Reg 1-7 Highlighted Only

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner, vs.HON. OMAR U. AMIN, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 135, HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134, Pairing Judge, SPECIAL COMPOSITE TEAM of: Senior State Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE, State Prosecutor FERDINAND ABESAMIS and Asst. City Prosecutor EULOGIO MANANQUIL; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas Law Offices for petitioner.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Together with the filing of an information charging Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as having committed rebellion complexed with murder 1 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, government prosecutors filed another information charging him for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The second information reads:

That on or about the 1st day of December 1989, at Dasmariñas Village, Makati, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having reasonable ground to believe or suspect that Ex-Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan has committed a crime, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously, willfully and knowingly obstruct, impede, frustrate or delay the apprehension of said Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan by harboring or concealing him in his house.

On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to hold in abeyance the issuance of a warrant of arrest pending personal determination by the court of probable cause, and (b) to dismiss the case and expunge the information from the record.

On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as pairing judge of respondent Judge Omar Amin, denied Senator Enrile's Omnibus motion on the basis of a finding that "there (was) probable cause to hold the accused Juan Ponce Enrile liable for violation of PD No. 1829."

On March 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the Information on the grounds that:

(a) The facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) The respondent court's finding of probable cause was devoid of factual and legal basis; and

(c) The pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder against Senator Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan, on the basis of their alleged meeting on December 1, 1989 preclude the prosecution of the Senator for harboring or concealing the Colonel on the same occasion under PD 1829.

On May 10, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration for alleged lack of merit and setting Senator Enrile's arraignment to May 30, 1990.

The petitioner comes to this Court on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the respondent court in refusing to quash/ dismiss the information on the following grounds, to wit:

I. The facts charged do not constitute an offense;

II. The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col. Honasan in a supposed meeting on 1 December 1989 is absorbed in, or is a component element of, the "complexed" rebellion presently charged against Sen. Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan on the basis of the same meeting on 1 December 1989;

III. The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be only one prosecution for all the component acts of rebellion;

IV. There is no probable cause to hold Sen. Enrile for trial for alleged violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829;

V. No preliminary investigation was conducted for alleged violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829. The preliminary investigation, held only for rebellion, was marred by patent irregularities resulting in denial of due process.

On May 20, 1990 we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from conducting further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-777 until otherwise directed by this Court.

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner could be separately charged for violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him.

Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case filed against the petitioner on the theory that the former involves a special law while the latter is based on the Revised Penal Code or a general law.

The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case of People v. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515 [1956]) the rulings of which were recently repeated in the petition for habeas corpus of Juan Ponce Enrile v. Judge Salazar, (G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164, June 5, 1990). The Enrile case gave this Court the occasion to reiterate the long standing proscription against splitting the component offenses of rebellion and subjecting them to separate prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in the Hernandez case. This Court recently declared:

The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that commutes rebellion. (Emphasis supplied)

This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not be charged with the complex crime of rebellion for the greater penalty to be applied, neither can he be charged separately for two (2) different offenses where one is a constitutive or component element or committed in furtherance of rebellion.

The petitioner is presently charged with having violated PD No. 1829 particularly Section 1 (c) which states:

SECTION 1. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction.

xxx xxx xxx

The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitioner entertained and accommodated Col. Honasan by giving him food and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house. Knowing that Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have Honasan arrested or apprehended. And because of such failure the petitioner prevented Col. Honasan's arrest and conviction in violation of Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.

The rebellion charges filed against the petitioner in Quezon City were based on the affidavits executed by three (3) employees of the Silahis International Hotel who stated that the fugitive Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan and some 100 rebel soldiers attended the mass and birthday party held at the residence of the petitioner in the evening of

December 1, 1989. The information (Annex "C", p. 3) particularly reads that on "or about 6:30 p.m., 1 December, 1989, Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan conferred with accused Senator Juan Ponce Enrile accompanied by about 100 fully armed rebel soldiers wearing white armed patches". The prosecution thereby concluded that:

In such a situation, Sen. Enrile's talking with rebel leader Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan in his house in the presence of about 100 uniformed soldiers who were fully armed, can be inferred that they were co-conspirators in the failed December coup. (Annex A, Rollo, p. 65; Emphasis supplied)

As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the rebellion charge constitute or include the very incident which gave rise to the charge of the violation under Presidential Decree No. 1829. Under the Department of Justice resolution (Annex A, Rollo, p. 49) there is only one crime of rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder but there could be 101 separate and independent prosecutions for harboring and concealing" Honasan and 100 other armed rebels under PD No. 1829. The splitting of component elements is readily apparent.

The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the fugitive Col. Gringo Honasan. Necessarily, being in conspiracy with Honasan, petitioners alleged act of harboring or concealing was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus constitute a component thereof. it was motivated by the single intent or resolution to commit the crime of rebellion. As held in People v. Hernandez, supra:

In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. (p. 536)

The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. (People v. Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells us that acts committed in furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion. (People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]; People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot therefore be made the basis of a separate charge. The case of People v. Prieto 2 (80 Phil., 138 [1948]) is instructive:

In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer v. U.S., ante) This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of treason it becomes Identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just

as one can not be punished for possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the Identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason.

The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring or concealing a fugitive is punishable under a special law while the rebellion case is based on the Revised Penal Code; hence, prosecution under one law will not bar a prosecution under the other. This argument is specious in rebellion cases.

In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the prosecution's theory must fail. The rationale remains the same. All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves. Thus:

This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. ... (People v. Hernandez, supra, at p. 528)

The Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in the crime of rebellion. These common crimes refer to all acts of violence such as murder, arson, robbery, kidnapping etc. as provided in the Revised Penal Code. The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however, constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but also to offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.

The conversation and, therefore, alleged conspiring of Senator Ponce Enrile with Colonel Honasan is too intimately tied up with his allegedly harboring and concealing Honasan for practically the same act to form two separate crimes of rebellion and violation of PD No. 1829.

Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring or concealing which was based on his acts of conspiring with Honasan was committed in connection with or in furtherance of rebellion and must now be deemed as absorbed by, merged in, and Identified with the crime of rebellion punished in Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.

Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as "common" offenses, and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty. (People v. Hernandez, supra, p. 541)

In People v. Elias Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960], the accused, after having pleaded guilty and convicted of the crime of rebellion, faced an independent prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. The Court ruled:

An examination of the record, however, discloses that the crime with which the accused is charged in the present case which is that of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition is already absorbed as a necessary element or ingredient in the crime of rebellion with which the same accused is charged with other persons in a separate case and wherein he pleaded guilty and was convicted. (at page 662)

xxx xxx xxx

[T]he conclusion is inescapable that the crime with which the accused is charged in the present case is already absorbed in the rebellion case and so to press it further now would be to place him in double jeopardy. (at page 663)

Noteworthy is the recent case of Misolas v. Panga, (G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990) where the Court had the occasion to pass upon a nearly similar issue. In this case, the petitioner Misolas, an alleged member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in furtherance of subversion under Section 1 of PD 1866. In his motion to quash the information, the petitioner based his arguments on the Hernandez and Geronimo rulings on the doctrine of absorption of common in rebellion. The Court, however, clarified, to wit:

... in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under PD 1866. HE IS NOT BEING CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the rulings of the Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and Rodriguez find no application in this case.

The Court in the above case upheld the prosecution for illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866 because no separate prosecution for subversion or rebellion had been filed. 3 The prosecution must make up its mind whether to charge Senator Ponce Enrile with rebellion alone or to drop the rebellion case and charge him with murder and multiple frustrated murder and also violation of P.D. 1829. It cannot complex the rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. Neither can it prosecute him for rebellion in Quezon City and violation of PD 1829 in Makati. It should be noted that there is in fact a separate prosecution for rebellion already filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In such a case, the independent prosecution under PD 1829 can not prosper.

As we have earlier mentioned, the intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged with rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is a friend and former associate, the motive for the act is

completely different. But if the act is committed with political or social motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion instead of being punished separately.

In view of the foregoing, the petitioner can not be tried separately under PD 1829 in addition to his being prosecuted in the rebellion case. With this ruling, there is no need for the Court to pass upon the other issues raised by the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Information in Criminal Case No. 90-777 is QUASHED. The writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining respondent Judges and their successors in Criminal Case No. 90-777, Regional Trial Court of Makati, from holding the arraignment of Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and from conducting further proceedings therein is made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Medialdea, J., took no part.

Fernan, C.J. and Paras, J., are on leave.

Footnotes


SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 95320 September 4, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.BALTAZAR LACAO, SR., PATRIA LACAO and TRINIDAD LACAO MANSILLA, accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Geomer C. Delfin for accused-appellants.

REGALADO, J:p

In an information filed on February 3, 1986 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 1416 in

the Regional Trial Court of Capiz, Branch XXI, Baltazar Lacao, Sr., alias "Bantan", Patria Lacao, Trinidad Mansilla, Baltazar Lacao II, alias "Boticol," and Baltazar Lacao III, alias "Toto," were charged with the complex crime of murder with direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 28th day of September, 1985, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, in Brgy. Manibad, Municipality of Mambusao, Province of Capiz, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused armed with knives and wooden stools, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of nighttime and superior strength to better facilitate the commission of the offense, assault, attack and hit one POLICE CORPORAL JOSE G. INOCENCIO, JR., an agent of person in authority while in the actual performance of his official duties, thereby inflicting upon the latter several injuries on the different parts of his body which caused his instantaneous death; that due to the death of said Police Corporal Jose G. Inocencio, Jr. and the consequent loss of his earning capacity, his heirs have suffered and are entitled to an indemnity in the sum of P30,000.00 plus moral and exemplary damages.

That accused Baltazar Lacao, Sr., alias "Bantan", has been previously convicted by final judgment of the crime of homicide.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 1

Upon arraignment, herein accused-appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. admitted killing the victim but interposed self-defense, hence a plea of not guilty was entered in his behalf, while Patria Lacao and Trinidad Mansilla pleaded not guilty. The other two accused, Baltazar Lacao II and Baltazar Lacao III, were not apprehended and have remained at large.

The facts found by the trial court, as established by unassailable evidence adduced at the trial, are as follows: At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of September 28, 1985, prosecution witness Mila Parto was at her house in Barangay Manibad attending to persons who came to the wake of her aunt, Nemesia Lacao. Mila Parto is the sister-in-law of the deceased police Cpl. Jose G. Inocencio, Jr. While she was so engaged, she heard and witnessed a commotion at the first floor of the two-storey house and the events that took place thereafter. The commotion arose from a card game where one Mansueto Rivera was losing and accused Baltazar Lacao II, who was playing with him, was furiously arguing with the former. Baltazar Lacao II then unsheathed his knife and threatened Mansueto Rivera by pointing the knife at the latter's neck. Wilma Rivera, the sister-in-law of Mansueto, intervened and Baltazar Lacao II released the latter. Baltazar Lacao II then went inside the house wielding his knife and causing the other guests to panic.

It was then that Cpl. Jose G. Inocencio, Jr. went down to inquire into the matter and to pacify the people. When he saw Baltazar Lacao II with a knife, he held the latter's hand

holding that knife. Baltazar Lacao II then said: "Nyor, release me." As Cpl. Inocencio did not release him, the latter's mother, Patria Lacao, then said: "Nyor, release my son." When Cpl. Inocencio released Baltazar Lacao II, the latter suddenly stabbed Inocencio on his right side. Baltazar Lacao, Sr. and his other son, Baltazar Lacao III, together with his wife, Patria Lacao, and his sister, Trinidad Lacao Mansilla, rushed inside the house and surrounded the victim.

The men then stabbed Cpl. Inocencio several times while the women hit him with stools. As the attack continued, the victim was pushed toward the door of the kitchen and he later slumped on the floor facing downward. Baltazar Lacao, Sr. then sat astride him and continued stabbing the latter as he was thus lying prostrate. Thereafter, this appellant asked: "Nyor, Nyor, are you still alive?" Appellant Patria Lacao interjected: "What are you waiting for, it is already finished, we have to go." Baltazar Lacao III then got the gun of Cpl. Inocencio and all the accused went away. 2

All the foregoing facts were clearly and categorically established by said prosecution witness, unshaken and unaffected by the gruelling cross-examination to which she was subjected. In the process she categorically identified the three appellants then present in the courtroom, as well as the knives and the stools used against the victim in the commission of the crime. Ample and credible corroboration was afforded by the straightforward testimonies of two other eyewitnesses, Isabel Llorente 3 and the victim's widow, Nelfa Inocencio, 4 who were admittedly present at the scene and the time of the bloody incident.

After an examination of the body of the deceased by Dr. Abel P. Martinez, a medico-legal officer and rural health physician, the following autopsy report was submitted and thereafter admitted in evidence:

PERTINENT POST-MORTEM FINDINGS ON THE BODY OF P/CPL. JOSE G. INOCENCIO, JR. DONE AT MAMBUSAO, CAPIZ, ON SEPTEMBER 29, 1985 at 4:30 AM

1. Rigor mortis — present.

2. Livor mortis — present.

3. Lacerated wound about 1" dia located at the left frontopa reital region of the head, superficial.

4. Stab wound, about 3/4" dia. located at the level of 31 CS MCL, left, going posters-inferiorly reaching the anterior pericardium.

5. Stab wound, about 3/4" dia. located at the level of 31 CS 1" lateral to MCL right, going posters-inferiorly reaching the right lung tissue.

6. Stab wound, about 2-1/2" horizontally located at the subcostal area, MCL right, going

posters-superiorly hitting the liver.

7. Stab wound 1" dia. located at the level of 51 CS AAL, right, going medio-superiorly reaching the right lung.

8. Stab wound, about 2" dia. located at the level of the 10ICS AAL right, going media-superiorly reaching the right lung.

9. Incised wound, about 1/2" dia. superficially located at the superior portion of the posterior elbow.

10. Stab wound, about 1/2" dia. located at the base of the neck, left going medio-inferiorly reaching the body of the cervical vertebra.

11. Stab wound, about 1" dia. diag. located at the supra-scapular region, left going antero-inferiorly reaching the left lung.

12. Two stab wounds superimposed to one another located at the scapular region, left, superficial, reaching the scapula.

13. Stab wound about 1-1/2" dia. perpendicularly located at the midscapular region, superficial, reaching the body of the scapula.

