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Overhauling the Bundeswehr
Adapting Germany’s Military to the 21st Century
Anthony F. Hillen UNC - Charlotte December 2006
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Introduction
Since the end of the Second World War, Germany has adopted a stringent foreign
policy of non-aggression and the strict limitation of her armed forces to a level scarcely
sufficient for national defense. Adherence to these policies has persisted to the present.
Primarily driven by political pressure stemming from domestic sentiments of collective
guilt for the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany during WWII and the desire to never
let that happen again, contemporary German leaders have skirted the issue of
restructuring the antiquated cold-war-era German military into a force more inline with
the contemporary geopolitical situation and Germany’s new role as one of the world’s
great powers.
Germany’s new leadership position also implies new responsibilities and
commitments. One of which is commitment to regional and global security. Alongside
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), Germany
is party to several other security initiatives including the Bremen Declaration and the
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The days of European reliance on
American military power for protection against external and internal conflict are clearly
over. With no Soviet behemoth lurking on Europe’s doorstep and with the economic
resources to provide for its own security, American policy makers have begun to realize
the futility of a large military presence on the continent. This has become more evident
with the closure of over 8,000 military bases in Europe over the past ten years. The
advent of globalization and the emergence of new symmetric and asymmetric, internal
and regional threats to European security predicate a revision of post-Cold War security
policy as well as the means of implementing that policy. To the detriment of national
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security, the altered strategic environment has rendered Germany’s force projection
capabilities virtually inept, and remedying the situation will require wide-sweeping
changes.
Martin Aguera (2002), a correspondent with the US Army’s Strategic Studies
Institute asserts that
…there is a distinctive mismatch between Germany’s internationally political
commitments and the domestically political willingness to allocate the necessary
financial resources to rigorously fulfill that modernization of the armed forces to
complete the transformation. The defense budget of the past ten years shows a
very negative figure for all defense planners – it has constantly decreased (179-
202)
Compared to the other two primary powers in the region, France (2.6% of GDP) and the
United Kingdom (2.4% of GDP), Germany has the smallest defense budget (less than
1.5% of GDP). Yet, with a GDP of about $2.27 trillion, Germany has by far the largest
economy in Europe. A US Department of Defense Report on Allied Contributions to the
Common Defense (DoD, 1998) stated, “We are concerned about the current and
projected German defense budget trends, and are urging the German government to give
close attention to this matter.” (p.32)
Germany’s political consensus on the use of force and its legitimacy has shifted
dramatically since the end of the cold war. The UK and France have responded to the
altered geopolitical environment with a multitude of reforms to their armed forces,
allowing effective participation in crisis management operations, the Bundeswehr’s
reform measures have been paltry in comparison (Szabo/Hampton, 2003). Policy makers
appear to remain fixated on the concept of territorial defense. However, modern security
policy involves much more than traditional border defense, it entails the containment of
conflicts and crises, so defense can no longer be geographically restricted. Regional
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security must be treated as a general public to be supplied by transnational organizations
like NATO and the EU. Pariah states and sub-state actors are now capable of challenging
strong opponents at the state-level. Similarly, asymmetric contenders can now choose to
adopt long-term approaches to inflicting severe human, material, and political costs
(Henry 2005). According to European defense analyst Alister Miskimmon (2001),
Germany’s continuing commitment to territorial defense and purchase of
immobile artillery had serious implications for the Bundeswehr’s ability to carry
out crisis-management tasks, infuriating the British. (p.4)
If Germany continues to shun its new responsibilities, not only would this constitute
detrimental risks to national security (especially from terrorists and/or rogue states hostile
to the West) but it would also (as it probably has already) put a severe strain on her allies’
military forces (viz. the United States), which could in turn manifest itself as a political
strain between Germany and her allies.
This paper aims to elucidate why German military inefficacy in the era of
Globalization will persist unabatedly without dramatic policy and structural reform
measures.
The Bundeswehr
With the dissolution of the “Wehrmacht” after World War II, Germany suddenly
found itself without its own armed forces. While diminutive armed units continued to
function in a border patrol capacity, the nation lacked an actual national defense force.
Germany’s territorial defense relied entirely on the occupying allied forces, but
considering the events of that time-period, any debate over German military revival was
nullified by French diffidence. Aside from increasing tensions between the West and the
Soviet Union, failure of the European Defense Community to pass muster in the French
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National Assembly, and the Korean War, assured West German rearmament and
accession to NATO. (Longhurst, 2005)
According to its official website, the Bundeswehr can trace its roots back to about
1950. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer assigned Hasso von Manteuffel, a former Wehrmacht
general, to spearhead a discussion panel regarding rearmament options. Von Manteuffel
suggested the new military be named the “Bundeswehr”, it was approved by the
Bundestag in1950. The Bundeswehr was officially established in 1955 and became a
member of NATO in the same year. The Bundeswehr maintains its rank and file using a
conscription system instituted in 1956; the system remains in effect today and is the
subject of much controversy.
