[Lloyd Long, Whitecoat Volunteer]: The monkey's faces were blue. It was cold. The wind was coming
right at us. I took my blanket and I put it over the monkeys.
We knew that when the siren blew, this was the signal to get up, sit on the stool, face the
wind, and just breathe naturally.
[Narrator:] It took 4 minutes for the infectious cloud to reach the test stands. After the trials, men,
monkeys, and guinea pigs sat in the silence of the desert.
45 minutes later, the Whitecoats were picked up. Their contaminated clothes were
incinerated and the men boarded a flight to return to Maryland that night.
Back at Detrick, the Whitecoats passed the time as the researchers waited to see if they'd
come down with Q fever.
[Lloyd Long, Whitecoat Volunteer]: They had all kinds of activities for us to do. We could eat. We
played games. We had ping-pong. We shot pool.
[Narrator:] After about 2 weeks, most of the exposed men began to fall ill.
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[Lloyd Long, Whitecoat Volunteer]: I woke up feeling I was coming down with the worst case of flu that I
ever had. My eyes were very, very sensitive to light. I wanted the room dark. I ached
everywhere. I was just incredibly sick -- just very, very sick!
[Narrator:] The ill men took antibiotics. Though one was hospitalized for months, all of the Whitecoats
recovered.
With the cooperation of Seventh Day Adventists, researchers had proved that windborne
germs could infect a small group of people under field conditions. Now with the help of
monkeys, they would try to determine if a biological weapon could match the impact of a
hydrogen bomb.
The tests began early in 1965 as barges took position near a Pacific atoll called Johnston.
[Richard Preston, Author]: Inside the barges were cages filled with monkeys. The monkeys were both
on the deck of the barge and inside the hold of the barge. There were also human beings wearing
space suits and probably quite nervous.
[Narrator]: A low-flying military plane sprayed a 32-mile line of germs that cause a lethal disease --
tularemia or rabbit fever. Drifting over a vast swath of ocean, the microbes remained infectious
for 60 miles.
[Richard Preston, Author]: The barges were towed back to the island. And in the next days, the
monkeys became ill. Ultimately, about half of the monkeys became sick and -- of those -- most
of them died.
[Bill Patrick, Microbiologist]: These large-scale field tests demonstrated -- beyond any shadow of a doubt
-- the feasibility of biological warfare. And that is why we know that one particular agent --
when properly stabilized and properly disseminated -- is a terrific, very effective weapon system.
[Richard Preston, Author]: In theory, a single jet could knock out a city. It could perhaps infect as
many as half the people in Los Angeles with tularemia.
[Narrator]: Though skeptics said the results were oversold, Detrick researchers were jubilant. After 20
years of hard work, they believed they had made the case that biological weapons deserved a
place in the U.S. arsenal.
In fact, they may have succeeded too well.
[Richard Preston, Author]: I think it frightened the U.S. Government. It was relatively easy to make
biological weapons, relatively easy to disperse them. It wasn't as difficult by any means as
building a hydrogen bomb. There was a thinking here that we don't really want to publicize how
powerful these weapons are. Because all we're really doing is proving to the rest of the World
that biological weapons work.
[Narrator]: Even as the trials were being conducted in the Pacific, other events were casting all
unconventional weapons in a negative light.
14
News stories broke about the American use of tear gas in Vietnam -- the first combat use of a
chemical weapon by the U.S. since World War I. America was also spraying a chemical
defoliant tested at Detrick -- Agent Orange.
Public protest erupted.
[Reporter (archival)]: Do you think germ warfare would be justified in Vietnam if it
shortened the war and saved the lives of U.S. servicemen?
[Protestor (archival)]: I feel that the best way to save lives of U.S. servicemen is to pull
them out of Vietnam immediately.
[Narrator:] Adding to the controversy, a news story in February 1969 disclosed an accident at the
Army's Dugway Proving Ground. At a nearby Utah ranch, an errant cloud of nerve gas was
claimed to have killed 6,000 sheep.
[Civilian (archival)]: The Army finally admitted that they had conducted experiments in the
area with nerve gas agents.
[Military officer (archival)]: There are too many confusing aspects. We have been working
in this area for 25 years in this particular part of this country. And we have never
done anything to damage the surrounding area. If we are the cause of this, we have
a problem.
[Narrator]: For critics, the incident strengthened the argument that unconventional weapons of all types
could not be controlled. For biowarfare researchers, it reinforced the need for secrecy
established long ago at Gruinard Island. Germ weapons programs could not survive the
sunlight of public scrutiny.
In Washington, President Richard Nixon was feeling the mounting political pressure. His
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger ordered a full review of American chemical and
biological weapons policy in May 1969.
Among the invited contributors was Harvard biologist Matthew Meselson. Meselson had
been pushing for a re-assessment of America's unconventional weapons strategy. Working for
the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, he had visited Fort Detrick.
[Matthew Meselson, Biologist]: I asked my hosts what value they saw in these weapons. And the main
answer I got back was that it would save money, that it was cheaper than nuclear weapons. I was
amazed at this answer. It took a little thought -- but not much -- to realize that to pioneer a cheap
weapon of mass destruction is exactly what the United States should never do.
[Narrator]: Kissinger presented Nixon with Meselson's brief, arguing that biological weapons were
redundant with nuclear weapons and easier for poor countries to make.
The U.S. had been developing biological warfare since World War II. Now, the president's
advisors undercut the weapons: they had a short shelf life, they were sensitive to weather, and
germs might get out of control.
On November 25, 1969, Nixon surprised the World.
15
[President Nixon (archival)]: Biological warfare -- which is commonly called "germ
warfare." This has massive unpredictable and potentially uncontrollable
consequences. It may produce global epidemics and profoundly affect the health of
future generations. Therefore, I have decided that the United States of America will
renounce the use of any form of deadly biological weapons that either kill or
incapacitate. Mankind already carries in its own hands too many of the seeds of its
own destruction.
[Martin Furmanski, Pathologist]: Nixon was under great pressure to do something. And disavowing
biological weapons was an easy bone to throw to his critics.
[Narrator:] Nixon had killed the American offensive biological weapons program after nearly 3 decades
of secret work.
[Richard Preston, Author]: It enabled us to take the moral high ground and to say "We've ended our
program. And other countries should do the same."
[Matthew Meselson, Biologist]: I thought that the decision he made was historic. It was good for the
United States and -- even better -- good for all of Humanity.
[Narrator:] In 1975, the U.S. finally ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning first use of germ
weapons.
And a new international agreement went further -- prohibiting the development and
possession of germ weapons. The Biological Weapons Convention outlawed -- for the first time
in history -- an entire class of weapons.
[Martin Furmanski, Pathologist]: One of the ironies of the United States' biological weapons program
was that it created its own monster. Although it was designed to reduce threats to the United
States, it in fact increased the threats.
