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Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
1985-09
Reconstitution and recovery capability of the
light infantry company.
Fujio, Hirome.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/21520
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DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARYNAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOLMONTEREY. CALIFORNIA 93943
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California
THESISRECONSTITUTION AND RECOVERY CAPABILITY
OF THE
LIGHT INFANTRY COMPANY
by
Hirome Fujio
September 198 5
Thesis Advisor: Alan W. McMasters
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
T222847
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1. REPORT NUMBER 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) 5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED
Reconstitution and Recovery Capability ofthe Light Infantry Company
Master's ThesisSeptember, 19856. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHORfsJ
Hirome Fu j io
8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERf*)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate SchoolMonterey, California 93943-5100
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASKAREA 4 WORK UNIT NUMBERS
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Naval Postgraduate SchoolMonterey, California 93943-5100
12. REPORT DATE
September, 198513. NUMBER OF PAGES
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18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side It necessary and Identity by block number)
AMORE, Reconstitution, Recoverability , Resiliency, Combat Capa-bility, Substitutability, Mission Essential Team, Probabilityof Degradation, Light Infantry Company
I
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side If necessary and Identify by block number)
This thesis is a study of the resiliency and recoverability ofthe light infantry company utilizing the Analysis of MilitaryOrganizational Effectiveness (AMORE) methodology. The efficiencyof the current organizational structure of the company is deter-mined by measuring its capability against its remaining resourcelevel after the application of degradation. A discussion of theAMORE methodology and the light infantry concept is followed by
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20. the extensive input requirements of the model. A sensitivity-analysis is conducted to examine the effects of changes ininput parameters on the company reconstitution capabilities.The methodology is also used to determine those personneland materiel that contributed to low rates and levels ofunit recover ability . Based on the criterion established byScience Applications, Incorporated, this study concludedthat the light infantry company, as it is currently designed,exhibits adequate resiliency and recoverability at degrada-tion levels between 10 and 50 percent.
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Reconstitution and Recovery Capability of theLight Infantry Company
by
Hirome FujioMajor, United States Army
B.B.A., University of Hawaii, 1974
Submitted in partial fulfillment of therequirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN OPERATIONS RESEARCH
from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOLSeptember 1985
1 1,
ABSTRACT
This thesis is a study of the resiliency and recover-
ability of the light infantry company utilizing the Analysis
of Military Organizational Effectiveness (AMORE) method-
ology. The efficiency of the current organizational struc-
ture of the company is determined by measuring its
capability against its remaining resource level after the
application of degradation. A discussion of the AMORE meth-
odology and the light infantry concept is followed by the
extensive input requirements of the model. A sensitivity
analysis is conducted to examine the effects of changes in
input parameters on the company reconstitution capabilities.
The methodology is also used to determine those personnel
and materiel that contributed to low rates and levels of
unit recoverability . Based on the criterion established by
Science Applications, Incorporated, this study concluded
that the light infantry company, as it is currently
designed, exhibits adequate resiliency and recoverability at
degradation levels between 10 and 50 percent.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION 10
A. AMORE METHODOLOGY 10
B. LIGHT INFANTRY CONCEPT 14
1. Organization of the Light Infantry
Company 18
2. Missions of the Light Infantry Company . . 18
C. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 22
D. PREVIEW 22
II
.
INPUT DATA 24
A. GENERAL 24
B. UNIT MISSION 24
C. INITIAL STRENGTH 25
D. TRANSFER MATRIX 25
1. Personnel 25
2. Materiel 28
E. MATERIEL REPAIR TIME 28
F. PROBABILITY OF DEGRADATION SET 35
1. Personnel PD 36
2. Materiel PD 36
3. Commander's Decision Time 36
G. MISSION ESSENTIAL TEAM (MET) 39
1. Personnel 39
2. Materiel 39
H. NUMBER OF ITERATIONS 40
III. ANALYSES OF UNIT CAPABILITY 45
A. GENERAL 45
B. UNIT CAPABILITY 46
1. Mean Fraction of Capability 46
2. Integral of Unit Capability with
Respect to Time 50
C. CHOKE ANALYSIS 51
1. Personnel Requirements and Shortages ... 53
2. Materiel Requirements and Shortages ... 54
D. CONCLUSIONS 55
IV. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 56
A. GENERAL 5 6
B. PROBABILITY OF DEGRADATION 5 6
1. Small Variations in Personnel PD 56
2. Broad Variations of Personnel and
Materiel PD Levels 59
C. MISSION ESSENTIAL TEAMS 62
D. CONCLUSIONS 66
V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS .... 69
A. SUMMARY 69
B. CONCLUSIONS 70
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 70
APPENDIX A: CHOKE ANALYSIS NEEDS AND SURPLUS 7 3
APPENDIX B: MEAN CAPABILITY FOR VARIOUS LEVELS OF
PROBABILITY OF DEGRADATION 79
LIST OF REFERENCES 84
BIBLIOGRAPHY 85
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 87
LIST OF TABLES
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
IX
X
XI
XII
XIII
XIV
XV
XVI
XVII
XVIII
XIX
XX
XXI
LISTING OF PERSONNEL INITIAL STRENGTHS 26
LISTING OF MATERIEL INITIAL STRENGTHS 27
TRANSFER MATRIX FOR PERSONNEL 29
TRANSFER MATRIX FOR MATERIEL . . . .• 32
MATERIEL REPAIR TIME • .... 35
PROBABILITY OF PERSONNEL DEGRADATION SET .... 37
PROBABILITY OF MATERIEL DEGRADATION SET 38
MISSION ESSENTIAL TEAMS - PERSONNEL 41
MISSION ESSENTIAL TEAMS - MATERIEL 43
UNIT CAPABILITY OVER TIME (BASE CASE) 48
INTEGRAL OF UNIT CAPABILITY OVER TIME (BASE
CASE) 50
PROBABILITY OF PERSONNEL DEGRADATION
SET (ALTERNATIVE CASE I) 57
UNIT CAPABILITY OVER TIME (ALTERNATIVE CASE I) . . 58
COMPARISON OF MAXIMUM UNIT CAPABILITY FOR' THE
BASE CASE AND ALTERNATIVE CASE I 59
LEVELS OF PROBABILITY OF DEGRADATION 61
MAXIMUM UNIT CAPABILITY 61
MISSION ESSENTIAL TEAMS -
PERSONNEL (ALTERNATIVE CASE II) 64
MISSION ESSENTIAL TEAMS -
MATERIEL (ALTERNATIVE CASE II) 65
UNIT CAPABILITY OVER TIME (ALTERNATIVE CASE
II) 66
COMPARISON OF MAXIMUM UNIT CAPABILITY FOR THE
BASE CASE AND ALTERNATIVE CASE II 67
CHOKE ANALYSIS DATA - PERSONNEL (TEAM 18) .... 73
XXII CHOKE ANALYSIS DATA - PERSONNEL (AFTER LAST
TEAM) 74
XXIII CHOKE ANALYSIS DATA - MATERIEL (TEAM 15) .... 75
XXIV CHOKE ANALYSIS DATA - MATERIEL (TEAM 16) .... 76
XXV CHOKE ANALYSIS DATA - MATERIEL (TEAM 17) .... 77
XXVI CHOKE ANALYSIS DATA - MATERIEL (TEAM 18) .... 78
XXVII UNIT CAPABILITY OVER TIME (LEVEL 1) 79
XXVIII UNIT CAPABILITY OVER TIME (LEVEL 2) 80
XXIX UNIT CAPABILITY OVER TIME (LEVEL 3) 81
XXX UNIT CAPABILITY OVER TIME (LEVEL 4) 82
XXXI UNIT CAPABILITY OVER TIME (LEVEL 5) 83
LIST OF FIGURES
1.1 AMORE Methodology 12
1.2 Acceptable and Unacceptable Recovery Capability
Regions 13
1.3 Combat Power of Heavy and Light Infantry Versus
Terrain 16
1.4 Organization of the Light Infantry Company .... 19
3.1 Resilience Curve (Base Case) 49
3.2 Effective Unit Hours (Base Case) 52
4.1 Comparison of Resiliency Curves for the Base
Case and Alternative Case I 60
4.2 Recoverability from Combat Degradation 63
4.3 Comparison of Resiliency Curves for the Base
Case and Alternative Case II 68
I. INTRODUCTION
A. AMORE METHODOLOGY
The Analysis of Military Organizational Effectiveness
(AMORE) methodology is an analytical approach for deter-
mining unit resiliency and recoverability under combat
conditions. This is accomplished by analyzing the correla-
tion between the unit's mission requirements and its capa-
bility through its available personnel and equipment
resources after applying combat degradation. The unit is
said to be resilient if it is able to reconstitute over the
time period of a mission to a given capability level. The
following factors make a unit resilient on the battlefield
[Ref. 1: p. 1-4]:
1. High substitutability of personnel and materiel.
2. Minimum number of essential skills or materiel items
per function.
