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Overhauling the Bundeswehr

Adapting Germany’s Military to the 21st Century

Anthony F. Hillen UNC - Charlotte December 2006

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Introduction

Since the end of the Second World War, Germany has adopted a stringent foreign

policy of non-aggression and the strict limitation of her armed forces to a level scarcely

sufficient for national defense. Adherence to these policies has persisted to the present.

Primarily driven by political pressure stemming from domestic sentiments of collective

guilt for the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany during WWII and the desire to never

let that happen again, contemporary German leaders have skirted the issue of

restructuring the antiquated cold-war-era German military into a force more inline with

the contemporary geopolitical situation and Germany’s new role as one of the world’s

great powers.

Germany’s new leadership position also implies new responsibilities and

commitments. One of which is commitment to regional and global security. Alongside

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), Germany

is party to several other security initiatives including the Bremen Declaration and the

European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The days of European reliance on

American military power for protection against external and internal conflict are clearly

over. With no Soviet behemoth lurking on Europe’s doorstep and with the economic

resources to provide for its own security, American policy makers have begun to realize

the futility of a large military presence on the continent. This has become more evident

with the closure of over 8,000 military bases in Europe over the past ten years. The

advent of globalization and the emergence of new symmetric and asymmetric, internal

and regional threats to European security predicate a revision of post-Cold War security

policy as well as the means of implementing that policy. To the detriment of national

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security, the altered strategic environment has rendered Germany’s force projection

capabilities virtually inept, and remedying the situation will require wide-sweeping

changes.

Martin Aguera (2002), a correspondent with the US Army’s Strategic Studies

Institute asserts that

…there is a distinctive mismatch between Germany’s internationally political

commitments and the domestically political willingness to allocate the necessary

financial resources to rigorously fulfill that modernization of the armed forces to

complete the transformation. The defense budget of the past ten years shows a

very negative figure for all defense planners – it has constantly decreased (179-

202)

Compared to the other two primary powers in the region, France (2.6% of GDP) and the

United Kingdom (2.4% of GDP), Germany has the smallest defense budget (less than

1.5% of GDP). Yet, with a GDP of about $2.27 trillion, Germany has by far the largest

economy in Europe. A US Department of Defense Report on Allied Contributions to the

Common Defense (DoD, 1998) stated, “We are concerned about the current and

projected German defense budget trends, and are urging the German government to give

close attention to this matter.” (p.32)

Germany’s political consensus on the use of force and its legitimacy has shifted

dramatically since the end of the cold war. The UK and France have responded to the

altered geopolitical environment with a multitude of reforms to their armed forces,

allowing effective participation in crisis management operations, the Bundeswehr’s

reform measures have been paltry in comparison (Szabo/Hampton, 2003). Policy makers

appear to remain fixated on the concept of territorial defense. However, modern security

policy involves much more than traditional border defense, it entails the containment of

conflicts and crises, so defense can no longer be geographically restricted. Regional

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security must be treated as a general public to be supplied by transnational organizations

like NATO and the EU. Pariah states and sub-state actors are now capable of challenging

strong opponents at the state-level. Similarly, asymmetric contenders can now choose to

adopt long-term approaches to inflicting severe human, material, and political costs

(Henry 2005). According to European defense analyst Alister Miskimmon (2001),

Germany’s continuing commitment to territorial defense and purchase of

immobile artillery had serious implications for the Bundeswehr’s ability to carry

out crisis-management tasks, infuriating the British. (p.4)

If Germany continues to shun its new responsibilities, not only would this constitute

detrimental risks to national security (especially from terrorists and/or rogue states hostile

to the West) but it would also (as it probably has already) put a severe strain on her allies’

military forces (viz. the United States), which could in turn manifest itself as a political

strain between Germany and her allies.

This paper aims to elucidate why German military inefficacy in the era of

Globalization will persist unabatedly without dramatic policy and structural reform

measures.

The Bundeswehr

With the dissolution of the “Wehrmacht” after World War II, Germany suddenly

found itself without its own armed forces. While diminutive armed units continued to

function in a border patrol capacity, the nation lacked an actual national defense force.

Germany’s territorial defense relied entirely on the occupying allied forces, but

considering the events of that time-period, any debate over German military revival was

nullified by French diffidence. Aside from increasing tensions between the West and the

Soviet Union, failure of the European Defense Community to pass muster in the French

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National Assembly, and the Korean War, assured West German rearmament and

accession to NATO. (Longhurst, 2005)

According to its official website, the Bundeswehr can trace its roots back to about

1950. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer assigned Hasso von Manteuffel, a former Wehrmacht

general, to spearhead a discussion panel regarding rearmament options. Von Manteuffel

suggested the new military be named the “Bundeswehr”, it was approved by the

Bundestag in1950. The Bundeswehr was officially established in 1955 and became a

member of NATO in the same year. The Bundeswehr maintains its rank and file using a

conscription system instituted in 1956; the system remains in effect today and is the

subject of much controversy.