[Jeanne Guillemin, Sociologist]: There's something in the military thinking about war and "honor" which
puts biological weapons in a very negative category. It's like dirty weapons, it's like poison. It's
like something that somebody does on the sly who really lacks a sense of honor.
[Matthew Meselson, Biologist]: "We don't fight with poisons. We don't fight with illness. This is alien."
16
Weapons Pioneer
In 1943, Ira Baldwin -- then chair of the Bacteriology Department of the University of Wisconsin --
was appointed by the United States military to lead the nation in the development of biological weapons.
For the rest of World War II while he directed the biological weapons program at Camp Detrick,
Maryland, Baldwin remained a full-time employee of the university. He also joined the nation's
Chemical Corps Advisory Council and served as a consultant to the CIA.
Baldwin returned to Wisconsin and served as a professor of Bacteriology, dean of the Graduate
School, dean of the College of Agriculture, and vice president of Academic Affairs and continued to
advise the U.S. military during the Cold War. When the university began an oral history program,
Baldwin became its 4th
interview subject in a series of conversations with Donna Taylor Hartshorne in
1974; additional recordings were made in 1985 and 1987. In 1999 at the age of 103, Ira Baldwin died in
his home in Tucson, Arizona.
Listen to Baldwin's candid recollections on the process of developing biological
weaponry as a civilian researcher.
Justifications for Biological Weaponry
"The immorality of war is war itself."
Safety Measures
"We developed many new techniques to handle things much more safely."
Civilian Command
"I wasn't even on the payroll of the Department of Defense."
Ira Baldwin at
the University of
Wisconsin, 1948
17
America's Bioweapons Program
On November 18, 1941 at the National Academy of Sciences in Washington, D.C., United States
Secretary-of-War Henry Stimson convened a committee to investigate the threat of biological warfare.
Over the next year, this committee catalogued a myriad selection of possible biological and germ
warfare agents.
In June 1942, they issued their recommendation to the War Bureau of Consultants: "In biological
warfare, the best defense is offense and the threat of offense." While American forces were entrenched
in the Pacific and European theaters, scientists began developing and testing biological weapons on the
homefront -- classified programs that would continue after the end of WWII and into the Cold War.
Find some of the declassified United States biological weapons program sites on this map.
WWII Weapons Production
Secured Area Tests
Public Airborne Tests
Large Airborne Tests
Biological Weapons production and Testing
Special Ops team
Project 112
WWII Weapons Production In November 1942, the head of Britain's biological weapons program Paul Fildes traveled to
Washington, D.C., to seek assistance from the U.S. in the production of biowarfare agents for
Britain.
Special Projects Division Production Facility / Vigo, Indiana 1944-1946
18
Biological Agent: Bacillus anthracis, Bacillus globigii
In May 1944, the Army's Special Projects Division converted a munitions plant to produce
anthrax spores for bombs: half for the British military, half for the U.S. At the end of World War II,
the Army shut down the Vigo plant before it ever went beyond the testing stage.
Horn Island Chemical Warfare Service Quarantine Center / Pascagoula, Mississippi 1943-1945
Biological Agent: Clostridium botulinum
On October 29, 1943, the Army opened this testing facility on this isolated island off the
southern coast of Mississippi. Scientists detonated 4-pound bombs filled with botulinum toxin over
guinea pigs confined in boxes, but only one died from inhalation of the botulinum (others died from
licking the botulinum off of their fur). By 1945. the Army closed the facility.
Camp Detrick / Frederick, Maryland 1943-1945
Biological Agent: Clostridium botulinum
On March 9, 1943, the Army took over this site from the Maryland National Guard to house their
chemical warfare personnel who were soon joined by their biological warfare counterparts. The first
order of business at Camp Detrick was the production of botulinum for the British. Production
operations shut down at the end of World War II. But the "camp" was renamed Fort Detrick and
continued to house the headquarters of the biological weapons program.
Secured Area Tests Even though World War II had ended -- and the atomic bomb had been added into the U.S. military
arsenal -- America's biological warfare program continued.
Granite Peak Installation / Dugway Proving Ground, Utah 1945
Biological Agent: VKA (vegetable killer acid)
The Army established a massive chemical weapons testing facility in the Utah desert in 1942. In
January 1945 after spending $1.3 million, they converted an area of the site for biological weapons
testing. One weapon tested was a 91-pound bomb containing vegetable killer acid that could be used
to destroy Japanese rice crops. The facility was shut down at the close of World War II.
Suffield Experimental Station, Area E / Alberta, Canada 1944
Biological Agent: Brucella suis
Army scientists from Camp Detrick field tested 4-pound bombs filled with Brucella suis in this
remote Canadian test site, jointly established by Canada and Britain in 1941 for chemical weapons
testing and later adapted for biological tests.
Public Airborne Tests In October 1948, Ira Baldwin -- the chairman of the United States' Committee on Biological Warfare
-- issued a report detailing the threat of covert biological threats on American soil. In May 1949, the
Army established their own covert group at Camp Detrick -- the Special Operations Division -- to
test the vulnerability of American targets and the effectiveness of biological warfare.
The Pentagon / Arlington, Virginia August 1949
Biological Agent: Serratia marcescens
John Schwab -- chief of Camp Detrick's Special Operations Division -- persuaded Pentagon
officials to allow his group to conduct a covert test of the building's defense against biological
attack. Small groups of operatives set up fake "air pollution tests" in the hallways spraying Serratia
marcescens, a harmless bacteria. The ventilation system distributed the bacteria efficiently
throughout the building.
19
Atlantic Ocean near Hampton, Virginia / April 1950
Biological Agents: Serratia marcescens and Bacillus globigii
Camp Detrick's Special Operations Division coordinated the large scale spraying of microbe
spores from the decks of the USS Coral Sea and the USS K. D. Bailey. The clouds of spores --
chosen for their similarity to the anthrax spore -- blew in from the ocean into the cities of Hampton,
Norfolk and Newport News.
Pacific Ocean near San Francisco, California / September 1950
Biological Agents: Serratia marcescens & Bacillus globigii
Camp Detrick's Special Operations Division repeated their offshore tests later the same year off
the coast of San Francisco. This time, they added clouds of fluorescent particles to the mix which
would appear visible when exposed to ultraviolet light. The entire population of the city was
exposed to the simulants and traces of the sprayed particles were found 23 miles inland.
St Jo Program / St. Louis, Minneapolis, Winnipeg January - September 1953
Biological Agent: Bacillus globigii
In the early 1950s, the Army established the St Jo Munitions Expenditure Panel to test the
effectiveness of biological aerosol attacks on urban environments. Camp Detrick scientists
dispersed simulants from the top of automobiles in St. Louis, Minneapolis and Winnipeg -- all
selected based on their similarities to particular Soviet cities.
Large Airborne Tests
Seeking to incorporate meteorological understanding of "large air masses" that regularly swept over
the continent into their distribution tests, the Army embarked on large scale airborne biological tests
in 1957.
