REGIMES OF ENGAGEMENT WITH THE WORLD.

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REGIMES OF ENGAGEMENT WITH THE WORLD

AND THE EXTENSION OF CRITIQUEin comparison with Dewey's pragmatism and Bourdieu's critical sociology

Laurent Thvenot

Professor, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales,

Groupe de Sociologie Politique et Morale (CNRS), Paris

Senior Researcher, Research Department,

Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, Paris.

August 2008

Workshop "Pragmatism, Practice Theory and Social Change"

Institute for Public Knowledge, New York University, Sept. 13-14 2008

In spite of the name "sociologie pragmatique", the sociological framework which Luc

Boltanski and Laurent Thvenot have developed after creating the Groupe de Sociologie

Politique et Morale at theEcole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (1984) and writing

the first version ofLes conomies de la grandeur[Economies of worth] (1987) was not

directly influenced by Dewey.1

Moreover, it broke with Bourdieu's sociology. Thus this

sociology cannot be easily captured within the legacy of Dewey's American pragmatism (JD),

nor within the wake of Bourdieu's theory of practice (PB), although it benefited from these

two heritages among others. On Justification (Boltanski and Thvenot 2006 [1991])

concentrated on a kind of social action which is more "collective" than others in so far as it is

prepared for public critique and justification. It involves persons and things which are treated

and shaped to effectively qualify for legitimate evaluation of their worth ["grandeur"]. Thus it

tackles the kind of abusive power which Bourdieu's sociology kept on unveiling, and also the

"reality test" and method of evaluating the significance of public issues, a question whichDewey's philosophy was committed to. The next development of this sociology inserts the

public and collective modes of co-ordination governed by orders of worth in a larger

framework to cover also other "regimes of engagement" with the world which are approached

in one way or other by social scientists in terms of action, 'strategy', practice and

habit (Thvenot 2001, 2002, 2006). Turning to relations to the world which are below the

level of public evaluation, this sociology of engagements meets other aspects of Dewey and

Bourdieu's work, experience and adaptation on the one hand, habituation on the other.

However, the focus is not so much on the human motor for action, but rather on the dynamics

of disagreement and agreement with the environment. These dynamics rest on different modes

of realism and confidence, different regimes of convenience, from personal convenience to be

at ease in familiar surroundings, to individual achievement of an individual plan or project in

a functionally shaped environment, to collective conventions sustaining public qualifications.

The regime implies both a form of evaluation and a format within which the environment iscaptured in order to fit evaluation (Thvenot 2002, 2007).

It is my contention that this third theoretical and empirical approach to structured action might

contribute to our workshop in clarifying certain common features but also strong differences

1A wider "pragmatic turn" can be situated through the series "Raisons pratiques" published from 1990 by Ecole

des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales Press, which has exemplified the renewed dialogue between the social

sciences and philosophy around action and practice. Other sociologists added their force in the continuity of

interactionism, ethnomethodology, and they later referred to Dewey who was poorly known before among most

French sociologists.


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between JD and PB which do not appear as clearly in a direct confrontation between these

two main contributions to critique and acknowledgement of practical activity. Obviously a

thorough comparison between these three orientations would be two broad and complex a task

for my contribution to this workshop. Therefore I chose to focus on the different ways these

three orientations contribute to elucidating critique, its requirements and its limits, with aview encompassing non reflexive practical relations to the world. Although limited, this focus

might be reasonably considered as a key issue in our common concern with social change and

the constraints which hamper it.

1. THE FIRST PLURALISM OF JUSTIFIABLE ORDERS OF WORTH : POWERS

UNDER PUBLIC SCRUTINY

After recalling the main features of the first pluralism of orders of worth in Boltanski and

Thvenot's "sociology of critique and justification" (B&T), I will compare it to Dewey,

Bourdieu and also to the durkheimian legacy for its contribution on symbolic forms of

thought.

Structural tensions exposed by the sociology of critique and justification

(Boltanski and Thvenot)The sociology of critique and justification, which was presented in On Justification (Boltanski

and Thvenot 2006 [1991]) and put to the test in many empirical studies2, exposes the

common model of the plurality of orders of "worth" and of their relations which are involved

in everyday disputes when the level of the argument rises. I will introduce this pluralism with

the case of welfare policies which I will follow in this paper since their recent transformation

in Europe have raised the kind of conflicting interpretations of social change mentioned in the

workshop introduction.3

This transformation is actually either viewed as "highlighting the

optional character of action and giving people the opportunity to reclaim their dignity with

respect to the design of their own lives", or threatening "hard won gains in social institutions",

or dominated by "inequalities of power" which "foreclose creative opportunities in processes

of change".

