Chapter I
REALITY AND REPRESENTATION
REALITY AND REpRESElfTATION
The earliest theory of art as propounded by Plato and Aristotle was
that art was mimesis, imitation of reality. The concept of mimesis,
broadly defined as imitation, reflection or representation has since,
over a period of more than two thousand years, enjoyed wide
currency and acceptance as an effort to theorise the various forms
of Western literature, especially theater and drama. Inspite of the
famous difference between Plato and Aristotle about the utility of
art, - the basic 'assumption was the same, that art mirrored reality
and that art represented reality.
To begin the debate, one must realise that in modem literary theory
mimesis as a critical concept has for some time now being
dismissed. The age of Erich Auerbach, who could canonically
subsume all western literature, ~nder the umbrella of mimesis
seems to be "long over. With the shift of literary theory towards
po structuralism and deconstruction this theory of mimesis has
been not only dismantled but also rejected. There has been a shift
away from the priority and the precedence given to the imitated over
imitation, The referent over the signifier. Instead there has been a
fore grounding of the medium of signification, the actual material by
which the mirror image is being constructed and transmitted,
which not merely conveys meaning but produces itl.
Reality and Representation
There is yet another aspect of this problem, wherein the social
reality that art mirrors, is itself being considered as a construct.
The form of social control, which in turn, changes the shapes and
contours of reality, the dominant power politics of a society, which
both marginalises and promotes certain representation provokes
several questions regarding the nature of mimesis. For eg: who is
holding the mirror, who determines the angle and focus of
reflection? What is the nature of the mirror and what kind of
refraction and reflection does it allow? The question of power, the
dominating discourse engrained in the process of signification, and
the language used for communication, all together effect the
mimetic functions of art. However in the arena of cultural theory
mimesis is being invested with a new critical power. According to a
cultural theorist Michael Taussig, representations assume the
character and power of the original referent, once represented.
These representations or mimesis unleash a dual and ambiguous
power to both mirror and falsify, pose and mask reality 2.
Aristotle in Poetics had already laid down the blueprint for mimesis,
which distinguished between art forms by the virtue of the medium
of representation they used, the aspects of real and imaginary life
they represented, and finally the manner of representation:
(i) The means of imitation (the medium such as painting or
language).
(ii) The object of imitation (some aspect of human action) and,
(iii) The mode of imitation (how something is imitated).
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Reality and Representation .
Aristotle isolates the possible modes of representation thus: -
(i) The poet may imitate by narration- either take another
personality or speak in his own voice.
(ii) Or the poet may present all his character as living and
moving before us.
Hence the modes of narration differ in terms of telling or showing.
While the Diegetic theories conceive of a narration as a verbal
activity or telling, Mimetic theories conceive of narration as the
presentation of spectacle.
When Aristotle spoke of mimesis, he was referring to poetry, fine art
and drama, which were the main art forms of the day. The
principles of mimetic analysis apply to most types of films as well,
however this analysis gets complicated once it is applied to
documentary film, cartoon animation, science fiction or the Classic
Hollywood narrative. Each of these could be said to use different
forms of representation. They interact with reality differently.
'Theories of Realism and Cinema" stretch back to Sergei Eisenstein
in the 1920's and were a key part of Italian neo-realism for directors
such as Vittorio De-Sica and Pasolini in the 1940's. Film theorists,
Verkov and Andre Bazin argued that film had to imitate life as
precisely as possible as if it was the divine mission of film to move
towards verisimilitude. The essence of pure mimetic Cinema would
perhaps be to turn on the camera and record the real time and
space endlessly, very similar to static cameras in a departmental
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Reality and Representation
store focused on various areas in the store recording the movement
of the customers.
Keeping this backdrop in mind we will try and trace the debate on
mimesis to contextualise our area of study. Miming no doubt had
preliterate origins in rituals and imitation of nature. 'The Theory of
Mimesis' has immediate application to visual arts but was primarily
used to evaluate the poetic arts of the day. Plato who was the most
influential classical exponent of mimetic theory used it to condemn
art. _ Th~ works of art according to Plato were thrice removed from
reality i.e. the ' ideas'. According to him since art only imitates, it
has no substance or subject of its own and is misleading. Artists
are merely knowledgeable in matters of medicine, music and sports
and have no originality of their own. Plato thus deprives art of its
autonomy. Art is to be judged by criteria like how true it is? What is
its relation to the original instead of the inspiration and the
creativity that led to that form of art? For Plato, art should
correspond to the idea, a standard to which all human endeavor
aspires. Since art appealed to the senses and not so much a
product of the intellect, it was an inferior form of representation of
human reality .•
Interestingly however the most obvious example from Plato's
writings which is pertinent to Cinema, is the imagery displayed in
the allegory of the cave. The 'oi polloi' chained in the cave and
directed towards the shadows dancing on the wall, could be
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Reality and Representation
construed as a cinematic rendering of certain social, educational,
ontological, epistemological, and political concems3 . Plato's concern
is how to distinguish between the real philosopher and his copy the
sophist. Among the mUltiplicity of images cast onto the wall, the 'oi
polloi' are incapable of distinguishing between the "good" and the
"bad". This concern anticipates the postmodernist situation, where
the contemporary society is Plato's concern. He felt that society
would get divorced from reality and anarchy would reign. Cinema in
that context would be simulacra -a space of total illusion.
In Plato's cave, those that cast the shadows, had the power to
project the icons before the fire. In his portrayal of the 'Philosopher
King', Plato wanted to ensure that the philosopher king will have
the power to formulate the images that will constitute the 'good
myth, the noble lie'. This formulation pre-supposes the present day
film director who has a greater control not only in formation of
images but can ensure that his audience will view things from an
angle and point -of-view from which he wishes them to. With this,
we once again reach the question of power ingrained in the process
of representation which consequently effects the mimetic functions
of art.
Plato maintained that art with its given appeal to the senses, was
an inferior representation of reality. Jacques Derrida rationalised
Plato's objection to art in the twentieth century. He said that
human beings are unable to tolerate the loss of an original reality
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Reality and Representation
against which they measure themselves to understand their place
in the world. If the image replaces the reality then it would result in
confusion and dislocation. Derrida writes:
The reflection, the image, the double, splits what it doubles. The origin of the speculation becomes a difference. What can look ai: itself is not one; and the law of the addition of the origin to its representation, of the thing to its image, is that one plus one makes at least three. 4
What arises from this argument is that on one hand we need to
know that the world has a single definable origin, which can be
anticipated. On the other hand the artist with its images of the
world reminds us that it is possible to add, supplement, and
fragment that world.
