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REBUILDING PLANS IN MEXICO – 1

REBUILDING FISHERIES © OECD 2012

REBUILDING PLANS IN MEXICO1

Introduction

In Mexico, the direct users of the fishery resources include people from different

social sectors such as the fishing cooperatives which members are locally called

“cooperativist fishers” (“Pescadores cooperativados”); the private sector, with groups

called “permisionarios”; the “armadores”, or simply “iniciativa privada”, which are

groups of private entrepreneurs with interests in fishing who, most often, possess fishing

vessels and have some investment in the processing sector; and the “pescadores libres” or

“free fishers”. The first two sectors hold fishing permits whereas the latter sectors pursue

fishing without any fishing permit and thereby pursue illegal commercial fishing.

The cooperatives (from any productive sector, including fisheries), are social

enterprises: all its assets (e.g. cars, processing plants, if any, among others) are common

property of the members. The highest authority of a cooperative is the general assembly

of members. A second, lower level of authority are two councils, an Administrative

Council, which is in charge of marketing the harvested product, and the Security Council

which is in charge of the enforcement of rules. According to most cooperative’s internal

rules, these authorities have a mandate of at last two years. Membership in cooperatives is

voluntary. Each member has only one vote in decision making at general assembly

gatherings. Some cooperatives run their own processing plants (e.g., in the abalone

fishery, where there are several such plants). Each member of a cooperative shall,

according to the internal rules, deliver all his or her catch to the cooperative for

marketing. In order to become a member of a cooperative, a person should submit an

application to the general assembly which then decides on whether the applicant is

accepted or not. Except for emerging and potential fisheries (i.e. some underdeveloped

fisheries, e.g. some crab fisheries in the Ocean Pacific coast) new entries to most fishing

cooperatives are currently restricted. The reason for restricting acces is that fishers are

well aware of the fact that admitting more fishers in a cooperative means less catch for

each member.

With respect to the legal status of a cooperative, there are no special laws for

regulating the cooperatives. On the other hand, “pescadores libres” or free fishers have

diverse backgrounds. In some cases they are sons of members of fishing cooperatives

who were not accepted as new members at their father’s cooperative but who pursue

fishing without a fishing permit; or simply fishers that care not to belong to a social

enterprise like a cooperative. Also there are many “pescadores libres” who moved from

sectors experiencing economic crises (mostly from agriculture) that turned to fishing for

their livelihood. Overall, “pescadores libres” usually means “illegal fishers” but in several

1. This case study has been prepared in collaboration with Ana Minerva Arce Ibarra, Eloy Sosa Cordero,

Moisés Valencia Arámburo, and Francisco Arreguín Sánchez.

2 – REBUILDING PLANS IN MEXICO


cases, entitled fishers fish alongside those illegal fishers in the same fishing areas.

However, should any fisher be pursuing fishing only for subsistence purposes, the current

Mexican Law on Fisheries allows him/her to do so which means that the current

legislation does not limit or restrict the total number of subsistence fishers to fisheries that

have not been previously allocated to someone else.

This paper will presents four Mexican case studies that do have implemented either

fishery rebuilding plans or isolated management strategies that can be considered to be

first steps towards development of a rebuilding plan.

Methods

This work was carried out in two stages. During the first one, a contract between

ECOSUR and OECD was signed at the end of November 2009 which contained the terms

of reference (TOR’s) with detailed instructions on the consultant’s task, together with the

schedule of an agreed upon remuneration. The second stage started with a selection of

four Mexican case studies to be included in the project, a task that was completed by the

consultant together with the co-authors as a research team, in collaboration with the

OECD Secretariat.

To fill out the “ATTACHMENT: Fisheries Rebuilding Plans- Case Study” template

of the present project, two sources of data were used; firstly, a literature review of

published and unpublished papers, and secondly, the expertise of a research team -the co-

authors, who gathered during the end of January 2010 to discuss and agree upon the

scope of the project as well as on the contents that were needed to fill out at each section

of the “attachment” template. With respect to the former, they included: unpublished

Master and Doctor of Science Theses, articles published in peer reviewed journals,

official documents published by the government, such as the National Fisheries Charter

(NFC), the National Fishing Institute’s (Instituto Nacional de Pesca, INAPESCA) Red

Book (i.e., INAPESCA, 2006), the Normas Oficiales Mexicanas (NOM`s), the Annual

Fishery Statistics (“Anuarios Estadísticos de Pesca”), a paper from OECD (OCDE, 2006)

as well as several internal (unpublished) stock assessment reports available at the

INAPESCA and National Institute of Aquaculture and Fisheries (Comisión Nacional de

Acuacultura y Pesca, CONAPESCA) websites . In this regard, this Mexican project is

based primarily based on past research undertaken by several authors. Thus, in several

cases, it was noted that in some of the reviewed papers concepts were used loosely and

which blurred the meaning of some details. Taking this into consideration, the co-authors

did their best in responding to the comments and questions of clarification posed by the

OECD staff to earlier drafts of those case studies. However, due to the nature of the

project, not all questions could be fully covered.

Finally, data to this paper also includes personal communications with staff from

INAPESCA (Mexico City) as well as from the Fisheries Secretariat of the Yucatan state

and from several fishing cooperatives from Quintana Roo.

Results

Results on the proposed Mexican case studies

A first Mexican case studies’ list was sent to OECD, which is shown in the following

paragraph. Some of those fisheries have already implemented a fishery recovery plan,

while others are fisheries with isolated management strategies which although sometimes



could be taken as stock recovery strategies, but are in need of a formal, explicit stock

recovery plan. Fisheries with relevance in terms of both, economic and social aspects are

marked with an *:

* The abalone fishery (Haliotis fulgens, H. corrugata, H. cracherodii, H. sorenseni and

H. rufescens). This is a small-scale fishery located on the western coast of the Baja

California Peninsula. It is one of the few cases of deteriorated fisheries which has a

fishery recovery plan. This plan was proposed in 1996 and fully implemented in the

year 2000. It is considered a successful case of a recovered fishery. There is political

will to recover this fishery.

* The totoaba (Totoaba macdonaldi) fishery. The totoaba is an endemic species

harnessed by small-scale and semi-industrial fisheries. It is located at the Gulf of

California, particularly at its inner side. In 1943, the catch reached a peak of about 2,000

tonnes but had fallen to only 50 tonnes in 1975. Since then the Mexican government

imposed a moratorium and introduced several aquaculture projects to enhance the stock.

However it is known that, an illegal and unreported catch for this species has continued

for several decades albeit the moratorium. Currently, juveniles of this species are

captured as by-catch in the shrimp fishery with estimated fishing mortalities

representing about 90-95% (Cisneros-Mata et al., 1995). This species is currently

enlisted on CITES, more specifically on the IUCN Red List of Threatened Species (as

critically endangered) and also on the Mexican NOM-059 (as endangered species)

(DOF, 2002, p. 77).

*The red grouper (Epinephelus morio, Epinephelus spp. and Mycteroperca spp.)

fishery. The target species of this fishery is the red grouper (E. morio). This is a

sequential fishery located at the Yucatan Peninsula, with a coastal fleet (or “flota

menor”) a semi-industrial fleet (or “flota mayor”) and a foreign industrial fleet (a Cuban

fishingvessels). It is currently overexploited (DOF, 2004).

*The queen conch (Strombus gigas) fishery. This is a small-scale fishery with strong

linkages to the culture and traditions of provincial fishers and is used as a sign at the

flag of Quintana Roo state. Situated in the greater Caribbean, the stocks of this species

have been systematically depleted in many fishing areas and the only place in Mexico

where its fishing is permitted is in the state of Quintana Roo. In order to assign the TAC

for this species, the Natinonal Fisheries Institute (INAPESCA) has estimated the stock

size using spatial models.

*The pink shrimp (Farfantepenaeus duorarum) fishery. This is an industrial fishery.

According to Arreguín-Sánchez et al. (2008) this fishery’s yields peaked at about

27,000 tonnes per year in the early 1970s, of which the pink shrimp represented around

90%. At present, with a fleet of about 300 boats, it yields around 3000 tonnes per year,

and pink shrimp contributes less than 1000 t of the total.

The jewfish (Epinephelus itajara) fishery: in the Gulf of Mexico and at the Quintana

Roo’s coast, this species is a part of a multispecies artisanal fishery based on bony

fishes called “escama” (or scaled fish). Due to this species longevity (about 40 years)

and behaviour it is very easy to capture it and therefore its abundance has been

diminishing in several fishing areas. The National Fisheries Chart states that it is

necessary to recover the population of this species at the Quintana Roo’s coast,

particularly at Chetumal Bay (DOF, 2004, p. 440).



*The pen shell (Pinna rugosa) fishery: This is an artisanal fishery located in the Pacific

Ocean, particularly off the Northwestern coast of Mexico and specifically on the coasts

of Sinaloa and Nayarit. During the last 5 years, there was a “boom” in this fishery

because of the discovery of a new fishing bank. Unfortunately, due to both natural

events and mismanagement, to date, the new bank has been already

depleted.Additionally, from 2005 to 2007, 14 fishers have died pursuing this fisheries

due to diving-related accidents. Currentfield observations claim that there are between

1900 to 2600 “pescadores libres” or free fishers (i.e., people without a fishing permit)

taking part in this fishery.

Mullets fisheries: white mullet (Mugil curema) and flathead mullet (M. cephalus).

There are two fisheries where the stocks of these species are perceived as deteriorated.

Those fisheries are located, respectively, at the Northwestern coast of Mexico (Pacific

Ocean) and in the Gulf of Mexico (DOF, 2004, p. 151).

The marsh clams (Rangia cuneata and R. flexuosa) fishery: This former artisanal

fishery was located at the Gulf of Mexico, particularly at the Campeche coast.

Currently, there is a permanent closed season because those populations are recovering

from overfishing. (DOF, 2004, p.129).

The brown sea cucumber (Isostichopus fuscus) fishery (see DOF, 2004, p. 483).

During the 1980’s and early 1990’s, there was a sea cucumber fishery which collapsed

and was permanently closed from May, 1994, to March, 2000. This fishery is currently

located at the Eastern coast of the Baja California Peninsula. It is currently exploited by

fishing cooperatives under a productive (area-delimited) system called UMAS

(“Unidades de Manejo para la vida Silvestre” or Units for Wildlife Management).

Based on a coordinated work with OECD Secretariat, the selected Mexican case

studies were cases numbered as 1, 3, 4 and 5, on which detailed information are presented

in the following paragraphs.

The Abalone Fishery

General Information

Five species of abalone form the resource base of a small-scale fishery located on the

western coast of the Baja California Peninsula (Figure 9.1). The fleet which takes part in

this fishery is composed of around 900 boats with outboard motors. The capture of these

species is undertaken through SCUBA and “Hooka”, collecting the specimens by hand,

with the aid of a palette knife, which size and characteristics are currently under

regulation.

The abalone muscle is used for human consumption and its shell is used for

handcrafts. Although this fishery started at the end of the 19th century, it was by the mid

20th century when its catch peaked at 6,000 tonnes of muscle. However current abalone

catches range only around 350 to 400 tonnes.

Among various management tools and regulations, the management of this fishery

encompasses fishing cooperatives as the de facto users of the abalone resource to which

the Mexican government grants fishing licenses (“concesión” in Spanish). The

management authorities has delineated four fishing zones in which catch quotas are

estimated annually to each abalone species by area.



Figure 9.1. Geographical distribution of the abalone fishery (in red) from Mexico

Every year, the amount of catch quotas are discussed and negotiated between the

government (INAPESCA and CONAPESCA) and the cooperatives. The management

measures also include minimum size restrictions and closed seasons by geographical

areas as well as a common will to strengthen surveillance in order to eradicate illegal

fishing (DOF, 2004). Furthermore, the National Fisheries Charter (NFC), portraits this

fishery as deteriorated and has set as a management objective to maintain the annual

biomass to a half of its virgin biomass (DOF, 2004). This fishery is primarily based upon

two species, the green abalone (Haliotis fulgens) and the pink abalone (H. corrugata),

which together represent over 95% of the total catch. Catch statistics by species show that

the deterioration of this fishery is primarily due to the green abalone’s gradually

diminishing abundance.

Species

The resource base includes; pink abalone (Haliotis corrugate), green abalone (Haliotis

fulgens), black abalone (Haliotis cracherodii), white abalone (Haliotis Sorensen) and red

abalone (Haliotis rufescens).

Fishing Area(s)

The fishery takes place at the western coast of the Baja California peninsula, from the

United States border., southward to a zone called “Arroyo El Conejo” in the state of Baja

California Sur (Figure 1). Nevertheless, the most productive area of the fishery is located

between the 24ºN and 28ºN, and between 111.5ºW and 115.5ºW. The five species of

abalone can be found at the following depths; the pink abalone between 7 and 44 m (with

a higher abundance between 8 and 28 m), the green abalone between 1 to 24 m (with a

higher abundance between 1.5 and 9 m), the black abalone between 1 and 8 m (with a

higher abundance between 1 and 4 m), the white abalone between 10 and 50 m (with a

higher abundance between 24 and 29 m) and the red abalone between 6 and 18 m.



Timeframe for rebuilding plan

Several documents issued by the government, such as the National Fisheries Charter

(NFC) (DOF, 2004, p. 79) mention a recovery plan for this species. The term used is

“plan de recuperación” which translates as recovery plan but also uses the term

“programa para la recuperación del recurso” which translates as program for the recovery

of the fishing resource. A second document, the Red Book (INP, 2000, p.150;

INAPESCA, 2006, p.28) mentions a recovery strategy for this fishery using the term

“estrategia de recuperación” that is, recovery strategy. However, no documentation was

found which formally mentions a rebuilding fishery plan. However we acknowledge that

there is a set of strategies clearly devised to recover this fishery (or “restaurar” as stated

in the Mexican Fishing Law). Therefore, in the following paragraphs, this project on

Mexican fisheries analyzes and evaluates the experiences from this set of strategies.

The set of strategies found did not contain a predefined timeframe to reach a specific

fishery recovery target. Overall, this set of established strategies is based upon an

initiative designed and implemented by the government, specifically by the INAPESCA

and the CONAPESCA, with an active participation of the fishing cooperatives. This

initiative is based on the rationale of controlling the annual catch of abalone, from one

year to the next, aiming at maintaining the stock biomass at a level which maximizes its

yield.

Major identified sources of mortality/threats to rebuilding

The recovery strategy for the abalone stocks is fully based on controlling the fishing

effort. This means that the fishing mortality is considered to be the main cause of

abalones’ diminishing catches and the main main threat to the stock. However, some

climatic events, such as the ENSO, have had negative impacts on the size of these stocks.

In this regard, it has been found that the ENSO events have had a negative influence on

the abundance, and even that during some years, have produced a complete disappearance

of the macroalgae, Macrocystis pirifera (Gluyas Millán, 2000), which is the main diet of

abalone, resulting in low recruitment for abalone. Several scholars consider this cause of

mortality as one of the major threats to the recovery of these stocks. Moreover, there are

several predators which also cause natural mortality on abalone, particularly the fish

Scorpaenichtys marmoratus and starfish, Pycnopodia helianthoides, along with Pisaster

ochrecea.