The Bundeswehr formed the bulk of NATO’s conventional ground forces during
the Cold War, consisting of 495,000 military and 170,000 civilian personnel. The Army
was made up of three corps with 12 divisions, mostly Leopard tanks and FV 103 armored
personnel carriers (APC). The Air Force (Luftwaffe) possessed numerous tactical combat
aircraft and participated in a number of integrated air defense operations in conjunction
with other NATO countries. In addition to containing the Soviet fleet, the Navy’s primary
tasking was to defend against approach through the Baltic and escort supply ships in the
North Sea.
After Germany’s reunification in 1990, NATO and the two German governments
signed the “Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany”. In accordance with
which Bundeswehr troop levels were reduced to approximately 370,000, while the former
East German military was completely disbanded.
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The Bundeswehr is constitutionally restricted to territorial defense only, but the
end of the Cold War and the ensuing geopolitical instability necessitated a change. In
1994 the Federal Constitutional Court proclaimed that the term “defense” is not limited to
territorial security but also includes crisis reaction and conflict prevention, this provided
the legal justification for Bundeswehr operations anywhere in the world.
The contemporary Bundeswehr is organized into four regional commands under
the Joint Service Support Command (Streitkräftebasis), a command structure designed to
centralize logistics and support functions like military police, communications, and
medical support. Army forces are structured into five combat divisions but generally
participate in multinational operations at the corps level. The Luftwaffe is organized into
three divisions, and the Navy into two flotillas.
In terms of leadership structure, the Service Headquarters (e.g. Fleet Command)
exercise command and control of each division. Each of the Service HQs reports to the
Armed Forces Operational Command (Einsatzführungskommando), run by the Military
Command Council (Militärischer Führungsrat). The Militärischer Führungsrat, run by
the Generalinspekteur, functions in a manner similar to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
Generalinspekteur answers only to the commander-in-chief. (Bundeswehr, 2006)
Martin Kanz, a writer for the Harvard International Review stated that over the
past decade and a half since the end of the cold war, Germany has outgrown its
traditional checkbook diplomacy. Today, more German troops participate in multilateral
peacekeeping operations in Europe and around the world than ever before. Bundeswehr
troops can be found in Afghanistan (2,824 troops), Kosovo (3,006 troops), Congo (743
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troops), Bosnia (881 troops), Sudan, Lebanon, Ethiopia, Georgia, and Lebanon to name
just a few. (2003)
Officially, all German citizens, except women, between the age of 18 and 45 are
eligible to be drafted into military service (Wehrdienst). Basic training for draftees
consists of three months of combat training and six months service at an assigned station.
By the end of the nine month term, most conscripts have attained a rank comparable to
the US Army’s Private First Class. According to the German constitution, conscripts
must volunteer for active service oversees and cannot be deployed against their will.
Although Wehrdienst is mandatory, a few exceptions exist. The constitutional
provision for conscientious objection allows draftees that oppose the military, weapons,
or violence in general, to complete civilian service (or Zivildienst) instead. Many young
Germans choose this alternative because they can live at home as opposed to a military
base. The first and most common form of Zivildienst is nine months of service in a public
service institution, usually hospitals, kindergartens and rehabilitation or assisted-living
facilities. Alternatively, Zivildienst can also take the form of volunteering with a Fire
Department for at least seven years or providing aid services in a developing country for
at least eighteen months. (Spiegel, 4/8/02)
There were only two significant attempts at Bundeswehr reform: the Weizsäcker
Commission and the Von Kirchbach report. The Weizsäcker Commission was tasked
with assessing the requirements of contemporary German security policy and making
recommendations regarding its future. In May of 2000, the committee suggested that the
“Bundeswehr is too big, badly organized and increasingly out of step with the times”, in
addition, the report also stressed that the German military had “no future in its current
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structure” (Kanz, 2002, p.4). The commission determined that efficient Bundeswehr
functionality was contingent upon its ability to simultaneously participate in two or more
crisis-reaction operations, and suggested that troop levels be reduced to 240,000 by 2006.
Political squabbling virtually negated all of the commission’s proposals. (Kanz, 2002)
The comparatively insouciant Von Kirchbach report advocated territorial defense
and the maintenance of NATO requirements, requiring a reduction of troops to 290,000
by 2010. However, just like the Weizsäcker Commission, the report proposed the
acquisition of modern weaponry and redirecting defense spending to research and
development. Just like the Weizsäcker Commission, the Von Kirchbach report fell victim
to political in-fighting. (Longhurst, 2005)
The New Geopolitical Environment
Unlike the Cold War or post-Cold War eras, globalization is not an event or
geopolitical environment per se. Globalization is more accurately described as a spatial
phenomenon, a gradual yet continuously expanding interaction of differing forms of
organization and cooperation outside the norms of state sovereignty (Cha, 2000).
Activities are more diffuse and inclusive as transcontinental and interregional processes
overlap each other.
It is not uncommon to confuse the post-Cold War era with that of globalization.
