Regional Integration and the Power of International Parliamentary Institutions
A comparative analysis of the EALA, Parlasur and UEMOA Parliament.
Student Mattijn Kroos
Studentnumber 1390619
Supervisor Dr. T.P. Louwerse
Word count 8.336 (text-only)
Date June 12, 2017
Abstract
This thesis explores explanations for the weak relation between regional integration and power of
international parliamentary institutions. There is an assumed causal relationship between regional
integration as an independent variable, and parliamentary power as a dependent variable. However,
quantitative research has shown that this relation is weak. As there are clear expectations for such a
relationship, why, then, is this relationship weak? A comparative case study is done for the UEMOA
Parliament, EALA and the Parlasur. These cases are analyzed on the areas of linkage between national
and international parliamentary assemblies; the mandate of the IPI; the involvement of grassroots
support; and executive dominance. The relationship between regional integration and parliamentary
powers is weak because of a dominating intergouvernmentalist attitude of the member states.
Introduction
Many scholars connect integration to parliamentary powers: political and economic integration led to
the powerful European Parliament (Malamud & Sousa, 2007), integration increased when the
European Economic Community was founded (Moravcsik, 2005) and integration and regional
governance rise along the establishment of parliamentary organs (Bechle & Rüland, 2014). Integration
leads towards supranational governance. Moreover, vertical accountability is an upcoming issue with
regard to supranational governance. Parliaments are then the organs needed for representation and
transparency (Habegger, 2006; Marschall, 2007). Democratic legitimacy is therefore considered as a
reasonable explanation for the relationship between parliaments and integration (Habegger, 2010;
Nzewi, 2014; Malamud & Sousa, 2007). However, quantitative research by Papenborg (2016) has
shown that this relationship is weak. Some strongly integrated international governmental
organizations do not have such strong parliamentary assemblies. Examples are the Parlandino, the
Benelux Council and the OECS Assembly.
This thesis examines the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA), the West African Economic and
Monetary Union (UEMOA in French) and Parlasur (Parliament of Mercosur). These parliaments have
similar levels of parliamentary powers but different levels of integration, which makes them an
excellent example when exploring the weak relationship between regional integration and
parliamentary powers. The research question for this thesis will be:
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Why does integration not impact parliamentary powers?
Explanations for this weak relationship can possibly be found in different paths towards parliamentary
development or the level of executive dominance. To analyse the different paths towards
parliamentary powers, the process of integration and the development of parliamentary powers over
time is studied to recognize the working mechanisms in these parliaments (Malamud & Sousa, 2007).
Next to path dependency, executive dominance is viewed as a possible explanation for the weak
relationship. Executive dominance is based on the idea that international organizations that
predominantly have members with parliamentary regimes are different from international
organizations that predominantly have members with presidential regimes. It is considered to be
unlikely that members with presidential regimes are very supportive to the parliaments of the
international organization (Malamud, 2005).
This discrepancy between broadly shared expectations and actual results offers an interesting
case for research. Also Cofelice and Stavridis (2014, p. 160) argue that “it would be particularly
interesting to explore whether the conditions that led to the development of EP’s (European
Parliament) powers are actually working in other contexts, or whether totally different processes are
underway” and comparative studies in this field would “allow to test the accuracy and validity of
theoretical approaches aiming to explain the puzzle of IPIs’ establishment and empowerment –
approaches that so far have been mainly based on the analysis of the EP case’’ (Cofelice & Stavridis,
2014, p. 160). Thereafter, there is need for a better understanding of parliamentary power with regard
to vertical accountability. Vertical accountability will decrease the democratic deficit (Habegger,
2006). Parliamentary assemblies are considered as an accepted way to legitimate authority of
transnational governance (Marschall, 2007), which hint towards the importance of parliamentary
powers.
The weak relationship between regional integration and the power of international
parliamentary institutions can be explained by the intergouvernmentalist approach of the member
states. The member states of the three studied IPIs are primarily concerned with their national
interests. In all of the three cases, member states seem to be primarily concerned with their national
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interests, just as we observe a relative similar, but limited level of parliamentary power.
Theory and concepts
Various scholars (Cutler, 2006; Sabic, 2008) have offered definitions for international parliamentary
institutions (IPI). In Cutler’s words “may an IPI be defined as an international institution that is a
regular forum for multilateral deliberations on an established basis of an either legislative or
consultative nature, either attached to an international organization or itself constituting one, in which
at least three states or transgovernmental actors are represented by parliamentarians, who are either
selected by national legislatures in a self-determined manner or popularly elected by electorates of the
member states’’ (Cutler, 2006, p. 83). Sabic (2008) makes a distinction between international
parliamentary organs (IPO) and international parliamentary associations (IPA). The difference is that
an IPO is a formal organ of an international governmental organization (IGO) and consists of
parliamentarians. In contrast, IPAs are ‘’irrespective of how they are constituted and to what extent the
appointment reflects the political spectrum in home parliaments’’ (Sabic, 2008, p. 258). An example of
an IPO is the European Parliament, which is a formal, institutional part of the European Union. An
example of an IPA is the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA). The NATO PA is an IPA as it is
“institutionally separate from the NATO structure” (Cofelice & Stavridis, 2014, p. 151). Both IPOs,
and IPAs are relevant for the study to IPIs, therefore no distinctions are made between in these two
forms (Cofelice & Stavridis, 2014).
The main explanatory variable in this thesis is the level of integration between the member
states of an international organization (IO). A distinction between two main forms of integration can
be made; political and economic integration (Nello, 2002). The first, political integration, has been
defined by Haas as follows: “Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several
distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities
toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national
states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed
over the pre-existing ones’’ (Haas, 1958, p.16). The second form of integration, economic integration,
is defined as "measures designed to abolish discrimination between economic units belonging to
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different national states" (Balassa, 2011, p.1). Balassa also identifies five different stages of
integration; from a Free Trade Area to complete economic integration with a supra-national authority.
These stages of integration are seen as an sequential process, but this does not necessarily have to be
so (Sapir, 2011).