The Bundeswehr formed the bulk of NATO’s conventional ground forces during

the Cold War, consisting of 495,000 military and 170,000 civilian personnel. The Army

was made up of three corps with 12 divisions, mostly Leopard tanks and FV 103 armored

personnel carriers (APC). The Air Force (Luftwaffe) possessed numerous tactical combat

aircraft and participated in a number of integrated air defense operations in conjunction

with other NATO countries. In addition to containing the Soviet fleet, the Navy’s primary

tasking was to defend against approach through the Baltic and escort supply ships in the

North Sea.

After Germany’s reunification in 1990, NATO and the two German governments

signed the “Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany”. In accordance with

which Bundeswehr troop levels were reduced to approximately 370,000, while the former

East German military was completely disbanded.

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The Bundeswehr is constitutionally restricted to territorial defense only, but the

end of the Cold War and the ensuing geopolitical instability necessitated a change. In

1994 the Federal Constitutional Court proclaimed that the term “defense” is not limited to

territorial security but also includes crisis reaction and conflict prevention, this provided

the legal justification for Bundeswehr operations anywhere in the world.

The contemporary Bundeswehr is organized into four regional commands under

the Joint Service Support Command (Streitkräftebasis), a command structure designed to

centralize logistics and support functions like military police, communications, and

medical support. Army forces are structured into five combat divisions but generally

participate in multinational operations at the corps level. The Luftwaffe is organized into

three divisions, and the Navy into two flotillas.

In terms of leadership structure, the Service Headquarters (e.g. Fleet Command)

exercise command and control of each division. Each of the Service HQs reports to the

Armed Forces Operational Command (Einsatzführungskommando), run by the Military

Command Council (Militärischer Führungsrat). The Militärischer Führungsrat, run by

the Generalinspekteur, functions in a manner similar to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. The

Generalinspekteur answers only to the commander-in-chief. (Bundeswehr, 2006)

Martin Kanz, a writer for the Harvard International Review stated that over the

past decade and a half since the end of the cold war, Germany has outgrown its

traditional checkbook diplomacy. Today, more German troops participate in multilateral

peacekeeping operations in Europe and around the world than ever before. Bundeswehr

troops can be found in Afghanistan (2,824 troops), Kosovo (3,006 troops), Congo (743

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troops), Bosnia (881 troops), Sudan, Lebanon, Ethiopia, Georgia, and Lebanon to name

just a few. (2003)

Officially, all German citizens, except women, between the age of 18 and 45 are

eligible to be drafted into military service (Wehrdienst). Basic training for draftees

consists of three months of combat training and six months service at an assigned station.

By the end of the nine month term, most conscripts have attained a rank comparable to

the US Army’s Private First Class. According to the German constitution, conscripts

must volunteer for active service oversees and cannot be deployed against their will.

Although Wehrdienst is mandatory, a few exceptions exist. The constitutional

provision for conscientious objection allows draftees that oppose the military, weapons,

or violence in general, to complete civilian service (or Zivildienst) instead. Many young

Germans choose this alternative because they can live at home as opposed to a military

base. The first and most common form of Zivildienst is nine months of service in a public

service institution, usually hospitals, kindergartens and rehabilitation or assisted-living

facilities. Alternatively, Zivildienst can also take the form of volunteering with a Fire

Department for at least seven years or providing aid services in a developing country for

at least eighteen months. (Spiegel, 4/8/02)

There were only two significant attempts at Bundeswehr reform: the Weizsäcker

Commission and the Von Kirchbach report. The Weizsäcker Commission was tasked

with assessing the requirements of contemporary German security policy and making

recommendations regarding its future. In May of 2000, the committee suggested that the

“Bundeswehr is too big, badly organized and increasingly out of step with the times”, in

addition, the report also stressed that the German military had “no future in its current

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structure” (Kanz, 2002, p.4). The commission determined that efficient Bundeswehr

functionality was contingent upon its ability to simultaneously participate in two or more

crisis-reaction operations, and suggested that troop levels be reduced to 240,000 by 2006.

Political squabbling virtually negated all of the commission’s proposals. (Kanz, 2002)

The comparatively insouciant Von Kirchbach report advocated territorial defense

and the maintenance of NATO requirements, requiring a reduction of troops to 290,000

by 2010. However, just like the Weizsäcker Commission, the report proposed the

acquisition of modern weaponry and redirecting defense spending to research and

development. Just like the Weizsäcker Commission, the Von Kirchbach report fell victim

to political in-fighting. (Longhurst, 2005)

The New Geopolitical Environment

Unlike the Cold War or post-Cold War eras, globalization is not an event or

geopolitical environment per se. Globalization is more accurately described as a spatial

phenomenon, a gradual yet continuously expanding interaction of differing forms of

organization and cooperation outside the norms of state sovereignty (Cha, 2000).

Activities are more diffuse and inclusive as transcontinental and interregional processes

overlap each other.

It is not uncommon to confuse the post-Cold War era with that of globalization.