Nevertheless, they are two separate and distinct geopolitical climates. The transition from
the post-Cold War era to globalization is best visualized along a “globalization-security”
spectrum. Concepts recently bandied about by the media like selective engagement, pre-
emptive withdrawal, democratic enlargement, and preventive defense sit at the far left of
the spectrum because they are based on effects stemming from the end of the Cold War,
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not globalization. Security “debellicization” or concepts based on the obsolescence of
war would be located slightly left of center, although clearly related to globalization; it is
not the actual cause. Slightly right of center would be discussions regarding rogue and
pariah states. The terms are functions of the post-Cold War environment, but the
proliferation of information and technology, inherent to the processes of globalization,
dramatically increased the danger posed by these threats. While the Soviet Union’s
dissolution increased the availability of previously controlled substances and technology,
it was globalization that resulted in their increased accessibility. Finally, the rise of
extremist and fundamentalist sub-state actors is located at the far right-hand side of the
globalization-security spectrum as their ability to communicate and organize
internationally is a direct result of globalization. (Cha, 2000)
Discussing the scope and agency of the new threats globalization implies is
imperative. In conflict between asymmetric non-state actors like paramilitaries, terrorists,
cults, religious and criminal organization, terms like human security and global violence
have become ubiquitous. Targets are no longer restricted to opposing force structures or
even counter-value targets like cities; they frequently include local groups and
individuals as well.
The era of globalization differs from that of the Cold War in that the very
processes it engenders empower non-state actors and catalyze existing dangerous
phenomena in previously unforeseen ways. Instantaneous communication and
transportation, proliferation of information and technology, and the free flow of capital,
have enabled narcotics smugglers, terrorists, and criminal syndicates to increase their
operational efficacy. (Cha, 2000)
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Globalization has also been the driving force behind the increasing need for non-
physical security. Although strategically relevant, the traditional definitions of security,
like territorial defense, no longer take center-stage. The need for security must also
extend to information and technology assets. The power of information plays a decisive
role in redefining the distribution of power in 21st century international relations
(Nye/Owens, 1998). The revolution in military affairs advocates information technology
as a higher priority than firepower alone, the future of warfare depends heavily on
“smart” weapons and battlefield awareness.
Non-physical security has always been an important part of any traditional
defense agenda. For example, the Cold War fear of proliferating sensitive technology
resulted in techno-nationalist institutions like the Coordinating Committee for
Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), in the US. However, the internet and
globalization has assured that government attempts to control the transfer of technology
are in vain (Simon, 1997). Another thing to consider is that defense contractors and
corporations are driven by the profit margin and cost-cutting, no longer constrained by
techno-nationalism; transnational defense has further reduced state control.
Consequently, access to surveillance and encryption technology is no longer restricted to
law enforcement and the military. Exponential growth in volume and variety of
communication modes has completely overwhelmed government attempts at control or
monitoring (Mathews, 1997; Freedman 1999).
Globalization’s overlapping foreign and domestic security issues cannot be
overlooked. The difference between internal and external threats has been significantly
obscured by the transnationalization of security concerns. The creation of institutions like
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Interpol, TREVI, and the Schengen Accords are a clear indication that governments are
becoming increasingly aware of the need for “intermestic security”. International crime,
immigration, drug trafficking, and terrorism all have one thing in common: their activities
affect more than a single nation and as such fall within the purview of intermestic
security. (Cha, 2000)
Globalization has also dramatically altered the way states estimate a potential
challenger’s relative capabilities. Diffusion of both old and new technology is the process
underlying this change. Measuring relative capabilities was traditionally a linear process.
More advanced technology implied qualitatively superior weaponry and consequently
stronger capabilities. Jet-for-jet and tank-for-tank comparison provided an accurate
assessment of relative strength and threat level. However, the technological diffusion that
accompanied globalization has obfuscated matters significantly. While more
technologically advanced states still hold the upper hand, broader access to technology
has complicated the strength measurement process.
Relative capabilities are prone to shifting more frequently than expected. More
importantly, drawing linear associations between power, technology, and capability has
become impossible. In the globalized era, generally weak and economically
underdeveloped states are capable of exerting regional and in some cases even global
influence because they now have the ability to pose a threat across greater distances.
Access to technologies related to force projection or weapons of mass destruction allow
states to pose a threat completely disproportionate to their size and level of development.
The technologies in question need not necessarily be state-of-the-art, in fact, the diffusion
of outdated technology posses a much greater risk. By typical measurements of power,
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states like North Korea could not compare. However, access to outdated but still
militarily relevant hardware like SCUD and rudimentary nuclear technology enable it to
pose a significant threat and influence the behavior of regional and global powers.
(Simon, 1997)
A review of globalization’s effect on time-tested strategic and operational
methodology is the final corollary baring closer scrutiny. Globalization engenders a
broader scope of national security. The fight to protect that security will not generally
occur on battlefields but rather in unorthodox locations against unconventional
opponents, new forms of combat have become a necessity. For instance, conflict
involving large civilian populations would require non-lethal but incapacitating
munitions instead of just massive firepower.
