Régimepoldel'UE

8/3/2019 Rgimepoldel'UE

1/70

EUSL2010

POLITICAL THEORIES AND REGIMES OF THE EU

Tom Delreux

INTRODUCTIONTO EUROPEANINTEGRATIONTHEORIES

1. What is European integration theories?

Theories: allow to make sense, give meaning and order to observations. They give a framework; pure factual

data are not enough to make sense. The aim of a theory is to understand, analyze and then critically assess what

you observe in the reality. Of course they are many ways to look at the same phenomenon

In the case of the EU, there is not only one framework: not 1 theory, right or wrong, but different

perspectives each emphasizing different points.

European integration: classical definition from Haas, 1958: a process whereby political actors in several

distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a newcenter, whose institutions process or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.

a process: dynamic not static

distinct national settings: member states

loyalties, expectations and political activities: European integration is not only a shifting ofcompetences, but also of broader aspects (=loyalties).

a new center: EU (and its predecessors)

institutions: European Commission, Parliament, Council all EU institutions can regulate inthe member states, they take bounding decisions.

The development of the European integration theories is closely connected to the development of the political

and historical situation.

2. Why study European integration theories?

It helps to:

- Understand how the EU works, whats happening. Understanding current situations reflecting on the

future.- Analyze: facts are not sufficient.

- Pose normative questions: assess European integration in a critical way.

3. Development of European integration theories and development of the EU

The development of theories is very closely connected with the development of the EU itself. Throughout the

development of the EU, it is possible to determine 3 stages, but they have fuzzy frontiers, not very delimited.

All these theories try to assess the EU. It is also possible to study 3 broad components:

Polity: umbrella word to define the political nature of the system.

Policy: measures created by the EU, the outcome of the EU.

Politics: decision-making process, before the policies.

1


2/70

1950-1982

Understanding the EU

Evolution in theories:

Dominant question in thoriesis Why do sovereign states

create the EU?

European integration as a

dependant variable

Evolution in the European integration:

- 1950s-1960s: ECSC / Treaty ofRome

- 1970s: empty chair crisis no new

question triggered

Theories initiated:

- Federalism: established duringWWII to avoid WWII again,

necessity to get rid of nationalism and

fascism build a European

federation.

Federalism is not really a theory in

term of mechanism, it is more an

idealism.

- Neofunctionalism: thinks EU has

been established by the member

states because of the benefits for

them : spill-over effect of one area to

the others (opposed tointergovernmentalism)

- Intergovernmentalism: the member

states drive the EU integration. EU

is not a supranational organization :

integration process seen as the result

of hard bargaining.

- Aim of those theories : understanding

1982-mid 90s

Analyzing the EU


Exploring the nature of thebeast: what is the EU?

Evol ution in the European integration :

Change: 1992: Single European Act-SEA + idea to create the Common

market with freedom of goods, capital

and men.

Theories initiated:

- Liberal intergovernmentalism :member states drive the EU

integration + they act on the bases of

national interest, each member state

acts according to its own values,

interests, preferences

- New institutionalism: a collection of

3 theories: rational choice,

sociological and historical theories

to understand the EU, necessity to

look at the institutions.

- Social constructivism: ideas matter.

The EU is what you make of it.

- Multi-level governance :

Vertical level: EU = supranational /

national / regional

Horizontal level: not only public

actors, also private (NGO, firms)

multi-level refers to the vertical

(supranational, and regional)

dimension, governance to the

horizontal dimension : the political

institutions but also the privateactors taking part in the integration

2


3/70

process Policy networks

- Policy networks: networks built

within the EU.

- Aim of those theories : analyzing

mid 90s-today Normative questions


How to evaluate the EU and

the European integration?

European integration as an

independent variable.

Evolution in the European integration:

Question of enlargement and

constitutionalization Lisbon Treaty

Theories initiated:

- Europeanization: all the theories

before analyze the EU integration as

a bottom-up process. This theory

looks at the top-down perspective:

how the EU can influence member

states.

- Critical political economy: criticizing

capitalism in the common market, :

criticizes the capitalist fundaments of

the EU clear normative element:

emphasize the need of a more social

construct.

3


4/70

A CRASHCOURSEONHISTORICALAND EU INSTITUTIONS

1. Deepening and widening: 1950s-now

2 dimensions in EU:

Deepening

The Assumption that national states decide to establish a supranational policy level and not only a cooperation

between states. The EU becomes stronger.

The process:

- Always goes together with the transfer of competence

- Unanimity requirement

- Parliament gets stronger

It is based on treaties and treaty amendments to amend treaties:

- IGCs = Intergovernmental conferences

- Unanimity requirement

- National ratification requirement

- 2002: Convention on the future of Europe: broadening the participation and the agenda lower influence of

national interest.

Widening

The EU enlarges, increases the number of member states.

The process:

- Candidate addresses membership request

- EU decides to launch accession negotiations

- Negotiations on the basis of chapters (exceptions, etc.)

- Since 1993: the Copenhagen criteria for membership:

o Political set: democracy, rule of law, Human rights, minority rights

o Economical set: liberalized market economy

o Implementation of the acquis communautaire

- Approval in the EU + ratification by each member state separately

Development of these 2 dimensions

- 1952: ECSC Treaty basis of the 1950 Schuman Declaration:Le gouvernement franais propose de

placer l'ensemble de la production franco- allemande de charbon et d'acier sous une Haute Autorit

commune, dans une organisation ouverte la participation des autres pays d'Europe.

o high authority = deepening

o organization open to the participation = widening

Motives of Schuman:

o Peace idealism by a Franco-German reconciliation.

o Economic: France wants to assure the accession to German coal.

o Diplomatic: France wants to take the initiative in Europe.

Significance:

o Avoidance of a new Franco-German war

o Supranational principles

o Institutional framework as the basis for further integration

4


5/70

- 1952 : 6 countries

- 1952: European Defense Community = EDC Treaty: the idea, from France, is to bring defense of European

countries under a supranational authority. It failed in the French Assemble Nationale, because at the time,

there are less threat outside Europe (end of the Korean war) what is the use of EDC? EDC never really

existed.

- 1957: Treaty of Rome : 3 entities are established: ECSC, Euratom, EEC, with a communitarian institutional

structure:

o Supranational Commission/High Authority

o Council of Ministers

o Common Parliament and Assembly

- 1965-1967: Merger Treaty : Mergence of the institutions of EEC, Euratom and ECSC.

- 1973 : 9 member states (+ UK, Ireland, Denmark economical logic mainly).

- 1986: SEA (= biggest deepening step since Rome in 1957):

o Internal market by the end of 1992 hence the need of a lot of piece of legislation necessity of

majority voting

o Beginning of qualified majority voting = QMV, instead of unanimity

o More power to the Parliament (directly elected since 1979)

- 1981-1986 : from 9 to 10 (+ Greece, 1981) and from 10 to 12 (+ Spain and Portugal, 1986): in the 1970s,

those countries shift from right-authoritarian regimes to democracy integration = stabilizing those countries

into democracy.

- 1992: Maastricht Treaty :

- 1992 : Treaty of Maastricht : most important step in the deepening of the European Union: the negotiations

leading to this treaty, negociations on a political union and a monetary union results :

Strengthening of the supranational structure (European parliament gets more influence, qualified

majority voting, competences transferred from the MS to the EU)

EU Treaty and the EC Treaty

Three pillar structure : EC, Euratom, and ECSC characterized by the so-called communitarian method ;

CFSP (common foreign and security policy) and PJCC (police, judicial and criminal cooperation)

which are driven by the MS.

above those three pillars, the EU

- 1995 : from 12 to 15 : Sweden, Finland and Austria. Before, they had adopted a neutral position after the

fall of the Berlin wall, not useful to remain neutral. Were in the European economic area, but nothing to say in

the negotiations decided to join.

- 1995 : Treaty of Amsterdam = a failure for the EU.- 2001 : Treaty of Nice : purpose was to prepare the EU institutionally for the foreseen 2004 enlargement to the

central & east Europe countries but = failure.

- 2002-2004 convention and constitutional Treaty

Laeken Declaration : many questions asked % structure of the EU & its future.

