Redefining “America”Identity and Aid from 1945-1950

Nathaniel WhittemoreHistory 395: Problem of Poverty

March 16, 2005

In some ways, the immediate postwar period was one in which

American experts and citizens had a renegotiated perception of the

metaphysical “borders” of America. The economic tragedy of the Depression

had brought the country into broad consensus about the role of government

in relief. By the same mechanisms of urgency, this time instilled by the

devastation of World War II, Americans felt and were made to feel a

connection to their allies. As the US emerged victorious, the general

sentiment held that the newly affirmed promise of American idealism and

the economic success and opportunity contained therein could be available

not only to all Americans, but indeed could be the lot of our former allies

ready to embrace our values.

This was not a total consensus, however. Nor was it an entirely

magnanimous idea driven by humanitarianism. The domestic discourse of

1945-50 was largely colored by theories asserting a strategic and political

urgency to relieving poverty in the post-war Allied world. Moreover, the

discourse surrounding foreign policy was often a vicious proxy battle for

domestic identity. Affirmations of new international norms and participation

in transnational activities had serious ramifications for domestic

entitlements of “Americanness” and who had rights to these benefits.

Still, it is the assertion of this paper that the period from 1945 to 1950

saw a general move from thinking about “America” in geographical terms to

ideological terms. It seems clear that the experience of Great Depression

(and moreover, the almost total agreement about the federal government’s

responsibility in helping alleviate poverty and economic misery) and an

extremely destructive war framed largely in terms of good vs. evil logic

produced a unique readiness to contextualize poverty and economic relief

outside the geographic or jurisdictional edges of America. With this starting

point, and under the backdrop of the increasingly menacing Soviet Union,

the Truman Administration worked diligently to inextricably bind the future

of Americans with the destiny of the “free world.”

This paper will explore that phenomenon through then-contemporary

scholarly articles and frame those thoughts in the polls taken of average

American opinions during the same period. While I will limit the body of the

essay to the period from 1945-50, I will spend a few paragraphs in the

conclusion mapping the questions of Americanness as it relates to economic

relief onto the contemporary moment.

This is a paper not so much about foreign poverty relief as about the

public’s common identification that compels support for relief measures. It is

less about the terms of the UNRRA, Marshall Plan, and their relation to

domestic poverty relief as it is to the changing sensibility about what being

American meant and to whom the rights of that association applied. It

attempts not to quantify and compare domestic and foreign poverty

initiatives but rather to understand the public reception of those programs

and the contemporary ideas and emotions that they reflected.

One::Optimism

In pre-1930s America, the Puritan work ethic and the frontier

mentality inflected discussions of poverty and relief. It was a place where

the backdrop of social welfare was rugged individualism and the bootstraps

mythology of Ragged Dick. Indeed, it was a place which still witnessed, for

whatever national vs. state resolution the Civil War symbolized, an

extremely weary perception of the activities of the central government. The

Great Depression brought with it, however, an entirely new set of

circumstances which demanded and generally recognized the role of the

federal government in large-scale poverty relief. Even before becoming

President, Franklin Roosevelt noted that whatever should happen, it was

clear that early 1930s America necessitated a drastic rethinking of

government action.

Throughout the decade, Americans came to a gradual agree that there

was a necessary role for federal action in helping to alleviate economic

misery. In some ways, the depression served to bind Americans together in a

way only national emergencies can. As the great war in Europe loomed,

Americans would soon find themselves connected not simply by common

plight, but now by a new national threat.

While Hitler and the threat of the Axis powers was well-known in

1939, it was discussed largely in terms of proxies and allies. The American

“war effort” was limited to infrastructural and economic supports for Britain

and the Allies. In 1940, a Gallup Opinion Poll asked

To pay the cost of defense, should every American family not on relief

pay an income tax based on the family’s earnings, no matter how little?1

In that poll, approximately 50% answered “YES!” or “yes,” as

compared to 41% who said “NO!” or “No.” The same question asked

eighteen months later, in the wake of Pearl Harbor and after formal

declarations of war, found a full 70% of respondents saying “Yes.”

What’s more, as early as 1940, polls found Americans willing

supporting wartime measures like a draft and government rationing of key

industrial items. Moreover, they saw an America conflicted between an

extreme desire to stay out of war on the one hand and a firm belief that

Germany must be defeated on the other. A December 1940 poll found that

68.65% of Americans thought it more important that Germany be defeated

than that America stay out of the war.2 Interestingly, the same poll displayed

an American sense that were Germany to defeat England, the individual

American citizen would be adversely affected.

For however brutal the war was on the front lines, at home it saw a

reinvigorated American idealism spurred to action by impeding horror. The

war time industrial capacity surged, unemployment evaporated, and the

entire nation was dragged out of listless Depression with a new sense of

epochal purpose. Aside from the bombing at Pearl Harbor, the destruction of

the war did not reach American shores. Indeed, by 1943, observers were

starting to notice a tide turning against Hitler and his axis powers. Even

before the Normandy Landings, visions for American place in a postwar

world were being circulated. These documents are remarkable for their

optimism and scope of vision. Throughout the corpus, America is imagined

as a mythologized entity with the capacity to lead a new international order.