3. Reduced probability of kill for both personnel and
materiel
.
4. Self-sufficient organizational elements.
5. Appropriate levels of cohesiveness
.
6. Good standard operating procedures for training and
implementation of reconstitution concepts.
The AMORE methodology is outlined graphically in Figure
1.1 and considers the following [Ref. 1: p. B-5]
:
1. Combinations of personnel and materiel damage.
2. Degradation of personnel and materiel and their
interaction as they merge together to form functional
teams required for combat capability.
3. The state of training and cross- training of indi-
vidual members of the organizations to include skill
substitutability
.
10
4. Substitutability and repairability of equipment.
5. The organization's ability to reconstitute its func-
tions and regenerate combat capability as a function
of time.
Initially Figure 1.1 defines the unit mission and posture,
which is needed to determine the structure of essential
teams. Then the functional analysis first specifies the
initial strengths (assets) of personnel and materiel
required by the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE).
These assets are then divided into essential teams such that
each will contribute equally to mission accomplishment.
Simultaneously with the functional analysis, the probabili-
ties of degradation for personnel and materiel are deter-
mined. These are often established by the use of Joint
Munitions Effectiveness Manual (JMEM) methodologies. Next
the AMORE model simulates the degradation of the unit by
using a Monte Carlo technique and the input probabilities.
Following degradation, the unit undergoes reconstitution by
using a transportation/assignment algorithm and the substi-
tutability data. Finally the model computes the expected
value of the best reconstituted unit capability for the
defined mission and the simulated degradation. This forms
the basis for the output analyses (Chapter III).
According to [Ref. 1: p. 1-7], Science Applications,
Incorporated (SAI) has suggested that, as a minimum, a resi-
lient unit should eventually attain a unit recovery capa-
bility which is linear with respect to damage level. This
defines a reconstituted capability value of 1-PD as the
resiliency threshold where PD is the probability of degrada-
tion for personnel and at least light damage for materiel.
Therefore, a unit is said to be resilient if its reconsti-
tuted capability level meets or exceeds this criterion
value. Figure 1.2 depicts the acceptable and unacceptable
regions
.
11
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B. LIGHT INFANTRY CONCEPT
The light infantry was organized out of a necessity to
have a highly-trained unit that could be deployed rapidly in
response to a contingency mission anywhere in the world.
The spectrum of conflict consists of the following scenarios
ranging from low- intensity to high- intensity
:
1.. Terrorism
2. Unconventional warfare
3. Minor conventional warfare
4. Major conventional warfare
5. Theater nuclear warfare
6. Strategic nuclear warfare
The current heavy forces are designed and structured for
the major conventional warfare scenario. Due to increased
occurrences of crises in the low- to mid- intensity scenarios
such as
1. Korea
2. Venezuela
3. Lebanon
4. Berlin
5
.
Cuba
6
.
Vietnam
7. Laos/Thailand
8
.
Panama
9. Dominican Republic
10. Israel
11. Grenada
it was determined that light forces were better suited to
meet these kinds of crises. The light infantry is charac-
terized by a capability to maneuver either offensively or
defensively through terrain impassable by vehicles and to
adapt quickly to various modes of ground, air, or water
transport available to the force. It possesses a
14
substantial number of automatic weapons to enhance its close
combat capability. Figure 1.3 [Ref. 2: p. iii] shows that a
heavy infantry force such as a mechanized infantry unit in a
deliberate attack on open terrain (desert, plains, valleys)
generates high combat power in terms of firepower, mobility,
and protection. However, this force loses considerable
combat power when it is assigned missions in restrictive
terrain (dry creek beds, urban or built-up areas, dense
forests, mountains, jungles). The light infantry is better
suited to fight in a low- intensity environment in all types
of terrain and climatic conditions or in a mid- to high-
intensity environment (Europe) in close terrain.
A limitation of the light infantry company is that it is
completely foot-mobile, making it vulnerable to enemy
artillery, mortar, and nuclear, biological, and chemical
(NBC) attacks. Its survivability depends greatly on the use
of cover and concealment. The light infantry soldier is the
most versatile, advanced, and effective combat "system" on
the battlefield and will never be duplicated in mechanical
or electrical form [Ref. 3: pp. 28-29]:
1. In one package, the light infantry soldier provides
an optical and aura sensor system (eyes and ears)
tied into a central processor (the brain) with an
incredible range of operating programs and almost
infinite recoverable memory.
2. The system can be rapidly programmed (through
training) and loaded through a voice-recognition
system. It is, thereafter, adaptive and
self -reprogrammable
.
3. It can accept and apply mission-type instructions to
infinitely variable terrain, conditions of visi-
bility, size and composition of enemy force, and
enemy movements and actions.
15
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16
4. It can assess and select covered and concealed routes
of advance into the enemy rear and onto his flanks.
5. All this is mounted on a multi-flex chassis capable
of negotiating every kind of terrain, including water
obstacles, by self -propulsion.
6. Super robotic arms, hands, and fingers with infinite
degrees of freedom couple the control processor to
weapons and communications devices.
7. This remarkable fighting system includes automatic
and continuous position location, plus situation
analysis and reporting, with a large, flexible (even
entertaining) vocabulary.
8. The "system" performs target detection, identifica-
tion, acquisition, munition and weapon selection,
engagement, damage assessment, and reengagement as
indicated by target condition.
For this unique "system", emphasis is placed on cross-
training and the attainment of individual proficiency on
multiple weapon systems to enhance unit flexibility. Every
effort is placed on commonality in weapons and equipment to
significantly reduce logistical requirements, streamline
maintenance operations, and simplify repair parts manage-
ment. Equipment commonality also reduces operator training
requirements and facilitates cross- training . In other words,
soldiers trained on one system have the basic knowledge to
operate, maintain, and diagnose problems on common equipment
items that are used with other systems [Ref. 4: pp. 5-6].
According to General John A. Wickham, Jr. [Ref. 5: ],
"The smallest Active Army in 34 years requires an Army of
Excellence which optimizes combat power. If we seize this
(light infantry) concept with conviction, innovativeness
,
and vision, the Army's land power will increase and, as a
result, play a more significant role in future U.S.
national security."
17
1. Organization of the Light Infantry Company
The light infantry company is organized as shown in
Figure 1.4 [Ref. 2: p. 2]. It consists of a company head-
quarters platoon, composed of a headquarters section, an
antiarmor (AA) section, and a mortar section, and three
rifle platoons, each composed of a headquarters section and
three rifle squads. A rifle squad operates in two fire
teams, each consisting of four men. The company has no
organic vehicles but it can use the support platoon's motor-
cycles if necessary.
The medium antiarmor weapons (Dragon) are consoli-
dated at company level to preclude encumbering the rifle
platoons with a bulky weapon system that may impede their
rate of movement in a low- intensity environment where armor
targets are scarce. This also enables the company commander
to provide rapid response based on the situation. The
antiarmor section can be used as an additional rifle unit if
the company is not faced with an enemy armor threat . The
M-60 machineguns (two per platoon) are placed, controlled,
and displaced by the platoon leader.
With the availability of night vision goggles and
night vision sights, the light infantry company is capable
of conducting operations under all visibility conditions.
2
.
Missions of the Light Infantry Company
a. Offense
The primary purpose of offensive operations is
to destroy the capability of the enemy and/or his will to
fight. This is accomplished by:
1. Attacking the enemy from the least expected area.
2. Concentrating effort in one direction while forcing
the enemy to fight in two or more directions.
18
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3. Destroying or wearing down enemy troops.
4. Penetrating the enemy's defenses to attack key combat
service, combat service support, and command,
control, and communications elements.
5. Seizing key terrain to enable maximum capability on
favorable ground.
The light infantry company can achieve maximum
success by employing sound principles of fire and movement
and attacking in restrictive terrain such as towns, swamps,
forests, and mountains. It can also maximize surprise by
attacking the flanks and rear of the enemy at night or
during limited visibility.
The light infantry company is capable of
conducting the following offensive operations [Ref. 4: pp.
B-9 - B-12]
:
1. Movement to contact
2. Hasty attack
3. Deliberate attack
4. Pursuit and exploitation when opposed by light enemy
forces
Movement to contact - conducted to locate the
enemy, develop the situation, and maintain the initiative.