14. Stab wound, about 1" dia. located at the left paravertebral line 10T, left hitting the rib.

15. Stab wound, about 1" dia. located at the left paravert, line 1L, superficial, hitting the underlying muscles.

16. Stab wound, 1" dia. located 2" lateral to Wd 15 going anteromedially hitting the underlying muscles.

CAUSE OF DEATH: CARDIAC TAMPONADE SEVERE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL HEMORRHAGES SECONDARY TO THE HEREIN INFLICTED WOUNDS. 5

After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment convicting the three appellants of the crime charged, imposing on them the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering them to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P30,000.00 for his death, P9,250.00 as actual damages, plus P100,000.00 as moral damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. 6

In their present recourse, appellants assign the following errors:

I

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS

BALTAZAR LACAO, SR., PATRIA LACAO AND TRINIDAD LACAO MANSILLA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER WITH DIRECT ASSAULT UPON AN AGENT OF PERSON IN AUTHORITY PURSUANT TO THE PROVISION OF ARTICLES 248 AND 148 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 48 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, As AMENDED, WHERE THE TRIAL COURT SENTENCES EACH OF THEM TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA AND TO INDEMNIFY THE HEIRS OF THE VICTIM P/CPL JOSE INOCENCIO, JR. IN THE SUM OF THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) FOR HIS DEATH; PLUS P9,250.00 AS ACTUAL DAMAGES; PLUS P100,000.00 MORAL DAMAGES AND TO PAY THE COST OF THE SUIT.

II

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BALTAZAR LACAO, SR. ACTED IN COMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE WHEN HE STABBED THE DECEASED JOSE INOCENCIO, JR.

III

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT TREACHERY AS A QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE ATTENDED IN THE KILLING OF JOSE INOCENCIO BY ALL ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

IV

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING APPELLANTS PATRIA LACAO AND TRINIDAD MANSILLA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER WITH DIRECT ASSAULT NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT PERFORMED OVERT ACT SHOWING CONSPIRACY FOR MERE KNOWLEDGE, ACQUIESCENCE OR APPROVAL OF THE ACT, WITHOUT COOPERATION IS NOT ENOUGH TO CONSTITUTE ONE A PARTY TO A CONSPIRACY, AND THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT APPELLANTS TRINIDAD MANSILLA AND PATRIA LACAO NOT HAVING CONSPIRED WITH BALTAZAR LACAO, SR. IN KILLING THE VICTIM JOSE INOCENCIO, JR. TREACHERY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AGAINST THEM.

V

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT BALTAZAR LACAO, SR. ON SELF-DEFENSE AND IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS PATRIA LACAO AND TRINIDAD MANSILLA FOR FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF SAID ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 7

The main thrust of the defense is that appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. acted in self-defense since Cpl. Jose Inocencio, Jr. attempted to shoot him but the gun did not fire.

Said appellant allegedly grabbed the gun and stabbed the deceased more than five (5) times. 8

The other appellants, Trinidad Mansilla and Patria Lacao, interposed the defense of alibi. Their version is that at 7:30 in the evening of September 28, 1985, they and one Consolacion Lago went to the wake at Barangay Manibad. They prayed and, at about 9:30 A.M., they went home but Baltazar, Sr. was left behind. 9 Baltazar Lacao II was alleged to be sleeping in their house and Baltazar Lacao III was said to be then in Roxas City studying at the La Purisima College. 10

The Court finds the appeal to be devoid of merit.

Appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr., by pleading self-defense necessarily admits that he killed the victim and he is thus duty bound to prove the essential requisites for this justifying circumstance. 11 This circumstance he has to prove by clear and convincing evidence, 12

the onus probandi having shifted to him.

Now, this appellant admitted stabbing the victim more than five (5) times. As seen from the medico-legal report, the victim actually suffered fifteen (15) stab wounds, that the cause of death was hemorrhage and multiple stab wounds, 13 and that most of the injuries inflicted were indeed fatal. It cannot now be denied that, even indulging said appellant in his theory, he definitely exceeded the limits of what is necessary to suppress an alleged unlawful aggression directed to him by the victim. In fact, from the eyewitness accounts, he even continued stabbing the victim who was already slumped prone and helpless.

Said appellant also sought to buttress his defense by claiming that Cpl. Inocencio, prior to the stabbing, fired his gun at the former but the gun did not fire. This subterfuge is refuted by the unequivocal statements of the prosecution witnesses that the victim never removed his gun from his waistband, 14 and that the revolver only fell when appellants pushed the deceased. 15 Significantly, this story of appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. was never corroborated by any evidence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. The first requisite of self-defense is indispensable. There can be no self-defense unless it is proven that there has been unlawful aggression on the part of the person injured or killed by the accused. If there is no unlawful aggression, there is nothing to prevent or to repel. The second requisite of self-defense will have no basis. 16

We also take note of the finding of the court below that none of the six (6) bullets recovered from the gun showed any sign or mark that the gun was ever fired. Had the gun been fired, the base of at least one bullet would have been impressed in the center by the corresponding indentation caused by the impact thereon by the firing pin of the revolver when the trigger is pulled. The absence of such physical evidence further sustains the holding of the trial court that even the first element of self-defense has not been proved despite said appellant's protestations.

Appellants Patria Lacao and Trinidad Mansilla were positively identified by all the

prosecution witnesses as the ones who hit the victim with stools several times while the other three (3) male accused were stabbing the victim with their knives. In their defense, Patria and Trinidad sought refuge in the impuissant sanctuary of alibi. Trite as it is, we have to impress on appellants once again the doctrine that alibi is the weakest defense an accused can concoct. In order to prosper, it must be so convincing as to preclude any doubt that the accused could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its vicinity at the time of the commission. In the face of positive identification of the accused by eyewitnesses, an alibi crumbles like a sand fortress. 17

The trial court definitely held that appellants "Patria Lacao and Trinidad Mansilla were positively identified by all the eyewitnesses for the prosecution who were without any motive to falsely testify and implicate or point an unerring finger at the three accused inside the courtroom as the perpetrators of the crime. Their disavowal of participation in the gory killing of Cpl. Inocencio are self-serving and feeble attempts to disprove complicity and to which the court gives scant consideration." 18 Indeed, the participatory acts of said appellants having been testified to so clearly in detail by three (3) eyewitnesses, to refute the same by the discreditable defense of alibi would be an evidential travesty.

Identification of the culprits in this case was not difficult because the place where the crime occurred was sufficiently lighted. Where considerations of visibility are favorable and the witnesses do not appear to be biased against the accused, their assertions as to the identity of the malefactor should be normally accepted. This is more so when the witness is the victim or his near relative because these witnesses usually strive to remember the faces of the assailants. Moreover, the trial court gave credence to the prosecution's identification of the appellants as the culprits. Subject to exceptions which do not obtain in this case, the trial court is in a better position to decide this question, having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. 19

The Court, however, is not favorably impressed with the prosecution's theory that the assailants acted pursuant to a conspiracy just because they apparently acted in unison in attacking the victim. True, conspiracy is always predominantly mental in composition because it consists primary of the meeting of minds and, generally, complicity may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, i.e., the community of purpose and the unity of design in the contemporaneous or simultaneous performance of the act of assaulting the deceased. 20 However, conspiracy must be proved with as much certainty as the crime itself. 21 The same degree of proof required to establish the crime is required to support a finding of conspiracy, 22 that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt. 23

At the very least, conspiracy presupposes a prior agreement or contemporaneous understanding on the part of the conspirators to commit a felony, in this case, to kill Cpl. Inocencio. A dispassionate appraisal of the facts readily reveals, however, that the attack on the victim originated spontaneously from and was initiated unexpectedly by Baltazar Lacao II. Appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. and his other son, Baltazar Lacao III, immediately joined in the fray by attacking the victim with their knives, whereupon the

two female appellants, also assisted their menfolk by hitting the victim with stools.

The rapidity in the succession of such consecutive acts of the assailants, with the last four coming instinctively, as it were, to the aid of the original assailant, cannot but produce the conclusion that their actuations were activated without prior or apparent deliberation. It does not even appear that there was a call or a signal from one to the other to join the attack on Cpl. Inocencio, much less is there even an intimation that they had such a murderous intent or cabal at any time prior thereto. The spontaneity of their respective reactions, albeit resulting in an attack where they all participated, rules out the existence of a conspiracy.

As a consequence, therefore, the respective liabilities of appellants shall be determined by the nature of their individual participations in the felonious act. 24 It is understood, however, that whatever liabilities may attach to Baltazar Lacao II and Baltazar Lacao III are not concluded by the dispositions herein nor shall they be bound by the discussions in this opinion on their putative participations in the crime charged.

Anent the issue on whether or not treachery was properly appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, we agree with the holding of the court below since this was sufficiently proven by the evidence. It is elementary hornbook knowledge that there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 25

In the present case, the deceased was stabbed without warning the moment he unsuspectingly released the hand of Baltazar Lacao II. So sudden and unanticipated was the attack that the victim was given no chance to defend himself. Then herein appellants, although apparently acting without prior agreement, also instantly and all together attacked him. Even if their aforesaid acts were independently performed on their individual initiatives, such concerted action ensured the commission of the crime without risk to them arising from any defense or retaliation that the victim might have resorted to. Treachery was thus correctly appreciated against all appellants, the use of superior strength being absorbed as an integral part of the treacherous mode of commission.

Appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. admitted during the trial that he was once convicted of the crime of homicide but he was granted an absolute pardon therefor. 26 The lower court properly considered recidivism since a pardon for a preceding offense does not obliterate the fact that the accused is a recidivist upon his conviction of a second offense embraced in the same title of the Code. 27 This aggravating circumstance of recidivism accordingly offsets the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender by Baltazar Lacao, Sr.

With respect to appellants Patria Lacao and Trinidad Lacao Mansilla, they did cooperate in the execution of the offense by simultaneous acts which, although not indispensable

to the commission of the offense, bore a relation to the acts done by the principal and supplied material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way. 28 Since they were aware of the criminal intent of the principals and having participated in such murderous criminal design sans a conspiracy, we hold them guilty of the milder form of responsibility as accomplices. 29

The penalty for the complex crime at bar is that for the graver offense, the same to be applied in its maximum period. No modifying circumstance can be considered for or against herein appellants. With the proscription against the imposition of the death sentence, the trial court correctly sentenced appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. to suffer reclusion perpetua. Appellants Patria Lacao and Trinidad Lacao Mansilla are hereby sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The death indemnity is hereby increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with the present policy on the matter, with appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. primarily liable for P40,000.00 and appellants Patria Lacao and Trinidad Lacao Mansilla for P10,000.00, subject to the provisions of Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code.

WHEREFORE, with the foregoing modifications, the judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

THIRD DIVISION

MARK CLEMENTE y MARTINEZ @ EMMANUEL DINO,

Petitioner,

- versus -

G.R. No. 194367

Present:

BRION, J.,

Acting Chairperson,

BERSAMIN,

VILLARAMA, JR.,MENDOZA, and

SERENO, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

Promulgated:

June 15, 2011

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997

Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to reverse the March 29, 2010

Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which denied petitioner's appeal and

affirmed the November 3, 2008 Judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

Manila, Branch 7, convicting petitioner of illegal possession and use of false bank

notes under Article 1683 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended. Also

assailed is the CA Resolution dated October 14, 20104 denying petitioner's motion

for reconsideration.

1234

Petitioner was charged before the RTC with violation of Article 168 of the

RPC under an Information5 which reads:

That on or about August 5, 2007, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to use, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control twenty[-]four (24) pcs. [of] P500.00 bill with Markings [] IIB-1 to IIB-24, respectively and specifically enumerated, to wit:

SERIAL NO. PCS. AMOUNT SERIAL NO. PCS. AMOUNTPX626388 1 P500.00 CC077337 1 P500.00CC077337 1 500.00 CC077337 1 500.00CC077337 1 500.00 CC077337 1 500.00BR666774 1 500.00 CC077337 1 500.00CC077337 1 500.00 BR666774 1 500.00BB020523 1 500.00 BR666774 1 500.00PX626388 1 500.00 CC077337 1 500.00BR666774 1 500.00 WW164152 1 500.00PX626388 1 500.00 WW164152 1 500.00BR666774 1 500.00 BR666774 1 500.00UU710062 1 500.00 PX626388 1 500.00CC077337 1 500.00 PX626388 1 500.00

Which are false and falsified.

Contrary to law.

Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter

ensued.

The version of the prosecution and the defense, as summarized by the CA,

are as follows:6

The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: Jail Officer 1 (JO1) Michael Michelle Passilan, the Investigator of the Manila City Jail; JO1 Domingo David, Jr.; and Loida Marcega Cruz, the Assistant Manager of the Cash Department of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.

[Their testimonies established the following:]

Appellant is a detainee at the Manila City Jail. On August 7, 2007, at around 3:30 pm, an informant in the person of inmate Francis dela Cruz approached JO1s Domingo David, Jr. and Michael Passilan. The informant narrated that he received a counterfeit P500.00 bill from appellant with orders to buy a bottle of soft drink from the Manila City Jail Bakery. The bakery employee, however, recognized the bill as a

56

fake and refused to accept the same. Consequently, JO1s David and Passilan, along with the informant, proceeded to appellant's cell for a surprise inspection. Pursuant to their agreement, the informant entered the cubicle first and found appellant therein, lying in bed. The informant returned to appellant the latter's P500.00 bill. The jail guards then entered the cell and announced a surprise inspection. JO1 Passilan frisked appellant and recovered a black wallet from his back pocket. Inside the wallet were twenty-three (23) pieces of P500.00, all of which were suspected to be counterfeit. They confiscated the same and marked them sequentially with IIB-2 to II-B24. They likewise marked the P500.00 bill that was returned by informant to appellant with IIB-1. Appellant was consequently arrested and brought out of his cell into the office of the Intelligence and Investigation Branch (IIB) of the Manila City jail for interrogation.

Meanwhile, the twenty-four (24) P500.00 bills confiscated from appellant were turned over to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas for analysis. Pursuant to a Certification dated August 7, 2007, Acting Assistant Manager Loida Marcega Cruz of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas examined and found the following bills as counterfeit, viz: one (1) P500.00 bill with Serial Number BB020523; six (6) P500.00 bills with Serial Number BR666774; nine (9) P500.00 bills with Serial Number CC077337; five (5) P500.00 bills with Serial Number PX626388; one (1) P500.00 bill with Serial Number UU710062; and two (2) P500.00 bills with Serial Number WW164152.

For the defense, appellant was the lone witness presented on the stand.

Appellant simply raised the defense of frame-up. He testified that in the afternoon of August 5, 2007, he was inside his room located at Dorm 1 of the Manila City Jail. At around 3:00 pm, JO1 Michael Passilan entered appellant's room while JO1 Domingo David, Jr. posted himself outside. Without any warning, JO1 Passilan frisked appellant and confiscated his wallet containing one (1) P1,000.00 bill. JO1s David and Passilan left immediately thereafter. Appellant was left with no other choice but to follow them in order to get back his wallet. Appellant followed the jail officers to the Intelligence Office of the Manila City Jail where he saw JO1 Passilan place the P500.00 bills inside the confiscated black wallet. Appellant was then told that the P500.00 bills were counterfeit and that he was being charged with illegal possession and use thereof. Appellant also added that JO1 Passilan bore a grudge against him. This was because appellant refused to extend a loan [to] JO1 Passilan because the latter cannot offer any collateral therefor. Since then, JO1 Passilan treated him severely, threatening him and, at times, putting him in isolation.