Convention established but not in the framework of an intergovernmental conference succeeded to

get a result : a draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.

Followed the formal intergovernmental conference agreed on the major part of the text.

Constitutional Treaty (October 2004).

Had to be approved by all parliaments in the MS : referenda in France & the Netherlands led to a no

5


6/70

blocage.

2004 : from 15 to 25

2007 + Bulgaria and Romania

2009 : Treaty of Lisbon : not so many differences % dead constitutional Treaty :

main dynamics kept :

o New double majority in the council

o Permanent president of the European council

o High representative for foreign affairs and security policy who is also vice-president of the

Commission

o Number of MEPs limited to 751

o Larger role for national parliaments (yellow card on subsidiarity : if they are benefits of

scale to act at European level EU can adopt legislations ; but sometimes better to act at

local, national level)

o Legal personality for the EU

o exit clause

o ordinary legislative procedure (codecision) in more policy areas equal powers given to

the EP and the council

Changes :

o Terminology : Constitution

o References to some symbols

o Charter of fundamental rights : no full text, but reference

o No reference to free competition as EU objective

European institutions

European Council Heads of State and government

Permanent president

Intergovernmental conferences

Since Lisbon = formal institution

Determines the general strategies of the EU, that have to be implemented

Economic and Social Committee

6


7/70

Advisory body : cant take binding decisions

Consulting the interests of the socio-economic sectors in the decision-making

Little verve : many people that belong to that committee are at the end of their career not very

dynamic

lobbying

Committee of the Regions Advisory body

Consulting the interests of the regions in the decision-making process

Very distinct composition : MS can decide the people they send to that committee

Diverging interests impact not very relevant

European Court of Justice

Has to solve the disputes between EU institutions mutually or between EU institutions and MS

guardian of the Treaties

Treaty interpretations

Has only powers in the first communitarian pillar

European Court of auditors Tests the accounts against the budget

Division of powers Supranational institutions = Commissions & Parliament

Legislative power = Council & Parliament

Executive power = Commission & Council

Commission

Composed of 27 members but they are not supposed to represent the State they come from representatives of

the common European interests. Each of the Commissioners is responsible for a certain policy area.

Who decides on the composition of the European Commission?

After the European elections in the MS, the European council proposes a president for the Commission, who isnominated by the EP the president of the Commission starts to compose the Commission by going to each

MS and asking who they propose as Commissioner for their country his role is to make a puzzle, build a team

the Commissioners are heard by the EP has to agree the whole team. Tension : Commissioners shouldnt

defend their State interests but if he wants to be designated again has to serve those interests a bit.

Functions

Exclusive agenda-setting on former first pillar issues right on initiative

Implementation EU legislation, on the field

Guardian of the Treaties defend common European interests examines the respect by the MS of

the obligations < Treaties

External representation on EU competences voice of the EU

7


8/70

Political role

Collegial decision-making

Important role of the Commission president

Each Commissioner has his own cabinet

Administrative role of the Commission

Line services : directorate-general = ministries under the authority of one Commissioner

Council of Ministers

Composed of 27 members, one per member States but this time = representatives of the interests and preferences

of their MS in the EU structure.De iure, there is only one Council of ministers; de facto, sectorial councils : forthe moment, there are 10 : on general affairs, foreign affairs, competitiveness, justice and home affairs,

agriculture & fisheries, economic and financial affairs, environment

Treaty : the only condition is that the participants to the Council are ministers

Federal states can be represented by ministers from federated entities system established in Belgium toassure Belgian representation at European level & rotation of the ministers of the federated entities :

system of agregation of preferences : federal, Flemish, Walloon and Brussels position have to be

reconciliated

Decision-making process : unanimity veto powers belong to each MS far more conservative, encourages

statut-quo, or qualified majority voting reformist perspective.

How is QMV defined at European level ? All MS are attributed a certain number of vote, which is the result of

political negociations biggest countries get more votes, but system isnt really proportional favorites the

small MS. Then qualified majority is reached if

255 of the 345 votes are got

+ a normal majority of the member States (14/27)

+ those member States must represent 62% of the European population

But

Luxumbourg compromise : vital national interest veto possible even in the QMV system but rare.

Loanina compromise : striving for more than 255 larger majority required, the MS try to get more

8


9/70

votes gentlemens agreement

In reality striving for consensus

Lisbon Treaty has reformed the QMV :

55% of the member States (unweighted)

65% of the European population

Three complications / additional conditions :

Qualified majority : minimally 15 member States

Blocking minority : minimally 4 member States

Loanina compromise

Presidency of the council of min isters :Six-monthly and rotating among the MS (now till December : Belgium)

mediating the council

agenda-shaping (>< high:

high-Representative!)

Council = top of the iceberg. Level of the ministers. Meet every semester, month...

-Below: ambassadors: COREPER (Comit des Reprsentants Permanents) I (administrative questions) & II

(foreign policy etc) : also try to prepare the meetings of their ministers. After political debate: A points

(ministers dont need political discussion/guidance anymore) and B points (still need political discussion).-Below: civil servants: 200-250 council working groups (meet on a weekly basis in Brussels): prepare decisions

of the ministers, daily technical debates. 70% of the decisions.

Legitimacy:

* = Spokesperson of the nation interests: mandated by the MS, formally!* dont decide alone formally: final formal decisions = ministers, but as A points!

Table: Change places each time closer to the presidency seat + presence of the commission during the council

9


10/70

meetings (logical: commission presents propositions so can answer questions) + Council secretariat (assists the

rotating presidency: institutional memory

European ParliamentNumber of seats of this assembly is divided by MS. Only matters before the elections, because after, the

laureates # Representatives of their country but of their political groups (i.e. of the interests of the European

citizens).Belgium : 24 seats (4 times less than Germany even if 8 times less Belgians than Germans!)

After European elections: the number of seats per political group depends on the election result:

Political groups in the EP # parties.

(ex) EPP = a lot of nation parties!!

2.1 : Commission isnt based on a majority in the EP

2.2 : MEPs # bound to stable majorities that would keep the commission alive (majorities vary from dossier to

dossier)

Legislative process

10


11/70

Ordinary legislative procedure, used for 90% of the Legislation (Treaty of Lisbon)

Commission: exclusive power to initiate the procedure (1 exception: initiative of the citizens) Plmt

(amendments possible) Council (amendments possible) Plmt:

agrees over the text by the Council adoption

wants to change the text Commission (reconsider his text following opinions of Plmt)

Council:

agrees with changes: adoption

doesnt agree: everything re-starts in the end: re-sent to council + Plmt (have to agree both: co-

Legislators) adoption

This system didnt exist before 86 (SEA).

Between 86-2009 (Treaty of Lisbon), this procedure was extended to more and more areas power of the Plmt

didnt stop rising now, veto power!

Conclusion % legislation making:

-commission = initiation-Council + Plmt = co-Legislators

The 3 institutions are interdependent. Institutional trianglethe 3 institutions = really intertwined!

11


12/70

CHA PTER ONE :FEDERALISM

1. ORIGINS

Federalism as a peace project, not as real theory: no clear-cut academic school of European federalism.

Throughout the 20th century: concern to end war (political holy grail)

WWI = decline of the European state system and demise of the balance of power: in the end 1860s-1870s,the consolidation of the German nation challenged the 19th century European order, the Concert of Europe,

by being a direct challenge to the balance of power mechanism 2 tendencies:

o Necessity of reordering the European states: state-centric

o Nation-state = ultimate dorm of human governance: liberal-idealist

Liberalists = founders of modern RI: conflict was not endemic to international politics, the systemicanarchy could be replaced alternative = collective security, achieved by:

o The progressive spread of liberal values (democracy, justice)

o The progressive spread of liberal processes (commerce)o The establishment of international organizations and bodies of international laws

Inter-war period : shaping of a European idea: significant activism on the boundary of the intellectual andthe political:

Richard Coudenhove-KalergiPan-Europa, 1923: vision of a united Europe underwritten by a federalconstitution. This vision is motivated by 2 perceptions:

o Positive side: the feeling that Europe was in many ways a natural entity that could become

significant global force.