Aristotle set out to reclaim mimesis as a viable theory of art in his
seminal work. After distinguishing between poetic and musical
arts, he focused on the object of mimesis or imitation. "What can be
the possible object of imitation?" Aristotle in Chapter-II of Poetics
says that it is possible to imitate "men either as better than in real
life, or as worse, or as they are"s. Again in Chapter-XXV, he
enlarges the scope of imitation and the range of the artist when he
says that artist imitates one of the three objects. "things as they are
or were, things as they are said or thought to be, or things as they
ought to be"6. Thus the test of mimetic skill is not historical
accuracy but instead the skill of the poet to mimic probable human
behaviour. The world of poetry is thus the world of fiction; world of
illusions and fantasies, of airy nothing and is not bound by the
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Reality and Representation
dimensions of time and place. In this sense, imitation for Aristotle is
an image-making faculty. Poetry thus does not represent mere facts
but reality based on probability. Imitation in Aristotle therefore
means an idealised representation of human life.
Poetics was edited and translated by sixteenth century Italian
humanists, and hence Sir. Philip Sydney received Aristotle's
comments in a context, which gave them a meaning rather different
from anything, Aristotle had intended. According to Sidney,
imaginative literature can be justified if it communicates historical
or philosophical or moral truths in a lively pleasing manner, and if
this means telling things which are not literally true, the untruths
can either be "interpreted allegorically as ways of representing an
underlying general truth or in the case of the historical poet, as
plausible reconstruction of what might well have occurred". 7
The poet according to Sidney does not imitate or represent or
express things, which already exists; he invents new things. He
further says in his Defense of Poesy (1595) that the world invented
or created by the poet is a better world than the real one. It is not
the mere exercise of his imagination that justifies the poet, but the
exercise of his imagination in order to create this better world, the
real world "is brasen, the poets only deliuer a golden"B. Only the
poet can, by his invention, produce something that goes beyond
nature. In creating this better world, the poet has in view the idea
(in the Platonic sense) of the quality he is representing; he is not
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Reality and Representation
imitating the idea as reflected palely in real life, but IS directly
embodying his own vision of the ideal.
This development in argument leads Sidney away from the
Aristotelian notion of imitation. He almost proceeds to develop a
theory of "ideal imitation", the notion that the poet imitates not the
mere appearances of actuality but the hidden reality behind them,
and maintains that the poet creates a better world than the one we
actually live in. The ideal world of the poet is presented in such a
way that the reader is stimulated to try and imitate it in his own
practice. Thus the Aristotelian notion of imitation is transferred
from the poet to the reader. The poet does not imitate but creates: it
is the reader who imitates what the poet creates. Taking from the
Roman poet Horace the view that the poet both delights and
teaches, Sidney goes on to show that the poet teaches by presenting
an ideal world for the imitation of the reader. The perfection of the
poet's world does not consist in its being peopled with wholly
virtuous characters, but his heroes are always perfect in behaviour
and successful in fortune and its villains thoroughly villainous
doomed to a certain bad end. It's a world where the righteous
always prospers and the wicked are never left unpunished. It is
from this conception that we get the term 'poetic justice'.
For Plato, the poet's world was second-hand imitation of reality and
therefore of no value. For Aristotle, the poet could, by proper
selection and organisation of incident achieve a reality more
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Reality and Representation
profound than the actual; for Sidney, the poet creates a world
morally better than the real word, for the moral edification and
improvement of th~ reader. None of these critics however suggest
that the poet would do well to describe life merely as he finds it as
in Dryden's Essay of Dramatic Poesie (1668), a dialogue on the
nature of poetic drama and the respective merits of classical,
modern French, Elizabethan and Restoration plays. Dryden defines
a play as "A just and lively image of human nature, representing its
passions and humours, and the changes of fortune to which it is
subject for the delight and instruction ofmankind"9.
Dryden agrees with Aristotle in describing poetry as a process of
imitation but he lays particular emphasis on the fact that a poet
can imitate things also as they are said to be or thought to be. He
follows Sidney, in his belief that poetry is an imitation not only of
nature but also of the best in nature and that poetry by a happy
chemistry unites all the scattered beauties of nature without its
deformities or faults. In other words like Plato he believes that
poetry does not merely imitate things as they are but the ideal
pattern behind the appearances and therefore is higher than
history. Dryden was fully aware of the fact that instruction, delight
and transport had been variously proposed as the function of poetry
by various critics. Dryden was clearly of the view that poetry only
instructs as it delights. According to Dryden the function of poetry
is not only to imitate well but also to affect the soul, to excite the
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Reality and Representation
passions and to move admiration. To do this poetry does not merely
make a copy of nature but it gives only as much resemblances of
nature as would produce beautiful and harmonious picture; it
heightens the beauties of nature and conceals its deformities. The
poet therefore is neither merely a teacher nor an imitator but
essentially a creator and like Coleridge, Dryden believed that
imagination and fancy are the faculties that breathe life into the
poet's world.
According to Dryden poetry is the image of human nature that is, it
is the representation of how men behave, a representation of their
passions and their states of mind. By the phrase, ' changes of
fortunes to which it is subject', Dryden actually means human
nature as it reveals itself under trying and testing circumstances
because men best reveal themselves only when they meet with
critical conditions in life:
If Hamlet's father had not been murdered by his uncle and his
mother had not married that same uncle, Hamlet would never have
been driven to exhibit the true image of his nature. 10
One wonders whether Dryden is saying that the aim of poetry is
'Psychological Realism', that is to reveal human nature as it is, to
describe the human passions and human states of mind. Plato
objected to poetry because according to him it is an imitation of an
imitation and therefore twice removed from reality. Aristotle on the
other hand believed that, the reality that poetry represents is more
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Reality and Representation
philosophical and profound because it represents not the factual
but the universal and the probable. Poetry in other words aims at
representing the ideal truth. However for Philip Sidney the world
that poetry represents is not the world as it is but is a morally
better world, in which the characters are more virtuous and actions
more noble. But Dryden would say that poetry is the image of
human nature that is, it is the representation of how men behave a
representation of their passions and their states of mind.