A different cause of natural mortality in abalone is an illness (in Spanish “Síndrome

de Deshidratación” (SD)) which causes a considerable loss of weight on the specimens,

usually causing death. This illness has primarily benn detected in the black abalone but

there is evidence that other abalone species (the green, pink, white and red abalones),

have also been affected. Finally, according to Bórquez-Reyes et al. (2009), this fishery

does have two groups of resource users, the cooperativist fishers but also the free or

independent fishers. The latter group of fisheries operate without a fishing license (and

therefore practices illegal fishing) and sell their harvest at the abalone black market in

$400 pesos per kg (about 23.5 Euros). Hence, pursuing illegal fishing on abalone catches

double the price set by the cooperatives (at $200 pesos per kg). Overall, this high abalone

black market’s price, together with both poor fishery surveillance by the CONAPESCA

and the easiness of which free fishermen pursuing this illegal fishing, is another threat to

the rebuilding of these stocks (Bórquez-Reyes et al., 2009; see also DOF, 2004, p. 80).



Rebuilding goal/target (MSY, MEY etc.)

The National Fisheries Charter states that, in the long run, the management objective

of the abalone fishery is to maintain its stocks at the half of its virgin biomass (= B0 /2)

(see DOF, 2004, p. 79). The estimation of B0 was obtained (exclusively to green abalone,

Haliotis fulgens ) through a logistic (rBt (1-Bt / Bo)), surplus yield model using

maximum likelihood procedures (INAPESCA, 2006, pp.17-18) in which B0 =1068

(Sierra, 2004, p.34).

Although the calculation of the catch quotas started in 1990, in practice, several

adjustments have been undertaken by the INAPESCA to the annual stock assessments.

However, there is only one issue that has been maintained without any change, namely

the negotiations of the catch quotas -which since they started have been agreed upon by

the government and the cooperatives. In general, the rationale of setting a catch quota is

to select a quota which, while the fishery operates at acceptable economic levels, as

assessed by the involved parties themselves allows a gradual steady recovery of the stock

biomass. Thus, for practical purposes, there is no Target Reference Point but the

assessment of the annual biomass is simply compared against the one estimated the

previous year. Hence, the decision rule in setting the catch quota proceeds as follows: a)

decrease the catch quota, as compared to the one set the previous year (if there was no

positive growth but a decrement in stock biomass); b) maintain the same catch quota of

the previous year (if the stock biomass showed neither an increment or a decrement, or c)

increase the catch quota as compared to the one set last year (if a growth in stock biomass

was detected).

Overview of issues (e.g. factors that led to development of rebuilding plan;

confounding factors such as multi species fisheries, ecosystem issues such as

climate change fisheries)

As the abalone is a highly valued resource, the gradual diminishing of the abalone

catch, from 6000 tonnes in the 1950s to less than 0.5 tonnes during the 1990’s, motivated

the devising and implementation of a stock recovery strategy starting in 1990, adjusted in

1996-97, and followed until the present. As an example of the past stock assessment

undertaken for one of the abalone species, the pink abalone, it was estimated that the size

of its stock, as it was from the early 1990’s, then it would take approximately between 25

and 45 years to recover to the size of its Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) as it was

during the 1960’s. This estimation assumed that fishing mortality is the main cause of

mortality. However, it is also known that the ENSO events do cause massive mortality of

the macroalgae Macrocystis pirifera, the main diet of abalone. Such mortality was

detected by Gluyas Millán (2000) during the ENSO event of 1997-98. This author

reported that abalone were completely uncovered of macroalgae according to biological

surveys. Thus, it seems that, the interaction of the fishing mortality with the ENSO

impacts does have an impact on the success of a fishery recovery strategy based solely on

controlling the fishing mortality.

Institutional Framework

Legislation – Authority (brief description)

In Mexico, the legislation which regulates the access, use and management of fishery

resources is the “Ley General de Acuacultura y Pesca Sustentable” (LGAPS, or the

General Law on Sustainable Fishing and Aquaculture). The authority responsible of the



application of this legislation is a Secretariat called as SAGARPA (or “Secretaría de

Agricultura, Ganadería, Pesca y Alimentación”); to this end, two administrative bodies of

SAGARPA, the INAPESCA (“Instituto Nacional de Acuacultura y Pesca”), and the

CONAPESCA (“Comisión Nacional de Pesca y Acuacultura”) undertake several duties

and enforce the regulations, as stated by the Law. The SAGARPA Secretariat is in charge

of coordinating and leading the scientific and technical research on fishing and

aquaculture but also in devising and updating the National Fisheries Charter (NFC) a

management instrument for the fishing and aquaculture resources of Mexico. In

particular, the Article 33 of the Law states that the NFC shall contain the guidelines,

strategies and other previsions for the conservation, protection, restoration and use of the

fishing resources. Therefore, the term “restauración” (in Spanish) would be the closest

(and only) term, used in Mexican legislation as a synonym to “rebuilding” as used at the

OECD. Furthermore, no Mexican documents issued by the government or the by

Mexican fishery scientists use the equivalent translation of the term “rebuilding”, which

literally would be “reconstrucción” in Spanish; rather they use “recuperación” which

translates into English as “recovery”.

To assist in management, the Mexican government also devised an instrument called

Normas Oficiales Mexicanas (NOMs) used primarily to regulate the most economically

valuable fishing resources. In the case of abalone, the NOM which sets the regulations on

minimum size by species, closed season and closed areas is the NOM-005-PESC-1993.

Other complementary activities on fisheries management are undertaken by both, the

SEMARNAT (or “Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales”) and the

PROFEPA (or “Procuraduría Federal de Protección al Ambiente”). The Navy assists all

the aforementioned bodies in monitoring and detecting illegal activity undertaken at sea.

Relevant policies and guidelines

Article 36 of the Sixth chapter of the Fishing Law (LGAPS) states that the

instruments for fishery policy are the following: 1) the programs on fishing ordination, 2)

the fishery management plans, and 3) the concession or granting. Besides, Article 36 also

states that: “the authorities will promote and support the use of any control mechanism set

by resource users themselves, backed up on their traditional knowledge on local system

management. They will also promote the creation of community groups which assist in

protection and management of the fishing resources based upon the guidelines set at the

LGAPS”.

Although in Mexico there is little progress on fishing ordination programs, it is

acknowledged that in the case of abalone, all the above policies have been historically

applied to this fishery.

Institutional changes that have resulted from the implementation of the rebuilding

plan

Given that for this fishery, the set of stock recovery strategies have been implemented

since the 1990’s, it could be expected that, by this time, some of the elements contained

in it had been formally incorporated into the Fishing Law (LGAPS). Nevertheless, except

for the acknowledgement of promoting the work between the government and the

community of users on fishery management, the remaining elements, such as the

incorporation of the stock recovery programs as instruments on fishery policy in

Article 36 of the LGAPS, among others, have not been introduced yet. Thus, in Mexico,

the abalone stock recovery strategies have not produced any institutional change yet,



neither for policies nor regarding the institutions. Moreover, it is currently known that

should a stock recovery strategy be cost-effective it needs careful planning and funds to

fully implement it.

Fisheries Rebuilding Plan Framework

Management response

Prior to the implementation of the recovery strategy, the abalone fishery was managed

by granting fishing licenses to fishers and by an instrument called NOM-005-PESC-1993.

The latter specified a minimum size for each abalone species and a closed season by area.

However, once the abalone catches declined abruptly, new management regulations were

set, including a catch quota and a banning of fishing with a technique called as “low-

tide”. Thus, although catch quotas started to be used in 1990, several documents state that

they were formally and systematically enforced from 1996-97 and onwards. Moreover,

since catch quotas were set, the CONAPESCA is supposed to be in charge of monitoring

and enforcing their observance. In general, it is acknowledged that the fishing effort

applied before the catch quota period, was higher than after it. The reason being that once

the catch quota was set, the fishing fleet dynamics changed because the fleet no longer

adjusted to natural dynamics but ones imposed by the catch quotas.

Since the end of the 1990s, several scientists conducted research on the culturing of

abalone. The government provided funds through the National Science and Technology

Council (CONACyT) and the results were spread among the scientific community, the

resource users and the government. Despite this, the aquaculture effort for abalone has

not resulted in any systematic stock enhancement and replenishment programs yet.

Monitoring and enforcement.

The monitoring of the stocks is undertaken by CONAPESCA but also by the fishers

themselves. The former has the responsibility of monitoring that the administrative and

regulatory measures are followed; do an evaluation of their success (or failure) and

alternatively, suggest new measures to reach the implicit target of recovering the stocks.

CONAPESCA is assisted by the Navy and PROFEPA (“Procuraduría de Protección al

Ambiente”). PROFEPA presses charges whenever illegal fishing is detected.

The cooperative fishers do have their own monitoring program. It has been estimated

that the cooperatives spend between 12,000,000 and 15,000,000 pesos per year (approx.

between EUR 705 882 and EUR 882 352) for monitoring activities and that each fishery

guard earns between MXN 12 000 and MXN 15 000 per month (or approx. between

EUR 706 and EUR 883). Moreover, several cooperatives have a radar system which

assists them in detecting illegal fishing. Despite this monitoring system, it is

acknowledged that illegal fishing still threatens the recovery of this fishery (Bórquez-

Reyes, et al. 2009).

Performance measurement and evaluation

The CONAPESCA, with technical support from INAPESCA, is in charge of

evaluating the success of the management of a fishery. Currently, the abalone fishery has

only one indicator to measure its performance, namely the increment of its stock biomass

from one year to the next. The general trend of recovery of the abalone stocks can be

examined or detected with data going back to 1990. Unfortunately, the current recovery



strategy and the evaluation of its performance are based solely on biological grounds,

leaving out the other economic, social and institutional factors.

Post rebuilding management

The abalone fishery is still considered as deteriorated. No post rebuilding

management analysis has been undertaken yet.

Economic Aspects

The abalone is a highly valued resource, being sold by the fishing cooperatives at

MXN 200 per kg (about EUR 11.8). It is primarily a product for exportation, the main

markets being the USA and Asia. It is sold both, fresh and frozen in domestic markets

and canned and frozen in international markets.

With respect to prices for international markets, in 1997, a box containing 48 cans of

abalone with approximately 300 g (drained weight) each, is priced between USD 1 650

and USD 2 200. Similarly, in 2004, the same box had a price between 1,585 and 1,905

USD. In contrast, a similar box with 48 cans traded in the domestic market (which has an

abalone muscle of lower quality than the former) had a price ranging between USD 650

and USD 850 (INAPESCA, 2006).

Describe the use of economic analysis in the design stage of the rebuilding plan

The abalone fishery in Mexico is the one with the highest value per kilo produced (at

canned, frozen and fresh). Moreover, this is also the fishery with the highest income per-

capita. However, no specific economic analysis has been undertaken and used in the

design of the stock recovery strategy. There are some indicators which show fishery

managers the loss of profitability in this fishery. For instance, in 1991the fishery

production (fishery catches) value was USD 55 million whereas in 2002, the production

value was only USD 21 million (INAPESCA, 2006, p.12). In other words, a comparison

between only two years shows that this fishery-2002’s production as compared to the one

reported in year 1991, had lost about USD 34 million (approx. EUR 2 000 000). To this

amount we should add the expenses derived from fishers’ own monitoring (between

MXN 12 000 000 and MXN 15 000 000 per year or approx. between EUR 705 882 and

EUR 882 352 per year).

However, a note on transferable fishing property rights is relevant here. The Fishing

Law (LGAPS) states that the granting of concessions (or “concesiones” –lasting 25 years

but with a potential of renewal by another 25 years), could be sold. Nevertheless, in the

case of abalone, which has the cooperatives fishers as the de facto users, such a

transaction would not be allowed because anyone interested in buying such a granting

would need to become an entitled cooperativist fisher before buying it, and, a

cooperativist right or title cannot be sold but only passed down or inherited, from a

father/mother to his/her descendants.

Nevertheless, based on the expertise of the working team, it can be said that as the

abalone is a highly valued resource, its marked has, albeit partially, compensated a loss in

this fishery’s profitability because as the catches have declined, abalone became more

scarce and its market price increased. Moreover, an indicator of economic success would

be an estimation of the gradually increasing biomass of abalone (see Table 9A.1) times its

price in the market. However, this economic analysis has not been carried out yet.



No alternative timeframes, measures or strategies have been considered or assessed

for this fishery yet.

Ex ante and Ex post evaluation

Most of the data to complete Table 9.1 are not published or easily available. However

estimates are given using unpublished data.

Table 9.1. Industry Profile

Number of

Fishers Number of

Vessels

Average Revenue per

Fisher

Total Landed Value

Average Vessel Length

(m)

Ex- ante 1989

- -

Mid point 2009 705

(cooperative fishers)

235 (abalone diving

equipments - - 7.6

Ex- post

Social Aspects

Key stakeholders affected by the rebuilding plan and their respective interests

According to the National Fisheries Institute, INP (2000), the first fishing cooperative

for abalone started in 1940. The history of the establishment of the other abalone’s

cooperatives is closely related to the human settlements of the western coast of the Baja

California. Thus, compared to most fisheries in Mexico, a striking characteristic of this

fishery is its geographical isolation, an aspect that precludes having human-related

pressures upon the abalone stocks. In this respect, except for the independent or free

fishers who practice illegal fishing, there are no other competing users for abalone and

therefore, the only group of people directly affected by the recovery strategy are the

cooperative fishers. However, this fishery has also both, direct and indirect users.

Although currently there are approximately 705 entitled fishers belonging to

22 cooperatives, it has been estimated that in total, there are about 20,000 people who

depend directly and indirectly from this fishery (INAPESCA, 2006; Valencia-Arámburo,

unpublished data).

Stakeholder participation (consultations, negotiations) in the design and

implementation of the rebuilding plan

To date, we have found no information on whether the cooperatives fishers

participated in any stage of the design of the abalone recovery strategy or if it was fully

designed by the government (INAPESCA and CONAPESCA).However, current

literature and related documents about this fishery show that since the abalone recovery

strategy started, in the 1990’s, the fishing cooperatives have actively participated in the

implementation of it. In particular, they participate in the stock assessment (biological

surveys) and in the negotiation of the TAC (in setting the size of the catch quota) as

suggested by the government.

Compared to other fisheries, these fishers are perceived by Mexican scholars as a

group with full awareness of the several problems affecting their fishery and who have

solutions to overcome them. In particular, this group of people has over 5 decades of

interaction with their resource base and therefore they are perceived as people with an



ample local knowledge on the coastal ecosystem where its fishery is located and on the

several issues of legislation on fisheries. They have skills and expertise not only in

capturing abalone but in accounting, processing and marketing. They own several

processing plants and do have airplanes to transport their product out of their isolated

area. Moreover, these people do have their own monitoring and enforcement system and

posses ample expertise on collaborative research. In this respect, the government

(INAPESCA and CONAPESCA) acknowledge that most cooperatives have provided,

albeit partially, financial, logistic and technical support during the implementation of the

recovery strategy (INP, 2000; INAPESCA, 2006).

