THE REGIONAL SECURITY CRISIS

IN THE ANDES:

PATTERNS OF STATE RESPONSE

Judith A. Gentleman

July 2001

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The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do notnecessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of theArmy, the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution isunlimited.

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ISBN 1-58487-058-3

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FOREWORD

Colombia is a paradigm of the failing state that has enormousimplications for American foreign policy and the adaptation ofU.S. air and landpower to the hemispheric threat environment.The instability, corruption, displacement of people, and violencegenerated by Colombias unholy trinity of narcotics traffickers,insurgents, and paramilitaries are spilling over into virtually allof northern South America and Panama. Thus, the stability andpolitical sovereignty of the region are being compromised. And, at the same time, progress toward achieving the Free Trade Area ofthe Americas (FTAA) and the economic integration of theWestern Hemisphere by 2005 are being severely threatened.Clearly, vital interests are at stake.

In this timely monograph, a colleague at the Air War College,Dr. Judith Gentleman, outlines some of the detail andimplications of the regional security crisis in the Andes andmakes recommendations for U.S. civil-military involvement inthe hemispheric security arena. She argues for the United Statesto lead in the articulation of strategic objectives, while designinga defensible and feasible policy that critical elements in NorthAmerica, Central and South America, Europe, and Japan canunderstand and support. She specifically argues for the U.S.military to build stronger and more cooperative securityrelationships within the circle of affected states aroundColombia.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to join with theNorth-South Center in offering this monograph as a contributionto the international security debate on the situation in Colombia.It is critically important to the vital interests of the United States, Colombia, the hemisphere, and the global community.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute

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PREFACE

This monograph is an invaluable contribution to theongoing study of Plan Colombia begun in February 2001 bythe U.S. Army War College and the Dante B. FascellNorth-South Center of the University of Miami. In herpresentation, Dr. Judith A. Gentleman of the U.S. Air WarCollege demonstrates the widening impact of the spillovereffect into each of Colombias neighbors and into Brazil andPanama. She then proposes sensible ideas worthy ofpolicymakers consideration.

For some time it has been apparent that the crisis ofColombia is no longer confined to that country. In fact,under no imaginable scenario can Colombias problems becontained within it. The activities of drug traffickers andguerrillas are on the rise in the entire region, coming fromColombia.

Given such compelling evidence of spillover, why has aregional, cooperative response been so slow in taking shape? Dr. Gentleman goes right to the heart of the matter: apattern of competing objectives and inherent tensions. Tobegin, Plan Colombia was seen in the region as aU.S.-inspired initiative by Colombia, about which theneighboring countries were not consulted in advance. Itsobjectives, while broad, were supported only in theirmilitary component (and by the United States alone).Moreover, the United States and Colombia were not reallyin harmony as to the true objective, which, for the UnitedStates was suppression of the drug trade; and for Colombia,pacification of the guerrilla insurgency.

The Andean countries have also come around slowly andgrudgingly to the concept, as the author points out, that only extensive international cooperation will work in an age ofglobalization. To do so, however, requires at least partialrenunciation of the cherished principles of noninterven-

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tion, national self-determination, and sovereignty.Meeting in Cartagena in April 2001 before the Quebec CitySummit of the Americas, Andean leaders agreed on aregional counternarcotics strategy. They also called on theUnited States to renew the Andean Trade Preference Actand to include Venezuela in it. Such agreement is a greatstep forward.

Much depends on the support of the United States forsuch a comprehensive regional approach. The Bushadministration has responded positively with its newAndean Regional Initiative (ARI) of over $800 million,announced in May 2001. It will expand assistance intoseven countries in the areas of alternative economicdevelopment, infrastructure development, human rightsactivities, and initiatives other than fighting narcoticstrafficking. The new U.S. approach may well draw thepromised (but not delivered) European assistance to thedevelopmental aspects of Plan Colombia.

Dr. Gentleman recommends, however, that the new U.S. regional approach avoid simply responding to politicalconstraints rather than strategic analysis, by which shemeans the political predilections of Colombias neighbors.She makes the case that a better level of analysis be appliedto design a defensible and feasible policy and that aspecial envoy be appointed for the Andean region tooversee and coordinate the program.