Indeed, any remnants of the once-powerful isolationist America were largely

drowned in a can-do chorus of duty and opportunity.

An early example of this thinking takes us all the way back to 1941,

before America officially entered the war. In February of that year, Henry

Luce, Editor of Time, published an article in Life magazine called The

American Century. The document is remarkable for the way in which it

1 Gallup Poll #2262 Galup Poll #227

prefigures the central discussions of upcoming debates of postwar vision.

Moreover, it is remarkable for the extent to which it attempts to tie America

and the freedom-loving world together in common destiny. Luce’s argument

is not simply that America must assume leadership, but that it has for too

long shrugged off its own responsibilities as world leader.

Importantly, The American Century almost wholly eliminates

geography as a mode of thinking about American borders. It represents

instead the beginning of a trend to understand American-ness in ideological

and metaphysical terms. On page 10, Luce writes

Is our national policy today limited to whatever means may seem wise? It is not. We are not in a war to defend American territory. We are in a war to defend and even to promote, encourage, and incite so-called democratic principles throughout the war.3

Indeed, in the same quote, he gives a plausible explanation for the

type of shift in attitude reflected by the aforementioned Gallup Polls

The average American begins to realize now that that’s the kind of war he’s in. And he’s halfway for it. But he wonders how he ever got there, since a year ago he had not the slightest intention of getting into any such thing.4

Later, he takes on the dominant philosophies which he asserts have

kept America from asserting its proper leadership in the world.

So now we come squarely face to face with…that old, old issue with those old, old battered labels – the issue of Isolationism versus Internationalism.5

He suggests that our unwillingness to accept our role has “had

disastrous consequences for all mankind,” and that the only cure is to

“accept wholeheartedly our duty and our opportunity as the most powerful…

nation in the world.”6

Most importantly, the document finds Luce asserting the sort of

unyielding optimism-predicated-upon-American-action that would largely

color the immediate postwar discourse. He states plainly that “no other

century has been so big with promise for human…happiness,” and “in no one

century have so many…suffered such pain.”7 Beginning to discuss the

potential for relief of poverty and economic misery, Luce asserts that, “our

world…for the first time in human history, is capable of producing all the 3 Luce4 ibid5 Luce, 226 Luce, 237 Luce, 27.

material needs of the entire human family.” Both the language and the

implication are remarkable. Luce binds America and the rest of the world

together under the banner of “human family,”8 and suggests that the United

States has the capacity to provide.

The concluding pages of The American Century also predate a

burgeoning American humanitarianism which would, after WWII, begin to

claim that the entitlements of American economic liberty and “freedom from

want”9 should indeed be the lot of all freedom loving persons the world over.

Luce states that

It is the manifest duty of this country to undertake to feed all the people of the world…For every dollar we spend on armaments, we should spend at least a dime in a gigantic effort to feed the world…Every farmer in America should be encouraged to produce all the crops he can, and all that we cannot eat…should…be dispatched as a free gift.10

Postwar planning was not limited to the international arena. 1943 and

44 also saw a number of documents spring up about the impact of the war

on the domestic landscape and the potential problems and opportunities the

end of the war presented. In October, 1944, Social Forces Journal published

an article by Dillard Lasseter entitled The Impact of the War on the South

and the Implications for Postwar Development. The article is colored by both

the domestic attitudes that had fermented during the Depression and the

new tone of optimism that had exploded since the American war machine

had kicked into high gear.

In the first few pages, he discusses how drastically the war had

affected the South and indeed, the degree to which the military industry

required a structural reinvigoration of the Southern economic system.

Moreover, however, he warns that the region’s striking previous problems

were likely to return without proper planning. On page 4, he rallies for

increased training. He says that

America has found in this war that the ability of the Nation to produce

depends not just on its manufacturing facilities, but upon the skill of its

people.11

8 Luce, 309 To quote an early internationalist document, The Atlantic Charter10 Luce, 3811 South ’44, 4

Throughout the document, he suggests that improvements in human

capitol, such as increased job training and research into more efficient

productive methods are the best means to avoid slippage back into poverty

and economic mire. Indeed, what is fascinating is that like many documents

of the time, what we would consider a discussion of “poverty relief” is

undertaken with the reverse tone of “economic improvement.” Lasseter

points to the example of food production. The South had such a rich bounty

of food products that were it to sell all of them in their organic form, they

would have to dump them at far-below-market prices. Processing machinery

would not only prevent this waste but would, he asserts, make the region an

international food juggernaut.