Operation Large Area Coverage / South Dakota to Minnesota; Ohio to Texas; Michigan to Kansas
via Illinois December 1957
Agent: Zinc Cadmium Sulfide
Building on the airborne tests conducted off the coasts of Virginia and California, the Army
tested the dispersal of particles over huge swaths of the Country. Using planes loaned from the Air
Force, 3 separate tests dumped large clouds of simulant over the continental United States with some
particles traveling over 1,000 miles. These tests proved that a single plane equipped with biological
weapons could devastate an entire continent.
Biological Weapons production and Testing
In the early 1950s, the Army's biological weapons program began developing and testing actual
weapons to be deployed.
"8-ball" Tests /Camp Detrick Frederick, Maryland 1949-1951
Biological Agents: Pasteurella tularensis, Brucella suis, Bacillus anthracis.
Herbert G. Tanner -- the head of Camp Detrick's Munitions division -- envisioned an enclosed
environment where biological tests could be conducted on site, rather than at remote places like
Dugway and Horn Island. The result was the "8-ball" -- a 4-story high, 131-ton other-worldly
sphere that could withstand the internal detonation of "hot" biological bombs without risk to
outsiders. Live animals were inserted into the ball along with biowarfare bombs for exposure tests.
M33/Brucella Cluster Bomb Field Tests /Dugway Proving Ground, Utah August, 1952
Biological Agent: Brucella suis
Having perfected a true biological weapon with the aid of the "8-ball", the Army set about
conducting a field test. In 1952, scientists constructed a mock city at the Dugway Proving Ground
20
with plywood houses and over 3,000 guinea pigs set up in cages. On August 9, an Air Force B-50
bomber flying from Florida dropped several cluster bombs -- each containing over 100 biological
bombs -- on a well-marked bullseye in the center of "town". The official report concluded that
atomic bombs were much more devastating, deadly, and efficient than the Brucella bombs.
Directorate of Biological Operations Pine Bluff Arsenal / Pine Bluff, Arkansas 1953-
Biological Agents: Bacillus anthracis, Francisella tularensis, Brucella suis, Coxiella burnetii,
Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus, Clostridium botulinum, Staphylococcal enterotoxin B
In 1953 the Army converted an arsenal -- originally built in 1941 to store chemical weapons -- to
manufacture and stockpile biological weapons. The Army continued to produce and store biological
agents at Pine Bluff until President Richard Nixon discontinued America's biological weapons
program in 1969. The Army's cleanup effort took over 2½ years at a cost of over $10 million.
Project CD-22 Human Test / Dugway Proving Ground, Utah July 12, 1955
Biological Agent: Coxiella burnetii (Q fever)
In the mid-1950s, the Army began testing biological weapons on live human test subjects:
Seventh Day Adventist Army volunteers. 30 volunteers participated in the first test of Project CD-
22 (also known as "Project Whitecoat") along with dozens of rhesus monkeys and guinea pigs.
Instead of a cluster bomb drop, the Army sprayed microbes upwind from the test subjects. Some of
the subjects did contract Q fever. They were effectively treated with antibiotics.
Special Ops team
In the early 1950s, the Army's biological weapons program began developing and testing actual
weapons to be deployed.
Greyhound Bus Terminal; Washington National Airport / Washington, D.C. May 1965
Biological Agent: Bacillus globigii
Special Operations agents entered these high volume transportation hubs armed with specially
outfitted briefcases to spray an anthrax simulant. Other agents -- armed with briefcases containing
vacuum pumps -- took samples from various points within the locations.
New York City Subway / New York, New York June 1966
Biological Agent: Unknown simulant
Teams from Detrick's Special Operations division descended into the New York City subway
system with a new delivery mechanism -- a light bulb filled with powdered simulant. Agents
dropped the light bulbs between moving cars, creating a cloud of simulant that was pushed through
the tunnels by each succeeding train. Other agents equipped with quiet "Mighty Mite" vacuum
samplers tested the effectiveness of the transmission at various points throughout the subway system.
Project 112
In 1961, Secretary-of-Defense Robert McNamara created Project 112 -- one of dozens of projects --
to test the effectiveness of biological and chemical weapons in warfare. Under this directive, the
Army began conducting larger scale tests in remote locations outside of the continental United
States.
Deseret Test Center --Fort Douglas, Utah 1962 - 1973
In May 1962, the Army established a new center for biological warfare studies at Fort Douglas,
Utah named the Deseret Test Center. The facility was used to organize and deploy dozens of large
scale remote tests in areas including Alaska, Panama, Hawaii, remote areas of Canada and the
Pacific Ocean. The Army closed the Deseret Test Center in 1973.
Project SHAD
21
Project SHAD ("Shipboard Hazard and Defense") was a group of tests conducted in remote
waters, most in the Pacific Ocean. In some tests, biological agents or simulants were released from
the decks of warships and their spread was monitored from other ships. In other tests, aircraft
sprayed materials over animals on ships or islands.
22
Diseases As Weapons
Glossary
Disease -- A distressed condition of a biological system in reaction to external stimuli -- such as
infection by bacteria or virus -- and characterized by a set of identifiable symptoms.
Bacteria -- One-celled organisms that can replicate themselves.
Virus -- Genetic material that needs to invade a cell in order to replicate.
Bacterium vs. Virus -- A single bacterium can be grown to the desired amounts whereas a virus
requires a host organism to be grown to large quantities. Both bacteria and
viruses are considered "agents" of a disease.
Weaponize -- Creating an aerosol or other form that would spread and infect people easily through
ingestion, inhalation, or skin contact.
Reservoirs -- Organisms that host the agent in nature -- the natural environment of the germ, which
often causes no harm to its host. The reservoir determines whether a disease could ever
be fully controlled and in the case of viruses, suggests the medium required to make more
of the agent. Natural reservoirs could also be used to spread a disease -- dropping a rat
infected with plague into a city, for example.
Categories for Bioweapons Agents (as defined by the Center for Disease Control)
Category A - Agents that spread easily and have a high mortality rate.
Category B - Agents that spread moderately and have lower death rates.
Category C - New, possibly genetically engineered diseases.
Anthrax
Bacteria Bacillus anthracis
Category A
Reservoir cows, sheep, goats and others; spores live for decades in the earth
Transmission skin contact, inhalation or ingestion
The cycle of anthrax transmission typically begins
when grazing animals eat infected soil. It can then be
passed on to humans who consume meat contaminated
with Bacillus antracis, inhale dust while rendering
hides, or come in skin contact. Cutaneous (skin)
anthrax first appears as a bump on the skin that soon
ulcerates. Inhalation anthrax is typically flu-like at
first, but rapidly progresses into difficult breathing and
shock. Mortality rates for untreated cases range from
20% for skin anthrax to nearly 100% for inhalation.
While early treatment with antibiotics can work, the
shock late-stage anthrax cases are usually fatal.
See a photograph of a victim of anthrax (i.e, not caused
by weaponry. Be advised -- it is a graphic image.
