Microsoft Word - GSCIS - Loleski.docxRealism, Culture,
and Practices of Statecraft in
the Global South
Steven Loleski
Since the end of the Cold
War, a burgeoning literature on
regional order has
attempted to explore the sources
of regional peace and war. With
a few important
exceptions, much work has attempted
to apply the insights of
mainstream international
relations (IR) to regions. Theories
about the stability of
international orders have been
refashioned and qualified to account
for the imperfect anarchy at
the regional level. Though
these theories prize themselves on
claiming to explain so much
with so little, it is important
to ask ourselves whether this
becomes a virtue or vice as
we move beyond the broad
contours of the international system.
Realists have ceded some ground
to pluralist
approaches in explaining the durability
of peaceful transformations, drawing
especially on
the European experience. For much
of the global south, mired
in conflict of facing the
prospect of it, realists maintain
that this qualified theorizing
captures the essential
dynamics at the regional level.
States are thought to
unproblmetically tailor their foreign
policies to the demands of the
balance of power and failure
to heed to power in some
regions can have disastrous consequences.
Though explanatory variables like the
distribution of power, differential
growth
rates, or state capacity clearly have
some purchase at the regional
level they only serve to
highlight the constraints and
opportunities faced by states. They
cannot explain state
motivation precisely because they
exogenously assume it away. These
theories are
ultimately indeterminate on the foreign
policy goals and strategies states
can pursue since
it is believed that outcomes will
fall within expected ranges
eventually. However, one must
not only explore the number of
poles in a system but also
the character of those poles.
As
such, exploring the foreign policies
of states can tell us a
great deal about their interests,
the strategies they are likely
to pursue to secure those
interests, and consequently, the
prospects for regional order.
Not much mainstream IR theory has
attempted to explicitly explore
foreign policy
interests and strategies or had the
global south in mind when doing
so. I intend this paper
to be an exploratory foray into
assessing the utility of
neoclassical realism and practice
theory and how they can enrich
our understanding of foreign
policy in the global south.
Randall Schweller has claimed that
neoclassical realism is “the only
game in town for the
current and next generation of
realists.”1 Also, given the recent
“practice turn” in
international relations, it makes sense
to explore the contributions of
each approach.
Principally, I argue that neoclassical
realism is a more useful
framework for exploring a
state’s foreign policy interests and
strategies than an approach
solely concentrated on
practices. Building and extending early
neoclassical realist work, I
insist that it is
compatible to include cultural and
ideational variables into an
ostensibly realist analysis. It
is the level of external threat
and opportunities that shapes the
broad contours of a state’s
foreign policy but strategic culture
intervenes to establish what goals
a state should pursue
and the strategies considered for
doing so. Practices can be
studied alongside and at the
level of strategic culture to
give a more comprehensive account
of a state’s strategic
culture(s). In this regard, I do
not view practices as a
competing account but
1
Randall L. Schweller, “The
Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism,”
in Progress in International
Relations Theory: Appraising the
Field, ed. Colin Elman and M.F.
Elman (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2003), p. 345.
complementary to fully grasp the
elements of strategic culture.
While the “practice turn”
has provided a necessary corrective
in exposing the representational bias
in IR scholarship,
it is important not to overstep
the limits of practices at
the expense of representational
knowledge. This paper will also
discuss the prospects for foreign
policy change and argue
that neoclassical realism presents a
more comprehensive framework for
understanding
change by discussing the links
between strategic culture, learning,
and foreign policy.
Practice theory seems to understand
change in similar terms but it
remains underspecified.
This paper begins by discussing the
concept of foreign policy goals
and strategies. It
will then consider the shortcomings
of structural realism and
constructivism before
moving on to discuss the
contributions of practice theory.
Following this, neoclassical
realism will be explored and I
will demonstrate that strategic
culture and practices can be
helpfully integrated into a
neoclassical framework. Moreover, I will
explain how foreign
policy change can be integrated
into a neoclassical realist framework
and how a focus
solely on practices cannot articulate
a comprehensive theory of
change. Finally, I will
discuss the realist credentials of
such an explanation by
emphasizing the classical in
neoclassical.