Traditional forms of deterrence have largely lost their relevance. During the Cold
War and post-Cold War periods, nuclear deterrence was effective due to certain
underlying assumptions. Firstly, the strategy targeted other nation-states. Those states
were assumed to have a central government that effectively controlled its territory,
population, and armed forces. More importantly, those states were assumed to posses
both counterforce and countervalue targets that could be retaliated against. While such
rationally based deterrence might still be applicable to interstate conflict, the
contemporary prevalence of armed and dangerous non-state actors has rendered such
deterrence passé. Firstly, they cannot be subject to retaliation since they do not possess
sovereign territory. Secondly, the ability to function in self-contained cells makes top-
down neutralization ineffective due to the lack of a central leadership structure.
(Freedman, 1999)
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This alteration of strategic and operational considerations requires modern
governments to respond in one of three ways (or a combination thereof). They might
choose to use whatever state, sub-state, or multilateral means necessary for dealing with
such threats. Secondly, the government could choose to place greater emphasis on
“consequence management” and civil-defense preparation. Lastly, some governments
prefer to employ pre-emptive or preventive operational strategies. As such, globalization
has forced most governments to adopt a dual-tiered system in which rational deterrence is
applied to state-level conflict, while utilizing preventive and pre-emptive strategies at the
sub-state level. (Guehenno, 1999)
Contemporary Deficiencies
The Bundeswehr is fundamentally flawed in three separate but equally important
ways that prevent it from operating effectively in the era of globalization. Factors like the
conscription system, Cold-War strategic doctrine, and weaponry dating back to the
Vietnam era have all assured that the Bundeswehr is a military force by name only.
Kanz argues that over 150,000 young Germans opt for civilian service every year
(2003). As such, it functions as the primary source of cheap labor for Germany’s public
healthcare sector, an inherently strong argument for keeping the current conscription-
based system in place. German politicians repeatedly assert that the abolition of
conscription and the consequent reduction in social care provision would necessitate
significant human and financial costs (such as the salaries the government would have to
provide for previously unpaid positions).
Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that tight-fisted bureaucrats in charge of
budgetary policy are naturally inclined to downplay the significance of just how much
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could be saved by eliminating yearly recruitment and training expenses. In 2000, the
University of the Bundeswehr in Munich conducted an economic study and concluded
that the government could save up to €3.5 billion annually by switching to a fully
professional volunteer army, those funds would discernibly offset the cost of paying
healthcare workers for their services. (General Anzeiger, 1999)
Disharmony among soldiers is one of the most notable consequences of
conscription. Preferential treatment based on whether one is enlisted or conscripted
causes bitter resentment among the Bundeswehr rank and file. While enlistees can count
on regular and lengthy deployments to regions of conflict around the world, the role of
conscripts is limited to nine months of service at home defending their barracks and
equipment against dust and decay, their only evident enemies (Aguera, 2002). The lack of
camaraderie and subsequent degradation of aggregate military cohesion is a notable cost
of maintaining the status quo.
The conscription system and the unbridled resource misappropriation associated
with it is the principal reason Germany ended up with an oversized military, comprised of
second rate draftees at home and career soldiers oversees, forced to function with training
and equipment lagging miserably behind those of their allies.
Germany appears to be chronically addicted to antiquated cold war-style doctrine
and training. For some confounding reason, not even the catastrophic events on
September 11th
2001 could shock Germany out of its strategically complacent policies.
Cold War mentality focused on major theater warfare (MTW), combat between two
medium to large-sized powers in a specific geographic area. MTW maintained that lesser
contingencies, like asymmetric threats, could be effectively dealt with using MTW assets
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(Longhurst, 2005). However, most military leaders were disabused of that assumption by
experiences in Bosnia and Somalia, aided by the embarrassingly deleterious failure or
inability to act in Rwanda. Only then did the need for reform become patently obvious to
most strategists. Germany needs to restructure the Bundeswehr in a way that emphasizes
small-unit special operations forces such as the Kommando Spezialkräfte (KSK).
The KSK is the Bundeswehr’s sole Special Forces unit, and frankly, the only
evidence of German military credibility. Prior to its establishment in 1996, the only outfit
even vaguely resembling an elite unit was the police counter-terrorist team,
Grenzschutzgruppe 9. However, GSG-9 is officially a border guard unit, and
constitutionally prohibited from operating outside Germany (exceptions have been made
in the past). The KSK operates under the authority of the Special Operations Division
(Div. Spezielle Operationen or DSO). The KSK consists of four 80 troop companies.
Each company features five platoons specializing in; land insertions, airborne operations,
amphibious landings, sniper-oriented reconnaissance, and extreme geographic or
meteorological operations (i.e. polar or mountainous regions). Each platoon is divided
into four combat units comprised of four-man teams. In addition to unique combat skills,
a member of each team is specially trained as a communications expert, combat engineer,
medic, and weapons expert, respectively. Depending on mission requirements, teams may
also include members with miscellaneous training like high-velocity tactical driving,
language skills, or heavy weapons training. (Bundeswehr, 2006)
Aside from MTW, German strategic doctrine is outdated in several other respects.