After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the

crime charged. The RTC gave credence to the prosecution's witnesses in finding

that the counterfeit money were discovered in petitioner's possession during a

surprise inspection, and that the possibility that the counterfeit money were planted

to incriminate petitioner was almost nil considering the number of pieces

involved.7 The RTC also did not find that the jail officers were motivated by

improper motive in arresting petitioner,8 and applied in their favor the presumption

of regularity in the performance of official duties considering the absence of

contrary evidence. As to petitioners defense of frame-up, the RTC held that the

purported frame-up allegedly staged by JO1 Passilan would not affect the

prosecution's evidence since the testimony of JO1 David could stand by itself. The

RTC likewise found that it was strange that petitioner did not remonstrate despite

the fact that he was allegedly being framed.9

As to the elements of the crime, the RTC held that the fact that the P500.00

bills found in petitioners possession were forgeries was confirmed by the

certification issued by the Cash Department of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,

which was testified into by Acting Assistant Manager Loida A. Cruz.10 The RTC

also ruled that petitioner knew the bills were counterfeit as shown by his conduct

during the surprise search and his possession of the bills. As to the element of

intention to use the false bank notes, the RTC ruled that the fact that petitioner

intended to use the bills was confirmed by the information received by the jail

officers from another inmate.11

Aggrieved, petitioner sought reconsideration of the judgment. Petitioner

argued that the evidence used against him was obtained in violation of his

constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Petitioner also

argued that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt

7891011

because of the non-presentation of the informant-inmate, Francis dela Cruz, who

could have corroborated the testimonies of the jail officers.

Unconvinced, the RTC denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. The

RTC, however, only ruled that there was no violation of petitioners constitutional

right against unreasonable searches and seizures because the seizure was done

pursuant to a valid arrest for violation of Article 168 of the RPC. The trial court

pointed out that prior to the search, a crime was committed and the criminal

responsibility pointed to petitioner.12

On appeal before the CA, petitioner argued that the RTC erred in finding

him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Article 168 of the RPC.

Petitioner contended that one of the elements of the crime which is intent to use the

counterfeit bills was not established because the informant Francis dela Cruz did

not take the witness stand.13

The CA, however, found the appeal unmeritorious and denied petitioners

appeal.14 The appellate court found that the fact the petitioner was caught in

possession of twenty-four (24) pieces of fake P500.00 bills already casts doubt on

his allegation that he was merely framed by the jail guards. The CA agreed with

the RTC that even without the testimony of JO1 Passilan, the testimony of JO1

David was already sufficient to establish petitioners guilt since petitioner did not

impute any ill motive on the latter except to point out that JO1 David was JO1

Passilans friend.15

12131415

Regarding the element of intent to use, the CA found that there are several

circumstances which, if taken together, lead to the logical conclusion that

petitioner intended to use the counterfeit bills in his possession. The CA pointed

out that jail officers were informed by inmate Francis dela Cruz that he received a

fake P500.00 bill from petitioner who told him to buy soft drinks from the Manila

City jail bakery. After Francis dela Cruz identified petitioner as the person who

gave him the fake money, the jail officers conducted a surprise inspection. Said

inspection yielded twenty-three (23) pieces of counterfeit P500.00 bills inside

petitioner's black wallet, which was taken from his back pocket. The CA further

held that the non-presentation of Francis dela Cruz would not affect the

prosecution's case because even without his testimony, petitioners intent to use the

counterfeit bills was established. The CA added that the matter of which witnesses

to present is a matter best left to the discretion of the prosecution.16

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the above ruling, but the CA denied

petitioners motion for reconsideration in the assailed Resolution dated October 14,

2010.17 Hence, the present appeal.

Petitioner raises the following assignment of errors, to wit:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, CONVICTING PETITIONER OF THE CRIME CHARGED, DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE.

II.

1617

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING THE COUNTERFEIT BILLS SINCE THEY WERE DERIVED FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE.18

The petition is meritorious.

Generally, the trial courts findings are accorded finality, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court has overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case. The exception applies when it is established that the trial court has ignored, overlooked, misconstrued or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, will change the outcome of the case.19

Here, the Court finds that the RTC and the CA had overlooked certain

substantial facts of value to warrant a reversal of its factual assessments. While

petitioner's denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed by

strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credence, said defense must be given

credence in this case as the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proof.

Article 168 of the RPC, under which petitioner was charged, provides:

ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and other instruments of credit. Unless the act be one of those coming under the provisions of any of the preceding articles, any person who shall knowingly use or have in his possession, with intent to use any of the false or falsified instruments referred to in this section, shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed in said articles. [Emphasis supplied.]

The elements of the crime charged for violation of said law are: (1) that any treasury or bank note or certificate or other obligation and security payable to bearer, or any instrument payable to order or other document of credit not payable to bearer is forged or falsified by another person; (2) that the offender knows that any of the said instruments is forged or falsified; and (3) that he either used or possessed with intent to use any of such forged or falsified instruments.20 As held

181920

in People v. Digoro, 21 possession of false treasury or bank notes alone, without anything more, is not a criminal offense. For it to constitute an offense under Article 168 of the RPC, the possession must be with intent to use said false treasury or bank notes.22

In this case, the prosecution failed to show that petitioner used the

counterfeit money or that he intended to use the counterfeit bills. Francis dela

Cruz, to whom petitioner supposedly gave the fake P500.00 bill to buy soft drinks,

was not presented in court. According to the jail officers, they were only informed

by Francis dela Cruz that petitioner asked the latter to buy soft drinks at the Manila

City jail bakery using a fake P500.00 bill. In short, the jail officers did not have

personal knowledge that petitioner asked Francis dela Cruz use the P500.00 bill.23

Their account, however, is hearsay and not based on the personal knowledge.24

This Court, of course, is not unaware of its rulings that the matter of

presentation of prosecution witnesses is not for the accused or, except in a limited

sense, for the trial court to dictate. Discretion belongs to the city or provincial

prosecutor as to how the prosecution should present its case.25 However, in this

case, the non-presentation of the informant as witness weakens the prosecution's

evidence since he was the only one who had knowledge of the act which

manifested petitioner's intent to use a counterfeit bill. The prosecution had every

opportunity to present Francis dela Cruz as its witness, if in fact such person

existed, but it did not present him. Hence, the trial court did not have before it

evidence of an essential element of the crime. The twenty-three (23) pieces of

counterfeit bills allegedly seized on petitioner is not sufficient to show intent,

which is a state of mind, for there must be an overt act to manifest such intent.

2122232425

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The

Decision dated March 29, 2010 and Resolution dated October 14, 2010 of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32365 are REVERSED and SET-ASIDE.

Petitioner Mark Clemente y Martinez alias Emmanuel Dino is hereby

ACQUITTED of the crime of Illegal possession and use of false bank notes

defined and penalized under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

With costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN


THIRD DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 174730-37 February 9, 2011

ROSALIO S. GALEOS, Petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. Nos. 174845-52

PAULINO S. ONG, Petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

The consolidated petitions at bar seek to reverse and set aside the Decision1

promulgated on August 18, 2005 by the Sandiganbayan convicting petitioners Paulino S. Ong (Ong) of eight counts and Rosalio S. Galeos (Galeos) of four counts of falsification of public documents under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

The facts are as follows:

Ong was appointed Officer-in-Charge (OIC)-Mayor of the Municipality of Naga, Cebu on April 16, 1986. He was elected Mayor of the same municipality in 1988 and served as such until 1998.2

On June 1, 1994, Ong extended permanent appointments to Galeos and Federico T. Rivera (Rivera) for the positions of Construction and Maintenance Man and Plumber I, respectively, in the Office of the Municipal Engineer.3 Prior to their permanent appointment, Galeos and Rivera were casual employees of the municipal government.

In their individual Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) for the year 1993, Galeos answered "No" to the question: "To the best of your knowledge, are you related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or of affinity to anyone working in the government?" while Rivera indicated "n/a" on the space for the list of the names of relatives referred to in the said query.4 The boxes for "Yes" and "No" to the said query were left in blank by Galeos in his 1994 and 1995 SALN.5 Rivera in his 1995 SALN answered "No" to the question on relatives in government.6 In their 1996 SALN, both Galeos and Rivera also did not fill up the boxes indicating their answers to the same query.7 Ong’s signature appears in all the foregoing documents as the person who administered the oath when Galeos and Rivera executed the foregoing documents.

In a letter-certification dated June 1, 1994 addressed to Ms. Benita O. Santos, Regional Director, Civil Service Commission (CSC), Regional Office 7, Cebu City, it was attested that:

This is to certify that pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, all restrictions/requirements relative to creation of positions, hiring and issuance of appointments, Section 325 on the limitations for personal services in the total/supplemental appropriation of a local government unit; salary rates; abolition and creation of positions, etc.; Section 76, organizational structure and staffing pattern; Section 79 on nepotism; Section 80, posting of vacancy and personnel selection board; Section 81 on compensation, etc. have been duly complied with in the issuance of this appointment.

This is to certify further that the faithful observance of these restrictions/requirements was made in accordance with the requirements of the Civil Service Commission before the appointment was submitted for review and action.8 (Emphasis supplied.)

The above certification was signed by Ong and HR Officer-Designate Editha C. Garcia.

On October 1, 1998, the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naga, Cebu filed a letter-complaint9 before the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB)-Visayas against Ong (then incumbent Vice-Mayor of Naga), Galeos and Rivera for dishonesty, nepotism, violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees and Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and for the crime of falsification of public

documents.

On August 11, 2000, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved the recommendation of OIC-Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas that criminal charges be filed against Ong, Galeos and Rivera for falsification of public documents under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in connection with the Certification dated June 1, 1994 issued by Ong and the false statements in the 1993, 1995 and 1996 SALN of Rivera and the 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1996 SALN of Galeos.10

On August 16, 2000, the following Informations11 were filed against the petitioners:

Criminal Case No. 26181

That on or about the 14th day of February, 1994, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Construction and Maintenance Man of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification of Relatives In the Government Service, as of December 31, 1993, filed by accused Rosalio S. Galeos and subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused made it appear therein that they are not related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, accused very well k[n]ew that they are related with each other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of consanguinity, the mother of accused Rosalio S. Galeos [being] the sister of the mother of accused Paulino S. Ong.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)


That on or about the 15th day of February 1994, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Federico T. Rivera] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Plumber I of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification of Relatives In the Government Service as of December 31, 1993, filed by accused Federico T. Rivera and subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused Federico T.

Rivera made it appear therein that he has no relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity working in the government, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, as accused very well knew that they are related with each other, since accused Federico T. Rivera is related to accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of affinity, the mother of Federico T. Rivera’s wife being the sister of the mother of Paulino S. Ong.



That on or about the 1st day of February, 1996, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Construction and Maintenance Man of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification of Relatives In the Government Service, as of December 31, 1995, filed by accused Rosalio S. Galeos and subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused made it appear therein that they are not related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity thereby making false statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, as accused very well k[n]ew that they are related with each other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of consanguinity, the mother of accused Rosalio S. Galeos being the sister of the mother of accused Paulino S. Ong.



That on or about the 1st day of February 1996, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Federico T. Rivera] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Plumber I of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification of Relatives In The Government Service, [a]s of December 31, 1995, filed by accused Federico T. Rivera and subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused Federico T. Rivera made it appear therein that he has no relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity working in the government, thereby making untruthful

statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, as accused very well knew that they are related with each other, since accused Federico T. Rivera is related to accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of affinity, the mother of Federico T. Rivera’s wife being the sister of the mother of Paulino S. Ong.



That on or about the 5th day of February 1997, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Federico T. Rivera] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Plumber I of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification of Relatives In The Government Service, [a]s of December 31, 1996, filed by accused Federico T. Rivera and subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused Federico T. Rivera made it appear therein that he has no relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity working in the government, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, as accused very well knew that they are related with each other, since accused Federico T. Rivera is related to accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of affinity, the mother of Federico T. Rivera’s wife being the sister of the mother of Paulino S. Ong.



That on or about the 3rd day of March, 1995, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Construction and Maintenance Man of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification of Relatives In the Government Services, as of December 31, 1994, filed by accused Rosalio S. Galeos and subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused made it appear therein that they are not related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, as accused very well k[n]ew that they are related with each other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused Paulino S. Ong,

within the fourth degree of consanguinity, the mother of accused Rosalio S. Galeos being the sister of the mother of accused Paulino S. Ong.



That on or about the 11th day of March, 1997, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Construction and Maintenance Man of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating, together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification of Relatives In the Government Service, as of December 31, 1996, filed by accused Rosalio S. Galeos and subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused made it appear therein that they are not related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, as accused very well k[n]ew that they are related with each other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of consanguinity, the mother of accused Rosalio S. Galeos being the sister of the mother of accused Paulino S. Ong.



That on or about the 1st day of June, 1994, at the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, a public officer, being the former Mayor of the Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Certification in the form of a letter addressed to Mrs. Benita O. Santos, then Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission (CSC)-Region VII, Cebu City dated June 1, 1994, a requirement in the approval of an appointment, certifying therein that there was a faithful compliance of the requirement/restriction provided under the Civil Service Laws and Rules in the appointment of Rosalio S. Galeos, as Construction and Maintenance Man of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Naga, Cebu, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact as accused very well knew that the appointment of Rosalio S. Galeos was nepotic being made in violation of the Civil Service Rules and Laws on Nepotism, as Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused within the fourth degree of consanguinity, since the mother of Rosalio S. Galeos is the sister of the mother of accused, which Certification caused the approval of the appointment of Rosalio S. Galeos, to the

detriment of public interest.



That on or about the 1st day of June, 1994, at the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, a public officer, being the former Mayor of the Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Certification in the form of a letter addressed to Mrs. Benita O. Santos, then Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), Region VII, Cebu City, dated June 1, 1994, a requirement in the approval of an appointment, certifying therein that there was a faithful compliance of the requirement/restriction provided under the Civil Service Laws and Rules in the appointment of Federico T. Rivera, a Plumber I of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Naga, Cebu, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact as accused very well knew that the appointment of Federico T. Rivera was nepotic being made in violation of the Civil Service Rules and Laws on Nepotism, as Federico T. Rivera is related to accused within the fourth degree of affinity, since the mother of Federico T. Rivera’s wife is the sister of the mother of accused, which certification caused the approval of the appointment of Federico T. Rivera, to the detriment of public interest.