Foreign Policy Goals and Strategies
Before discussing the
various goals statues pursue, it
is important to avoid
conceptual confusions and dwell on
the relationship between ends and
means.2 Separating
ends from means is a notoriously
difficult endeavor. Is power an
end in itself or a means
to
2 For the purposes
of this paper, I will use
goals, interests, preferences, objectives,
and ends interchangeably and as
distinct from strategies, tactics, or
policies.
some other end? Is survival an
end or a means to the
further attainment of others goals?
Foreign policy goals represent fundamental
and deep-rooted interests states
have whereas
strategies are the means to pursue
those interests.3 Keeping in mind
that conceptual lines
will always be blurred in some
sense, it is possible to
analytically separate these concepts
in a useful way. Traditional
attempts to typify the ends of
states as security, power, and
prestige or some variation thereof
invariably raise more questions than
they answer.
As a result, following Wolfers,4 I
have chosen to distinguish the
type of goals states
pursue ranging from narrow to
expansive goals. Indeed, the problem
becomes more
manageable once it is recognized that
“governments conceive of these
cherished values in
more or less moderate and in
more or less ambitious and
exacting terms.”5 Though goals
run the gamut, these can be
recovered through an exploration of
a state’s strategic culture;
it is analytically useful at
this point to distinguish between
narrow and expansive goals.
Narrow goals refer to goals
pertaining to immediate, territorial
integrity and security.
Expansive goals generally convey an
“activist foreign policy that ranges
from attention to
international events to increases in
diplomatic legations to participation
in great-power
diplomacy.”6 In adopting an inclusive
definition of expansion, it rids
expansion
(traditionally understood in purely
territorial terms) of its great
power connotation and
allows the expectation that a
state of any rank can expand
its political interests abroad.
3 I part company with
Moravcsik who insists that
preferences are “prior to specific
interstate political interactions.” See
Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences
Seriously: A Liberal Theory of
International Politics,” International
Organization Vol. 51, No. 4
(1997), p. 519. 4 This is
similar to Wolfers’ distinction
between “possession” goals and
“milieu” goals. See Arnold Wolfers,
Discord and Collaboration: Essays on
International Politics (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1962), pp. 73-77.
5 Ibid., p. 72. 6 Fareed
Zakaria, From Wealth to Power:
The Unusual Origins of America’s
World Role. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1998), p. 5.
Principally, this would include growing
regional assertiveness and adventurism,
war
and/or crisis initiation,7 attempts at
territorial aggrandizement,8 contestation
and violation
of international norms, and the
active pursuit of nuclear weapons.9
Power-based Explanations
In his writings, Waltz has
explicitly maintained that “international
politics is not
foreign policy” and it would be
a mistake to confuse the
two.10 International political or
systemic theory explains “why different
units behave similarly.”11 By
contrast, a theory of
foreign policy analyzes why “different
units behave differently despite
their similar
placement in a system.”12 A systemic
theory assumes that each state
develops their policies
and acts as a result of its
own internal processes, but it
recognizes that these policies are
constrained by the existence and
interaction with other states.13 It
then becomes possible
to explain why “a certain similarity
of behavior is expected from
similarly situated states.
The expected behavior is similar, not
identical”14 Therefore, competition and
socialization
7 T.V. Paul, Asymmetric
Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker
Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1994). 8 Mark W.
Zacher, “The Territorial Integrity
Norm,” International Organization Vol.
55, No.2 (Spring 2001), pp.
15-50. 9 T.V. Paul, Power versus
Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear
Weapons (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2000. 10 Kenneth
N. Waltz, Theory of International
Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley,
1979.), p. 121. 11 Ibid., p.
72. 12 Ibid.; Zakaria, From
Wealth to Power, p. 14. 13
Waltz, Theory of International
Politics, p. 65. Jennifer
Sterling-Folker suggests that
incorporating domestic processes is
consistent with systemic theories,
see Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Realist
Environment, Liberal Process, and
Domestic-Level Variables,” International
Studies Quarterly Vol. 41, No.
1 (March 1997), pp. 1-25; see
also, Rathbun. 14 Ibid., p.