Negative assertion: unless substantial changes occurred in the political organization of Europe,

the continent would tear itself apart in nationalistic internecine conflict. The post-Versailles

order might have eradicated empires aggrandizing tendencies, but the system that replaced

empires was one with potentially problematic national units, often internally incoherent.

His suggestions was an economic integration will precede political integration (the second will

follow quasi automatically)

Aristide Briand, Memorandum on the Organization of a Regime of European Federal Union, 1930 = 1st

20th century proposal of a European government for European unity (but received with skepticism and

quickly overwhelmed by events).

But in the inter-war period, these kinds of books were written in the context of a more pamphleteeringculture than ours.

What is interesting is that the theme of European unity had moved squarely onto the intellectual and politicalagendas emergence of a sort of relationship between these intellectual schemes and the actions of certain

politicians.

Altiero Spinelli (1941) THE real founder of this theory : Altiero Spinelli: politician prisoner during

WW2: document written in Mussolini prison the Ventotene manifesto (on cigarette paper!!). Very anti-

fascist. His Idea: nationalism will tear apart (dchirer, dtruire) Europe on the international level! Only way

to get rid of that in a stable and permanent way = new political structure: European federation.

One of the two big EP buildings = called after his name

Pro-federalism group in the European Parliament = spinelli group.

12


13/70

After WWII : idea that the state system and the attendant problem of the relationship between nationalistsentiments and international conflict gave rise to Nazism in Germany the German question and the need

to attend to the historic tension between France and Germany possibility to secure an alliance?

Cold War: necessity to ensure Germanys future with the Western alliance.

Federalism:

Big role for Europe in global politics

Fear of nationalism

Economical integration > political integration

France-Germany axis

2. WHATISFEDERALISM

a) Definition

Elements of definition:

Constitutional structure polity where authority is shared between 2 or more levels ofgovernments.

Division of authority between central and regional or state government: Taylor, 1993 TheFederalist integration process requires the establishing of 2 levels of government separate but

coordinate being the government of the whole, the federal level, and the government of the parts, thestate or local level.

Necessity of compromises: permanent agreements between territorial units.

Territorial units:

o Yield a measure of authority to common, centralized institutions,

o Remain intact as units,

o Retain at least a measure of autonomy.

The magic formula = optimum mixture of unity and diversity, allowing the constituent units to perform

common tasks with maximum efficiency while maximizing decentralization and autonomy ensure

constitutional government in plural liberal democratic societies.

Federalism = ideology

Federation = the derivative organizational principle.

2 tendencies in federalism:

Disunitycentrifugal federalism: Belgium, UK de-centralist federalism

Unitycentripetal federalism: USA, EU centralist federalism

The existence of those tendencies explain why this ideology has become such an elastic and controversial

concept.

For some, the doctrine of subsidiarity (article 3b of the TEU) = form of federalism.

Problem: no core prescription about the division of powers.

Federalists: statehood = either a desirable or inevitable mode

b) The objectives of federalism

Murray Forsyth: 3 strands in federalist theory:

o Derived from the ideas associated with Kant: an expanding federation is the most appropriate

13


14/70

constitutional safeguard against war.

o Ensuring efficient governance within the democratic framework so that authority is supplied as

closely as possible to the people.

o The scholarly contemplation of federalizing tendencies and processes: analyzing background

conditions and the social movements that induce federal outcomes.

Charles Pentland: 2 key starting points:

o Sociological: progress and peace emerges from the interaction of peoples

o Constitutional: harmony and stability flow from enlightened constitutional design.

Both have the same destination: a clearly defined supranational state.

Federalism as a peace project, not a real theory

2 advantages of federalism:

o The prevention of the capture of a system by any one group;

o Strengthening of the federated state as a unit in the face of external threat.

Shortcomings of

nationalismObjectives of federalism

People and nations are

put against each other,

which undermines

chance of peace

Shift from national to European level

But not everything should be unified Unity in diversity

The symbols of the UnionThe flag of the Union shall be a circle of twelve golden stars on a blue background.

The anthem of the Union shall be based on the Ode to Joy from the Ninth Symphony byLudwig van Beethoven.

The motto of the Union shall be: United in diversity.The currency of the Union shall be the euro.

Europe day shall be celebrated on 9 May throughout the Union.

(article I-8, Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe)

Clearly defined division of power/competences: contract

Shared rule and self rule

Tendency to lead to

totalitarian regime

Higher democratic level

Link between European citizen and federal level: formal and legal, Federalism has

more democratic fundaments than nationalism Federalists insist that European union should be brought about by the European

populations, and not by diplomats, by directly electing a European constituent assembly, andby the approval through a referendum, of the constitution that this assembly would prepare.

(Spinelli, Ventotene Manifesto, 1941)

Critical junctures

c) The method of federalism

Federalism involves achieving the appropriate balances between:

Different levels of authority

Democracy and efficiency

To achieve the optimum mixture of unit autonomy and overarching harmony common objectives. The pursuit

of these objectives must be constitutionalized rather than left to traditional diplomatic devices; it cannot be

achieved through either individual unit action or the construction of international alliances.

How:

14


15/70

Democratic radicalism: federation should be an act of constitutional immediacy.o Aim: European constitution with a broad public support

o But: failure of EDC & the Treaty establishing a Constitution for the EU in 2004 & 2005.

Gradual integration: Jean Monnet develops a step by step approach of European integration. incremental, pragmatic approach : economic integration will lead to political integration // spill over effect

o Federalism as a popular movement to create a impetus for a federal pact among political elites. In

this sense, federalists = activists, consciousness-raisers.

o Incremental approach

o Economical integration will lead to political integration political economy of integration:

economic forces and processes generate political transformation

o Predominance ofpopular willin this approach

o Exploitation of crisis situations as moments for the widespread propagation of federalist ideas

(Hence a resemblance with neofunctionalism, because of the strategic dexterity used)

o Carl Friedrich, 1968: Federalism = an evolving pattern of changing relationships, rather than a

static design regulated by firm and unalterable rules emphasis on the question of the function of a federal

relationship over the question of its structure.

o In this approach, necessity to question:

The nature of relations between states before the federalization;

The powers allocated to the components once the process begins;

If unification is an even process, and if certain actors are more implicated in the

beginning;

The functions of a system once the process is complete.

Normative approach = neofunctionalism: spillover

In all those approaches: primacy of the political: sociological change is not sufficient; institutions matter,

either as human creations or as advocates shaping mass ideational change in favor of federation.

3. CRITICISMS

Conceptual vagueness/elasticity : Federalism can be useful to a variety of political projects, and therefore isdifficult to conceptualize: what would a federal Europe look like?

o Member states like US states/German Lnder?

o Differentiated integration? It might lead to an EU where the depth of integration varies

considerably from one state to another.

o Europe of the regions? The rigidity of national territorial barriers would wither away; 2 primary

levels of governance = regional an European.

o Clearly defined competences and autonomy, with constitutional principles delimitated, to protect

the rights of member-states.

A federal Europe is not by definition a pacifist Europe

o Federalism as conflict management system

o Risk of superstate, making the same mistakes: since the normal outcome of federalism is a state-

like entity, theres a risk of reproducing or even exacerbating nationalism, with the emergence of a global systemof superstates.

15


16/70

o Risk of European nationalism

Democratic level of a federal Europe?

o Concentrating significant elements of governing capacities at the European level creates an

increasing gap between citizens and supranational level

o 1940s-2000s: increasing degree of legitimacy in nation states

Feasibility

o Wrong assessment of preparedness of European citizens

o Wrong assessment of willingness of European governments

4. EUROPEANFEDERALISMAND BELGIANFEDERALISM

3 aspects of similarities between Belgium and the EU:

Belgium EU

Multi-national and multi-lingual federation Pluri-national and multi-lingual polity

Consociational federation majority-constrainingStructural and procedural features that are majority-

constraining

No representatives from a state-wide party in

Parliament

No representatives from a EU-wide party in

Parliament

Belgium EU

Evolution

Centrifugal

Centripetal

16


17/70

Political parties

No state-wide parties

Parliamentary majority

Divided party groups in Parliament

No state-wide parties

No parliamentary majority

Unified party groups in Parliament

Majoritarianism Grand Coalition requirementNo Grand Coalition requirement

is possible

Constitutional framework

Upper level decides

No referenda

Not transparent + package deals

Lower level decides

Referenda

Not transparent + package deals

Policy symmetry Policy symmetry Policy asymmetry is possible

Nature of the competences Detailed list Relatively open-ended

1. Belgium : 1932 : language frontier lead in 1970 to the creation of the cultural communities and in

1980 to the creation of the regions more autonomy given to federated entities, to lower levels ofpower >< EU: more competences, powers are given to the center.