23
Anthrax is quite rare in the U.S. with only a handful of cases over one 21 period. Inhalation anthrax
in particular has typically been limited to industries that handle dead animal wool or skin. Its occurrence
is more common in developing countries. Anthrax spores can be extremely difficult to eradicate,
lingering in soil for up to 70 years. They are also heat resistant, another factor that made them attractive
to wartime scientists.
During World War II, Paul Fildes supervised the making of 5 million linseed cakes contaminated
with anthrax bacterial spores for possible use against German livestock. When the War ended, the U.S.
was beginning work on the production of a million anthrax bombs. The actual application of anthrax
bacterial spores for weapons use has been quite rare -- one tragic case being the attacks during the fall of
2001 that utilized envelopes containing anthrax bacterial spores which infected 22 people in the U.S.
and caused 5 deaths.
Botulism
Bacteria Clostridium botulinum
Category A
Transmission Injestion
Botulinum toxin -- among the most deadly
substances in the World -- was one of the first agents
considered for use as a biological weapon. An ounce
has the potential to kill everyone on Earth.
The toxin causes botulism, which is today quite
rare with about 110 cases reported annually in the
United States. The vast majority arise from the
consumption of contaminated home-canned foods like
green beans and corn. Infants are also susceptible to
botulism if they eat honey.
Left unchecked, botulism presents with muscle
paralysis and respiratory failure. Treatment is often the
administration of an antitoxin and -- in severe cases --
use of a breathing machine until the patient's lungs can
function once more. (The muscle paralysis is exploited when botox -- a form of the toxin -- is used for
cosmetic applications.)
Current death rates from botulism are under 10%. But in the World War II era, more than half of
patients died. That made it appear attractive for weapons use to scientists like Paul Fildes. But
botulinum toxin (called "Agent X" by the Allies) was difficult to produce in the large quantities. And
the aerosol form necessary for widespread use is unstable. Although the first production order placed by
the British for Camp Detrick was 7 pounds of dried botulinum toxin, field tests conducted by the
Americans at Horn Island were a notable failure and the Army concluded that botulinum toxin would
likely not be a good bioweapon agent.
See a photograph of a wound complicated by
botulism (i.e, not caused by weaponry. Be
advised -- it is a graphic image.
24
Brucellosis
Bacteria Brucella suis
Category B
Reservoir cows, sheep, pigs, camels and others
Transmission Injestion
This lesser-known disease agent became a staple of
the United States biological weapons program in the
1950s. Like anthrax bacteria, Brucella bacteria are
spread to humans by infected animals or animal
products -- often through the ingestion of
unpasteurized milk and cheese.
Unlike anthrax, brucellosis has a very low
mortality rate -- around 2 percent. It can, nonetheless,
incapacitate its victims with waves of flu-like
symptoms for months.
Today brucellosis strikes from 100-200 people a
year in America and is treated with antibiotics. But it
remains a much more widespread problem elsewhere in
the World. Though not readily passed from human-to-human, brucellosis is very infectious. A high
percentage of people exposed to its bacteria are likely to come down with the disease.
The Brucella bacteria are fairly easy to grow. To U.S. planners in the early Cold War years,
Brucella bacteria therefore appeared an effective yet "humane" biological weapon. In 1952, the first
large-scale field tests began at Utah's Dugway Proving Ground. That summer, thousands of guinea
pigs in mock enemy cities were exposed to Brucella bacteria bombing runs, leading one general to
remark, "Now we know what to do if we ever go to war against guinea pigs."
Results were favorable enough to officially add Brucella bacteria to the U.S. arsenal. But there was
a key production problem. The bacteria decayed completely in a few months. So empty bomb casings
had to be prepared and a facility made ready to produce large quantities of the agent at a moment's
notice. Such a facility was completed in December 1953 in Pine Bluff, Arkansas and the Army
eventually assembled more than 2.5 million empty bomb casings.
Q Fever
Bacteria Coxiella burnetii
Category B
Reservoir cows, sheep, goatshers
Transmission inhalation of animal products
Q Fever -- named for its discovery in Queensland, Australia in the 1930s -- makes victims very sick
with flu-like symptoms (fever, sort throat, headache, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea among others). Only
fif50ty percent of those infected with the C. burnetii bacteria show any symptoms. And of those who
do, the fatality rate is about 4%. The bacteria lives in domestic livestock and can be transmitted to
humans through inhalation of barnyard dust.
See a photograph of a victim of brucellosis (i.e,
not caused by weaponry.
25
Q fever can be treated with antibiotics and an
effective vaccine has been developed, primarily for
people who work with animals. The ability to treat Q
fever and its low morbidity are 2 reasons why the U.S.
made it a staple of the human testing conducted in
Operation Whitecoat.
Smallpox
Bacteria variola
Category A
Reservoir humans
Transmission bodily fluids
Smallpox was the first biological weapon used in
America when British soldiers gave infected blankets
to Native Americans.
Rashes appear on the skin of smallpox victims, the
bumps become pustules -- they feel like there is a
small object under the skin -- and then the pustules
scab and fall off. Direct contact with the bodily fluids
of infected persons or their infected clothing is
necessary for transmission. However, smallpox has
been known to spread in enclosed environments where
the air is re-circulated.
Smallpox was weaponized by the secret Soviet
bioweapons program. Unlike most other bioweapons
agents, smallpox viruses are easily spread from person-
to-person and this -- combined with a mortality rate of about 10% to 30% -- meant it could devastate a
target community.
But smallpox can be prevented by vaccination. In fact, a global public health campaign completely
eliminated smallpox -- a disease that had affected human beings for millennia -- in the United States by
1949. Because human beings are the only natural reservoir for smallpox, after the last known case of the
disease in Somalia in 1977, the disease has been considered eradicated. Regular vaccination for
smallpox is no longer required. Stores of smallpox viruses remain in U.S. and Russian laboratories,
however. And bioterrorism fears have led to recent vaccination campaigns and the stockpiling of
vaccine for potential future use.
See a photograph of a victim of smallpox (i.e.,
not caused by weaponry). Be advised -- it is a
graphic image.
26
Yellow Fever
Bacteria yellow fevera
Category A
Reservoir primates
Transmission mosquitoes
One of the most historically deadly viral
hemorrhagic fevers is yellow fever which killed
thousands of Americans in epidemics that terrified the
Nation. The fatality rate of this disease is around 10-
20%. But because light cases tend to go undetected,
the mortality rate is perceived to be much higher.
Victims of this viral hemorrhagic fever have their
liver attacked (leading to a yellow complexion) and
their clotting mechanisms destroyed. Victims produce
black vomit -- the result of bleeding into their
stomachs -- before dying. Many believed that the
fluids produced in death were the carriers of this virus
until Walter Reed and a U.S. Army team proved that
mosquitoes were the source of infections.
In the 1930s, Japanese agents had tried to purchase strains of the yellow fever virus from the
laboratories of Rockefeller University where a vaccine was being developed. They were unsuccessful.