122.
are responsible for the striking
“sameness” in international politics
because of the
“disadvantages that arise from a
failure to conform to successful
practices.”15
Although state behavior is not
identical, there is an assumption
that behavior will
conform to expected outcomes. States
that fail to adopt successful
practices will “fall by the
wayside…thus the units that survive
come to look like one
another.”16 In an oft-quoted
passage, Waltz forcefully asserts that
states “are free to do any
fool thing they care to, but
they are likely to be rewarded
for behavior that is responsive
to structural pressures and
punished for behavior that is
not.”17 For these reasons, a
discernable similarity in the
behavior of states arises. From
a structural perspective, it cannot
explain why similarly
situated states would respond differently.
To do so would almost seem
moot for it is “not
possible to understand world politics
simply by looking inside of
states” because “results
achieved seldom correspond to the
intentions of actors.”18 These
are the “ironic
consequences” of state behavior because
regardless of the internal
dispositions and wants
of the state outcomes will fall
within expected ranges.19 Structural
theories, including
offensive realism, cannot explain the
differences among states because
of the sparse
assumptions made about state motives.
Although Waltz is not bothered
too much by the motivations of
states, it is
important to recognize that he makes
assumptions about them nonetheless.
Anarchy and
15 Ibid., p. 128. 16
Ibid., p. 77. 17 Kenneth
Waltz, “Evaluating Theories,” American
Political Science Review Vol. 91,
No. 4 (December 1997), p. 915.
18 Waltz, Theory of International
Politics, p. 65. 19 Andrew
Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously:
A Liberal Theory of International
Politics,” International Organization Vol.
51, No. 4 (1997), p. 522.
the distribution of power loom large
in Waltz’s writings as key
explanatory variables but
“much of the work is being done
by factors only implicit in the
model.”20 In the interests of
theory construction, Waltz firstly and
chiefly assumes that states are
moved by the will to
survive.21 However, there remains an
ambiguity the survival imperative
which becomes all
the more acute with every attempt
at precision. As Waltz contends,
“the first concern of
states is not to maximize power
but to maintain their positions
in the system.”22 Clearly,
striving to maintain one’s position
is not the same thing as
the minimalist definition of
survival implied initially by Waltz.
Indeed, attempts to uphold the
status quo may endanger
one’s survival. A variety of policies
can be pursued which seek to
safeguard “survival” and
in so doing it leaves structural
realism with “very little explanatory
content.”23
More important are the implications
of the survival-first imperative
on the
formation of foreign policy goals.
States in Waltz’s world are
by nature cautious,
conservative, and “highly fearful.”24
As a result, states would be
predisposed to adopt
modest foreign policy aims. Such a
conceptualization implies a status-quo
bias in structural
realism by depicting a “world of
all cops and no robbers, that
is, all security-seeking states
and no aggressors.”25 Without the
presence of a revisionist states,
there would be no cause
20 Alexander Wendt, Social
Theory of International Politics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999), p. 103. 21 Waltz,
Theory of International Politics, p.
91. 22 Ibid., p. 126. 23
Brooks, p. 451. 24 Ibid., p.
449. 25 Randall Schweller,
“Neorealism’s Status-Quo Bias: What
Security Dilemma?” Security Studies
Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996),
p. 91. Similar critiques have
been leveled by critical theorists,
as Robert Cox writes “there is
a latent normative element which
derives from the assumptions of
neorealist theory: security within
the postulated interstate system
depends upon each of the major
actors understanding this system in
the same
for conflict. Indeed, a world of
security-seekers would be remarkably
peaceful.26 But the
structural realists are not beat so
easily. They rely on the
perennial problem of uncertainty
under anarchy to fuel security
dilemmas. Therein lies the “tragedy”
of international politics
where good intentions can lead to
bad outcomes. “History shows no
exact and necessary
correlation between the quality of
motives and the quality of
foreign policy.”27 For
Morgenthau, attempting to discern a
statesman’s motives was a futile
and ultimately
misleading endeavor. Notwithstanding some
of the problems with discerning
a state’s
intentions, it is not an
insurmountable task. Wendt suggests
that it may actually be easier
to
discern the intentions of states
than individuals.28 Inferences can be
made based upon
public documents, practices, speeches,
memoirs, and statements of key
decision-makers.
Furthermore, history is often a
reliable guide to understanding what
a state wants or
values. Structural realists tend to
overemphasize the uncertainty of
intentions as a prime
mover of international conflict but
the conflict of interests
between states is “not only
apparent but real.”29
way.” See Robert W. Cox, “Social
Forces, States and World Orders:
Beyond International Relations Theory,”
in Neorealism and Its Critics,
ed. Robert O. Keohane (New
York: Columbia University Press,
1986), p. 212. 26 Andrew Kydd,
“Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing: Why
Security Seekers Do Not Fight
Each Other,” Security Studies Vol.