Decentralized control, rapid execution, and responsive fire
support are critical to defeating the enemy.
Hasty attack - conducted to defeat an ill-
prepared enemy force quickly or to take advantage of an
enemy weakness. The effective use of indirect and supporting
weapon systems, suppression of enemy fire support and air
defense, and efficient application of combat support assets
increase the devastating effect of the swift, violent
maneuver against an ill-prepared enemy.
Deliberate attack - conducted to defeat a strong
enemy force in well-prepared positions that cannot be over-
come by a hasty attack. The main effort is directed toward
the enemy's weakest point.
20
Exploitation and pursuit - conducted to cut off
enemy dismounted infantry forces and defeat remaining
forces, conduct military operations on urban terrain (MOUT),
and destroy pockets of resistance.
b. Defense
The light infantry company is capable of
defending against enemy light forces. However, as was
depicted in Figure 1.3, it can also defend against tank and
motorized units in close terrain. Defensive operations are
conducted in order to:
1. Cause an enemy attack to fail by destroying him or
forcing him to withdraw.
2. Control essential terrain or secure a key area to
deny enemy entry.
3. Gain time to prepare for a subsequent offense.
4. Economize forces in one area to allow concentration
elsewhere
.
5. Reduce the enemy capability for offensive action.
The light infantry company is capable of
conducting the following defensive operations:
1. Defend in sector
2. Defend from a battle position
3. Defend a strongpoint
Defend in sector - This is the most frequent
defensive mission. The company defends in an area character-
ized by positions in depth and coordination with adjacent
units. Defending in depth entails drawing the enemy into the
sector and conducting multiple and repeated surprise attacks
throughout the depths of its formation.
Defend from a battle position - This mission is
assigned when key terrain must be held or when the position
is located in a favorable engagement area. It is character-
ized by obstacles to slow the enemy and stop it in the
21
engagement area such that the battle position can engage
targets from the flanks and rear.
Defend a strongpoint - This mission prevents the
enemy from bypassing or reducing the strongpoint without
expending excessive amounts of resources and time. A strong-
point is usually located in restrictive terrain such as
thick forests, mountains, swamps, urban areas, etc., that
cannot be easily bypassed.
C. PURPOSE AND SCOPE
Because of the importance of the light infantry concept
to the United States Army, this thesis investigated the
composition and mechanics of a light infantry company to
identify, from a set of alternatives, the force structure
that maximizes unit resiliency on the battlefield for a
night defensive mission in a nuclear, biological, and chem-
ical (NBC) environment. The AMORE methodology was used to
evaluate the alternatives.
Although the United States Army Infantry School (USAIS)
conducted an AMORE analysis of the light infantry company as
input to the AMORE Analysis of the Light Infantry Division
prepared by Science Applications, Incorporated, it was
constrained by time and resident experience on the AMORE
model, resulting in an analysis that was not performed at
the level of detail and depth as this study. Additionally,
the USAIS analysis considered the organization of the light
infantry company before a mortar section was included in the
TOE. This thesis analyzed the company subsequent to that
change
.
D. PREVIEW
Chapter II discusses the input information that must be
determined before the AMORE methodology can be exercised.
22
The development of these input data required an extensive
analysis of the unit and its mission in conjunction with
subject matter experts. Chapter III provides the output
analyses based on the transformation of the input informa-
tion into measures of organizational capability. The anal-
yses focus on the recovery potential of the unit and include
developing capability as a function of time and identifying
critical resources. A sensitivity analysis is conducted in
Chapter IV. It examines the effects of changes in degrada-
tion probabilities and the definition of a mission essential
team on unit reconstitution capabilities. Chapter V summa-
rizes the analyses, and presents conclusions and recommenda-
tions based on the results of these analyses.
23
II. INPUT DATA
A. GENERAL
The AMORE methodology requires a significant amount of
input data based on an evaluation of a unit's capabilities,
organizational and operational concepts, and resources
provided in the Table of Organization and Equipment. The
following data elements are required to run the base case
using the AMORE methodology:
1. Unit mission.
2. TOE or starting strength of personnel and materiel.
3. Personnel and materiel transfer matrices.
4. Repair time for materiel.
5. Probability of degradation for personnel and
materiel
.
6. Commander's decision time.
7. Essential team requirements for personnel and
materiel
.
8. Number of simulation iterations.
B. UNIT MISSION
Although the unit mission is not input directly, it
determines the requirements for essential teams. For this
analysis, the light infantry company is in a six-hour night
defensive posture in a nuclear, biological, and chemical
(NBC) environment. This presents a stressful situation
which requires most of the skill groups and equipment types,
thereby providing the most information about the company
performing its combat function.
24
C. INITIAL STRENGTH
The initial strength pertains to the number of personnel
by grade and military occupational specialty (MOS) and the
number of significant items of equipment specified in the
TOE. These listings are depicted in Table I and Table II.
Although the fire support team chief, the fire support team
sergeant, the fire support team radio telephone operator
(RATELO), the medic, the forward observer, and the forward
observer RATELO are not included in the TOE, they are
usually attached to the light infantry company during opera-
tions and are therefore included in Table I.
D. TRANSFER MATRIX
A transfer matrix identifies the personnel and materiel
that are substitutable for other personnel and materiel and
the amount of time it takes to complete the substitution.
The matrix consists of row and column headings corresponding
to the row or line numbers of the personnel or materiel. An
entry indicates the time, in minutes, it takes for a row
skill or materiel item to substitute for a column skill or
materiel item. Zero entries indicate that substitutions
take place immediately while dots denote substitutions that
would not normally occur or would be infeasible. The diag-
onal entries represent the intersections of the rows and
columns with equal numbers. The transfer times used for
this analysis were developed from discussions with subject
matter experts from the Light Division Certification Board
of the US Army Combat Developments Experimentation Center
(CDEC) at Fort Ord.
1 . Personnel
The transfer matrix for personnel displays the
substitutability of one personnel for another in terms of
25
TABLE I
LISTING OF PERSONNEL INITIAL STRENGTHS
Personnel Skill Groups Grade MOS Qty
123456789
1011
12131415
16171819
2021222324252627
2829303132
Company Headquarters:
Company CommanderExecutive OfficerFirst SergeantSupply SergeantCommunications ChiefNBC NCOArmorerCompany RATELOFire Support Team ChiefFire Support Team SergeantFire Support Team RATELO
Antiarmor Section:
0-30-2E-8
Antiarmor Section LeaderAntiarmor Team leaderAntiarmor GunnerAsst Antiarmor Gunner
Mortar Section:
Mortar Section LeaderMortar Squad LeaderMortar GunnerAmmunition Bearer
Platoon Headquarters:
Platoon LeaderPlatoon SergeantPlatoon RATELOMachinegun GunnerAsst Machinegun GunnerMedicForward ObserverForward Observer RATELO
Rifle Squad:
Squad LeaderTeam LeaderAutomatic RiflemanGrenadierRifleman
6654
E-30-2E-6E-4
E-6E-5E-4E-3
E-6E-5E-4E-3
0-2E-7E-3E-4E-3E-4E-5E-3
E-6E-5E-4E-4E-3
11B00 111B00 111B5M 176Y30 131V30 154E20 176Y10 111B10 213A00 113F30 113F10 1
11B30 111B20 311B10 611B10 3
11C30 111C20 111C10 211C10 2
11B00 311B4G 311B10 311B10 611B10 691A10 313F20 313F10 3
11B30 911B20 1811B10 1811B10 1811B10 18
Total 142
26
TABLE II
LISTING OF MATERIEL INITIAL !STRENGTHS
1
Materiel Quantity
Binocular 132 Chemical Alarm 13 Compass, Magnetic 24 Dragon 65 Grenade Launcher 40mm M-203 186 Infrared Viewer AN/ PAS -7
Machinegun 7.62mm M-604
7 68 Mortar bOmm 29 Night Vision Goggles AN/P^
Night Vision Sight AN/PVS/S-5 36
10 -4 1811 Night Vision Sight AN/TVS -5 612 Pistol Caliber .45 713 Platoon Early Warning System 314 Radiac Detector Charger 115 Radiac Set AN7PDR-27
Radiacmeter IM-174/PD1
16 317 Radiacmeter IM-185/UD
Radio Set AN/PRC-7712
18 619 Rifle 5.56mm M- 16A2 8420 Small Unit Transceiver 1221 Speech Security Equipment 422 Squad Automatic Weapon 1823 Tape Reader
Telephone Set TA-l/PTTelephone Set TA-312/PT
124 1425 1
the average time required to reach an acceptable operational
capability. Table III presents the 32 x 32 matrix of
personnel transfer times, in minutes, for the light infantry
company. It can be seen that there is significant potential
for substitution between infantry MOS codes (llxxx; see
Table I) but only limited potential for headquarters
elements and attached personnel (fire support team, forward
observer teams, and medics).