Nevertheless, they are two separate and distinct geopolitical climates. The transition from

the post-Cold War era to globalization is best visualized along a “globalization-security”

spectrum. Concepts recently bandied about by the media like selective engagement, pre-

emptive withdrawal, democratic enlargement, and preventive defense sit at the far left of

the spectrum because they are based on effects stemming from the end of the Cold War,

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not globalization. Security “debellicization” or concepts based on the obsolescence of

war would be located slightly left of center, although clearly related to globalization; it is

not the actual cause. Slightly right of center would be discussions regarding rogue and

pariah states. The terms are functions of the post-Cold War environment, but the

proliferation of information and technology, inherent to the processes of globalization,

dramatically increased the danger posed by these threats. While the Soviet Union’s

dissolution increased the availability of previously controlled substances and technology,

it was globalization that resulted in their increased accessibility. Finally, the rise of

extremist and fundamentalist sub-state actors is located at the far right-hand side of the

globalization-security spectrum as their ability to communicate and organize

internationally is a direct result of globalization. (Cha, 2000)

Discussing the scope and agency of the new threats globalization implies is

imperative. In conflict between asymmetric non-state actors like paramilitaries, terrorists,

cults, religious and criminal organization, terms like human security and global violence

have become ubiquitous. Targets are no longer restricted to opposing force structures or

even counter-value targets like cities; they frequently include local groups and

individuals as well.

The era of globalization differs from that of the Cold War in that the very

processes it engenders empower non-state actors and catalyze existing dangerous

phenomena in previously unforeseen ways. Instantaneous communication and

transportation, proliferation of information and technology, and the free flow of capital,

have enabled narcotics smugglers, terrorists, and criminal syndicates to increase their

operational efficacy. (Cha, 2000)

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Globalization has also been the driving force behind the increasing need for non-

physical security. Although strategically relevant, the traditional definitions of security,

like territorial defense, no longer take center-stage. The need for security must also

extend to information and technology assets. The power of information plays a decisive

role in redefining the distribution of power in 21st century international relations

(Nye/Owens, 1998). The revolution in military affairs advocates information technology

as a higher priority than firepower alone, the future of warfare depends heavily on

“smart” weapons and battlefield awareness.

Non-physical security has always been an important part of any traditional

defense agenda. For example, the Cold War fear of proliferating sensitive technology

resulted in techno-nationalist institutions like the Coordinating Committee for

Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), in the US. However, the internet and

globalization has assured that government attempts to control the transfer of technology

are in vain (Simon, 1997). Another thing to consider is that defense contractors and

corporations are driven by the profit margin and cost-cutting, no longer constrained by

techno-nationalism; transnational defense has further reduced state control.

Consequently, access to surveillance and encryption technology is no longer restricted to

law enforcement and the military. Exponential growth in volume and variety of

communication modes has completely overwhelmed government attempts at control or

monitoring (Mathews, 1997; Freedman 1999).

Globalization’s overlapping foreign and domestic security issues cannot be

overlooked. The difference between internal and external threats has been significantly

obscured by the transnationalization of security concerns. The creation of institutions like

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Interpol, TREVI, and the Schengen Accords are a clear indication that governments are

becoming increasingly aware of the need for “intermestic security”. International crime,

immigration, drug trafficking, and terrorism all have one thing in common: their activities

affect more than a single nation and as such fall within the purview of intermestic

security. (Cha, 2000)

Globalization has also dramatically altered the way states estimate a potential

challenger’s relative capabilities. Diffusion of both old and new technology is the process

underlying this change. Measuring relative capabilities was traditionally a linear process.

More advanced technology implied qualitatively superior weaponry and consequently

stronger capabilities. Jet-for-jet and tank-for-tank comparison provided an accurate

assessment of relative strength and threat level. However, the technological diffusion that

accompanied globalization has obfuscated matters significantly. While more

technologically advanced states still hold the upper hand, broader access to technology

has complicated the strength measurement process.

Relative capabilities are prone to shifting more frequently than expected. More

importantly, drawing linear associations between power, technology, and capability has

become impossible. In the globalized era, generally weak and economically

underdeveloped states are capable of exerting regional and in some cases even global

influence because they now have the ability to pose a threat across greater distances.

Access to technologies related to force projection or weapons of mass destruction allow

states to pose a threat completely disproportionate to their size and level of development.

The technologies in question need not necessarily be state-of-the-art, in fact, the diffusion

of outdated technology posses a much greater risk. By typical measurements of power,

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states like North Korea could not compare. However, access to outdated but still

militarily relevant hardware like SCUD and rudimentary nuclear technology enable it to

pose a significant threat and influence the behavior of regional and global powers.

(Simon, 1997)

A review of globalization’s effect on time-tested strategic and operational

methodology is the final corollary baring closer scrutiny. Globalization engenders a

broader scope of national security. The fight to protect that security will not generally

occur on battlefields but rather in unorthodox locations against unconventional

opponents, new forms of combat have become a necessity. For instance, conflict

involving large civilian populations would require non-lethal but incapacitating

munitions instead of just massive firepower.