In the after war France, a former transformation resulted in the Scurit sociale (public

Medicaid and Medicare). This welfare policy was based on criticism of previous organizationof providence accused to be paternalist. Such criticism can be clarified by the critical matrix

of crossed "denunciations" of one order of worth on the ground of another, which we

systematically examined (id., part IV, chap.8). In this occurrence, the Domestic order of worth

governing charitable organization is denounced, because of the kind of dependency which it

develops between the beneficiary and his benefactor, personal and privileged relations

supporting this beneficence. Such a critique also points to certain type of corporate power.

The normative basis of this denunciation is the Civic worth. It aims at collective and

anonymous solidarity for higher equality, thus strongly opposing Domestic personalized

protection. Such a solidarity is equipped by public policies and supported by a "social State"

("Etat social").4

Actually, it involves another order of worth, Industrial efficiency which

expand on serial and categorical treatment of beneficiaries. A "compromise" can be found

between the Civic and Industrial orders of worth because of this categorical, and thus

anonymous treatment. The new recent transformation introduces a completely different orderof worth, Market competition. It results from the denunciations of each of the Civic and

2 The first publication in French (Boltanski et Thvenot 1987) was rapidly followed by an edited volumes of

empirically grounded research on labor, organization, education (Boltanski et Thvenot 1989).3

I have launched a collective research program which documents this transformation in France within a broader

perspective on "Politiques du proche" which are policies and political actions getting closer to the person. A

book is on preparation, edited with Marc Breviglieri. See also: Breviglieri Stavo-Debauge et Pattaroni, 2003.4 "Etat social" is much more appropriate that "Etat providence" which reminds inopportunely of the Domestic

"providence".


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Industrial orders of worth, and also of the compromise between them which is criticized as

"bureaucratic". Market worth is praised for the individual choice it would allow in addition to

the benefits of competition on prices. Principles or values are not only at stake, but also the

material arrangements which sharply differ in order to qualify for one kind of worth or the

other. And social workers' task go through considerable transformation to qualify for marketservices.

To prepare the comparison with Dewey and Bourdieu, I will present the main features of

B&T theoretical framework in relation to structural tensions weighing on social life.

Critique vs. justification reveals a first structural tension between opening and closingone's eyes

- When the level of the argument rises, participants look for the most legitimate grounds for

critique and justification which would satisfy third party evaluation.

- Disputes are situated within a material environment (nature and artifacts) which is grasped

in the critical judgment as relevant evidence.

- Arguments are thus put to the "reality test".

- Analyzing the movement of critique and justification reveals a first structural tension

between opening and closing one's eyes. The moment of critical and inquisitive opening leadsto the dynamical revision of landmarks after the reality test. But the moment of affirmative

closure is also needed for things to go on "naturally" when people are "closing their eyes to

the insinuation of dubious beings" (Boltanski and Thvenot 2006), and secured with

ceremonies and institutions. Calming down this first tension requires the clear-cut separation

between the two moments.

The qualification for the common good reveals a second structural tension between

unequal appraisal and common humanity

- Critiques and justifications require an order of relevance to selectively take into account

entities in the judgment, and relevance implies both generalizing and placing value on the

generalization (within an order of "worth").

- During the critical test, persons and things jointly qualify for a certain state of worth.

- Analyzing the shared properties of the plurality of orders of worth reveals a secondstructural tension between inequality of acknowledged worth (and thus capacity and power)

and a sense of injustice and power abuse based on a notion of common humanity. Calming

down this second tension is twofold (and unfolded in the common model to all orders of

worth): 1) to single out from various evaluative orders the ones (orders of worth) which can

be shown to rely on a characterization of the common good and thus benefit all and not only

to most worthy persons; 2) to demonstrate that states of worth are not fixed properties of

persons but submitted to the qualifying test.

This last requirement of the sense of justice is the basis for first kind of critical operations

which are internal to one order of worth. Persons and things are criticized for not really

qualifying for theses alleged states of worth. Abusive power is the result.

The confrontation of a plurality of orders of worth generates critical denunciations

while their integration requires compromising for the common goodCritical operations of a second kind are partly external to the order of worth since they result

from the clash between different orders.