The main dependent variable in this thesis is the level of parliamentary power. In the work of
Cofelice and Stavridis (2014), parliamentary power is built upon five different parliamentary functions
which are consultative, oversight, appointment, budgetary, and legislative powers. The actual
operationalization of these functions will be discussed later. Every IPI has consultative powers, while
appointment and legislative powers are often lacking. Parliamentary powers can also be seen as
institutional authority (Rocabert et al, 2014).
Now we will take a look at the dominant integration theories. An important theory on
integration is developed by Haas. “Haas sought to develop a theory that explained why, once an initial
commitment was made, forward momentum of integration was inevitable” (Moravcsik, 2005, p. 350).
Therefore he developed the theory of neo-functionalism (Moravcsik, 2005). According to neo-
functionalism, integration takes place via spillover. Spillover is the ongoing process of cooperation,
from one sector into another. This process is no coordinated process, but merely a result of unintended
developments. Several different kind of spillover can be identified. First, we distinguish functional
spillover. Functional spillover is based on enhancing cooperation to realize a certain objective.
Political spillover is the furthering cooperation to related policy areas. Cultivated spillover is
“upgrading the common interest’’ (Van der Vleuten, 2015, p. 231). Fourth, we can identify
geographical spillover. Geographical spillover is expansion of cooperation by attracting new member
states (Van der Vleuten, 2015).
However neo-functionalism is considered to be an approach which deserves to be taken
seriously, it is not free from criticism. Empirical results do not always fit neo-functionalist
expectations. European cooperation has not always been the smooth process as neo-functionalist
suppose, but a mere stop-and-go process. Functional spillover and geographical spillover are also less
commonly observed than neo-functionalists would expect (Van der Vleuten, 2015). The theory of neo-
functionalism is strongly connected to the case of the European Union. However the theory is not
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designed to specifically explain European integration, it is questionable whether it is applicable to
other cases of regional integration (Cini & Borragán, 2013).
The realist counterpart of neofunctionalism is intergouvernmentalism. Just like
supranationalism, intergouvernmentalism as described here is not used as a term to describe the
distribution of powers between national governments but as an approach to integration. According to
intergouvernmentalism, states are the central actors in decision-making and explains that agreements
only take place by convergence of national interests. States will only cooperate on issues of low
politics, as high politics impair national sovereignty too much. Low politics are less sensitive issues on
which states are willing to cooperate and to shift decision-making to a higher, supranational level.
High politics are concerned with vital interests to which states protect their sovereignty (Van der
Vleuten, 2015). Critics of intergouvernmentalism argue that this approach does not acknowledge the
possible movement of interests during negotiations. Thereafter, negotiations are often a showdown of
force in which less powerful states cannot always defend their national interests (Van der Vleuten,
2015).
Integration needs institutionalization to facilitate further cooperation. Malamud and Sousa
(2007) argue that the European Parliament has become such a powerful parliament because of the high
extent of political and economic integration. Regional integration increased at the moment that the
European Economic Community was founded (Moravcsik, 2005). Nzewi (2014) argues too that
“integration implies community-building’’ (Nzewi, 2014, p. 492). Furthermore, Bechle and Rüland
(2014) state that the establishment of parliamentary organs often goes along with developing levels of
integration and regional governance. This reaction on integration might be the result of increasing
national and international pressures (Bechle & Rüland, 2014). More often, explanations are found in a
need for democratic legitimacy (Habegger, 2010; Nzewi, 2014; Malamud & Sousa, 2007). Higher
levels of integration often go along decision-making at supranational levels. Then the question arises
how such a vertical accountability can be guaranteed (Habegger, 2010). Parliamentarism is viewed “as
a widespread accepted way to legitimize political constitutions“ (Marschall, 2007, p.5).
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In defiance to this, research of Papenborg (2016) has shown that the assumed link between regional
integration and parliamentary powers lacks empirical evidence. Powers of IPIs and levels of regional
integration show a positive, but weak relationship. How could this possibly be?
Malamud and Sousa (2007) offer several explanations. The European integration process is
widely seen as an example and the outcome of this process is admired by other regional organizations.
But the process tend to be overlooked and phases are sometimes skipped. Path dependency, thus,
might be a possible explanation. Path dependency is the notion that history matters and that history
influences the path to the future (Mahoney, 2000). The idea of path dependency is based in the study
of historical institutionalism. Hall and Taylor (1996) argue that path dependency rejects the view that
the same operative forces will lead to the same results, due to different contexts. “Contextual features
are often inherited from the past” (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 6). State capacities and policy legacies do
influence policy choices in a nation’s response (Hall & Taylor, 1996).
Next, executive dominance can be viewed as a likely explanation. Executive dominance is the
extent to which the executive power dominates the legislative power. International organizations that
predominantly have members with parliamentary regimes are different from international
organizations that predominantly have members with presidential regimes. Presidential regimes
emphasize the executive power and will therefore prefer intergovernmental structures. Parliamentary
regimes emphasize the legislative power and will therefore support international parliaments. If the
level of executive dominance is high on a national level, it is likely that there is comparable level of
executive dominance on an international level (Malamud, 2005). Parliamentary of presidential regimes
do influence the integration process (Malamud & Sousa, 2007), knowledge on this issue therefore is
very interesting for this study. However, it is important to know that this mechanism is not always the
case. For example, the United States have a relative powerful parliament while being part of a
presidential regime. Moreover, despite the parliamentary regime of the United Kingdom, the British
parliament is still dominated by the executive power and therefore have a high level of executive
dominance (Erk et al, 2013).
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Another more intergouvernmentalist explanation is integration merely takes place by
convergence of interests of national states and the importance and competences of parliamentary
assemblies thus are of relative minor importance (Moravcsik, 2005).
Case selection
The case selection is based upon a quantitative data analysis. The method of case selection is provided
by Gerring and Seawright (2008). This “diverse case selection strategy has as its primary objective the
achievement of maximum variance along relevant dimensions (Gerring & Seawright, 2008, p. 300).
The relevant dimension in this study is the explanatory variable of integration. This method is used to
explore explanatory relationships. In this study, we work with three independent variables which all
lead towards the same dependent variable, which is a comparable level of parliamentary power. As the
three independent variables cover a major range of all possible values, the representativeness is
considerably high (Gerring & Seawright, 2008).