Dav~d Daiches says, "that all this representation according to
Dryden is done for the delight and instruction of mankind"ll. The
delight comes from the liveliness with which human nature is
represented, and from the pleasure, which comes from recognising
in fictional characters and fundamental psychological truths. The
instruction is not the moral instruction but instruction in the facts
of human nature. But the 'recognition' that delights is like Keats'
coinage of the word Remembrance. Keats wrote in one of his letters,
"Poetry should strike the reader as a wording of his own highest
thoughts and appear almost as a Remembrance" 12. Thus when
Dryden says "a just and lively imitation of human nature" delights
and instructs us, the delight is not because of recognising examples
of the familiar or the unfamiliar but it is the new knowledge. The
implication of Dryden's definition is that, literature is a form of
knowledge. The knowledge pleases partly because it is pleasant to
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Reality and Representation
increase our awareness and partly because of the delightful manner
in which it is conveyed.
One must consider Dr. Johnson VIews on poetry to understand
Dryden's argument. In his Preface to the Plays of Shakespeare
(1765) Dr. Johnson praises the playwright because he fulfils
precisely Dryden's requirement of a "just and lively image of human
nature". Dr. Johnson lays down the general principle that "nothing
can ple::l.se many and please long but just representation of human
nat'l:lre". The qualitY of justness brings out this adherence to the
truth of nature. Shakespeare is, above all writers, 'a poet of nature'
by which Dr. Johnson means that he holds up to his readers a
faithful mirror of manners and a life'. So the first quality is the
quality of verisimilitude, the quality of life likeness, the quality of
faithful adherence to the truth of nature. Dr. Johnson says that a
character in other writers is often an individual; in 'Shakespeare it
is commonly a species. Thus just representation of human nature
also means the representation of the universal element in human
nature. Shakespeare achieved the justness of representation not
only in his characters but also in his dialogues so much so that
they hardly seemed to be the product of fiction but they seemed to
have been gleaned with diligent selection out of day to day
conversation. It is true that Shakespeare represents the universal in
human nature and yet Shakespeare has the singular merit of
endowing each one of his characters with a distinct individuality.
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Reality and Representation
Dr. Johnson says that:
Shakespeare has no heroes, his scenes are occupied by speakers who act and speak as the reader thinks that he himself would have acted and spoken on the same occasion. 13
Not only this, even in his supernatural he approximates the remote
and familiarises the wonderful, so that if such creatures did exist
they would have probably behaved as he has described them. This
incidentally brings out two other important qualities of poetry; first,
that poetry has two fold function of making familiar unfamiliar by
addi_ng a certain novelty to it and unfamiliar familiar by adherence
to the truth of nature.
Dr. Johnson then talks of Shakespeare's weaknesses as a
dramatist. According to him Shakespeare often sacrifices virtue to
convenience. Shakespeare is so much more careful to please than
to instruct that he often seems to write without any moral purpose.
It is possible to construct a system of social order and duty from his
writings because he who thinks reasonably must also think
morally, but his precepts drop only casually. Moreover, in his plays
there is no just distribution of reward and punishment to good and
evil and he does not always show in the virtuous a disapprobation
of wickedness. Dr. Johnson believes that it is the writer's duty to
make the world better and this does not seem to have been a very
serious concern with Shakespeare. Secondly, his plots are loosely
formed and often carelessly persued and the end of the plots are not
always satisfactory. Thirdly, In Shakespeare the correct
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Reality and Representation
correspondence of diction to things is often neglected and trivial
sentiments and vulgar ideas are often expressed through sonorous
epithets and swelling figures. Fourthly, a quibble or a pun is to
Shakespeare 'what vapors are to the traveler'. A quibble is the
golden apple for which he will always turn aside from his career or
stoop from his elevation. These according to Dr. Johnson are some
of the glaring defects of Shakespeare's dramas.
While talking about unites in Shakespeare Dr. Johnson says that
his histories have only the unities of chronicles but in his tragedies
and comedies he has well preserved the unity of action. His plots as
Aristotle demands have a beginning, a middle and an end, and the
events are logically linked together and the conclusion follows by an
easy consequence. To the unities of time and place Shakespeare .
shows no regard and rightly so because they have given more
trou1;Jle to the poet than pleasure to the reader. According to Dr.
Johnson the necessity of observing the unities of time and place
arises from the supposed necessity of making the drama credible.
The critics believe that it is impossible that an action of months and
years should be supposed to pass in three hours nor can the
spectator believe the characters to pass from one place to another
in the duration of the same period and therefore they argue that the
mind revolts from evident falsehood. Dr. Johnson however argues
that it is a mistake to believe that a dramatic representation is ever
taken for reality:
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Reality and Representation
No spectator when he goes to the theater and finds the first scene opening in Alexandria believes that his walk to the theater is a voyage to Egypt, nor does he believe that he is living in the days of Antony and Ceasar, but if the spectator at one time takes the stage for Alexandria, there is no reason why a mind wandering in imagination should court the clock, or why an hour should not be a century in that calenture of the brains that can make the stage a field. 14
Dr. Johnson therefore argues that the spectators are always in their
senses. They know that a stage is a stage and the player a mere
actor and therefore there is nothing absurd In the stage
representing Sicily at one time and Athens at another, since the
spe~tator knows that it is neither Sicily nor Athens but only the
stage. Similarly there is no absurdity in compressing a long passage
of time in a short duration, since time is most congenial to
imagination and a lapse of years can be easily conceived as a
passage of hours. We do not take drama for reality but we are
moved because i,t is the just representation of the original and the
spectator feels the drama to be a truthful picture of what he himself
would feel or do. We do not take the evils in drama for real evils but
we are moved because we feel there are evils to which we may be
exposed. Dr. Johnson concludes that imitation produces pain or
pleasure not because it seeks representation of realities but
because it brings them to our mind. Dr. Johnson tested literature
by its capacity to appeal to the deepest moral needs. One of the
sternest Augustan doctrines was his credo, 'that imaginative writing
must appeal to what is general in human experience, not what is
particular'. In his Preface to his edition of Shakespeare he says:
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Reality and Representation
Nothing can please many, and please long, but just representations of general nature. Particular manners can be known to few, and therefore few only . can judge how nearly they are copies. The irregular combinations of fanciful invention may delight awhile, by that novelty of which the common satiety of life sends us all in quest; but the pleasures of sudden wonder are soon exhausted, and the mind can only repose on the stability of truth. 1s
Dr. Johnson thus implicitly accepted the Aristotelian doctrine that
art is an imitation. The Augustan dislike of eccentricity in art and
faith in the stability of truth were however the mainstay of his
thesis. In the above remark there is firstly an emphasis on
representational or mimetic nature of poetry, and secondly, there is
an emphasis on the fuzziness of representation. For Dr. Johnson
Shakespeare's characters are not unreal abstractions. They are real
people acting as they do in real life, while at the same time their
behaviour illuminates those general aspects of human nature
which, according to Dr. Johnson, are the true concerns of the poet.