7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp.
114-54. 27 Hans J. Morgenthau,
Politics among Nations: The Struggle
for Power and Peace. 4th ed.
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
Inc., 1967), p. 6. 28 Wendt,
Social Theory of International
Politics, pp. 221-23. 29 Schweller,
“Neorealism’s Status-Quo Bias: What
Security Dilemma?” p. 104.
Following the momentous changes
at the end of the Cold
War, many were
proclaiming the death of realism30
and wondering if any realists
were still around.31 Upon
reflection, those proclamations seem to
have been greatly exaggerated.
Nevertheless, those
approaches that were relegated to the
margins of the discipline during
neorealism’s reign
began to flourish by asserting,
“‘norms,’ ‘identities,’ and ‘culture’
matter.”32 There are a
variety of disparate social theories
which affirm the importance of
identity and culture, but
they are of like mind about
the socially constructed nature of
international politics. Two
foundational assumptions unite these
approaches: (1) the structures of
international
politics are primarily ideational and
not strictly material; (2) and
as such, these structures
define actors’ identities and
interests, not just their behavior.33
Constructivism is not a
theory of international politics per
se but more aptly characterized
as an ontological
approach.34 As a result, it does
not prescribe which units and
structures to examine a priori
and these must be chosen and
justified by the theorist. Strategic
culture, for example, has
focused on domestic culture. Before
discussing the strategic culture
literature specifically,
30 Ethan B. Kapstein, “Is
Realism Dead? The Domestic
Sources of International Politics,”
International Organization Vol. 49, No.
4 (Autumn 1995), pp.
751-74. For an argument which
suggests that realism weathered the
end of the Cold War, see
Randall Schweller and William
Wohlforth, “Power Test: Evaluating
Realism In Response to the End
of the Cold War,” Security
Studies Vol. 9, No. 3 (Spring
2000), pp. 60-107. 31 Jeffrey
W. Legro, and Andrew Moravcsik,
“Is Anybody Still a Realist?”
International Security Vol. 24, No.
1 (Fall 1999), pp. 5-55. 32
Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt,
and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms,
Identity, and Culture in National
Security,” in The Culture of
National Security: Norms and
Identity in World Politics, ed.
Peter J. Katzenstein (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1996), p.
65. 33 Alexander Wendt,
“Constructing International Politics,”
International Security Vol. 20, No.
1 (Summer 1995), pp. 71-72;
Wendt, Social Theory of International
Politics. 34 Wendt, Social Theory
of International Politics, pp. 4-8.
Hence, Wendt’s lengthy discussion of
foundational assumptions of his
social theory; substantive theory
concerns the latter half of his
book.
it is necessary to comment on
how the assumptions of constructivism
differ from structural
realism and the implications of these
differences.
An important bone of contention
raised by constructivists is the
relationship
between agents and structures or
how the “agent-structure problem” is
addressed.
Societies, be they of states or
individuals, are composed of
purposeful actors and the
relationships which structures interaction.
The problem arises in how
to conceptualize
units and the relationship among
them. Despite Waltz’s ardent commitment
against the
temptations of reductionism, Wendt
argues that structural realism’s view
of system
structure is committed to “ontological
reductionism.”35 What this means is
that structural
realism reduces the structure of the
system to the properties of
agents themselves. Waltz
affirms that systems are “individualist
in origin, spontaneously generated,
and
unintended.”36 Viewed in this way, a
system can only act as a
“constraining and disposing
force”37 on units and as a
result, a system can only
affect a state’s behavior not
its
properties. This becomes intuitive if
one recalls the individualist
ontology adopted by
structural realism: a system cannot
generate units if it is reduced
to their properties in the
first place. In other words,
structure simply affects the behavior
of pregiven actors through
changing opportunities and constraints.
For constructivists, the problem with
structural
realism is that “it is not
structural enough.”38 The exclusively
constructivist contribution to
systemic theorizing is to show how
structures can constitute state
properties or identities
35 Alexander Wendt, “The
Agent-Structure Problem in International
Relations Theory,” International
Organization Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer
1987), p. 342. 36 Waltz,
Theory of International Politics, p.