This case selection based upon three data indexes. These indexes are economic integration,
political integration, and parliamentary power, of which the latter is the dependent variable. The
population of IPIs is determined by Cofelice and Stavridis (2014) and Cofelice (2015). These two
sources are quite similar but complement each other (Papenborg, 2016).
The economic integration is defined by the Integration Achievement Score (IAS). This index
is originally created by Huffbauer and Scott (1994), which Feng and Genna have further developed
(2003). Feng and Genna have made this economic integration index for regional organizations. The
index is composed by six different categories: “trade in goods and services; the degree of capital
mobility; the degree of labour mobility; the level of supranational institutional importance in decision-
making; the level of monetary policy coordination; and the level of fiscal policy coordination. Each
category has a value of 0 to 5 along a Guttman scale with higher values translating to higher levels in
each category” (Feng & Genna, 2003, p. 287). The final IAS is an average of the scores of these six
categories.
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The political integration is measured by three different indicators. These indicators are the
degree of supranationality, the locus of activity and supranational institutional importance. The relative
importance of these indicators is measured by a principal component analysis (Papenborg, 2016, p. 6).
The used index for this case selection originates from Papenborg's study either (2016).
Cofelice and Stavridis (2014) have measured parliamentary powers over five different
parliamentary functions. These functions are consultation, oversight, appointment, budgetary, and
legislation. Each of these functions is given a score from zero to five powers, respectively indicating
no power to very powerful. Via these scores is a weighted average calculated which indicate the
Parliamentary Power Index (PPI). It is a weighted average because not all parliamentary functions
have a common importance; consultative power cannot be, by definition, supranational or legislative,
whereas the other parliamentary functions can. Appendix A shows on which parliamentary
competencies the PPI is decided.
The PPI is based on scores of 2016, while scores on political and economic integration depend
on statistics of 2012. This difference is theoretically explainable. According to Malamud and Sousa
(2007 in Papenborg, 2016) change international structures gradually. There is a time lag between the
increased level of integration and the level of parliamentary power. Additionally, taking consistency
and reliability into account, there was a lot of data available for the year 2012 (Papenborg, 2012).
Graph 1. Case selection
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The case selection consists of the Parlasur, the EALA, and the UEMOA Parliament. The sample varies
on the extent of integration, which is the explanatory variable, and is rather similar on the dependent
variable, which is parliamentary power (See graph 1). The complete range on the cumulative
integration varies from 0.87 to 7.8 of which the least integrated IO is the UMA Council and the most 1
integrated IO is the European Union. The sample varies between 3.20 and 5.67 and therefore
represents a major part of the complete range.
The complete range on parliamentary power varies from 0.07 to 0.89 of which the European
Parliament has the highest score. Six parliaments score 0.07 in the parliamentary power index. The
sample varies slightly between 0.33 and 0.38 on parliamentary power. See Appendix B for more
information. More parliaments had a parliamentary power score in the range of the sample but are not
included in this study due to methodological considerations. Literature or data were missing in these
cases; this would decline the reliability of this study.
The Treaty of Ascunsión established the Mercosur in 1991. The Mercosur was created as an entirely
intergovernmental system. Current member states are the Argentine Republic, the Federative Republic
of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay, the Oriental Republic of Uruguay and the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela. The Treaty of Ascunsión also established the Joint Parliamentary Committee of which the
Parlasur became the successor. The Parlasur was the result of demands among the members for a
formal organ to trigger integration. The Parlasur was inaugurated in 2006 and the working session
started in 2007 (Parlasur, 2015).
The East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) is established by the Treaty for the
Establishment of the East African Community (EAC) in 1999, which came into force in 2000. The
first member states were the Republic of Uganda, the Republic of Kenya and the United Republic of
Tanzania. In 2007, the Republic of Burundi and the Republic of Rwanda also also joined the EAC.
According to Article 49 of the Treaty, the EALA is the legislative organ of the EAC. It is the mission
of the Assembly to legislate, to oversight, to represent, and to foster integration (EALA, n.d.).
The cumulative integration score is the sum of the economic and political integration score. This 1
index is made to index both integration levels of IPOs on which the case selection is determined. Economic and political integration are checked on high differences, but were absent.
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The UEMOA is the West African Economic and Monetarian Union (UEMOA in French) and
is established in 1994. The UEMOA is based on its predecessor, the UMOA (Unité Monetaire Ouest
Afrique). In 1994, seven states became member of the UEMOA (Worldbank, 2015). These countries
were Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. Guineau-Bissau joined the UEMOA in
1997. The countries in the UEMOA use the same currency, which is the CFA Franc. The CFA France
is at fixed-rate to the euro. The main objectives of the UEMOA are to intensify the competitiveness
and financial activities of the region, to develop an open market, and to harmonize national legislation.
In 2003, UEMOA Parliament succeeded the UEMOA Inter-Parliamentary Committee (UEMOA,
2003). The UEMOA Parliament is a formal part of the UEMOA structure and therefore considered to
be an IPO.
Research methods
A comparative case study is done for the Parlasur, EALA, and the UEMOA. The research design is
inspired on meta-ethnography. Meta-ethnography offers an excellent method to discover ‘what works’
and is considered to be highly replicable and transparent (Bryman, 2012; Tranfield et al, 2003). The
actual meta-ethnography framework cannot be applied to this thesis because of the use of primary
literature in this thesis. However, the process inspires the research method used in this study. An
interpretive approach is a dominant feature of meta-ethnography (Noblit & Hare, 1988).
In the process of meta-ethnography, we can identify several phases. As this study is not an
exact form of meta-ethnography, the phases have been adjusted modestly. This study is executed in
four phases. The first phase concerns the research question and the theoretical framework. The second
phase is about deciding which sources are credible and the intensive reading of these sources. The
third phase is about determining the relevant fields in order to secure the structure of the research
results. In the fourth phase, the various IPIs are compare. These phases are interconnected and do
overlap (Bryman, 2012).
Used sources are a combination of primary and secondary literature. The primary literature
consists of treaties and official documents of the different institutions and parliaments. The EALA and
EAC are the only IPI and institution of which the documents and treaties were written in English.