When Johnson says that "Shakespeare has no heroes" he does not
mean that none of his characters are heroic in character or
behaviour or impressive in the strength of personality: he means
that his heroes illustrate and act according to general laws of
human nature. They are not demi-gods or supermen, but men,
whom we recognise as fellow human beings. Johnson's praise of
Shakespeare's 'Psychological Realism' is by implication recognition
of the importance of the particular, through which the general must
be presented. No character in a work of fiction or drama can appear
real if he is not individualised. According to David Daiches:
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For Johnson like Dryden, literature is a form of knowledge, which is valuable for its illustration, and illumination of human nature. We derive pleasure from seeing human nature thus illustrated and illuminated and not from the incidental beauties of expression the author employs. Johnson is clearer than Dryden on the question of whether what we learn about human nature is new knowledge or simply a lively illustration of what we already know. It is in essence what observant and thoughtful people already know conveyed through unknown examples to the reader.16
The pleasure the reader gets derives from his recognition of general
human nature. But. for Dr. Johnson poetry besides providing
recognition must also provide moral instruction. Thus the Neo-
classical critics like Dryden and Johnson moved away from Aristotle
in their insistence on moral instruction. For them poetry was
illustrative and exploratory in nature and hence the representation
of life was not revealing but merely evoked recognition so as to
instruct.
Mimesis continued to be a viable theory of poetic invention through
the Renaissance and beyond, into the eighteenth century. However
with the advent of Romantic Criticism, the emphasis on originality
and on the poets' genius became the major thesis of the era. Poetry
was "the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings" the poetic
process, the craft was not so essential to the production of art. In
his Preface to the Lyrical Ballads (1798) Wordsworth spoke at length
on the emotional state of the poet's mind rather than the means
with which he creates his work. According to Tillotson, the poet was
like an inspired Old Testament prophet who wrote the inspired
poem 17. Coleridge's Kubla Khan is an appropriate example of this.
The overt interest in mimesis was marginalised and poetry, as a
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reflection of poet's mind and soul was considered as the repository
of highest truth. For Wordsworth, the object of poetry was truth, for
Shelley poetry was the very image of life expressed in its eternal
truth. For John Stuart Mill, poetry was truth and the truth of
poetry was to paint the human soul. Derrida noticed an inevitable
hierarchy in Romantic literary theory which by positioning the poet
as a special being, endowed him with creative imagination and lively
sensibility, in short a comprehensive soul, made the literary
discourse superior to other sorts of discourse.
Wordsworth was aware that he was living In a world of rapid
historical change and the society was under constant transition
under these forces of change unleashed by industrialisation. He
along with Coleridge believed that society could be purified, but for
that the poets should tap the elemental forces in human beings and
their surroundings. This necessarily meant a new kind of poetry
and criticism. For the Augustan the task of the critics and the
philosopher was to maintain a clear vision so as to sustain and
refine the civilisation they inherited. The task of imaginative writer
was to renew the emotional freshness by his wit and invention.
Wordsworth however, tea~hes in his Preface that the educated
vision is not enough; simplest men are more likely to be aware of
their deep resources of life.
In the Preface Wordsworth continues with Aristotle's doctrine that
poetry is imitation, and he agrees with Johnson that its object is
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general not individual and particular. Poetry was the image of man
and nature. Wordsworth was trying to awaken the reader to a new
conception of poetry by conveying how the poet's mind operates. For
Wordsworth, the poet's mind 'recollects' and contemplates like a
chemical process of emotions; the mind is the spectator, and it is
emotion that is active.
With Coleridge's Biographia Literaria (1817) German thought
propounded by, Fichte, Schelling and Kant became predominant in
English Romanticism between 1800 and 1850. It ended the reign of
reason over imagination in literary thought. It broke the frontiers of
life and art and art was no longer thought of so much as highly
skilled profession, but more as a way of life. The critic became an
interpreter rather than an evaluator, and the imaginative writer
became the man living out human problems in imaginative terms,
rather . than the poet holding a mirror up to nature for the
judgement of reason. "Reason", Shelley was to write in A Defence of
Poetry (1821), "is to imagination as the instrument to the agent, as
the body to the spirit, as the shadow to the substance" 18. With the
Romantics the audience gradually receded in the background giving
place to the poet himself, and his own mental powers and emotional
needs. With the shift in focus of critical interests, the expressive
theory of art came into' being. Coleridge was the first critic to show
that no theory of artistic creation was valid unless it showed how
the artist was totally involved in the process of creation as man.
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Reality and Representation
This of course, demanded a total response by the reader: "The poet
brings the whole soul of man into activity" (Biographia Literana
Chap-XIV).
Coleridge begins his argument with eighteenth century assumption
basic to Hartley, that, in any theory of knowledge, there must be
subject and object, known and unknown, man and nature. He goes
on to argue that behind this duality there must be a unity neither
subject nor an object, but a principle of being which manifests itself
in the sum or 'I am'. This is God the infinite creative, unifying power
for which he invents the adjective 'essemplastic' (shaping into one).
Coleridge declares that this infinitive creative power, which he
terms the primary imagination', manifests itself as the secondary
imagination' in acts of creation. It differs from 'Fancy', which
hitherto had loosely been regarded as synonymous with
imagination, because 'Fanc;y' is merely a mode of memory with no
capacity to recreate, but only to combine images in associations,
whereas the 'imagination dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to
re-create'.
Thus in Coleridge's terms, it becomes difficult any longer to think of
the poet as making Aristotelian imitations of nature, for this implies
judgement of the poem in the light of the nature regarded as an
object. For Coleridge poetic truth is not that of the object, but a
union between the subject and the ojbect; of a union of the poet
and the nature; general and the concrete; the idea with the image;
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Reality and Representation
the individual and the representative. The poetry is thus
essemplatic, and creates new wholes out of discordant qUalities.
Coleridge's Biographia has had·more influence on twentieth century
critics than on the nineteenth century ones. It was the most
articulate expression of a spirit, which had been slowly taking
shape even within the Augustan Neo-Classic 18th century. Sense
(feeling) and sensibility (reason) became prominent in literary
currency. Jane Austen's novel Sense and Sensibility (1811)
contrasts the two aspects of late Augustan period: admiration for
sound reason and cultivation of taste for the imaginative pleasures.