Personnel skill substitutions during reorganization
and reconstitution following degradation were limited to
those substitutions that would normally occur instead of
considering every possibility. For example, although the
company commander has the skill and training to substitute
for a rifleman, he would not assume that role.
27
Transfer times ranged from 1 to 45 minutes (with the
exception of diagonal elements). For the most part, the
increased transfer times resulted from substitutions
involving greater differences in proficiency levels and from
the distance that had to be travelled during limited visi-
bility between positions of one personnel to the other. In,
the case of the light infantry company in the defense
mission, that distance could be as much as 750 meters,
depending on the terrain. The time penalty assessed for
travel varied from 5 to 15 minutes.
2 . Materiel
A similar matrix for materiel substitution times is
presented in Table IV. Due to the nature and organization
of the light infantry company, the unit possesses relatively
few essential materiel items. This provides very little
potential for these items to substitute for one another.
The most significant elements of materiel transfer times are
adjustment and repositioning times.
E. MATERIEL REPAIR TIME
The times to repair light (operator level or first
echelon maintenance) and moderate (organizational level or
second echelon maintenance) materiel damage are shown in
Table V. According to [Ref. 6: p. 6], doctrine dictates 18
minutes as the time limit for light repair and four hours as
the time limit for moderate repair. Any equipment exceeding
four hours of repair time is assumed to be not repairable by
the organizational level and therefore is considered lost to
the unit
.
28
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TABLE V
MATERIEL REPAIR TIME
Repair Time (Minutes
)
Light Moderate
1
Materiel Damage Damage
240Binocular 182 Chemical Alarm 18 2403 Compass, Magnetic 18 2404 Dragon 18 2405 Grenade Launcher 40mm M-203 18 2406 Infrared Viewer AN/PAS-
7
Machinegun 7.62mm M-6018 240
7 18 2408 Mortar 60mm 18 2409 Night Vision Goggles AN/PVS-5
Night Vision Sight AN/PVS-418 240
10 18 24011 Night Vision Sight AN/TVS-5 18 24012 Pistol Caliber .45 18 24013 Platoon Early Warning System
Radiac Detector Charger18 240
14 18 24015 Radiac Set AN/PDR-27
Radiacmeter IM-174/PD18 240
16 18 24017 Radiacmeter IM-185/UD
Radio Set AN/PRC-7718 240
18 18 24019 Rifle 5.56mm M-16A2 18 24020 Small Unit Transceiver 18 24021 Speech Security Equipment 18 24022 Squad Automatic Weapon 18 24023 Tape Reader
Telephone Set TA-l/PTTelephone Set TA-312/PT
. 18 24024 18 24025 18 240
F. PROBABILITY OF DEGRADATION SET
A probability of degradation set (PD set) consists of
both the degradation probabilities and the commander's deci-
sion times for personnel and materiel. This set is
presented in Tables VI and VII. The degradation probabili-
ties for personnel and materiel are determined by the unit
posture and the threat being simulated.
35
1. Personnel PD
Personnel probabilities of degradation can be
derived from the Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual based
on the light infantry company in a defensive posture against
conventional weapon systems. The recommended degradation
probability is 0.10 by the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at
Fort Leavenworth.
2. Materiel PD
Materiel probabilities of degradation are required
for light and moderate damage (repairable in the unit) and
for severe damage (lost to the unit). The Combined Arms
Center recommended that the corresponding degradation prob-
abilities should be 0.10, 0.05, and 0.02. In Table VII, the
cumulative "at least light" column is the sum of the indi-
vidual light, moderate, and severe PD ' s , the "at least
moderate" column is the sum of the moderate and severe PD ' s
,
and the "severe" column is only the severe PD. These cumu-
lative PD's are required by the AMORE model.
3
.
Commander' s Decision Time
In any given situation following degradation, a
commander needs time to assess the condition of the unit and
decide how to reorganize. This decision time is in addition
to any transfer times (personnel and materiel) except for
diagonal elements. It takes into consideration the time
lost due to the initial impact following an attack, which
may result in a brief period of confusion, demoralization,
and immediate aid to casualties. After the initial reaction
period, the commander's decision time will involve time
elements for damage assessment, communication of damage and
casualty reports, the commander's evaluation and decision
process, and communication of decisions for employment of
36
surviving assets to reconstitute the unit [Ref. 7: page 20].
A time of five minutes, concurred by subject matter experts
at the Light Division Certification Board at CDEC, for all
levels of degradation was used for this analysis.
TABLE VI
PROBABILITY OF PERSONNEL DEGRADATION
Commander'
s
SET
Decision Degradation
1
Personnel Time (min) Probability
Company Commander 5 0. 102 Executive Officer 5 0. 103 First Sergeant 5 0. 104 Supply Sergeant 5 0. 105 Communications Chief 5 106 NBC NCO 5 107 Armorer 5 0. 108 Company RATELO 5 0. 109 Fire Support Team Chief 5 0. 10
10 Fire Support Team Sergeant 5 1011 Fire Support Team RATELO 5 0. 1012 Antiarmor Section Leader 5 1013 Antiarmor Team leader 5 1014 Antiarmor Gunner 5 1015 Asst Antiarmor Gunner 5 1016 Mortar Section Leader 5 1017 Mortar Squad Leader 5 1018 Mortar Gunner 5 1019 Ammunition Bearer 5 1020 Platoon Leader 5 1021 Platoon Sergeant 5 1022 Platoon RATELO 5 1023 Machinegun Gunner 5 1024 Asst Machinegun Gunner 5 1025 Medic 5 1026 Forward Observer 5 1027 Forward Observer RATELO 5 1028 Squad Leader 5 1029 Team Leader 5 1030 Automatic Rifleman 5 1031 Grenadier 5 1032 Rifleman 5 10
37
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38
G. MISSION ESSENTIAL TEAM (MET)
The AMORE capability analysis requires the breakdown of
the unit into essential teams, consisting of only those
personnel and materiel elements which are necessary to
accomplish a mission. In the case of the light infantry
company, the smallest combat force is the fire team
consisting of the following elements: team leader, automatic
rifleman, grenadier, and rifleman. If an element is missing
for any given essential team, that team then has no mission
capability [Ref. 8: p. 2-10]. Using the fire team as the
basic increment of capability, eighteen teams were
constructed to produce the increment of mission performance.
An effort was made to distribute basic skills and equipment
as evenly as possible across the various increments of
capability
.
1
.
Personnel
Table VIII shows the personnel mission essential
teams for the light infantry company. It can be noted that
the teams contain a command element along with a full
complement of infantry, antiarmor, and mortar personnel
required for night defensive operations. The executive
officer, supply sergeant, armorer, fire support team,
medics, and the forward observer teams were not considered
essential to this particular mission.
2
.
Materiel
The composition of the materiel mission essential
teams of the light infantry company is presented in Table
IX. These elements represent the equipment associated with
the proper personnel. Only major items of equipment are
listed and each item is considered to include all of its
component parts. Some items which are issued on the basis
39
of one per individual (protective masks, bayonets) are not
included.
H. NUMBER OF ITERATIONS
An iteration includes application of damage to personnel
and materiel, assessment of surviving resources, reconstitu-
tion of the maximum number of mission essential teams, and
evaluation of an expected value of unit capability at speci-
fied time periods. The number of iterations must be greater
than or equal to two for proper program execution.
According to the User's Manual [Ref. 9: p. 2-32], fifty
iterations are generally sufficient to provide statistically
significant convergence of results. Thus, fifty iterations
were used in the analysis of the light infantry company.
40
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44
III. ANALYSES OF UNIT CAPABILITY
A. GENERAL
This chapter looks at those personnel and materiel
factors which influence the light infantry company's ability
to reconstitute its combat capability following an attack.
Some of the factors which affect its recoverability are
[Ref. 1: p. 5-1]:
1. The number of personnel and materiel items which are
authorized by the TOE and the number that survive
after an attack.
2. The transferability of personnel and materiel to
other skills or functions.
3. The time required to accomplish the transfer
(including delay and repair times).
4. The demand of the essential teams for specific types
and numbers of personnel and materiel items
.
The AMORE methodology considers the above factors in
producing the output for the base case from the available
data.
The following assumptions apply in the analyses:
1. Personnel and materiel systems for the base case
light infantry company are from the TOE developed by
the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).