Documents and treaties of the UEMOA and its parliament were written in French, but could be well
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translated to English with Google Translate. When doubts on translations occurred, language experts 2
were consulted. Documents and treaties of the Parlasur and Mercosur are written in Spanish, except
for some official documents. These sources were also well translatable into English with Google
Translate and when needed, language experts were consulted.
Secondary literature was found with Google Scholar and the Leiden Catalogue. Only one
source came from the Africa Study Centre in Leiden (Adar, 2008). Literature on the EALA, UEMOA
parliament and Parlasur is found by searching on the organization’s name the parliament belongs to
(respectively EAC, UEMOA and Mercosur) or by searching on the names of the parliaments
themselves. These names were searched in combination with the terms: institutional development,
political development and (regional) integration. The resulting articles of which these searches led to,
are subsequently used to find new connecting articles by using snowball sampling. For the EALA,
Lumallas provides a comprehensive in-depth analysis of the EALA from which snowball sampling
takes place for the case of EALA. Lumallas acquired his information from “academic papers, journals,
books, annual reports of EALA and information from persons affiliated with the
Assembly” (Lumallas, 2011, p. 5). Secondary literature is used to provide contexts for the treaties.
For each case, a literature analysis is done. First, the development over time will be described
for each case. These developments will then be explained by four categories. These categories have
come forward during the reading of the literature; the main arguments tend to fall in four categories.
These categories are: the link between national and international PAs; the mandate of the IPI; the
involvement of grassroots support; diverging national political systems. When these categories are
discussed, a short conclusion per IPI will follow. In this conclusion, the understood relation between
regional integration and parliamentary power is key.
The first category of this analysis is the link between national and international PAs and
describes the interconnectedness of the two levels of policy. Do members of the IPI also have a seat in
the national parliament, or are they separated? The second category is the mandate of the IPI. This
focuses merely on the shifting of sovereignty from the national level to the international level. Themes
within this category are intergouvernmentalism; supranationalism; sovereignty; diverging/converging
interests. The third category is the level of grassroots support affected with the IPI. This category
Native speakers.2
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covers elections; civil society movements; connectedness with citizens of the region. The fourth
category is the level of executive dominance. This is the extent to which the parliament is dominated
by the executive power. This dominance can manifest in various ways. First, national structures of
decision-making will likely influence the international structures of decision-making. If presidential
regimes are predominant on a national level, than it is unlikely that the parliament dominates the
international level of decision-making in the IO. Second, executive dominance might also manifest
itself in the IO itself when there are considerably low parliamentary powers.
Results
Parlasur
The purpose of the Parlasur is, according to the Protocolo Constitutivo del Parliamento Del Mercosur,
to “ensure participation of civil society actors in the integration process” (Art. 1.4) and to “contribute
to consolidating integration through deepening and expansion” (Art. 1.6). Parlasur shows the lowest
score on integration of the sample in this study (Appendix B). Studied literature endorses this low
level of integration. Integration did increase over time, especially due to the enactment of direct
elections. Parliamentary powers have risen significantly with the establishment of the Parlasur, as the
successor of the joint parliamentary committee of the Mercosur. Since then, no developments took
place (Cofelice & Stavridis, 2014).
The first argument is based on the link between national and international parliamentary
assemblies. Members of the Parlasur have no function in the national assembly, as this is considered to
be incompatible (Parlasur, 2005). The Mercosur parliamentarians organize themselves in political
parties “according to ideological affinity rather than nationality” (Malamud & Dri, 2013, p. 228).
Members of the Parlasur are directly chosen by the Mercosur citizens (Parlasur, 2005).
A Parlasur member can be seen as a two-faced official. On the one hand, the official is tied to
national linkages and its own government. On the other hand, officials are appointed by the political
parties and they quickly adapt themselves to the regional parliament by creating connections with
ideologically affiliated parliamentarians (Malamud & Dri, 2013). This policy offers both an advantage
and a disadvantage. Beneficial is the likelihood for spillover. Detrimental, however, is that this double
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function is considered to be a contributing factor for the low legislative output by members of
Parlasur. Especially in a recently established parliament as the Parlasur, a high level of engagement is
a necessary condition (Lucci, 2013).
The double position seems to hold down the level of engagement towards the international
assembly and therefore restraints the actual parliamentary powers, considering the low legislative
production.
Secondly, we focus on the mandate of the Parlasur. The parliamentary powers increased
significantly after the constitution of the Parlasur in 2005 (Cofelice & Stavridis, 2014). The preceding
joint parliamentary committee existed and only had some consultative powers (Cofelice & Stavridis,
2014; Parlasur, 2005).
Since 2005, there have been no increases in parliamentary powers. Dri (2010) tries to explain
this by pointing out a different aim. He argues that the objective of the Parlasur was not directly
related to a democratic concern, but to include national parliaments formally in negotiations to
facilitate later ratification of treaties (Dri, 2010 in Medeiros et al, 2016). The actual Parlasur activities
are also considered as not being very influential. Although the consultative powers are relatively high
(Cofelice & Stavridis, 2014), the Parlasur has not given any opinions, has proposed almost no bills and
has not produced any human rights reports which the Parlasur ought to do (Malamud & Dri, 2013;
Lucci, 2013; Parlasur, 2005).
This low level of parliamentary activity is possibly an outcome of a region-wide
intergovernmental preference. The Parlasur member states are characterized by a deeply rooted
intergovernmental nature (Ledo, 2015; Malamud & Dri, 2013). Mercosur states fear supranationalism,
according to a Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official (Malamud & Dri, 2013). Mercosur elites
advocate for regionalism, except when it costs them sovereignty. Another important factor impairing
integration is more structural and a result of demographic asymmetry. Brazil covers around eighty
percent of the Mercosur population, accordingly more than half of seats in the Parlasur should be
distributed to Brazil. Obviously, this is a triggering situation but assigning less than fifty percent of the
seats would be undemocratic (Malamud & Dri, 2013). Criticism on the Mercosur and Parlasur is
frequently heard, for example in Uruguay. Former President Lacalle argued that Parlasur
disadvantaged Uruguay on the aspect of economic integration and therefore called for a withdrawal
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from the Parlasur. President Lacalle also stated that the Parlasur was also responsible for high costs for
the member states (Lucci, 2013).