With Keats the Romantic thought reached its pinnacle of glory. This
development as a poet was also his spiritual development. This
struggle to experience truth in his poems was his singular
occupation and he invented the famous phrase 'Negative ,Capability'
i.e. 'where a man is capable of being in uncertainties, ,mysteries,
doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason'. The
union of thought and the sense constituted 'Beauty" for Keats. The
process of reconciling suffering and delight in 'Beauty' is the theme
of his great Odes 'what the imagination seizes as beauty must be
truth'. Wordsworth, Coleridge and Keats all in their own individual
ways saw poetry as an enlargement of the poet's and the reader's
personalities through the extension of their sympathies. This
concern with growth from within the personality was what
distinguished the Romantic period of 1790-1830 from the Augustan
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period and it constituted a change of direction from the outer world
of society to inner world of spirit.
The Augustans were deeply critical of their society but were highly
optimistic that their society had all the regenerative resources to
reinvigorate human civilization. However the Romantics influenced
by the ferment of ideas unleashed by the French Revolution, and
under the onslaught of social ills ushered in by the Industrial
Revolution, felt that society denied essential human needs. Hence
the need for imaginative literature to nurture the inner lives of
individuals. For Sidney the world was by its nature a fallen one,
and for Shelley poetry was the supreme function of the mind, but
Arnold was specifically concerned with poetry as a remedy for the
ills of contemporary society. He felt that English life had lost the
spirit of culture and civilisation, which was so vital in the age of
Shakespeare. He made a plea not for poetry but for criticism, to
counter the ills of materialism. The essence of this critical function,
was "the idea of a disinterested endeavour to learn the best that is
known and felt in the world and to establish a current of fresh
ideas".
In the later half of the nineteenth century a two-fold process
unfolded itself. In creative poetry, it could be said that the Victorian
Age was a continuation of the Romantic Movement; it was the
overflow of the Romantic spirit. On the other hand in criticism there
was a re-establishment of many of the Neo-Classical principles. In
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fact much of Arnold's criticism is only a re-statement of many
canons of Aristotle's theory of poetry. However, the Victorian Age
added a new dimension both to creative literature as well as to the
critical theory; and this was the dimension of social realism on the
one hand and social criticism on the other. In this area before
Arnold, Carlyle and Ruskin are important philosophers as they
helped to increase the social consciousness of both writers as well
as critics. Both Carlyle and Ruskin belonged to anti-philistine
movement. They were the crusaders against the materialistic
progress of the nineteenth century and the utilitarian philosophy of
the nineteenth century. Carlyle describes Economics as a dismal
science and Ruskin had a clear concept in his mind that we can not
serve two masters, we can either serve God or Mammon.
The critics of the later Victorian Age that is after, 1850, seem to be ,
more in ~greement with Aristotle, that it is possible for a poet to
imitate men 'as they are'. There was a difference however that while
in Dryden and Dr. Johnson the emphasis was on 'Psychological
Realism' in the Victorian critics the emphasis was on 'Imitation of
man not only as he is but in relation to society'. Thus, in Arnold the
social aspect of criticism becomes important. This is brought out
particularly by his great emphasis on 'Culture'. Arnold could not
speak of poetry or literature without at the same time speaking
about culture. For him 'Culture' was the context in which literature
was created and literature expressed the 'Culture' or the cultural
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context in which that particular literature was created. It is for this
reason that he came out with a new idea in the second important
critical document called "The Function of Criticism At The Present
Time" (Essays in Criticism 1- 1865). This essay is less an essay in
literary criticism and more an essay in the relationship between
literary criticism and culture. It is in this essay that Arnold
introduces the very important term in his critical theory, namely the
concept of 'disinterestedness'. This concept of 'disinterestedness' is
closely allied to the concept of objectivity and it should be noted
that mimetic theory is essentially an objective theory of literature.
The Romantic theory on the other hand was a subjective theory, it
was concerned basically with 'ego' and 'self. Arnold believed that no
social or political reform could lead to a truly enlightened society, or
even understand the contemporary ills unless guided by 'Hellenic'
consciousness. He was impressed by the high level of culture in
contemporary France, with its governing academy and by the
success of Von Humboldt in the organising of Prussian education.
These examples of enlightened authority led him to declare in
Culture and Anarchy (1869) that the state must be made the
'expression of our best self. Central to Arnold is however his view
that poetry was a criticism of life and the greatness of a poet lies in
his powerful and beautiful application of ideas to life. Arnold
rejected poets like Chaucer, Dryden, Pope and Burns for they
according to him did not exhibit high seriousness, unlike Dante,
Homer, Milton and Shakespeare.
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It has the power of forming, sustaining and delighting us, as nothing else can. It is therefore essentially moral, not in the narrow didactic sense, but in the larger sense of conforming to the highest ideals of truth, goodness and Beauty .19
In Literature for T.S. Eliot it was necessary for the poet and critic to
owe an allegiance to what he named as tradition. Eliot is
particularly remembered in criticism for the varied importance and
meaning he gave to the concept of tradition. Secondly, he is
remembered for his impersonal theory of poetry. In both of these
there seems little connection with Aristotle. Nevertheless, Eliot in a
way- re-interprets some of the principles of Aristotle's Poetics and it
is not without significance that Eliot describes Aristotle as a perfect
critic:
The most important idea connected with the mimetic theory is Eliot's emphasis on objectivity. Just as Matthew Arnold is never tired of laying an emphasis on the importance of action in poetry, similarly, Eliot is never tired of laying an equal emphasis on the importance of 'objectivity' in a work of art. Eliot believed that a critic ought to be objective in his outlook. The mimetic theory of poetry is the most objective theory of poetry. In a way, the Imagist movement of poetry in England the credit for encouraging which goes to Eliot, is also a part of the mimetic theory of poetry, because even there the attempt is to present ideas and feelings in the form of concrete images, which is something objective. John Crowe Ransom calls the Imagist poetry a kind of physical poetry, that is it talks of things and, as he puts it, about their 'thinginess': .... The Imagists were important figures in the history of our poetry, and they were both theorists and creators. It was their intention to present things in their thinginess, ... and to such an extent had the public lost its sense of thinginess that their redirection was wholesome. What the public was inclined to seek in poetry was ideas, whether large ones or small ones; grand ones or pretty ones, certainly ideas to live by one die by, but what the Imagist identified with the stuff of poetry was, simply, things .... 20
Eliot is quite clear in his mind that if poetry has to be great then it
must be objective and it must be impersonal. T. S. Eliot therefore,
in his essay, "Tradition and Individual Talent" rejects Wordsworth's
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expressive theory of poetry outright. He says that it is wrong to say
that poetry is 'emotions recollected in tranquility', because it is
neither emotion, nor recollection, nor, the state of mind in which
poetry is created can without distortion of meaning be called
tranquil. Later on he makes an even more powerful statement when
he says:
Poetry is not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion; it is not the expression of personality but an escape from personality. But, of course, only those who have personality and emotions know what it means to want to escape from this things.21
In ather words according to Eliot, direct expression of emotion in
poetry is not possible. Poetry is not the spontaneous overflow of
powerful feelings. But poetry has to seek a medium through which
alone emotions can be expressed. Here we are reminded of
Aristotle's emphasis on action. According to Aristotle, vr'ragedy is an
imitation not of men but of action' and character comes in only as
subsiaiary to it. For Aristotle character includes feelings and
thought includes ideas. Eliot is more or less saying the same thing
as Aristotle when he invents the term 'objective correlative' which is
one of the terms which has become extremely popular in the
twentieth century criticism. Eliot uses this term when he talks
about Hamlet in his essay. The thesis Eliot wishes to bring out is
the emotion that Shakespeare sought to bring out in Hamlet could
not be properly expressed because he was not able to find an
outward framework of situation which would exactly correspond to
the emotion he had wanted to express:
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Reality and Representation
The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an 'objective correlative'; in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are, given, the emotion is immediatelyevoked.22
In other words the failure of Hamlet is the failure of a proper
'objective correlative'. The idea that poetry should express itself in
the form of legends is only another expression of the emphasis on
'objective correlative'. Because 'image' IS the objective
correspondence to the idea, the feelings, the emotion that the poet
wishes to express. He no longer tries to express them through 'a
spontaneous overflow' but he presents an image which would
exactly correspond to the emotion that is sought to be expressed.