2. The parties linked to one of the Belgian communities are focusing and defending only this communitys

interests, then when they are elected they must work and negotiate with the parties that represent the

other community comparable to the European dynamic : national parties only care about nationals

interests.

But 2 differences appear after the elections % trust of the Parliament (required >< not required) and %

party groups in Parliament (divided or unified).

3. Belgian Constitution is full of details defending the minorities on political field (under more, the so-

called sonnette dalarme : alarm bell procedure, assuring the minority a veto it can oppose to a project

which would threat its interests) grand coalition requirement >< QMV in the Council of ministers,

and the majority, on European level, is constantly shifting, from a certain issue to another.

4. The nature of the Belgian federal system is decided at the upper level >< the EU MS within

intergovernmental conferences decide about the treaties and the basic rules governing EU constitutional

framework. & no referenda organized at Belgian level : not possible constitutionally >< it is an option

at European level. Finally, there are package deals both at European & Belgian level : each of the

political parties see some of its interests fulfilled but has also to make some concessions consensus

after long negotiations (which are not transparent).

5. Symmetric distribution of competences : all the regions, & communities have the same competences //

same in the EU : if one MS gives a competence to the EU level, all the other MS must agree this

delegation and lose this competence but there are exceptions at European level (a negative and a

positive) : some member States have decided to remain out of certain EU decisions : for example,

Denmark has an opting outfor one policy area : citizens policy ; UK and Ireland have an opting in on

the same field, UK and Poland % treaty of Lisbon those options are often offered during the

ratification process of a new treaty. Sometimes some of the MS also decide to do sthg together, to go

further than EU rules require, and not all of the MS are joining the project.

6. Detailed list of competences in Belgium >< competences of the EU are relatively open-ended (article

17


18/70

191 TFEU). In Belgium, the lower levels can conduct regulatory policies (regulating the society)

whereas the federal level has distributive policies (tax policies, collecting money and spending it) >< in the sixties, when intergovernmentalism was developed :

European integration slowed down, many doubts, skeptical reflects, no new treaties more national feelings.

Furthermore, UK joined the EU and it was thought this would slow down European integration

In the 1960s: a very different atmosphere: EU integration slowed down + a lot of skepticism; no new treaty (until

1985-1986 with the SEA).

De Gaulle is the illustration of this skepticism:

Veto to the accession of UK (reasoning: will to have a strong France in the EU)

The empty chair crisis in the 2nd half of 1965:boycott of the EU by France. The reason: the Commission, withpresident Hallstein, wanted to introduce QMV on some policies, but he knew De Gaulle would refuse, so hehad the idea to couple its voting in the Commission with a proposition on financing of the CAP, very much

wanted by France. But it didnt work, and France boycotted the EU. This crisis was solved by the

Luxembourg compromise: if a vital interest is at stake, the member state has de facto a veto power on the

question.

Two important names to know

Stanley Hoffman = intellectual father of intergovernmentalism (USA)

Andrew Moravcsik= his intellectual son, he added the liberal to intergovernmentalism. (USA)

2. INTERGOVERNMENTALISM (= HOFFMANN)

It is more or less a derivate of realism, a theory of RI, which states that international politics is about interactionsofself-interested actors in an essentially anarchic environment:

actors: states are primary actors and they act rationally, on the basis of a cost-benefit assessment (CBA).

self-interested: those actors want to survive military and security power = hard power.

Intergovernmentalism is based on 2 assumptions derived from realism:

Actors (states) act rationally.

They are self-interested and want to survive, hence the importance of military and security power.

In intergovernmentalism: sovereignty of states in Europe is transforming, but states are obstinate, rigid, they

remain the central actors; it is difficult to change them.

Therefore, cooperation is possible :

If it serves the national interest CBA

Only if it is in low politics areas (e.g. never in military issues)

Neofunctionalism explains the transition :

From pluralism To more Europepolitics as group-based activity

Intergovernmentalists: transition:

From pluralism To more diversity

26


27/70

Rational behavior: High politics:Short term CBA centrifugal instead of

It is an obstacle to integration integrational (away from each other)

In intergovernmentalism, pluralist politics lead to a low degree of integration because of the uncertainty of the

EU integration. States want an international environment certain to them because they are driven by the idea to

survive. But EU integration is full of uncertainties: Finalit politique of the EU integration? To what aim is the EU being constructed? What is the political method of the EU?

Why do pluralist politics lead to diverging interests and thus to low extend of European integration because

EU is a factor of uncertainty, full of uncertainties % finalits politiques : unknown outcome of the European

integration (we dont know where it is going) & % political method (means to get there) dangerous for the

survival of those self-interested actors that are the States

Member states go along but they dont know where theyre going Hoffman (1966: 882):

3. LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM (= MORAVCSIK)

Theory in the beginning of the 1990s.

Moravcsik added to Hoffman the need to take into account domestic interests of the member states liberal

intergovernmentalism: liberal in the way of looking at what happens inside the main actors, mostly

economically.

This theory was established because of the question of why internal market was established in the 1990s.

Moravcsik built his theory on the basis of the answer: to understand, we need to look at the big member states,

France, Germany and UK. The QMV rule implies that those 3 states were willing to accept internal market,

which is not surprising for Germany and France, but more for the UK. Therefore, to understand why the internal

market was established, we need to understand why the UK accepted it:

End of the 1980s, Thatcher negotiated with the EU a rebate: if the UK contributed financially like other member

states, this financing would immediately come back to the UK.

QMV was limited: UK accepted QMV because a lot of decisions were still voted by unanimity.UK didnt want to be sidelined (the market being created without them).

Hence the importance of looking at whats happening inside.

a) Liberal intergovernmentalism: EU integration, a 3-step model:

For each step, Moravcsik relies on existing theories of spol:

Step 1 liberalism

Step 2 realism

Step 3 delegation theory

1. Preferences, interests formation at domestic, national level ; Andrew Moravcsik relies on liberalism toanalyze this first step.

27


28/70

2. Negotiations at EU level (the MS having defined their own interests at domestic level step 1) ; Andrew

Moravcsik relies on realism

3. Institutional design of EU institutions ; Andrew Moravcsik relies on delegation theories to explain this

third step.

Liberalism Realism

Predominance to Predominance to

Interests of states Military capabilities/power

Pluralism = politics is a group-based activity: 3 assumptions:

Rational behavior = self-interest and risk-aversion = Cost/Benefits Assessment-CBA

Internal interests = external interests

Internal configuration (inside member states) determines external pattern of conflict/cooperation

Its all about domestic interest

Liberal intergovernmentalism tries to link those 2 antagonistic theories of RI (bridge-building).

Step 1 national level : it all starts with the preference formation at domestic level

o It looks at states as not being unitary actors, or black box, at what is inside the interests of

societal groups determine the positions in politics.

o Moravcsik: Understanding the domestic politics (= Moravcsik) is a precondition for, and not a

supplement to, the analysis ofstrategic interactions among states (= Hoffmann).

o Economical interests are the starting point. They can be:

Clear and outspoken: it will therefore be defined at the EU level, and will determine the

government positions. Unclear and insignificant: it gives some room for other elements in the government

positions (e.g. ideology).

o It means that for each issue, the position of one actor can change.

Step 2 intergovernmental level : once interests are defined, intergovernmental negotiations at EU level

o The Council of ministers is there to defend member states interests. Therefore, it is where the

intergovernmental negotiations happens a key institution.

o Moravcsik works on certain moments where member states have decided to delegate power in the

history of EU integration. Those dates are big moments that shaped the EU as it is today

deepening process.