- Since the plurality of orders of worth are competing for the common good, they generate a

matrix of crossed "denunciations" which shape critical activities.

- Persons have to shift from one order of worth to another depending on the arrangement

["dispositif"] of the situation.


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- By contrast to the reduction to a single order of worth, the pluralism allows for multiple

possibilities of combination as long as critical tensions are bypassed. A variety of

organizational structures accommodate several orders of worth locally or temporally in

compromising for the common good. The task is made easier because of the shared properties

of orders of worth.Critical operations of a third kind result from the combination of the two previous ones.

Without explicit compromising for a locally acknowledge common good, an external order of

worth unduly influences the qualification for another worth, so that the qualification test is

corrupted.

An overall view over the dynamics of reality test and the grading of unequally profound

revisions

The analytical framework of the plural orders of worth allows the clarification of the notion of

critique, and the differentiation of unequally profound revisions ensuing the critical

confrontation with reality. These revisions are unequally profound and can be graded with

respect to this depth:

(i) Unexpectedness is considered as irrelevant, pure noise.

(ii) It is relevant within the order of worth. It leads to the revision of the state of worth ofsome beings involved or, otherwise, gives rise to a sentiment of injustice.

(iii) It is suspected to result from the encroachment of another order of worth. If it is picked

out, it leads to a denunciation of this intrusion, or to a dispute about the right worth to adopt

for the qualification test. Otherwise, it is another source of the sentiment of injustice. A main

source of intrusion and injustice stems from the fact that someone unduly transports a high

state of worth from one order to another (privilege) or a low one (social handicap).

(iv) The revision is even deeper when the creation of a new order of worth is on progress.

In comparison with Bourdieu's critical sociology

The comparison could be drawn between the previously outlined sociology of critique and

justification and Weber's orders of legitimate domination regarding political authority, or

Foucault's analyses of the relations between power and knowledge inLes mots et les choses,

but I shall concentrate here on differences with Bourdieu's critical sociology.

Critical sociology / sociology of critique

The first thing to say is that the two innovations in the French social sciences which followed

the Bourdieu and Foucault generation, the sociology of innovation created by Latour and the

sociology of critique and justification depart from the previous generation by the attention

they pay to everyday critical activities (or scientific controversies in the first case) which are

part of social life. In the critical sociology by contrast, the sociologist is the main character of

the critical play.

This makes a strong difference but does not imply that these two more recent sociologies

cannot bring original contributions to critique, as critical sociology obviously did. Although

they declare as a motto that the researcher should "follow the actors" in their critical activities,

these sociologies do not confine themselves to description, classification or typification of

their action. The theoretical modeling they propose (quite different in each of the twosociologies) reveals structural requirements or impediments to the critical activities involved

in controversies and disputes. Such a theoretical and analytical detour gives new insight into

the conditions of critical activities, which can be beneficial to them.

Although, in many places, Bourdieu insisted that sociology should be value free in order to be

scientific, he developed an overall critical theory. This might lead to contradictory statements,

regarding the status of sociology in particular. But such inconsistency can be disentangled if

we admit that sociologists approach critique in three different ways: #1 by analyzing

laypersons' critical activities; #2 by discovering structural constraints or mechanisms which


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which a person qualifies governs the arrangement of relevant entities (persons and objects)

when it is put to the test, and thus specifies a mode of coordination of action.

Both theories are deeply concerned by the transformation of a capacity of one kind into a

capacity of another. The concept of "conversion" or "reconversion" of one kind of capital into

another points to a hidden aspect of the reproduced domination which endures in spite ofapparent social changes. The concept of "transport of worth" designates a process which

raises a sentiment of injustice and may arouse accusation precisely because the evaluation

takes into account objects that are foreign to the world from which the test stems, and only

relevant for another worth. Conversely, criticism of injustice may demonstrate that the

deficiency of a person in a different qualification has followed her into the test in spite of

herself, so that she suffers from a handicap (accusation of a "transport of deficiency"). The

theoretical category of the critical sociology ("reconversion of capital") is thus part of the

systematical sources of injustice and motives for critique that the sociology of critique

reveals.