91. 37 Ibid., p. 72. 38
Wendt, “Constructing International
Politics,” p. 72.
and interests. Normative structures not
only regulate behavior but also
define identities
and interests in the first place.39
The concern with how much
impact structure have on agents
naturally leads to a
consideration of what structure is
made of. Though the debate
between rationalists and
constructivists is often portrayed in
zero-sum terms, there is “little
difference…on the issue
of whether ideas ‘matter.’”40 The
question is rather how ideas
matter. Rationalists tend to
treat ideas as residual variables
of secondary importance whereas
constructivists give
more weight to ideas in shaping
actor properties. Materialism conceives
of power and
interest as constituted by “brute”
material forces, which is to
say things that exist
independently of ideas. To conceive
of interests and ideas separately,
constructivists argue,
is to stack the deck against
ideational arguments. Material forces
as such explain relatively
little because it is the meaning
and content that ideas give
to material forces which
matter.41 For instance, the United
States interprets the nuclear weapons
held by the United
Kingdom differently than those held
by North Korea. Structure is
not just about material
capabilities but also how those
material forces are embedded in
social relations matters.
Despite the promise of constructivism,
some qualifications need to be
made. Firstly,
the focus on ideas seems to be
overstated in many respects. Hence,
Wendt and other thin
constructivists ascribe an independent
causal role for ostensibly material
forces by
39 Jepperson, Wendt, and
Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and
Culture in National Security,” p.
54. This reflects constructivism’s
concern with both causal and
constitutive questions, see Wendt,
Social Theory of International Politics,
pp. 77-88. On systemic effects,
Wendt suggests the Waltz’s
materialist view of structure
precludes him from discussing socialization
in any meaningful sense, see
Ibid., pp. 101-02. 40 James
Fearon and Alexander Wendt, “Rationalism
v. Constructivism: A Skeptical
View,” in Handbook of International
Relations, eds. Walter Carlnaes,
Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons
(London: Sage 2002), p. 59. 41
Wendt, Social Theory of International
Politics, pp. 94-98.
defending a “rump materialism” and
claiming that interests are not
ideas all the way
down.42 Further, Wendt adopts the
state as a referent object
with certain essentialist
properties.43 As a result of
this corporate identity, states have
certain presocial and
intrinsic needs and interests. Namely,
all states have an interest
to survive, exercise
autonomy, pursue economic well being,
and the need to secure
collective self-esteem.44
These interests, and especially the
inclusion of the latter, go far
in exploring the variety of
needs inherent in states. Wendt
quickly cautions that these interests
do not imply that
states are by nature egoists but
rather this feature is
historically contingent. In other
words, “states are not Realists by
nature.”45 Wendt would find himself
in good company
with classical realists who were
quite aware and weary about the
“weaknesses of intellect
and will which flesh is heir
to, are bound to deflect
foreign policies from their rational
course.”46 Nonetheless, Wendt touches
upon social identity theory and
ultimately
concludes that there are good
reasons to believe that “all
other things being equal, the
international system contains a bias
toward ‘Realist’ thinking.”47 These
conclusions all
point to a greater role for
material forces than most
constructivists are willing to admit
or
begrudgingly admit. The question is
how material and ideational
variables fit together in
the formation of foreign policy
interests.
42 Ibid, see chapter 3.
43 Wendt, Social Theory of
International Politics, pp. 201-14. There
is an uneasiness about this
claim among some constructivists,
see Martha Finnemore, National
Interests in International Society
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996),
p. 13. 44 Ibid., pp. 233-37.
45 Ibid., p. 234. 46
Morgenthau, p. 7. 47 Wendt,
Social Theory of International
Politics, p. 241.