AMBLER H. MOSS, JR.DirectorThe Dante B. Fascell North-South CenterUniversity of Miami

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

JUDITH GENTLEMAN is a Professor of InternationalSecurity and Latin American studies in the Department ofStrategy and International Security at the U.S. Air WarCollege. She previously taught at the University of NewHampshire and was a Fulbright Scholar at the Universidadde los Andes, Bogota, Colombia, and at El Colegio de Mexico, Mexico City, Mexico. She was also a Research Fellow at theCenter for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California,San Diego. She earned her Ph.D. degree at the StateUniversity of New York at Buffalo. Among her publicationsare articles and reviews published in Political ScienceQuarterly , the Journal of Interamerican Studies and WorldAffairs, the Latin American Research Review and theAmerican Political Science Review. She is the author, editorand co-editor of Mexican Oil and Dependent Development,Mexican Politics in Transition and Mexicos AlternativePolitical Futures. Her recent work has focused uponColombias political conflict, regional security in the Andes,and Mexicos political transition.

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THE REGIONAL SECURITY CRISISIN THE ANDES:

PATTERNS OF STATE RESPONSE

THE ANDEAN CRISIS AND GLOBALIZATION

The growing security crisis in the nations of the AndeanRidge has focused attention upon the seemingly intractableproblem of consolidating democratic governments in thecontext of increasing political, economic, and militarydifficulties. Throughout the region, the governments ofColombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, alongwith neighboring states Panama and Brazil, findthemselves confronted by a series of security challengesthat reflect the influence of globalization upon traditionaldimensions of conflict in the region. Globalization has notonly redefined security issues in a generic sense,1 but nowcomplicates and dramatically increases the difficulty statesface in shaping responses by traditional national means.

Analysts have suggested that effective state sovereigntyis being whittled away under pressure from the forces ofregionalization and globalization. While there is littleagreement on the precise definition of globalization, severalelements have gained broad currency. Of particular note isthe growing phenomenon of the inability of nation-states to cope with global problems that require global solutions,such as demography, ecology, human rights, and nuclearproliferation.2 The nations of the Andean Ridge appear tobe increasingly overwhelmed by external forces thatconverged with domestic problems to create nearlyinsurmountable obstacles to crisis management anddevelopment.

Specifically, the weak states of the Andean area are nowconfronted by networks of drug and arms trafficking, bypressure from rising domestic discontent and insurgency,and increasingly by international criminal networks tied to

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these illegal financial resources. They also face demands byother international actors that national leaders confrontthese challenges to national authority. Simultaneously,these states face demands from international organizationsand external states to conform to norms of political andeconomic liberalization deemed to be foundational forcontemporary market democracy. Throughout the AndeanRidge, levels of democratic practice that had been achievedearlier have now eroded in the face of these challenges.From Peru to Venezuela, their are increasing indicationsthat the regional states lack the capacity to surmount thesedifficulties by traditional means.

Historically, states in the region have placed highestpriority upon the values of sovereignty, nonintervention,and national self-determination, thereby resistingmultilateral or collective approaches to problems affectingthe region. The record of successful collaboration forregional problem-solving has been spotty at best. Whilestates have been eager to util ize internationalorganizations and forums and international law as meansto achieving national ends, much less common has been awillingness to work collectively on a sustained basis at theregional level. The acute nature of the deepening crises inthe region may be promoting a new direction in regionalrelations, however, with far greater emphasis uponcollective determination than has been seen before. Thismonograph will examine the sources of the security crisis inthe region, discuss national responses to the challengesfaced by these states, and assess the likelihood that regional states may begin to successfully overcome the constraints oftraditional political culture while mapping out strategiesfor collectively confronting the regions security challenges.

THE COLOMBIAN CRISIS

The current axis of the Andean crisis is to be found inColombia, where a historically weak state has been all butoverwhelmed by an insurgency now harnessed tonarcotrafficking, in turn propelling the development of

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powerful paramilitary forces and assorted criminalelements, many with ties to international networks. At thesame time that these forces continue to become morepowerful, the Colombian states capacity to respond hasbeen weakened further due to corruption, an impotentjustice system, a weak military, woefully outgunned lawenforcement capability, and the inability of the politicalclass to make progress toward a negotiated peacesettlement. So riven with conflicts at this point in itshistory, the Colombian state, as some argue, may haveceased to exist as measured by any conventionalunderstanding of sovereignty, certainly when defined interms of territorial control.