An American attempt to weaponize yellow fever involved raising hundreds of thousands of
mosquitoes a month at Fort Detrick. Tests included dropping uninfected mosquitoes on Savannah,
Georgia in 1956 to see how far the insects would spread. Technical difficulties in infecting and
maintaining the insects -- and then the development of an effective yellow fever vaccine -- made the
weapons program irrelevant. "Fortunately, this never got beyond the research stage," says Dr. Thomas
Monath, a leading yellow fever researcher.
The last outbreak of yellow fever in the United States occurred in New Orleans in 1905. Recent
American deaths from the disease have involved travelers to tropical Africa or South America -- regions
where yellow fever is still present.
Other viral hemorraghic fevers include Ebola and Marburg viruses which are deadlier because they
can be spread directly from person-to-person without the need for an animal host.
Others
A number of other diseases were considered as part of various bioweapons programs. During World
War II, the Japanese dropped plague-infested fleas from airplanes and caused disease outbreaks in
China. The South African government allegedly released cholera into the water sources of particular
villages. Other diseases that the CDC is keeping a watch on include tularemia and genetically-altered
diseases.
Other biological weapons that would infect food supplies have also been researched.
See a photograph of a victim of yellow fever (i.e.,
not caused by weaponry).
27
See 2 photographs of victims of plague (i.e., not
caused by weaponry).
See a photographs of a victim of cholora (i.e., not
caused by weaponry).
See 2 photographs of a victim of tularemia (i.e.,
not caused by weaponry). Be advised -- it is a
graphic image!
28
People and Events
Paul Fields (1882-1971)
Knight and germ warrior, Sir Paul Fildes ran the biology department at
Britain's secret Porton Down facility and oversaw his country's first attempts
to develop biological weapons.
Becoming a Bacteriologist
Son of a noted painter who had illustrated books by Charles
Dickens, Fildes was born in 1882 in London. As a young
schoolboy, he already displayed a scientific bent -- even drafting a
paper on "The passage of food to the stomach". Although he
entered medical school in 1904 with the intent of focusing on
surgery, Fildes soon moved into bacteriology. After working in a
Royal Navy hospital, he joined Great Britain's Medical Research
Council and became head of its Bacterial Chemistry Unit, editing a
9-volume treatise on the field.
In 1940 with Britain at war with Nazi Germany, a new
biology department was established at Porton Down -- a secret
British facility near Salisbury that had been established in 1916 to deal with the threat of chemical
weapons. Fildes became the head of this department and began conducting
research into offensive biological weapons. One early project dubbed
"Operation Vegetarian" investigated the practicality of dropping linseed
cakes containing anthrax bacterial spores over Germany that would kill any
cattle that ate them. Although Fildes ordered the production of 5 million of
these cakes, they were never used.
Fildes would later claim he participated in another biological warfare
project that did go forward, however. The May 1942 assassination by the
British Secret Service of high-ranking Nazi leader Reinhard Heydrich near
Prague. Heydrich was ambushed and later died of what had appeared to be
minor wounds. Although his claims could not be substantiated, Fildes later
said he "had a hand" in Heydrich's death -- possibly by supplying the
assassins with grenades containing botulinum toxin that were used in the attack.
An experiment being carried out
at the chemical defence
establishment in Porton Down,
Wiltshire, U.K.
Reinhard Heydrick on
a visit to Paris
29
Anthrax Island
Individual grenades were one thing. But llarge-scale biological
weapons another. As Fildes' anthrax experiments continued, he
sensed the need for testing beyond that which could be conducted
near a populated area like Salisbury.
In the summer of 1942, Fildes and his colleagues settled on
Gruinard Island -- a remote 522-acre island off Scotland's northwest
coast -- as a field test site. After the military had bought the island
and declared it off-limits, Fildes' team prepared it to become Great
Britain's first outdoor biological weapons test site.
On July 15, they dropped a bomb filled with anthrax bacterial
spores from a 1-foot wooden gallows about a hundred yards
upwind from a group of 15 sheep, each of whom had been placed in crates with openings for their necks.
The sheep began to present with symptoms of anthrax three days after the test. 13 of the animals
eventually perished. Another similar test was successfully conducted on July 24.
Some months later on September 26, an airplane dropped a bomb filled with anthrax bacterial spores
onto the island. But the bomb became lodged in a bog and thus none of its payload was released.
Fildes' team then repeated that experiment a month later on a beach in Wales and this time it went off
without a hitch. The British now became convinced that they could make anthrax bombs work but
realized they needed help with the large-scale production of anthrax bacteria. For this, they sought
America's help.
Turning to America
The Americans had been slower to investigate biological
weapons than the British. But in terms of industrial capacity,
they had no peer.
In November 1942, Fildes and a colleague arrived in
Washington where they requested that the United States set
up production facilities sufficient to produce large amounts
of anthrax bacterial spores (called "Agent N") and botulinum
toxin ("Agent X"). Their initial order was for 7 pounds of
Agent X, and an American team overseen by Ira Baldwin at
Camp Detrick began working on this in June 1943. They
were able to fulfill this order within a couple of months.
Anthrax Bombs
Not everyone on the British side approved of the mass production of biological weapons. For
example, when they learned of Fildes' activities, 2 members of the Biological Warfare Committee that
oversaw Porton Down raised strenuous objections. But they were overruled by Prime Minister Winston
Churchill who in March 1944 ordered 500,000 anthrax bombs from America. That summer, Fildes
drew up plans for massive anthrax bombing raids of Germany, including the resumption of Operation
Vegetarian.
Although Allied military victory ended the war in Europe before any of these operations were
conducted, Fildes continued his research and development program and was rewarded for his services
Gruinard -- the island used by
British scientists during WWII to
test a series of anthrax bombs
researcher works in one of several size
aerobiology chambers at Camp
Detrick for work on microbial
aerosols and the spread of disease
30
with knighthood in 1946. He carried out open-sea testing of weapons during the winter of 1948-49 near
the British colony of Antigua.
With the rise of British nuclear capacity during the 1950s, interest
in offensive biological weapons lessened and eventually Fildes left
Porton Down. He died a year before the 1972 Biological Weapons
Convention that banned offensive biological weapons came into
being.
Gruinard Island remained contaminated until 1986 when British
scientists finally found a way to kill the bacterial spores that had been
infesting "Anthrax Island" since Fildes' tests more than 40 years
earlier.
Ira Baldwin (1895-1999)
An Indiana farm boy, World War I veteran, and part-time preacher, Ira Baldwin became a noted
agricultural bacteriologist at the University of Wisconsin and the civilian science director of the United
States biological weapons research program at Camp Detrick.
Roots
Baldwin was born on a 40-acre farm in 1895 and spent the
summers of his youth husking corn and selling ducks to earn
money for college. Deeply religious with Quaker grandparents,
Baldwin also preached in local churches that lacked regular
ministers.