Implementation Issues & Lessons Learned

Key institutional and policy challenges faced

Despite a lack of formal documents entitled as rebuilding or recovery plan for

abalone, it is clear that actions and management decisions have been undertaken during

the last two decades, all of which correspond to a de facto fishery recovery strategy. At

the very beginning of the implementation of this strategy, many cooperative fishers

opposed to it, especially because the catch quota set was less than what they were used to

capture. Thus, during some abalone stock assessments, fishers asked the government for a

review of the data and the catch quota.

Given that current institutions on fisheries management lack a capacity (in budget and

staff) to fully implement a fishery recovery strategy, the fisher themselves devised their

own monitoring and enforcement systems. In the case of the abalone fishery, the recovery

strategy also included an active participation of fishers, especially with regards to the

collection of data, monitoring and enforcement, andin the discussions and negotiations of

the catch quotas, which at the end are decided upon by CONAPESCA. This collaboration

(government-resource users) has characteristics of both, participatory research and co-

management.

Estimate of the costs of designing and implementing the rebuilding plan

No data exists to fully estimate the cost of designing and implementing the rebuilding

plan. However, there are some clues, especially taking into account the cost of monitoring

and enforcement undertaken by the cooperatives, all which annually cost between

12,000,000 and 15,000,000 pesos (aprox. between 705,882.00 and 882,352.00 Euros). In

other words, the costs of designing and implementing the rebuilding strategy will be

well over 800,000 Euros per year.

Lessons learned

In general, the high value of abalone, together with a sudden drop of its catches,

leaded to agreements being reached and consensus on working towards the recovery of its

fishery, among authorities responsible for management and the highly organized

(experienced and well trained) cooperative fishers and technical staff from the

INAPESCA.

Lesson learned include: i) it is currently known that several factors and not only the

fishing mortality, are affecting the recovery of the abalone fishery and therefore it is

suggested that the current recovery strategy should be reviewed to incorporate this fact;

ii) the current recovery strategy is grounded solely on biological objectives; however, it is

suggested that other objectives (economic and social) should be, in the short run,



incorporated to it; iii) given the high degree of organization of cooperative fishers, the

implementation of the recovery strategy has been legitimated by the resource users

themselves, with participatory research, monitoring and enforcement and, in general, with

characteristics of co-management; iv) currently, in Mexico, the recovery strategy for

abalone, as well as the research and management associated to it, is seen as a success;

with the green abalone stock showing signs of gradual recovery whereas the pink abalone

has been around a range of a steady biomass; v) should the Mexican government be

willing to fully rebuild or recovery its deteriorated fisheries, current fisheries policies

need to be reviewed; in particular, the successful elements of the abalone recovery

strategy need to be formally incorporated into the fishing legislation; and, a thorough

review of the government capacities on institutions (e.g., infrastructure, budget and staff)

appointed to fisheries management needs to be undertaken; and vi) the abalone recovery

strategy could be used as a successful case study by all, scholars, resource users, and

managers.



ANNEX 9A.

KEY INDICATORS

The key indicators introduced in Tables 9.2 and 9.3 were extracted from unpublished

Master of Science Thesis as well as from several internal (unpublished) stock assessment

reports available at the INAPESCA and CONAPESCA websites. The majority of those

indicators are not the result of a previously set annual target for this fishery; rather, they

correspond to annual stock biomass assessments used to set catch quotas. Table 9A.1

contains data of a gradually recovering stock biomass as estimated for the green abalone.

Currently, Mexican researchers and fishery managers consider this outcome as a success

of the green abalone recovery strategy. In contrast, Table 9A.2 contains the outcome for

several years of a stock biomass, the pink abalone, which shows no sign of recovery.

However, researchers and managers do consider that this stock has, in general, oscillated

around a steady biomass range. Note that in both tables, no data was available to

complete columns 5th to 8th because such estimations depend upon fishing mortalities for

which there are no available assessments.

Table 9A.1 Rebuilding Indicators of Green Abalone

Year

Biomass Limit Reference Point (BLIM)

Biomass MSY

(BMSY)

Biomass Target

(BTARG) used as Biomass

Limit

Science Advice fishing target

(FTARG)

Fishing Limit Reference

Point (FLIM)

TAC / catch limit

Fishing mortality (F)

MSY

Year 0

(1990) 540 540 790 - - - - -

Year 1 540 540 500 - - - - -

Year 2 540 540 350 - - - - -

Year 3 540 540 355 - - - - -

Year 4 540 540 200 - - - - -

Year 5 540 540 300 - - - - -

Year 6 540 540 320 - - - - -

Year 7 540 540 420 - - - - -

Year 8 540 540 400 - - - - -

Year 9 540 540 540 - - - - -

Year 10 (2000) 540 540 400 - - - - -



Table 9A.2. Rebuilding indicators for pink abalone (from 1990-2000).

Year

Biomass Limit

Reference Point

(BLIM)

Biomass MSY

(BMSY)

BiomassTarget

(BTARG) used as Biomass

Limit

Science Advice fishing target

(FTARG)

Fishing Limit

Reference Point (FLIM)

TAC / catch limit

Fishing mortality (F)

MSY

Year 0

(1990)

180 180 130 - - - - -

Year 1 180 180 120 - - - - -

Year 2 180 180 128 - - - - -

Year 3 180 180 125 - - - - -

Year 4 180 180 70 - - - - -

Year 5 180 180 110 - - - - -

Year 6 180 180 90 - - - - -

Year 7 180 180 125 - - - - -

Year 8 180 180 110 - - - - -

Year 9 180 180 90 - - - - -

Year 10 (2000)

180 180 70 - - - - -

The Red Grouper Fishery in Mexico

General Information.

The red grouper fishery encompasses the species Epinephelus morio and

approximately 36 other species; 20 of them being grouper species (Family Serranidae).

The majority of the captured species have a relatively high market value. According to

Arreguín-Sánchez et al. (1997), in this fishery, and during the period from 1980 to 1985,

the species E. morio represented, on average ~89% of the total catch; nevertheless, it has

been estimated that currently, this species only represents ~60% of the total catch. This

fishery is actually a sequential fishery, with three distinct fishing fleets, two Mexicans

and one Cuban. The Mexican artisanal fleet is referred to as the “la flota menor” (the

minor fleet) in Spanish. It is composed of approximately 3,440 boats with outboard

motors (with a HP not exceeding 115 HP) with fishing trips lasting from 1 to 3 days. This

fleet uses both hand-lines and bottom long-line. It operates from the shore to

approximately 36 m depth, and captures juvenile and sub-adult groupers (from 1 to 3

year-old) (DOF, 2004). The other Mexican fleet is called the “la flota mayor” which is an

industrial fishing fleet. This fleet is composed of 539 vessels using inside motors with

fishing trips lasting between 15 to 20 days. This fleet uses two fishing methods: a) a part

(approximately 40%) of the vessels use a major boat (a ”nodriza” or “mother” boat), also

called a carry-on-vessel, which is able to carry about 7 to 10 small boats locally known as

“alijos”. The “alijos” are 3 m long, wooden-made paddled boats with only one fisher

onboard. They use an easy to handle long-line and the catch is delivered to the mother

boat; and b) the remaining part of vessels use a long-line with approximately 1,500 to

2,000 hooks using power-winches. Presently, the Cuban fleet is composed of 12 vessels

of the industrial type. Each vessel is able to carry, on average, 6 outboard boats (Burgos,

2006). Before the year 2001, the fishing season was all year long with a peak in catches

during December-April, coincident with the red grouper's reproductive gathering.

However, since 2001, a closed season was set for one month during the reproductive



gathering period. This fishery is considered to be a deteriorated fishery (“pesquería

deteriorada”, DOF, 2006, p. 51) but also as an overexploited one (“pesquería

sobreexplotada”, INAPESCA, 2006, p. 516). It lacks a formal recovery plan, but does

have a management plan devised by INAPESCA in the year 2003 (INAPESCA, 2006;

see also section 1.3).

Boats in the Mexican fleets are obliged to havefishing permits (“permisos de pesca”)

without any limit on their maximum catch whereas a catch quota is set to the Cuban fleet.

However, in Mexico, this fishery was, for several decades, considered as an open access

fishery because before the year 2001, any boat or vessel which wanted to get into the

fishery was able to do so. Thus, before the year 2001, the regulation of this fishery was

based only on a minimum fish size. Because of a gradual drop in yields from 2001 and

onwards, , a closed season regulation was put in place, aimed at protecting spawning

stock. Currently, the closed season runs from 15 February to 16 March.

Species

The resource base of this multi-specific fishery is composed by the red grouper,

Epinephelus morio, plus by the following grouper species: Epinephelus flavolimbatus,

Epinephelus nigritus, Epinephelus guttatus, Epinephelus drummondhayi, Epinephelus

adscensionis, Epinephelus itajara, Epinephelus mystacinus, Epinephelus niveatus,

Epinephelus striatus, Mycteroperca bonaci, Mycteroperca microlepis, Mycteroperca

venenosa, Mycteroperca interstitialis, Cephalopholis cruentata, Cephalopholis fulva,

Dematolepis inermis, Gonioplectrus hispanus, Paranthias furcifer, Mycteroperca phenax,

Mycteroperca tigris. Moreover, this fishery also captures the following commercially

important demersal fish species, Lutjanus campechanus, Lutjanus analis, Lutjanus

griseus, Lutjanus synagris, Lutjanus buccanella, Lutjanus vivanus, Lutjanus jocu,

Rachycentron canadum, Ocyurus chrysurus, Calamus bajonado, Calamus campechanus,

Haemulon plumieri, Seriola zonata, Rhomboplites aurorubens, Lachnolaimus maximus,

and Lopholatilus chamaeleonticeps.

Fishing Area(s)

The red grouper fishery operates on almost the whole continental shelf of the Yucatan

Peninsula, although there are several specific areas with higher fish abundance than

elsewhere (Figure 9.2). It is known that the grouper fish schoolings undertake seasonal

movements (López-Rocha and Arreguín-Sánchez, 2007) and it has been reported that one

of the most important areas for reproductive gathering of this species is located at the

Centre-Eastern part of the Peninsula. Reproductive gatherings take place from Winter

until early Spring, a time period when, due to their higher abundance, the species become

more vulnerable to fishing (Arreguín-Sánchez and Pitcher, 1999, López-Rocha and

Arreguín-Sánchez, 2008). The peak of the fishing season coincides with the time of

reproductive gathering. Other studies have reported that high densities of juveniles and

pre-adults of grouper occur at a coastal area located in front of Dzilam de Bravo and

Laguna Yalahau.Due to this the fishing fleets also show some seasonal dynamics, with

the artisanal fleet being primarily found in coastal, shallower areas, whereas the industrial

and Cuban fleets operate at deeper waters. Moreover, it is known that there are overlaps

between all fishing areas with approximately 60% overlapping between the artisanal and

the industrial fleets.



Figure 9.2. Main fishing areas for the red grouper, Epinephelus morio, fishery at the Campeche Bank, Mexico (after Burgos, 1987)

Timeframe for rebuilding plan (years)

The current official management rules set at the National Fisheries Charter (NFC) do

not lay out an explicit strategy or aim at recovering this fishery. Therefore, no timeframe

for rebuilding has been set officially yet (however see sections below).

In contrast to what has been explicitly stated with regards to the abalone fishery at the

NFC, i.e. about the need to recover the fishery stocks, and about a recovery strategy, no

similar statement was found at the NFC to the red grouper fishery. It was, however, found

that the NFC publications from the years 2004 and 2006, in addressing the current status

of the red grouper fishery, recognize, using exactly the same wording, that (DOF, 2004,

p. 153; DOF, 2006, p. 51):

“Taking into consideration the Reference Points set to Epinephelus

morio, this fishery is currently deteriorated

Also, several technical reports undertaken by INAPESCA and its research units (the

Centros Regionales de Investigación Pesquera, CRIP), have explicitly addressed the

topic of recovering this fishery. Thus, Burgos (2006, p. 10) states that:

“The (red grouper) fishing resource will recover its stock only after

protection guidelines are set and responsible fishing promoted

Several scholars, including technical staff from INAPESCA who have been studying

this fishery for over a decade, have already worked on several red grouper stock recovery



scenarios (see INAPESCA, 2006).However, there seem to be a lag between policies

addressing the red grouper fishery at the NFC and what scholars have been working on

the fishery during the last 5 years, i.e., examining scenarios that would potentially allow

the recovery of the red grouper stock. Despite this, the results obtained from scholars and

staff from INAPESCA from their academic exercises on stock recovery scenarios could

easily be incorporated into the NFC and other management instruments. For example, to

date these people have set short-run (5 years) and long-run (20 years) Reference Points

(INAPESCA, 2006) both which could be used in future formal stock recovery plans.

In general, this fishery does have, from 2001 onwards, relatively new management

actions, that implicitly point toward an effort to avoid its collapse (these actions are

explained in section 1.5).


Given that this fishery, had been for several decades, an open access fishery, it is

recognized as overcapitalized. Fishing mortality is seen as one of the major sources of

mortality to this stock and therefore one of the major threats to rebuilding it. Similarly,

some authors report that the red grouper stock is currently overharvested due to increased

overfishing which resulted from an uncontrolled increase of the minor fleet (Hernández

et al., 1999),which primarily catches juveniles and pre-adults. Moreover, Arreguín-

Sánchez et al. (1990) also point out that several factors may have caused a fault in annual

recruitment for this species and therefore a decline in its stock; among them being, the

occasional oil spills that occurred at the Campeche Bank (CB), the changes in water

temperature detected at this same area (CB), and changes to the red grouper’s habitats due

to hurricanes. Furthermore, Arreguín-Sánchez et al. (1996, 2008) hypothesized that the

Campeche Bank, as an ecosystem, has, during the last 4 decades experienced a decreased

carrying capacity which could have caused a decline in the stock of several fisheries,

including the red grouper. This, however, is a topic that needs to be further addressed in

future fisheries studies.

As this is a multi-fleet fishery, there is conflict of interests among different

stakeholders involved in the fishery. However, in Mexico, there is an important degree of

experience on fisheries conflict resolution (e.g the Pacific shrimp fishery; the abalone

fishery) which can serve as lessons learned for the red grouper fishery.


No formal or explicit rebuilding plan has been designed for this fishery yet. Despite

this, the NFC (DOF, 2006, p. 51) states that, given the current status of the red grouper

fishery, there is a need of implementing its new management plan, as devised by

INAPESCA in 2003, which is based on setting both, the Reference Points (TRP and LRP)

and a catch quota per fishing fleet. In turn, the Target Reference Point (TRP) was set as

(INAPESCA, 2006, p. 515):

TRP = 50% B0 = 50% B (1958)

B (1958) = 248,548 t

TRP = 124,178

Whereas the Limit Reference Point, (LRP) was set as (INAPESCA, 2006, p. 515):

LRP = 30% B0 = 30% B (1958)



B (1958) = 248,548 t

LRP = 78, 945 t

In 2003, the red grouper biomass was assessed, resulting in 46,487 t which is well

below the Limit Reference Point because it represents only 18.7% of the reference

biomass (B (1958)) (INAPESCA, 2006, p. 516). However, given the multi-fleet nature of

the red grouper fishery as well as its latest estimated biomass [B (2003) = 46,487 tonnes],

our analysis indicates that, at present, the Target Reference Biomass (TRP) and Limit

Reference Biomass (LRP) may be too high to be the only targets. Hence, in accordance

with what INAPESCA has recommended this fishery should be managed based on catch

quotas per fishing fleet, which should be fully discussed and negotiated with the involved

fishers. In deciding on a catch quota to this fishery, for each year, the red grouper stock

biomass would be estimated based on biological surveys and the decision rule in setting a

catch quota would be analogous to how it is currently done for the abalone fishery, i.e. the

annual biomass would be simply compared against the one estimated the previous year.