The government continues to view information warfare from the rather limited
perspective of information attacks and information defense (Nye & Owens, 1998). In
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other words, destroying, jamming, or otherwise inhibiting communications. The
Bundeswehr needs to fully embrace strategic information warfare across the entire depth
of the battlefield. Bundeswehr capabilities should be expanded to include three major
aspects of information warfare. The first is the ability to collect tactical information
through network intrusion, satellite surveillance, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)
like Predator drones. Second is non-physical security, the ability to effectively secure
sensitive electronic assets and information. Disseminating false information and
propaganda is the third capability the Bundeswehr lacks (ironic, considering Germany’s
historic prowess in that particular field). Modern militaries should have the ability to
hijack radio and television transmissions, infiltrate or sabotage financial transactions, and
disable logistics networks (Simon, 1997).
A military force cannot be formidable on the battlefield if it does not know that a
battle is even taking place, let alone where it’s taking place. Both the military and the
government have demonstrated a continuous inability to view space as a battleground and
not simply a tool. According to defense and security analyst Sorin Lungu, German
politicians perceive the aerospace industry and space itself to be neither a profitable
enterprise nor a vote yielding constituency (2004).
Military strategy is a direct function of the weaponry at its disposal.
Consequently, a revolution in strategic thinking must be accompanied by a modernization
of equipment available for implementation. Identifying incompatible or obsolete
equipment is imperative. According to Agüera (2002),
To keep the Bundeswehr of today and tomorrow intact, the armed forces will
either a) need more money to operate its aging fleet or b) to include an extensive
replacement to lower maintenance costs or c) decrease its international
commitments. The latter option would resemble a foreign policy disaster for
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Germany. The first is also troublesome since costs would simply rise continuously
and not bring Germany any new innovative weapons systems. So, only the second
option really makes sense in order to lower the maintenance costs but also to close
the capability gaps in NATO; extensive replacement. (p.2)
At the expense of national security, the German government has refused to approach the
issue of defense expenditure from the perspective of how much money is necessary for
effective national security or even of which capabilities are required to fulfill its
international obligations. Instead, Germany first approached military expenditure from
the perspective of spending the least amount necessary in order to regain its sovereignty
and achieve NATO accession. After that, it was simply the least amount of money
required to maintain the United States’ security guarantee.
The practical implication of this fiscal parsimony is a generally vacuous research
and development budget. Just about every military budget cut from 1981 to 1998 was
introduced largely at the expense of R&D and hardware procurement. The Bundeswehr’s
recent functional ineptitude is a direct result of such political myopia. For instance,
[t]he German Air Force was only of conditional use in the sphere of modern aerial
warfare: Germany’s contribution to the air war over Kosovo consisted of 14 ECR
Tornados to attack enemy anti-aircraft emplacements and four Tornados for
reconnaissance. NATO did not ask for more – but for good reason. The rest of the
Bundeswehr fleet was non-operational, because their air-to-ground armaments
consisted exclusively of World War II-vintage (Lungu, 2004, p2).
The geopolitical landscape has changed dramatically since the Cold War, the
Bundeswehr, on the other hand, has not. The next logical step in the discussion is to
examine reform measures capable of nudging the Bundeswehr into the 21st century.
Proposed Reform Measures
According to Scott Jasper of the United States’ Naval Postgraduate School,
“Military transformation is the process of rendering previous mehods of warfare obsolete
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by changes in operational concepts, organizational structures, and technologies” (2005).
Before any other reform measures can be initiated, addressing the primary source of
Bundeswehr inefficiency is imperative. Germany must completely abandon the
conscription system in favor of a completely volunteer-based professional military.
Fewer but more highly skilled soldiers will make the Bundeswehr more effective in crisis
reaction and out-of-area operations.
The aforementioned university study suggests that abandoning the conscription
system would save the German government up to €3.5 billion annually in recruitment and
training costs alone. (General Anzeiger, 1999) As in just about every country, the private
sector usually attracts most of the skilled and intelligent workers. This is specifically
applicable to the Bundeswehr, which pays its conscripts only 6 euros per day. The
financial resources saved by abolishing conscription can be used not only to offset the
increase in defense spending but could also be used to increase the wages of Germany’s
soldiers, making a military career appear more attractive.
Proposed reform measures include strategic reform, equipment modernization,
and the creation of a unified, special forces-oriented command structure. Germany
currently faces a strategic environment for which the Bundeswehr is miserably
unprepared. German leaders and, indeed, the German state in general are operating under
the misguided assumption that the sole purpose of a military force is to fight traditional
state-on-state, mass-on-mass warfare in a regularized battlespace. Nevertheless, should
they decide to place greater emphasis on national security policy, Germans would
eventually realize that the new strategic environment is composed of both “Irregular
Catastrophic” and “Traditional Disruptive” conflicts (Henry, 2005).
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The Bundeswehr is designed only for Traditional Disruptive conflicts; even then,
its chances of success against a modern force are dubious at best. This form of conflict
involves two or more nation states engaging in the traditional competition of firepower
and maneuver. Such conflict would require the application of air, sea, and land based
forces. Germany is unlikely to succeed in such conflict as potential competitors would
probably use technological (cyber, biological, or space warfare) and/or unconventional
(diplomatic blackmail or cultural/economic assaults) to nullify any military advantage the
Bundeswehr might have had. In all fairness, while the likelihood of Germany being
involved in such a conflict is low, it cannot be entirely ruled out.