In World War I, he served state-side as a second lieutenant in
an artillery unit, commanding a burial detail during the 1918
influenza epidemic. And although Baldwin attended college
at Purdue, he sought his Ph.D. at the University of Wisconsin
in Madison -- a place he remembered fondly from a summer
spent cultivating cucumbers there for the Heinz Company.
Baldwin began his graduate work at University of Wisconsin in the mid-1920s and by the time the
United States entered World War II, he had become chair of the bacteriology department. Then in
November 1942, Baldwin got a call from Colonel William Kabrich of the Army's Chemical Warfare
Service, requesting his presence at a top secret meeting in Washington.
The War Effort
At first it was just speculative talk. But after announcing that Germany and Japan were supporting
biological warfare programs, Kabrich asked Baldwin and other assembled scientists whether they
thought the U.S. could produce tons of its own bacteriological agents. Absolutely, Baldwin replied. "If
you could do it in a test tube, you could do it in a 10,000-gallon tank" and "if you get enough tanks, I'm
sure you will get tons."
researcher works in one of several size
aerobiology chambers at Camp
Detrick for work on microbial
aerosols and the spread of disease
Malcolm Broster --of the Ministry of Defence Chemical
Defence Establishment at Porton Down -- alongside one of
the warning signs at Gruinard Island which has been sealed
off from the public for almost 45 years (1986)
31
A month later, Kabrich was on the phone again, asking Baldwin to
lead the effort to do just that. Baldwin considered the moral
implications of this request. But it only took him 24 hours to decide.
"You start out with the idea in war of killing people," he would later
say. "And that to me is the immoral part of it. It doesn't make much
difference how you kill them."
Armed with this rationalization, Baldwin again headed East -- this
time in charge of the science and administration of America's biological
weapons research program.
A Red Tie
Baldwin remained a civilian and found certain advantages to that;
he would later say. "As long as I wore a red tie, I could say no to
anybody."
But the absence of military rank did not mean Baldwin lacked
responsibility. He first undertook to find a home for the program,
eventually settling on a little-used National Guard airfield in
Frederick, Maryland known as Camp Detrick. Baldwin recruited
scientists for his facility, later observing that unless the person was
also needed by the Manhattan Project, he usually got the men he requested. And aided by a
production manual written by British bacteriologist Paul Fildes, Baldwin's team began work on the
production of botulinum toxin and anthrax bacterial spores.
In 1943, he scouted locations for outdoor biological weapons testing, eventually settling on Horn
Island off the Mississippi coast. As the War dragged on, Camp Detrick expanded, employing more than
2,000 people at its height and conducting tests responsible for the death of 658,039 animals. Faced with
requests for a million anthrax bombs from the U.S. and British governments, Baldwin helped set up a
large-scale manufacturing facility in Vigo, Indiana. But the War ended before any biological weapons
were actually produced by the Vigo plant.
Back to Wisconsin
After World War II ended, Baldwin returned to University of Wisconsin,
becoming vice president of academic affairs in 1948 and special assistant to
the university's president a decade later. He continued to advise the United
States on biological weapons, evaluating the threat posed by Cold War
adversaries and suggesting a series of tests on U.S. cities with supposedly
harmless bacteria in order to evaluate how pathogens might spread if released
by enemy agents. He officially retired from University of Wisconsin in 1966
but continued working in the field of international agriculture for a number of
years. Baldwin died in 1999, just a couple of weeks before he would have
turned 104.
1943 Chemical Warfare Agents
a Fort Detrick researcher using
a Class III safety hood
32
Shiro Ishii (1892-1959)
Both the United States and Great Britain tested biological weapons during
World War II. But for ethical reasons such tests were limited to animal
subjects.
Japanese medical officer Shiro Ishii had no such scruples and he
unleashed some of nature's deadliest pathogens on helpless humans with
horrifying results.
Purification
Ishii was born in Japan in 1892 and became a doctor in 1920, graduating from Kyoto Imperial
University. He had a reputation for being thoughtless towards colleagues but obsequious to superiors.
Ishii married the daughter of the university's president and joined the Army Medical Corps.
When the 1925 Geneva Protocol banned the use of
bacteriological and chemical weapons in war, he began to urge the
creation of a Japanese bacteriological weapons program. Ishii
reasoned that such weapons must be very effective; otherwise they
wouldn't have been prohibited. Ishii traveled through Europe and
the United States for several years with an interest in the
bacteriological weapons used in World War I.
Upon his return he was appointed professor of immunology at
the Tokyo Army Medical School and given the rank of major.
While there Ishii quickly made a name for himself, inventing an
effective water purification filter that he allegedly demonstrated before the Emperor. But the fame and
riches that this invention brought were not enough for Ishii. He continued advocating that the Japanese
army develop biological weapons. In 1932, the government put him in charge of a testing and
production facility in the Chinese province of Manchuria which the Japanese had invaded the previous
year. As head of what would be euphemistically named the "Anti-Epidemic Water Supply and
Purification Bureau", Ishii eagerly got to work.
Unit 731
Ishii's first facility was in the city of Harbin. However, the need for secrecy made it necessary for
Ishii to relocate his group to a prison camp 60 miles away. After this camp was blown up by escapees,
an installation called 'Ping Fan' was constructed about 14 miles from Harbin. When completed in 1940,
what became known as 'Unit 731' housed some 3,000 personnel.
At a ceremony honoring the event, the now General Ishii made the
facility's purpose crystal clear. A doctor's "god-given mission," Ishii said,
was to block and treat disease. But the work "upon which we are now about
to embark is the complete opposite of these principles." In the name of
defeating Japan's enemies, Ishii and his staff spent the next 5 years mixing
witch's brews of pathogens that cause some of the World's most horrific
diseases: anthrax, plague, gas gangrene, smallpox, and botulism, among
others. They then used Chinese prisoners (dismissively termed maruta or "logs") as guinea pigs, forcing
First building for 'Unite 731'
33
them to breathe, eat, and receive injections of deadly pathogens. Allied POWs were also allegedly
targeted.
Reign of Horror
Victims were often killed before the diseases had run their
course so autopsies could show their progress through the
body. Ishii's men also supplied the Japanese Army with
typhoid, cholera, plague, and dysentery bacteria for battlefield
use. In addition, they contaminated water sources, released
disease-carrying fleas, and dropped contaminated wheat from
airplanes. Although dissolution of Unit 731 in 1945 led to the
destruction of many of its records, there is no doubt that Ishii
and his men had caused the death of many thousands of
Chinese and possibly hundreds of Russian and Allied prisoners
of war.
Immunity
No doubt aware that his activities constituted war crimes of the highest
order, Ishii faked his own death in late 1945 and went into hiding. When
American occupation forces learned that Ishii was still alive, they ordered the
Japanese to hand him over and investigators from Camp Detrick began
interrogations.
At first, Ishii denied any human testing had taken place but -- aware that
the Soviets also wanted to talk to him and their methods might not be so mild
-- he later offered to reveal all the details of his program in exchange for
immunity from war crimes prosecution. Anxious to learn the results of
experiments that they themselves had been unable to perform, the American
military accepted Ishii's offer and approval was then given by the highest
level of government.