Hence, the decision rule in setting the catch quota would then proceed as follows: a) the

catch quota would be decreased, if there is a decrease in measured biomass between

consecutive years; b) the catch quota would be the same as compared to the one set the

previous year, if the stock biomass showed neither an increase or decrease, or c) the quota

would be increased as compared to the one set the previous year, if a growth in stock

biomass was detected. As with the abalone fishery, this recovery strategy is based on the

rationale of controlling the annual catch of the red grouper fishery, from one year to

another, aimed at maintaining the stock biomass at a level, which would maximize its

yield. Moreover, a catch quota should be selected in such a way that, while the fishery

operates at acceptable economic levels as assessed by the stakeholders, would allow for a

gradual steady recovery of the stock biomass.

The proposal above is based solely on biological grounds it is nevertheless

recommended that other objectives should be examined and considered in the recovery

plan. Ideally, these objectives should include other aspects (see Díaz-de-León and Seijo,

1992) including economic, social and ecological-biological criteria.

As previously stated, this fishery does have recent management measures in place to

avoid its collapse. Actions include the implementation of a negotiated closed season

during the reproductive gathering of fish. In other words, the closed season was not

simply imposed by the government but agreed upon with the interested parties

(cooperatives fishers, “permisionarios”, government, and scholars). However, to be

considered as a recovery strategy, these management rules still seem weak to ensure the

recovering of any fish stock.

Overview of issues

The red grouper and associated species are valuable resources which form the

resource base of this most socially important fishery (in terms of number of generated

jobs) of the Yucatan peninsula. Thus, although devising this plan seems a complex and

difficult task, there is little doubt that most stakeholders would be interested in

collaborating on it.




Legislation – Authority

In Mexico, the “Ley General de Acuacultura y Pesca Sustentable” (from here

onwards referred to as “LGAPS”, or the General Law on Sustainable Fishing and

Aquaculture) regulates the access, use and management of the fishery resources. The

authority responsible of the enforcement of this legislation is a Secretariat called as

SAGARPA (or “Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Pesca y Alimentación”); to this

end, two administrative bodies of SAGARPA, the INAPESCA (“Instituto Nacional de

Acuacultura y Pesca”), and the CONAPESCA (“Comisión Nacional de Pesca y

Acuacultura”) undertake the several duties and enforce the regulations, as stated at the

LGAPS, on fishing and aquaculture. The INAPESCA is in charge of coordinating and

leading the scientific and technical research on fishing and aquaculture but also in

designing and updating the National Fisheries Charter (NFC). CONAPESCA is in charge

of executing any technical recommendations pointed out by the former; authorizes the

fishing permits and fishing concessions based on the management regulations set at the

NFC and, whenever a boat or fisher is seen or caught with fish product outside the

authorized fishing season, has the authority to take it off. Note that in authorizing the

permits, CONAPESCA uses the management regulations set out by the NFC.

The management of the red grouper fishery is based on the Norma Oficial Mexicana,

NOM-009-PESC-1993, which was recently updated in NOM-065-PESC-2007 (DOF,

2009). It contains the regulations on minimum size by species, including a gradual

increase of the minimum size, of 30.9 cm total length (TL) in 2009, to 36.3 cm TL in the

year 2010. Moreover, DOF (2007) decreed a closed season, lasting one month, for this

fishery.

The Fishing Law or LGAPS also stipulate the setting up of Fishery Councils at the

state level (or “Consejos Estatales de Pesca”) representing the relevant stakeholders. In

Yucatan, this Council was already established and was instrumental when all interested

parties (government of the three levels, fishers, “permisionarios” and the academia)

agreed upon setting a closed season to the red grouper during the reproductiveperiod.


Article 36 of the Sixth chapter of the Fishing Law states that the following

instruments are used for fisheries management: 1) the programs on fishing ordination,

2) the fishery management plans, and 3) concession or granting. Article 36 also states

that: “the authorities will promote and support the devising of any control mechanism set

by resource users themselves, backed up on their traditional knowledge on local system

management. They will also promote the creation of community groups which assist in

protection and management of the fishing resources based upon the guidelines set at the

LGAPS”. Hence, such policies should assist in the design and implementation of a fishery

recovery plan.

The current Fishing Law also encourages change in the currently centralized (top-

down) system of fisheries management, by handing down many of these duties either to

the states/regions or to the municipalities (in the case of demersal fisheries). Thus, given

the social importance of some fisheries, several states, like the Yucatan, do a have their

own Fisheries Secretariat. For the red grouper stock recovery plan to be more cost-

effective, a coordinated action needs to be agreed by the three level of government

(municipal, state, and federal). An example is when the most relevant stakeholders agreed



upon a closed season for the red grouper fishery. Then the Fisheries Secretariat of

Yucatan implemented policies aimed at assisting fishers and their families with in-kind

and cash income during the closed season (see ).

If in the short and medium term, a reduction in fishing effort is necessary to recover

this fishery, new policies to back up this reduction need to be put in place. In particular,

there is some experience in Mexico with reducing the fishing effort through a policy on

boat or vessel voluntary retirement (or “retiro voluntario de embarcaciones”). An

example of this policy has been applied in the Pacific shrimp fishery (M. Valencia-

Arámburo, personal observation). Based on the lessons learned from that fishery, a policy

for the red grouper fishery could proceed as follows: a) the government would assess the

economic value of, say, a standard boat of the minor fleet including its fishing gear and

outboard motor. Based on this estimation, the government offers a specific amount of

money to each fisher (i.e., boat owner) who is instead willing to trade his or her boat, gear

and equipment, together with its fishing permit, for the amount of money offered. Once

this transaction is completed, the boat is scrapped and the fishing permit discarded. This

policy should continue until, the fishery operates at its desired levels (as assessed by the

management authority and the involved parties). However, this process will be even more

complex in the coast of Yucatan than in the Pacific shrimp fishery. The reason being that

in the red grouper fishery, many of the artisanal fleet's boats do switch to capturing other

species along the year. As an example, many boats switch to capturing octopus during

several months of the year (August to November). Hence, the above retirement policy

would apply to the boats targeting red grouper exclusively. Alternatively, what should be

retired from the red grouper fishery should be the fishing permit (to capture red grouper)

and the fishing gears used for this species.

Moreover, an inter-sector analysis of the region is needed. In particular, the region as

a whole (Yucatan Peninsula) should be examined and focused on the potential productive

sectors wherein new jobs or small business could be created for retired fishers. Thus,

ideally, government would promote (public and private) investments on those productive

sectors.

Finally, two other aspects should be taken into consideration in the recovery plan,

namely a new policy concerning the Cuban fleet and a better control of the “pescadores

libres” (free fishers).

Institutional changes that resulted from the implementation of the rebuilding

plan

There is no rebuilding plan yet but only an agreed upon closed season among the

stakeholders including the three-level government, to avoid the collapse of this fishery.


Management response

There is no rebuilding plan in place yet. It is uncertain, if a policy on the voluntary

withdrawal of vessels from the red grouper fishery is launched whether the reduction in

fishing effort will be rapid and effective. However, a desired management response

would be that an improved and sustained coordination among the three government levels

resulted in recovering this fishery. This coordination would need to be part of the Fishery

Council from Yucatan including the participation of neighbouring coastal states.



From the fishers side, and because since the implementation of the closed season

there has been a slight increase in red grouper catches (from 2003 to 2009), they perceive

that the closed season, implemented since 2003, has been useful in increasing the stock

biomass (V. Alcántar, Head of the Fisheries Secretariat at Yucatan, personal

communication). Thus, the fishing community could actively participate in observing the

management rules.

With respect to controls, they would be based on the comparison of the stock biomass

from one year to the next as well as the total number of fishing permits issued for this

fishery.

As previously stated, in order to recover this fishery, one of the new management

tools would be to close some of the areas which are habitat for juveniles and young

adults.

Some research institutions from the Yucatan Peninsula, like CINVESTAV,has for

several years now been conducting research on the culturing of red grouper (A.M. Arce-

Ibarra, personal observation). The government has, through its National Science and

Technology Council (CONACyT), provided the required funds and their results have

been distributed among the scientific community. Nevertheless, it is unknown whether

the government knows about these results or if they will be interested in undertaking

stock enhancement and replenishment programs for this species based on those results.

Monitoring and enforcement

Once the objectives of a recovery plan are set, and in an analogous form to what is

currently done at the Abalone fishery, the government, i.e., CONAPESCA, could be in

charge of the monitoring and the enforcement of rules. To complement CONAPESCA's

enforcement, local fishers should participate too, but they would need to devise their own

monitoring program. In this respect, fishers from Yucatan could learn from the several

successful experiences of fisheries co-management in other places. One of these is the

spiny lobster fishery located at the centre of Quintana Roo (one of the three states of the

Yucatan Peninsula). In this fishery the community rules for monitoring and enforcement,

as set by the cooperative fishers themselves, are even stricter than the ones devised by the

government. To this end, the fishers would need to organize themselves to get funding to

implement their own monitoring program.


The CONAPESCA, assisted with technical support from INAPESCA, is the

institution in charge of evaluating the success of the management of a fishery.

Nevertheless, the fishers and other stakeholders should also participate in the evaluation

of the progress of the stock recovery.

As previously stated, once the recovery plan is set up, the red grouper fishery would

have its stock biomass compared, from one year to the next, as the indicator of the

recovery performance. Nevertheless, other indicators based on economic, social and

institutional criteria should be also devised and considered. In particular, it would be

necessary to undertake a bioeconomic analysis for the red grouper fishery and derived

from this study, the average net return per trip could be used as another indicator to

measure the performance of this fishery.



Economic Aspects

Taking into consideration the GDP by productive sector, the red grouper fishery

contributes with 1.8% of the GDP within the fisheries sector (SAGARPA, 2006).

The red grouper is a relatively valuable resource, prices reaching up to MXN 70 per

Kg (about EUR 4 per kg) in domestic markets. It is a product for both, international

(about 70% of total catch) and domestic (about 30% of total catch) markets, the USA

being the most important market with exports ranging between 3 000 and 4 000 t since

1995 (INAPESCA, 2006). However, in contrast to the observed domestic price, the price

paid for imported, fresh product in 2004 was MXN 27 per Kg (about EUR 1.6 per Kg).

In 2003, even with its lowest historical record in catches, of 5,551 t, the red grouper

fishery production value was MXN 111 000 000(about EUR 6 529 411). During the last

five years the red grouper production reported an average value of 7 965 tonnes

(INAPESCA, 2006).

Uuse of economic analysis in the design stage of the rebuilding plan

Despite the social importance of the red grouper fishery we found no specific social

or bioeconomic analysis undertaken for this fishery. However, in devising a recovery plan

for this fishery, a trade-off between social (generation of jobs) and economic criteria

should be made, taking into account the sustainability of the resource.

An analysis based on market issues should be considered when devising the recovery

plan. Among such issues are: the size of captured fish (compared against what sizes are

demanded in the markets); and the transferable property rights of the granting (or

“concesiones”) of the “permisionarios”, a permit that can be sold in commercial

transactions.

In contrast, the cooperativist fishers would continue being ruled by what there is now

the norm (i.e., a cooperativist right or title cannot be sold but only passed down or

inherited, from a father/mother to his/her descendants).

However, based on the expertise of the working team, it can be said that to some

extent (although less than to what happens to Abalone), the red grouper market could,

albeit partially, compensate a loss in this fishery’s profitability because once its catches

have declined, this species would become a scarcer resource and most likely its market

price will increase. Similarly, an indicator of economic success would be an estimation of

the gradually increasing biomass of red grouper times its price in the market. However,

this economic analysis has not been done yet neither in any of the documents issued by

the government or in the scholarly literature on red grouper.

Social Aspects


There is no formal rebuilding plan yet, however, according to INAPESCA (2006),

three groups of people participate in the red grouper fishery: a) the entrepreneurs called

locally as “Los Industriales”, b) the fishing cooperatives, and c) other organizations and

the free fishers (or “pescadores libres”). The first own the majority of processing plants as

well of the Mexican industrial fleet and of the majority of artisanal boats. The

cooperatives sell their captured fish to the industrial group but own several artisanal boats

and of some processing plants. The third group of people, belonging to the CNC or



“Confederación Nacional Campesina” and the so called Solidarity groups “grupos de

solidaridad”, does not own boats or processing plants but usually sell their catches to the

former group. The free fishers are a part of this group.

“Los industriales” and then the cooperatives would be the two groups most interested

in working collaboratively and agreeing upon a stock recovery plan. Nevertheless, not all

members of the second group have their fishing licenses or fishing permits yet (i.e.,

several of them work without fishing permits); therefore, this would be the first topic to

address and solve within the group. In a similar way, the third group is a cause for

concern because, very likely, most of them do not always have the necessary fishing

permits. Therefore, if no new fishing permits are issued for this fishery, the groups that

would be most affected would be the third one and to a lesser extent, the second one.

On the other hand, this fishery has also both, direct and indirect users. According to

INAPESCA (2006), the red grouper fishery provides jobs to approximately 80% of the

total people involved with Yucatan fisheries. In terms of number of full-time fishers, it is

estimated that the fishery employs between 10,000 to 12,000 people plus a 4,000 to 7,000

part-time fishers (total range 14,000 to 19,000 fishers). Moreover, the processing plants

sustain approximately another 2,000 jobs.

With respect to other directly competing users for red grouper, there seems to be

none, except the oil industry that is currently based at the Campeche Bank. Unfortunately

the fisheries and the oil industries do have conflicting interest that would need to be

addressed at higher political levels.

Stakeholder participation in the design and implementation of the rebuilding plan

There is no rebuilding plan yet but rather voluntary stakeholder participation.

However, one of the most recent outcomes resulting from this stakeholder participation

was the agreed upon closed season for the red grouper (DOF, 2007).The major

stakeholders participated in this negotiation process: cooperativist fishers,

“permisionarios”, government, and scholars. This illustrates that, despite that the fishery

is being considered as one with many internal conflicts among users by some people,

there is will to undertake collaboratively work among stakeholders. We have no doubt

that these people will be willing to continue its participation in the stock assessment

(biological surveys) and in the negotiation of any TAC.

Compared to the abalone fishery, we do perceive these stakeholders as a group with a

certain degree of awareness of the several problems affecting their fishery and who may

have solutions to them. Again, this group of people has over 5 decades of interaction with

their resource base and therefore they are perceived to be people with an ample local

knowledge on the coastal ecosystem where this fishery is located. Many of them do have

skills and expertise not only in capturing red grouper but in accounting, processing and

marketing.