In comparison with Dewey's pragmatism

I shall now turn to aspects of critique and justification which relate to public problems and

which Bourdieu's critical sociology did not address. On these aspects, fruitful comparisonsshould be drawn between the model of the sense of justice that we found common to the

plurality of orders of worth and political or social philosophies which theorized

justice (Rawls, Walzer), or the pragmatic and normative requirements of the communicative

public space (Habermas).5

Within the context of this workshop, I shall limit myself to a

comparison with Dewey's pragmatist approach which fully dealt with public problems.

When Boltanski and Thvenot developed the key notion of "test" (preuve), they were not

influenced by Dewey but by Latour's "trial", although they twisted it in a completely different

notion, from Latour's "trial of force" (preuve de force) to a "reality test" (preuve de ralit)

involved in the qualification for worth. But one could find a former origin to both these

notions in Dewey's main concern for uncertainty and experience, for trials and tests, and his

insistence on the high dependency on the surroundings, a concern which is not so strong in

Bourdieu. The tests for profitable knowledge is "imposed by surroundings, which are only in

part compatible and reinforcing" and "these surroundings test its strength and measure itsendurance". In contrast to Latour's trials of force, Dewey praises "intelligently directed

experience" against "casual and uncritical experience" (Dewey 1929 [1925], chap.III). Here is

the basis for his notion of "critique", with a sense which is closer to scientific inquiry than the

exposition of unjust and abusive power or domination. This kind of test grounds Dewey's

critical stance and delineates his approach to public problems. Yet "to be intelligently

experimental is but to be conscious of this intersection of natural conditions so as to profit by

it instead of being at its mercy", so that "a fulfillment comes and is pronounced good, is

judgedgood". The additional notion of the good is explicitly there, in contrast to Latour.

Unlike Boltanski and Thvenot however, there is no consideration for the confrontation of a

plurality of most legitimate species of the common good.

Dewey's notion of "common interest" or "shared interest" is defined after a process of

communication, when "the consequences of conversation extend beyond the two directly

concerned, that they affect the welfare of many others, the act acquires a public

capacity" (Dewey 1946 [1927], chap. I). Actually the process relies of the default of some

good, and it is the recognition of "evil consequences" which forces to reflect upon

interconnected behavior. Consequently Dewey is hostile to the notion that aggregated

collective action constitutes a community. He insists on the "participation in activities and

sharing in results" which "demand communication as a prerequisite", and not only the "frozen

words of written speech" but "the winged [ails] words of conversation" and dialogue as

5 On the comparison with Rawls and Walzer, see: Thvenot 1995, Boltanski and Thvenot 2000.


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well (id., chap.V, VI). For this reason, he is constantly preoccupied by what is referred to as

participative democracy. He highlights appropriate methods of education and training which

are needed for such participation to prevail.

"Concerted action" accounts for the "becoming institutionalized" of natural events, the rule

being nothing but "standardized habit" (Dewey 1929 [1925], chap.III). In this perspective,institutions and rules are to be flexible and criticized, and we shall not find in Dewey an

account of their specific strength or power which actually make them distinct from habits. Yet

his observation about "symbolism" reminds us of Durkheim "effervescence collective" and

we should now turn to Durkheim's legacy to find another source of inspiration for a stronger

notion of institution: "[symbolism is] a product of reflection upon direct phenomena", not a

"cold, intellectual sign of a social organization", but the social organization "made present and

visible, a center of emotionally charged behavior" (Dewey 1929 [1925], chap.III)

In comparison with Durkheim's legacy

Durkheim was not officially invited to our confrontation. Nevertheless, I feel obliged to call

for him now. Considering his legacy, and the way his approach to institutions and forms of

thought (formes de connaissance) was elaborated in new directions by Bourdieu and

Boltanski-Thvenot, will clarify differences with Dewey's pragmatism and even sharperdivergences with Dewey's sociological interactionist legacy. Another reason for summoning

him now is that he has been abundantly used in the later movement of social constructivism,

although he preventively distanced himself from the risk of relativism. Social constructivism

is now strongly attacked for its relativism, by the tenants of the reactive wave of

"Standardized factuality", if I may put it this way, which is presently invading politics and

social affairs and, among other domains, the welfare policies which I chose here as an

illustrative case study. This reaction is also at the background of our workshop agenda.