Hence 'image' in a poem on a minor scale is what 'objective
correlative' is in a drama. Objectification of one's personality alone
can render greatness to a work of art. Keats' 'Negative Capability'
where the poet must have the capacity of abnegation of his own self,
is reminiscent in this context.
In his essay "Tradition and Individual Talent"(1917), Eliot redefined
the term 'tradition' like Wordsworth had redefined the word 'nature'
in the beginning of nineteenth century. 'Nature' for Wordsworth was
not inanimate but active which provided emotional nourishment to
the humanity. Similarly for Eliot 'tradition' was not 'the dead hand
of past' forcing the present into conformity with it, but all that is
alive from the past capable of assimilation by the present, and
altered by it. Thus representation of reality for Eliot meant a
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Reality and Representation
creative amalgamation of reality filtered through past and altered by
the present. For Eliot felt that a 'dissociation of sensibility' had
taken place with Milton and Dryden when the mind and emotion
separated. 'A thought to Donne was an experience, it modified his
sensibility', but that ended in the seventeenth century. While
talking about tradition Eliot gives a new meaning to the term
'history'. As Watson points out, it is a strange historical sense that
ignores the chronological sense of time:
And this historical sense is 'what makes a writer traditional'. But _ it is an odd historical sense that denies chronology and conceives
of the past as both 'the timeless and the temporal'. 23
In a way Eliot releases history from its historical context because in
talking about historical sense, he says it is a sense of the timeless
and of the temporal and of the timeless and temporal together.
Infact he introduces the concept of simultaneity of history. He says
all great poetry IS simultaneous, it IS a statement of .. ;:.
contemporaneity of all great poetry:
Tradition is a matter of much wider significance. It can not be inherited, and if you want it you must obtain it by great labour. It involves, in the first place, the historical sense, which we may call nearly indispensable to anyone who would continue to be a poet beyond his twenty-fifth year; and the historical sense compels a man to write not merely with his own generation in his bones, but with a feeling that the whole of the literature of Europe from Homer and within it the whole of the literature of his own country has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order. This historical sense, which is a sense of the timeless as well as of the temporal and of the timeless and the temporal together, is what makes a writer traditional and it is at the same time what makes a writer most acutely conscious of his place in time, of his own contemporaneity.24
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In Aristotle this simultaneity is a part of the emphasis on the formal
element. Eliot is never tired of saying that we must consider a poem
free from its historical context as well as from the poet's biography.
This idea was put forth also by Arnold when he said that the real
estimate is that which is free of historical estimate and personal
estimate. In other words, as with Aristotle, for Eliot also a poem has
its meaning in itself and the meaning can be discovered only
through its form. The formal element is therefore the most
important element in a work of art. In fact, what makes a work of
art IS the formal element. This concern with the form is one of the
common elements between the twentieth century criticism and
Aristotle. Besides Eliot, a group of critics, who described themselves
as New Critics particularly in the United States, derived inspiration
both from Aristotle and Eliot.
With the Formalists the e,xpressive and mimetic definition of
literature were discarded. To see literature either as an expression
of an author's personality and world vision or as a mimetic
representation (realistic) of the world in which he lived was no more
valid. To see literary texts as an expression of author's personality
invariably would undermine the literary qualities of the text and
focus would be more on biography, psychology, history, politics,
and sociology. The Russian Formalists introduced the notion of
'defamiliarisation' i.e. reality presented in such a way so as to make
it strange. The concept of 'literariness' i.e. what makes a work
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Reality and Representation
literary and the concept of 'differentiation' in which for e.g. poetry is
analysed only by a. comparison with what is not poetry are the
hallmarks of Formalists. Formalist theory reversed the priority of
content over form and devoted its attention exclusively to form.
Roland Barthes identified five major codes by which literature IS
constituted: - the semic, the symbolic, the proairetic, henneneutic
and the cultural code. These codes are shared by the author and
the reader and their role in the text is what makes it a text.
According to Barthes these codes form a network or a topos through
which the text passes, and these codes are not inherently literary
and function as a part of the general. Reality therefore is not
defined either concretely or semantically. Instead reality becomes a
kind of text itself, constituted by codes. To write about reality is
then not to relate word to thing, but text to text.
For the Marxi~~ theoretician George Lukacs, literature does not
reflect reality as a mirror reflects the objects placed in front of it.