Moreover, the cooperative fishers do posses ample expertise in undertaking

collaborative research. In this respect, regional research institutes, such as CINVESTAV

and ECOSUR acknowledge that several cooperatives have provided, for several years

now, some logistic and technical support during their fieldwork.

Equity or distributional issues raised as a result of the implementation of the

rebuilding plan; if so, explain how these issues were addressed

No information was found on any equity or distributional issues for this fishery.



Compensation mechanism used in support of rebuilding measures

After the closed season for red grouped was implemented in 2003, the government of

Yucatan sought funds to partially support fishers and their families during this period.

Thus, a program for temporal job (“programa de empleo temporal”) was launched. The

people who benefited from the program were fishers working in both the artisanal and

industrial fleets who were enlisted at the “Padrón de Pescadores Activos del Litoral

Yucateco” (or in a List of active fishers from the coast of Yucatan). Notably, the

municipal government assisted the state government in reviewing the list of benefited

fishers. The program included both, in-kind and cashpayments. The in-kind support, it

was a weekly basket of groceries with basic food (“despensa”). The cash payments were

$300 pesos (about 17.6 Euros) per week. In turn, the fishers undertook some duties

related to community well-being. The fund to cover the program came from the state

government (i.e., from the Secretaría de Fomento Agropecuario y Pesquero, as well as

from DIF).



Despite a lack of formal document entitled as rebuilding or recovery plan for the red

grouper, some management actions and a negotiated closed season were detected which,

altogether are perceived as a genuine will of stakeholders to work together to avoid a

fishery collapse. Thus, these management actions could be considered as the first step in

devising a stock recovery plan to this fishery.

Prior to the implementation of any recovery plan for the red grouper, stakeholders

may be sceptic about being ruled by new management guidelines because this fishery has

historically been an open access fishery.

During the implementation of the recovery plan for an open access fishery, the

challenges faced could be along the lines of reaching effective communication among

stakeholders: no doubt each group will speak a “different” language or use a different

codices of communication signs; therefore, participatory workshops should be undertaken

to avoid mistrust. Thus, setting any compromise clearly from each group since the

beginning will be needed. Moreover, in assessing the stock and setting the catch quota,

all procedures to be followed should be clear enough to all involved parties. Finally, the

evaluation and performance measurement of stock recovery should be clear to everyone.

In summary, given the size of the red grouper fishery, enforcement of management

rules undertaken solely by the government would not be cost-effective. In this respect,

government and scientists should work in collaboration with government and resource

users to ameliorate the fisheries management in a form of co-management.

Lessons learned

The red grouper fishery is from a social viewpoint the most important fishery of the

Yucatan Peninsula. A gradual decline in catches lead to the acknowledgment that the

fishery is deteriorated and secondly, that new management actions were needed to avoid

collapse. To this end, a striking negotiated agreement, within an apparent fishery full of

internal conflict, was reached among the interested parties (three level-government:

municipal, state and federal, as well as cooperative fishers, “permisionarios”, scholars,

and technical staff from INAPESCA).This agreement concerns a closed season to this



species during winter, the season of high abundance due to the reproductive gathering of

this species.

Lesson learned include:

It is currently known that the red grouper fishery is overcapitalized; hence, decreasing the

fishing mortality is one of the major factors in possibly rebuilding this fishery. However, it is

suggested that other environmental and human-derived factors, like the increment of water

temperatures as well as a decrease in the productive capacity of the Campeche Bank wherein an

oil industry is based, should be further looked into.

There is political will to discuss and devise a recovery plan for this fishery. To this end, one of

the first challenges will be along the lines of establishing effective communication among

stakeholders who have been historically participating, on their own, in an open access fishery.

The recovery plan should not be based solely on biological grounds; hence, the objective of the

plan should be include other factors such as social and economic criteria, while ensuring

sustainability.

Another challenge to be faced ís to review and then control the total number of boats (both,

legal and illegal) participating in this fishery.

Given the size of the red grouper fishery and the high costs of enforcement, the recovery plan

needs to be deemed legitimate by the resource users themselves, with participatory research,

monitoring and enforcement and, in general, with the characteristics of co-management;

As a reduction in the fishing effort is necessary, a program of voluntary scrapping of boats

should be implemented. Also part-time job programs or similar measures should be devised to

assist fishers who are willing to both, observe the new management rules as well as voluntarily

retire from the fishery.

The Mexican government should consider how to deal the current participation of the Cuban

fleet.

Should the Mexican government be willing to successfully recover its deteriorated fisheries,

current fisheries policies need to be revised.



Annex 9B.

Key indicators

R: With no stock recovery plan to the red grouper yet, there are no key indicators

which could be used for this fishery. The key indicators introduced in Table 9B.1 were

extracted from INAPESCA (2006, from Figure 3, p. 516). Those indicators are not the

result of a previously set annual target for this fishery, rather they correspond to stock

assessments simulation models used to estimate the Reference Points (TRP and LRP). In

this case, the year 20 is a hypothetical timeframe with an estimated stock recovery value

(Table 9B.1).

Table 9B.1. Rebuilding indicators for red grouper (from 1990-2000)

Year Biomass Limit Reference Point (BLIM)

Biomass MSY (BMSY)

Biomass Target (BTARG) used as Biomass Limit

Science Advice fishing target (FTARG)

Fishing Limit Reference Point (FLIM)

TAC/ catch limit

Fishing mortality

(F)

MSY

Year 0

(2002)

74000 120000

46592

- - - - -

Year 1 74000 120000 49579 - - - - -

Year 2 74000 120000 55228 - - - - -

Year 3 74000 120000 61814 - - - - -

Year 4 74000 120000 68422 - - - - -

Year 5 74000 120000 74136 - - - - -

Year 6 74000 120000 79828 - - - - -

Year 7 74000 120000 84604 - - - - -

Year 8 74000 120000 89380 - - - - -

Year 9 74000 120000 92345 - - - - -

Year 10 (2012)

74000 120000 97077

Year 20 (2022)

74000 120000 120000 - - - - -



The Pink Shrimp Fishery in the Campeche Sound

General Information

The pink shrimp (Farfantepenaeus duorarum) fishery started in the 1940s. Three

fishing fleets, one domestic and two foreign fleets -one from the USA starting in 1947,

and another from Cuba starting in the 1960´s, used to take part in this fishery. Both of the

foreign fleets stopped fishing in 1979. The catch of pink shrimp peaked at close to 20 000

tonnes in the early 1970's whereas the lowest historical catch of 1 200 tonnes was

recorded in1997. In general, it is acknowledged that the development of this fishery was

relatively fast and unplanned, with several technological improvements introduced in the

trawling fishing gears over several years, and as a result the catch per unit of effort

among years are not comparable (INAPESCA, 2006).

A steady stock decline for this species started in the mid 1970s and continued until

the end of the 1990s. This fishery is considered as a collapsed one by some authors

(Gracia et al., 1997) as well as a deteriorated resource according to official, governmental

documents, such as the National Fisheries Charter, NFC ( where this species is portrayed

as “recursos deteriorados” at DOF, 2004, p.131, and as “los recursos están deteriorados”

at DOF, 2006, p. 24).

With respect to the domestic fleet, the pink shrimp fishery is a sequential fishery,

where two fleets operate, an industrial fleet and an artisanal fleet. Artisanal boats, with

outboard motors, originating from Campeche and Yucatan use to fish upon two shrimp

species, Xiphopenaeus kroyeri and Farfantepenaeus duorarum, with the former being the

target species and juveniles of the latter the by-catch species. In the past, there was an

artisanal fishery targeting at F. duorarum in coastal lagoons, however, at present, fishing

upon subadults and juvenile pink shrimp as target species either at coastal lagoons or

estuaries is explicitly forbidden (Gracia, 1997). Despite this restriction, and due to shrimp

larvae being naturally trapped at the coastal zone, currently this species is also caught in

relatively small quantities by an unknown number of artisanal boats, at the northern part

of the Yucatan Peninsula.

This fishery is managed by various regulations concerning for example as minimum

size, a closed season - set by INAPESCA, to protect parental stock; a minimum opening

size for nets, restriction on fishing gears to protect turtle populations, and closed areas

(DOF, 1993 and 1997). During the year 2009, the closed season was set from 20 May to

31 October.

Species

Target species is the pink shrimp, Farfantepenaeus duorarum, with Farfantepenaeus

aztecus, Litopenaeus setiferus, and Sicyonia brevirostris being by-catch species.

Fishing Area(s)

The pink shrimp fishery is located at the Campeche Sound - a continental shelf

system with a seaward limit defined by the 200 m isobath. Besides sustaining several

commercial and subsistence fisheries, the Campeche Sound is economically important

because approximately 70% of oil and natural gas produced in Mexico comes from this

region. The pink shrimp´s fishing area is located between 18° 45’ and 21° 25’ N, and 90°

30’ and 92° 30’ W, at depths ranging primarily from 30 m to 70 m. In addition, the

fishery has two closed areas; a coastal one, from 0 to 15 miles, along Campeche state, to



protect pink shrimp juveniles, and another area encompassing oil marine platforms (see

Figure 9.3).

Figure 9.3. Fishing area for the pink shrimp at the Campeche Sound (in gray color)

Blue and red lines represent restricted fishing zones due to the establishment of oil extractive industry


Despite that the NFC has accorded the pink shrimp fishery the status of a deteriorated

resource, at present, and contrary to what was found in abalone fishery, the current

official management rules set at the NFC do not set forth an explicit strategy or aim to

recover this fishery. Therefore, no timeframe for rebuilding has been set officially yet

(see however sections 1.5 and 1.6, below).

A statement from INAPESCA (2006, p. 466- 470) written by a research team,

including INAPESCA´s staff, pointing out the need of devising a stock recovery strategy

for pink shrimp: “Existe la necesidad de recuperar las poblaciones de camarón blanco y

rosado” (There is a need of recovering the stocks of white and pink shrimps.) Similarly,

Arreguín-Sánchez et al. (2008, p. 90) studied Pink shrimp and reported that: “In the case

of southern Gulf of Mexico, fishermen clamour for actions aimed at recovering the

shrimp stock”.

Thus, despite having no formal or explicit recovery objective yet, several scholars

including technical staff from INAPESCA who have been studying this fishery for over a

decade and who are aware of its crisis, have already examined, as academic exercises,

several pink shrimp stock recovery scenarios (see Arreguín-Sánchez et al., 2008a and

Arreguín-Sánchez et al., 2008b). In this respect, and similarly to what was found in other

Mexican fisheries, there seems to be a lag between the updating of governmental policies

and management rules addressing the pink shrimp fishery at the NFC and the stock

recovery scenarios being examined by researchers.




In 1994, the pink shrimp fishery was formally declared to be in crisis. At that time, it

was thought that overfishing was the main cause of the steady decline of shrimp stocks.

However, during the early 2000s, new studies on this fishery showed that the rate of this

species’ recruitment had been decreasing since the end of 1970´s which pattern coincided

with a decrease in global primary productivity of the Campeche Sound. Moreover,

changes in sea surface temperature and in salinity were also detected at this area

(Arreguín-Sánchez et al., 2008), the latter being inversely related to shrimp stock

abundance (Ramírez-Rodríguez et al., 2000). Therefore, a major threat to rebuilding is the

uncertainty of changes in the environment. Moreover, no studies were found that

addressed or monitored any shrimp stock- environment relationship; hence, there is

uncertainty on the reactive capacity of shrimp populations to natural or human-induced

events (such as oil spills). Finally, a potential threat could arise from the fact that since

2003, this fishery (together with all Mexican shrimp fisheries) is subsidized (see more

details in section 4 Economic Aspects).


No formal rebuilding plan or target has been devised to this fishery yet. In 1994,

when the pink shrimp fishery was formally declared to be in crisis and it was thought that

the factor causing stock decline was the fishing mortality; the short-term goal was to

control fishing effort as to allow a recovery of 50% of stock biomass (DOF, 2002).

Previously, the NFC of the year 2000 (DOF, 2000) portrayed this fishery as deteriorated

and recommended not to increase its fishing effort. Currently, the reference point for this

fishery set at the NFC (DOF, 2006, p.24) is not to increase the last five-year average

catch (or “no aumentar la captura promedio de los últimos 5 años”). Moreover, the

current management regulations imposed a closed season and closed areas to protect the

shrimp reproductive stock and to increase the yield per recruit for this species (DOF,

2006, p. 24).

In terms of monitoring the recovery of the pink shrimp stock, it is recommended that

this fishery should be managed in an analogous fashion to what is currently being done in

the abalone fishery (see Mexican case study number 1), namely based on catch quotas per

fishing fleet or alternatively quotas per fishing area, an aspect which should be fully

discussed and negotiated with the involved fishers and the private sector.

Thus an analogous recovery strategy for pink shrimp would include using a catch

quota where each year, the shrimp stock biomass would be estimated based on biological

surveys and the decision rule in setting the quota would be as follows: the annual biomass

of this species would be compared to the one estimated the previous year. Hence, the

decision rule in setting the quota would, again, proceed as follows: a) the catch quota

would be reduced, as compared to the one set the previous year, if there was no positive

growth but a decrement in the shrimp stock biomass; b) the catch quota would be set the

same as compared to the one set the previous year, if the shrimp stock biomass showed

neither an increment or a decrement, or c) the quota would be increased as compared to

the one set the previous year, if a growth in shrimp stock biomass was detected. Again,

this recovery strategy is based on the rationale of controlling the annual catch of this

fishery, from one year to another, aimed at maintaining the stock biomass at a level,

which maximizes its yield. Moreover, a catch quota should be selected in such a way that,

while the fishery operates at acceptable economic levels as assessed by the involved

parties themselves, that it would lead to a steady recovery of the stock biomass. Finally, it



is suggested that multiple (biological, social and economic) objectives should be

considered in any future fishery recovery plans (Díaz-de-León and Seijo, 1992).

Overview of issues

No rebuilding plan has been developed yet.

The Campeche Sound pink shrimp fishery is currently the major economic activity of

the after the oil industry and therefore the crisis in this fishery generates into an economic

crisis at this area (Arreguín-Sánchez et al., 2008b, p. 91). There are two main factors that

can be pointed out as important when developing a rebuilding plan, namely the social and

economic considerations. Moreover the environmental changes detected at the Campeche

Sound should also be considered as additional factors that need to be taken into account

when developing such a plan.



In Mexico, the “Ley General de Acuacultura y Pesca Sustentable” (LGAPS, or the

General Law on Sustainable Fishing and Aquaculture) regulates the access, use and

management of the fishery resources. The authority responsible for the enforcement of

this legislation is a Secretariat called SAGARPA (or “Secretaría de Agricultura,

Ganadería, Pesca y Alimentación”); to this end, two administrative bodies of SAGARPA,

the INAPESCA (“Instituto Nacional de Acuacultura y Pesca”), and the CONAPESCA

(“Comisión Nacional de Pesca y Acuacultura”) undertake several duties and enforce the

regulations, as stated at the LGAPS, on fishing and aquaculture. The former is in charge

of coordinating and leading the scientific and technical research on fishing and

aquaculture but also for devising and updating the National Fisheries Charter (NFC). The

latter is the body in charge of executing technical recommendations pointed out by the

former; issues the fishing permits and fishing concessions based on the management

regulations set by the NFC and, whenever a boat or fisher is found with fish products

outside the authorized fishing season, it has the authority to confiscate it. When issuing

fishing permits, CONAPESCA uses the management regulations set by the NFC.