Under the Joint Stipulation of Facts submitted to the court a quo, the accused made the following admissions: (1) Ong was the Municipal Mayor of Cebu at all times relevant to these cases; (2) Ong is related to Galeos, within the fourth degree of consanguinity as his mother is the sister of Galeos’ mother, and to Rivera within the fourth degree of affinity as his mother is the sister of the mother of Rivera’s wife; and (3) Galeos and Rivera were employed as Construction and Maintenance Man and Plumber I, respectively, in the Municipal Government of Naga, Cebu at all times relevant to these cases. Ong likewise admitted the genuineness and due execution of the documentary exhibits presented by the prosecutor (copies of SALNs and Certification dated June 1, 1994) except for Exhibit "H" (Certification dated June 1, 1994 offered by the prosecution as "allegedly supporting the appointment of Rosalio S. Galeos"12).13

As lone witness for the prosecution, Esperidion R. Canoneo testified that he has been a resident of Pangdan, Naga, Cebu since 1930 and claimed to be friends with Ong, Galeos and Rivera. He knows the mother of Galeos, Pining Suarez or Peñaranda Suarez. But when the prosecutor mentioned "Bining Suarez," Canoneo stated that Bining Suarez is the mother of Galeos and that Bining Suarez is the same person as "Bernardita Suarez." Ong is related to Galeos because Ong’s mother, Conchita Suarez, and Galeos’ mother, Bernardita Suarez, are sisters. As to Rivera, his wife Kensiana,14 is the daughter of Mercedes Suarez who is also a sister of Conchita Suarez. He knew the

Suarez sisters because they were the neighbors of his grandmother whom he frequently visited when he was still studying.15

Both Galeos and Rivera testified that they only provided the entries in their SALN but did not personally fill up the forms as these were already filled up by "people in the municipal hall" when they signed them.

Galeos, when shown his 1993 SALN,16 confirmed his signature thereon. When he was asked if he understood the question "To the best of your knowledge, are you related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity to anyone working in the government?" he answered in the negative. He claimed that the "X" mark corresponding to the answer "No" to said question, as well as the other entries in his SALN, were already filled up when he signed it. When shown his SALN for the years 1994, 1995 and 1996, Galeos reiterated that they were already filled up and he was only made to sign them by an employee of the municipal hall whom he only remembers by face. He also admitted that he carefully read the documents and all the entries therein were explained to him before he affixed his signature on the document. However, when asked whether he understands the term "fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity" stated in the SALNs, he answered in the negative.17

Rivera testified that he was not aware that his wife was a close relative of the Municipal Mayor because when he asked her, the latter told him that Ong was a distant relative of hers. Rivera added that it was not Ong who first appointed him as a casual employee but Ong’s predecessor, Mayor Vicente Mendiola.18

On the part of Ong, he testified that at the time he was serving as Municipal Mayor of Naga, he did not know that he and Galeos are relatives, as in fact there are several persons with the surname "Galeos" in the municipality. He signed Galeos’ 1993 SALN when it was presented to him by Galeos at his office. There were many of them who brought such documents and he would administer their oaths on what were written on their SALN, among them were Galeos and Rivera. He came to know of the defect in the employment of Galeos when the case was filed by his "political enemy" in the Ombudsman just after he was elected Vice-Mayor in 1998. As to Rivera, Ong claimed that he knows him as a casual employee of the previous administration. As successor of the former mayor, he had to re-appoint these casual employees and he delegated this matter to his subordinates. He maintained that his family was not very close to their other relatives because when he was not yet Mayor, he was doing business in Cebu and Manila. When queried by the court if he had known his relatives while he was campaigning considering that in the provinces even relatives within the 6th and 7th degree are still regarded as close relatives especially among politicians, Ong insisted that his style of campaigning was based only on his performance of duties and that he did not go from house to house. Ong admitted that he had been a resident of Naga, Cebu since birth. He could no longer recall those SALN of most of the employees whose oaths he had administered. He admitted that he was the one who appointed Galeos and Rivera to their permanent positions and signed their official appointment (Civil Service Form No. 33) but he was not aware at that time that he was related to

them. It was only after the filing of the case that he came to know the wife of Rivera. As to the qualifications of these appointees, he no longer inquired about it and their appointments were no longer submitted to the Selection Board. When the appointment forms for Galeos and Rivera were brought to his office, the accompanying documents were attached thereto. Ong, however, admitted that before the permanent appointment is approved by the CSC, he issues a certification to the effect that all requirements of law and the CSC have been complied with.19

On August 18, 2005, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed Decision convicting Ong, Galeos and Rivera, as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered on the following:

In Criminal Case No. 26181, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 26182, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Federico T. Rivera GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 26183, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).1auuphil

In Criminal Case No. 26184, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Federico T. Rivera GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the

Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 26185, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Federico T. Rivera GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 26186, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 26187, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 26188, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong NOT GUILTY for Violation of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code for failure of the Prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and

In Criminal Case No. 26189, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision

Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).

SO ORDERED.20

In its Resolution21 dated August 28, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied the motions for reconsideration of Ong and Galeos. However, in view of the death of Rivera on August 22, 2003 before the promulgation of the decision, the cases (Criminal Case Nos. 26182, 26184 and 26185) against him were dismissed.

In G.R. Nos. 174730-37, Galeos contends that the Sandiganbayan erred when:

1) . . . IT HELD THAT THE SUBJECT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE CONTAINED UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENTS IN A NARRATION OF FACTS.

2) . . . IT DID NOT CONSIDER PETITIONER’S VALID DEFENSE OF GOOD FAITH AND LACK OF INTENT TO COMMIT THE CRIMES IMPUTED.

3) . . . IT GAVE FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE SOLE WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION.22

In support of his assigned errors, Galeos argues that he did not make untruthful or false statements in his SALN since a "statement" requires a positive averment and thus silence or non-disclosure cannot be considered one. And even if they are considered statements, Galeos contends that they were not made in a "narration of facts" and the least they could be considered are "conclusions of law." He also argues that the prosecution failed to adduce any evidence to support the finding that he was aware of their relationship at the time of the execution of the SALN. With the presence of good faith, Galeos avers that the fourth element of the crime – the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person – is missing. He also faults the Sandiganbayan for its heavy reliance on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecution’s sole witness despite the fact that there are aspects in his testimony that do not inspire belief.

On the other hand, in G.R. Nos. 174845-52, Ong argues that the Sandiganbayan erred when:

(a)

. . . IT HELD THAT THE SUBJECT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE CONTAINED UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENTS IN A NARRATION OF FACTS.

(b)

IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 26181-26187, [IT HELD] THAT A PERSON MERELY

ADMINISTERING THE OATH IN A DOCUMENT IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF FALSIFICATION BY MAKING UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENTS IN A NARRATION OF FACTS.

(c)

. . . IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 26189, … IT INFER[R]ED, DESPITE THE COMPLETE ABSENCE OF ANY RELEVANT AND MATERIAL EVIDENCE, THAT RESPONDENT’S EXHIBIT "I" (OR PETITIONER’S EXHIBIT "8") REFERS TO OR SUPPORTS THE APPOINTMENT OF FEDERICO T. RIVERA.23

Ong similarly argues that the subject SALN do not contain any untruthful statements containing a narration of facts and that there was no wrongful intent of injuring a third person at the time of the execution of the documents. He contends that he cannot be held liable for falsification for merely administering the oath in a document since it is not among the legal obligations of an officer administering the oath to certify the truthfulness and/or veracity of the contents of the document. Neither can he be made liable for falsification regarding the letter-certification he issued since there was no evidence adduced that it was made to support Rivera’s appointment.

In the Joint Memorandum filed by the Ombudsman through the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Sandiganbayan, it was pointed out that Galeos categorically admitted during his testimony that before affixing his signature on the subject SALN, he carefully read its contents and the entries therein have been explained to him. Moreover, the admission made by Ong during the pre-trial under the joint stipulation of facts indicated no qualification at all that he became aware of his relationship with Galeos and Rivera only after the execution of the subject documents. The defense of lack of knowledge of a particular fact in issue, being a state of mind and therefore self-serving, it can be legally assumed that the admission of that particular fact without qualification reckons from the time the imputed act, to which the particular fact relates, was committed. As to mistaken reliance on the testimony of prosecution witness, the analysis and findings in the assailed decision do not show that such testimony was even taken into consideration in arriving at the conviction of petitioners.24

With respect to Ong’s liability as conspirator in the execution of the SALN containing untruthful statements, the Special Prosecutor argues that as a general rule, it is not the duty of the administering officer to ascertain the truth of the statements found in a document. The reason for this is that the administering officer has no way of knowing if the facts stated therein are indeed truthful. However, when the facts laid out in the document directly involves the administering officer, then he has an opportunity to know of their truth or falsity. When an administering officer nevertheless administers the oath despite the false contents of the document, which are known to him to be false, he is liable, not because he violated his duty as an administering officer, but because he participated in the falsification of a document.25

After a thorough review, we find the petitions unmeritorious.

Petitioners were charged with falsification of public document under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which states:

Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. — The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:

1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;

3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

x x x x (Emphasis and italics supplied.)

The elements of falsification in the above provision are as follows:

(a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

(b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and

(c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.26

In addition to the afore-cited elements, it must also be proven that the public officer or employee had taken advantage of his official position in making the falsification. In falsification of public document, the offender is considered to have taken advantage of his official position when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies.27 Likewise, in falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person because in the falsification of a public document, what is punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.28

Falsification of Public Documentby making untruthful statementsconcerning relatives in thegovernment service

All the elements of falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements have been established by the prosecution.

Petitioners argue that the statements "they are not related within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity" and "that Section 79 of the Local Government Code has been complied with in the issuance of the appointments" are not a narration of facts but a conclusion of law, as both require the application of the rules on relationship under the law of succession. Thus, they cite People v. Tugbang29 where it was held that "a statement expressing an erroneous conclusion of law cannot be considered a falsification." Likewise, in People v. Yanza,30 it was held that when defendant certified that she was eligible for the position, she practically wrote a conclusion of law, which turned out to be incorrect or erroneous; hence, she may not be declared guilty of falsification because the law violated pertains to narration of facts.

We disagree.

A conclusion of law is a determination by a judge or ruling authority regarding the law that applies in a particular case. It is opposed to a finding of fact, which interprets the factual circumstances to which the law is to be applied.31 A narration of facts is merely an account or description of the particulars of an event or occurrence.32 We have held that a certification by accused officials in the Statement of Time Elapsed and Work Accomplished qualifies as a narration of facts as contemplated under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, as it consisted not only of figures and numbers but also words were used therein giving an account of the status of the flood control project.33

In this case, the required disclosure or identification of relatives "within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity" in the SALN involves merely a description of such relationship; it does not call for an application of law in a particular set of facts. On the other hand, Articles 963 to 967 of the Civil Code simply explain the concept of proximity of relationship and what constitute direct and collateral lines in relation to the rules on succession. The question of whether or not persons are related to each other by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree is one of fact. Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, statements concerning relationship may be proved as to its truth or falsity, and thus do not amount to expression of opinion. When a government employee is required to disclose his relatives in the government service, such information elicited therefore qualifies as a narration of facts contemplated under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Further, it bears to stress that the untruthful statements on relationship have no relevance to the employee’s eligibility for the position but pertains rather to prohibition or restriction imposed by law on the appointing power.

Since petitioner Galeos answered "No" to the question in his 1993 SALN if he has relatives in the government service within the fourth degree of consanguinity, he made an untruthful statement therein as in fact he was related to Ong, who was then the municipal mayor, within the fourth degree of consanguinity, he and Ong being first cousins (their mothers are sisters). As to his 1994, 1995 and 1996 SALN, Galeos left in blank the boxes for the answer to the similar query. In Dela Cruz v. Mudlong,34 it was held that one is guilty of falsification in the accomplishment of his information and personal data sheet if he withholds material facts which would have affected the

approval of his appointment and/or promotion to a government position. By withholding information on his relative/s in the government service as required in the SALN, Galeos was guilty of falsification considering that the disclosure of such relationship with then Municipal Mayor Ong would have resulted in the disapproval of his permanent appointment pursuant to Article 168 (j) (Appointments), Rule XXII of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which provides:

No person shall be appointed in the local government career service if he is related within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to the appointing power or recommending authority.

Section 7 (e), Rule V of the Implementing Rules of Book V, Executive Order No. 292 otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, provides that the CSC shall disapprove the appointment of a person who "has been issued such appointment in violation of existing Civil Service Law, rules and regulations." Among the prohibited appointments enumerated in CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38, series of 1993 are appointments in the LGUs of persons who are related to the appointing or recommending authority within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity.35

The Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, series of 1998 dated December 14, 1998) contain a similar prohibition under Rule XIII, Section 9:

SEC. 9. No appointment in the national, provincial, city or municipal governments or any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations with original charters shall be made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office or of the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the word "relative" and the members of the family referred to are those related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.

In the local government career service, the prohibition extends to the relatives of the appointing or recommending authority, within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.

x x x x

The nepotism rule covers all kinds of appointments whether original, promotional, transfer and reemployment regardless of status including casuals and contractuals except consultants. (Emphasis supplied.)

The second element is likewise present. "Legal obligation" means that there is a law requiring the disclosure of the truth of the facts narrated.36 Permanent employees employed by local government units are required to file the following: (a) sworn

statement of assets, liabilities and net worth (SALN); (b) lists of relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity in government service; (c) financial and business interests; and (d) personal data sheets as required by law.37 A similar requirement is imposed by Section 8 (B) of Republic Act No. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, thus:

(B) Identification and disclosure of relatives38. – It shall be the duty of every public official or employee to identify and disclose to the best of his knowledge and information, his relatives in the Government in the form, manner and frequency prescribed by the Civil Service Commission.

Section 11 of the same law penalizes the violation of the above provision, either with imprisonment or fine, and, in the discretion of the court of competent jurisdiction, disqualification to hold public office. Such violation if proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall also be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him.

The evidence on record clearly showed that Galeos’ negative answer reflected in his SALN is absolutely false. During the trial, both Ong and Galeos admitted the fact that they are first cousins but denied having knowledge of such relationship at the time the subject documents were executed. The Sandiganbayan correctly rejected their defense of being unaware that they are related within the fourth degree of consanguinity. Given the Filipino cultural trait of valuing strong kinship and extended family ties, it was unlikely for Galeos who had been working for several years in the municipal government, not to have known of his close blood relation to Ong who was a prominent public figure having ran and won in the local elections four times (three terms as Mayor and as Vice-Mayor in the 1998 elections), after serving as OIC Mayor of the same municipality in 1986 until 1988.

The same thing can be said of Ong, whose unbelievable claim that he had no knowledge that a first cousin (Galeos) was working in the municipal government and appointed by him to a permanent position during his incumbency, was correctly disregarded by the Sandiganbayan. It was simply unthinkable that as a resident of Naga, Cebu since birth and a politician at that, he was all the time unaware that he himself appointed to permanent positions the son of his mother’s sister (Galeos) and the husband of his first cousin (Rivera). Indeed, the reality of local politics and Filipino culture renders his defense of good faith (lack of knowledge of their relationship) unavailing. Despite his knowledge of the falsity of the statement in the subject SALN, Ong still administered the oath to Galeos and Rivera who made the false statement under oath. The Sandiganbayan thus did not err in finding that Ong connived with Galeos and Rivera in making it appear in their SALN that they have no relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity/affinity in the government service.