2. The light infantry company is at 100% strength (as
defined by the TOE) at the beginning of the mission.
3. Personnel are fully trained and qualified in their
Military Occupational Specialty (MOS).
4. Materiel systems are operationally combat ready at
the beginning of the mission.
45
5. Available weapon systems have an adequate supply of
ammunition for the entire mission.
6. Stress, fatigue, morale, etc. are not explicitly
considered.
The two most important outputs used as the basis for the
analyses of this chapter are:
1. Unit capability - the average recovery capability the
total unit (both personnel and materiel) has attained
by a given time.
2. Available surpluses and shortages - those elements
(either personnel or materiel) that prevented the
unit from having additional capability (shortages)
and those which are not being utilized (surpluses).
B. UNIT CAPABILITY
1. Mean Fraction of Capability
The rate of reconstitution is a function of the
times required for transfer and/or repair of assets. The
AMORE methodology allows the user to use average times or
random exponential simulated times based on the input mean
or expected times. The exponential distribution is known as
a frequently observed waiting time distribution. For this
analysis, the "mean time only" option was considered suffi-
cient for determining capability.
Table X presents the mean fraction of pre-
degradation capability for personnel and materiel as a func-
tion of time after degradation. These capabilities are
evaluated at the specified time periods, and at minimum and
infinite times. The minimum time capability is evaluated
immediately after the start of the reconstitution. All
transfers are in progress, but only those with a total time
(transfer + commander's decision + equipment repair) of zero
have been completed. Infinite time or maximum capability is
46
evaluated when all possible transfers and all possible
equipment repairs have been made. The "Unit" column gives
the unit capability which is the minimum of the personnel
and materiel capabilities derived from the average for all
iterations [Ref. 9: p. 2-50]. Additionally, the confidence
limit based on the t-test of significance for a 90 percent
confidence level (two-sided) is given for each of the mean
capabilities. The basic equation is [Ref. 10: p. 3-84]:
90% CI = +t VX Z - (YX )2
/ N (eqn 3.1)n-. / i i
V n"(n"-"I)
where X = capability for iteration i;i
N = number of simulation iterations (2-=N<CO);
t = table value of t for N-l degrees of freedom,n
An example of how to read the table is as follows:
after 0.5 hours, personnel regained a mean capability of
96.2 percent, materiel reached 69.9 percent, and the minimum
or unit mean capability was 69.9 percent. Maximum recovery
is accomplished between 4.0 and 4.25 hours. This can be
identified by the first point in time where the value of
unit capability reaches its maximum. The 90 percent confi-
dence interval for the unit capability can be calculated
using eqn. 3 . 1 at that time and the range is from 0.913 to
0.933.
Figure 3.1 depicts the graphical representation of
the mean data presented in Table X. It does not indicate
any significant divergence between the personnel and
materiel capability over time. It does show that materiel
is always the limiting or minimum factor at any time after
0.25 hours. At 0.25 hours the materiel capability and unit
capability become and continue to be equal. Prior to that
47
TABLE X
UNIT CAPABILITY OVER TIME(BASE CASE)
Time(Hours
)
Minimum
Personnel
394 0.033
Materiel
0.589 0.034
Unit
376 0270.250 747 0.043 0.618 0.032 596 0350.500 962 0.011 0.699 0.035 699 0350.750 974 0.007 0.797 0.025 797 0251.000 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0251.250 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0251.500 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0251.750 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0252.000 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0252.250 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0252.500 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0252.750 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0253.000 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0253.250 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0253.500 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0253.750 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0254.000 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0254.250 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 0104.500 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 0104.750 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 0105.000 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 0105.250 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 0105.500 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 0105.750 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 0106.000 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 010
Infinity 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 010
time, the personnel capability was lower than the materiel
capability
.
Based on the resiliency threshold (1-PD) discussed
in Chapter I, it can be seen that the light infantry company
is resilient at a 10 percent degradation level (degradation
probability, PD, of 10 percent for personnel and 10 percent
at least light damage for materiel). The maximum capabili-
ties are 97.4 percent and 92.3 percent for personnel and
materiel, respectively. The value of Figure 3.1 to the Army
is that it portrays the light infantry company as being
self-sufficient and effective on the battlefield at a light
level of degradation.
48
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49
2.,Integral of Unit Capability with Respect to Time
Table XI provides the output of the cumulative area
under the capability curve. This area provides a measure of
the accumulated effective unit hours over the six-hour time
period.
TABLE XI
INTEGRAL OF UNIT CAPABILITY OVER TIME(BASE CASE)
-Time Unit Unit Team(Hours
)
Capability Hours Hours
Minimum 0.376 0.000 0.0000.250 0.596 0.121 2.1850.500 0.699 0.283 5.0970.750 0.797 0.470 8.4621.000 0.798 0.669 12.0501.250 0.798 0.869 15.6401.500 0.798 1.068 19.2301.750 0.798 1.268 2-2.8202.000 0.798 1.467 26.4102.250 0.798 1.667 30.0002.500 0.798 1.866 33.5902.750 0.798 2.066 37.1803.000 0.798 2.265 40.7703.250 0.798 2.464 44.3603.500 0.798 2.664 47.9503.750 0.798 2.863 51.5404.000 0.798 3.063 55.1304.250 0.923 3.278 59.0024.500 0.923 3.509 63.1574.750 0.923 3.740 67.1575.000 0.923 3.970 71.4675.250 0.923 4.201 75.6225.500 0.923 4.432 79.7775.750 0.923 4.663 83.9326.000 0.923 4.894 88.087
50
The unit capability (Unit column from Table X), as
mentioned earlier, is the minimum of the personnel and
materiel capabilities derived from the average for all iter-
ations. The unit hours available to the light infantry
company define the maximum potential output of the company
in time. This means that a full-up unit at 100 percent
capability would have one unit hour available in one hour.
Unit output is expressed in terms of team hours where one
team hour is defined as the amount of work one team can do
in one hour. The maximum value for the light infantry
company would be 18 team hours of output work every hour.
The average cumulative area is given in terms of the unit
hours and team hours that are available from the beginning
of reorganization to the desired time. Table XI shows that
0.669 unit hours were available in the first hour or 12.050
team hours from an eighteen- team unit. The light infantry
company has recovered to 79.8 percent capability at the end
of the first hour. However, the potential work the company
could have produced in that hour is only 66.9 percent of a
full-up unit. Figure 3.2 graphically shows the effective
unit hours compared to a reference line representing a unit
at 100 percent capability over the entire time.
C. CHOKE ANALYSIS
The choke analysis output (Appendix A) provides the
information on why the light infantry company was unable to
reconstitute to full capability by infinite time. The
output includes those items needed (Needs), on the average,
to complete the designated team and those items excess
(Surplus), on the average, to the requirements of that team.
The standard deviation for these averages is also given.
51
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52
Those personnel and materiel items critical to additional
capability in the unit are identified as need items while
the surplus items show where possible changes in transfer
capability could be used to increase unit recovered capa-
bility. The number of teams attempted (one beyond the
optimal solution team) is provided along with the number of
iterations for which this "next" team was attempted [Ref. 9:
p. 2-53].
1. Personnel Requirements and Shortages
As expected, the richness of total personnel due to
substitutability is apparent in the light infantry company
as evidenced by Tables XXI and XXII in Appendix A. For
example, in the results listed in Table XXI labelled "(Team
18)", seventeen teams were built and the eighteenth team was
attempted to be built. The model failed to complete the
eighteenth team twenty-three times out of the fifty itera-
tions (The other twenty-seven attempts will be shown on
additional printouts at ' the appropriate team level of
attempted completion) . The attempted construction of the
eighteenth team failed (choked) due to the personnel needs
in column one by the amounts specified by the values as
listed. These values were derived by the following
expression:
n
( Y (total number of shortages by skill) )/ni
i=l
where n = number of failures (iterations).
53
The major items contributing to the choke on the eighteenth
team were as follows:
1. Communication Chief (skill number 5)
2. Antiarmor Gunner (skill number 14)
3. Mortar Gunner (skill number 18)
4. Squad Leader (skill number 28)
5. Team Leader (skill number 29)
6. Automatic Rifleman (skill number 30)
7. Grenadier (skill number 31)
Table XXII is denoted by "After Last Team" and indicates
that the "next" team increment solution is not required
since all eighteen teams can be built. Therefore, the
average needs are not necessary, resulting in only a listing
of average surplus and standard deviation of surplus. The
fifty iterations of the simulation are accounted for as
follows: seventeen teams were built in the twenty-three
iterations of Table XXI, and eighteen teams were built in
the twenty-seven iterations (23 + 27 = 50) of Table XXII.