Bourdieu and Boltanski on classifications

The way Durkheim and Mauss related classificatory schemes to social groups, and the way

the late Durkheim linked forms of thought to religion and social ties, were quite influential on

Bourdieu's sociology. But the agonistic transformation of social groups into conflicting social

classes gave a different thrust to Bourdieu's understanding of the "social usages ofcategorization". Even in his late proposal to go beyond both Cassirer's symbolic forms and

Durkheim's "form on thought", the variations in the cognitive disposition towards the world

remain related to social positions. By contrast, pragmatist's differentiation like James' "various

type of thinking" or Hacking's "styles of reasoning" are not related to social positions but to

different modes of accommodating reality depending on purposes. These two differentiations

are again "perpendicular", one linked to the disposition of the person and the other to the

disposition of the situation.

Boltanski collaborated at length with Bourdieu and was deeply involved in the creation of the

journalActes de la recherche en sciences sociales. In relation to the former topic, they wrote

together about "dominant ideology" and classification struggles as class struggles (Bourdieu

et Boltanski 1974). Later he developed a proper analysis of the representation of social

groups, using the case of professionals ("cadres") (1987 [1982]). It was a first contribution to

understanding the way persons get "bigger" through collective representation.

The paradox of coded forms

Being ten years younger than Boltanski, I joined later Bourdieu's research group, after an

initial training in mathematics and economics, and stayed for a much shorter time than he did


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leads to a considerable stretching of the notion of institution which comes to include any

"social practices", as most frequently termed today, or even "social rituals". When we get to

this point, the benefit of the strong first affirmative side of the institution is lost.

Boltanski and Thvenot on "monte en gnralit"

Both our parallel and collaborative work with Boltanski led to the understanding of

justification/critiqueand two-sided conventions or engagement in my own workwhich

captures both this moments. At the beginning of this collaboration, I was elaborating the

notion of "investment in form" for costly construction operations which spare actors the work

of forging resemblances and crafting equivalencies in each situation and, in return, yield

coordination output that varies by three characteristics: time span, spatial extension and the

solidity of the related material equipment (Thvenot 1984). From my experience of going to

and fro between sociological investigations based on interviews and observations and

statistical surveys, I realized that these two forms of knowledge were not in the relation of

particular monographs to general evidence, or qualitative to quantitative as currently stated,

but that they were linked to different ways of making people and things general, either by

comparing entities to a prototype or putting them in series according to criteria. I also noticed

these two modes of categorization in classifying activities. I also noticed that proximity to aprototype and statistical frequency both rest on differently shaped material evidence and

involvement of objects, while what counts as relevant evidence is quite different in the two

cases. In the link between cognition and coordination, objects offer strong mediations:

different investments of forms generate different forms of the probable, differentconstraints on what can be proved and offered as relevant evidence. From experiencing the

concrete support which techniques and methods bring in the way statistical codes coordinate

activities, I was attentive to the role of material arrangements in equivalency-making and

these orientations gave rise to a research program on the " economies of conventional forms"

in organization.

On his side, Boltanski was studying the process of detaching from singularity

("dsingulariser") which is required to support general causes and, when it fails, provokes the

"denunciative" judgment of abnormality that third parties produce (Boltanski, Darr et Schitz

1984).9

Together, we run a large experimental research program on "finding one's way insocial space" (Boltanski and Thvenot 1983). It documented laymen capacity of social

categorization. This boundary paper marks the turning point from Bourdieu's "sens social"

perspective to studying the relation between representation and evaluation which resulted in

the notion of order of worth. In our avenues of research, one can notice both Durkheim's

legacy used in a quite different way from Bourdieu, and a departure from Durkheim in the

analyses of the operations (and failures) of "monte en gnralit", as we coined them with a

phrase and notion that were largely taken up. The phrase, which is not easy to translate in

English, encapsulates the formatting that allows abstraction from situated things and people,

generalization and circulation. But what about characterizations which are not based on such

general forms of equivalence, that Dewey and Bourdieu seems to favor and which notions of

"social practice" or "practical knowledge", "tacit knowledge" are opposing to (Knorr-Cetina

Schatzki Savigny, 2001)? The answer to this question led to the next step of the analytical

framework which I will present now for the sake of discussing notions of practice.

2. THE SECOND PLURALISM OF REGIMES OF ENGAGEMENT: THE

EXTENSION OF CRITIQUE

On Justification was dedicated to studying actions that are submitted to public judgment. It

deliberately left aside other kind of actions and their appreciation. While we prepared the

9 In On Justification we adopted a different concept of "denunciation" that designates the critical reduction of

one order of worth on the ground of another.