Conspiracy need not be shown by direct proof of an agreement of the parties to commit the crime,39 as it can be inferred from the acts of the accused which clearly manifest a concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime.40 In this case, Ong

administered the oaths to Galeos and Rivera in the subject SALN not just once, but three times, a clear manifestation that he concurred with the making of the untruthful statement therein concerning relatives in the government service.

Falsification by makinguntruthful statementsin the Certification re:compliance with theprohibition on nepotism

As chief executive and the proper appointing authority, Ong is deemed to have issued the certification recommending to the CSC approval of Galeos’ appointment although he admitted only the authenticity and due execution of Exhibit "I". Since Ong was duty bound to observe the prohibition on nepotistic appointments, his certification stating compliance with Section 7941 of R.A. No. 7160 constitutes a solemn affirmation of the fact that the appointee is not related to him within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. Having executed the certification despite his knowledge that he and Rivera were related to each other within the fourth degree of affinity, as in fact Rivera was his cousin-in-law because the mother of Rivera’s wife is the sister of Ong’s mother, Ong was guilty of falsification of public document by making untruthful statement in a narration of facts. He also took advantage of his official position as the appointing authority who, under the Civil Service rules, is required to issue such certification.

The importance of the certification submitted to the CSC by the proper appointing authority in the local government unit, regarding compliance with the prohibition against nepotism under R.A. No. 7160 cannot be overemphasized. Under Section 67, Book V, Chapter 10 of the Administrative Code of 1987, a head of office or appointing official who issues an appointment or employs any person in violation of Civil Service Law and Rules or who commits fraud, deceit or intentional misrepresentation of material facts concerning other civil service matters, or anyone who violates, refuses or neglects to comply with any of such provisions or rules, may be held criminally liable. In Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy,42 we held that mere issuance of appointment in favor of a relative within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity is sufficient to constitute a violation of the law. Although herein petitioners were prosecuted for the criminal offense of falsification of public document, it becomes obvious that the requirement of disclosure of relationship to the appointing power in the local government units simply aims to ensure strict enforcement of the prohibition against nepotism.1avvphil

Relevant then is our pronouncement in Dacoycoy:

Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel. In Debulgado, we stressed that "[T]the basic purpose or objective of the prohibition against nepotism also strongly indicates that the prohibition was intended to be a comprehensive one." "The Court was unwilling to restrict and limit the scope of the prohibition which is textually very broad and comprehensive." If not within the exceptions, it is a form of corruption that must be nipped in the bud or abated whenever or wherever it raises its ugly head. As we said in an earlier case "what we need now is not only to punish the wrongdoers or reward the ‘outstanding’ civil servants, but also to

plug the hidden gaps and potholes of corruption as well as to insist on strict compliance with existing legal procedures in order to abate any occasion for graft or circumvention of the law."43 (Emphasis supplied.)

The prosecution having established with moral certainty the guilt of petitioners for falsification of public documents under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, we find no legal ground to reverse petitioners’ conviction.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Decision dated August 18, 2005 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 26181-26187 and 26189 is AFFIRMED.

With costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSupreme Court

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

NORMA DELOS REYES VDA.DEL PRADO, EULOGIA R.DEL PRADO, NORMITA R.DEL PRADO and RODELIAR. DEL PRADO,Petitioners,

-versus-

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondent.

G.R. No. 186030

Present:

CARPIO, J.,Chairperson,BRION,PEREZ,SERENO, andREYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

March 21, 2012

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

REYES, J.: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which

seeks to assail and set aside the following issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA) in the case docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 31225 and entitled Norma Delos Reyes Vda. Del Prado, Eulogia R. Del Prado, Normita R. Del Prado and Rodelia R. Del Prado v. People of the Philippines":

1) the Decision[1] dated September 15, 2008 affirming with modification the decision and order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38, Lingayen, Pangasinan in Criminal Case No. L-8015; and

2) the Resolution[2] dated January 6, 2009 denying the motion for

reconsideration of the Decision of September 15, 2008.

The Factual Antecedents

This petition stems from an Information for falsification under Article 172, in relation to Article 171(4), of the Revised Penal Code filed against herein petitioners Norma Delos Reyes Vda. Del Prado (Norma), Normita Del Prado (Normita), Eulogia Del Prado (Eulogia) and Rodelia[3] Del Prado (Rodelia) with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Lingayen, Pangasinan, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 19th day of July, 1991, in the [M]unicipality of Lingayen, [P]rovince of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously falsified, execute[d] and cause[d] the preparation of the DEED OF SUCCESSION, by stating and making it appear in said document that they were the only heirs of the late Rafael del Prado, when in truth and in fact, all the accused well knew, that Ma. Corazon Del Prado-Lim is also an heir who is entitled to inherit from the late Rafael Del Prado, and all the accused deliberately used the DEED OF SUCCESSION to claim ownership and possession of the land mentioned in the DEED OF SUCCESSION to the exclusion of the complainant Ma. Corazon Del Prado-Lim to her damage and prejudice.

Contrary to Art. 172 in relation to Art. 171, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[4]

Upon arraignment, the accused therein entered their plea of not guilty. After pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution claimed that Ma. Corazon Del Prado-Lim (Corazon), private complainant in the criminal case, was the daughter of the late Rafael Del Prado (Rafael) by his marriage to Daisy Cragin (Daisy). After Daisy died in 1956, the late Rafael married Norma with whom he had five children, namely: Rafael, Jr., Antonio, Eulogia,

Normita and Rodelia. The late Rafael died on July 12, 1978. On October 29, 1979, Corazon, as a daughter of the late Rafael, and Norma, as the late Rafaels surviving spouse and representative of their five minor children, executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of the Estate of Rafael Del Prado to cover the distribution of several properties owned by the late Rafael, including the parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-22848, measuring 17,624 square meters, more or less, and situated at Libsong, Lingayen, Pangasinan. Per agreement of the heirs, Corazon was to get a 3,000-square meter portion of the land covered by OCT No. P-22848. This right of Corazon was also affirmed in the Deed of Exchange dated October 15, 1982 and Confirmation of Subdivision which she executed with Norma. Corazon, however, later discovered that her right over the subject parcel of land was never registered by Norma, contrary to the latters undertaking. The petitioners instead executed on July 19, 1991 a Deed of Succession wherein they, together with Rafael, Jr. and Antonio, partitioned and adjudicated unto themselves the property covered by OCT No. P-22848, to the exclusion of Corazon. The deed was notarized by Loreto L. Fernando (Loreto), and provides in part:

WHEREAS, on the 12[th] day of July 1978, RAFAEL DEL PRADO[,] SR., died intestate in the City of Dagupan, leaving certain parcel of land, and more particularly described and bounded to wit:

ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. P-22848

A certain parcel of land (Lot No. 5518, Cad-373-D) Lingayen Cadastre, situated in Poblacion, Lingayen, Pangasinan, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE., by Lots Nos. 5522, 5515; and 6287; on the SE., by Lots Nos. 5516, 5517, 55 and Road; on the SW., by Road, and Lots Nos. 5521, 5510, and 5520; and on the NW., by Road; x x x containing an area of SEVENTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TWENTY-FOUR (17,624) Square Meters, more or less. Covered by Psd-307996 (LRC), consisting of two lots. Lot No. 5510-A and Lot 5518-B.

WHEREAS, the parties hereto are the only heirs of the decedent, the first name, is the surviving spouse and the rest are the children of the decedent; x x x

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the premises and invoking the provisions of Rule 74, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, the parties hereto do by these presents, agree to divide and partition the entire estate above[-]described and accordingly adjudicate, as they do hereby adjudicate the same among themselves, herein below specified to wit: x x x[5]

By virtue of the said Deed of Succession, OCT No. P-22848 was cancelled and several new titles were issued under the names of Corazons co-heirs. When Corazon discovered this, she filed a criminal complaint against now petitioners Norma, Eulogia, Normita and Rodelia. Antonio and Rafael, Jr. had both died before the filing of said complaint. Among the witnesses presented during the trial was Loreto, who confirmed that upon the request of Norma and Antonio, he prepared and notarized the deed of succession. He claimed that the petitioners appeared and signed the document before him. For their defense, the petitioners denied having signed the Deed of Succession, or having appeared before notary public Loreto. They also claimed that Corazon was not a daughter, but a niece, of the late Rafael. Norma claimed that she only later knew that a deed of succession was prepared by her son Antonio, although she admitted having executed a deed of real estate mortgage in favor of mortgagee Prudential Bank over portions of the subject parcel of land already covered by the new titles.

The Ruling of the MTC

The MTC rejected for being unsubstantiated the petitioners denial of any participation in the execution of the deed of succession, further noting that they benefited from the property after its transfer in their names. Thus, on August 9, 2006, the court rendered its decision[6] finding petitioners Norma, Eulogia, Normita and Rodelia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, sentencing them to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor as minimum to two years and four months and one day of prision correccional as maximum. They were also ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 each, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment of fine.

Considering the minority of Rodelia at the time of the commission of the crime, she was sentenced to suffer the penalty of four months of arresto mayor, plus payment of fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment.

All the petitioners were ordered to indemnify Corazon in the amount of P10,000.00 as attorneys fees, and to pay the costs of suit.

Unsatisfied with the MTCs ruling, the petitioners filed a motion for new trial on the grounds of alleged gross error of law, irregularities during the trial, and new and material evidence. To prove that they did not intend to exclude Corazon from the estate of the late Rafael, the petitioners cited their recognition of Corazons right to the estate in the deed of extra-judicial partition, confirmation of subdivision, deed of exchange, joint affidavit and petition for guardianship of minors Rafael, Jr., Eulogia, Antonio and Normita, which they had earlier executed.[7] Again, the petitioners denied having signed the deed of succession, and instead insisted that their signatures in the deed were forged.

The motion was denied by the MTC via a resolution[8] dated December 21, 2006, prompting the filing of an appeal with the RTC.

The Ruling of the RTC

On August 10, 2007, the RTC rendered its decision[9] affirming the MTCs decision, with modification in that the case against Rodelia was dismissed in view of her minority at the time of the commission of the crime. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan dated August 9, 2006 is hereby AFFIRMED, but modified as to accused Rodelia R. Del Prado as the case against her is hereby DISMISSED on account of her minority at the time of the commission of the offense. SO ORDERED.[10]

A motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit by the RTC via its resolution[11] dated October 31, 2007. Hence, Norma, Eulogia and Normita filed a petition for review with the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

On September 15, 2008, the CA rendered its decision[12] dismissing the petition and affirming the RTCs ruling, with modification as to the imposable penalty under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The appealed Decision dated August 10, 2007 and Order dated October 31, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Pangasinan, in Crim. Case No. L-8015 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that appellants Norma delos Reyes Vda. Del Prado, Eulogia R. Del Prado and Normita R. Del Prado are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of one (1) year and one (1) day of arresto

mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, as maximum. SO ORDERED.[13] The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the CA in

its resolution[14] dated January 6, 2009. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners appealed from the decision and resolution of the CA to this Court, through a petition for review on certiorari[15] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The Present Petition

The petitioners present the following assignment of errors to support their

petition: A. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT CLEARLY ERRED

IN FINDING THAT COMPLAINANT MA. CORAZON DEL PRADO-LIM WAS EXCLUDED AS AN HEIR OF THE LATE RAFAEL DEL PRADO.

B. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT CLEARLY

ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE FACT THAT IN SEVERAL DOCUMENTS/INSTRUMENTS EXECUTED BY THE PETITIONERS WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF COMPLAINANT MS. CORAZON DEL PRADO-LIM, SHE WAS SPECIFICALLY NAMED AS AN HEIR WITH CORRESPONDING SHARES/INHERITANCE IN THE ESTATE OF THE LATE RAFAEL DEL PRADO.

C. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT CLEARLY

ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE GOOD FAITH OF THE PETITIONERS WHICH NEGATES THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE OF FALSIFICATION ON THEIR PART.

D. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT CLEARLY

ERRED IN CONVICTING THE PETITIONERS WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE OF THE PETITIONERS NOT HAVING BEEN OVERCOME BY THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE.

E. WITH DUE RESPECT [THE LOWER COURT ERRED] IN NOT

HOLDING THAT THE CASE IS PURELY CIVIL ONE[,] NOT CRIMINAL.[16]

To support their assigned errors, the petitioners invoke the existence and contents of the several documents which they had presented before the MTC, including the deed of extrajudicial partition of the estate of Rafael Del Prado dated October 29, 1979, confirmation of subdivision, deed of exchange and petition in the guardianship proceedings for the minor Del Prado children filed by Norma, in which documents they claim to have indicated and confirmed that Corazon is also an heir of the late Rafael. Given these documents, the petitioners insist that they cannot be charged with falsification for having excluded Corazon as an heir of their decedent.

In sum, the issue for this Courts resolution is whether or not the CA erred in

affirming the petitioners conviction for falsification, notwithstanding the said petitioners defense that they never intended to exclude private complainant Corazon from the estate of the late Rafael.

This Courts Ruling

The petition is bound to fail. Only questions of law may be raised in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

First, the questions being raised by the petitioners refer to factual matters that are not proper subjects of a petition for review under Rule 45. Settled is the rule that in a petition for review under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised. It is not this Courts function to analyze or weigh all over again evidence already considered in the proceedings below, our jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the lower court. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect. A question of law which we may pass upon must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants.[17] This is clear under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, which provides:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency. (Emphasis supplied)

The distinction between a question of law and a question of fact is settled.

There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. Such a question does not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts or when the query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence, considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to one another and to the whole, and the probabilities of the situation.[18]

Contrary to these rules, the petitioners ask us to review the lower courts factual finding on Carmens exclusion in the subject deed of succession, to reconsider its contents and those of the other documentary evidence which they have submitted with the court a quo, all of which involve questions of fact rather than questions of law. In their assignment of errors, petitioners even fully question the factual basis for the courts finding of their guilt. However, as we have explained in Medina v. Asistio, Jr.:[19]

Petitioners allegation that the Court of Appeals grossly disregarded their Exhibits A, B, C, D and E, in effect, asks us to re-examine all the [evidence] already presented and evaluated as well as the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals. Thus, in Sotto v. Teves (86 SCRA 154 [1978]), [w]e held that the appreciation of evidence is within the domain of the Court of Appeals because its findings of fact are not reviewable by this Court (Manlapaz v. CA, 147 SCRA 236 [1987]; Knecht v. CA, 158 SCRA 80 [1988] and a long line of cases).

It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh such

evidence all over again. Our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower court. (Nicolas[,] et al., v. CA, 154 SCRA 635 [1987]; Tiongco v. de la Merced, 58 SCRA 89 [1974]).