28


29/70

o Member states are driven by asymmetrical interdependence:

Asymmetrical: benefits of cooperation are not equally distributed among the participants

of that cooperation.

Interdependence: member states depend on each other because the world is globalized

hence need of cooperation asymmetrical

This concept means that the actors are dependent on each other, because the world is globalizing

problems need to be solved by cooperation, BUT the benefits are not evenly, equally distributed : some have

more advantages than others % benefits of cooperation : some MS have a lot to win with the EI (export oriented

MS ; smaller MS, like Belgium they are in a weaker negotiation position, as they also have a lot to lose

without the EI) >< Some dont have so much to win with the EI (less economically dependent MS ; bigger MS,

like Germany they have a stronger negotiation position, as they dont really need the EI to be economically

competitive).

o Benefits are not equally distribute 2 ideal-types:

Member states that have a lot to win with EU integration member states with an

export-oriented economy; usually the smaller member states weaker negotiation

position: they have a lot to win from integration, therefore a lot to lose if no integration.

Member states that dont have so much to win with EU integration less economically

dependant member states, e.g. Germany. Those can economically manage well on their

own; usually the bigger member states stronger negotiation position.

Because benefits of integration are unequally divided, intergovernmental negotiations are a

fight.

o The degree to which a member state is dependant on EU integration and on other member states

depends on 2 factors = costs:

Cost of no-agreement: the value a member state attaches to reaching an agreement at

29


30/70

EU level how costly is it that negotiation fails the higher the cost is, the more

dependant the member state is, the weaker his negotiation position, so prepared to big

concessions (e.g. Germany, at the beginning of the 1990s, who didnt want monetary

union because of their strong money low cost of no-agreement strong position and

power during negotiation).

Cost of exclusion: political cost connected to a situation in which all other member states

reach an agreement, and 1 member state is excluded value attached to the non-

anticipation (e.g. creation of the internal market from UK point of view, they didnt want

to be side-lined).

This logic is often used by people who plead for a bipolar Europe a core and a

periphery increasing the cost of exclusion persuade peripheral countries to more

integration.

But this cost only holds for market-related policy areas, because in other domains (social,

environmental), it may not be a disadvantage to be excluded (it might increase

competitiveness).

o Those 2 costs determine the power of member states on the negotiation table usually, big

member states are more powerful, because the costs are not too high, they dominate the EU

consequences: To reach an agreement the lowest common denominator (also in unanimity)

In this 2nd step, the Council and the European Council are the most powerful institutions,

where intergovernmental negotiations happen.

Step 3 creation of institutions : institutional design of EU institutions = outcome

o Deepening process 2 characteristics:

Transfer of competences: EU competent for more and more political areas

Stronger EU institutions: an EU framework which is stronger and stronger

delegation of power

Why do member states delegate? Three reason:

o The Minimization of transaction costs: all the costs (not only financing) that have to be made

before the negotiations and the policies start. All 27 members have to make those costs; the idea is

that by making it together, those costs will decrease benefits of scale. (not to have to take these

measures separately).

o Maximizing credibility: 2 components:

Among member states mutually; credibility that member states will apply the decisions

taken in Brussels collective action problem make sure that all member states will

take action the prisoners dilemma :

In the short term, non-compliance is rational (hoping that the other MS will comply, what will

constitute a competitive advantage ex. establishing a trade barrier later than the other MS) >< in the long term,

compliance is rational. How to avoid this collective action problem ? Answer of liberal intergovernmentalism :

they try to avoid this problem by creating institutions : overseeing institutions (The Commission, controlling theimplementation of European policies at national level) and sanctioning institutions (The Court of Justice)

30

Not doing what

youre supposed

to do


31/70

increase the credibility of the MS commitments vis--vis each other.

How to avoid the collective action problem creation of institutions:

- Institutions overseeing/monitoring whats happening: the EC (= guardian of

treaties)

-Institutions sanctioning in case of non-compliance: the ECJ (brought to court byEC)

Those 2 types of institutions increase the credibility of commitments of member states

vis--vis each other.

Between governments of member states and their constituents, at the domestic level

blame-shifting = shifting the blame of an action to the EU (e.g. in the 1990s, in order to

implement : necessity for the MS to cut off their public dispenses for the

establishment of the EMU its because of the EU increasing credibility national

governments BUT decreasing credibility of the EU.

o Increasing power of national government vis--vis interest groups:

At the national level close control on governments

At the EU level less control on governments: what governments do is not so visible (not

so mediatised, lower control of EP, interest groups dont have so much access, Council

behind closed doors) a lot of freedom, possibility of high maneuvers for governments

Question of the democratic deficit of the EU: to what extent is the EU democratic?

For liberal intergovernmentalists, the fact the there is a democratic deficit is a good thing:

ironically, the European Communitys democratic deficit may be a fundamental

source of its success democratic deficit increased efficiency (in 2002, Moravcsik

writes an article in the JCMS In Defence of the Democratic Deficit).

At national and EU level, negotiations happen simultaneously Robert Putnam, the2-level-games: negotiations happening simultaneously are closely connected to each

other, because a central actor, the governments of the member states, link the levels

governments allow negotiations to be connected to each other. Therefore, the 1st 2

steps of liberal intergovernmentalism are a 2-level-game. In this theory, all actors have

certain interests about policies decided at the EU level (from o policy, or very few, to

extreme reformist policy). In the national contest, actors matter because they have to

accept the decision taken afterward.

Collection of policy options = the domestic win-set it is transferred at the EU level in

the negotiations. But those domestic win-sets are multiplied by 27 Moravcsik: the EU

win-set = junction of every domestic win-sets where they overlap (that way member

states accept the policy because it is part of their domestic win-set, so no problem at the

national level).The problem: in reality, domestic win-sets dont always overlap. The central point of the

2-level-game is that governments can play with those 2 levels strategically:

- From EU to national level: compellingness by other member states, feasibility,

They can tell their national parliaments, their electors that they had to make

concessions, to shift their domestic win set in order to reach an agreement, that

it was a necessary condition for the EI going further and deeper argument of

compellingness

- From national to EU level: use the national political dynamics to have more

power in EU negotiations the schelling conjecture = negotiation strategy:

the weaker your internal position is, the stronger you will be at the external level

(my hands are tied) [...] the power of a negotiator often rests on a manifest

inability to make concessions and to meet demandsargument of the tiedhands : MS can say they cannot change their domestic win set the weaker

31


32/70

you are at domestic level (divisions), the stronger you are at international level,

the stronger your negotiation position at EU level will be, as your hands are tied

you can argue youre not able to make any concession power of the

negotiator // his inability to make any concessions.

The basic question behind each step:

Step 1: what are the motivations behind the national preference national preference

Step 2: how to explain the outcome of EU negotiations EU agreement

Step 3: when is sovereignty delegated to the EU and how to explain the institutional design delegation /pooling of sovereignty

4. EXAMPLE: THECREATIONOF CAP (=PAC)

CAP: easy case to apply liberal intergovernmentalism

because interests of interest groups are easily definedand determined.

3 steps to explain the creation of CAP:

Inside the big member states, who dominate the

bargaining, Germany and France at the time:

o Neofunctionalism explains it with

political spillover

o Liberal intergovernmentalism: CAP is

not so much a liberalized market. It

reflects the interests of interest groups,

farmers:

In Germany, farmers wanthigher support prices

In France, farmers want

preferential access to German

market + higher support prices.

CAP was decided as wanted by those 2 countries

Unanimity applied because:

o Germany: guarantee for a high level of protection for German farmers

o France: Guarantee for a high level of protection for French farmers, even when UK would join.

5. CRITICISMS

32


33/70

All of the criticisms are usually based on the work of the 5 case studies of Moravcsik, the 5 big moments in EU

history, 3 of them about liberalization, 2 of them about monetary market.

No attention paid to political integration, and only to economic integration. Liberal intergovernmentalism

argue that political integration is possible only if no economical interests are at stake. But in EU, in the facts,

there is an increasing level of political integration (e.g. military actions of the EU outside since Lisbon); this

is ignored by liberal intergovernmentalism.