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"bad faith" ("mauvaise foi") highlights processes involved in the substantialist reduction of the

engagement in plan which are different from the instrumental subjection of another human

being. He assumes as existential the "project" format i.e. a human being free to make the

choice of her goal. His analysis of the "facticity" of the "being-in-itself" displays the

alienation of the one who denies (bad fait) her freedom of choice and behaves as an objectamong constraining circumstances. Sartre does not take into account parallel reductions

related to other engagement, since he sticks to the project format, the explicit reason why

Bourdieu was so critical against him.

The asymmetrical exploitation of the reduction: extending the analysis of domination

When at least two persons are involved, A can asymmetrically exploit the substantialist

reduction, deliberately taking advantage of it at the expense of B. In order for the reduction to

be beneficial to him, A shows "bad faith" i.e. only faith in the guaranteed side, but bad faith

because of his intent to deceive. He manifests the one-sided confidence in order to induce B in

the same stance. In some more or less formal agreementdepending on the regime of

engagementA communicates B, possibly implicitly, that he counts on this guaranteed side:

worthy qualification, good will or little routine. In the second operation, A takes for granted

this one side as a fact, assuming that it is established without any questioning. In the thirdoperation, A makes out of it a property of B who is thus trapped in this facticity. B is assumed

a fixed conventional quality without concern for the dynamics of the situation, or a fixed

project without any demand for revision in its achievement, or a fixed routine ability without

the slightest accommodating to the surroundings. How does A "exploits" this substantialist

reduction? Quite simply, he plays on the two faces of the engagement. He remembers for his

own benefit all that was forgotten in the three reductive operations. For his own sake he takes

full advantage of the opening side of the engagement while relying on the entrapped other,

locked in theprima facie of the engagement as if there were no opening for inquietude and

dynamics of revision. A is an "exploiter", or more precisely exploiteurin a former meaning of

the French term pointing to the one who abuses, for his one profit, the trust of someone else.

But the notion of "trust" is considerably enriched by the approach of the dynamics of

engagement and their pluralism.

Exploitation can remain invisible if A, well aware of the limited landmarks of the confidenceengaged, uses profitably the room for maneuver that it leaves. Or bad faith can be cynically

expressed in case A reproaches B not to have properly behaved. The reproach means that B

did not open her conduct to convenient revisions as "it" was expected. In fact, "it" hides A's

own expectations for the benefit of his maneuver. But, because of the former reduction to the

face value of the engagement, there was no way to anticipate the need for revision. At the

level of mutual familiarity engagement, this bad faith reduction is a very common feature of

male domination when living with a partner although the reverse can happen in the alleged

feminine bad faith.

The maneuver can get more complex and involve several regimes of engagement. For

instance, current organizational work will imply a cascade of regimes most of them, if not all,

suffering from the substantialist reduction and being used for exploitation. A "agrees" with B

that, for a conventionally qualified duty (publicly justifiable engagement) to be properly done,

B will act normally, through normal actions (engaging in a plan), and even behave as she is inthe habit of doing it, as usual, with her own little routine (familiar engagement), and possibly

be watchful and vigilant to changes and new opportunities in an ever-changing

environment (exploration engagement). Exploitation comes from the limited number of

engagements among this cascade which are acknowledged with their two faces and opened to

dynamical evaluation and thus, to remuneration. The "culture of audit" or omnipresent

evaluation is actually hiding these limitations and ensuing exploitations. By analyzing the

exploitation of the substantialist reduction, we can offer an new extension of the analysis of

mechanisms of domination.


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The encounter of the plurality of engagements: extending to oppression thedomain of critique

Just as the first pluralism of orders of worth arouses critical tensions between them as well as

efforts for compromising, the second pluralism of engagements entails pressures from one

regime to another. I use the word pressure rather than the phrase critical tension which

suggests publicity. Troubling pressures can lead to the expression of inconvenience, but not

necessarily through criticizing and arguing since the use of language and argument is

unequally appropriate for the different regimes below the public engagements.

Structural tyranny from one regime upon another

The tyranny of one regime upon another implies that one kind of good is stifled by anoother.

The differentiation of regimes allows a systematic account of this source of pressure and of

the resulting oppressions. Such pressures are not adequately grasped by the

collective/individual or even public/private oppositions, since strain is neither a matter of

aggregation, nor of trespassing. The pressure which a regime puts on another discredits the

realistic confidence engaged, and prejudices the good pursued. Moreover the public/private

distinction is too dependent on the liberal architecture to capture the familiar engagement nor

the pressure on it from the engagement in an individual plan which occupies an intermediary

position with regard to the public. Benefiting the differentiation, we can analyze the

consequences of the contemporary insistence on individual will, choice, consent or autonomy.