Secondly, as mentioned before, because
constructivism is a social
theory it must
deal with the levels of analysis
problem in international relations
theory. Theo Farrell
draws a distinction between
constructivists and culturalists where
the former “see
international norms shaping the
similarity in state form and
action, regardless of the
material circumstances of states...” and
the latter exploring the “impact
of domestic norms
of state form and action, they
invariably find norms producing
difference in what states
do.”48 Wendt is primarily concerned
with the nature and effects of
the international system
on states; it is an unapologetic
systemic theory. It is not
interested in explaining state
identity and concedes that “state
identities are also heavily
influenced by domestic factors
that I do not address.”49
Putting Constructivism into Practice
There was growing
dissatisfaction that “constructivism has
long ignored what states
and their agents do, while
concentrating on what they say.”50
The promise of practice
theory was that it would provide
a necessary corrective to the
imbalance and bias of
representational thinking in the
discipline. The “practice turn” in
social theory “brings
knowledge to the foreground of
analysis.”51 Obeying norms or facing
consequences is a
reflective, deliberative process whereas
practical knowing is self-evident
and non-thinking.
48 Theo Farrell, “Constructivist
Security Studies: Portrait of a
Research Program,” International Studies
Review Vol. 4, No. 1 (2002),
p. 54, emphasis in original.
49 Wendt, Social Theory of
International Politics, p. 11. 50
Ted Hopf, “The Logic of Habit
in International Relations,” European
Journal of International Relations
Vol. 14, No. 4 (2010), p.
544. 51 Vincent Pouliot,
International Security in Practice:
The Politics of NATO-Russia
Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2010), p. 13.
The clearest exposition differs
representational thinking from “In
circumstance X, you
should do Y,” to practical thinking
of “in circumstance X, action
Y follows.”52 Drawing on
insights from Bourdieu, scholars have
sought to ground the structure
and agency problem
in and through the concept of
practice. Bourdieu’s theory of
practice comprises a number
of interrelated elements centered on
the concepts of habitus and
field. Although by no
means an exhaustive account, these
concepts will be brought to
bear on interests and
strategies. Habitus is defined as a
“set of dispositions which incline
agents to act and react
in certain ways. The dispositions
generate practices, perceptions and
attitudes which are
‘regular’ without being consciously
co-ordinated or governed by any
‘rule.’”53 Firstly, the
habitus is historical in the
sense that the past informs the
future through a process of
“socialization, exposure, imitation and
symbolic power relationships.”54 Secondly,
those
learned dispositions are learned
through action not conscious thought.
It is inexplicable
because, unlike representational knowledge,
it is corporeal knowledge
“ingrained in the
body.”55 As such, practice theory
“de-emphasizes what is going on
in people’s heads -- what
they think -- to focus on
what they do.”56 Finally, the
habitus is both relational and
dispositional. That is, it structures
social relations and disposes actors
to certain courses of
action over others. The latter
invariably raises the question of
change in practices.
52 Ted Hopf, Social
Construction of International Politics:
Identities & Foreign Policies,
Moscow, 1955 and 1999 (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2002), p.
12. 53 Quoted in Michael C.
Williams, Culture and Security:
Symbolic Power and the Politics
of International Security (London:
Routledge, 2007), p. 25. 54
Pouliot, p. 31. 55 Williams,
p. 26. 56 Ibid., p. 32.
Bourdieu also discusses the field
as an interrelated concept in
his theory of practice.
Basically, the habitus is ordered
and is ordered by certain
social fields and the interplay
between habitus and field produces
action. A field is a
“social configuration structured
along three main dimensions: relations
of power, objects of struggle
and taken-for-granted
rules.”57 Fields are characterized and
structured by dominant actors
who use resources
(however defined) in the struggle
over issues and capital used in
the social game. A field is
typically hierarchically structured and
actors act from their positions
by having an intuitive
“feel for the game” or a “sense
of one’s place” and also a
“sense of the other’s place.”58
As
expected from a theory about
practical knowledge, actors act from
their resources at hand
and as such “means regularly matter
more than ends.”59 What of
interests and strategies?
The interplay between habitus and
field generate interests and
strategies for actors.
Interests are not pregiven and
timeless but are constituted based
upon the context of the
field. The structure of the field
means that “the universe of
potential strategies (and indeed
of potential interests) of a
given actor is circumscribed.”60 This
structures social life and
gives it much of the regularity
we ascribe to it.