Colombias deepening crisis pushed the United Statesinto far greater involvement in the region for three reasons.First, Colombia had become the premier cocaine source forthe United States. Second, the United States identifiedColombia as one of a group of key states whose democracieswere in jeopardy and upon which special efforts needed to be focused. This group also included Indonesia, Ukraine, andNigeria.3 Third, the United States regards Colombia as thegreatest threat to regional stability now facing the SouthAmerican region. At the Fourth Defense Ministerial of theAmericas, convened at Manaus, Brazil, in October 2000,then U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen likenedColombias political pathology to a disease, observing thatit will spread like a cancer to other regions.4 He arguedthat democracy in Latin America was, simply put, at riskbecause of Colombias crisis.5 As the Colombia Task Forcereport of the Council on Foreign Relations and theInter-American Dialogue reported,

Colombias deterioration spreads instability and conflictbeyond its borders. Insurgent and paramilitary groups havemade frequent incursions into the neighboring countries ofVenezuela, Ecuador, and Panama. Such incursions could wellincrease. The wider region is increasingly uncertain,reflecting both real spillover effects and independent,troublesome political developments. A stronger Colombiameans a stronger region and a stronger Western Hemisphere.6

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In still another perspective, former Assistant Secretaryof State Bernard Aronson argued that U.S. interest inColombias security crisis was shaped by three issues:drugs, migration, and oil.7 Although the Colombia crisislong remained a second tier matter for the United Stateswhen compared to security issues involving Asia or theMiddle East, for example, the increasing destabilizationthere came to be viewed in the late 1990s as a prioritymatter. The former U.S. Drug Czar, General (Retired)Barry McCaffrey, urged that more attention be focusedupon the growing regional crisis, but recognized that theU.S. domestic political environment would more easilysupport such efforts if the emphasis were placed upon drugsand military and law enforcement assistance. At the sametime, the Pastrana government was urged to develop acomprehensive approach to the crisis and, with substantialU.S. involvement, unveiled the ambitious Plan Colombia in2000.

The Clinton administration enthusiastically endorsedPlan Colombia as the coherent, feasible approach that wasneeded. Problems soon emerged, however. The UnitedStates was widely seen to have all but developed the planitself. Neither Colombia nor the United States hadconsulted neighboring states, nor even kept them informed.Ecuadors Foreign Minister Heinz Moeller complained, forexample, that this was a ball to which we were not invited.Ecuador was not consulted at all.8 The failure to consultonly made matters worse when U.S. officials also readilyacknowledged that the plan would put pressure onbordering states, increasing the security problems for thosenations. Nonetheless, the United States pushed for theplans acceptance and campaigned to build support for theplan throughout the region.

In the meantime, dramatic upheaval unfoldedthroughout the Andes. Of all the states affected bynarcotrafficking and by the Colombia crisis, Ecuador wasperhaps the most severely affected because of its limitedability to respond. Having thus far successfully avoided

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being pulled into the Colombian conflict, Ecuador now sawitself threatened by major incursions of refugees that werelikely to flee Colombia once the counternarcotics offensiveinto southern Colombia commenced in the period 2001-2002 under the terms of Plan Colombia. Foreign MinisterMoeller worried about the cancerous tumor being removedfrom Colombia and metastasizing in Ecuador.9 Wishingnot to be drawn into the conflict, Ecuador acknowledgedthat the Colombian insurgents and paramilitaries had formany years freely used Ecuadorian territory for rest andrecuperation as well as for resupply. In addition,Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) elementswere known to have established settlements for familymembers, and, indeed, intermarriage had becomecommonplace between FARC elements and Ecuadoriannationals on the northern Ecuadorian border.

Northern Ecuador had also become an important supplypoint for growing narcotrafficking and guerrilla interests insouthern Colombia. Given its weak military capabilities,and not wishing to directly confront Colombian irregularmilitary forces, Ecuadors approach had been to rely uponthe FARCs stated commitment to avoid using Ecuadoriannational territory for armed activity. In a bargain withcompelling outside force, Ecuador sought to keep Colombian incursions confined to noncombatant purposes. No suchagreement had been reached, however, either with theColombian paramilitaries who had been growing instrength, or with narcotraffickers. In effect, Ecuador,already beset by its own overwhelming political andeconomic difficulties, including a recent attempted coup,found itself politically and militarily threatened by theColombia crisis. Evidence suggested that the implicitbargain with Colombias narcotrafficking interests had runseriously aground. U.S. Southern Commands(USSOUTHCOM) Commander-in-Chief General PeterPace testified before the U.S. Senate in 2001 that nurseriesof coca and heroin poppy seedlings had been found in remote areas of Ecuador, and that guerrillas working with drug