Considering the critiques of President Lacalle, regional economic integration has declined
since 2005. The Parlasur member states are not willing to transfer sovereignty to higher levels of
decision-making which impairs development on integration and on parliamentary powers. This
unwillingness might be strengthened due to the asymmetries among the Parlasur member states.
Thirdly, we observe the involvement of grassroots support. Mercosur is willing to
“increasingly close the ties between their peoples” (Mercosur, 1991, p. 1), and the Parlasur, as well as
the Mercosur, wants to harmonize legislation and ensure participation of civil society in the integration
process (Mercosur, 1991; Parlasur, 2005).
With the establishment of the Parlasur, no grassroots movements were involved. Only national
officials and policy experts were associated with the creation of Parlasur (Grugel, 2007 in Malamud &
Dri, 2013). When the Parlasur was eventually established, civil society and social movements had no
interests in Mercosur decision-making as it was of such little relevance that it discouraged
participation (Hochstetler, 2007 in Malamud & Dri, 2013).
To establish a sustainable organ, the development is divided into two transition periods
(Parlasur, 2005; Parlasur 2015). In 2011 was the start of the second transition period of the Parlasur.
This period is characterized by the direct elections which are being implemented since 2015. This
election takes place on Mercosur Citizen Day via universal suffrage. In this way, the Mercosur citizens
are represented in the Parlasur (Mercosur, 2009; Parlasur, 2015). Actual progress on the
implementation of these direct elections differs (Lucci, 2013).
Engagement among the Mercosur population has risen over time. In the beginning, citizens
were not involved in their actual representation. But with the second transition period, direct elections
were held on the Mercosur Citizen Day. Unfortunately, social movements have had no role in this
process.
Fourthly, we consider the level of executive dominance. All of the Mercosur member states are
led by presidential regimes (CIA, 2013). This creates a high level of national executive dominance. On
the international level, the executive dominance can also be considered as quite high. Because the
Parlasur has no actual decision-making powers, the Council is the only organ responsible for decision-
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making. Therefore, the Parlasur has very limited capabilities to influence decision-making in the
Mercosur (Gorenman, 2007). The Parlasur “comprises an entirely intergovernmental system (Parlasur,
2005).
Although integration is considered to be relative low among the Mercosur member states, we
do observe a slight increase of integration over time through the implementation of direct elections on
Mercosur Citizen Day. Since the establishment, no social movements were involved in the Parlasur’s
creation nor in its consultation.
Parliamentary powers have risen strongly since the establishment of the Parlasur, as the
successor of the Mercosur Joint Parliamentary Committee. However, the parliament still lacks any
decision-making powers which results in high executive dominance. Since the creation of the Parlasur,
the parliament have neither used, nor increased its powers. According to Dri (2010), this is because the
parliament is merely used as an instrument to facilitate later treaty negotiations. As the dominant
feature is of no democratic concern, there is no incentive to increase the parliamentary powers.
Overall, parliamentary development is limited because the member states mainly concerned
with their national interests. The focus on national interests also limits integration.
EALA
The EALA is the middle case of the sample considering its level of integration. The EALA scores 3.87
on the integration index, which is the independent variable. The level of integration has risen over
time. This is foremost a result of the East African Community Legislative Assembly Elections Act of
2011 which unified the elections dates for representatives for the EALA (EALA, 2011; Lumallas,
2013). The parliamentary powers, being the dependent variable, stayed the same over time (Cofelice
& Stavridis, 2014).
The first argument is based on the link between the national and international assemblies. The
Members of the Regional Assembly (MRA) are elected by the national assembly. Members of the
EALA cannot be members of their national parliaments, according to Art. 51 of the EAC Treaty. This
consequently means that MRA are not bound to national elections and can, therefore, fulfill their
function in the EALA for the complete term of five years, regardless of the result of national elections
�15
(EAC, 2002).
This policy can be viewed in two perspectives. On the one hand, this policy enhances the
continuity of the EALA policies. Changing domestic policies and preferences do not directly change
preferences of the EALA, as well as changes in the composition of the national parliament, due to
national elections, do not directly change the MRA. It is also argued that as a result, MRA focus more
on the regional mandate if these parliamentarians are not bound to national parties (Lumallas, 2013).
However, this disconnection might also be seen as counterproductive to EALA’s interests. Such a
disconnection limits the available instruments to translate regional policy into national policy
(Terlinden, 2004; Lumallas, 2013). Integration might have risen over time due to the intense
cooperation in the EALA. But this intense cooperation is a result of a disconnection between the
national and international parliament. The integration has thus only taken place on the international
level. The disconnection does not constrain the formal parliamentary powers but does constrain the
actual parliamentary power.
Secondly, we focus on the mandate of the EALA. Considering that the EALA is by definition
the legislative organ of the EAC, it is remarkable that the EALA has a very small legislative mandate.
According to Cofelice and Stavridis (2014), the Assembly scores two out of five on legislative powers.
However, these power of the EALA can easily be overruled by the Summit and the Council (Adar,
2008; Cofelice & Stavridis, 2014). According to Art. 63 of the EAC Treaty, if a head of state withholds
assent, the bill will lapse (EAC, 2002). This makes the autonomy and exclusiveness practically useless
(Adar, 2008; Lumallas, 2013). “It therefore is not very surprising that the five pieces of legislation
enacted by the EALA do not seem terribly influential in the overall regional integration
process” (Terlinden, 2004, p. 8).
Next, when a bill does make it to the national assemblies, there is no actual follow-up
mechanism which leads to the implementation of decisions and policies in the member states. When a
member state does not implement decisions from the EAC or EALA, there are no sanctions to impose
on the neglecting member state (interview Gervase Akhaabi in Lumallas, 2013).
This limited mandate might be the result of economic and political tensions between member
states. There is an ongoing dispute between Kenya and Uganda. Also, Rwanda and Burundi are in
different phases of economic development (Adar, 2008; Lumallas, 2013). Diverging economic
�16
progress and strifes between nation-states complicate regional integration.
In the 2010 - 2012 strategic plan, the EALA declared the need to review its mandate to ensure
meaningful integration (EALA, 2010). According to the 2013 - 2018 strategic plan “It [the Assembly]
developed and implemented EALA’s first Strategic Plan (2010 - 2012)” (EALA, 2013). Unfortunately,
no evidence or support for this claim can be found.