Traditional forms of deterrence have largely lost their relevance. During the Cold

War and post-Cold War periods, nuclear deterrence was effective due to certain

underlying assumptions. Firstly, the strategy targeted other nation-states. Those states

were assumed to have a central government that effectively controlled its territory,

population, and armed forces. More importantly, those states were assumed to posses

both counterforce and countervalue targets that could be retaliated against. While such

rationally based deterrence might still be applicable to interstate conflict, the

contemporary prevalence of armed and dangerous non-state actors has rendered such

deterrence passé. Firstly, they cannot be subject to retaliation since they do not possess

sovereign territory. Secondly, the ability to function in self-contained cells makes top-

down neutralization ineffective due to the lack of a central leadership structure.

(Freedman, 1999)

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This alteration of strategic and operational considerations requires modern

governments to respond in one of three ways (or a combination thereof). They might

choose to use whatever state, sub-state, or multilateral means necessary for dealing with

such threats. Secondly, the government could choose to place greater emphasis on

“consequence management” and civil-defense preparation. Lastly, some governments

prefer to employ pre-emptive or preventive operational strategies. As such, globalization

has forced most governments to adopt a dual-tiered system in which rational deterrence is

applied to state-level conflict, while utilizing preventive and pre-emptive strategies at the

sub-state level. (Guehenno, 1999)

Contemporary Deficiencies

The Bundeswehr is fundamentally flawed in three separate but equally important

ways that prevent it from operating effectively in the era of globalization. Factors like the

conscription system, Cold-War strategic doctrine, and weaponry dating back to the

Vietnam era have all assured that the Bundeswehr is a military force by name only.

Kanz argues that over 150,000 young Germans opt for civilian service every year

(2003). As such, it functions as the primary source of cheap labor for Germany’s public

healthcare sector, an inherently strong argument for keeping the current conscription-

based system in place. German politicians repeatedly assert that the abolition of

conscription and the consequent reduction in social care provision would necessitate

significant human and financial costs (such as the salaries the government would have to

provide for previously unpaid positions).

Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that tight-fisted bureaucrats in charge of

budgetary policy are naturally inclined to downplay the significance of just how much

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could be saved by eliminating yearly recruitment and training expenses. In 2000, the

University of the Bundeswehr in Munich conducted an economic study and concluded

that the government could save up to €3.5 billion annually by switching to a fully

professional volunteer army, those funds would discernibly offset the cost of paying

healthcare workers for their services. (General Anzeiger, 1999)

Disharmony among soldiers is one of the most notable consequences of

conscription. Preferential treatment based on whether one is enlisted or conscripted

causes bitter resentment among the Bundeswehr rank and file. While enlistees can count

on regular and lengthy deployments to regions of conflict around the world, the role of

conscripts is limited to nine months of service at home defending their barracks and

equipment against dust and decay, their only evident enemies (Aguera, 2002). The lack of

camaraderie and subsequent degradation of aggregate military cohesion is a notable cost

of maintaining the status quo.

The conscription system and the unbridled resource misappropriation associated

with it is the principal reason Germany ended up with an oversized military, comprised of

second rate draftees at home and career soldiers oversees, forced to function with training

and equipment lagging miserably behind those of their allies.

Germany appears to be chronically addicted to antiquated cold war-style doctrine

and training. For some confounding reason, not even the catastrophic events on

September 11th

2001 could shock Germany out of its strategically complacent policies.

Cold War mentality focused on major theater warfare (MTW), combat between two

medium to large-sized powers in a specific geographic area. MTW maintained that lesser

contingencies, like asymmetric threats, could be effectively dealt with using MTW assets

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(Longhurst, 2005). However, most military leaders were disabused of that assumption by

experiences in Bosnia and Somalia, aided by the embarrassingly deleterious failure or

inability to act in Rwanda. Only then did the need for reform become patently obvious to

most strategists. Germany needs to restructure the Bundeswehr in a way that emphasizes

small-unit special operations forces such as the Kommando Spezialkräfte (KSK).

The KSK is the Bundeswehr’s sole Special Forces unit, and frankly, the only

evidence of German military credibility. Prior to its establishment in 1996, the only outfit

even vaguely resembling an elite unit was the police counter-terrorist team,

Grenzschutzgruppe 9. However, GSG-9 is officially a border guard unit, and

constitutionally prohibited from operating outside Germany (exceptions have been made

in the past). The KSK operates under the authority of the Special Operations Division

(Div. Spezielle Operationen or DSO). The KSK consists of four 80 troop companies.

Each company features five platoons specializing in; land insertions, airborne operations,

amphibious landings, sniper-oriented reconnaissance, and extreme geographic or

meteorological operations (i.e. polar or mountainous regions). Each platoon is divided

into four combat units comprised of four-man teams. In addition to unique combat skills,

a member of each team is specially trained as a communications expert, combat engineer,

medic, and weapons expert, respectively. Depending on mission requirements, teams may

also include members with miscellaneous training like high-velocity tactical driving,

language skills, or heavy weapons training. (Bundeswehr, 2006)

Aside from MTW, German strategic doctrine is outdated in several other respects.