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traffickers had been spotted moving across Colombiasborders into both Ecuador and Panama.10

Despite progress by the Fujimori government in quelling insurgency and drug trafficking throughout the 1990s, Peru had emerged from the summer 2000 national elections incomplete disarray, the subject of an Organization ofAmerican States (OAS) diplomatic sanction and diplomaticintervention. These were then followed by the dramaticimplosion of the Fujimori government itself. Further, newassessments suggested that coca cultivation had once againbegun to increase, with indications that the acreage undercoca cultivation had in fact grown over the previous 2 years.Arguably, it was the political firestorm ignited by thealleged involvement of President Fujimoris principalpolitical associate and director of national intelligence,Vladimiro Montesinos, in arms trafficking and arms sales to Colombian guerrillas, all with the apparent complicity ofthe Peruvian military, that brought an end to the Fujimoriregime.11 While certainly Fujimoris record of electoralmanipulations also contributed to public demands forpolitical change, it was not until Fujimori found himselfmired in the Colombian problem over arms trafficking withthe FARC did the regime collapse, opening the door towide-ranging investigations of the militarys and othergovernment officialscomplicity in drug trafficking.12

Elsewhere in the Andes, Bolivia experienced aresurgence of chronic instability, once thought to have beenlargely allayed due to success in the counterdrug war anddue to the Banzer government reforms. While not directlytied to the Colombian crisis, its difficulties stemmed in large part from controversy over the governments counterdrugpolicy. Following decades of turmoil, under the leadership of former General Banzer, now Bolivias elected president, thenation seemed to be on the brink of resolving the issue ofillegal drug production, having succeeded in implementingall but the final elements of its Dignity Plan. Indeed, along with Peru, Bolivia had been touted internationally as asuccess story, one demonstrating that it was possible to

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defeat the scourge of illegal drug production through anaggressive policy of crop eradication and alternativedevelopment.

With the onset of 2001, however, it became clear thatneither eradication nor alternative development had wonthe day.13 Indeed, the plan to build several small garrisonsto hold the line on the dismantled fields incited thecoca-producing peasantry to violence against thegovernment. Despite all the public declarations of success,the cocaleros apparently had every intention of returning tococa production once the crop eradication sweeps hadterminated and counterdrug forces had returned to thebarracks. Clearly, the lucrative nature of drug productioncontinued to appeal to Bolivias impoverished peasantrywho were unwilling to follow through with the wholesalerelocation of population from drug-producing regions tozones suitable for alternative development.14

At the same time, for Venezuela, Colombias crisisincreasingly put pressure on the Chavez government andled to strained relations with the United States. Venezuelaviewed itself as the victim of Colombias crisis, sufferingfrequent incursions by refugees, guerrillas, paramilitaries,and narcotraffickers, and it thus voiced concerns over theprospects for a further widening of the conflict. Venezuelahad already become home to hundreds of thousands ofColombian economic migrants in the 1980s and 1990s, andthe prospect of further conflict in Colombian territoryadjacent to the Venezuelan border promised to escalate thenumbers of Colombian nationals seeking refuge outside forreasons of personal safety.

On Colombias northern border, Panama soundedalarms over the extensive, repeated territorial incursions ofinsurgent and paramilitary elements from Colombia. Never territory well controlled by central authority, and without amilitary of its own to, at least in theory, defend the territoryfrom illicit use, the Darien province of Panama became anarea of essentially free reign for Colombian insurgent and

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paramilitary forces. Increasingly, Panamanians expressedconcern that the Moscoso governments prospects fordealing both with of the internal pressures (stemminglargely from corruption, some owing to narcotrafficking andmoney laundering) and with the external pressures(involving narcotrafficking, insurgency, andparamilitaries) were slim at best. A tendency to ignore theproblem was made more difficult to sustain with thepromise delivered by United Self Defense Forces ofColombia (AUC) paramilitary commanders that they wouldconsider Panama fair game if Colombian insurgents wereable to use Panamanian territory with impunity.