Like Luce’s American Century a few years early, this article is

underscored by a tone of brimming optimism for America. “We have amazed

no one more than ourselves,” Lasseter says, “at what we have been able to

accomplish in this war. We have found that when every shoulder is put to

the wheel practically nothing is impossible.”12 He also importantly connects

the fighting men abroad with the war at home. In some ways, the war

represented, ideologically and physically, a new scope of “America” and

extension of geographic borders into an extra-national realm. Finally, the

document asserts that planning is necessary to created the economic

structure which will sustain the “social gains which are the aims of all

enlightened people.”13 The article then is an important indicator of

contemporary American thought in the way it founds its roots in the

Depression and War era notions of government responsibility, yet speaks of

postwar potentialities in the same prophetic terms as Luce’s American

Century.

Two::The New American Internationalism and Poverty:UNRRA

A main exploration of many wartime documents which sought to

conceptualize the postwar world was related to the method and means of

immediate reconstruction in the allied territories. The failure to ensure the

economic rehabilitation of Europe (and in particular, Germany) after WWI

12 South ’44, 713 South ’44, 8

was widely recognized as a primary culprit in the rise of German

Nationalism and the conditions that spurred WWII. Policymakers and

leading intellectuals were determined not to repeat their mistake. Moreover,

for Americans, European reconstruction represented a chance to assert a

new and distinctly American internationalism. The United Nations Relief and

Rehabilitation Agency was the first large-scale international effort to begin

planning and implementing strategies for rebuilding. Indeed, the effort

predated the actual ratification of the United Nations by a few years and,

although ostensibly international, was a project largely driven by American

efforts.

The UNRRA was created on Nov. 9 1943 as “an experiment in

international planning,” and “with a view to establishment of a permanent

international welfare organization.”14 Its ostensible functions laid in four

general areas including 1) relief supplies such as food, fuel, medical

supplies; 2) relief services like repatriation of displaced peoples and medical

assistance; 3) rehabilitation supplies and services such as seeds, machinery,

financial/technical experts; and 4) rehabilitation of public utilities such as

light, water, and gas.15 An article published by Phillip Weintrob in the Feb.

1945 Journal of Public Affairs explicitly notes that part of the impetus for

this organization was the learned lessons of the first World War’s aftermath.

It is precisely a purpose of UNRRA to prevent a repetition of this mistake by estimating future exigencies, by planning for their relief, and by organizing machinery to effect the project.16

Importantly then, even as people were beginning to discuss

international poverty in terms similar to that of domestic economic hardship,

there was a simultaneous trend to understand poverty relief (or its corollary,

economic restructuring) as necessary to the political stability of the global

system. This thinking would become even more pronounced just a few years

later.

Nonetheless, this discussion is quickly sidelined and replaced by an

impassioned diatribe that paints the organization as the embodiment of a

new spirit of international cooperation. Interestingly, the language

consistently reflects classic American sensibilities of relief entitlement and

14 Read First UNRRA -3 15 UNRRA, 1016 UNRRA, 4

“deserving poor.” While WWI saw the “Big Four” making most decisions

about the postwar arena,

This time it is a group of fourty-four nations which has undertaken the obligation to share the burden of relief and rehabilitation and to act in agreement under the equalitarian maxim, “From each country according to its ability, to each country according to its needs.”17

This maxim and the sensibility it represented were echoed in the

proposed funding structure of the organization as well. Whereas money for

reconstruction after WWI came almost entirely from the US, the UNRRA

would seek the estimated two to two and a half billion dollars it needed from

“a sort of international community chest.” All members were “expected to

make a standard basic payment of one per cent of their national income for

the year ending June 30, 1943.”18 This non-recurring payment would ensure

that the United States, being the world financial juggernaut, would retain

the largest burden yet also the largest influence in the organization.

The proposed structure and operational norms of the organization

also reflected a distinctly American sense about poverty relief and

development. The UNRRA, although set to prefigure an “international

welfare organization,” was itself designed to be temporary. “From its

emergency function,” Weintrob writes, “follows the temporary character of

UNRRA. Relief and rehabilitation are like a bridge which UNRRA will help

liberated countries to build on their march toward reconstruction. If offers

its assistance only for building the bridge.”19 This statement reflects an

American notion of relief that ensured each person an equal chance to be

successful. Indeed, this new organization was not intended to be

“charitable” in the old sense. The document states that the leitmotif of the

UNRRA was “help the liberated peoples to help themselves.”20

If these starting norms would resonate with an American audience, so

too did the proposed structure of the group look appealing. Throughout the

essay, the author emphasizes the “auxillary” character of the UNRRA,

admonishing his readers that the UNRRA would not add bureaucracy, but

indeed coordinate or occasionally supplant existing local relief bodies.

17 ibid18 UNRRA, 1619 UNRRA, 620 UNRRA, 5

Weintrob states that the second general principle of the organization was

that the “UNRRA is subsidiary.”21

The document reflects the more general search for America’s place in

the new international order. It is fascinating because while it states

explicitly that the world society is “universally interdependent,” it also

affirms “the principle of national sovereignty as the basis of international

relations.” It seems then, that although there was no “super-national

unification” in governance, there was a burgeoning new ideological and

tangible association that took American ideals rather than American

geographical borders as its starting point for shared identity.