Thirdly, we observe the involvement of grassroots support. The EAC and EALA argue to be
people-centered (EAC, 2002; EALA, 2010; EALA, 2013) as grassroots support is “crucial for the
success of the regional integration process” (Lumallas, 2013, p. 70). However, “the EAC integration
process is largely political elite-driven and the people of East African are not directly linked to the
integration process” as there are no elections which would legitimize the parliamentarians in their
function (Adar, 2008, p. 91). The absence of direct elections is explained by logistic and financial
issues, according to former Kenyan Assembly Speaker Kenneth Marende (Lumallas, 2013). To
improve this minor link with the EAC citizens, bus tours with EALA representatives have been
organized to bring the assembly to the people (Adar, 2008; EALA, 2010). According to Lumallas
(2013), these tours provide no replacement for direct elections, as elections are one of the core
principles of liberal democracy. Furthermore, the assembly is often criticized on the conduct of its
mandate as it stays away from providing advice in matters concerning the dispute between Uganda
and Kenya or other matters concerning the EAC citizens’ interests (Lumallas, 2013).
However, the EALA has been working on harmonization of the national election procedures.
These procedures varied per nation but the East African Community Legislative Assembly Elections
Act has united these procedures. This bill passed in 2011 and is considered to be a big step on the issue
of integration (EALA, 2011; Lumallas, 2013). The election date of the EALA representatives has been
harmonized among the member states. Still, the national assemblies continue to make the rules for the
election procedure of EALA members and direct elections remain to be absent (EALA, 2011).
Fourthly, we consider the level of executive dominance. The EAC member states are all led
by presidential regimes (CIA, 2013). This results in a high executive dominance on the national level.
On the international level, the extent of this executive dominance is also considerably high. The few
legislative powers of the Assembly are easily overruled by a single head of state (Adar, 2008: Cofelice
& Stavridis, 2014; Lumallas, 2013).
�17
The EALA shows no clear relationship between regional integration and parliamentary
powers. As already mentioned in the introduction of this case, integration has risen due to the
Elections Act of 2011. Parliamentary powers did not change (Cofelice & Stavridis, 2014)
This absent relationship can be explained by the disconnection of the EALA elite with the
citizens of the EAC and by the high level of executive dominance. The members of the EALA
cooperate closely which might intensify integration through spillover. But through disconnection
between the national assembly and the EALA and the missing mechanism to implement EAC policy,
possible integration does not gain a foothold as there is no strong top-down policy process. EAC
integration remains to be an EALA project, while the member states need to be become involved.
Next, the EAC is characterized by a very high level of executive dominance. The national
assemblies, as well as the EALA, are dominated by the executive powers which likely causes a
preference for intergovernmental structures.
UEMOA Parliament
The UEMOA has the highest score on the integration index of the sample. The UEMOA scores 5.67
on the level of integration; the independent variable (Appendix B). Based on the literature on the
UEMOA, integration has risen over time. Before the UEMOA Parliament, the UEMOA IPC existed
and only had consultative and appointment powers. Parliamentary powers increased strongly with the
establishment of the UEMOA Parliament. Since then, no developments concerning parliamentary
powers took place (Cofelice & Stavridis, 2014).
The first argument is, again, settled on the link between national and international
parliamentary assemblies. The precursor of the UEMOA Parliament was the ‘international
parliamentary committee’ (IPC). The members of the IPC were representatives of their national
interests and did not directly serve the common interests of the UEMOA (Grimm, 1999). Also,
according to Claeys and Sindzingre (2003), national governments focus foremost on national interests
in the UEMOA. This focus on the parliamentarian’s member state changed with the Treaty of the
UEMOA Parliament. Art. 6 states that “the members of the UEMOA Parliament do exercise their
�18
mandate independently and cannot be bound by instructions from any member state (UEMOA, 2003).
This shift of dominant focus can be observed as an increase of integration.
Secondly, we focus on the mandate of the UEMOA Parliament. Before the Treaty of the UEMOA
parliament, the Interparliamentary Committee was only “advisory and animating - it was thus a body
without power” (Grimm, 1999, p. 17; Cofelice & Stavridis, 2014).
The current UEMOA parliament is held responsible for the democratic control and participates
in the decision-making, according to Article 14 of the Treaty of the UEMOA parliament (UEMOA,
2003: 1). However, this participation in the decision-making is of minor extent. The parliament is
permitted to pronounce its views on discussed issues, according to Article 26 (UEMOA, 2003: 1).
Change after the Treaty Modifying the UEMOA can be summarized as the increase of
mandatory consults to the parliament by the Commission (UEMOA, 2003: 2). Interesting is the
parliamentary competence to submit a motion of censure against the Commission, after which the
Commission can be discharged from its function (UEMOA, 2003: 1).
The small mandate might be the consequence of diverging economic performances. The
economies are not complementary and only Ivory Coast seems to benefit from the external tariff. This
strengthens the different development of UEMOA member states even more (Kireyev, 2016). Also
Nigeria and the ECOWAS influence the UEMOA negatively on politics and economy. These regional
imbalances are furthermore bolstered by the landlockedness of certain states which hampers trade
(Claeys & Sindzingre, 2003).
Thirdly, we observe the involvement of grassroots support. In the Traite Portant Creation du
Parliament de l’UEMOA is “reaffirmed that the parliament will give new impetus to the process of
integration by greater participation” (UEMOA, 2003: 1, p. 1). But according to Article 31, each
national legislative assembly appoints five members of the UEMOA parliament and citizen
participation is neglected (UEMOA, 2003: 1). Next to this, no literature on the participation or
inclusion of civil society is found. The level of integration is considered to be very low and
development over time did not take place.
The fourth and last argument is on the level of executive dominance. In the UEMOA are four
out of seven member states run by presidential regimes. Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and Niger are run by
�19
semi-presidential regimes (CIA, 2013). The level of executive dominance is therefore considered to be
relatively high for most of the member states. The UEMOA Parliament does not have a significant
amount of supranational powers (Cofelice & Stavridis, 2014). Therefore, the executive dominance can
be considered as high. But this executive dominance is limited due to the parliament’s right to submit
a motion of censure against the Commission. When such a motion is submitted, the Commission can
be discharged (UEMOA, 2003: 1). With this competence, the UEMOA Parliament has a strong control
function.