Of all the countries considered, Brazil arguably facedsome of the more daunting challenges deriving from theColombian crisis, chiefly owing to its vast unguardedAmazonian territories. To begin with, counterdrug efforts in the Andes increasingly had pushed narcotraffickingoperations into Brazil as a result of the widely notedballoon effect. With Brazilian national territory (land, air,and riverine) increasingly impacted by this traffic, Brazilfelt increased pressure upon its already weak ability toprotect national resources and the sovereignty of nationalterritory. Essentially, Brazil could control neither itsairspace, ground, or riverine traffic. With only relatively few federal police to monitor the entire country for counterdrugoperations, Brazil faced heavy odds in contending with thethreat to its territory.

While Brazils Amazon region had never been wellcontrolled, Brazils national security officials increasinglyrecognized that the future pattern of development in theregion could be seriously affected by the myriad illegalunmonitored activities taking place. Mining activity,forestry, and indigenous communities were all affected bythe uncontrolled situation in the region. The arrest ofBrazils leading drug lord, Luis Fernando Da Costa(Fernandinho Beira-Mar), by Colombian forces onColombian territory in the spring of 2001 brought into boldrelief the growing ties between narcotics trafficking and the

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Colombian insurgency. Fernandinho had allegedly servedboth as a major trader in cocaine from the FARC and as asupplier of arms to the FARC, all via Brazilian territory,reportedly relying upon Paraguayan, Russian, andSurinamese organized crime elements in the process.15

STATE RESPONSES TO THE ANDEAN CRISIS

Colombia.

With the success of counterdrug operations in Peru andBolivia in the first half of the 1990s, and with the successfulinterdiction of the Andean air bridge, more and moreelements of cocaine production moved to Colombia fromformer, more dispersed producing areas. With the defeat ofthe centralized cartels in Colombia in the 1980s and 1990s,the industry moved in several new directions, the mostimportant of which came to be the strengthening of tiesbetween producers and both the FARC and the AUC, theso-called paramilitaries. Initially, the FARC swelled itscoffers with tax payments from coca producers, as did theAUC at a later point. Over time, however, the FARCreportedly became more directly involved in various stagesof coca production, increasing coca production by a third inthe demilitarized zone, the despeje, over which it hadexclusive control.16 Ceded temporarily to the FARC by thePastrana government as a confidence-building measuredesigned to get the peace negotiations off the ground, thisarea the size of Switzerland also came to be used as aplatform for hiding kidnap victims and for increasedmilitary preparations.

The Colombian crisis had now all but spiraled out ofcontrol. Law enforcement was incapable of dealing witheither escalating traditional crime or the escalating crimeassociated directly or indirectly with drugs. The justicesystem was equally incapable of contributing to a solution,as it had been both corrupted and intimidated. The firstpriority, that of regaining control over the national

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territory, was now arguably beyond the reach of either theColombian military or the police without substantialimprovements in capabilities. Nearly two million personshad been displaced by the violence and either were internalrefugees flooding into Colombias cities, or had leftColombia for neighboring countries.17 The nations eliteshad left en masse, with immigration rates into the UnitedStates skyrocketing and with a special protected statusdesignation for such Colombians under consideration by the U.S. Congress. The economy had gone into a tailspin, withthe country experiencing its first serious recession inmodern history. Nearly half of the nations territory waseffectively beyond state control. The most compelling armed forces in the Colombian state were the nearly 20,000 armedelements of the insurgent armies (along with their 36,000civilian militia supporters) and the over 8,000 (and growing) AUC paramilitary forces.

At the behest of the United States, as we noted earlier,the Colombian government developed Plan Colombia as anapproach to resolving some of these issues. The multi-year,multi-billion dollar plan existed at two levels: theconceptual level and the practical level. At the conceptuallevel, the plan appeared to be a comprehensive approach toissues of social development, human rights, lawenforcement, economic development, and peacemaking. Atthe practical level, however, the only part that was likely tobe funded was the U.S.-sponsored element that targetedcounterdrug efforts. The U.S. contribution of $1.3 billion (ofthe total proposed $7.5 billion) focused upon thedevelopment of a military capability designed to supportlaw enforcement counterdrug efforts. Pledges of non-U.S.international financial support were disappointing. Whilethe European Union pledged several hundred milliondollars, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)offered support to social development projects, the bulk ofthe financing had to be shouldered by Colombia itself,chiefly through loans.18

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The approach espoused by the Colombian governmentfor confronting its internal crisis was based on a two-trackprocess: (1) peace negotiations with insurgents where andwhen possible, and (2) armed confrontation with thenarcotraffickers, principally with U.S. support. Put simply,the primary preferred goal of the Colombian governmentwas to reach peace with the insurgency, while the primarygoal of U.S. policymakers was to curtail the production andexport of Colombian cocaine to the United States. In otherwords, in principle (though not in practice) the Colombiangovernments objectives and the U.S. Governmentsobjectives were very different. Reflecting this distinction,the United States provided assistance to supportColombias development of three specially trainedanti-narcotics battalions, and provided several hundredU.S. military personnel along with several hundred civiliancontractors to support counterdrug training activities.