Finally, the article foreshadows a discussion of the diplomatic and

strategic uses of relief aid that would increasingly dominate the public

discourse in the postwar period. One extremely pertinent question was what

to do with former enemies. Should Germany be given aid, despite its

instigation of the war? Weintrob and it seems, the UNRRA, answered a

resounding “absolutely, yes.” Part of the reason, he suggests, was the lesson

of what radical ideology could foment in an economically decimated and

militarily defeated Germany. There was serious diplomatic value in

providing aid to the defeated. Commenting on the UNRRA’s founding

documents which make explicit provisions for Germany, Weintrob says that

“this unrestricted field of operations is not only humane but politically

prudent.”22 Continuing later, he writes that, while “its basic spirit is

humanitarian,”

One would utterly misinterpret the nature of UNRRA, however, if he were to judge it charitable because it is humanitarian. It is true that “relief” is usually associated with charity, and the name of UNRRA, therefore, may be challenged and resented by some sensitive peoples. In a universally interdependent society such as ours, however, the weakness of one link affects the strength of the whole social body and relief ceases to be altruism…What appears to be a matter of good will is no less a demand of good sense.23

Gallup Polls from the same period reflect a general American

agreement about many of the ideas and associations projected by the

UNRRA. Many demonstrate that Americans had a sense that the

reconstruction of Europe was not a remote goal but something humane and

21 UNRRA, 622 UNRRA, 923 UNRRA, 18

necessary. There was often a recognition of the plight of Europeans as

having personal ramifications. There is even, at times, an explicit willingness

to reevaluate the way “America” is thought of. At the same time, just like the

literature surrounding the UNRRA, domestic citizens projected American

ideals of poverty relief and economic welfare onto the international arena.

In 1945, there was clearly a willingness on the part of Americans to

extend the wartime food rationing in order to help recovering European

states in the immediate postwar world. 65% of Americans thought that

people in the US should continue to put up with shortages for one more year

to help Europeans24. When the same question was asked for a duration of

two years, that number dropped to 57%, reflecting the notion that relief

should be temporary.25

Even more impressive is that when asked “if necessary, would you

and your family be willing to eat about one-fifth less than you are now eating

in order to send more food to Europe?” 73% responded affirmatively.26 86%

said that they themselves would be willing to continue to put up with food

shortages to send food to the needy in Europe.27

Even in early 1946, Americans were still generally willing to sacrifice

more to provide European relief. A February poll that asked “Would you eat

LESS meat and use LESS flour in order to send MORE food to the people of

Europe,” found more than 70% of people willing.28 This reflected a readiness

to sacrifice that Gallup had discovered during the war, when 44% of August

1943 poll responders said that the government had not gone far enough in

asking people to make sacrifices for the war.29

Polls surrounding the United Nations give some insight into the

American thinking about international associations. While there was often

mixed opinion about how well the fledgling UN was carrying out its mission

or how fast it was progressing, there was a cautious optimism and moreover,

willingness to share power with other nations in the organization. Only 20%

24 Gallup 34425 ibid26 Gallup 34727 ibid28 Gallup 36529 Gallup 301

of respondents said that France and China should not be given a say in the

UNO equal to Russia, Britain, and the US.30

The poll perhaps most reflective of the extent to which American

citizens were willing to contextualize themselves in transnational terms was

from August, 1946. A full 54% of Americans responded “Yes” when asked

“Do you think the United Nations organization should be strengthened to

make it a world government with power to control the armed forces of all

nations, including the U.S.?” 20% said they were “undecided,” and only 26%

said that they did not think the US Armed Forces should be subjected to the

control of an international body.31

Yet for all of this sentiment, 1945 and 1946 saw an increasingly

important discourse about the strategic and political potential for aid. This

conversation reflected the growing public recognition of the Soviet Union as

a menace that threatened the very freedom which formed the basis for the

postwar peace and transnational cooperation. It was not long before the

apparition of Communism became the dominant consideration in

international relief.

Three::Values as Borders and Diplomatic Aid

Even as Americans felt increasingly connected to peoples of a larger

world, this relationship was always predicated on a certain set of shared

values. The Luces and UNRRAs all took notions of freedom and liberty as the

common departure from which a new postwar internationalism would grow.

In the immediate wake of the war, this commonality manifested itself in a

new imagination by Americans of their own metaphorical borders; ideology

and provision for these values gained increasing importance as a way of

defining allegiances and their rewards. It was within this framework that

such a large percentage of Americans were willing to sacrifice for people

that they had never met from countries they had never been to. At the same

time however, the same forces which pushed the understanding of

“America” outward soon came to develop a clear set of borders as well.

Indeed, as the Soviet Union came to be increasingly at loggerheads with the

30 Gallup 36931 Gallup 376

United States, it was these very values that people began to feel threatened.