Irregular conflict involves state or non-state actors employing tactics specifically
designed to negate the inherent advantages enjoyed by powerful states. Such methods
may include terrorism, guerilla tactics, and civil war in addition to relatively new
concepts like “unrestricted” warfare. Irregular Catastrophic conflicts are anathema to
Bundeswehr strategic doctrine. Terrorists or rogue states acquiring and using WMD or an
unconventional weapon that produces WMD-like effects against German interests at
home or abroad is one of the most dangerous Irregular Catastrophic scenarios. Counter-
terrorism has traditionally fallen within the purview of law enforcement, but the new
security environment frequently demands preventive or preemptive operations oversees,
as an attack against a strategic ally would create a state of shock and preclude normal
behavior. (Henry, 2005)
During the Cold War NATO faced only one strategic challenger, characterized by
its predictability. The strategic situation permitted threat-based planning, by which soviet
power could be accurately estimated and its future position anticipated. NATO could plan
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years in advance as Eastern and Western capabilities developed at a generally equal and
relatively stable pace. However, the contemporary strategic environment is defined by
uncertainty. There is simply no telling where or when the next threat will emerge. A
planning process based on predefined and predetermined threats is no longer an adequate
tool for addressing the plethora of potential threats to national security engendered by
globalization. (Guehenno, 1999)
In order to function effectively in the 21st century, Germany must abandon the
obsolete threat-based planning in favor of a more dynamic “capability-based” planning
strategy. The US Department of Defense defines “capabilities” as “the ability to achieve
desired operational effects under specified standards and conditions through
combinations of means and ways to perform a set of tasks” (DoD). The standards to
which this definition refers, are based on four basic factors; scale aspects, temporal
aspects, observability aspects, and spatial aspects. Scale refers to the size or intensity of
the desired effect. Temporal aspects involve the latency and duration of the effect and
whether or not it is time-phased. Observability refers to the effect’s detection and to
whom it is attributed. Lastly, the spatial aspects of the desired effect are considerations of
distance and area. (Freedman, 1999)
Capabilities-based planning would allow the Bundeswehr to be better prepared for
the conditions under which it will have to operate in the future. Understanding the
operational environment (terrain, vegetation, weather, etc) is imperative for any military
force. First, the Bundeswehr must conceptually determine which capabilities it will need,
at which point the government can apply the standard decision making process (planning,
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programming, budgeting, execution) to translate the capabilities framework into policy
decisions on specific issues.
While capabilities-based planning is an effective long-term planning strategy,
there are certain capabilities the Bundeswehr lacks but must seek to acquire if it wants to
operate effectively in the 21st century. Military hardware procurement can be envisioned
as being split into four categories; aircraft, naval, information technology, and munitions
upgrades. Land-based forces are not part of the modernization effort because they are
generally associated with MTW. Typical of Germany’s Cold War fixation, the
Bundeswehr’s land based platforms are the only ones not desperately requiring an
upgrade.
The aircraft category contains two sub-categories; fixed-wing and rotary. The two
fixed-wing aircraft the Bundeswehr needs are transport and tactical combat aircraft. In
2001 Germany ordered 73 Airbus A400M military transport and airlift planes but
political squabbling has since jeopardized the entire deal (Spiegel, 3/17/03). In case it
does fall through the Bundeswehr should consider buying a similar quantity of C-130s
from Lockheed or C-17 Globemaster IIIs from Boeing in order to meet its tactical airlift
requirements. This would greatly increase Germany’s logistical support capabilities,
assuring that German participation in multilateral operations is no longer contingent on
German forces “getting a ride from the United States”, as Defense Minister Rudolf
Scharping said in regard to the conflict in Afghanistan (Van Willigen, 2003).
The Luftwaffe’s fleet of aging Panavia Tornados is ill-suited to the contemporary
security environment. NATO’s polite refusal to use the Luftwaffe in any meaningful
capacity during the Balkan conflict is testament to the Luftwaffe’s decrepit and
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antiquated state of affairs. Germany’s most advanced tactical combat aircraft are a single
squadron of Soviet MiG-29s left over from reunification, clear evidence that something
needs to be done in order bring the Luftwaffe into the 21st century (Lungu, 2004).
Evidently, someone in the German government figured this out because in 1983,
Germany and a host of other European countries began the Eurofighter program with the
objective of creating a tactical combat fighter for the new millennium. After a number of
political delays and cost increases, the Eurofighter Typhoon was introduced in 2003, but
political and budgetary squabbling caused Germany to cut its initial order in half.
Although a few are currently in service, it is rumored that the plane is riddled with
technical problems to the point that it cannot operate in hot climates or even take off
when loaded with ammunition (Spiegel, 3/17/03), making it useful for nothing other than
target practice.