Moravcsik pays no attention for day-to-day decision-making processes, only to big historical steps. Liberal

intergovernmentalism is easily applied to theses big steps, but difficult to apply to day-to-day processes; it is

suited to analyze negotiations of treaties, but not negotiations inside the boundaries of treaties.

Moravcsik answer:

European Council: increasing power + increasing initiation (formal role of the EC).

In the European Council: culture of consensus = +/- intergovernmental bargaining; rarely QMV.

Main determinant of policy-making = interests and preferences.

In the EU, there are still many intergovernmental areas that remain.

33


34/70

C HAPTER 4 : NEW-INSTITUTIONALISM

1. ORIGINSOFNEW-INSTITUTIONALISM

New institutionalism: applied to the study of the EU as a polity and to European integration as a process.

Finds its origin in comparative politics hasnt been developed only to analyze the European integration NIcan also be used in order to understand other political systems nosui generis approach.WhyNew Institutionalism ? Because the institutions were defined in a new way : not only formal but also

informal institutions (norms).

Development of this school = reflection of a gradual and diverse reintroduction of institutions into a large body

of theories in which institutions had been either absent or epiphenomenal, i.e. reflections of deeper factors or

processes, theories that are institution-free accounts of politics.

The 1st : RCI

2. WHATAREINSTITUTIONS?

Policy choices are inherently unstable: no single policy is able to command a lasting majority amonglegislators; yet empirically, legislators have been able to agree on stable policies how and why such

stability is achieved how actors choose or design institutions to secure mutual gains, and how those

institutions change or persist over time

Institutions are the ex ante agreements about the structure of cooperation Shepsle:

o equilibrium institutions: institutions as independent variables explaining how they shape policy

outcomes.

o structured-induced equilibria: institutions as dependent variables created and maintained by

rational actors to perform certain functions for the actors that created them.

Institutions are relatively stable collections ofpractices and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific

groups of actors in specific situations March and Olsen

3. 3 SCHOOLSINNEW-INSTITUTIONALISMThe common point: they all agree on the fact institutions matter. But no agreement % how the institutions

matter, thus affect policy making.

Rational Choice Institutionalism

Sociological Institutionalism

Historical Institutionalism

Question: how do institutions matter?

a) Basic features of rational choice institutionalism

Functionalist explanation: political institutions are designed by actors for the efficient performance of

specific functions.

Actors have exogenous preferences and aim to maximize them

Politics is a series ofcollective action problems prisoners dilemma :

Behavior that is rational in the short term is suboptimal in the long term.

Actors follow a logic of consequences:

o Cost-Benefits Assessment CBA

o Rational expectations

34

EU Collective

action problem

= making sure that

all MS will take

action the prisonersdilemma


35/70

Institutions are developed because their function is beneficial for the actors

Therefore feedbacks from institutions can either strengthen and reinforce existing institutions, or undermine

them:

o Self-reinforcing institutions = institutions that change the political environment in ways that make

the institution more stable in the face of exogenous shocks

o Self-undermining institutions = institutions that change the environment such that a previouslystable institutional equilibrium is undermined

b) Basic features of sociological institutionalism

A broad definition of institutionalism, blending institution and culture:

o Informal norms and conventions

o Normative power and formal rules

the notion includes informal norms & normative power (the norms constitute the actors, has an

enormous impact on the way the actors behave & even on their preferences)

definitions by Shepsie and March & Olsen:

Institutions are the ex anteagreements about the structure of cooperation Shepsle

Institutions are relatively stable collections ofpractices and rules defining appropriatebehavior for specific groups of actors in specific situations March and Olsen

Actors have endogenous preferences culturally-specific practices explain institutional forms. they are not

only and purely determined outside the institutional framework, as the institutions have an important impact

on them also inside deep normative impact of institutions.

Actors follow a logic of appropriateness: not based on rational calculation of costs and benefits butassessment of the appropriateness, of what is considered as being legitimate, as being the correct way to

behave in a certain situation) : kind of unwritten norm.what is [appropriate/legitimate/correct] in a given

situation?

role with attached prescriptive norms of behavior: institutional forms constitute the identity of social actor

Constructivist approach: institutions constitute actors, i.e. they shape the way in which actors view theworld.LOA: The institutional environment shapes the preferences of the actors in the EU: process by which the EU

and other institutional norms are diffused and shape the preferences and behavior of actors in domestic and

international politics. Ex. two cars on a desolate road both drivers have the same preference : being home

asap : they suddenly meet a red traffic light one of them act rationnaly : calculations of costs and benefits :

not likely to be a police patrol on this road, and he wants to be home asap he doesnt stop (RCI LOC), the

other knows hes expected to act according to the norm he stops (SI LOA)

Logic of consequence Logic of appropriateness

Step 1 What are the alternatives? What is the situation?

Step 2 What are my interests? What is my role in the situation?

Step 3What are the consequences of the alternatives for

my interests?

How appropriate are the possible actions for me

in my role in the situation?

Step 4Choose the alternative with the best

consequencesDo what is most appropriate

c) Intermezzo (1): comparing RCI and SI

RCI SI

Characteristics of institutions

Status Strategic forum, reducing collective actionproblem

Forum for communicative action, entailingnorms

35


36/70

Effect Determine strategies Determine preferences

Density Low institutional density High institutional density

Characteristics of actors

Preferences Exogenous Endogenous

Rationality Instrumental rationality Collective rationality

Action logic LOC LOA

Characteristics of interactions

Negotiation style Hard bargaining Problem-solving

Consensus Leads to lowest common denominator Promotes integrative bargaining

RCI: actors = strategic utility-maximizers whose preferences are taken as given

SI: people act according to a LOA construction of their preferences and selection of the appropriate behaviorfor a given institutional environment

d) Intermezzo (2): empirical non-exclusivity of RCI and SI

Rational Choice Institutionalism Sociological Institutionalism

Empirically:

No either/or

But both/and

Analytically useful

The two schools look thus incompatible, BUT important to see them as the two ends of a continuum :

on empirical field, the actors will try to conciliate them, their behaviour will thus be somewhere between those

two ends (they try to maximize their interests, but not at every cost, every price : there are norms they must

obey) rather both/ and than either/ or analytically useful : we need those two perspectives to

understand the policy making process.

e) Basic features of historical institutionalism

Position +/- in between SI and RCI focus on the effects of institutionsover time: institutional choicestaken in the past can persist, or become locked in shaping and constraining actors later in time rejection

of functionalist explanations (i.e. RCI)

Both LOC and LOA are applicable

Institutions provide asymmetrical power

A key role forpath-dependency and (the choices are not only determined by preferences and/ or norms butfar more dependent on the choices made in the past very costly to quit that path because you lose

everything you made before) and unintended consequences (that may be reached because of that path

dependency : it is a logical consequence of this concept : you may finally end somewhere you didnt, at first,

imagine you would finish).

Existing institutions may produce:

o Positive feedbacks: support of existing institutions = institutions generate incentives for actors to

stick with and not abandon existing institutions, but incremental adaptation interrelated

phenomena characterizes politics:

Inertia = lock-ins: existing institutions remain in equilibrium for extended periods

despite political change Critical role for timing and sequencing: relatively small and contingent events occur at

36


37/70

critical junctures early in a sequence, and shape events that occur later

Path-dependence: early decisions provide incentives for actors to perpetuate institutional

and policy choices inherited from the past; Levi once a country or region has starteddown a path, the costs of reversal are very high. () entrenchments of certain

institutional arrangements obstruct easy reversal of the initial choice.

o

Negative feedbacks: creation of pressures for institutional and policy changes.

Emphasis on the importance of time, feedbacks, sequencing, and path-dependence, but no rejection ofequilibrium analysis history matters, and explain how and under what conditions historical events shape

contemporary and future political choices and outcomes.

4. NEW-INSTITUTIONALISMANDTHE EU

RCI: e.g. Garrett cf. principal-agent and delegation theory (comitology as a control mechanism of Com)

SI: e.g. Lewis cf. social constructivism HI: e.g. Pierson

a) RCI and European integration by Geoffrey Garett(Cf. tableau de comparaison RCI-SI)

RCIthe effect determines the strategies:

e.g.:Preference: opposing Commission proposal Strategy to maximize: using voting rules in institutions

Question of the voting power under different decision rules: relative weights, hence bargaining power, of

MS under various voting formulas. Preference = opposing Commission proposal.