Diplomatic potency and the fear of Communism spreading soon came to

supplant humanitarianism as the primary consideration of foreign relief

efforts. This move was systematic and intentional by the government, but

came to infect public discourse somewhat more organically. By 1950, an

American internationalism based on a love of freedom, democracy, and

liberty had come to bind America and its European allies not simply in

common ideal but now, again, in common threat.

As early as Luce’s 1941 The American Century it was clear that the

new opening of America to the world still started with the United State’s

hallowed principles. Posing the question “what internationalism have we

Americans to offer?” Luce answers

It must be the produce of the imaginations of many men. It must be a sharing with all peoples of our Bill of Rights, our Declaration of Independence, our Constitution, our magnificent industrial products, our technical skills. It must be an internationalism of the people, by the people, for the people.32

After outlining all of the wonderful things America must be apart of

abroad, Luce concludes with the warning that “all this will fail…unless our

vision of America as a world power includes a passionate devotion to great

American ideals…above all Justice, the love of Truth, the ideal of Charity.”33

This was not simply the vision of the editor of Time. President

Roosevelt took up the idea that these ideals must be the underlying goal for

any and all government action. Speaking to the delegation at the 1941

International Labor Conference, President Roosevelt said that

We have learned too well that social problems and economic problems are not separate water-tight compartments in the international any more than in the national sphere. In international affairs economic policy can no longer be an end in itself. It is merely a means for achieving social objectives.”34

Indeed, a common thread in US postwar vision was that American

ideals manifested themselves in the economic realm in freedom from

unemployment and a raised standard of living. In the October 1944 edition

of The American Political Science Review Walter Sharp wrote that these

32 Luce, 3333 Luce, 38-3934 Am Foreign Policy, 3

principles were the utmost priorities of the new US-led world economic

institutions.

Declarations of United Nations policy inspired mainly by us…have already set the broad objectives of postwar economic and social welfare collaboration…1) the world-wide prevention of unemployment and 2) the progressive improvement of standards of living for the world’s peoples.35

Writing in Pacific Affairs in 1947, Rupert Emerson makes an even

more explicit connection between American internationalism’s economic,

political and moral goals. Discussing US policy towards the Pacific Rim, he

suggests that

For the great mass of the American people [the] principles [for which the United States stands] center about the advancement of democratic self-government, the raising of the standard of living, and maintenance of world peace.36

Throughout this discourse, however, there was the constant specter of

a place, the Soviet Union, which seemed fundamentally outside of the new

American international realm and an ideology, Communism, which

appeared, in practice, totally antithetical to the values which ostensibly

connected the polities and peoples of that realm. In 1946, Princeton

Economics professor Jacob Viner gave a talk entitled “America’s Lending

Policy” which displayed a distinct sensibility about “dollar diplomacy” and

the way in which the threat of the Soviet Union might affect American relief

towards the liberated countries.

The document is interesting because it reflects the spectrum of

considerations surrounding American relief and lending policy in the

immediate post-war period. While Vender attached “great weight to our

moral obligations,” he also suggests that there was no “former period of

history when international financial collaboration was as urgently needed

and had as great potentialities of economic benefit…to the world at large.”37

While he spends time elaborating the way in which the United States

could and in his opinion, should, work with new institutions such as the

International Monetary Fund to ensure a certain world economic order, his

most fascinating discussion revolves around the increasingly recognizable

threat of Soviet Russia. Vender is an advocate of “denationalized lending,”

35 Am Foreign Policy, 836 Pacific Dependencies 47, 237 Lending Policy, 3

and claims to find “dollar diplomacy” an uncouth tool of government, to be

avoided if possible. Yet at the same time, Vender states that he has

“reluctantly become convinced in recent months that [Russia] is, as a matter

of cold and calculated policy, being deliberately provocative to the Western

democracies.”38 With this in mind, the speech finds him advocating the

strategic use of international aid to frustrate Soviet designs on recovering

nations and to shore up alliances that might at some near future point be

countervailing forces against the rise of global communism.39

This type of thinking was increasingly dominant in the public

discourse surrounding international relief. Gallup polls offer indication that

it was not only intellectuals who were weary of the USSR and thought that

international relief aid might be used as a strategic resource. Indeed, if

nothing else, the polls indicate that even if the average citizen’s

understanding of the metaphorical borders of America were expanding,

there was still a distinct limit to postwar inclusiveness.

Early polls about the Marshall Plan suggest that Russia was

something of a pariah in the American public consciousness. Some of

Gallup’s wording is leading in a way which indicates this in the tone of the

questions themselves. A July 1947 poll asked “If Russia will not agree to the

plan do you think the other European nations should go ahead…without

Russia?” Some 90% responding answered “Yes.”40

A few months later, the Gallup Poll became even more forthright in its

questions surrounding the impetus for international relief. Reflecting the

feelings about uses of aid, the November ‘47 poll asked, “Would you favor or

oppose sending Western European countries…about $20 BILLION worth of

goods from this country in order to improve conditions there and to keep

these countries from going Communistic?” Just under 50% answered

“Favor” compared to 30.5% who said “Oppose.”41 While the results do not

indicate a total consensus about how to stop the expansion of Communism,

both the question’s presence on the questionnaire and the large margin who

38 Lending Policy, 939 Lending Policy, 9-1040 Gallup 40041 Gallup 407

favored rather than opposed the idea indicate a changing notion of the

motivations and objectives of international aid.