At the same time, despite substantial efforts tomodernize the organization of Colombias armed forces,those combatant forces remained very limited in theircapability to confront their principal foe, the insurgents.Despite these limitations, as a result of its partnership withthe Untied States, the government concentrated scarceresources on those forces it believed to be of secondaryconcern, narcotraffickers. While the profits earned by theFARC from narcotrafficking connections certainly played apivotal role in their ability to sustain operations, Colombiananalysis suggested that drug trafficking could not be shutdown if the insurgency were not first defeated. In otherwords, the government apparently saw no other source ofsupport available to meet its urgent requirements. In itsweakened state, it accepted the U.S. initiative as the onlygame in town.

As noted previously, at the outset both the Colombianand the U.S. Governments acknowledged that the plan waslikely to produce spillover effects, broadening the conflict asnarcotraffickers, insurgents, and paramilitary forcesincreased their use of neighboring states territories,

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thereby regionalizing the conflict. While regional leaderswere willing to support President Pastranas efforts to reach a negotiated peace settlement, they voiced serious objectionto Plan Colombia due to the spillover potential resultingfrom the military rather than socio-economic emphasis thatwas felt to characterize the plan. While defenders noted that nearly 80 percent of the proposed funding was fornonmilitary expenditures, detractors noted that the onlyfirm commitment was, in fact, the U.S. commitment tomilitary and law enforcement expenditure.

Despite anxious U.S. and Colombian appeals for support at the meeting of the presidents of South Americas 12countries, convened by Brazil in Brasilia in September2000, such appeals met with only measured success.Chilean President Lagos reported that the presidents fullysupport the peace process, which implies negotiations asdistinct from the problem of narcotics trafficking.Colombian Foreign Minister Guillermo Fernandez de Sotocomplained about this response, arguing that it is unjustand counterintuitive that Colombias efforts to strengthenitself to fight the threat it faces are the subject of complaintswhen no one criticizes the arms buildup of the insurgents.We want cooperation, not unfair criticism.19

A vocal opponent of the plan was Venezuelan PresidentHugo Chavez, who declared, We support Plan Colombia solong as it does not generate combat activities that couldcomplicate our situation, noting further that he feared thethreat of the Vietnamization of the entire Amazonregion.20 Chavez also argued that [the plan] is going tomake the conflict even more tense and is going to worsenarmed clashes. He further observed, Peace cannot beachieved by arms, that is a great contradiction.21 Earlierassurances offered by both Presidents Pastrana and Clinton apparently did little to allay the fears of regional leadersthat the spillover effects of Plan Colombia could beadequately handled. During his visit to Colombia in August2000, President Clinton admitted that the plan would likelycause the problem to spill over the borders of neighboring

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countries, but added that the United States would providea substantial amount of money to help other countries dealwith those problems at the border when they start. 22 Suchassurances were in no way sufficient to bridge the gapbetween the U.S. plan and South American objections.

Venezuelas Response.

Under President Chavezs leadership, Venezuela sought to chart an independent course with respect to theColombian crisis and the problem of narcotrafficking. These efforts reflected the continuing and longstandingdifficulties in Venezuelan-Colombian relations, along withthe increasingly tense relations between Venezuela and theUnited States. From the outset, Chavezs populist messagehad struck a discordant note with Colombian authorities, as the Venezuelan leader never missed an opportunity tocriticize the Colombian oligarchy, pointing to unfavorablecontrasts between Colombias internal social policies andhis own Bolivarian Revolution. To the consternation ofBogota, Chavez sponsored talks in Caracas betweenrepresentatives of the FARC and the Colombiangovernment itself. Although Bogota viewed Chavez asengaging in unwanted meddling, it did send the nationsAttorney General to participate in the talks. Yet relationswere rubbed raw by the experience. Venezuelas DefenseMinister Rangel went so far as to state publicly thatVenezuela has the right to talk with those who havepower. Further commenting upon the Colombiansannoyance over the matter, he suggested that theColombians would get over it.23 A FARC delegation,including Olga Marin, daughter of FARC chief ManuelMarulanda, had been hosted at a meeting of the LatinAmerican Parliament in the Venezuelan NationalAssembly in November 2000.24 Caracas was generallythought to have good contacts with the FARC, if for no otherreason than to be in a position to hold the insurgency at bayand to maintain some leverage over their forces. They would thus not pose uncontainable problems to the Venezuelan