Strategy to maximize = institutions voting rule (if QMV, youll have to convince a minority of States

which will be able to stop the proposal; if unanimity, strategy very simple : oppose the proposal as long as

you have interest to act this way)

Geoffrey Garrett combines 2 axis : substantive preference & procedural preference (unanimity, QMV, simplemajority). Then he uses a mathematic model to determine whether and why a certain proposal will be adopted/

fail very positivist approach, hardcore RCI : goes too far

Example 1: Garrett, 1992: positivist approach, often formalismsubstantive preferences determine

procedural preferences; e.g. bargaining over the SEA:

cf. principal-agent theory

b) SI and European integration

37

COREPER

Comit de reprsentants permanents des Etats

Fait partie du rseau administratif de lUE, qui

travaille en parallle du rseau politique, et assiste

celui-ci, le Conseil des ministres, dans sa tachelgislative, au niveau de la prparation des

dcisions.

A la fois une instance de dialogue et de contrle

politique

Charg de lexamen pralable des dossiers

lordre du jour du Conseil, pour en prparer les

travaux, et s'efforce de trouver un accord sur

chaque dossier

Groupes dexpert compos des ambassadeurs des

EM auprs de lUE fonctionnaires nationaux, de

reprsentants des intrts socioprofessionnels et de

consultants indpendants

Le Coreper agit au moyen de deux formations :

le Coreper I, compos des reprsentants permanents adjoints, couvre les dossiers caractre technique ;

le Coreper II, compos des ambassadeurs traite

des sujets caractre politique, commercial,

conomique ou institutionnel.

Les comptences du Coreper s'appliquent tous

les domaines d'activit du Conseil sauf pour les

questions agricoles


38/70

Example Lewis, 2002, on COREPER I and II:

Both the processes and the outcomes of the decision: making process are influenced by the normative

environment of the Council:

Diffuse reciprocity:

o Influence of the future / expected decision-making

o Shadow of the future

o Reciprocity is diffuse

Thick trust:

o Respect, confidence, interpersonal relations

o Discrete setting

o Informal Council meeting

Mutual responsiveness:

o Knowing and understanding each other

o Arguments, explain considerations

Consensus reflex:

o Voting very rare

o LOA effect

Culture of compromise: basic intuition to accommodate diverging interests

Geoffrey Lewis examines the working of the Coreper (prepares the meetings of the Council on basis of the work

of the civil servants) insists on the impact of the norms on the functioning of this organ.

Both the processes and the outcomes of the decision-making process are influenced by the normative

environment of the Council. Lewis points 5 community norms that make that policy makers at European level

dont follow their own, national interest :

Diffuse reciprocity : influence of future/ expected decision-making ; shadow of the future ;

reciprocity is diffuse (no deal between two States but concessions that are made in order to benefit from

another concession on another field).

Thick trust : establishment of interpersonal relations of respect, confidence, trust : two factors

contributing to this respect : discrete setting : behind close doors, very untransparent process enables

building of confidence (>< when cameras are there) ; & informal council meetings : group-based

activities, with as goal the growing of personal relations between the ministers.

Mutual responsiveness : knowing and understanding each other (conscience of the difficulties of the

other MS at national level). Not only express ones position, also explain it.

38


39/70

Consensus reflex : voting very rare and LOA effect (try to achieve a compromise).

Culture of compromise : basic intuition to accommodate diverging interests. Interest can be defined

broadly : material, process, relationship and principled interests.

c) HI and European integration

Example Pierson, 1998

Policies Council

Paul Pierson starts from the observation that there are some policies that are contradictory with the preferences

of the MS and sometimes even with those of the Commission ! How can that be explained ?

Member states: short-term time horizon but (societal) situation and preferences evolve: gaps in the ability of

MS governments to control institutions and policies, for 4 reasons:

Electoral considerations at the national level agreement on EU policies leading to a long-term loss of

national control in return for a short-term electoral return Unintended consequences of institutional choices

Change and evolution of MS preferences, most obviously because of electoral turn-over: a new nationalgovernment inherits an acquis communautaire negotiated by the previous government

Lock-ins due to the incremental growth of political support for existing institutions from below, associetal actors adapt and develop a vested interest in the continuation of specific EU policies.

Why dont member states use their powers to change the policies?

o Institutions are sticky = resistant to change uncertainty of institutional design + possible

transaction costs setting high institutional thresholds to later reforms

o Exit-option is costly

o Path-dependency: European integration is aprocess unfolding over time, often as a result of the

unintended consequences of early integration decisions that become difficult for the EUs

constitutive MS to control of overturn explanation of temporal aspects of EU integration

Link of positive feedback with functional spillover (Haas) and socialization of elites (Checkel).

5. THEJOINTDECISION-TRAP

Developed by Fritz Scharpfin the 80s : EU would be caught in a trap

Concept applicable to all kinds of multi-level political systems.

The EU is stuck in a trap, at the time it was in a joint-decision system: to take a decision, everyone had to beon board (federalism also highlights this point) joint decision-making systems decisions in the EU could

only be reached if all actors agreed upon those decisions everyone, every MS needed on board grand

coalition required, QMV = exception to that rule. joint decision-trap: a given institution or policy, once

instituted, tends to remain in place, rigid and inflexible, even in the face of a changing policy

environment.

Joint decision-trap characterized by 3 interrelated rules:

o Intergovernmentalism ( federalism or supranational decision-making)

o Voting rule ofunanimity ( majority)

o A default condition in which the institution/policy would persist if no agreement is found (no

change, stuck in a status quo NO renationalization) = suboptimal result of the joint decision-

trap

39


40/70

For the joint decision-trap: no achievement/crisis status quo falling apart it therefore disagrees with the bicycle theory which states that in case of a crisis, the EU

will fall apart.

Consequence of this joint-decision system : suboptimal results : default condition going back to thedomestic level : it means if we dont agree on how to realize a certain policy, if we dont achieve to reach a

consensus, the competence is not renationalized we dont make any progress the trap is exactly there : theEU because of the joint-decision system is kept in astatus quo.

Some say then the EU is going to fall apart if it is unable to resolve crisis that stop its development, its progress

= bicycle theory : the wheels of the bike have to continue turning, otherwise it will fall, and fall apart >< joint

decision-trap doesnt agree : according to this perspective, EU is just kept instatus quo.

Change in any of the interrelated rules alleviation of the joint decision-trap allowing adaptation ofexisting institutions to changing circumstances.

e.g. of the CAP, policy locked-in as long as a single MS remained able to block policy or institutional

reforms, even in the face of ever-growing agricultural surpluses or other pressures.

In 2006: the joint decision-trap revisited:

o More and more QMVo Maybe too pessimistic

o Intergovernmentally organized areas

40


41/70

CHAPTER 5 : DELEGATION AND THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT

THEORY

This theory is an application of rational choice institutionalism, therefore the assumption of RCI are all

applicable:

Preferences formed outside the EU institutional framework

LOC = minimum cost for maximum benefits

Actors have an instrumental rationality

The relationship between the 2 actors: the principal delegates a certain task to the agent, who executes that task

on his behalf.

The principals: most often the member states in the European Council.

The agents: e.g. The Commission (to represented EU in WTO), the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA),the ECJ

An actor / Actors (MS in the European Council in the EU case) delegate(s) a certain task / tasks to

another (Commission, European Court of Justice), who executes that/ those task(s) on his/ their behalf =principal agent relationship. What are the reasons for delegation ? and what will be the resulting autonomy -

in which measure ?

1. THEBENEFITSOFDELEGATION

Why member states delegate to actors at EU level? They expect functions that are beneficial to them

functionalist answer.

The functions:

Monitoring compliance: control whether member states do at the national level what they have promised atthe EU level

solving the collective action problem: institution oversee and sanction allows credibility ofcommitments of the agents vis--vis each others.

Solving problems of incomplete contracting: contract = agreements among principals (= member states);those contracts can never be complete (impossibility to predict all possibilities). The point is: who will fill the

gap of these possibilities not predicted? The agents (e.g. need of the ECJ to interpret treaties).