It does not only eclipses the higher level of the common public, as Dewey rightfully noted.

The format of individual project achievement relying on a functionally seized world puts also

high pressure on the lower level of familiar accommodation. And since such attachments

support self-confidence and has a strong part in the consistency of the person, the damage to

this engagement causes more than discomfort or embarrassment, and results in humiliation.

Fieldwork research based on this approach documented these pressures in a variety of

domains of social change: welfare and health policies, workplace organization, life together in

communities. These studies also brought to light the tyranny of most public regimes which

discredit familiar attachments, as well as the reverse tyranny of close attachments which

threatens the good of public engagements.

The analytical framework of the second pluralism calls for an extension of current approachesto critique. Everyday critique which is explicitly oriented towards a public judgment relying

on a qualified reality test, or sociological critique which leaves more implicit its normative

basis, converge in assuming legitimate third party forms of evaluations of the good. By

contrast with tensions stemming from the first pluralism of the orders of worth, which

produce a main source of public criticism, the pressures resulting from the second pluralism

of regimes do not immediately or invariably lead to such criticism since they lack a shared

level of publicity. Revisions ensuing testing experience in non public regimes do not lead to a

critical and argued reaction based on conventional qualification. In the engagement in plan,

revision can be reported with oral, unqualified ordinary language which lacks the formal

conventional control but, thanks to its embedded grammar of action, usually fits the format of

planned action achieved with adjusted functionality. The material support for relevant

information should be a tool or environment offering functional grip or clutch. They can be

used by different actors to evaluate the achievement of the action in plan and the rightfunctioning, without further conventional qualification. Public critique consisting in

disqualification with respect to the common good is replaced by the critical assessment of

dysfunction. In the familiarity engagement, the testing experience is more personalized and

localized, depending on the path of familiarization. Disruption of confidence which lead to

uneasiness. Embarrassment is not expressed in articulate language at first. Bodily gestures are

appropriate ways of signaling the relevant information, initially for oneself, in the form of

clues or indices which are spotted in the surroundings.


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find their path to public criticism. It should also embrace mechanism which can be exploited

to maintain unquestioned asymmetries of power.

We can sketch out this comparison reefing to broad domains of social, political and economic

change on which the three considered social theories inspired a large amount of research, and

on which I also have run empirical collective research program. The first one deals withwelfare and education policies in action or practice, together with participative democracy

dynamics The second deals with the regulation of policies and politics including economical

ones, and the investments in standardization and evaluation tools which are implemented for

the coordination of action. We have studied both theses domain in France but also in a

comparative perspective with other European countries, and with the US in some cases,

aiming at a view on differences and global changes. Each domain undergoes massive changes

and questions social theories about their ability to deal with them.

Welfare and educational policies, participative democracy

A lot of research inspired by Bourdieu's theory has been devoted to educational and social

work. The reason is that professionals occupied in these domains have been particularly

targeted by the unveiling of the symbolic violence they exert. Inculcating the values of the

dominant class and bringing discredit on working-class culture, they are pointed out asunconscious agents of the reproduction of domination. As such, they are considered as

members of a specific socio-occupational category, "professions intermediaries". As a matter

of fact, Alain Desrosires and Laurent Thvenot created a new category with this design when

they were revising the French socio-occupational classification (Desrosires et Thvenot

1988).

This unveiling would certainly challenge Dewey's claim that professions of education and

social work actively contribute to educating for a more participative democracy. More

generally, Bourdieu's critical sociology is highly suspicious towards claims for democracy

and, as a result, discloses strong limitations on these pretensions. For example he stated that

the democratization of the French educational system did not change significantly the

reproduction of domination because of the devaluation of diplomas and reorientation on

selective curricula. With the analysis of the "noblesse d'Etat", he points to the reproduction of

an elite class through socialization from their milieu to personal bonds forged in grandescoles. Actually this unveiling converges with the actors' denunciation of the hidden

transportation of Domestic worth into the realm of Civic worth. More generally this critical

sociology points to the monopolizing of representative positions by the same persons which

consequently do not represent their constituency. In addition, intellectuals, political experts

and intermediaries involved in the promoters of participative democracy are frequently

members of the dominated fraction of the dominant class and their activity has few impact on

the "overall field of power", by contrast to those who have in their possession economic

capital. This critical sociology is mainly dedicated to debunking claims of democratization or

of social change which hides conversion of capital and perpetuation of domination. With this

specialization, it is highly valuable in pushing further the critical stance.