Integration as well as parliamentary powers has risen over time in the UEMOA. During the
UEMOA IPC, the member states focused foremost on their national interests and the IPC did not have
a strong mandate.
The establishment of the UEMOA Parliament in 2003 led to a significant rise of parliamentary
powers. The level of executive dominance also decreased by the parliament’s power to submit a
motion of censure against the UEMOA Commission after which the Commission can be discharged.
Next to the executive dominance, the members of the UEMOA Parliament were not bound to
instructions of the member states which increased loyalties to the collective interest.
Since the establishment of the UEMOA Parliament, no increases of parliamentary powers
have been observed. This might be the consequence of differences between the member states in
economic strength and economic development. These differences result from landlockedness of some
member states in the Sahelian zone (World Bank), which limits trade opportunities. Next to the
argument on landlockedness, does the common external tariff only benefit the further developed states
such as Ivory Coast and Senegal. This even enlarges the gap between the lowest and highest developed
member states. As a result, member states focus more on their national interests, which hinder
integration (Lumallas, 2011).
As a reaction to this, the UEMOA has set up convergence criteria for monetary integration for
debts, deficits and price stability (Claeys & Sindzingre, 2003). This convergence is supported by
flexible adhesion. Member states can operate in the field of their own interest while still be deepening
integration with the other member states (Gnassou, 1997 in Claeys & Sindzingre, 2003).
�20
Discussion
The link between national and international assemblies has been discussed in detail. UEMOA
parliamentarians, as well as EALA parliamentarians exercise their regional mandate considerably
independent of the national assemblies. Even though this might enhance continuity of the regional
policies, the disconnection between the national and regional assembly might also be
counterproductive for the implementation of regional integration policies (Terlinden, 2004; Lumallas,
2013). As a result, actual parliamentary power of the international assembly decreases although this is
not observable in formal parliamentary powers.
Accordingly, Ruffing (2015) has written about the differences between formal and de facto
autonomy within the framework of the principal-agent theory. He argues that “the correlation between
formal and de facto autonomy is often disputed (Ruffing, 2015, p. 1114).
A high level of national autonomy can have various consequences. First, the IPI is less able to
observe changing national political context and its influence on the national assembly. Second, the IPI
does not retrieve knowledge from its member states. These two arguments might result in information
asymmetry. According to the principal-agent theory, a risk is connected to information asymmetry,
which is called ‘bureaucratic drift’. In the case of a bureaucratic drift, the agent takes a different path
than proposed by the principal (Bach & Ruffing, 2013; Ruffing, 2015). The agent in this scenario is
the member state, while the IPI is the principal. The disconnectedness of the regional parliament to the
member states might rise over time, which complicates integration and the transfer from regional
policy to national policy. Therefore, I recommend limiting the disconnectedness between the national
and international assemblies.
The EP is considered to be one of the largest examples of international parliaments. It is one of
the oldest IPIs and currently has the highest level of parliamentary powers (Cofelice & Stavridis,
2014). Considering the development of the EP, the rise of parliamentary powers is an incremental
process. The EP slowly accumulated various powers, but still does not have the powers like a national
legislative assembly, as the Council and Commission remain to be the most powerful organs in the EU
(Terlinden, 2004).
This incremental process of development however, is hardly observable in the sample of this
study. The Parlasur, EALA, and the UEMOA Parliament are all successors of parliaments with less
�21
parliamentary powers. Possibly, their predecessors might have laid a foundation for a significant rise
in powers of the newly-established parliaments. Since the establishment of the current IPIs however,
no increases have taken place. There, one can question wether the establishment of a parliamentary
organ is solely a formality for an IO in the international system.
One of the main tasks of parliaments is to represent the citizens’ preferences and to translate
these into legislation (Hänggi, 2004). Representation increases democratic legitimacy (Habegger,
2010; Nzewi, 2014; Malamud & Sousa, 2007). Despite this, actual representation is hard to discover in
the sample of this study. The Parlasur introduced direct elections with the second transition period and
is therewith the only parliament which directly represents its citizens. Next to a lack of representation,
the legislative powers of parliaments are also weak (Cofelice & Stavridis, 2014). This is remarkable,
as all three parliaments discussed have considerably low legislative powers, even though legislation is
one of their main tasks (Hänggi, 2004). Especially the ‘East African Legislative Assembly’ , which is
called after its main task, does not live up to its name. This strengthens the previous remark whether a
parliamentary organ is considered to be only formality for an IO.
Limitations in this research lie in its reliability and generalizability. The reliability of this
thesis is limited by the available literature on this sample. International parliamentary assemblies have
been regularly discussed in academic literature, but literature on specific IPIs is limited. If more
literature would be available, further substantiated claims could be made.
Furthermore, generalizability is limited due to the sample size. Generalizability however, is
considered less relevant in qualitative research (Bryman, 2012). As a result of time limitations and
available literature on specific IPIs, I was limited in my choice of data.
Conclusion
Referring to the introduction, the assumed relationship between regional integration and parliamentary
powers is argued to be weak (Papenborg, 2016). This originally assumed relationship is based on the
idea that “integration implies community-building’’, as summarized by Nzewi (2014, p. 492).
Mercosur member states show a low level of integration; the East African Community shows a
medium level of integration and the UEMOA member states show a high level of integration. Despite
�22
this, the parliamentary powers of these respective IOs are quite similar. This case selection, therefore
shows that IPIs can increase their powers indifferent of the level of integration.