Based on the new strategic environment and the military flexibility it demands,
the Luftwaffe should ideally acquire several squadrons of F/A-18 Hornets along with a
few aircraft carriers from which to launch them, unfortunately that is practically and
financially impossible. The Luftwaffe needs an aircraft compatible with all the
aforementioned reform measures. If the Bundeswehr is to become more elite force
oriented, special operations units in the field will require the Luftwaffe’s mainstay to be
dynamic. In addition to air-to-air combat, an ideal multi-role fighter should be capable of
close-air-support, tactical bombing, and taking on a “wild-weasel” function, destroying
enemy radar and surface-to-air missile (SAM) emplacements. If the Typhoon is not all it
was cracked up to be, the ideal replacement for the Tornado IDS would be Lockheed
Martin’s new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The JSF is a true multi-role fighter currently
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under production by the United States and several partner countries; it is scheduled to be
introduced in 2011. Current JSF participants include the UK, Canada, Turkey, Australia,
Israel, Singapore, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands (Globalsecurity.org, 2006).
Germany ought to simply cut its losses on the Typhoon project and support the JSF
program instead.
Rotary aircraft are essential to Special Forces operations. Unlike most fixed-wing
aircraft, transport helicopters can safely insert troops by flying extremely low to the
ground in order to avoid detection, they can also stay within the area of operation (AO)
incase they are needed for an emergency extraction. Two squadrons of Sikorsky MH-53
Pave Low transport helicopters should meet all the requirements of a modernized
Bundeswehr. The Pave Low is specifically designed for mission requiring “low-level,
long-range, undetected penetration into denied areas, day or night, in adverse weather, for
infiltration, exfiltration and resupply of special operations forces” (dod.mil, 2006). Attack
helicopters can provide crucial support to special operations troops in combat. In addition
to providing fire-support, they can hover near or above the AO and be the soldier’s eyes
and ears in the sky. As such, the Bundeswehr should seek to acquire at least three
squadrons of Boeing AH-64 Apache (Longbow variant). Both of these helicopters have
supported special operations in Afghanistan and Iraq with great success
(globalsecurity.org, 2006).
In terms of naval forces, a complete overhaul of the Navy is both unnecessary and
cost-prohibitive. There are only three major changes that need to be made to the
Bundeswehr’s existing fleet. All of its existing submarines need to be dry-docked and
retrofitted with what the US Navy calls an Advanced Seal Delivery System (ASDS).
-24-
Launched from a submarine, ASDS is a dry, single atmosphere submersible, capable of
both sea and littoral operations. Inline with the Bundeswehr’s new Special Forces
orientation, ASDS facilitates safe, long-range travel from submarine to shore. It also
enhances operating efficacy as the troops will reach their destination better rested and
equipped. (globalsecurity.org, 2006)
Along a similar vain, the Navy needs to acquire 10 to15 AAV-7A1 amphibious
assault vehicles (AAV). AAV were designed with four things in mind: prolonging
combat operations, securing a site for a forward command base, denying an enemy access
to an area or facility, and diverting enemy attention in order to create tactical
opportunities (globalsecurity.org, 2006). Thus, AAV are critical components of a modern
and flexible military force.
The third category of hardware procurement requirements is information
technology. Sixth-century Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu wrote,
If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a
hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained
you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will
succumb in every battle. (Art of War)
To improve operational efficacy, the Bundeswehr will need to be capable of accurately
reconnoitering the battlefield. A fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) would be
invaluable to Special Forces units in the field. The Bundeswehr should seek to obtain a
small fleet of MQ-9 Reaper UAVs for use in a tactical combat support role. In addition to
UAVs the Bundeswehr should also acquire the technology and equipment required for
network intrusion as well as television/radio signal manipulation, necessary tools for
modern information warfare.
-25-
The new geopolitical climate predicates the modernization of Bundeswehr
munitions. In addition to the medium range Taurus cruise missiles currently being
employed by the Bundeswehr, the globalized strategic environment necessitates the
procurement of long range cruise missiles (like Raytheon’s Tomahawk missile) featuring
BLU-113 bunker-busting warheads in order to penetrate typical terrorist and insurgent
hideouts such as hardened bunkers or tunnel networks.
Another Raytheon product, the MIM-104 Patriot missile battery system is another
21st century defense requirement. Although the Patriot has been largely unnecessary in its
original design as an anti-aircraft weapon, it has demonstrated enormous success in its
capacity as a ballistic missile defense system. The system proved itself invaluable against
Saddam’s SCUD missiles during the first Gulf War (Kagan, 2003).
The new security environment also precipitates the development of
unconventional forms of combat. Civilian non-combatants typify the urban battlefields
inherent to the globalized era. The Bundeswehr will occasionally be required to utilize
non-lethal munitions. Accordingly, obtaining crowd control and dispersal munitions like
blunt projectiles, traction modifiers, stink bombs, and rigid, incapacitating foam
substances are a necessity.
The Bundeswehr also requires far-reaching structural changes in order to function
effectively in the modern strategic environment. A revision of the Bundeswehr’s
command structure and strategic orientation would facilitate greater operational
efficiency.