The government continues to view information warfare from the rather limited

perspective of information attacks and information defense (Nye & Owens, 1998). In

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other words, destroying, jamming, or otherwise inhibiting communications. The

Bundeswehr needs to fully embrace strategic information warfare across the entire depth

of the battlefield. Bundeswehr capabilities should be expanded to include three major

aspects of information warfare. The first is the ability to collect tactical information

through network intrusion, satellite surveillance, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)

like Predator drones. Second is non-physical security, the ability to effectively secure

sensitive electronic assets and information. Disseminating false information and

propaganda is the third capability the Bundeswehr lacks (ironic, considering Germany’s

historic prowess in that particular field). Modern militaries should have the ability to

hijack radio and television transmissions, infiltrate or sabotage financial transactions, and

disable logistics networks (Simon, 1997).

A military force cannot be formidable on the battlefield if it does not know that a

battle is even taking place, let alone where it’s taking place. Both the military and the

government have demonstrated a continuous inability to view space as a battleground and

not simply a tool. According to defense and security analyst Sorin Lungu, German

politicians perceive the aerospace industry and space itself to be neither a profitable

enterprise nor a vote yielding constituency (2004).

Military strategy is a direct function of the weaponry at its disposal.

Consequently, a revolution in strategic thinking must be accompanied by a modernization

of equipment available for implementation. Identifying incompatible or obsolete

equipment is imperative. According to Agüera (2002),

To keep the Bundeswehr of today and tomorrow intact, the armed forces will

either a) need more money to operate its aging fleet or b) to include an extensive

replacement to lower maintenance costs or c) decrease its international

commitments. The latter option would resemble a foreign policy disaster for

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Germany. The first is also troublesome since costs would simply rise continuously

and not bring Germany any new innovative weapons systems. So, only the second

option really makes sense in order to lower the maintenance costs but also to close

the capability gaps in NATO; extensive replacement. (p.2)

At the expense of national security, the German government has refused to approach the

issue of defense expenditure from the perspective of how much money is necessary for

effective national security or even of which capabilities are required to fulfill its

international obligations. Instead, Germany first approached military expenditure from

the perspective of spending the least amount necessary in order to regain its sovereignty

and achieve NATO accession. After that, it was simply the least amount of money

required to maintain the United States’ security guarantee.

The practical implication of this fiscal parsimony is a generally vacuous research

and development budget. Just about every military budget cut from 1981 to 1998 was

introduced largely at the expense of R&D and hardware procurement. The Bundeswehr’s

recent functional ineptitude is a direct result of such political myopia. For instance,

[t]he German Air Force was only of conditional use in the sphere of modern aerial

warfare: Germany’s contribution to the air war over Kosovo consisted of 14 ECR

Tornados to attack enemy anti-aircraft emplacements and four Tornados for

reconnaissance. NATO did not ask for more – but for good reason. The rest of the

Bundeswehr fleet was non-operational, because their air-to-ground armaments

consisted exclusively of World War II-vintage (Lungu, 2004, p2).

The geopolitical landscape has changed dramatically since the Cold War, the

Bundeswehr, on the other hand, has not. The next logical step in the discussion is to

examine reform measures capable of nudging the Bundeswehr into the 21st century.

Proposed Reform Measures

According to Scott Jasper of the United States’ Naval Postgraduate School,

“Military transformation is the process of rendering previous mehods of warfare obsolete

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by changes in operational concepts, organizational structures, and technologies” (2005).

Before any other reform measures can be initiated, addressing the primary source of

Bundeswehr inefficiency is imperative. Germany must completely abandon the

conscription system in favor of a completely volunteer-based professional military.

Fewer but more highly skilled soldiers will make the Bundeswehr more effective in crisis

reaction and out-of-area operations.

The aforementioned university study suggests that abandoning the conscription

system would save the German government up to €3.5 billion annually in recruitment and

training costs alone. (General Anzeiger, 1999) As in just about every country, the private

sector usually attracts most of the skilled and intelligent workers. This is specifically

applicable to the Bundeswehr, which pays its conscripts only 6 euros per day. The

financial resources saved by abolishing conscription can be used not only to offset the

increase in defense spending but could also be used to increase the wages of Germany’s

soldiers, making a military career appear more attractive.

Proposed reform measures include strategic reform, equipment modernization,

and the creation of a unified, special forces-oriented command structure. Germany

currently faces a strategic environment for which the Bundeswehr is miserably

unprepared. German leaders and, indeed, the German state in general are operating under

the misguided assumption that the sole purpose of a military force is to fight traditional

state-on-state, mass-on-mass warfare in a regularized battlespace. Nevertheless, should

they decide to place greater emphasis on national security policy, Germans would

eventually realize that the new strategic environment is composed of both “Irregular

Catastrophic” and “Traditional Disruptive” conflicts (Henry, 2005).

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The Bundeswehr is designed only for Traditional Disruptive conflicts; even then,

its chances of success against a modern force are dubious at best. This form of conflict

involves two or more nation states engaging in the traditional competition of firepower

and maneuver. Such conflict would require the application of air, sea, and land based

forces. Germany is unlikely to succeed in such conflict as potential competitors would

probably use technological (cyber, biological, or space warfare) and/or unconventional

(diplomatic blackmail or cultural/economic assaults) to nullify any military advantage the

Bundeswehr might have had. In all fairness, while the likelihood of Germany being

involved in such a conflict is low, it cannot be entirely ruled out.