The regularity of social life
pronounced by practice theorists
tends to make one
wonder about the possibility of
change and transformation. If actors
are bound by habitus
and unthinkingly reproduce practices,
what are the prospects for
change? Practice
theorists suggest that change is
hard but not impossible through
“awareness and
57 Pouliot, p. 33. 58
Williams, pp. 28-29. 59 Pouliot,
p. 35. 60 Williams, p. 36.
learning.”61 Vincent Pouliot reaches the
conclusion that “diplomacy is a
normal though not
self-evident practice in NRC dealings”
which suggest that “contemporary
Russian-Altantic
diplomatic relations stop short of
a security community.”62 Pouliot
paints a picture of
practices that characterize and
distinguish non-war communities from
security
communities but does not discuss
how transformations would occur.
Indeed, practice
theory paints a very deterministic
picture of social relations
without comprehensively
discussing the conditions for change.
Hopf readily admits that
scholars of Bourdieu
conclude that “Bourdieu offers no
endogenous account for change.”63
Like most theories of
international relations, practice theory
remains bedeviled with the problem
of accounting
for change.
Domestic Practices and Foreign
Policy While much of
the recent work done building
upon practice theory has explored
a
number of issue areas of world
politics,64 very little has directly
addressed foreign policy
making. Hopf’s exploration of Soviet
and Russian identity stands as
an early exception to
this trend by suggesting that
“the most important mechanism for
the reproduction of
identity is not the role and
norm but rather habit and
practice.”65 The logic of everyday
practice is used to define the
realm of thinkability and
possibility that paves the way
for
interpretation and action. Hopf
attempts to provide an endogenous
understanding of
61 Williams, p. 26. 62
Pouliot, p. 234. 63 Hopf, “The
Logic of Habit in International
Relations,” p. 546. 64 Emanuel
Adler and Vincent Pouliot, eds.
International Practices (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011).
65 Hopf, Social Construction of
International Politics, p. 10.
interests through a recovery of
identity which makes “threats and
opportunities, enemies
and allies, intelligible, thinkable,
and possible.”66 Hopf’s inductive
recovery of identity
through wide textual and intertextual
reading is impressive and
illuminating. Despite the
impressive effort and progress made
with identity reconstruction, there
remain some
problems. Firstly, the distinction between
practice and habit is often
blurred and “remains
partly embroiled in an internalization
[of norms] scheme.”67 The
discourse on identity
partly obscures the exclusive focus
on the day-to-day practical
logics at work. Secondly,
and more importantly, Hopf overlooks
the role of the external
environment in shaping
identity at home. The realm of
possibilities for foreign policy
identities in 1955 and 1999
can be partly explained by changed
international circumstances. This is
not to suggest that
the external environment should be
the principal explanatory variable in
explaining foreign
policy but that it at the same
time cannot be overlooked in a
comprehensive understanding
of foreign policy.
If communities of practitioners
understand practices as competent
performances,
then domestic practices can play
a role in the process of
foreign policy-making. Foreign
policy practitioners can rely on
their background knowledge to execute
what constitutes
acceptable and competent foreign
policy. Most neoclassical realist work
has overlooked
practices and has instead focused
its efforts on exploring the
effects of domestic
institutions, procedures, and norms. While
practices may be less durable,
widespread, and
66 Ibid., p. 16. 67
Pouliot, p. 21.
limited than institutions, they can
also shape the foreign policy
process.68 Practicies are
envisioned as a mediating force
on the bargaining between the
state and society over
foreign policy. “Where institutions,
procedures, and practices insulate the
executive and
procedural norms stifle dissent,” Ripsman
argues “the more autonomous national
security
executives are freer to respond to
systemic demands as structural
realists would expect.”69
Conversely, more constraining institutions
and practices would dispose the
state to pay
greater attention to internal demands
in constructing foreign policy.
Despite the promise of integrating
practices into a neoclassical
framework, it seems
that practices have been conceived as
yet another constraint on state
power. That is, it is
expected that states inhibited with
constraining foreign policy
decision-making practices
will thwart the state’s course by
falling victim to capture by
parochial domestic interests.
States with decision-making practices
yielding to and insulating the
foreign policy
executive from domestic groups are
more able to unproblematically
follow interests
dictated by the system. Indeed,
Ripsman contends “differences in
domestic decision-
making environments can also explain
variations in state motivations.”70
However,
practices conceived in this way
cannot tell us a great deal
about state motivations but
rather, they can illuminate how
foreign policy is enacted. It
is essentially indeterminate on
the question of state interests
because it defers to the system
on what is expected of states.
&n