The Bundeswehr command authority should be restructured in order to more
effectively support smaller and more elite combat units. The individual service
-26-
headquarters under the Einsatzführungskommando need to be reorganized under a joint
special operations command (JSOC), similar in structure to its American namesake. The
German JSOC ought to be adapted to the Streitkräftebasis and should ideally incorporate
the entire Division Spezielle Operationen, effectively putting the KSK under JSOC
command. In addition to an operational Special Forces detachment, JSOC should include
unrestricted intelligence support (both Human Intelligence – HUMINT, and Signals
Intelligence – SIGINT, in US parlance) from the Bundesnachrichtendienst. Similarly, the
Federal Navy and Luftwaffe should be prepared to fully commit the aforementioned
military hardware to special naval and aviation units fully dedicated to the new JSOC.
Finally, in order to retain a clear and comprehensible chain of command, JSOC should
report directly to the Militärischer Führungsrat authority.
Viability and Implications
In order to assess their viability, determining the political implications, in addition
to the financial feasibility of the proposed reform measures is imperative. Bundeswehr
generals have consistently requested highly trained fighters, complaining bitterly that
conscription directly contributes to policy stasis (Spiegel, 2003). Nevertheless, the most
serious hindrance to military transformation is its utter dependence on the German
political establishment to initiate reform measures, and as previously mentioned, political
motivation has not been forthcoming. However, the situation may be starting to improve
as government initiated inquiry panels (like the Weizsäcker commission) start to pick up
steam, raise their credibility, and increasingly pressure policy makers.
Switching to a completely volunteer-based professional military has certain
implications. Practically, this would reduce Bundeswehr forces from the current 315,000
-27-
soldiers to an estimated 240,000 during peace time. A paper written by a group of
Bundeswehr generals that surfaced in 2002 argued that crisis-reaction commitments
required a professional armed force of 200,000 to 250,000 troops. (Spiegel, 2002)
One advantage of this approach is that the much needed military reform more or
less pays for itself and requires relatively little in the way of additional financial resource
allocation. Augmenting the existing defense budget by 3.5 billion Euros a year should
provide ample funding for a gradual modernization of training and strategic doctrine.
However, technical modernization efforts would require a proactive approach by the
government and a substantial increase in the defense budget to at least 2.6 % of GDP,
which would then roughly equal Germany’s principal regional allies; France and the
United Kingdom.
Drastic modernization would give the Bundeswehr an entirely different purpose,
that of a foreign policy tool, as would be expected of any powerful country. Not only
would this allow the Bundeswehr to be utilized as geopolitical leverage, but it would also
facilitate full-scale invasions and/or occupations of rogue and pariah states, making
Germany a more effective partner to the United States, capable of shouldering its share of
the global security burden as well as becoming a generally more functional NATO ally.
Having watched the seemingly constant increase of American influence in Europe with
obvious disdain, France would most likely welcome the creation of a European axis
capable of constraining the occasional military adventurism of a hegemonic United
States.
For obvious historical reasons, a large scale German rearmament such as this
could be misinterpreted by the international community. Concordantly, it is necessary for
-28-
the foreign ministry to reassure its allies and the rest of Europe that such a military
reform is merely an overdue adjustment to an altered global security environment and
should in no way be interpreted as a prelude to unilateral actions or aggressive foreign
policy.
Along with its allies, Germany is committed to playing a significant role on the
geopolitical stage, a role that will surely involve high short term costs. Germany has no
choice but to accept these costs due to the fact that the country’s long term security will
depend on the foundation that it sets during that short period of high costs.
The US has continually suggested that it would favor greater German
participation in multilateral peacekeeping and peace making operations, but the German
public has resisted German military involvement oversees, especially in out-of-area
operations. Thus, efforts by German leaders to reform Germany’s military will most
likely come at a very high domestic political cost unless domestic anti-military attitudes
subside. This change of heart is not as unlikely as it may seem. As the older “collective
guilt” (for WWII atrocities) generation dwindles and the newer generation of
multicultural, “children of globalization” (whose parents were not even alive during
WWII) enter the political scene, a shift in public sentiment regarding the use of military
force is a distinct possibility. Signs that this general anti-military proclivity is changing
are already visible. The war in Kosovo increased domestic pressure for change,
solidifying opposition to conscription and territorial defense and resulting in a nascent
advocacy coalition in support of a professional, crisis-management oriented military
force (Sueddeutsche 2001).
-29-
In conclusion, the post-Cold War geopolitical environment and Germany’s
national interests, along with those of its allies, depend on implementing a policy of
substantial rearmament. Nevertheless,
[t]his new international order and Germany’s power/position in it are not the most
important determinants of … policy choices. Domestic politics, history and norms
also play crucial roles in defining and making choices.” (McCartney, 2002)
The questions Germans should be asking themselves are: how much longer can Germany
afford to sit back and trust others to provide for their national security? Will it always be
in the United States’, French, or British interests to protect Germany from external
threats? More importantly, are self-righteous moral principles regarding the use of force
worth surrendering their way of life?
Policy makers in a position to effect change will, most likely, continue to do so in
terms favorable conscription and territorial defense, concepts supported on the macro-
political level for their instrumental value, namely the economic and political costs of
abolishing territorial defense and conscription. At this point, the real dangers facing the
Bundeswehr are those of inefficacy and technological stagnation due to irresolute and
fainéant means of policy reform being employed by politicians more concerned with
opinion polls than the well being of their country or the security of its citizens.
-30-
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