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government, or so it was hoped. At the same time, suchoutreach to Colombias insurgents was designed to serve astestimony to Chavezs domestic constituency as to theirleaders progressive credentials.

Such irritations notwithstanding, Venezuela hadsuffered incursions from Colombians over its border formany years. As one news broadcast described the situation,Venezuela is constantly suffering the negative effects ofColombian drug trafficking: the air, river, and land routesare disrupted and those who are not part of the problem stillhave to suffer the consequences of this same problem, onethat is unpredictably grave. Colombian insurgents hadkidnapped scores of Venezuelan ranchers and businessleaders, and the 1,400-mile border offered porous transitpoints for illicit trafficking of narcotics, weapons, andpeople. Recently Colombian kidnapping gangs were formedto seize Venezuelan ranchers to sell them to Colombianguerrillas.25 At the same time, Colombian authoritiescharged that Colombias insurgents routinely obtainedweapons from the Venezuelan armed forces.26

Venezuelas release in 2001 of National Liberation Army (ELN) insurgent Jose Maria Ballestas, hijacker of aColombian commercial flight in 1999, only served to furthersour relations.27 Finally, Venezuela complained thatColombian traffickers used Venezuelan territory as a majorroute for shipping drugs destined for the Europeanmarket.28 Nonetheless, Venezuela remained steadfastunder Chavez in refusing to allow U.S. counterdrugoperations on Venezuelan national territory and continuedto refuse to reauthorize counterdrug surveillance flights bythe United States in Venezuelan airspace that had beenstopped by the Chavez government. In that regard,Venezuelan authorities also suggested that the new U.S.Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) in Aruba and Curacao represented nothing more than a staging platform for theinvasion of South America by the United States. Morerecently, however, Defense Minister Rangel reportedly

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agreed to visit with USSOUTHCOM and Americanoperations at Key West.

Venezuela suffered increasing influxes of refugees asColombian paramilitaries cleared towns on the Colombianside of the border of suspected insurgent sympathizers.These influxes were in addition to the tens of thousands ofColombians who had previously, from the Venezuelan pointof view, colonized western Venezuela.29

Both President Chavez and Venezuelas former defenseminister warned that Colombias efforts must not worsenVenezuelas difficulties, suggesting that Colombias conflictcould spread and provoke a medium intensity regionalconflict.30 Then Defense Minister Ismael Hurtado Soucrenoted, Were worried about the military plan. The way thatits done could generate more violence.31

Chavez commented at length about Plan Colombia:

We are terribly affected by the war in Colombia. Peasantshave been kidnapped or murdered; there is terror on theborder. It is a lawless land. We want peace. But peace cannotbe achieved with 80 Blackhawks or military trainers, but bydialogue. So it is a terrible mistake that the governments ofthe United States and Colombia are making. We are warningthat the conflict could escalate and become another Vietnam.32

Indeed, such fears seemed to be well borne out asColombia accused Venezuela of an illegal military incursion(not the first) in October 2000. Colombias Defense MinisterLuis Ramirez charged that Venezuelan forces invadedColombian national territory with 30 helicopter-bornetroops, and that Venezuelan military aircraft had firedrockets and destroyed houses and livestock. Venezuelasthen Foreign Minister Jose Rangel denied this and calledColombias claim irresponsible and a vulgar lie.33

In the meantime, Venezuela deployed thousands ofreinforcements to its Colombian border to deal with risinglevels of conflict, stationing 10,000 soldiers in what weredescribed as two theaters of operation.34 In an early sign of

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what would later come to be a willingness to cooperate on aregional basis, however, Chavez also floated a trial balloonproposing that South American states form a NATO-likemilitary alliance to deal with regional problems, a measurethat was vetoed by Brazils Foreign Minister Luiz FelipeLampreia as antithetical to Brazils own interests.35