There are recognized exceptions to this rule on questions of law as subjects of petitions for review, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures, (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible, (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion, (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts, (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting, (6) when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee, (7) when the CAs findings are contrary to those by the trial court, (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based, (9) when the acts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the

respondent, (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record, or (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[20] After a consideration of the petitioners arguments, this Court holds that the present appeal does not fall under any of these exceptions. There can be no good faith on the part of the petitioners since they knew of the untruthful character of statements contained in their deed of succession.

Even granting that the present petition may be admitted, we find no cogent reason to reverse the CA decision appealed from, considering that the elements of the crime of falsification under Art. 171, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Art. 172 thereof, were duly proved during the proceedings below. Said elements are as follows:

(a) The offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a

narration of facts;(b) The offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts

narrated by him; and(c) The facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false.[21]

These elements are based on the provisions of Art. 172, in relation to Art. 171,

par. 4, of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:

Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or

ecclesiastical minister. The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:

x x x 4. Making untruthful statements in narration of facts; x x x Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of

falsified documents. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000 pesos shall

be imposed upon: 1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the

falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document; and

2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.

x x x

The material document claimed to be falsified in this case is the Deed of Succession dated July 19, 1991, the presentation of which before the Register of Deeds and other government agencies allowed the cancellation of OCT No. P-22848, and the issuance of several new titles in its stead. The first and third elements were committed by the inclusion in the subject deed of the clause that states, (w)hereas, the parties hereto are the only heirs of the decedent, the first name, is the surviving spouse and the rest are the children of the decedent.[22] The untruthfulness of said statement is clear from the several other documents upon which, ironically, the petitioners anchor their defense, such as the deed of extrajudicial partition dated October 29, 1979, the parties confirmation of subdivision, deed of exchange and Normas petition for guardianship of her then minor children. Specifically mentioned in these documents is the fact that Corazon is also a daughter, thus an heir, of the late Rafael.

The obligation of the petitioners to speak only the truth in their deed of

succession is clear, taking into account the very nature of the document falsified. The deed, which was transformed into a public document upon acknowledgement before a notary public, required only truthful statements from the petitioners. It was a legal requirement to effect the cancellation of the original certificate of title and the issuance of new titles by the Register of Deeds. The false statement made in the deed greatly affected the indefeasibility normally accorded to titles over properties brought under the coverage of land registration, to the injury of Corazon who was deprived of her right as a landowner, and the clear prejudice of third persons who would rely on the land titles issued on the basis of the deed.

We cannot subscribe to the petitioners claim of good faith because several

documents prove that they knew of the untruthful character of their statement in the deed of succession. The petitioners alleged good faith is disputed by their prior confirmation and recognition of Corazons right as an heir, because despite knowledge of said fact, they included in the deed a statement to the contrary. The wrongful intent to injure Corazon is clear from their execution of the deed, showing a desire to appropriate only unto themselves the subject parcel of land. Corazon was unduly deprived of what was due her not only under the provisions of the law on succession, but also under

contracts that she had previously executed with the petitioners. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is

hereby DENIED. The Decision dated September 15, 2008 and Resolution dated January 6, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31225 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYESAssociate Justice WE CONCUR:

SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

GINA A. DOMINGO,

Petitioner,

- versus -

G.R. No. 186101

Present:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA, and

PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:

October 12, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

This is an appeal from the Decision26 dated November 24, 2008 of the Court

of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31158 entitled People of the Philippines v. Gina

A. Domingo, which affirmed the Decision27 dated May 21, 2007 in Criminal Case

Nos. Q-98-75971-87 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 80 in Quezon City.

The RTC convicted petitioner Gina Domingo (petitioner) of 17 counts of Estafa

through Falsification of Commercial Document.

The Facts

Private complainant, Remedios D. Perez (Remedios), is a businesswoman

and a valued depositor of the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), Aurora

Boulevard branch. Petitioner, on the other hand, is a dentist who had a clinic in

Remedios compound.

Being the wife of the best friend of Remedios son, petitioner had a close

relationship with Remedios and her family.

On June 15, 1995, Remedios accompanied petitioner to BPI because the

latter wanted to open an account therein. Remedios then introduced petitioner to

the banks staff and officers. Soon thereafter, petitioner frequented Remedios

office and volunteered to deposit her checks in her bank account at BPI.

Sometime in October 1996, Remedios wanted to buy a car thinking that she

already had a substantial amount in her account. Thus, she went to BPI to

withdraw two hundred thousand pesos (PhP 200,000). To her surprise, however,

2627

she found out that her money had already been withdrawn. The withdrawals

were effected through 18 encashment slips bearing her forged signatures

reaching the amount of eight hundred thirty-eight thousand pesos (PhP 838,000).

She denied having affixed her signatures on the encashment slips used.

Testimonies showed that on several occasions beginning September 18,

1995 until October 18, 1996, petitioner presented a number of encashment slips

of various amounts to BPI, and by virtue of which she was able to withdraw huge

amounts of money from the checking account of the complainant. She deposited

the bigger portion of these amounts to her own account and pocketed some of

them, while also paying the rest to Skycable. The transactions were processed by

four tellers of BPI, namely: Regina Ramos, Mary Antonette Pozon, Sheila Ferranco,

and Kim Rillo who verified the signatures of the complainant on the questioned

encashment slips.

As synthesized by the trial court, the transactions are as follows:

Date of encashment slip

Amount withdrawn

via encashment

slip

Amount deposited to

accuseds account

Amount paid to Skycable

(PS) or Pocketed (Po) by the accused

Name of Teller who processed the transaction

1. Sept. 8, 1995 P10,000.00 P8,000.00 P2,000.00 (Po) Regina Ramos2. Sept. 18, 1995 30,000.00 20,000.00 10,000.00 (Po)3. Feb. 12, 1996 30,000.00 28,550.00 1,450.00 (PS) Shiela Ferranco4. Feb. 15, 1996 20,000.00 20,000.00 none Mary Antonette

Pozon5. March 21, 1996 40,000.00 30,000.00 10,000.00 (Po) Shiela Ferranco6. April 8, 1996 40,000.00 35,000.00 5,000.00 (Po) Regina Ramos7. April 10, 1996 30,000.00 30,000.00 none Shiela Ferranco8. April 29, 1996 40,000.00 34,500.00 5,500.00 (Po) Regina Ramos

9. May 13, 1996 40,000.00 38,550.00 1,450.00 (PS) Shiela Ferranco10. May 24, 1996 50,000.00 50,000.00 none Mary Antonette

Pozon11. June 7, 1996 40,000.00 40,000.00 none Shiela Ferranco12. June 26, 1996 45,000.00 45,000.00 none Shiela Ferranco13. July 5, 1996 25,000.00 25,000.00 none Mary Antonette

Pozon14. July 17, 1996 40,000.00 40,000.00 none Mary Antonette

Pozon15. Aug. 5, 1996 50,000.00 48,550.00 1,450.00 (PS) Shiela Ferranco16. Sept. 17, 1996 35,000.00 35,000.00 none Shiela Ferranco17. Oct. 4, 1996 40,000.00 40,000.00 none Kim P. Rillo18. Oct. 18, 1996 40,000.00 40,000.00 none Kim P. Rillo

After having been apprised of the illegal transactions of petitioner on

complainants account, the latter complained to the bank for allowing the

withdrawal of the money with the use of falsified encashment slips and

demanded that the amount illegally withdrawn be returned. She was required by

BPI to submit checks bearing her genuine signature for examination by the

Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory. After examination, Josefina

dela Cruz of the PNP Crime Laboratory came up with a finding that complainants

signatures on the questioned encashment slips had been forged. Only then did

the bank agree to pay her the amount of PhP 645,000 representing a portion of

the amount illegally withdrawn with the use of the forged encashment slips.

In her defense, petitioner testified that she is a dentist, practicing her

profession in her house at No. 21, Alvarez Street, Cubao, Quezon City. She further

stated that she knew Remedios as the owner of the house that she and her

husband were renting at No. 3 New Jersey Street, New Manila, Quezon City. She

declared that she never used Perez as an alias or nickname and that the

signatures appearing on the questioned encashment slips were not hers.

Petitioner, however, admitted that she was once a depositor of BPI Aurora

Boulevard branch, having opened an account in said bank sometime in June 1995.

She had been maintaining said account until she was arrested in 1998. She used

to frequent the bank three times a week or as the need arose for her bank

transactions, for which reason, she and the bank tellers had become familiar with

each other. She knows that, like her, Remedios was also a depositor of BPI Aurora

Boulevard branch, but there was no occasion that they met each other in the

bank.

Remedios and BPI filed a complaint before the prosecutors office.

The Information in Criminal Case No. Q-98-75971 reads as follows:

That on or about the 18th day of October 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, a private individual, by means of false pretenses and/or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud and by means of falsification of commercial document did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Remedios D. Perez and/or the Bank of the Philippine Islands represented in the following manner, to wit: said accused falsified or caused to be falsified an encashment slip of Bank of the Philippine Islands dated October 18, 1996 for P40,000.00, Philippine Currency, by then and there filling up said encashment slip and signing the name of one Remedios D. Perez, a depositor of said bank under Account No.

3155-0572-61, thereby making it appear, as it did appear that said encashment slip is genuine in all respect, when in truth and in fact said accused well knew that Remedios D. Perez never signed the said encashment slip; that once said encashment slip was forged and falsified in the manner set forth, accused pretending to be the said Remedios D. Perez used it to withdraw the aforesaid sum of P40,000.00 from the latters account, and once, in possession of the said amount of money misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW.28

The allegations in the Information in Criminal Case Nos. Q-98-75972-87 are

all substantially the same as those in Criminal Case No. Q-98-75971, except for

the dates of the commission of the crime or dates of the BPI encashment slips and

the amounts involved, to wit:

Criminal Case No. Date of the commission of Amount Involvedthe crime/encashment slip

1. Q-98-75972 October 4, 1996 P40,000.002. Q-98-75973 September 4, 1996 35,000.003. Q-98-75974 August 5, 1996 50,000.004. Q-98-75975 July 17, 1996 40,000.005. Q-98-75976 July 5, 1996 25,000.006. Q-98-75977 June 26, 1996 45,000.007. Q-98-75978 June 7, 1996 40,000.008. Q-98-75979 May 24, 1996 50,000.00

9. Q-98-75980 May 13, 1996 40,000.0010. Q-98-75981 April 29, 1996 40,000.0011. Q-98-75982 April 10, 1996 30,000.0012. Q-98-75983 April 8, 1996 40,000.0013. Q-98-75984 March 21, 1996 40,000.0014. Q-98-75985 February 15, 1996 20,000.00

28

15. Q-98-75986 February 12, 1996 30,000.00

16. Q-98-75987 September 18, 1995 30,000.0029

Upon motion by the prosecution, the 17 cases were consolidated and tried

jointly by the trial court. When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty to each of

the crimes charged in the 17 Informations. Trial on the merits ensued with the

prosecution presenting seven witnesses, namely: Remedios; Arturo Amores,

General Manager of BPI, Aurora Blvd. Branch; Regina Ramos, Mary Antonette

Pozon, Sheila Ferranco, and Kim P. Rillo, all bank tellers of BPI, Aurora Blvd.

Branch; and Josefina Dela Cruz, a Document Examiner III of the PNP Crime

Laboratory. On the part of the defense, it presented petitioner herself and

Carmelita Tanajora, petitioners house helper.

Ruling of the Trial Court

On May 21, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of

which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, joint judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged in Criminal [Case] Nos. Q-98-75971; Q-98-75972; Q-98-75973; Q-98-75974; Q-98-75975; Q-98-75976; Q-98-75977; Q-98-75978; Q-98-75979; Q-98-75980; Q-98-75981; Q-98-75982; Q-98-75983; Q-98-75984; Q-98-75985; Q-98-75986 and Q-98-75987. Accordingly, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment, as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75971 Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision] correccional to Seven (7) Years and Twenty One (21) Days of prision mayor;

29



4. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75974 Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision] correccional to Eight (8) Years and Twenty One (21) Days of prision mayor;


6. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75976 Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision] correccional to Six (6) Years and Twenty One (21) Days of prision mayor;











17. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-7598[7] Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision] correccional to Six (6) Years and Twenty One (21) Days of prision mayor;

Further, the accused is hereby ordered to pay BPI and/or Remedios Perez the total sum of Six Hundred Thirty Five Thousand Pesos (P635,000.00), as civil indemnity, plus six percent (6%) interest per annum from the time of the filing of these cases, until fully paid.

The bond posted by the accused for her provisional liberty is hereby canceled.

SO ORDERED.30

Ruling of the Appellate Court

On appeal, the CA, in its Decision dated November 24, 2008, disposed of

the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the challenged Joint Decision of the Court a quo is AFFIRMED in toto.

30

SO ORDERED.31

The CA held that petitioner was the one who authored the crimes of which

she was convicted reasoning that she was the only person who stood to be

benefited by the falsification of the document in question; thus, the presumption

that she is the material author of the falsification is present.

Moreover, petitioners theory that the crimes committed were perpetrated

by the bank tellers or is an inside job cannot be sustained because of the lack of

any evidence showing that the tellers harbored any ill motive against her. The CA

emphasized that the defense of denial, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing

evidence, is negative and self-serving and merits no weight in law; it cannot be

given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who

testified on affirmative matter.

On March 4, 2009, petitioner filed a timely appeal before this Court.

The Issues

Petitioner interposes in the present appeal the following assignment of

errors:

31

I

ERROR IN THE APPRECIATION OF THE EVIDENCE, DOCUMENTARY AND TESTIMONIAL, WERE COMMITTED BY THE LOWER COURT IN THE PROMULGATION AND ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT DECISION;

II

ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW, SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL, WERE COMMITTED IN THE PROMULGATION OF THE SUBJECT DECISION.

Our Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

Substantially, the issues raised boil down to the question of whether or not

the evidence adduced by the prosecution is sufficient to establish the guilt of

petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.

Elements of Falsification of Commercial Documents are Present

Petitioner contends that the decision of the lower court is not supported by

the evidence on record and that this evidence cannot sustain in law the

requirements of proof beyond reasonable doubt for the crime for which she was

charged.

Specifically, petitioner claims that, as a matter of policy, the bank personnel

verified the signature cards of private complainant Remedios before any

encashment can be drawn against the account of Remedios. Thus, petitioner

contends that the signatures in the encashment slips are genuine as found by the

staff and manager of BPI and that the cases filed against her are the products of

inside jobs. Further, she argues that the results of the examinations conducted by

Josefina dela Cruz of the PNP Crime Laboratory lack evidentiary value, since the

report only stated that the signatures on the Encashment/Withdrawal Slips were

different from the genuine signatures of Remedios based on the checks, which

contained the genuine signatures of Remedios, but did not state that the

signatures belong to petitioner.

The contentions are flawed.

Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) punishes any private individual

who commits any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Art. 171 of the Code in

any public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of

commercial document. The acts of falsification enumerated in Art. 171 are:

Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:

1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric;

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact participate;

3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;5. Altering true dates;6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which

changes its meaning;7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy

of an original document when no such original exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or

8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry or official book. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Essentially, the elements of the crime of Falsification of Commercial

Document under Art. 172 are: (1) that the offender is a private individual; (2) that

the offender committed any of the acts of falsification; and (3) that the act of

falsification is committed in a commercial document.

As borne by the records, all the elements of the crime are present in the

instant case. Petitioner is a private individual who presented to the tellers of BPI

17 forged encashment slips on different dates and of various amounts. The

questioned encashment slips were falsified by petitioner by filling out the same

and signing the name of the private complainant, thereby making it appear that

Remedios signed the encashment slips and that they are genuine in all respects,

when in fact petitioner knew very well that Remedios never signed the subject

encashment slips.

In her testimony, Remedios categorically denied having filled out and

signed any of the subject encashment slips on the dates indicated on them. Her

testimony is further strengthened by the testimonies of the bank manager and

the bank tellers, who facilitated the banking transactions carried out by petitioner

with their branch. Their testimonies were coherent and consistent in narrating

that it was indeed petitioner who presented the encashment slips, received the

proceeds of the transactions, and/or caused the transfer of the money to her own

bank account.

Moreover, the testimony of Josefina dela Cruz (dela Cruz) bolsters the

findings of the trial court that the alleged signatures of Remedios in the

encashment slips are forged, to wit:

Q: Using the method you employed in the examination of questioned and standard signatures of Remedios Perez, will you please elaborate the study you made?

A: After conducting the examination, I reduced my examination to writing and my findings are as follows:

Scientific comparative examination and analysis of the questioned documents and the submitted standard signature reveals significant divergences in handwriting movement, stroke structure and other individual handwriting characteristics.

Q: You mentioned divergences in handwriting movement, will you please point to this Honorable Court this significant divergences of differences in the strokes of handwriting?

A: First of all the manner of execution. The manner of execution is slow while in the execution of the standard, it is moderate. The line quality in the questioned signature, there is presence of tremors in the strokes while in the standard signatures, all the strokes are smooth. In the capital R in the questioned signature, there is presence of re-trace strokes while in the standard signature, there is no re-trace strokes. In the downward portion of the letter R in the questioned signature, the direction is downward while in the standard it is horizontal. Now the angular strokes

following the capital R is traced in the middle part of the letter R, the downward portion while in the standard, it is found in the last stroke of capital R. In the middle name letter D, the shape is more rounded on the questioned signature but in the standard it is more elongated. In the loop of the family name, it is more rounded in questioned signature[;] while in the standard, it is more elongated. With that, I was able to conclude that the questioned signatures Remedios D. Perez marked Q-1 to Q-36 standard signatures of Remedios Perez marked S-1 to S-27 inclusive were not written by one and the same person.32

Typically, such inconspicuous divergences noted by dela Cruz on the

questioned signatures could not be easily detected by untrained eyes or by one

who had no formal training in handwriting examination; thus, resort to the

opinion of an expert is imperative. This explains why the bank tellers who

processed the illegal transactions entered into by the petitioner on the account of

Remedios failed to notice the forgery or falsification. As a result, they allowed the

encashment by petitioner. The training or skill, if any, of the tellers in detecting

forgeries is usually minimal or inadequate and their opinion is generally

unreliable. It was, therefore, prudent on the part of the bank to seek the opinion

of an expert to determine the genuineness of the signatures in the encashment

slips.

As found by the trial court, the totality of the testimonies of Remedios, dela

Cruz, the handwriting expert, and the bank tellers bears the earmarks of truth

that the questioned encashment slips had been falsified by petitioner and that

they were presented to the bank in order to defraud the bank or holder of the

account.

32

Additionally, the Court has held that in gauging the relative weight to be

given to the opinion of handwriting experts, the following standards are adhered

to:

We have held that the value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer. The test of genuineness ought to be the resemblance, not the formation of letters in some other specimens but to the general character of writing, which is impressed on it as the involuntary and unconscious result of constitution, habit or other permanent course, and is, therefore itself permanent.33

Moreover, it cannot be said that since none of the prosecution witnesses

saw the falsification actually done by petitioner, she cannot be held liable. The

bank tellers who processed the illegal transactions of petitioner involving the

account of Remedios were consistent in their testimonies that it was petitioner

herself who presented the encashment slips and received the proceeds of the

slips. In such a situation, the applicable rule is that if a person has in his

possession a falsified document and he made use of it, taking advantage of it and

profiting from it, the presumption is that he is the material author of the

falsification.34 In the instant case, petitioner has failed to overthrow the

presumption.

3334

Furthermore, contrary to petitioners assertions, the questioned

encashment slips are commercial documents. Commercial documents are, in

general, documents or instruments which are used by merchants or businessmen

to promote or facilitate trade.35 An encashment slip necessarily facilitates bank

transactions for it allows the person whose name and signature appears thereon

to encash a check and withdraw the amount indicated therein.

Even more, petitioner would have this Court believe that the crime of

falsification of a commercial document did not exist because Remedios and BPI

did not suffer any damage. Such argument is specious. It has been ruled that

damage or intent to cause damage is not an element in falsification of a

commercial document, because what the law seeks to repress is the prejudice to

the public confidence in such documents.36

Therefore, the acts of petitioner clearly satisfy all the essential elements of

the crime of Falsification of Commercial Document.

Crime of Falsification was a Necessary Means to Commit Estafa

It has been held that whenever a person carries out on a public, official, or

commercial document any of the acts enumerated in Art. 171 of the RPC as a

3536

necessary means to perpetrate another crime, such as estafa or malversation, a

complex crime is formed by the two crimes.37

Under Art. 48 of the RPC, a complex crime refers to: (1) the commission of

at least two grave or less grave felonies that must both (or all) be the result of a

single act; or (2) one offense must be a necessary means for committing the other

(or others).

The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a

means of committing estafa, because before the falsified document is actually

utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been

consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the

crime of falsification of public, official, or commercial document. In other words,

the crime of falsification has already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public,

official, or commercial document to defraud another is estafa. But the damage is

caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document.

Therefore, the falsification of the public, official, or commercial document is only

a necessary means to commit estafa.38

In general, the elements of estafa are: (1) that the accused defrauded

another (a) by abuse of confidence or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) that damage

or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or

3738

third person. Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by

words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that

which should have been disclosed; and which deceives or is intended to deceive

another so that he shall act upon it, to his legal injury.

In the case before us, all the elements of estafa are present. Once

petitioner acquired the possession of the amounts she encashed by means of

deceit, she misappropriated, misapplied, and converted the same to her own

personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the private complainant

and BPI.

Without a doubt, the falsification of the encashment slips was necessary

means to commit estafa. At that time, the offense of falsification is already

considered consummated even before the falsified document is used to defraud

another.

Therefore, the trial court aptly convicted petitioner for the complex crime

of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Document.

Defense of Denial Is Untenable

It is a hornbook doctrine that the defense of denial, unsubstantiated by

clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving, and merits no weight

in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of

credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.39

39

In the instant case, petitioners defense of denial crumbles in the face of the

positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses during trial. As

enunciated by this Court, [p]ositive identification where categorical and

consistent and not attended by any showing of ill motive on the part of the

eyewitnesses on the matter prevails over alibi and denial.40 The defense has

miserably failed to show any evidence of ill motive on the part of the prosecution

witnesses as to falsely testify against her.

Thus, between the categorical statements of the prosecution witnesses, on

the one hand, and bare denials of the accused, on the other hand, the former

must, perforce, prevail.41

We accord the trial courts findings the probative weight it deserves in the

absence of any compelling reason to discredit its findings. It is a fundamental

judicial dictum that the findings of fact of the trial court are not disturbed on

appeal, except when it overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or

circumstances of weight and substance that would have materially affected the

outcome of the case. We find that the trial court did not err in convicting

petitioner of the crime of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Document.

4041

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for failure to sufficiently show

reversible error in the assailed decision. The Decision dated November 24, 2008

of the CA in CA-G.R. CR No. 31158 is AFFIRMED.

No costs.


FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 164443 June 18, 2010

ERIBERTO S. MASANGKAY, Petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Every criminal conviction must draw its strength from the prosecution’s evidence. The evidence must be such that the constitutional presumption of innocence is overthrown and guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecutorial burden is not met when the circumstances can yield to different inferences. Such equivocation betrays a lack of moral certainty to support a judgment of conviction.

This Petition for Review1 assails the March 16, 2004 Decision2 and the July 9, 2004 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 25775. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Eriberto Masangkay is instead meted the penalty of imprisonment for a term of Six (6) months and One (1) day of prision correccional minimum.

SO ORDERED.4

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner Eriberto Masangkay (Eriberto), his common-law wife Magdalena Ricaros (Magdalena), Cesar Masangkay (Cesar) and his wife Elizabeth Masangkay (Elizabeth), and Eric Dullano were the incorporators and directors of Megatel Factors, Inc. (MFI) which was incorporated in June 1990.5

On December 29, 1993 Eriberto filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a Petition for the Involuntary Dissolution6 of MFI for violation of Section 6 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 902-A. The named respondents were MFI, Cesar and Elizabeth.7 The said petition was made under oath before a notary public, and alleged among others:

3. At or around September 1, 1993, respondent Elizabeth A. Masangkay prepared or caused to be prepared a Secretary’s Certificate which states:

That at a special meeting of the Board of Directors of the said corporation held at its principal office on December 5, 1992, the following resolution by unanimous votes of the directors present at said meeting and constituting a quorum was approved and adopted:

RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved that Lot No. 2069-A-2 situated at Bo. Canlalay, Biñan, Laguna containing an area of 3,014 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-210746 be exchanged with 3,700 shares of stock of the corporation worth or valued at P370,000.00 by way of a "Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct".

x x x x

4. Said secretary’s certificate is absolutely fictitious and simulated because the alleged

meeting of the Board of Directors held on December 5, 1992 did not actually materialize.

x x x x

5. Using the said falsified and spurious document, x x x respondents executed another fictitious document known as the "Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct".

The contract purporting to be a transfer of 3,700 shares of stock of MFI in return for a piece of a land (Lot No. 2064-A-2) located at Canlalay, Biñan, Laguna and owned by minor child Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay is void.

Article 1409 of the New Civil Code states:

"Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning.

x x x x

(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;

(3) Those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the transaction;

x x x x

These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived."

The aforementioned contract is indeed simulated and fictitious because they defrauded minor child Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay and deprived him of his own property without any consideration at all.

Records of the MFI revealed that minor child Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay [or] his alleged guardian Magdalena S. Ricaros never became a stockholder at any point in time of MFI.

x x x x8

The case remains pending to date.9

Claiming that Eriberto lied under oath when he said that there was no meeting of the Board held on December 5, 1992 and that the Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct is a fictitious instrument, the respondent in the SEC case, Cesar, filed a complaint for perjury10 against Eriberto before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal.

Eriberto raised the defense of primary jurisdiction. He argued that what is involved is

primarily an intra-corporate controversy; hence, jurisdiction lies with the SEC pursuant to Section 6 of PD 902-A, as amended by PD No. 1758. He also insisted that there was a prejudicial question because the truth of the allegations contained in his petition for involuntary dissolution has yet to be determined by the SEC. These defenses were sustained by the assistant provincial prosecutor and the complaint for perjury was dismissed for lack of merit.11

It was however reinstated upon petition for review12 before the Department of Justice.13

Chief State Prosecutor Zenon L. De Guia held that the petition for involuntary dissolution is an administrative case only and thus cannot possibly constitute a prejudicial question to the criminal case. He also rejected the claim that the SEC has exclusive authority over the case. The Chief State Prosecutor explained that the prosecution and enforcement department of the SEC has jurisdiction only over criminal and civil cases involving a violation of a law, rule, or regulation that is administered and enforced by the SEC. Perjury, penalized under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), is not within the SEC’s authority.14 Thus, he ordered the conduct of a preliminary investigation, which eventually resulted in the filing of the following information:

That sometime in the month of December 1992,15 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of perjury in his Petition for Involuntary Dissolution of Megatel Factors, Inc. based on violation of Section 6 of Presidential Decree 902-A against Megatel Factors, Inc., Cesar Masangkay, Jr. and Elizabeth Masangkay which he made under oath before a notary authorized to receive and administer oath and filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, wherein he made willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood on a material matter when he declared the following, to wit: a) the secretary certificate dated September 1, 1993, proposed by Elizabeth Masangkay is fictitious and simulated because the alleged December 5, 1992, meeting never took place; and, b) the Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct is a fictitious document, whereby the respondents defrauded the minor child Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay, by exchanging the child’s 3,014 square meters lot with 3, 700 shares of stock of the corporation, when in fact no consideration for the transfer was made as Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay or his guardian Magdalena Ricaros has never been a stockholder of the Corporation at any point in time, when in truth and in fact the accused well knew that the same statements he made in his petition and which he reaffirmed and made use as part of his evidence in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are false.16

The information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 56495 and raffled to the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City, Branch 59.

Eriberto filed a motion to quash,17 insisting that it is the SEC which has primary jurisdiction over the case. He also argued that the truth of the allegations contained in the information is still pending resolution in SEC Case No. 12-93-4650, thereby constituting a prejudicial question to the perjury case.

The MeTC denied the motion to quash for lack of merit.18 It held that the fact that the parties to the criminal case are mostly stockholders of the same corporation does not automatically make the case an intra-corporate dispute that is within the SEC jurisdiction. It likewise held that the fact that the parties are stockholders is merely incidental and that the subject of the case is a criminal act and hence within the general jurisdiction of the MeTC. As regards the issue of prejudicial question, the MeTC ruled that the petition before the SEC has nothing to do with the criminal case. The truth of the statements for which he is being indicted is a matter of defense which the defendant may raise in the criminal case.

Eriberto filed a petition for certiorari before Branch 158 of the Pasig City Regional Trial Court (RTC) to assail the denial of his motion to quash. The denial was affirmed.19 He then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which was denied for being a wrong mode of appeal.20

Failing to suspend the criminal proceedings, Eriberto entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment.21 He then waived the conduct of a pre-trial conference.22

During trial, the prosecution presented the private complainant Cesar as its sole witness.23 He testified that on December 5, 1992, a meeting of the Board of Directors was held at 9:00 o’clock in the morning at the office of MFI in Canlalay, Biñan, Laguna. He presented the minutes of the alleged meeting and reiterated the details contained therein indicating that the Board unanimously approved Magdalena’s proposal to exchange her son’s (Gilberto Masangkay [Gilberto]) property with MFI shares of stock.24

The prosecution established that one of the signatures appearing in the minutes belongs to Eriberto.25 This allegedly belies Eriberto’s statement that the December 5, 1992 meeting "did not actually materialize," and shows that he knew his statement to be false because he had attended the meeting and signed the minutes thereof. The prosecution also pointed out that in the proceedings before the guardianship court to obtain approval for the exchange of properties, Eriberto had testified in support of the exchange.26 The guardianship court subsequently approved the proposed transaction.27

The resulting Deed of Exchange contained Eriberto’s signature as first party.28

As for Eriberto’s statement that the Deed of Exchange was simulated, the prosecution disputed this by again using the minutes of the December 5, 1992 meeting, which states that the property of Gilberto will be exchanged for 3,700 MFI shares.