The pink shrimp fishery is regulated through the Norma Oficial Mexicana, NOM-

009-PESC-1993 (DOF, 1994) and its amendments from 1997 (DOF, 1997) which

contains regulations on minimum size by shrimp species, closed seasons, as set yearly by

INAPESCA, and closed areas. There is also a consultative body wherein the management

regulations for every shrimp fishing season are discussed, namely the National

Committee of Fisheries and Aquaculture (or “Comité Nacional de Pesca y Acuacultura”).

This Committee is composed of the stakeholders in the shrimp fisheries, which meet

before the opening of the fishing seasons. During the meeting, the Committee introduces

and discusses issues on the various shrimp fishery parameters, as estimated by

INAPESCA´s staff, as well as on the recommended policies for the next fishing season

(Hernández and Kempton, 2003). Hernández and Kempton (2003) report that during the

meetings, not all the stakeholders seem to be well informed or aware of the many

technical aspects related to the shrimp fishery. Thus, those authors suggest that some of

the stakeholder participants on shrimp fishery meetings seem to be in need of training to

assist them in understanding long-term pros and cons of shrimp fishery decision-making.

Finally, specific regulations concerning fisheries in natural protected areas (NPA), have

to be observed.



Relevant policies and guidelines and (brief description)

Article 36 of the Sixth chapter of the Fishing Law (LGAPS) states that the

instruments for fishery policy are the following: 1) the programs on fishing plans

(ordenación), 2) the fishery management plans, and 3) the concession or granting.

Besides, Article 36 also states that: “the authorities will promote and support the

introduction of any control mechanism set by resource users themselves, backed up on

their traditional knowledge on local system management. They will also promote the

creation of community groups which assist in protection and management of the fishing

resources based upon the guidelines set at the LGAPS”. Hence, these policies should

assist in agreeing upon and designing a fishery recovery plan to the Pink shrimp fishery.

The current Fishing Law or LGAPS also encourages a change from the centralized

(top-down) system of fisheries management, to passing many of these duties either to the

state or to the “municipios” (in the case of demersal fisheries). Thus, given the social

importance of some fisheries, several states, like Campeche and Yucatan, do have their

own Fisheries Secretariat. Thus, for the pink shrimp stock recovery plan to be cost-

effective, a coordinated action needs to be agreed upon among the three levels of

government (municipal, state, and federal). Lessons can be learned from the the red

grouper fishery (see the second Mexican case study). However, if in the short and

medium runs, a reduction in fishing effort is needed for this fishery to recover, some

policies to back up this reduction need to be put in place. For example, currently there is a

policy to reduce the fishing effort through boat or vessel voluntary retirement (or “retiro

voluntario de embarcaciones”). This policy is being applied in both, the Pacific and Gulf

of Mexico shrimp fisheries (CONAPESCA, 2010). According to this policy, from 2005 to

2009, 147 shrimp vessels (with their respective fishing permits) were voluntarily retired

from the Gulf of Mexico.2

Moreover, an inter-sector analysis of the region needs to be taken into consideration.

In particular, the region as a whole (the Campeche Sound) should be examined and

focused on potential productive sectors wherein new jobs or small business could be

created for retired fishers. Finally, another aspect that should be taken into consideration

in the recovery plan is a better control of the “free fishers”.

Institutional changes that resulted from the implementation of the rebuilding plan

No rebuilding plan has been set yet.


Management response

No rebuilding plan has been set yet and therefore no management changes could be

described. Nevertheless, some desired changes are briefly described in the following

paragraphs.

Better coordination among the three government levels (municipal, state and federal)

based on the political will to recover this fishery is an important part of a rebuilding plan.

2 See

www.conapesca.sagarpa.gob.mx/wb/cona/20_de_marzo_de_2010_ensenada_bc/_rid_mto_wst_maximiz

ed?imp_act=imp_step3&page=0).



This coordination needs to be a part of the Fishery Council from Campeche State

including the participation of neighbouring coastal states.

On the side of the fishers, a desired management response would be that they could

actively participate in observing the management rules.

Controls could be made by using the comparison of the stock biomass, from one year

to the next, as well as considering the total number of fishing permits issued for this

fishery.

For illustrative purposes, Table 9.2 shows a chronological listing of the management

measures used in the pink shrimp fishery.

Table 9.2. Management measures used over time upon queen pink shrimp.

Year Management tool Place or area

1949 Mexican vessels started their operation (The United States fleet had started in 1947)

Gulf of Mexico

1949 Shrimp is formally assigned to members of cooperatives (i.e., as a common property)

Mexico: Pacific and Atlantic Coasts

1949 Only the private sector owns the shrimp fishing fleet


1960 The Cuban fleet starts its operation Campeche Sound

1966 The first Mexican cooperatives were formed but sign a contract to use the private vessels

Campeche Sound

1980 Foreign fleets stopped their operation Mexican Atlantic Coasts

1982 The government switched the shrimp fleet from private to the social sector


1992 The government returned the shrimp fleet to the private sector


1993 Closed seasons were set; and closed coastal areas (from 0 to 15 coastal miles)

Gulf of Mexico

1998 Closed seasons were set Campeche Sound

1993-

2009

Annual closed seasons are set (after INAPESCA’s staff biological surveys are undertaken)


Source: INP (2000); INAPESCA (2006), DOF (2004), and personal observation of M. Valencia-

To protect juvenile and young adults of pink shrimp, the management authority has

closed the coastal area at the Campeche Sound, along the Campeche state, from 0 to

15 miles to fishing.


No rebuilding plan has been set yet and therefore no monitoring and enforcement has

been undertaken. However, some desired monitoring and enforcement are briefly

described in the following paragraph.

Similarly to what has been described for the other Mexican case studies with no stock

recovery plan, once the objectives of a recovery plan are set, the government,

i.e. CONAPESCA, would be in charge of the monitoring and enforcement of rules. To



complement CONAPESCA's enforcement, fishers and interested stakeholders should

participate too, but they need to devise their own monitoring program. In this respect,

fishers from Campeche could learn from the several successful experiences on fisheries

co-management occurring elsewhere. To this end, the fishers would need to organize

themselves to get funding to implement their own monitoring program.



institution in charge of evaluating the success of the management, and in this case of the

stock recovery of any marine species. Additionally, the fishers and other stakeholders

should also participate in the evaluation of the progress of the stock recovery. Even with

no recovery plan yet, it the emerging management regulations established during the

1990s, namely the latest amendments done to NOM 009-PESC-1993 (DOF, 1997) has,

albeit slightly, stabilized the past pink shrimp biomass decline (INAPESCA, 2006,

p. 466).

In terms of using variables for the evaluation of the plan, as previously stated, once

the recovery plan is set, the pink shrimp fishery would have its stock biomass compared,

from one year to the next one, as the indicator to measure the recovery performance. In

addition, other indicators based on economic, social and institutional criteria should also

be used. In particular, it would be necessary to undertake a bioeconomic analysis to this

fishery and, based on the results, the average net return per trip could be used as another

indicator to measure the performance of this fishery.

Economic Aspects

In Mexico, the shrimp fisheries, together with several other semi-industrial and

industrial fisheries, with a total of 2 215 vessels, receive partial fuel subsidies. In

particular, from 2003 to 2009, a total of MXN 5 200 000 000 (about EUR 305 882 353)

have been paid out as subsidies to the aforementioned vessels (CONAPESCA, 2009). Of

this amount, 50% has been delivered to the shrimp fishing fleets from both, the Pacific

coast and from the Gulf of Mexico. In 2009, a total of 1,443 registered trawling shrimp

vessels received MXN 520 000 000 (about EUR 30 588 235.30) as a fuel subsidy

(CONAPESCA, 2009).

According to CONAPESCA (2009), with this subsidy, the Mexican government is

assisting the shrimp fishing fleets because, it is argued, they are coping with an economic

crisis derived from tree main factors, namely a decline in the price of shrimp at

international markets, the steady increment of the gas used in Mexico to pursue fishing,

and because, given that the majority of the shrimp vessels are quite old, they are

inefficient in capturing shrimp.3 (see). Nevertheless, the Mexican government also is

interested in assisting the shrimp fishing fleet with funds to modernize or substitute old

vessel by new ones (CONAPESCA, 2009; FIRA, 2009).

With respect to the economic importance of pink shrimp, it is an export product for

which main the market is the United States. According to FIRA (2009), 95.3% of the

national Mexican shrimp production was exported to the United States in 2008. During

the last decade, the price of shrimp has declined in international markets and this has

severely affected Mexico´s fishing sector. This decline was due to an increase in the

3 www.conapesca.sagarpa.gob.mx/wb/cona/10_de_enero_de_2009_mazatlan_sin



world production of shrimp, primarily from aquaculture. For example, in the year 2000,

Mexican shrimp prices –U15, U15/20, and U21/25 peaked (USD per lb) at 7.4, 6.8, and

6.5 respectively, whereas in 2006, they reached, respectively, USD per lb) 5.0, 4.3, and

4.2 (FIRA, 2009, p. 39).

Economic analysis in the design stage of the rebuilding plan

There is no design stage of the rebuilding plan yet. Despite the pink shrimp fishery is

recognized as a major economic activity after the oil industry, we found no specific

bioeconomic analysis undertaken for this fishery. When designing a recovery plan to this

fishery, a trade-off between social (generation of jobs) and economic criteria should be

made, based on the premise of sustainability.

An analysis based on market measures should be considered at the time of designing

the recovery plan. Among these measures are: the size of captured shrimp (compared

against the sizes that are required by the markets); and the transferable property rights of

the granting (or “concesiones”) of the “Industriales” or “Armadores”, a permit that can be

sold in commercial transactions. In contrast, if the current legislation dealing with

cooperatives is left unchanged, the cooperativist fishers would continue being ruled by

their rules and norms (i.e., a cooperativist right or title can’t be sold but only passed down

or inherited, from a father/mother to his/her descendants).

Similarly to what was commented in the previous reviewed case studies, one indicator

of economic success would be a gradually increasing value of the catches.

No alternative timeframes, measures or strategies have been considered or assessed

for this fishery yet.

Rebuilding efforts as they have affected the fishing industry

As many artisanal fishers do not have their corresponding fishing permits, we will

give an estimation to the second, third, and fifth columns (considering 2010 as an Ex-

ante).

Table 9.3. Industry Profile (Industrial fishery)

Number of

Fishers Number of

Vessels

Average Revenue per

Fisher

Total Landed Value

Average Vessel Length

(m)

Ex ante 2010

Unknown 252 - - 20.0-24.0

Mid point 2020

Ex post

Table 9.4. Industry Profile (Artisanal fishery)

Number of

Fishers Number of

Boats

Average Revenue per

Fisher

Total Landed Value

Average Vessel Length (m)

Ex ante 2010

Unknown 490 - - 7.0-7.6

Mid point 2020

Ex post



Social Aspects


There are no stakeholders affected by any rebuilding plan yet; however, a description

of current users of this resource, as potential affected people, is briefly described in the

following paragraphs.

According to INAPESCA (2006), the Mexican pink shrimp fleet, owned by

entrepreneurs, started its operation in 1949, the very year during which the Mexican

government assigned the property rights of the shrimp fisheries to members of the fishing

cooperatives. In turn, Mexican fishing cooperatives were not formed until 1966, a year

when they claimed their common property resource, resulting in a contract (or “Contrato

de Uso de Embarcaciones Camaroneras”) signed between entrepreneurs and fishers to

allow the latter the use of the shrimp vessels. After several years and amendments to

those contracts, the Mexican government decided to transfer (i.e., to first buy and then

give through credit) the shrimp fleet to the social sector (or to fishing cooperatives) in

1982. However, due to the liberalization of markets and related global policies, changes

in the Mexican Fishing Law (LGAPS) in 1992, allowed sectors, private and social, to get

into or to invest in any fishery of their interest, including shrimp. Therefore, currently

both, entrepreneurs (locally called “Armadores”) and the social sector do form (own) the

pink shrimp fleet.

A total of 290 artisanal boats with outboard motors are currently registered in

Campeche and Tabasco states (247 in Campeche, and 43 in Tabasco), which are members

of fishing cooperatives; to this must be added an unknown number of outboard motor-

boats from the northern portion of Yucatan, and an unknown number of free fishers.

The industrial fleet is located at the Campeche state although some vessels from

neighbouring states also use to fish pink shrimp at the Campeche Sound.

At the end of the 1970s, the industrial fleet numbered of around 800 vessels, which

were located at both, Ciudad del Carmen and Campeche city. According to INAPESCA

(2006) and to Navarrete del Proó (unpublished), by the end of 2000’s this fleet had

decreased by nearly 50%. Currently, there are a total of 252 vessels registered in

Campeche state; 122 of them being registered in Campeche city and the remaining

registered at Ciudad del Carmen (INAPESCA, 2006). The industrial fleet is relatively old

and hence it is not considered to be efficient in catching shrimp. In particular, about 71%

of the fleet based at Campeche city is between 19 and 33 years old. The majority of the

fleet based at Ciudad del Carmen is between 10 and 20 years old.

Both the fishing cooperatives and the “Armadores”, want to sell their shrimp product

on international markets and would probably both be interested in participating in a

formal shrimp stock recovery plan.

The oil industry, based in the Campeche Sound, shares the area with the shrimp

fishers. The fisheries and the oil industries do have competing interest that would need to

be addressed at higher political levels.

Stakeholder participation in the design and implementation of the rebuilding plan

Given the steady decline in stock biomass of this species, both the fleets involved

asked INAPESCA and local authorities to meet with stakeholders to examine and discuss

the current status of this fishery. This resulted in local gatherings including all involved



sectors held in the years 1994 and 2000 (Arreguín-Sánchez et al., 2008b). The first year

in which a closed season was implemented was in 1994 but as the stock decline continued

in the following years, the closed season was lengthened (since 1998) to first two and

then to five months (May to October) during 2001-2003.

As previously stated, according to INAPESCA, the above management regulations

are commonly discussed and negotiated with the interested parties; that is the

cooperativist fishers, “Armadores”, government, and scholars. There is little doubt that

these people will be willing to continue their participation in designing a stock recovery

plan, as well in the negotiation of any future TAC.

Equity or distributional issues raised as a result of the implementation of the

rebuilding plan

No information was found on any equity or distributional issues for this fishery.

Compensation mechanism used in support of rebuilding measures

No compensation mechanisms associated to any recovery plan were found.



No rebuilding plan has been implemented yet; however, in the next paragraphs, we

will describe about the emergent management actions implemented since the pink shrimp

fishery was declared in crisis, in 1994.