2. Materiel Requirements and Shortages
Tables XXIII through XXVI in Appendix A display the
choke analysis output for materiel. An examination of Table
XXIV shows that the sixteenth team was attempted five times,
resulting in a maximum capability of fifteen teams. This
was caused by a lack of materiel items 18 and 20. On the
average, team sixteen required 0.80 of item 18, an AN/PRC-77
radio set, and 0.20 of item 20, a small unit transceiver.
In other words, in four of the five iterations an AN/PRC-77
radio set was needed to build the sixteenth team while the
remaining iteration required a small unit transceiver.
Analyzing the remainder of the choke data for materiel in a
similar method results in a Dragon (item number 4) being
needed to build the fifteenth team in one iteration, a
54
binocular (item number 1) being needed to build the seven-
teenth team in one of the six iterations, and a Dragon being
needed in the other five iterations. Thirty-eight itera-
tions choked on team eighteen in Table XXVI due to a lack of
most of the materiel items. To account for all fifty itera-
tions of the materiel run, the following summary of results
is provided:
Number of Teams Built Number of Iterations
14
15
16
17
1
5
6
38
50
D. CONCLUSIONS
Based on the results from the analyses of the two
outputs, the following observations are made:
1. The recovery capability of the light infantry company
at the end of its assigned mission indicates that it
is resilient at the 10 percent level of degradation.
2. Resiliency is limited by some items of equipment,
particularly the Dragon which is a low-density equip-
ment. Improving survivability for the Dragon would
increase reconstitution capability.
3. Although all eighteen personnel essential teams were
built in 54 percent of the iterations, improved capa-
bility could be accomplished by increasing theft
substitutability for squad leaders and team leaders.
55
IV. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
A
.
GENERAL
This chapter investigates how sensitive the AMORE simu-
lation output measure of effectiveness of the light infantry-
company is to changes in the input parameters. A review of
existing AMORE literature indicates that the model provides
sensitivity analyses to changes in practically every input
factor. This analysis examined the sensitivity to changes
in the following input parameters, which are considered by
the author to be of primary importance to the light infantry
company analysis:
1. Probability of degradation
2. Mission essential teams
These will be referred to as Alternative Cases I and II.
B. PROBABILITY OF DEGRADATION
1. Small Variations in Personnel PD
The base case in Chapter III assumed a 10 percent
probability of degradation for all personnel in the light
infantry company. This section will allow the degradation
probabilities to vary with the relative location of each of
the personnel in the defensive position. It should be
expected that vulnerability levels would vary depending on
the degree of exposure. Table XII illustrates such a
possible situation. As an example, squad members (PD =
0.12) are more exposed to direct fire weapons than those
personnel in the company headquarters position (PD = 0.08).
These probability of degradation values were developed from
discussions with subject matter experts at the Light
56
Division Certification Board at CDEC. It was determined
that values between 0.06 and 0.14 would be considered
reasonable to classify as a light level of damage.
TABLE XII
PROBABILITY OF PERSONNEL DEGRADATION SET(ALTERNATIVE CASE I)
Commander'
s
Decision Degradation
1
Personnel Time (min) Probability
Company Commander 5 0.122 Executive Officer 5 0.083 First Sergeant 5 0.084 Supply Sergeant 5 0.085 Communications Chief 5 0.086 NBC NCO 5 0.087 Armorer 5 0.088 Company RATELO 5 0.089 Fire Support Team Chief 5 0.08
10 Fire Support Team Sergeant 5 0.0811 Fire Support Team RATELO 5 0.0812 Antiarmor Section Leader 5 0.1213 Antiarmor Team leader 5 0.1214 Antiarmor Gunner 5 0.1215 Asst Antiarmor Gunner 5 0.1216 Mortar Section Leader. 5 0.0817 Mortar Squad Leader 5 0.0818 Mortar Gunner 5 0.0819 Ammunition Bearer 5 0.0820 Platoon Leader 5 0.1221 Platoon Sergeant 5 0.1222 Platoon RATELO 5 0.1023 Machinegun Gunner 5 0.1224 Asst Machinegun Gunner 5 0.1225 Medic 5 0.1026 Forward Observer 5 0.1027 Forward Observer RATELO 5 0.1028 Squad Leader 5 0.1229 Team Leader 5 0.1230 Automatic Rifleman 5 0.1231 Grenadier 5 0.1232 Rifleman 5 0.12
The AMORE model was then run with all other input
parameters kept constant. Table XIII displays the mean
fraction of capability for personnel, materiel, and the
unit
.
57
TABLE XIII
UNI T CAPABILITY OVER TIME(ALTERNATIVE CASE I)
Time(Hours)
Minimum
Personnel Materiel Unit
432 0.037 0.580 0.028 399 032 .
0.250 702 0.047 0.604 0.029 547 0360.500 949 0.014 0.710 0.034 708 0330.750 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 0261.000 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 0261.250 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 0261.500 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 0261.750 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 0262.000 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 0262.250 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 0262.500 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 0262.750 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 0263.000 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 0263.250 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 0263.500 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 0263.750 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 0264.000 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 0264.250 963 0.007 0.928 0.011 927 Oil4.500 963 0.007 0.928 0.011 927 Oil4.750 963 0.007 0.928 0.011 927 Oil5.000 963 0.007 0.928 0.011 927 Oil5.250 963 0.007 0.928 0.011 927 Oil5.500 963 0.007 0.928 0.011 927 Oil5.750 963 0.007 0.928 0.011 927 Oil6.000 963 0.007 0.928 0.011 927 Oil
Infinity 963 0.007 0.928 0.011 927 Oil
A comparison with the base case is presented in
Table XIV and shows that this set of PD values resulted in a
slightly increased unit capability due to an improvement in
materiel capability. It seems logical that they should have
been identical since the probabilities of degradation for
materiel do not change. The reason for the difference is
due to the stochastic process and the "sort" routine used in
the AMORE model. The first iteration change will throw all
subsequent results out of sequence from the original run,
thus yielding different results. The graphical comparison
58
of the resiliency curves of both cases over all time periods
in Figure 4.1 suggests that the differences are
insignificant
.
TABLE XIV
COMPARISON OF MAXIMUM UNIT CAPABILITYFOR THE BASE CASE AND ALTERNATIVE CASE I
Base CaseAlternative Case I
Personnel Materiel
0.9230.928
Unit
0.9740.963
0.9230.927
In this case, although the changing of the prob-
ability of degradation for personnel based on their degree
of exposure to enemy direct fire weapons increased the capa-
bility of the light infantry company, the difference was not
deemed significant enough to draw any viable conclusions.
2. Broad Variations of Personnel and Materiel PD Levels
The effect of widely varying levels of degradation
probabilities for personnel along with a corresponding
change to materiel probabilities of degradation was analyzed
next. The degradation levels used include the base case as
level 1 and are listed in Table XV. The results of running
the AMORE model for each level are provided in Appendix B.
Figure XVI presents the capability of the light infantry
company at infinite time at each level.
59
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60
TABLE XV
LEVELS OF PROBABILITY OF DEGRADATION
Materiel PD (Cumulative)
Personnel At Least At LeastLevel
1
PD Light Moderate
.10 .05
Severe
.02.102 .20 .20 .10 .043 .30 .30 .15 .064 .40 .40 .20 .085 .50 .50 .25 .10
TABLE XVI
MAXIMUM UNIT CAPABILITY
Level Personnel Materiel Unit
1 0.974 0.9232 0.858 0.8823 0.749 0.8194 0.649 0.7815 0.518 0.771
9238397 32640518
The recovery capability of the light infantry
company based on Table XVI is displayed in Figure 4.2.
According to the resilience threshold (1-PD), it can be seen
that the company is resilient between the 10 percent and 50
61
percent levels of degradation. Its capability to reconsti-
tute after degradation is primarily limited by the number of
survivors and not by the shortage of any particular skill or
materiel items.
C. MISSION ESSENTIAL TEAMS
Although doctrine states that the rifle fire team is the
smallest combat fighting force, its size (four members)
under the light infantry concept may preclude it from under-
taking very many missions. Therefore, in this section the
squad will be considered as the basic increment of capa-
bility in determining mission essential teams. This results
in nine mission essential teams for both personnel and
materiel (Tables XVII and XVIII) versus eighteen for the
rifle fire teams. The same total number of personnel and
materiel was used in constructing these new mission essen-
tial teams.
The AMORE model was again run with all other input
parameters kept constant. Table XIX displays the mean frac-
tion of capability for personnel and materiel.