Ultimately Ishii's materials proved to be of little value, but the United States kept its end of this
dubious bargain. Biological weapons were never mentioned in the Japanese war crimes trials and Ishii
died a free man in 1959.
Operation Whitecoat
Although they had experimented on animals during and after
World War II, Camp Detrick scientists were still unsure of the
effects of biological agents on human beings.
Operation Whitecoat aimed to solve that problem by providing
volunteers to enable the military to test the effects of a range of
disease agents on human subjects.
Group of Biological Warfare
technical advisers at Camp Detrick.
Ira Baldwin is on the left.
Japanese 'Unit 731' doctor stands with
face covered in fron of pile of Chinese
prisoner bodies
34
Ideal Test Subjects
The first task for the scientists was to find people willing to be
infected by pathogens that could make them very sick. They found
them in the followers of the Seventh-day Adventist faith. Although
willing to serve their country when drafted, the Adventists refused to
bear arms. As a result, many of them became medics. Now the U.S.
was offering recruits an opportunity to help in a different manner: to
volunteer for biological tests as a way of satisfying their military
obligations.
When contacted in late 1954, the Adventist hierarchy readily
agreed to this plan. For Camp
Detrick scientists, church members were a model test population since
most of them were in excellent health and they neither drank, smoked,
nor used caffeine. From the perspective of the volunteers, the tests gave
them a way to fulfill their patriotic duty while remaining true to their
beliefs.
And there was another factor: participation in these tests meant
avoiding possibly more hazardous service abroad. For example, one
participant -- Carl Walker -- had orders for his deployment to Laos
reversed when he volunteered for Operation Whitecoat. An officer told him, "You guys are worth a lot
more to your country as guinea pigs than as cannon fodder."
The "8-Ball"
Many of the Adventists were recruited at Fort Sam
Houston, Texas -- a training center for medics. The first
volunteers were sent to Camp Detrick where biological tests
began in late January 1955.
The site for these experiments was a million-liter sphere
called "the 8-Ball" that looked to one recruit like an enormous
grapefruit.
After having entered the '8-Ball', subjects were placed in
structures resembling telephone booths that contained rubber
hoses leading to face masks. They put the masks on and then
breathed in the current contents of the '8-Ball'. Perhaps air or
another harmless substance, or perhaps aerosols that
contained pathogens that caused such diseases as tularemia or Q fever.
Many tests involved Q fever -- a disease first observed in the 1930s that caused intense fever but was
rarely fatal. One recruit recalled that he had "never been any sicker"; another's temperature reached
106° F; and a third's gums swelled to the point he "could no longer see my teeth". Once the disease
appeared, recruits were given antibiotics and almost all made a quick and complete recovery.
Fort Detrick in late-50s or
60s. Whitecoats and staff.
Workers perform a test on the 1-million
liter sphere the "8-Ball" -- the largest
aerobiology chamber constructed
35
Dugway and Beyond
After the success of its first experiments, the decision was made to attempt an outdoor release of Q
fever bacteria. 30 recruits traveled to the Dugway Proving Ground in Utah. On the evening of July 12,
1955, they were lined up across a ½-mile of desert next to cages of monkeys and guinea pigs.
Located slightly more than 3,000 feet away, several generators
filled with pathogens began spraying an infectious mist into the
night air. The volunteers were told to breathe normally and
within a few minutes, the mist was upon them.
Some had been vaccinated against Q fever and never got sick.
Others became ill and ended up in bed for days. From the
military's perspective, the Dugway field test proved that under
the right meteorological conditions, biological weapons would
work.
The human experiments continued for almost 20 years, ending
in 1973. All told, about 2,200 Adventists participated in Operation Whitecoat. And to this day, many
remain proud of their service which resulted in the development of several vaccines and, presumably,
the generation of much information on how biological weapons work in the field.
For its part, the Army holds up Operation Whitecoat as a model of "informed consent" in testing on
humans. The Army also maintains there were almost "no adverse health effects" for the recruits -- a
view disputed by some volunteers. The truth may never be known. Ffollow-up questionnaires were sent
to fewer than half of the participants in Operation Whitecoat.
Secret Testing in the United States
The start of the Cold War brought new foes and new fears for the officials running America's
biological weapons program. Determined to anticipate possible Soviet attacks, the U.S. staged more than
200 domestic tests aimed at assessing national vulnerabilities to biological warfare.
From the Pentagon to the Pacific
Ira Baldwin -- Camp Detrick's scientific director during World War II -- left his position after the
Allied victory in 1945 and returned to teaching at the University of Wisconsin. He continued to advise
the government on issues concerning biological weapons, however -- particularly the threat that might
be posed by enemy spies releasing biological agents in American cities.
In an October 1948 report, Baldwin posited that the U.S. was "particularly vulnerable to this type of
attack." But in order to determine the precise nature of these vulnerabilities, secret field tests would
have to be done to ascertain the vulnerability of targets of potential
interest to the enemy. The Army's Chemical Corps -- which ran
Camp Detrick -- agreed with Baldwin's assessment and set up a
Special Operations Division at Camp Detrick to carry out the tests.
Its first target was to be the Pentagon.
In August 1949, the Special Operations Division operatives
infiltrated the World's largest office building and sprayed bacteria
Whitecoat test group heading out
to Dugway
36
into the Pentagon's air handling system which then spread them throughout the structure.
The operatives moved to larger scale testing, releasing clouds
containing supposedly harmless bacteria from Navy ships off Norfolk,
Virginia in April 1950 and the San Francisco coast in September 1950.
The San Francisco experiments showed exposure among
almost all of the city's 800,000 residents. Had the bacteria released
been anthrax bacteria or some other virulent pathogen, the number of
casualties would have been immense.
The St Jo Program and Large Area Concept
The success of the first field tests only increased demand for more experiments. In response to an
Air Force request, in 1953 the Chemical Corps created the St Jo Program and operatives staged mock
anthrax attacks on St. Louis, Minneapolis, and Winnipeg. The bacteria were released from generators
placed on top of cars, and local governments were told that "invisible smokescreens" were being
deployed "to mask the city on enemy radar".
The next stage was to increase dispersal patterns, dispensing particles from airplanes to find out how
wide of an area they would affect. The first Large Area Concept experiment in 1957 involved
dispersing microorganisms over a swath from South Dakota to Minnesota. Monitoring revealed that
some of the particles eventually traveled some 1200 miles away. Further tests covered areas from Ohio-
to-Texas and Michigan-to-Kansas. In the Army's words, these experiments "proved the feasibility of
covering large areas of the country with [biological weapons] agents."
Airports and Subways
Open-air testing continued through the 1960s with the Special
Operations Division operatives simulating even more audacious
assaults. In 1965, they spread bacteria throughout Washington's
National Airport. A year later, agents dropped light bulbs filled with
organisms onto the tracks in New York's subway system. I think it
spread pretty good," participant Wally Pannier later said, "because
you had a natural aerosol developed every few minutes from every
train that went past."