Despite a lack of formal document or an implicit strategy entitled as rebuilding or

recovery plan for pink shrimp, some management actions including a consulted closed

season were implemented which, altogether are perceived as a genuine will of

stakeholders to halt the fishery collapse. Thus, these management actions could be

considered as the baseline in devising a stock recovery plan to this fishery.

The first issue to address is the effective communication among stakeholders. Thus,

during the implementation of the recovery plan to this fishery, the challenges faced could

be along the lines of reaching effective communication among stakeholders; therefore,

participatory workshops could be undertaken to dissipate mistrust. Moreover, in assessing

the stock and setting the catch quota, all procedures used should be clear to all involved

parties. Finally, the evaluation and performance measurement of stock recovery should be

clear to all stakeholders. In summary, given the social and economic importance of the

pink shrimp fishery, enforcement of management rules undertaken solely by the

government would hardly be cost-effective. In this respect, government and the academia

should seek collaborative work (government-resource users) to help with fisheries

management, especially in the artisanal fleet. Thus, if this goal could be, to some extent,

reached, it would have a form of co-management.

Lessons learned

The pink shrimp fishery in the Campeche Sound was the second most economically

important activity after the oil industry. A gradual and steady decline of catches led to

firstly, an acknowledgement that the fishery was coping with a crisis and secondly, that

new management actions were needed to halt the collapse of the fishery. To this end the



government and the corresponding consultative bodies imposed closed seasons to protect

the reproductive stock of this species.

Lesson learned include:

It is currently known that the recruitment of the pink shrimp stocks has been gradually

decreasing since the end of 1970s; hence, the uncertainty related to environmental changes

affecting the recruitment process in this species would be one of the major factors affecting any

recovery of this fishery. However, the causes of this diminishing recruitment, either natural or

man-made (e.g., oil spills), should be further studied as to have a better understanding of the

changes that are having place in the Campeche Sound.

Based on the new management regulations set in 1994, there seems to be political will to

discuss and devise a recovery plan to this fishery. To this end, one of the first challenges will be

along the lines of reaching effective communication among stakeholders.

The recovery plan should not be based solely on biological grounds. The objective of the plan

should be more wide ranging, including social and economic criteria, taking sustainability into

consideration.

Another challenge is to review and then control the total number of boats (both legal and

illegal) and industrial vessels participating in this fishery.

Given the high costs of enforcement in fisheries, the recovery plan would need to be

legitimated by the resource users themselves, with participatory research, monitoring and

enforcement and, in general, with characteristics of co-management.

Should a reduction in the fishing effort be necessary, the program on voluntary retirement of

boats, together with an evaluation of it, should continue Also a policy on old vessels

decommissioning should be implemented. Moreover, a part-time job program or similar

policies could be devised to assist fishers who are willing to both, observe the new management

rules as well as to those which voluntarily choose to retire from the fishery.

The NFC should be updated, i.e., it should include the explicit government effort to recover the

fishery as well as a brief summary of results obtained with the stock recovery scenarios run by

scholars; and

The NFC should be updated, i.e., it should include the explicit government effort to recover the

fishery as well as a brief summary of results obtained with the stock recovery scenarios run by

scholars; and

Current national fisheries policies need to be reviewed to incorporate more effective rebuilding

of fisheries in crises



Annex 9C.

Key indicators

With no stock recovery plan for the pink shrimp yet, there are no key indicators

currently in use.



The Queen Conch Fishery in Mexico

General Information

The queen conch (Strombus gigas), a large gastropod (>15 cm siphonal length) was,

for several decades, together with other nine gastropod species, the main resource basis of

an open access artisanal fishery. The fishery was located from the Gulf of Mexico, more

specifically from Veracruz’s reefs, to the Mexican Caribbeanalong the Quintana Roo’s

coasts (Sosa-Cordero et al., 1997; Basurto et al., 2000). It was not until 1987 that an

official allocation of catch quota to this fishery was decided upon (INP, 2000). However,

several factors including a notably uncontrolled illegal fishing, resulted in depleted queen

conch's stocks and therefore in a progressive contraction of its commercial geographical

range at the Caribbean, until this species was listed in CITES’ red list, Appendix II, as a

“Commercially threatened” species (Shawl and Davis, 2004). In Mexico, fishery statistics

data for this and many gastropod species are fragmented or lacking, but there is a

maximum catch record of 450 tonnes for queen conch in the year 1979 (INP, 2000).

Given the depleted status of queen conch stocks, since 1987, an indefinite fishery

closure for this species was implemented at Yucatan State, although illegal fishing has

been reported to still take place at some coastal areas, especially at “Arrecife Alacranes”

(Aldana-Aranda et al., 2006). Nevertheless, regional research institutes from Yucatan are

already working on educational programs to raise awareness on the ecologic and

economic importance of this species (see Aldana-Aranda et al., 2006).

Currently, the Mexican fishery is split up, with the first fishery catching nine

gastropods, in which queen conch no longer forms part of its landed catch, being located

at Campeche’s coasts and a second fishery, based primarily on catching queen conch,

located at Quintana Roo’s coasts, particularly at an atoll-like called “Banco Chinchorro”

and at Cozumel Island.

Queen conch’s muscle is used for human consumption and its shell is used for

handcraftsIt is used as an ingredient in a traditional and much demanded dish in the

coastal communities and in at restaurants of Quintana Roo. However, a steady

diminishing abundance of this species had occurred during several decades resulting in

depleted stocks This resulted in lowering of the catch quota so that in 1993, the quota for

this species was set at only 45 tonnes, and 21 t in 2008 (Sosa-Cordero, unpublished data,

2009).

In 2009, only 37 boats with outboard motors were recorded being engaged in this

fishery. The TAC is fished using two methods; skin diving at Banco Chinchorro, and

SCUBA at Cozumel Island. In both cases, specimens are captured by hand (Basurto et al.,

2000). Nevertheless, given that there are serious difficulties in the enforcement of fishing

rules, the fishery has many other occasional users as well as permanent free fishers

(“pescadores libres”) who do not form part of entitled fishers.

The management measures include a minimum size, an annual catch quota and a

closed season. Moreover, the National Fisheries Charter (NFC) portraits this fishery as

deteriorated and sets its Target Reference Points as 0.10 individual/m2 to Banco

Chinchorro and as 0.04 individual/m2 to Cozumel Island (DOF, 2006, p. 28).



Species

Two gastropod species, the queen conch (Strombus gigas), and the white conch

(Strombus costatus) form the resource base of this fishery, with the former comprising

around 95-98% of the catch (DOF, 2000, 2004). According to Basurto et al. (2000), until

1986, other gastropod species, including Pleuroploca gigantea, Turbinella angulatus, and

Busycon contrarium formed part of the Quintana Roo’s queen conch fishery with

corresponding shares in the landed catch. However, no recent studies were found to

confirm whether these species are still a part of this fishery.

Fishing Area(s)

The queen conch´s fishing grounds for an artisanal fishery at the Mexican Caribbean

are located in Banco Chinchorro, an atoll-like arrecifal complex approximately 814 km2

located south of Quintana Roo (Figure 9.4). Banco Chinchorro was decreed as a

Biosphere Reserve, in 1996. Whenever densities of queen conch are enough to support a

certain level of fishing mortality (as evaluated by INAPESCA´s biological surveys),

commercial fishing has been allowed to commence at the continental shelf located north

of Cozumel Island (Figure 9.4).However, in 1990, monitoring of this species abundance

resulted in the setting of a closed season, which has been occasionally re-opened. In

general, this fishery operates at depths of 2-15 m at Banco Chinchorro wherein skin

diving is used, and at depths of 25-32 m, using SCUBA, at Cozumel Island (Basurto

et al., 2001).

Figure 9.4. Geographical distribution of the queen conch fishery (in color) at Quintana Roo’s coasts, Mexico (Source: INP, 2000)




No timeframe for its rebuilding has been set yet (but see sections 1.5 and 1.6, below).


Fishing mortality, primarily due to illegal fishing, is considered to be the main cause

of queen conch’s mortality (Sosa-Cordero, 1994; Sosa-Cordero et al. 1997; Basurto et al.,

2001; 2005) and therefore, as a main threat to any potential rebuilding plan. Illegal

fishing results in double negative consequences to queen conch On the one hand it makes

useless the management regulations in place (i.e., closed season, minimum size, and catch

quota) because their effectiveness and adequacy can not be systematically and objectively

evaluated On the other hand it also causes disappointment among cooperative fishers with

fishing permits who abide by the management rules, with regards to the others that do not

abide to the law (Thomassiny-Acosta, 2010; Sosa-Cordero, personal observation). Indeed,

people who are caught pursuing illegal queen conch fishing are able to, can easily avoid

heavy sentences if they pay a quite modest infraction fee. Therefore, many fishers argue

that there are no incentives for them to observe the queen conch's management rules

(Thomassiny-Acosta, 2010).

Other aspects which should be considered include the status of queen conch habitats

or seagrass meadows which are being negatively affected due to a rapid expansion of

Quintana Roo’s tourism industry (Alvarez-Legorreta, personal communication, 2008;

Thomassiny-Acosta, 2010).


No explicit rebuilding goal has been set to queen conch yet. However, in terms of its

management, currently the NFC does not allow an increment of the fishing effort on

Quintana Roo’s queen conch fishery (DOF, 2006). Moreover, the NFC also sets Target

Reference Points to 0.10 individual/m2 for Banco Chinchorro and 0.04 individual/m2 for

Cozumel Island (DOF, 2006, p. 28). The Centros Regionales de Investigación Pesquera

(CRIP or Regional Centre for Fishery Research), belonging to INAPESCA, are in charge

of the biological surveys used to set the annual catch quota to this and to most other

commercially exploited species. Additionally, and similarly to what has occurred for the

red grouper fishery (see the second Mexican case study) the CRIP’s staff, has for several

years now worked on stock assessments scenarios – undertaken as academic exercises

but also as potential information to be delivered to INAPESCA whenever required to

recover this fishery. Thus, for instance, Basurto et al. (2000) report that queen conch´s

Target Reference Point should be around 500 tonnes, and assess that this target would

correspond to 70-100 Kg of queen conch (muscle) per fishing trip; as well as to an annual

catch of 45 tonnes, and to a total fishing effort of 12-15 days per year (Basurto et al.,

2000).

However, a systematic, yearly assessment that is fully taken into account by the CRIP

is the annual catch quota (TAC) for this species. Two procedures are used to set this

quota The first procedure is ad hoc and consists in that once the assessment of adult’s

stock biomass has been completed, a catch quota is set in such a way that only half of the

estimated stock should be harvested (Basurto et al., 2007; 2008; 2009). The second

procedure is based on biological grounds andt consists in estimating differences between

the current adult observed density (in m2) at the fishing area and a known minimal adult

density of 0.0048 individual/m2 needed for queen conch to potentially complete a

reproductive cycle (based on Stoner and Ray-Culp, 2000). Based on this criteria and



using the distribution area (in Km2) of this species, a surplus biomass is estimated which

corresponds to a catch quota (Basurto et al., 2007; 2008; 2009).

Overview of issues

No rebuilding plan has been developed for this fishery yet. However, the fact that

although no official or formal documents issued by the federal government have

addressed or stated any will to recover the queen conch fishery this contrasts with an

explicit local will to recover the fishery. Given that in several regional workshops

undertaken to design Banco Chinchorro’s management plan, local fishers and the private

sector have asked local authorities to set up a strategy to eradicate illegal fishing on queen

conch and thereby allow it to recover (Arce-Ibarra, 2008, personal observation). This will

is coincident with the opinion of the Banco Chinchorro Biosphere Reserve's staff (from

the Minister for Environment or SEMARNAT-CONANP) as well as with local CRIP`s

staff in using recovering scenarios for this species. In addition, there are other cultural

factors related to queen conch which seem to be important to local people. An example is

the fact that this species forms part of Quintana Roo’s flag, representing an icon of

identity and livelihood to coastal communities.Currently, several coastal communities of

Quintana Roo have tourism and fishing (based primarily on queen conch and spiny

lobster), as their major livelihoods (Thomassiny-Acosta, 2010). Unfortunately, the fact

that queen conch is distributed at relatively shallow transparent waters (2-32 m depth) and

as this species moves very slowly, makes it vulnerable for illegal fishing.

Institutional Framework.

No rebuilding plan has been devised yet.


In Mexico, the rules to access, allocate and manage the fishery resources are set by

the “Ley General de Acuacultura y Pesca Sustentable” (LGAPS, or the General Law on

Sustainable Fishing and Aquaculture). The authority responsible for the enforcement of

this legislation is a Secretariat called SAGARPA (or “Secretaría de Agricultura,

Ganadería, Pesca y Alimentación”); to this end, two administrative bodies of SAGARPA,

the INAPESCA (“Instituto Nacional de Acuacultura y Pesca”), and the CONAPESCA

(“Comisión Nacional de Pesca y Acuacultura”) undertake the several duties and enforce

the regulations, as stated at the LGAPS, on fishing and aquaculture. The former is in

charge of coordinating and leading the scientific and technical research on fishing and

aquaculture but also in devising and updating the National Fisheries Charter (NFC), the

main instrument used in the management of fisheries. In turn, CONAPESCA is the

institution in charge of executing any technical recommendations pointed out by the

former; issuing fishing permits and fishing granting based on the management regulations

set at the NFC and, whenever a boat or fisher is caught with fish product outside the

authorized fishing season, it has the authority to take confiscate it. Note that in issuing the

fishing permits, CONAPESCA uses the management regulations set at the NFC, and for

this very reason the NFC needs to be updated.

To help with management, the Mexican government has also devised an instrument

called Normas Oficiales Mexicanas (NOMs) used primarily to regulate the most

economically important fish resources. Queen conch is acknowledged as a valuable

resource, therefore the NOM which sets the management regulations on this species -such

as a minimum size of 20 cm total length, and introduces the two approved methods for



capturing this species, SCUBA and skin diving, is controlled by the NOM-009-PESC-

1994 (DOF, 1995). This is complemented by a fishing agreement (“acuerdo de pesca”)

specifying a closed season of eight months (currently changed to eleven months), and

several closed areas (such as the Gulf of Mexico and Yucatan state) (DOF, 2009). It also

addresses a closed seasons of three years, 2009-2012 to Cozumel Island.

For most fisheries, other complementary activities on fisheries management are

undertaken by both, the SEMARNAT (or “Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos

Naturales”) and the PROFEPA (or “Procuraduría Federal de Protección al Ambiente”).

However, in the case of queen conch which fishing area is primarily located at a natural

protected area (Banco Chinchorro) it is the SEMARNAT and within it, a Commission in

charge of managing the natural protected areas (or CONANP, “Comisión Nacional de

Areas Naturales Protegidas”) which, in coordination with CRIP's staff approve any

fishing permit issued to fishers working in natural protected areas. The Navy assists all

the aforementioned institutions in monitoring and detecting any illegal activity

undertaken at the sea.