Literature is knowledge of reality, and knowledge is not a matter of
making one to one correspondences between things in the world
outside and ideas in the heads, but it has shape. To be reflected in
literature, reality has to pass through the creative form giving work
of the writer. The 'correct form' for Lukacs is one, which reflects
reality in the most objective way. He feels Walter Scott, Balzac and
Leo Tolstoy's writings to be the most correct as they take into
account the contradictory nature of a capitalist society. Zola and
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Reality and Representation
Proust on the other hand gave an inflated emphasis to one aspect of
reality at the expense of others i.e., unmediated totality. According
to Lukacs a properly 'mediated totality' by contrast, IS a
representation which reveals the true relationship between the
human subject and the objective world. The rest was a distorted
reality or ideological deformations of reality which failed to take into
account objective situation of a society founded on the contradiction
between classes.
The film theory draws upon the two principal traditions of narrative
representation: -
1. Mimetic: Narration as the presentation of spectacle, l.e.,
showing.
2. Diegetic: Narration in terms of a verbal activity, i.e. telling (oral
and written).
Aristotle's theory of mimesis applies primarily to theatrical
performances, however before him in Plato's time the term had been
stretched to include imitation in painting and sculpture. Mimetic
theories begin from the act of seeing or viewing; an object is
presented to the eye of the beholder. The Greek theater and
painting and later Renaissance arts were all guided by one central
characteristic of 'perception'. All representation in arts and all the
modes of representation struggled towards an accurate imitation so
as to provide an accurate perception. Aristotle's Greece had in it's
theater (theatron-seeing place) and painting an awareness of how to
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Reality and Representation
calculate visual spectacle in relation to spectator's sight. In fact the
Greek theater had confronted the question of theater space and the
spectator in relation to it in the very beginning. Hence various
principles of perspective in painting influenced the Renaissance
stage, the proscenium framed the stage picture, concealed the back
stage and so on and so forth. The Renaissance church exploited the
perspective principles to paint the church walls and ceilings with
biblical and ecclesiastical stories. Even then the prime deciding
factor was the spectator's vision and the construction of an 'ideal
viewer' with an 'ideal vantage point'.
With the rise of the novel in the eighteenth and nineteenth century
all prose fiction came to be thought of in mimetic terms. Right from
George Eliot to Dryden everyone aimed for mastery of images and
pictures in their writings. Henry James considered the novel to be a
pictorial art and attempted a mimetic theory of literary narration.
According to James the writer's technical devices included 'framing'
and the 'point of view'. All film theory before 1960 is derived from
mimetic theories of narration. Film theorists like Hugo Munsterberg
and Rudolph Arnheim begin theorising from a basic hypothesis that
a film is a string of images. Andre Bazin acknowledges the centrality
of visual spectacle. According to him Cinema is like a photographed
play with the camera stressing and selecting certain details. Film
theory stresses the role of the camera and the camera lens becomes
the invisible or implied spectator. V.l. Pudovkin in his 1926
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Reality and Representation
monograph Film Technique describes how the change of shot
conveys the impression of a spectator watching a street encounter
and casting his glance from one to the other. Pudovkin even
suggests that quickening the tempo of editing can replicate in the
viewer the mounting excitement of the implied viewer.
All film theorists readily accepted the invisible or implied viewer
theory and this model solved all the problems of space, storyteller,
point-of-view etc. This classical model assumed the invisible
witness rooted to the spot, on the same side of the axis of action or
"1800 Line". Continuity editing or cutting was the mainstay of this
classical model and could easily mimic ordinary experience. This
formulation however sprung a leak when this invisible witness was
to don an omniscient observer role and could view anything and
everything cutting through space and time. This could hardly be
justified as faithful rendition of invisible viewer's perception, hence,
the filmmake"rs and theorists decided that omniscience should be
limited and the invisible observer became the ideal implied viewer
without an obtrusive presence. However, there were other problems
to contend with, given the fact that the camera position and cutting
approximated the actual perception, the stylized technique likes
wipe outs, negative filming, jade out etc brought in psychological
aspects of the viewer beyond his viewing. Yasujiro Ozu, the famous
Japanese filmmaker always used low camera angles so as to
reproduce the perception of a seated guest. However, the viewing
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Reality and Representation
would become disconcerting because the real viewer would always
find itself looking up. The classical model was useful for a very
basic narrative representation. Its emphasis upon the eye-camera
analogy however made it reductive. The narrational role of other
film techniques was reduced.
Eisenstein developed the mimetic theory further by including an
emotional aspect in the narration. He insisted that representation
involved not a simple and flat depiction but a heightening of the
import and emotion of what was depicted. He called it the
Expressive Movement and considered that representation should
affect the perceiver, something like Aristotle's Catharsis. Eisenstein
felt that this could be achieved through 'montage' the juxtaposition
of shots that would shock the spectator into a desired emotion. 'The
Agitprop Theater of Eisenstein's time left its mark. Representation I
was supposed to be an instrument affecting the perceiver in specific
ways. The expressionist emphasis in Eisenstein's theory implies the
shaping hand of a director. His theory of 'montage' and mise-en-
scene (all the physical properties that constitute a frame) all point
to the creative intervention of a maker of a film. His mimetic theory
of the Cinema now aimed at various techniques to articulate the
emotional essence of the reality and thus absorbing the spectator in
the narrative process itself.
Coming back to the question of narrative tradition propounded by
both Plato and Aristotle, we know that if Plato viewed narration as
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fundamentally a linguistic activity, Aristotle laid emphasis In the
mimetic tradition of narrative representation. The film theory
borrowed heavily from such a conception and the 'film narrative'
was closely compared with language. This narrative tradition of
'telling' was called Diegesis. Diegesis now stands for the fictional
world depicted in a narrative. Diegesis became a popular concept
with the twentieth century literary theorists, for whom literature
was not merely mimesis but primarily a linguistic activity. In 1960's
Roland Barthes applied Ferdinand De Sassures' theory of
signification and Semiotics to non-linguistic systems like fashion
and advertisements, including media. All manner of cultural
phenomena like films thus came to be treated as analogous to
verbal activity.
The Semiologists wrote of painting and theater as language ,
systems. The Russian Formalists were the first to exploit the
analogies betWeen language and film in a detailed way. While a film
shot was compared to the line of verse, various other cinematic
equivalents for symbol metaphors and similes were sought
energetically. However it was only with the French Structuralists
and Semioticians that the lingusitic theory was applied to analyse
fil . .Hi
1 m narration.