Issuing complex or credible regulations:

o High degree of complexity some agents are specialized, they can deal with it,

o Agents as independent actors for credibility (acting as neutral arbiter). the MS dont want a

certain policy to be biased among them dealing with complexity & neutrality /

independence

Agenda-setting: question of who takes the initiative: the agent, the Commission, initiates legislation.

Those are applicable to all kind of political systems.

2. THECOSTSOFDELEGATION

Costs = risks of delegation; mainly 2:

The agents will have their own preferences, maybe diverging from the principals preferences : will the agentdo what the principals want?

risk 1: the opportunistic behavior cost 1: heterogeneous preferences

The agents can gain new information that principals dont have: risk to use this information againstprincipals.

41


42/70

risk 2: own information cost 2: asymmetrical information

Those risks are called the agency losses/slack

Therefore the principals must weight the benefits against the costs:

The need to delegate authority may give powers to the agents that can be used against the principals.

The same features that make agents attractive can also make them dangerous.

3. MITIGATINGTHECOSTSOFDELEGATION: CONTROL

The relation between the actors is characterized not only by delegation, but also by control: delegation and

control go together.

A balancing act from the principals:

Too much control risk of undoing the benefits of delegation

vs. Not enough control risk of being confronted with the costs of delegation

How do member states control their agents?

3 steps:

1. Decision to delegates ex ante control mechanism

2. Execution of delegated task by the agent ex post control mechanism

3. Once the task is executed ex post control mechanism

Ex ante control mechanisms: before the execution of the task

Ex postcontrol mechanism: during or after the execution of the task

a) Ex ante control mechanisms

Defini tion of the scope of delegation = contract between principal and agent (I want exactly this to be done, and

done that way) in the case of the EU, ex. of the principle of Subsidiarity

what and how an agent has to do establish a contract, give instructions to the agent.

The contract = definition of tasks (what) and procedures (how)

The principle of subsidiarity is a clear example of this control mechanism: art. 5 3 TEU: Under theprinciple

of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and insofaras the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central

level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be

better achieved at Union level.

b) Ex post control mechanism

Much more elaborate: 4 mechanisms:

Police patrol: monitoring the agents all the way by member states themselves. But it is very costly (time,capacity). E.g. Comitology = member states, in a lot of legislative acts, delegate implementation powers to

the Commission, but in a committee composed with member states representatives.

Fire alarm: principals dont monitor the agents themselves, but assume that other actors will monitor theagents and raise the alarms if the agents dont perform the delegated tasks: e.g. NGOs, industrial lobbies,

trade unions, interest groups

less costly assumption by principals: others will raise the alarm; but it is less effective than the police patrol, because:

42


43/70

o risk that the alarm is raised too late

o less likely to work in less politicized areas.

Institutional checks to keep an eye on what agents are doing on behalf of the principals:

o An agent controls the agent executing the task

o More or less the system of checks and balances

Sanctioning: indispensable for control, necessary for credibility.

Ways of sanctioning:

Cut/reduce the budget of the agent, since the budget is composed of annual contributions by member states =the power of the purse; but collateral damages, because it punishes other actors.

Refuse to reappoint the agent, e.g. the president of the Commission, or national commissioners. But memberstates cannot dismiss the Commission and commissioners.

Refuse to cooperate with the agent, e.g. not accepting with a proposal of the Commission, but difficult

because to deviate from a proposition need unanimity.

Change the treaties: the nuclear option limited credibility and last resort. Moreover, changing treaties =a default condition, e.g. the status quo, therefore it is pointless to change the treaty.

In practice, those sanctioning mechanisms are seldom applied, but they are not unuseful, they contribute to

reducing the possibility of agency slack rational anticipation by the agent: the agent wants to avoid the

activation of sanctions, so he will execute the task according to the principals demand. Themere existence of

control mechanisms can be sufficient to reduce the likelihood of agency loss ( they exist to NOT be used).

4. DISCRETIONASTHERESULTOFDELEGATIONANDCONTROL

The agents have some room of maneuver how big is it after establishing the control mechanisms?

It is the discretion = room of maneuver after establishing the control mechanisms .

How can variation be explained degree of autonomy / flexibility / discretion. MS delegate powers to agents,

simultaneously exert control on those agents, BUT yet those last do have a room for manoeuvre after

establishment of the control mechanisms = discretion. Some agents are more autonomous than others; and if we

look at the European Commission, we can make another statement : a certain agent can be more or less

autonomous, depending on the field, the area in which he intervenes two extreme ends : the puppet on

strings and the wild horse, autonomy of the agents has to be replaced between those two ends.

5 factors explain the degree of discretion (they are hypothesis):

In reality, there are 27 principals, for which the preferences dont go in the same direction preference

homogeneity among principals.Effects on agents:

o Homogenous preferences clearly defined scope low degree of discretion

o Heterogeneous preferences broad mandate + divide & rule by the agent high degree of

discretion

If homogeneous preferences clearly defined scope of delegation low degree of discretion >< if

heterogeneous preferences broad mandate + the agent can use the divide between the principals on behalf of

his own interests (EU, on behalf of EI) high degree of discretion.

Preference homogeneity between agents and principals:

o Homogenous no need to control high degree of discretion the ally principle

o Heterogeneous tight control mechanism low degree of discretion

43


44/70

Mostly: its the Council that delegates to the agents: the voting rule applied in the Council will have aneffect:

o Unanimity all member states have to agree low degree of discretion

o QMV high degree of discretion

Degree of politicization of the delegated tasks: are the tasks needing to be executed politically sensitive forthe member states?

o High degree of politicization the principal is concerned with what the agent is doing low

degree of discretion

o Low degree of politicization member states care less high degree of discretion

The question ofprivate information for the agent, that principals dont have:

o Private information asymmetrical information high degree of discretion

o No private information low degree of discretion

5. APPLICATION: COMMISSIONASEXTERNALNEGOTIATORONBEHALFOFTHEMEMBERSTATESATTHE

WTO

In the WTO, the EU is represented as 1 by the Commission. The Council f ministers is the principal, it delegates

the task of representation to the agent, the Commission.

a) Why delegate?

3 functions:

Benefits for the Council: it creates a bargaining power: the sum is stronger than its parts.

The Commission has a betterknow-how, expertise, capabilities.

(Cynically), by delegating, member states can play the blame game: governments of member states can shiftthe blame to the Commission if the decisions are not according to the plans; it allows national governments

to sell it at home, at the national level.

b) Control mechanisms

Risk of heterogeneous preferences and private info necessity of control mechanisms:

Authorization: although the Commission being their delegate is written in the treaties, it needs an additionalauthorization from the member states: The Commission shall make recommendations to the Council, which

shall authorise it to open the necessary negotiations., art. 207 3 TFEU primary law.

Activating this mechanism means a high political cost for the member states, because they have thepossibility not to activate it, but they wouldnt be represented.

The Commission shall make recommendations to the Council , which shall authorise it to open the

necessary negotiations. the 1st step comes from the Commission, as a policy-setting institution.

The mandate: the typical ex ante control mechanism, established together with the decision to delegate The Commission shall conduct these negotiations [] within the framework of such directives as the

Council may issue to it., art. 207 3 TFEU directives = mandate.

The Council may activate this mechanism, giving instructions on what the Commission has to obtain.

Committee 133: the police patrol control mechanism: control the Commission in its negotiation: TheCommission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with a special committee appointed by the

Council to assist the Commission in this task, art. 207 3 TFEU

special committee: composed ofmember states = principals, gathering with the Commission during negotiations constant control of the

agent by the principals.

44


45/70

Attending the international negotiations: police patrol control mechanism: member states can attendmeetings of WTO, which allows them to constantly observe the actions of the Commission (those member

states are called mothers-in-law). Even if only the European Commission is competent to speak on behalf

of the MS, often those MS are also able to attend the meetings of the WTO, as they are members of this

organization

Ratification requirements: sanctioning mechanism: The Council shall authorise the opening ofnegotiations, adopt negotiating directi

Date post:	06-Apr-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	agnes-balla
View:	215 times
Download:	0 times

Régimepoldel'UE

Documents