For his defense, Eriberto asserted that the December 5, 1992 meeting did not actually take place. While he admitted signing, reading and understanding the minutes of the alleged meeting, he explained that the minutes were only brought by Cesar and Elizabeth to his house for signing, but there was no actual meeting.29

To support the claim that no meeting took place in 1992, the defense presented Elizabeth, the MFI corporate secretary, who could not remember with certainty if she had sent out any notice for the December 5, 1992 meeting and could not produce any copy thereof.

The defense also presented a notice of meeting dated October 19, 1993, which called for the MFI board’s initial meeting "since its business operations started," to be held on November 9, 1993. Emphasizing the words "initial meeting," Eriberto argued that this proves that prior to November 9, 1993, no meeting (including the December 5, 1992 meeting) had ever taken place.

As for the charge that he perjured himself when he stated that the Deed of Exchange was fictitious and simulated for lack of consideration, Eriberto explained that MFI never issued stock certificates in favor of his son Gilberto. Corporate secretary Elizabeth corroborated this statement and admitted that stock certificates were never issued to Gilberto or any of the stockholders.30

While he admitted supporting the proposed exchange and seeking its approval by the guardianship court, Eriberto maintained that he did so because he was convinced by private complainant Cesar that the exchange would benefit his son Gilberto. He however reiterated that, to date, Gilberto is not a stockholder of MFI, thus has not received any consideration for the exchange.

On rebuttal, the prosecution refuted Eriberto’s claim that the board had its first actual meeting only on November 9, 1993. It explained that the November 9, 1993 meeting was the initial meeting "since business operations began", because MFI obtained permit to conduct business only in 1993. But the November 9, 1993 meeting was not the first meeting ever held by the board of directors. The prosecution presented the secretary’s certificates of board meetings held on April 6, 199231 and September 5, 199232 -- both before November 9, 1993 and both signed by Eriberto.33 At this time, business operations have not yet begun because the company’s hotel building was still under construction. The said secretary’s certificates in fact show that MFI was still sourcing additional funds for the construction of its hotel.34

Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court

On October 18, 2000, the MeTC rendered a judgment35 holding that the prosecution was able to prove that the December 5, 1992 meeting actually took place and that petitioner attended the same as evidenced by his signature in the minutes thereof. As for Eriberto’s statement that the Deed of Exchange was "fictitious," the MeTC held that his participation in the approval and execution of the document, as well as his avowals before the guardianship court regarding the proposed exchange all militate against his previous statement. Petitioner was thus found guilty as charged and sentenced to imprisonment of two months of arresto mayor minimum and medium, as minimum, to one year and one day of arresto mayor maximum and prison correccional minimum, as maximum.36

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Eriberto appealed37 his conviction to the RTC of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213, which eventually affirmed the appealed judgment.38 The fallo of the Decision states that:

WHEREFORE, the decision of October 18, 2000 by Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 59, Mandaluyong City, convicting the accused-appellant Eriberto S. Masangkay of the crime of perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.39

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA affirmed the appealed ruling of the trial courts, holding that the prosecution was able to prove that the falsehoods in the petition for involuntary dissolution were deliberately made. It explained that Eriberto’s signatures on the two allegedly fictitious documents show that he participated in the execution of the Deed of Exchange and was present in the December 5, 1992 meeting. Having participated in these two matters, Eriberto knew that these were not simulated and fictitious, as he claimed in his verified petition for involuntary dissolution of MFI. Thus, he deliberately lied in his petition.40

The CA rejected petitioner’s argument that the two statements were not material. It ruled that they were material because petitioner even cited them as principal basis for his petition for involuntary dissolution.41

The appellate court found no merit in the issue of prejudicial question. It held that the result of the petition for involuntary dissolution will not be determinative of the criminal case, which can be resolved independently.42

The CA however, corrected the imposed penalty on the ground that the trial court was imprecise in its application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The CA meted the penalty of imprisonment for a term of six months and one day of prision correccional minimum.43

Petitioner moved for reconsideration44 which was denied.45

Hence, this petition.46

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for review:

I

Whether there was deliberate assertion of falsehood

II

Whether the TRUTHFUL allegation in the petition for involuntary dissolution that there was no meeting is material to the petition

III

Whether perjury could prosper while the main case remains pending47

Since this is a case involving a conviction in a criminal case, the issues boil down to whether the prosecution was able to prove the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Our Ruling

We rule that the prosecution failed to prove the crime of perjury beyond reasonable doubt.

Article 183 of the RPC provides:

False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. – The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires.

Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of the falsehoods mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of this section, shall suffer the respective penalties provided therein.

For perjury to exist, (1) there must be a sworn statement that is required by law; (2) it must be made under oath before a competent officer; (3) the statement contains a deliberate assertion of falsehood; and (4) the false declaration is with regard to a material matter.48

The presence of the first two elements is not disputed by the petitioner and they are indeed present in the instant case. The sworn statements which contained the alleged falsehoods in this case were submitted in support of the petition for involuntary dissolution, as required by Sections 105 and 121 of the Corporation Code.1avvphi1

The petition was also verified by the petitioner before a notary public49—an officer duly authorized by law to administer oaths. This verification was done in compliance with Section 121 of the Corporation Code.50

It is the elements of deliberate falsehood and materiality of the false statements to the petition for involuntary dissolution which are contested.

On the element of materiality, a material matter is the main fact which is the subject of the inquiry or any fact or circumstance which tends to prove that fact, or any fact or circumstance which tends to corroborate or strengthen the testimony relative to the

subject of inquiry, or which legitimately affects the credit of any witness who testifies.51

Petitioner filed a petition for involuntary dissolution of MFI based on Section 105 of the Corporate Code, which states:

Section 105. Withdrawal of stockholder or dissolution of corporation. – In addition and without prejudice to the other rights and remedies available to a stockholder under this Title, any stockholder of a close corporation may, for any reason, compel the said corporation to purchase his shares at their fair value, which shall not be less than their par or issued value, when the corporation has sufficient assets in his books to cover its debts and liabilities exclusive of capital stock: Provided, That any stockholder of a close corporation may, by written petition to the Securities and Exchange Commission, compel the dissolution of such corporation whenever any of the acts of the directors, officers or those in control of the corporation is illegal, or fraudulent, or dishonest, or oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to the corporation or any stockholder, or whenever corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted.

He stated in his petition for involuntary dissolution that:

x x x x

4. Said secretary’s certificate is absolutely fictitious and simulated, because the alleged meeting of the Board of Directors held on December 5, 1992 did not actually materialize.

x x x x

5. Using the said falsified and spurious document, x x x respondents executed another fictitious document known as the Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct.

x x x x


x x x x

8. The foregoing acts and deeds of the respondents, done in evident bad faith and in conspiracy with one another, are seriously fraudulent and illegal because they constitute estafa through falsification of documents, punishable under Articles 315 and 171 of the Revised Penal Code.

9. Likewise, said acts and deeds are feloniously prejudicial to the stockholders of MFI, including petitioner, as corporate assets are being misapplied and wasted.

10. MFI should therefore be ordered dissolved after appropriate proceedings before this Honorable Commission, in accordance with Sections 105 and 121 of the New Corporation Code x x x.52

The statements for which the petitioner is tried for perjury are the very grounds he relied upon in his petition for corporate dissolution. They refer to acts of the MFI directors which are allegedly fraudulent, illegal and prejudicial, and which would allegedly justify corporate dissolution under Section 105 of the Corporation Code. Evidently, these statements are material to his petition for involuntary dissolution. The element of materiality is therefore present.

The prosecution, however, failed to prove the element of deliberate falsehood.

The prosecution has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt the falsehood of petitioner’s statement that the December 5, 1992 meeting "did not actually materialize." In other words, the prosecution has to establish that the said meeting in fact took place, i.e., that the directors were actually and physically present in one place at the same time and conferred with each other.

To discharge this burden, the prosecution relied mainly on the minutes of the alleged December 5, 1992 meeting, signed by the accused, which are inconsistent with his statement that the December 5, 1992 meeting did not actually materialize. According to the minutes, a meeting actually took place. On the other hand, according to the petitioner’s statement in the petition for dissolution, the meeting did not actually materialize or take place. The two statements are obviously contradictory or inconsistent with each other. But the mere contradiction or inconsistency between the two statements merely means that one of them is false. It cannot tell us which of the two statements is actually false. The minutes could be true and the sworn statement false. But it is equally possible that the minutes are false and the sworn statement is true, as explained by the petitioner who testified that the minutes were simply brought to his house for signature, but no meeting actually transpired. Given the alternative possibilities, it is the prosecution’s burden to affirmatively prove beyond reasonable doubt that the first statement (the minutes) is the true one, while the other statement (in the petition for dissolution) is the false one.

We have held before that a conviction for perjury cannot be obtained by the prosecution by merely showing the inconsistent or contradictory statements of the accused, even if both statements are sworn. The prosecution must additionally prove which of the two statements is false and must show the statement to be false by evidence other than the contradictory statement.53 The rationale for requiring evidence other than a contradictory statement is explained thus:

x x x Proof that accused has given contradictory testimony under oath at a different time will not be sufficient to establish the falsity of his testimony charged as perjury, for this would leave simply one oath of the defendant as against another, and it would not appear that the testimony charged was false rather than the testimony contradictory

thereof. The two statements will simply neutralize each other; there must be some corroboration of the contradictory testimony. Such corroboration, however, may be furnished by evidence aliunde tending to show perjury independently of the declarations of testimony of the accused.54

In this case, however, the prosecution was unable to prove, by convincing evidence other than the minutes, that the December 5, 1992 meeting actually took place. It merely presented, aside from the minutes, the testimony of private complainant Cesar, who is a respondent in the corporate dissolution case filed by the petitioner and is therefore not a neutral or disinterested witness.55 The prosecution did not present the testimony of the other directors or participants in the alleged meeting who could have testified that the meeting actually occurred. Neither did the prosecution offer any explanation why such testimony was not presented. It likewise failed to present any evidence that might circumstantially prove that on December 5, 1992, the directors were physically gathered at a single place, and there conferred with each other and came up with certain resolutions. Notably, the prosecution failed to present the notice for the alleged meeting. The corporate secretary, Elizabeth, who was presented by the petitioner, could not even remember whether she had sent out a prior notice to the directors for the alleged December 5, 1992 meeting. The lack of certainty as to the sending of a notice raises serious doubt as to whether a meeting actually took place, for how could the directors have been gathered for a meeting if they had not been clearly notified that such a meeting would be taking place?

The insufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence is particularly glaring considering that the petitioner had already explained the presence of his signature in the minutes of the meeting. He testified that while the meeting did not actually take place, the minutes were brought to his house for his signature. He affixed his signature thereto because he believed that the proposed exchange of the assets, which was the subject of the minutes, would be beneficial to his child, Gilberto. Acting on this belief, he also supported the approval of the exchange by the guardianship court.

Under these circumstances, we cannot say with moral certainty that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the December 5, 1992 meeting actually took place and that the petitioner’s statement denying the same was a deliberate falsehood.

The second statement in the petition for involuntary dissolution claimed to be perjurious reads:

5. Using the said falsified and spurious document, respondents executed another fictitious document known as the Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct.

The contract purporting to be a transfer of 3,700 shares of stock of MFI in return for a piece of land (Lot No. 2064-A-2) located at Canlalay, Biñan, Laguna and owned by minor child Gilberto Masangkay is void.

Article 1409 of the New Civil Code states:

Article 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:

x x x x

(2) those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;

(3) those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the transaction;

x x x x

These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived.


Records of the MFI revealed that minor child Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay [or] his alleged guardian Magdalena S. Ricaros never became a stockholder at any point in time of MFI.

In short, the petitioner is being charged with deliberate falsehood for his statement that the deed of exchange is fictitious. To support the accusation, the prosecution proved that petitioner assented to the said Deed of Exchange by virtue of his signatures in the minutes of the alleged December 5, 1992 meeting and on the instrument itself, and his participation in procuring the guardianship court’s approval of the transaction. These allegedly show that the exchange was not fictitious and that Eriberto knew it.

We cannot agree with this line of reasoning. Petitioner’s imputation of fictitiousness to the Deed of Exchange should not be taken out of context. He explained in paragraph 5 of his petition for involuntary dissolution that the Deed of Exchange is simulated and fictitious pursuant to Article 1409 of the Civil Code, because it deprived Gilberto Masangkay of his property without any consideration at all. To justify his allegation that Gilberto did not receive anything for the exchange, he stated in the same paragraph that Gilberto never became a stockholder of MFI (MFI stocks were supposed to be the consideration for Gilberto’s land). This fact was subsequently proven by the petitioner through the corporate secretary Elizabeth, who admitted that MFI never issued stocks in favor of the stockholders. This testimony was never explained or rebutted by the prosecution. Thus, petitioner’s statement that the exchange was "simulated and fictitious x x x because they x x x deprived [Gilberto] of his own property without any consideration at all" cannot be considered a deliberate falsehood. It is simply his characterization of the transaction, based on the fact that Gilberto did not receive consideration for the exchange of his land.

As importantly, petitioner’s statements in paragraph 5 of the petition for involuntary dissolution about the nature of the Deed of Exchange are conclusions of law, and not factual statements which are susceptible of truth or falsity. They are his opinion regarding the legal character of the Deed of Exchange. He opined that the Deed of Exchange was fictitious or simulated under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, because MFI supposedly did not perform its reciprocal obligation to issue stocks to Gilberto in exchange for his land. His opinion or legal conclusion may have been wrong (as failure of consideration does not make a contract simulated or fictitious),56 but it is an opinion or legal conclusion nevertheless. An opinion or a judgment cannot be taken as an intentional false statement of facts.57

We recognize that perjury strikes at the very administration of the laws; that it is the policy of the law that judicial proceedings and judgments shall be fair and free from fraud; that litigants and parties be encouraged to tell the truth, and that they be punished if they do not.58 However, it is also at the heart of every criminal proceeding that every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Given the foregoing findings, there is no more need to discuss the issue involving the propriety of proceeding with the perjury case while the civil case for corporate dissolution is pending.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed March 16, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. GR No. 25775 and its July 9, 2004 Resolution, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Eriberto S. Masangkay is ACQUITTED of the charge of perjury on the ground of REASONABLE DOUBT.

SO ORDERED.

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