Irregular conflict involves state or non-state actors employing tactics specifically

designed to negate the inherent advantages enjoyed by powerful states. Such methods

may include terrorism, guerilla tactics, and civil war in addition to relatively new

concepts like “unrestricted” warfare. Irregular Catastrophic conflicts are anathema to

Bundeswehr strategic doctrine. Terrorists or rogue states acquiring and using WMD or an

unconventional weapon that produces WMD-like effects against German interests at

home or abroad is one of the most dangerous Irregular Catastrophic scenarios. Counter-

terrorism has traditionally fallen within the purview of law enforcement, but the new

security environment frequently demands preventive or preemptive operations oversees,

as an attack against a strategic ally would create a state of shock and preclude normal

behavior. (Henry, 2005)

During the Cold War NATO faced only one strategic challenger, characterized by

its predictability. The strategic situation permitted threat-based planning, by which soviet

power could be accurately estimated and its future position anticipated. NATO could plan

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years in advance as Eastern and Western capabilities developed at a generally equal and

relatively stable pace. However, the contemporary strategic environment is defined by

uncertainty. There is simply no telling where or when the next threat will emerge. A

planning process based on predefined and predetermined threats is no longer an adequate

tool for addressing the plethora of potential threats to national security engendered by

globalization. (Guehenno, 1999)

In order to function effectively in the 21st century, Germany must abandon the

obsolete threat-based planning in favor of a more dynamic “capability-based” planning

strategy. The US Department of Defense defines “capabilities” as “the ability to achieve

desired operational effects under specified standards and conditions through

combinations of means and ways to perform a set of tasks” (DoD). The standards to

which this definition refers, are based on four basic factors; scale aspects, temporal

aspects, observability aspects, and spatial aspects. Scale refers to the size or intensity of

the desired effect. Temporal aspects involve the latency and duration of the effect and

whether or not it is time-phased. Observability refers to the effect’s detection and to

whom it is attributed. Lastly, the spatial aspects of the desired effect are considerations of

distance and area. (Freedman, 1999)

Capabilities-based planning would allow the Bundeswehr to be better prepared for

the conditions under which it will have to operate in the future. Understanding the

operational environment (terrain, vegetation, weather, etc) is imperative for any military

force. First, the Bundeswehr must conceptually determine which capabilities it will need,

at which point the government can apply the standard decision making process (planning,

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programming, budgeting, execution) to translate the capabilities framework into policy

decisions on specific issues.

While capabilities-based planning is an effective long-term planning strategy,

there are certain capabilities the Bundeswehr lacks but must seek to acquire if it wants to

operate effectively in the 21st century. Military hardware procurement can be envisioned

as being split into four categories; aircraft, naval, information technology, and munitions

upgrades. Land-based forces are not part of the modernization effort because they are

generally associated with MTW. Typical of Germany’s Cold War fixation, the

Bundeswehr’s land based platforms are the only ones not desperately requiring an

upgrade.

The aircraft category contains two sub-categories; fixed-wing and rotary. The two

fixed-wing aircraft the Bundeswehr needs are transport and tactical combat aircraft. In

2001 Germany ordered 73 Airbus A400M military transport and airlift planes but

political squabbling has since jeopardized the entire deal (Spiegel, 3/17/03). In case it

does fall through the Bundeswehr should consider buying a similar quantity of C-130s

from Lockheed or C-17 Globemaster IIIs from Boeing in order to meet its tactical airlift

requirements. This would greatly increase Germany’s logistical support capabilities,

assuring that German participation in multilateral operations is no longer contingent on

German forces “getting a ride from the United States”, as Defense Minister Rudolf

Scharping said in regard to the conflict in Afghanistan (Van Willigen, 2003).

The Luftwaffe’s fleet of aging Panavia Tornados is ill-suited to the contemporary

security environment. NATO’s polite refusal to use the Luftwaffe in any meaningful

capacity during the Balkan conflict is testament to the Luftwaffe’s decrepit and

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antiquated state of affairs. Germany’s most advanced tactical combat aircraft are a single

squadron of Soviet MiG-29s left over from reunification, clear evidence that something

needs to be done in order bring the Luftwaffe into the 21st century (Lungu, 2004).

Evidently, someone in the German government figured this out because in 1983,

Germany and a host of other European countries began the Eurofighter program with the

objective of creating a tactical combat fighter for the new millennium. After a number of

political delays and cost increases, the Eurofighter Typhoon was introduced in 2003, but

political and budgetary squabbling caused Germany to cut its initial order in half.

Although a few are currently in service, it is rumored that the plane is riddled with

technical problems to the point that it cannot operate in hot climates or even take off

when loaded with ammunition (Spiegel, 3/17/03), making it useful for nothing other than

target practice.