Article 36 of the Sixth title of the Fishing Law (LGAPS) states that the instruments

for fishery policy are the following: 1) the programs on fishingplans, 2) the fishery

management plans, and 3) the concession or granting of licences. Besides, Article 36 also

states that: “the authorities will promote and support the devising of any control

mechanism set by resource users themselves, backed up on their traditional knowledge on

local system management. They will also promote the creation of community groups

which assist in protection and management of the fishing resources based upon the

guidelines set at the LGAPS”.

From the previous paragraph, it is noteworthy that, except for point 3), queen conch

has been not subject to the other ruling instruments. However, based on the contents of

Article 36h, the federal institutions in charge of fishery management could benefit

fromlocal community groups` organization in the design of a recovery plan for queen

conch.

Institutional changes that resulted from the implementation of the rebuilding plan

No rebuilding plan has been developed to this fishery yet.


Management response

No rebuilding plan has been developed to this fishery yet; therefore, no management

response can be described. However, Table 9.5 outlines the main management measures

in chronological order:



Table 9.5. Management measures used over time upon queen conch

Year Management tool Place or area

1950 None (open access fishery) Campeche, Yucatan and Quintana Roo

1976 First attempts to set a TAC (but it was not systematically set the following years)

Quintana Roo

1981 Resource assigned to members of cooperatives Campeche, Yucatan, and Quintana Roo

1983 A TWO AND A HALF-MONTH closed season was set

Quintana Roo state

1987 A catch quota (of 77 t) was set Quintana Roo state

1987 A temporary closed fishery Yucatan coasts

1990-96 A temporary closed fishery Quintana Roo state (except Banco Chinchorro)

1990 A TAC of 45 t was set Quintana Roo: Banco Chinchorro

1990 A temporary closed area Quintana Roo: Cozumel Island

1992 Inclusion of queen conch at CITES’ red list Grand Caribbean

1994 A new stock assessment was performed and as a result an indefinite closed season was set

Yucatan coasts

1995 The NOM-013-PESCA-1994 was approved. It has the basic management rules (minimum size, closed seasons and areas) to queen conch

Yucatan and Quintana Roo

1995 A SIX-MONTH closed season was set Quintana Roo

1996 A re-opening of a queen conch closed fishery (wit a TAC of 12 t)

Quintana Roo: Cozumel Island

1997 A TAC of 30 t was set Quintana Roo: Banco Chinchorro

2003 Stock assessments at Cozumel Island reported a tendency to diminish its abundance (a TAC: 2t)


2003’ A temporary closed season was announced for 2009-2012 at Cozumel Island


2004 Because of the announcement on 2003, Cozumel’s fishers decided to halt their queen conch fishing


2009 An eleven-month closed season Quintana Roo:

Banco Chinchorro

Source: INP (2000); DOF (2004), and personal observations from E. Sosa-Cordero and A.M. Arce-Ibarra.

There are temporary area closures for the queen conch fishery (the fishing areas from

Yucatan state and most recently, Cozumel Island) but they are not a part of a formal stock

recovery plan.

Since the mid 1990s, several scientists have conducted research on culturing Queen

Conch (e.g. de Jesús-Navarrete et al., 1996). The government provided the required funds

to undertake research through its National Science and Technology Council (CONACyT)

as well as through the former Ministry of Fisheries (“Secretaría de Pesca”) and their

results were spread among the scientific community but less among the resource users

and the government. Despite this, although the aquaculture efforts for queen conch have

not resulted in any stock enhancement and replenishment programs yet, it could easily be

incorporated in any future stock recovery plan.




No rebuilding plan has been developed to this fishery yet. Therefore, the only

monitoring that will be described will be one of any standard fisheries management plan

(as set at the NFC).

With respect to the monitoring of any fishery stock, it is undertaken by the

CONAPESCA that has the responsibility of monitoring that the administrative and

regulatory measures are observed.

In many fisheries, the cooperative fishers do have their own monitoring programs but

in the case of queen conch, a fishery which is knownto have a relative high number of

free fishers (“pescadores libres”) no such programs are known to exist.


No rebuilding plan has been developed to this fishery yet.


institution in charge of evaluating the success of the management of a fishery. Currently,

the queen Conch fishery has only one indicator to measure any increment in stock

biomass, namely the density of this species by area (individual/m2) as assessed through

biological surveys. Unfortunately, the current criteria used to set the catch quota for this

species are based solely on biological grounds, leaving out other economic, social and

institutional aspects.

Economic Aspects

Despite queen conch being a valuable resource, the fact that this species is listed on

CITES’ Red List, as a “Commercially threatened” species (UNEP, 2010) restricts its

export because CITES states that export permits should only be issued when the national

authority has deemed that the export will not be detrimental to the survival of this species

(Meddley, 2008). It has been estimated that the annual queen conch production from the

whole Caribbean is worth around USD 60 000 000 (approximately EUR 42 352 941)

(CITES, 2003). From 1992 to 1998, Caribbean`s queen conch production ranged between

6,519,000 and 7,369,000 Kg. However its annual production only reached up to

3,131,000 Kg in 2001 (CITES, 2003).

Prices for queen conch from the Caribbean region usually ranges from USD 3.0 to

8.0 per Kg (approx. EUR 2.1-5.6) but in some countries, like in Martinica and

Guadaloupe, it reaches up to 11.0 US Dollars per Kg, for local meat, and up to 20.0 US

dollars per Kg for imported meat (CITES, 2003). In Quintana Roo, Mexico, this species

is being sold by the fishing cooperatives at USD 76.40 pesos per Kg (about 4.5 Euros per

Kg). It is only sold fresh and is essentially a product for local consumption, in particular

at both, local and touris restaurants. For several years, Mexico had occupied the fifth

place in queen conch’s production in the Caribbean, and during the year season 1996-

1997 its production value reached about MXN 2 000 000 Mexican pesos (about

EUR 117 647) (INP, 2000).

The following table shows Quintana Roo’s official statistics and its corresponding

values for the years 2000 to 2008.



Table 9.6. Quintana Roo’s queen conch production (records are on fresh landed meat): areas of Banco Chinchorro and Cozumel Island

Year Catch (t ) Economic value

(MXN, 000’s) Comments*

2000 42.5 3 247 Cozumel recorded 12 t.



2003 31.3 2 380 Cozumel recorded 4 t

2004 32.6 3 127 No production reported from Cozumel

2005 29.8 3 82

2006 14.9 1 846

2007 14.6 1 968 Authorized catch (TAC): 15 t.

2008 20.0 2 798 Authorized catch (TAC): 21 t.

Average ± 1 S.D.

28.7 ± 10.0 2702.8 ± 525.4

Source: CONAPESCA-SAGARPA from Quintana Roo’s office. This information was not published but provided

by. Mario González from CONAPESCA-SAGARPA’s Quintana Roo.

Use of economic analysis in the design stage of the rebuilding plan

No rebuilding plan has been devised yet.

Market-based measures

No information was found to address this question. However, a note on transferable

fishing property rights is relevant here. The Fishing Law (LGAPS) states that the granting

(or “concesiones” –lasting 25 years but with a potential of renewal by another 25 years),

could be sold. Nevertheless, in the case of queen conch, which has the cooperative fishers

as the de facto users, such a transaction would not be allowed because any interested

people on a aving such a right would need to become an entitled cooperative fisher before

buying it, and, a cooperative right or title can’t be sold but only passed down or inherited,

from a father/mother to his/her descendants.

Rebuilding efforts as they have affected the fishing industry

As there are a relatively high number of free fishers associated to this fishery, no

reliable data were available to complete Table 9.7.

Table 9.7. Industry Profile

Number of Fishers

Number of Vessels

Average Revenue per Fisher

Total Landed Value

Average Vessel Length (m)

Ex-ante (2007)

136 73 - - 5.9 - 8.6

(2009) 89 37 - - 5.9 – 8.6 Midpoint Ex post



Social Aspects

Key stakeholders affected by the rebuilding plan and their respective interests.

As there is no rebuilding plan in place, there are no stakeholders affected yet.

However, a description of current queen conch’s stakeholders is presented below.

Since 1981, the queen conch fishery was “informally” (i.e. no document was signed)

assigned to fishers grouped into fishing cooperatives and hence, at that time, it became a

de facto common property resource. Nevertheless, the Fishing Law of 1992 changed all

Mexican fisheries status from common property resources to be open for investment to

any group or organization interested in any of them. In this case, investment was open to

private and social (i.e. social organizations or groupings of any type) sectors. Currently,

with the exception of recreational fishing, the Mexican Fishing Law allows both private

and social sectors to enter or invest in any fishery, including the queen conch fishery.

However, as it occurs with most of the valuable fishing resources, like queen conch, they

have already a relatively high fishing pressure or are in a deteriorated status Therefore the

private sector has shown little interest in investing in such fisheries. For some resources,

like shrimp, the private sector invested in aquaculture. That has not been the case for the

queen conch.

At the end of the 1990s there were about 100 entitled fishers at Banco Chinchorro

plus 50 more registered in Cozumel Island cooperatives, using 73 registered outboard

boats (INP, 2000). However, at present, and given its deteriorated status, the queen conch

fishery is being pursued by only 89 fishers using 37 outboard motor boats all belonging to

three fishing cooperatives operating at Banco Chinchorro (Sosa-Cordero, unpublished

data, personal communication from the heads of the fishing cooperatives, 2009). Other

cooperative fishers had been participating in this fishery, particularly from Cozumel

Island, but they stopped fishing in 2004 due to the very low abundance of this species as

well as because closed season had been declared for some of their fishing grounds.

Other competing users or stakeholders include an unknown number of artisan women,

located at several coastal communities of the Yucatan Peninsula who use the shell of this

species to make hand crafts (such as lamps made of the whole shell; earrings, necklaces).

Two groups of these women have been met by local scientists, one at the community of

San Felipe, Yucatan (Arce-Ibarra, unpublished data, personal observation, 2006) and

another at the community of Xcalak, Quintana Roo (Thomassiny-Acosta, 2010; Arce-

Ibarra, unpublished data, personal observation, 2010). Their arts and crafts are sold

primarily to tourist and form a part of their income (Thomassiny-Acosta, 2010).

Another group of stakeholders are the free fishers, an aspect that the Mexican

government needs to address in a more integral (i.e., seeking to diversify their livelihoods

or offering job opportunities at alternative productive sectors) way. Finally, it is not clear

how many people depend directly and indirectly from the queen conch fishery.

Stakeholder participation in the design and implementation of the rebuilding

plan

As there is no rebuilding plan in place, there have not been any stakeholder

participation in designing and implementing any rebuilding plan. However, a comment on

an observed will to recover the queen conch stocks is discussed below.



No technical report or formal document have addressed or reported that consultation

or negotiation between the government and fishers when setting the queen conch catch

quota.

For several years several sectors of Quintana Roo's society have, in one way or

another, raised their concerns about the gradual diminishing abundance of queen conch

stocks at the coast. Thus, as previously stated, at the regional workshops undertaken to

review the Banco Chinchorro management plan, the private sector and fishers stressed the

view that local authorities could design improved plans to stop illegal fishing on queen

conch and thereby to allow for the recovery of the stocks (Arce-Ibarra, 2008, personal

observation). Moreover, the owners of local restaurants have also protested whenever,

they claim, queen conch's management rules have been affecting their income because,

they argue, this species is a much demanded dish (Arce-Ibarra, 2008; 2009 personal

observation).

Compared to other fisheries, the group of queen conch fishers is perceived by

Mexican scholars as a group with full awareness of the numerous problems affecting their

fishery and who may help in finding ways to overcome them. In particular, this group has

over 5 decades of interaction with the resource base and they are perceived as people with

an ample local knowledge on the coastal ecosystem where its fishery is located and on the

several issues of legislation on fisheries. They have skills and expertise not only in

capturing queen conch but also in accounting and marketing this and many other fish

species.



No rebuilding plan has been devised for this fishery yet. Despite a lack of formal

acknowledgement by the federal government, for the need of a fishery recovery plan to

queen conch stocks, some isolated management regulations are in place, currently set in

the National Fisheries Charter and at some NOMs which point toward an implicit goal, as

pursued by INAPESCA's staff, to avoid the collapse of this fishery. Additionally a will to

recover the fishery has been expressed by fishers, the private sector and CONANP's staff.

The main obstacle to be faced by any future rebuilding plan is the effect of illegal fishing

of queen conch.

Given the current status of institutions dealing with fisheries management (i.e. lacking

a capacity, in budget and staff, to devise and implement a fishery recovery strategy),

government and academia should seek the participation of regional fishers in devising a

rebuilding plan to queen conch stocks. In this respect, local fishers should also participate

in devising and enforcing their own monitoring systems, as well in biological surveys. No

doubt that the abalone fishery (i.e. the Mexican Case Study Number 1) could be used as a

successful example of how fishers and government ca work together toward the recovery

of fish stocks. Thus, such a collaborative work (government-resource users), if pursued,

would have characteristics of both, participatory research and co-management.

Estimate of the costs of designing and implementing the rebuilding plan

No data were available to fill out this section.



Lessons learned

Institutions in charge of managing Mexican fisheries did not devise, on time, robust

management rules to avoid the current deteriorated status of queen conch and other

gastropod species from the Gulf of Mexico and the Mexican Caribbean. Moreover, as the

catch statistics of this fishery are fragmented or lacking, a thorough stock assessment for

the whole fishery cannot be undertaken.

Lesson learned

It is known that during the 1970s and 1980s, the queen conch was a part of an open access,

regional artisanal fishery, which geographical range has been gradually contracting due to a

diminishing abundance of this and other gastropod species.

Fishing mortality, on which illegal fishing has a major impact, has left queen conch stocks in a

deteriorated condition in such a way that if not controlled, could drive the fishery to its

collapse. Moreover, it is suggested that other environmental and human-derived factors, like

the tourism industry development along the coast of Quintana Roo, have a negative impact on

the queen conch's habitat (i.e., seagrass). This should be explored further.

A mismatch is found between federal, centralized will and local will to devise and implement a

recovery strategy for this species. In addition, there was also a mismatch between an update of

management regulations set at the NFC for queen conch and the criteria used to set the catch

quota. The latter having implicit management objectives related to recovering the stock of this

species.

One of the overarching challenges in devising and implementing a recovery plan for the Queen

conch would be controlling the illegal fishing in what still seems to be an open access fishery.

Moreover, a recovery plan should include international cooperation among some Caribbean

countries. Thus, the challenge is twofold, first, to work locally and, once the recovery strategy

for this species has been legitimated by the resource users, with education on the importance of

Queen conch, participatory research, monitoring and enforcement and, in general, with

characteristics of co-management, managers should proceed to seek international cooperation.

The current management regulations and criteria to set the catch quota for queen conch is

grounded solely on biological objectives. Should a rebuilding plan be devised, it is suggested

that other objectives such as economic and social should be taken into account.

The lessons learned from the recovery strategy for abalone, as well as the research and

management associated to it, could be used in designing a recovery strategy for queen conch.

If the Mexican government be willing to rebuild or recover its deteriorated fisheries, current

fisheries policies need to be reviewed; in particular, a recovery strategy as a policy needs to be

formally incorporated into the fishing legislation; and, a thorough review of the government

capacities and institutions (e.g., infrastructure, budget and staff) needs to be undertaken.



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