By February of 1948, the threat of “Russian domination” had found its

way into the polls. Poll 412 asked “What do you think will happen in Western

Europe if Congress does not approve the Marshall Plan?” Some 26.5%

responded to the effect that “Russia will take over.” This was compared to

14.65% (the next highest group) who said that “General collapse – violence,

chaos, revolution, war, etc.” would occur. “Poverty, starvation, death, etc,”

came in a lonely fourth with only 7.5%.

Furthermore, American compassion for needs of an impoverished

European seemed to extend only as far as the borders of “freedom-loving,

pro-capitalist” nations. Gallup 422 asked

Have you heard or read about the dispute between Marshal Tito of

Yugoslavia and Stalin of Russia? If yes: Do you think it would be a

good idea or a poor idea for the US to send money and goods to help

Yugoslavia as we are now doing for other Western European

countries?42

Only 21% of respondents said that this was a “good” idea, versus

51.5% who said that it was a “poor” idea.

The truth is that this cautious and even nervous disposition toward

the Soviet Union and the peoples whose governments had adopted

communism had been largely prompted by actions and rhetoric of the

Federal government. First with the Truman Doctrine and later the Marshall

Plan, Truman and his administration had worked not to prohibit a new broad

understanding of the American role in the world, but to demonstrate that the

Soviet Union was where American internationalism found its moral and

physical boundaries. Moreover, they asserted that the Stalin regime was

trying actively to thwart American democracy and freedom around the globe

and it was the great responsibility of the United States to stop them. This

effort would require all means, including international relief and aid.

The Truman Doctrine came out of a speech given by the President

before a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947. It adopted classic

notions of relief as well as newer postwar perceptions of American place in

42 Gallup 422

the world. Moreover, it embodied the increased Soviet-American antagonism

and indeed, placed Soviet Russia at the opposite end of a moral spectrum.

The document began with a recap of the industrious and proud history

of Greece. Having always been a “rich nation,” Greece found herself in a

position of economic mishap through no fault of her own, but rather because

the devastation of war had left her without infrastructure. Indeed, this was

Truman’s ode to the notion of “deserving poverty.” Just as the UNRRA had

claimed that it would be temporary and simply help the European nations

get back on their feet, so too does the March speech find Truman implying

that the US is just lending a hand to a nation that, without the misery of the

war, never would have needed it.

More importantly, at least for Truman’s purposes, was that a few

extremists had taken advantage of the economic chaos to gain political and

military power in areas of the shattered nation. The President claimed that,

“the very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist

activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists.”43 Indeed, he

was asserting that, the purpose of American relief money being the support

of freedom-loving popular democracies world-wide, it seemed logical that

when those democracies were threatened politically and militarily as well,

the US should offer up its full support.

The most important part of the speech came when Truman defined

America’s notion of freedom as “freedom from coercion.” Indeed, the

rhetorical function was to connect “coercion” with “communism” and in so

doing place Soviet Russia and the United States in Manichean opposition to

each other. Additionally, Truman began to reclaim the post WWII mythology

of foreign relief. He says that economic and financial aid is the chosen

means for “assisting free peoples” in “work[ing] out their own destinies in

their own ways.”44

Finally, he redefines postwar American internationalism by giving the

American circle of friends not simply a root in common values but in

common threat. Greece (and Turkey) were vital because they represented

border lands that, once fallen, could lead to regional instability and

43 Truman Doctrine Speech44 ibid

communist upsurge. The United States, Truman asserted, must be prepared

to protect “freedom-loving peoples” the world over, wherever the threat of

coercion should arise.

The Doctrine gave rise to an extraordinary amount of discourse that

often tried to contextualize the notions projected in recent American history

and public discussion. Writing in The American Journal of International Law

in October, 1947, Edwin Borchard noticed that the speech, which he

considered a “promise to use American dollars, if not more, to stop

Communism,”45 was fundamentally different from the Monroe Doctrine.

While they were frequently being compared, Borchard wrote that the

Truman speech was different because it had “no geographical limits and

promis[ed] American intervention in places where the United States [had]

little or no interest.”46 This is a phenomenally important observation because

this difference mirrored the new postwar imagination of “America” as a

fundamentally ideological rather than geographic body. This was not to say

that America didn’t have territorial integrity to protect. Indeed, Truman

asserts that his desire to protect Turkey and Greece stemmed largely from

national self-interest. At the same time, however, it was clear that after

1945, the average citizens concept of America did not begin in Maine and

end in California.