Based on the new strategic environment and the military flexibility it demands,

the Luftwaffe should ideally acquire several squadrons of F/A-18 Hornets along with a

few aircraft carriers from which to launch them, unfortunately that is practically and

financially impossible. The Luftwaffe needs an aircraft compatible with all the

aforementioned reform measures. If the Bundeswehr is to become more elite force

oriented, special operations units in the field will require the Luftwaffe’s mainstay to be

dynamic. In addition to air-to-air combat, an ideal multi-role fighter should be capable of

close-air-support, tactical bombing, and taking on a “wild-weasel” function, destroying

enemy radar and surface-to-air missile (SAM) emplacements. If the Typhoon is not all it

was cracked up to be, the ideal replacement for the Tornado IDS would be Lockheed

Martin’s new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The JSF is a true multi-role fighter currently

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under production by the United States and several partner countries; it is scheduled to be

introduced in 2011. Current JSF participants include the UK, Canada, Turkey, Australia,

Israel, Singapore, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands (Globalsecurity.org, 2006).

Germany ought to simply cut its losses on the Typhoon project and support the JSF

program instead.

Rotary aircraft are essential to Special Forces operations. Unlike most fixed-wing

aircraft, transport helicopters can safely insert troops by flying extremely low to the

ground in order to avoid detection, they can also stay within the area of operation (AO)

incase they are needed for an emergency extraction. Two squadrons of Sikorsky MH-53

Pave Low transport helicopters should meet all the requirements of a modernized

Bundeswehr. The Pave Low is specifically designed for mission requiring “low-level,

long-range, undetected penetration into denied areas, day or night, in adverse weather, for

infiltration, exfiltration and resupply of special operations forces” (dod.mil, 2006). Attack

helicopters can provide crucial support to special operations troops in combat. In addition

to providing fire-support, they can hover near or above the AO and be the soldier’s eyes

and ears in the sky. As such, the Bundeswehr should seek to acquire at least three

squadrons of Boeing AH-64 Apache (Longbow variant). Both of these helicopters have

supported special operations in Afghanistan and Iraq with great success

(globalsecurity.org, 2006).

In terms of naval forces, a complete overhaul of the Navy is both unnecessary and

cost-prohibitive. There are only three major changes that need to be made to the

Bundeswehr’s existing fleet. All of its existing submarines need to be dry-docked and

retrofitted with what the US Navy calls an Advanced Seal Delivery System (ASDS).

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Launched from a submarine, ASDS is a dry, single atmosphere submersible, capable of

both sea and littoral operations. Inline with the Bundeswehr’s new Special Forces

orientation, ASDS facilitates safe, long-range travel from submarine to shore. It also

enhances operating efficacy as the troops will reach their destination better rested and

equipped. (globalsecurity.org, 2006)

Along a similar vain, the Navy needs to acquire 10 to15 AAV-7A1 amphibious

assault vehicles (AAV). AAV were designed with four things in mind: prolonging

combat operations, securing a site for a forward command base, denying an enemy access

to an area or facility, and diverting enemy attention in order to create tactical

opportunities (globalsecurity.org, 2006). Thus, AAV are critical components of a modern

and flexible military force.

The third category of hardware procurement requirements is information

technology. Sixth-century Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu wrote,

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a

hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained

you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will

succumb in every battle. (Art of War)

To improve operational efficacy, the Bundeswehr will need to be capable of accurately

reconnoitering the battlefield. A fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) would be

invaluable to Special Forces units in the field. The Bundeswehr should seek to obtain a

small fleet of MQ-9 Reaper UAVs for use in a tactical combat support role. In addition to

UAVs the Bundeswehr should also acquire the technology and equipment required for

network intrusion as well as television/radio signal manipulation, necessary tools for

modern information warfare.

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The new geopolitical climate predicates the modernization of Bundeswehr

munitions. In addition to the medium range Taurus cruise missiles currently being

employed by the Bundeswehr, the globalized strategic environment necessitates the

procurement of long range cruise missiles (like Raytheon’s Tomahawk missile) featuring

BLU-113 bunker-busting warheads in order to penetrate typical terrorist and insurgent

hideouts such as hardened bunkers or tunnel networks.

Another Raytheon product, the MIM-104 Patriot missile battery system is another

21st century defense requirement. Although the Patriot has been largely unnecessary in its

original design as an anti-aircraft weapon, it has demonstrated enormous success in its

capacity as a ballistic missile defense system. The system proved itself invaluable against

Saddam’s SCUD missiles during the first Gulf War (Kagan, 2003).

The new security environment also precipitates the development of

unconventional forms of combat. Civilian non-combatants typify the urban battlefields

inherent to the globalized era. The Bundeswehr will occasionally be required to utilize

non-lethal munitions. Accordingly, obtaining crowd control and dispersal munitions like

blunt projectiles, traction modifiers, stink bombs, and rigid, incapacitating foam

substances are a necessity.

The Bundeswehr also requires far-reaching structural changes in order to function

effectively in the modern strategic environment. A revision of the Bundeswehr’s

command structure and strategic orientation would facilitate greater operational

efficiency.