Answering the main question of this thesis ‘why regional integration does not impact
parliamentary powers’, member states are dominantly concerned with their national interests. This
intergouvernmentalist approach is observable in all three cases. The Mercosur member states can be
characterized by their strong nationalist approach to regionalism, as they do not want to shift their
sovereignty to supranational levels of bureaucracy. This might be the result of high asymmetries
among the member states (Lucci, 2013). The intergouvernmentalist approach of the Mercosur member
states is also noticeable among the EAC member states. This dominant concern with national interest
is a result of tensions between EAC member states. Kenya and Uganda are in an ongoing conflict and
Rwanda and Burundi experience different stages of economic development (Adar, 2008; Lumallas,
2011). The UEMOA development of parliamentary powers is also constrained by varying economic
performances of members statees. These differences are caused by the common external tariff and
landlocked states in the Sahelian region. Only Ivory Coast is profiting from the common external
tariff, as the Ivory Coast is the most economically developed member state (Kireyev, 2016; Claeys &
Sindzingre, 2003).
Next to intergouvernmentalism, the level of executive dominance is also likely to influence the
level of parliamentary powers. Most of the member states are governed by presidential regimes.
Presidential regimes emphasize the executive power the national government and will consequentially
focus on intergouvernmentalist structures. It is considered to be unlikely that the institutional design of
an IGO would differ heavily from the architecture of the domestic regime (Malamud, 2005; Malamud
& De Sousa, 2007). This domestic situation offers an interesting opportunity for future research.
As deliberated in the discussion, one can argue that IPIs are formalities within the IO
structure. After the establishment of the studied IPIs, no increases in parliamentary powers have taken
place. Moreover, these IPIs have a very low levels of democratic legitimacy. The Parlasur is the only
parliament that is directly elected by the Mercosur citizens. Considering these arguments, it is hard to
compare the European Parliament with other IPIs. The European Parliament is, in contrast, directly
elected and has experienced incremental increase of its powers. Perhaps, the European Parliament is
sui generis. Addressing the democratic deficit seems to solely concern the European Union. Possibly,
�23
international parliamentary institutions are only formalities for IOs, in order to become accepted in the
international system.
�24
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Appendix A: Operationalization Parliamentary Power
The Parliamentary Power Index was adopted from Cofelice and Stavridis (2014, pp.155-156).
1. Consultative
0 = No consultative powers.
1 = The IPO may deliver non-binding opinions only upon requests by the inter-governmental
/supranational branch.
2 = The IPO may deliver non-binding opinions on its own initiative, but only in some limited
matters.
3 = The IPO may deliver non-binding opinions on its own initiative, in all matters of interest
for the regional organization.
4 = In some specific areas, the regional organization decision-making bodies are compelled
to consult the IPO before taking a decision; these bodies subsequently inform the IPO
about the choice to accept or reject its opinion.
5 = It is always compulsory for the regional organization decision-making bodies to consult
the IPO before taking a decision; these bodies subsequently inform the IPO about the
choice to accept or reject its opinion.
2. Oversight
0 = No oversight powers.
1 = The IPO may invite other institutions to submit reports on their activities for its
consideration.
2 = The IPO has the right to receive oral and written replies to its questions by other bodies
of the organization.
3 = Other bodies of the organization are compelled to prepare regular reports on their
activities and submit them to the IPO for its consideration.
4 = The IPO can adopt motions of censure on the activities of other institutions, and submit
them to the main intergovernmental body of the organization: this latter can invite
the concerned institution to resign.
5 = The can adopt motions of censure on the activities of other institutions that are
compelled to resign.
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3. Appointments
0 = No appointment powers.
1 = The IPO can be consulted on the appointment of administrative, judicial and/or control
institutions.
2 = The IPO can elect/appoint the administrative, judicial and/or control institutions.
3 = The IPO can be consulted on the appointment of decision-making/supranational bodies
of the organization.
4 = The IPO has the right to approve the appointment of decision-making/supranational
bodies of the organization, through a vote of confidence.
5 = The IPO has the right to appoint/elect the decision-making/supranational bodies of the
organization.
4. Budgetary
0 = No budgetary powers.
1 = The IPO can debate the budget proposal of the organization and express general nonbinding recommendations.
2 = The IPO can propose modifications for some limited expenditure items (and within a rate
of maximum increase).
3 = The IPO has the right to scrutinize the implementation of the budget by other institutions
of the organization, and to grant, postpone or refuse discharge in respect of its
implementation.
4 = The IPO can propose modifications for all expenditure items.
5 = The IPO can reject the budget proposal: a new draft has to be prepared by the decision making bodies.
5. Legislative
0 = No legislative powers.
1 = The IPO may request the decision-making bodies to submit appropriate legislative
proposals on any matter of interest for the organization.
2 =The IPO can prepare draft legislative acts and submit them to the decision-making bodies
for their consideration; however, the parliamentary proposal may be finally
overruled by these bodies.
3 = The IPO’s assent is required in some specific matters.
4 = In some specific areas, the IPO has joint legislative powers along with the
intergovernmental bodies of the organization: it may propose amendments during all
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the phases of the legislative process and veto the adoption of legislative proposals it
its amendments are not accepted.
5 = The IPO has joint legislative powers in all subject areas that are relevant for the
organization, as well as the right to initiate the legislative procedure and to fix the
agenda of the organization.
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Appendix B: Statistics on integration and parliamentary power
OrganisationInstitutional
integration
Economic
integration
Cumulative
integration
Parliamentary
Power Index
Arab Parliament 2.33 .4 2.73 .20
Benelux Council 2.33 3.4 5.73 .09
CARICOM CP 2.67 2.2 4.87 .16
CEMAC CP 1.67 3.0 4.67 .58
CPLP PA 1.33 1.33 .16
CSTO PA 2.00 2.00 .07
EALA 1.67 2.2 3.87 .33
ECOWAS PA 1.33 1.4 2.73 .67
EFTA PC 2.00 2.0 4.00 .07
EP 4.00 3.8 7.80 .89
IPA CIS 1.33 .6 1.93 .07
Nordic Council 2.00 2.00 .36
OECS Assembly 2.00 3.0 5.00 .07
OSCE PA 1.33 1.33 .20
PA CEI 1.33 1.33 .07
PABSEC 2.00 .0 2.00 .07
PACE 3.00 3.00 .44
PAP 2.33 .4 2.73 .29
Parlacen 2.00 1.2 3.20 .33
Parlandino 3.00 2.4 5.40 .24
Parlasur 2.00 1.4 3.40 .36
UEMOA IPC 2.67 3.0 5.67 .38
UMA Council .67 .2 .87 .07
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