President Nixon's 1969 termination of the United States
offensive biological weapons program brought an end to the open-air
testing. But the American public did not learn of this testing until
1977. Relatives of one elderly man Edward Nevin -- who had died
of a nosocomial infection 6 months after the San Francisco tests --
sued the Government in 1981, arguing that the supposedly harmless Serratia marcescens bacteria used in
that test had in fact caused his death. In the event the courts ruled against them, the main reason being
that the plaintiffs could not prove that the bacteria used in the test were the same as those that killed Mr.
Nevin.
USS Coral Sea -- one of the ships
involved in the spraying of
bacteria off Norfolk, Virginia in
April, 1950.
37
Nixon Ends U.S. Biological Weapons Program
In November 1969, President Richard Nixon surprised the American public and the World by
ordering the United States to unilaterally discontinue its biological weapons program, thus ending
further research into their development.
Though this decision came as a shock to many who operated the offensive biological warfare
program at Fort Detrick, Pine Bluff Arsenal, Dugway Proving Ground, and elsewhere, its seeds had
been planted years earlier.
Growing Pressure
On the surface, the U.S. biological weapons program
appeared to be going swimmingly in the 1960s. frequent tests
of simulated pathogens proved the efficacy of biological
weapons and in 1967, the Fort Detrick scientists developed a
bacteriological missile warhead.
But opposition was growing to the U.S. use of
unconventional weapons like napalm and Agent Orange in
Vietnam. And biological weapons began to be tarred with the
same broad brush. Matters weren't helped by a March 1968
accident in which the Air Force mistakenly dropped VX nerve
agent outside the Dugway Proving Ground, apparently resulting
in the death of over 3,000 sheep (some estimates claim that over
6,000 sheep were killed) in Skull Valley, Utah.
That same year Seymour Hersh published a book called Chemical and
Biological Warfare: America's Secret Arsenal and news arose of the large-
scale tests the military had conducted in the Pacific with biological agents. A
plan to sink ships filled with old chemical weapons in the ocean off Long
Island met with furious public protest. Congressional representatives began
to demand more scrutiny of what had been heretofore a largely secret
program.
The scientific community was also raising alarms. Harvard
biology professor Matthew Meselson had already circulated a
petition in 1966 signed by 5,000 scientists asking the U.S. to halt
the use of chemical weapons in Vietnam and conduct a top-to-
bottom review of American biological and chemical weapons policy.
Working Together
Against this backdrop, word came from Great Britain and Canada that it might be possible to get an
international convention passed banning biological weapons if the U.S. made some gesture of good faith
in the area. Newly-inaugurated President Nixon decided that the time was right to look into the matter.
Kissinger's Review and Nixon's Decision
Nixon's National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger headed up the review process which began in
late spring 1969. A chance encounter with Meselson at an airport led Kissinger to ask his old Harvard
Napalm bombs explode on Viet
Cong structures south of Saigon in
the republic of Vietnam, 1965
Matthew Meselson in Vietnam
where he was studying the effects
of chemical weapons, 1969-70
38
colleague to submit a position paper on the subject of biological weapons. Meselson's conclusion was
that biological weapons were both dangerous because the technology could readily fall into the hands of
enemy groups or nations and unnecessary because of the U.S.'s massive nuclear arsenal.
His arguments were reinforced by other submissions. In fact, when the
National Security Council met with Nixon on November 18, only the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued for the retention of biological
weapons. One week later, Nixon made his announcement. "I have decided
that the United States will renounce the use of any form of deadly biological
weapons that either kill or incapacitate," the president said. "Our
bacteriological programs in the future will be confined to research in
biological defense, on techniques of immunization, and on measures on
controlling and preventing the spread of disease."
In taking this step, Nixon cited the "massive, unpredictable, and potentially uncontrollable
consequences" of biological weapons. He added, "By the examples that we set today, we hope to
contribute to an atmosphere of peace and understanding between all nations." Privately, Nixon showed
more realpolitik. America had no need for biological weapons, he declared. If an enemy used them on
the U.S., we would retaliate with nuclear bombs.
The Biological Weapons Convention
Whatever Nixon's motivations, his decision had the desired international effect. Negotiations on a
treaty banning all biological weapons intensified and -- after the Soviet Union dropped its opposition --
in April 1972, the Biological Weapons Convention was completed and became open for signature by the
nations of the World. The U.S. Senate ratified the convention in December 1974 and it went into effect
in March 1975 -- the same year the Senate also finally ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the
wartime use of bacteriological weapons.
The Biological Weapons Convention was a historic accomplishment -- not merely restricting
biological weapons, but pledging their complete elimination.
Unfortunately, one of its key signatories -- the Soviet Union -- continued a secret biological
weapons program in direct violation of the treaty's terms, a fact that would only become known years
later.
39
Primary Sources: Charts
These 2 charts were prepared for a briefing called "USAF Operational concepts for BW [biological
weapons] and CW [chemical weapons]" in November 1952. This occurred in the period in the early
1950s when weapons of mass destruction research was pursued aggressively.
Although the Army Chemical Corps developed the biological and chemical weapons, the Air Force
was responsible for delivering the ordnance; these charts show how the weapons would be used in a
battle situation. Specifically, the scenario envisioned a Soviet invasion of Western Europe and required
some method of slowing the advance until American troops could reinforce Allied positions in Europe.
In 1952, the atomic arsenal was still limited and to be kept in reserve for major Soviet positions or
retaliation in kind for attacks on American cities. Chemical and biological weapons presented a way to
retard the enemy.
Martin Furmanski -- an expert on WMD policies -- writes: "Ultimately, the 1952 Air Force 'crash
program' was a failure because the Army Chemical Corps could not produce a useful biological weapon,
Britain would not allow biological weapons to be stockpiled on her soil, and the CW nerve gas
production plants did not become operational for several more years. By the mid-1950s, the atomic
arsenal had greatly expanded and hydrogen bombs had been developed. The Eisenhower administration
decided to rely entirely upon nuclear weapons for the 'retardation' operation."
These charts then, represent a hypothetical response that remained a possibility for only a few years
before other factors rendered it moot.
40
More Information
1. Experts Q & A
Martin Furmanski and Raymond Zilinskas answer questions about biological weaponry.
2. Behind the Scenes
Follow filmmaker John Rubin into the Nevada desert where scenes of "Operation Whitecoat" were
filmed.
3. More About Biowarfare
Learn more on other PBS sites about how bioweapons work and the history of the Soviet program.
4. Declassified Films
Watch recently declassified military films on biowarfare.
5. Timeline of Biological Weapons
if on the Internet, Press <BACK> on your browser to return to the
previous page (or go to www.stealthskater.com)
else if accessing these files from the CD in a MS-Word session, simply <CLOSE> this file's
window-session; the previous window-session should still remain 'active'
41