The Bundeswehr command authority should be restructured in order to more

effectively support smaller and more elite combat units. The individual service

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headquarters under the Einsatzführungskommando need to be reorganized under a joint

special operations command (JSOC), similar in structure to its American namesake. The

German JSOC ought to be adapted to the Streitkräftebasis and should ideally incorporate

the entire Division Spezielle Operationen, effectively putting the KSK under JSOC

command. In addition to an operational Special Forces detachment, JSOC should include

unrestricted intelligence support (both Human Intelligence – HUMINT, and Signals

Intelligence – SIGINT, in US parlance) from the Bundesnachrichtendienst. Similarly, the

Federal Navy and Luftwaffe should be prepared to fully commit the aforementioned

military hardware to special naval and aviation units fully dedicated to the new JSOC.

Finally, in order to retain a clear and comprehensible chain of command, JSOC should

report directly to the Militärischer Führungsrat authority.

Viability and Implications

In order to assess their viability, determining the political implications, in addition

to the financial feasibility of the proposed reform measures is imperative. Bundeswehr

generals have consistently requested highly trained fighters, complaining bitterly that

conscription directly contributes to policy stasis (Spiegel, 2003). Nevertheless, the most

serious hindrance to military transformation is its utter dependence on the German

political establishment to initiate reform measures, and as previously mentioned, political

motivation has not been forthcoming. However, the situation may be starting to improve

as government initiated inquiry panels (like the Weizsäcker commission) start to pick up

steam, raise their credibility, and increasingly pressure policy makers.

Switching to a completely volunteer-based professional military has certain

implications. Practically, this would reduce Bundeswehr forces from the current 315,000

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soldiers to an estimated 240,000 during peace time. A paper written by a group of

Bundeswehr generals that surfaced in 2002 argued that crisis-reaction commitments

required a professional armed force of 200,000 to 250,000 troops. (Spiegel, 2002)

One advantage of this approach is that the much needed military reform more or

less pays for itself and requires relatively little in the way of additional financial resource

allocation. Augmenting the existing defense budget by 3.5 billion Euros a year should

provide ample funding for a gradual modernization of training and strategic doctrine.

However, technical modernization efforts would require a proactive approach by the

government and a substantial increase in the defense budget to at least 2.6 % of GDP,

which would then roughly equal Germany’s principal regional allies; France and the

United Kingdom.

Drastic modernization would give the Bundeswehr an entirely different purpose,

that of a foreign policy tool, as would be expected of any powerful country. Not only

would this allow the Bundeswehr to be utilized as geopolitical leverage, but it would also

facilitate full-scale invasions and/or occupations of rogue and pariah states, making

Germany a more effective partner to the United States, capable of shouldering its share of

the global security burden as well as becoming a generally more functional NATO ally.

Having watched the seemingly constant increase of American influence in Europe with

obvious disdain, France would most likely welcome the creation of a European axis

capable of constraining the occasional military adventurism of a hegemonic United

States.

For obvious historical reasons, a large scale German rearmament such as this

could be misinterpreted by the international community. Concordantly, it is necessary for

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the foreign ministry to reassure its allies and the rest of Europe that such a military

reform is merely an overdue adjustment to an altered global security environment and

should in no way be interpreted as a prelude to unilateral actions or aggressive foreign

policy.

Along with its allies, Germany is committed to playing a significant role on the

geopolitical stage, a role that will surely involve high short term costs. Germany has no

choice but to accept these costs due to the fact that the country’s long term security will

depend on the foundation that it sets during that short period of high costs.

The US has continually suggested that it would favor greater German

participation in multilateral peacekeeping and peace making operations, but the German

public has resisted German military involvement oversees, especially in out-of-area

operations. Thus, efforts by German leaders to reform Germany’s military will most

likely come at a very high domestic political cost unless domestic anti-military attitudes

subside. This change of heart is not as unlikely as it may seem. As the older “collective

guilt” (for WWII atrocities) generation dwindles and the newer generation of

multicultural, “children of globalization” (whose parents were not even alive during

WWII) enter the political scene, a shift in public sentiment regarding the use of military

force is a distinct possibility. Signs that this general anti-military proclivity is changing

are already visible. The war in Kosovo increased domestic pressure for change,

solidifying opposition to conscription and territorial defense and resulting in a nascent

advocacy coalition in support of a professional, crisis-management oriented military

force (Sueddeutsche 2001).

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In conclusion, the post-Cold War geopolitical environment and Germany’s

national interests, along with those of its allies, depend on implementing a policy of

substantial rearmament. Nevertheless,

[t]his new international order and Germany’s power/position in it are not the most

important determinants of … policy choices. Domestic politics, history and norms

also play crucial roles in defining and making choices.” (McCartney, 2002)

The questions Germans should be asking themselves are: how much longer can Germany

afford to sit back and trust others to provide for their national security? Will it always be

in the United States’, French, or British interests to protect Germany from external

threats? More importantly, are self-righteous moral principles regarding the use of force

worth surrendering their way of life?

Policy makers in a position to effect change will, most likely, continue to do so in

terms favorable conscription and territorial defense, concepts supported on the macro-

political level for their instrumental value, namely the economic and political costs of

abolishing territorial defense and conscription. At this point, the real dangers facing the

Bundeswehr are those of inefficacy and technological stagnation due to irresolute and

fainéant means of policy reform being employed by politicians more concerned with

opinion polls than the well being of their country or the security of its citizens.

-30-

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