Dewey's contribution to this domain is completely different. It might even seem, at first sight,

opposed to the previous one and certainly is, in some aspects. Dewey's developments on non

authoritarian relationships and learning have had large influence on research, training courses

and practice in the domains of education, social work and participative democracy. These are

the key domains to which he expects his philosophy to contribute, in fostering the critical

construction of options and values within the process of inquiry and search. As mentioned

before, his notion of critique is mainly issued from the scientific and experimental method. As

such, it does not directly relate to critical tensions coming from the denunciation of abusive

powers, and the interplay between different orders in particular. In terms of orders of worth,

his contribution has a strong bias in favor of the Industrial worth because of the way he

conceives the reality test in the process of inquiry and investigation, and even the contribution


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(i) Although standard-setting procedures and committees offer the opportunity to contrast and

confront different specifications of the common good and orders of worth (Industrial, Market,

Civic, Renown and Inspiration), the outcome is a quality, qualification or certification.

This encapsulation of a plurality of engagements in the thing in itself is a requirement for the

extension of Market coordination which assumes that goods (merchandises) and their qualityare common knowledge. As a consequence the Market worth is placed in a superordinate

position with regards to other orders of worth which are reduced to qualities of the market

goods and not conflicting claims for the common good, on the same level as the Market worth

of competition. Thus market convention of coordination integrates a plurality of other

conventions at a lower level and in the reduced form of objective qualities.

This reduction of engagement into the measurable properties of separated entities is a clear

case of the "substantialist reduction" that I analyzed before, disclosing the exploitation

mechanism associated with it.

(ii) The "governing with standards" move is not only market-worthy and market-driven. It can

be positively evaluated with respect to the construction of the public (good) according to

political liberalism. Then the issue is not market competition which requires the common

knowledge identificationqualityof market goods, but freedom of individual choice. The

change in the domain of regulations marked by the expansion of standardization andcertification can thus be presented as some sort of individual "liberation", and be supported by

the critique against abusive power of centralized and hierarchical regulations. We reach here

the paradoxical aspect of the ongoing change : more standardization for more

individualization.13

In fact "choice" requires the preliminary consolidation of options, the

formatting of a range of plans in between which one is chosen: the prerequisite of individual

choice is engagement in a plan. This liberal political construction necessitates the

infrastructure of well formatted autonomous options. When applied to welfare, educational or

health policies, this formatted options are hard to obtain since professional services are to

include care for familiar attachments, as we have seen before. When studying safety

standards, I could already analyze the difficulty raised by familiar uses to the standardization

process which demands, at least, functional engagement in a plan, in order to devise the

testing procedures. Consequently, standardization dramatically downplays and oppresses the

familiarity engagement, or relies on routine (Breviglieri 2004), the result of substantialistreduction of this engagement.

(iii) Since it privileges the level of engaging in a plan, governing with standard reduces both

the appeal to, an debate on, the upper level of the plurality of orders of worth or specifications

of the common good, and the opening to the lower level of familiar engagement and

attachments. This limitation corresponds to a general move in the way policies are evaluated

nowadays by targeted "objectives" and functional factors. Public critique as a disqualification

with respect to the common good is replaced by critical assessment of dysfunction. Even

European law has undergone a similar transformation with the expansion of the notion of

"directive" which targets an objective.

This limitation fosters the confusion between a guaranteealways dependant to the

specification of some kind of good and open to inquietudeand a fact. Certification is

becoming pure measurement. The deep movement of "evidence-based policy" now reaching

Europe after the US is typical of this confusion. And the ensuing "hard facts" orientation is

striving to shroud all the benefits brought to the understanding of measurement, quantification

and qualification by the non relativist constructivist approaches here considered, and the

science studies.

13 In contradiction to Arendt's diagnoses of simple mass standardization. I ironically coined the

paradoxical conjunction of standardization and individualization, " les standards de la libert" playing with the

phrase "l'tendard de la libert" (standard of liberty) which reminds us that a standard is, originally, the flag

raised as a rallying point


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