Digital imaging technologies are rapidly transforming nearly all
aspects of contemporary film production. Computer manipulation of
images in films like Steven Speilberg's The Jurassic Park (1993),
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Reality and Representation
Oliver Stone's JFK (1991) or the Hollywood blockbuster Terminator
II (1991), is so novel and its special effects so unprecedented that
the concepts of mimesis and representation in Cinema have to
readapt itself. In Spielberg's Jurassic Park viewers watched
photographic images of moving, breathing and chomping dinosaurs,
images which have no basis in any photographic reality but which
nevertheless seem realistic. In JFK the real life news footage of
President Kennedy's assassination and aftermath is so cleverly
juxtaposed with recreated shots and edited in such a manner that
the -thin line between reality and re-enacted reality gets blurred. To
match the black and white print of news footage the raw stock of
the film IS also black and white in places and hence the reality
imitated is merely a constructed reality. In the film Forest Gump
(1994), directed by Robert Zemeckis, President Kennedy is shown
speaking to actor Tom Hanks with dialogues provided by the
scriptwriter years after Kennedy is dead. Computer- imaging has
thus made it possible to create credible images and challenge the
traditional assumptions about realism and Cinema, which are
embodied in film theory.
From Charles Pierce to Roland Barthes, it was postulated that
photographs and their referents couldn't be separated.
I call photographic referent' not the optionally real thing to which an image or sign refers but the necessarily real thing which has been placed before the lens without which there would be no photograph. 26
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Reality and Representation
Since Cinema was a photographic medium, film theorists based
their theories on the indexical status of the photographic sign.
While Andre Bazin went on to say that however distorted,
discoloured and howsoever lacking in documentary value the film
image may be, it was a reproduction and a mode1.2~ Siegfried
Kracauer also maintained that film image basically redeems
physical reality. However the technique of computer generated
images (CGI) by twisting, stretching, adding, deleting images mocks
the notion of indexical referentiality.
In film theory, the Formalist outlook propounded by Rudolph
Arnheim, Dziga Vertov and Sergei Eisenstein, stresses Cinema's
capacity for reorganising and even countering and falsifying,
physical reality. This schism in classical film theory, which either
considers Cinema's capability to photographically copy reality, or to ,
stylisti~ally transcend that reality continues till date. However the
Semioticians feel that codes and discourse, in Cinema produce the
"reality" effect. Dudley Andrew explains:
The discovery that resemblance is coded and therefore learned was a tremendous and hard won victory for semiotics over those upholding a notion of naive perception in Cinema.2~
Representation in Cinema today is viewed as both indexical and
semiotical where Cinema is a discourse and realism is seen as one
discourse among many. In order to understand the nature of
representation through digital imaging technologies, one must
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Reality and Representation
understand a correspondence-based model of cinematic
representation .2~ The synthetic realities produced by digital
imaging seem real because they include iconic and non-iconic social
cues, which are from the viewer's real world. These cues could be
visual, i.e., they approximate to real world features of shape-size,
contour, geography and monoloculur distance codes, these in turn
evoke comprehension among VIewers who recognIse the
experientially familiar objects. These visual cues are then
juxtaposed along with social behaviour like motive, intent. Hence
we see that cinematic representation operates through structured
correspondence between the images and the viewer's visual and
social world. These digital images can be called 'Perceptually
Realistic'. A 'Perceptually Realistic' image is one, which corresponds
to the viewer's audio-visual experience of the three-dimensional
space and may not have an exact referent in the real world29 •
Perceptually Realistic images may be unreal but they organise the
display of light, colour, texture, movement and sound in ways that
correspond with the viewer's own understanding of these
phenomena in daily life.
Perceptual Realism thus brings us into new realms of mimesis in
film theory. The theory of cinematic representation in the last
hundred years has moved from indexically based notions of realism
to realism as a discourse in Cinema to perceptual realism with no
referent in the real world.
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Reality and Representation
Notes
1. Tobias Doring, "The Real Inspector Freud: Kim Morrisey, Terry Johnson and the Drama of Hysteria" in Contemporary Drama in English Vol. 3,1995 Drama and Reality, from Tobias Doring Website (online database).
2. Michael Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity; A particular history of the senses (NY: London: Routledge, 1993), p.xiii.
3. Jack Purcell, 'Plato's Theory of film' Commentary Page, USA, 2000
in Cinemania
4. Jacques Derrida, of Grammotology, Trans. Gayatri Spivak (Baltimore: John Hopkins Univ. Press, 1976), pp.36-37.
5. _ S.H. Butcher, Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art (New Delhi: Kalyani Publishers, 1981), p.25
6. Ibid., p.27
7. Kapil Kapoor and Ranga Kapoor,ed. Canonical Texts of English Literary Criticism: With Selections From Classical Poeticians, (NewDelhi:Academic Foundation, 1995),p. 133.
8. Ibid.p, 133.
9. S.Ramaswami and V.S. Seturaman ed., The English Critical Tradition: An Anthology of English Literacy Criticism. Volume One (India: Macmillan, 1977) p.123.
10. Ibid., John Dryden, An Essay on Dramatic Poesie, p.170
11. David Daiches, Critical Approaches to Literature (U.K., Orient Longman, 1977), p. 79.
12. Obset Ramaswami, Sethuraman, ed. John Keats, 'From the Letters to John Taylor, 27th Feb 1818, p.369.
13. Ibid. Dr. Johnson's, A Preface to Shakespeare, p.249.
14. Ibid., p.258.
15. Ibid., p.247.
16. p.84.
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Reality and Representation
17. Geoffrey Tillotson, 'Drewmar's Essay on Poetry an Exposition and Comment', in HenryLevin L, Perspectives on Criticism (NY: Russell and Russell, 1970), p.176.
18. Op.Cit. Ramaswami & Sethuraman, ed. Selections from Mathew Arnold, p.362.
19. Ibid., A Defence of Poetry by Shelley, p.290.
20. Op.Cit .David Daiches, p.288.
21. Shiv K. Kumar, Three Essays (Calcutta: O.U.P. 1994), p.25.
22. Ibid., p.27.
23. George Watson, The Literary Critics (Middlesex: Hammondsworth, Penguin Book Ltd., 1962), p.182.
24. Op. cit. David Daiches, p.288.
25. Ann Jefferson and David Robey ed. Modem Literary Theory: A Comparative Introduction2nd ed.: (London: B.T. Basford Ltd., 1986), p.172.
26. Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, Trans. Richard Howard (NY: Hill and Wany, 1981), p.76.
27. Andre Bazin, What is Cinema? Vol. 1 Ed. and Trans. Hugh Gray (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1967), p.14.
28. Dudley Andrew, Concepts in Film Theory (NY: Oxford University Press, 1984), p.25. .
29. Stephen Price, "True Lies: Perceptual realism digital images and film theory" in Film Quarterly .49.3 (Spring, 1996), pp.27-38.
67