This trial resulted in a significant decrease in unit
capability compared to the base case as shown in Table XX.
Both personnel and materiel capabilities are lower at infi-
nite time. Although personnel capability exceeds the
criterion value of 1-PD as the resiliency threshold, the
unit as well as the materiel does not, resulting in the
company being not resilient. Figure 4.3 presents a graph-
ical comparison of the resiliency curves of both cases over
all time periods.
62
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65
TABLE XIX
•
UNIT CAPABILITY OVER TIME(ALTERNATIVE CASE ID
Time(Hours
)
Minimum
Personnel
0.424 0.037
Materiel Unit
0.651 0.018 413 0340.250 0.649 0.038 0.671 0.015 593 0260.500 0.871 0.030 0.747 0.029 718 0290.750 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 0221.000 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 0221.250 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 0221.500 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 0221.750 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 0222.000 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 0222.250 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 0222.500 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 0222.750 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 0223.000 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 0223.250 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 0223.500 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 0223.750 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 0224.000 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 0224.250 0.938 0.013 0.880 0.014 876 0134.500 0.938 0.013 0.880 0.014 876 0134.750 0.938 0.013 0.880 0.014 876 0135.000 0.938 0.013 0.880 0.014 876 0135.250 0.938 0.013 0.880 0.014 876 0135.500 0.938 0.013 0.880 0.014 876 0135.750 0.938 0.013 0.880 0.014 876 0136.000 0.938 0.013 0.880 0.014 876 013
Infinity 0.938 0.013 0.880 0.014 876 013
D. CONCLUSIONS
The following summarizes the sensitivity of unit
recovery rates to changes in the input parameters:
1. Small variations in personnel probability of degrada-
tion which modeled more realistic probabilities of
exposure for various unit members resulted in insig-
nificant differences in the capability levels.
66
TABLE XX
COMPARISON OF MAXIMUM UNIT CAPABILITYFOR THE BASE CASE AND ALTERNATIVE CASE II
Personnel Materiel Unit
Base Case 0.974 0.923 0.923Alternative Case II 0.938 0.880 0.876
Broad variations of personnel and materiel probabili-
ties of degradation levels identified the light
infantry company as still being resilient to at least
the 50 percent level of degradation.
Restructuring the number of mission essential teams
from eighteen to nine revealed that the capability
level decreased significantly to the point that the
company was no longer resilient.
67
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68
V. SUMMARY , CONCLUSIONS , AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A . SUMMARY
The importance of the light infantry concept is to
provide a capability of rapidly deploying a highly-trained
unit in response to a contingency mission anywhere in the
world. This light force would be particularly effective in
meeting a crisis in a low-intensity scenario such as Grenada
and Lebanon.
This thesis investigated the light infantry company for
a night defensive mission in a nuclear, biological, and
chemical (NBC) environment to identify, from a set of alter-
natives, the force structure that maximizes unit resiliency/
recoverability on the battlefield. The Analysis of Military
Organizational Effectiveness (AMORE) methodology, developed
by Science Applications, Incorporated (SAI), was used to
evaluate the alternatives.
Chapter I discussed the AMORE methodology, the light
infantry concept, and the purpose of this thesis. Chapter
II presented the extensive input data that was developed for
the AMORE model. This data assumed the light infantry
company was performing only the defense mission. The anal-
yses of unit capability are presented in Chapter III. Some
of the areas examined include capability as a function of
time, potential productivity, and available surpluses and
shortages. A sensitivity analysis was conducted in Chapter
IV to investigate the effects of changes in degradation
probabilities and the definition of a mission essential team
on unit reconstitution capabilities.
69
B. CONCLUSIONS
Based on the results of this analysis, the following
conclusions are provided:
1. The light infantry company, as currently designed for
employment in low- intensity conflicts and as analyzed
in this study, possesses resiliency/recoverability
,
as defined by SAI , if it is structured with eighteen
mission essential teams. It is not resilient when
only nine teams are constructed.
2. At a low level of degradation corresponding to the
defense mission (probability of degradation = .10),
the light infantry company is materiel- limited.
However, at higher levels, personnel constraints
become the limiting factors.
3. The choke analysis identified the squad leader and
the team leader as the primary personnel shortfalls
at a 10 percent probability of degradation.
4. Materiel recovery was affected by some low-density
items such as the Dragon and the AN/PRC-77 radio set.
Losses of these key items were found to be extremely
degrading to the company's combat resiliency.
5. The relatively low rate of substitutability is
attributable in part to the large number of technical
jobs requiring specialized training.
C
.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are given:
1. Subsequent analyses of the light infantry company
should establish the fire team as the increment of
capability for determining mission essential teams.
2. Further specific areas of study that could complement
this thesis include random exponential simulated
times and increased probabilities of degradation.
70
The analyses of the capability of the light infantry
company based on eighteen mission essential teams and
on nine teams raised questions about the definition
of resiliency and what an essential team is believed
to do. This issue should be resolved.
At higher intensity conflicts, augmentation in
personnel and materiel is likely to result in
improved capability. AMORE analyses of the light
infantry company for each type of attack and defense
mission in every scenario of the strategic spectrum
of conflict is needed to provide a complete picture
of the resiliency of the company.
The procedures for determining the probability of
degradation for infantry equipment should be investi-
gated since many of the choke points uncovered by
AMORE may be due to an artificially high degradation
level for materiel.
Increasing the quantities of the critical low-density
items may be appropriate and should be evaluated.
In the sensitivity analysis, an attempt was made to
have various personnel elements of the company have
different risks of being degraded. This concept
suggests that some type of weighting factors, based
upon external analysis such as combat simulations or
Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual (JMEM) methodol-
ogies, could be developed and assigned to each
element to reflect the varying risks.
The value of substitutability is so significant that
every effort should be made by Table of Organization
and Equipment (TOE) builders to insure that all
possible substitutions are recognized and considered
in structuring the organization of a unit.
Cross-training and on-the-job training should be
increased to improve the light infantry company's
71
reconstitution ability as a result of greater substi-
tutability. Lower skill level personnel should be
trained to work and plan as effectively as possible
with minimum supervision. Emphasis should be placed
at unit level to train for reconstitution.
10. The application of high technology to reduce materiel
losses or repair times can reap great benefits. Due
to the limited mobility of the light infantry,
continued emphasis must be placed on equipment design
oriented toward reduced size and weight. Some design
criteria would be high reliability and maintain-
ability, man-portability, survivability, and longer
range. This would significantly increase the ability
of the light infantry company to reconstitute.
11. Although the AMORE methodology has value in providing
insights into existing organizations and into indi-
vidual training objectives, it should be used in
conjunction with, not to replace, the present US Army
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) TOE develop-
ment methodology.
72
APPENDIX A
CHOKE ANALYSIS NEEDS AND SURPLUS
TABLE XXI
CHOKE ANALYSIS DATA - PERSONNEL (TEAM 18)
Skill
1
Need:5 Suirplus
Average !
0.00
5td. Dev. Average
0.00
Std. Dev.
0.00 0.002 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.213 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.004 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.005 0.22 0.42 0.00 0.006 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.007 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.008 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.009 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.29
10 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.2111 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.2112 0.04 0.21 0.00 0.0013 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.0014 0.17 0.49 0.00 0.0015 0.04 0.21 0.00 0.0016 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0017 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.0018 0.17 0.39 0.00 0.0019 0.04 0.21 0.00 0.0020 0.04 0.21 0.00 0.0021 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0022 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0023 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0024 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0025 0.00 0.00 2.70 0.5626 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0027 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.2128 0.39 0.58 0.00 0.0029 1.04 . 1.19 0.00 0.0030 0.13 0.46 0.00 0.0031 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.0032 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of Iterations = 23.
73
TABLE XXII
CHOKE ANALYSIS DATA PERSONNEL (AFTER LAST TEAM)
Skill
1
Surplus
Average
0.00
Std. Dev.
0.002 0.04 0.193 0.00 0.004 0.00 0.005 0.00 0.006 0.00 0.007 0.07 0.278 0.11 0.329 0.15 0.36
10 0.44 0.5111 0.56 0.5112 0.00 0.0013 0.00 0.0014 1.00 0.0015 0.00 0.0016 0.00 0.0017 0.00 0.0018 0.00 0.0019 0.00 0.0020 0.00 0.0021 0.00 0.0022 0.00 0.0023 0.00 0.0024 0.00 0.0025 2.67 0.5526 0.37 0.7427 0.81 0.8328 0.00 0.0029 0.00 0.0030 0.00 0.0031 0.00 0.0032 0.00 0.00
Number of Iterations = 27.