The Marshall Plan was similarly inflected with Truman’s version of the

new American internationalism. Extending and specifying the March 12

speech, the European Economic Recovery plan asserted a distinct notion of

relief embroiled in humanitarian duty and ideological identification with

European allies, but also with a proactive desire to prevent the European

expansion of Soviet values. Borchard’s article had noticed that the doctrine

of Communism “finds its major source and soil in poverty and misery.”47 To a

large degree, the Marshall Plan was designed to deny it these roots.

The Marshall Plan was born into an atmosphere that the

Administration believed necessitated a publicity campaign to convince

American citizens of the necessity and efficacy of the proposal. In early

45 Truman Doc and Marshall Plan 47, 346 Ibid 47 ibid

1948, Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs Norman Armour spoke

to the Academy of Political Science about “America’s Challenge.” The

speech attempted to appropriate the general willingness of Americans to

support their European allies, but also add the specter of Russia and the

diplomatic potential of aid to discussions of foreign relief.

Armour begins with a dialectic about the nature of foreign policy. He

starts by suggesting that “one of the most important factors in the formation

of foreign policy, certainly in its execution, is the role of public opinion.”48

Even more importantly, he recognizes the average American’s heightened

awareness of world events. More and more, he suggests, Americans citizens

feel that their own lives might be affected by international occurrences. This

sentiment had its antecedents in the poll mentioned at the beginning of this

paper which asked if Americans thought their own lives would be

detrimentally affected by a German defeat of Britain/

Certainly with the growing importance of our international relationship in the lives of our people, the impact of public opinion on policy determination in this field tends correspondingly to increase.49

The speech traces the advent of American postwar planning and the

growth of a new sense of common destiny among the peoples of freedom-

loving democracies on all continents. The trajectory is followed with a tone

that has great admiration for previous efforts but also with an underlying

assertion that more is needed. Talking about the population boom in postwar

Europe, Armour says that

With these added strains on a depleted and disjointed economy, the wonder is, not that western Europe has not made greater strides toward recovery, but that she has held her own and even made measurable progress toward that goal.50

With all these things in mind, Secretary Marshall crafted his

European Economic Recovery Plan to better facilitate United States support

for its most important allies. While most of Europe “seized” the proposal

“with both hands,”51

The Soviet Union declined to participate and seven other countries of eastern Europe, under Communist domination or in fear of such

48 America’s Challenge, 249 Ibid50 America’s Challenge, 651 America’s Challenge, 7

domination, either spurned the invitation or did not feel free to accept.52

This represented an important rhetorical step for the Truman

Administration. It had spent much time and energy convincing the public

that relief was necessary because of the values and intertwined destiny

America shared with Europe. By decrying Russia and its satellites as the

rejecters of the Marshall Plan, Armour was attempting to paint them as

rejecters of freedom and democracy.

The conclusion of the speech walks listeners through the compelling

reasons for sustained or increased aid to Europe. “On humanitarian grounds

alone, the suffering and privations being endured by…fellow human beings

across the sea call for a generous sharing of the food and other necessities

of life which we have.” Moreover, however, Armour suggests that Americans

feel, and indeed, have felt for some years, even if subconsciously, a cultural

and moral connection to Europe as the seat of the civilization values which

they held dear.53

Perhaps without thinking it through or putting it in words, Americans realize that the traditional Europe we have known has been a sheer anchor of the kind of world we wanted.54

The implication of the paper, and indeed, the most compelling reason

the Truman Administration thought it could offer for support for the

Marshall Plan, was that it was nothing less than this world itself that the

Soviet Union and its insidious ideology were threatening.

Gallup Polls from the time indicate that the Plan face mixed reception

with the American public. To some degree, this is probably attributable to a

general weariness for supporting an overseas clientele. One of the

fundamental Americanisms of the new internationalism was that that sort of

relief was ostensibly temporary. At the same time, polls seem to indicate a

general confusion about the exact purpose of the plan. Was it fundamentally

about support for our European allies, or prevention of the spread of

Communism, or both, or neither?

Throughout 1947, Gallup asked a set of questions about the Marshall

Plan. By the end of December, 78.5% of Americans had at least heard of it,

52 ibid53 America’s Challenge, 854 ibid

up from 54.75% in late July, just a few weeks after Marshall had begun to

explicate the idea. Yet even at this later date, 38.5% of respondents said

they “don’t know” what the purpose of the plan was. Just under 41% thought

that it had something to do with “helping Europe.” Another 7% thought that

it was entirely about anti-communism.55

Fiscally speaking, the Marshall Plan did little more than sustain the

American relief effort that had been underway in Europe since the end of the

war. Although it was through different programs such as the UNRRA, the US

government spent relatively the same per year in 1945 and ’46 as it did in

48-51 while Marshall was in effect. What is more important was the way in

which the plan was party of a greater trend toward understanding relief as a

necessary tool to ward against the shared threat of coercion, slavery and

destruction menaced by the Soviet Union.