74
TABLE XXIII
CHOKE ANALYSIS DATA - MATERIEL (TEAM 15)
Item
1
Needs Surplus
Average Std. Dev
0.00 0.00
Average
0.00
Std. Dev.
0.002 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.003 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.004 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.005 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.006 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.007 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.008 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.009 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.0011 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0012 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.0013 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0014 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.0015 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0016 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0017 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.0018 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0019 0.00 0.00 5.00 0.0020 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.0021 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.0022 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.0023 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.0024 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.0025 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Number of Iterations = 1.
75
TABLE XXIV
CHOKE ANALYSIS DATA - MATERIEL (TEAM 16)
Item
1
Needs Su:rplus
Average S
0.00
td. Dev. Average
0.20
Std. Dev.
0.00 0.452 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.003 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.004 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.555 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.006 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.007 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.008 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.009 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.45
10 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.8411 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0012 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0013 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0014 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.0015 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.5516 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0017 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.5518 0.80 0.45 0.00 0.0019 0.00 0.00 0.60 1.3420 0.20 0.45 0.00 0.0021 0.00 0.00 3.00 1.0022 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.4523 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.0024 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.4525 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.45
Number iDf Iterations = 5.
76
TABLE XXV
CHOKE ANALYSIS DATA - MATERIEL (TEAM 17)
Item
1
Needs Suirplus
Average Std. Dev. Average
0.00
Std. Dev.
0.17 0.41 0.002 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.413 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.004 0.83 0.41 0.00 0.005 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.006 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.007 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.008 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.009 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0011 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0012 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0013 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0014 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.5215 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.4116 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0017 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.5218 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0019 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0020 0.00 0.00 2.50 0.5521 0.00 0.00 3.50 0.5522 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0023 0.00 0.00 1.00 . 0.0024 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.5225 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.52
Number <}f Iterations = 6.
77
TABLE XXVI
CHOKE ANALYSIS DATA - MATERIEL (TEAM 18)
Item
Needs Surplus
Average Std. Dev. Average Std. Dev.
1 0.26 0.55 0.00 0.002 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.003 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.004 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.005 0.29 0.46 0.00 0.006 0.11 0.31 0.00 0.007 0.05 0.23 0.00 0.008 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.009 0.47 0.65 0.00 0.00
10 0.45 0.65 0.00 0.0011 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0012 0.11 0.39 0.00 0.0013 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.0014 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.0015 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0016 0.05 0.23 0.00 0.0017 0.16 0.37 0.00 0.0018 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.0019 1.89 1.35 0.00 0.0020 0.16 0.37 0.00 0.0021 0.00 0.00 3.55 0.6922 0.37 0.71 0.00 0.0023 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.2724 0.24 0.49 O'.OO 0.0025 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.00
Number Df Iterations = 38.
78
APPENDIX B
MEAN CAPABILITY FOR VARIOUS LEVELS OF PROBABILITY OF
DEGRADATION
TABLE XXVII
UNIT CAPABILITY OVER TIME(LEVEL 1)
Time(Hours
)
Minimum
Personnel Materiel Unit
394 0.033 0.589 0.034 376 0270.250 747 0.043 0.618 0.032 596 0350.500 962 0.011 0.699 0.035 699 0350.750 974 0.007 0.797 0.025 797 0251.000 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0251.250 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0251.500 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0251.750 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0252.000 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0252.250 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0252.500 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0252.750 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0253.000 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0253.250 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0253.500 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0253.750 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0254.000 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0254.250 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 0104.500 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 0104.750 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 0105.000 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 0105.250 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 0105.500 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 0105.750 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 0106.000 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 010
Infinity 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 010
79
TABLE XXVIII
UNIT CAPABILITY OVER TIME(LEVEL 2)
Time(Hours
)
Minimum
Personnel Materiel Unit
330 0.028 0.482 0.029 316 0230.250 564 0.047 0.522 0.028 458 0340.500 837 0.020 0.658 0.024 648 0250.750 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 0211.000 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 0211.250 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 0211.500 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 0211.750 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 0212.000 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 0212.250 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 0212.500 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 0212.750 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 0213.000 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 0213.250 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 0213.500 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 0213.750 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 0214.000 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 0214.250 858 0.009 0.882 0.017 839 0144.500 858 0.009 0.882 0.017 839 0144.750 858 0.009 0.882 0.017 839 0145.000 858 0.009 0.882 0.017 839 0145.250 858 0.009 0.882 0.017 839 0145.500 858 0.009 0.882 0.017 839 0145.750 858 0.009 0.882 0.017 839 0146.000 858 0.009 0.882 0.017 839 014
Infinity 858 0.009 0.882 0.017 839 014
80
TABLE XXIX
UNIT CAPABILITY OVER TIME(LEVEL 3)
Time(Hours
)
Minimum
Personnel Materiel Unit
0.290 0.027 0.347 0.027 254 0240.250 • 0.452 0.047 0.379 0.023 323 0280.500 0.614 0.057 0.589 0.029 500 0470.750 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 0231.000 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 0231.250 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 0231.500 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 0231.750 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 0232.000 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 0232.250 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 0232.500 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 0232.750 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 0233.000 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 0233.250 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 0233.500 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 0233.750 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 0234.000 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 0234.250 0.749 0.011 0.819 0.021 732 0124.500 0.749 0.011 0.819 0.021 732 0124.750 0.749 0.011 0.819 0.021 732 0125.000 0.749 0.011 0.819 0.021 732 0125.250 0.749 0.011 0.819 0.021 732 0125.500 0.749 0.011 0.819 0.021 732 0125.750 0.749 0.011 0.819 0.021 732 0126.000 0.749 0.011 0.819 0.021 732 012
Infinity 0T.749 0.011 0.819 0.021 732 012
81
TABLE XXX
UNIT CAPABILITY OVER TIME(LEVEL 4)
Time(Hours
)
Minimum
Personnel Materiel Unit
239 0.024 0.261 0.028 206 024- 0.250 394 0.035 0.287 0.025 256 0240.500 568 0.043 0.512 0.036 454 0430.750 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 0241.000 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 0241.250 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 0241.500 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 0241.750 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 0242.000 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 0242.250 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 0242.500 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 0242.750 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 0243.000 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 0243.250 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 0243.500 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 0243.750 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 0244.000 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 0244.250 649 0.011 0.781 0.025 640 0154.500 649 0.011 0.781 0.025 ,640 .0154.750 649 0.011 0.781 0.025 640 .0155.000 649 0.011 0.781 0.025 .640 0155.250 649 0.011 0.781 0.025 640 .0155.500 649 0.011 0.781 0.025 .640 0155.750 649 0.011 0.781 0.025 .640 0156.000 649 0.011 0.781 0.025 640 .015
Infinity 649 0.011 0.781 0.025 .640 .015
82
TABLE XXXI
UNIT CAPABILITY OVER TIME(LEVEL 5)
Time(Hours
)
Minimum
Personnel Materiel Unit
.197 0.023 0.197 0.025 144 0190.250 320 0.032 0.229 0.023 199 0210.500 446 0.036 0.430 0.033 358 0350.750 518 0.021 0.521 0.025 471 0221.000 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 0221.250 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 0221.500 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 0221.750 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 0222.000 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 0222.250 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 0222.500 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 0222.750 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 0223.000 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 0223.250 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 0223.500 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 0223.750 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 0224.000 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 0224.250 518 0.021 0.770 0.019 518 0214.500 518 0.021 0.770 0.019 518 0214.750 518 0.021 0.771 0.019 518 0215.000 518 0.021 0.771 0.019 518 0215.250 518 0.021 0.771 0.019 518 0215.500 518 0.021 0.771 0.019 518 0215.750 518 0.021 0.771 0.019 518 0216.000 518 0.021 0.771 0.019 518 021
Infinity 518 0.021 0.771 0.019*
518 021
83
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3.
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1982.L c i
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86
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST
No. Copies
1. Defense Technical Information Center 2Cameron StationAlexandria, Virginia 22304-6145
2. -Library, Code 0142 2Naval Postgraduate SchoolMonterey, California 93943-5100
3. Professor Alan W. McMasters, Code 55Mg 3Department of Operations ResearchNaval Postgraduate SchoolMonterey, California 93943-5100
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5. Major Hirome Fujio 2376-A Bergin DriveMonterey, California 93940
87
>G. c
ThesisF916c.l
21«*t7
FujioReconstitution and
recovery capability o£
the light infantry com-
pany.
ThesisF916
c.l
21*>2it
Fu"* 5.0
Reconstitution andrecovery capability of
the light infantry com-pany.