Conclusion

By the time that the Truman Administration adopted NSC-68 as

official policy, the Cold War was in full swing. The Soviet Union had become

sanctified as the Great Other, and discussions of both domestic and foreign

policy tended more and more to find common terminology in the ideological

battle between Capitalism and Communism.

It is important to recognize, however, that this historical moment to

not spring from a vacuum. Indeed, the early Cold War was largely a product

of the developing postwar sensibilities of “America.” International relief

efforts form an interesting case study that demonstrates a trajectory of

sentiment. In the immediate aftermath of WWII, Americans felt a clear sense

of connection and duty towards Europe. In many ways, this sense sprung

from a new appreciation of their own American-ness as fundamentally

ideological rather than geographic. Even as a new internationalism

developed, it was predicated on the upholding and extension of a certain set

of highly sanctified values. As the Soviet Specter increased in the public

mind, these same values were increasingly perceived as threatened. Aid

began to take on new strategic significance. By 1950, the line between a

55 Gallup 410

shared humanitarian ideal and preventative dollar diplomacy had become

extremely blurred.

This discussion seems especially relevant in the modern world. As the

Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Empire imploded, there was a similar flurry of

postwar envisioning. Some famously predicted an “end to history.” Others

thought that new conflicts would be “clashes of civilizations.” Yet for the

average American, the 1990s would be a decade notable mostly for its

economic prosperity and the relatively mundane sense of American

involvement in the world. A burgeoning non-governmental humanitarian

sector became more active than ever at home and overseas. Ironically,

outside of America, the 1990s was one of the most violent and volatile

decades of the century.

In the wake of September 11th, the American public consciousness

was suddenly awakened to a new world landscape. There was an immediate

push, but the Bush Administration on the one hand and political and moral

opponents on the other, to appropriate the causes and meanings of the

tragic event. The last four years have largely been a process of the Bush

White House trying to convince Americans of the rightness and

righteousness of their world view and the efficacy of their international

strategy. As witnessed by NSS-2002 and famous sound bytes like “with us,

or against us,” Americans find themselves again thinking of America both

ideologically and territorially. The Bush Doctrine, like the Truman Doctrine,

promises to go after Terrorism wherever it seeks refuge. Member nations of

‘Coalitions of the Willing’ are important not necessarily because of their size

or strategic value, but because of their common acceptance of the Bush-

American ideology. Remember, we can’t forget Poland. In this scenario,

international aid and relief is almost entirely predicated on value norms or

strategic needs which ostensibly provision for the maintenance of those

norms. Like in 1950, “humanitarianism” is often colored by a distinct

American internationalism.

As we progress further into the 21st century, our discussions of aid,

relief, international obligation and domestic identity will becoming

increasingly connected. By looking back at the post WWII period, we can

find not only precedent but lessons as we update and reevaluate our notions

of that constant question: what does it mean to be American?

Bibliography

Articles

F. Cyril James. “The Unfinished Struggle for Human Freedom.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science Vol 258 (1948): 101-111

Nathan Brodsky. “Some Aspects of International Relief.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 62 (1948): 596-609

Simon Kuznets. “Foreign Economic Relations of the United States and Their Impact upon the Domestic Economy.” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society Vol. 92 (1948)

Norman Armour. “America’s Challenge” Proceedings of the Academy of Poliutical Science Vol. 22 (1948): 107-116

Theodore A. Sumberg. “The Financial Experience of UNRRA.” The American Journal of International Law Vol 39 (1945): 698-712

G. Hayden Raynor. “The United Nations: Our Challenge.” Virginia Law Review Vol. 31 (1945): 888-912

Dillard B. Lasseter. “The Impact of the War on the South and Implications for Postwar Developments.” Social Forces Vol. 23 (1944): 20-26

Phillip Weintraub. “UNRRA: An Experiment in International Welfare Planning.” The Journal of Politics, (1945): 1-24

Rupert Emerson. “American Policy Toward Pacific Dependencies.” Pacific Affairs Vol. 20 (1947): 259-275

J. Bradford De Long, Barry Eichengreen. “The Marshall Plan: History’s Most Successful Structural Adjustment Program.” October 1991

Jacob Viner. “America’s Lending Policy.” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science. Vol 22 (1947): 57-66

J.O.M. Brock. “The Future of Southeast Asia.” Far Eastern Survey Vol. 12 (1943): 243-247

Herbert Von Beckerath. “Interrelations Between Moral and Economic Factors in the Postwar World.” The American Economic Review Vol. 34 (1944): 25-40

C. Arnold Anderson. “Sociological Elements in Economic Restrictionism.” American Sociolgoical Review Vol. 9 (1944): 345-358

Walter R. Sharp. “American Foreign Relations Within an Organized World Framework.” The American Political Science Review Vol. 38 (1944): 931-944

Books

May, Ernest R., ed. American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68. New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1993

Anderson, Carol. Eyes Off the Prize. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003

Other

Gallup Brain Research Site, http://institution.gallup.com, 2004. The Gallup Organization.