President Chavez sought to distance himself from U.S.influence in the region in a number of different ways,particularly with respect to U.S.-sponsored counterdrugoperations. In addition to the suspension of U.S. overflightrights, the Venezuelan government also issued a diplomaticprotest to the United States over the presence of a U.S.Coast Guard vessel that had entered Venezuelan waters insupport of counterdrug operation. The United Statesargued that this arrangement had been provided for under a prior treaty arrangement. More generally, Chavez sought to declare his independence from the United States by, amongother things, developing close relations with Cuba, and byturning to Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries(OPEC) through overtures to Saddam Hussein, including avisit to Iraq as well as a planned visit to Iran.36

In sum, Venezuelan authorities deplored what wascharacterized as primarily a military approach toColombias internal problems and one that set the stage forU.S. intervention in the region. Moreover, Venezuelanofficials went so far as to argue that U.S. military support toColombia would create a worrisome regional militaryimbalance, but offered assurances that Venezuela wouldnot embark upon an arms buildup in response to PlanColombia.37

Ecuadors Response.

Of all the frontline states, Ecuador faced what may bethe bleakest implications deriving from the Colombiancrisis. The 1990s had been a time of enormous domesticfinancial and political turmoil that left the state teeteringon the brink of collapse. As pressure from Colombia

16

mounted with the increasing penetration of Ecuadorianterritory by Colombians, Ecuador had little in the way ofresources that it could bring to bear upon its problem, givenits already severe internal crisis. Gustavo Noboa, the fifthEcuadorian president in 5 years, came to office in theaftermath of a coup staged by a coalition force of disgruntled junior army officers and indigenous rights activistsaggrieved by the nations economic crisis.38 The coupattempt fizzled only after the very direct diplomaticintervention by the leaders of neighboring states and mostparticularly by the United States. All issued strongwarnings concerning the isolation Ecuador would face wereit to abandon democracy.

Ecuadors difficulties stemmed from an array of bothinternational and domestic factors. Its most recent crisisemerged as a result of pressures from political, financial,investor, human rights, indigenous rights, and insurgentforces.39 Desperate for solutions, the government sought toachieve economic stability by dollarizing the economy.Most observers agreed that this measure alone could dolittle to secure stability for an economy in need of seriousstructural reform. So severe were Ecuadors political andeconomic difficulties that fully 4 percent (500,000) of thepopulation had left the country in the 1999-2000 period. Atleast one observer pointed to globalization and theeconomic transition that has hit the region hard40 as thechief reasons for Ecuadors (and other similarly afflictedstates) acute difficulties. Ecuador had little capacity torespond to rising pressure from the Colombian situation,although it moved some forces to the Colombian border inorder to try to increase security.41

Sensing weakness, the FARC bluntly demanded thatEcuador remain strictly neutral with regard to theColombian conflict, that it should refrain from supportingPlan Colombia, and that it should resist the use of thefusarium oxysporum fungus to eradicate coca crops.42

According to FARC representatives,

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There are certainly democratic sectors in Ecuador which are notgoing to support Plan Colombia, and we believe there aresectors within the Ecuadorian armed forces that are also notgoing to open fire on their Colombian brothers. The Colombianguerrillas do not consider the Ecuadorians or their army as their enemies, neither do they consider the Venezuelans, Peruvians,Brazilians, or Panamanians as their enemies. We have enoughland there. To come and fight here, to Ecuador; that would beoutrageous.43

Despite such assurances, Ecuador nonetheless feltcompelled to double its border forces to 4,000 troops44 as thepressure in southern Colombia mounted. EcuadorianForeign Minister Heinz Moeller announced theimplementation of a combined armed forces and policeborder patrol program.45 According to Colombian sources,Ecuador had become the principal source of supplies for theFARC, including food supplies, medicine, provisions,weapons, ammunition, explosives, uniforms.46 Ecuadorianauthorities struggled to respond with limited resources.Farmers were being driven off of their land; the Ecuadorianarmy had discovered four cocaine labs in Ecuadorianterritory; Colombian paramilitaries were reported to berunning extortion rings in Ecuador; and FARC and ELNarmed belligerents crossed regularly into Ecuadorianterritory with impunity.47 Reports indicate that hundreds of Ecuadorian residents of the border area had fled in the faceof threats from both Colombian guerrillas and Colombianparamilitaries.48 New evidence suggested FARC complicityin the kidnapping of oil workers in Ecuador, an act thatoriginally was thought to have been the work of internalcriminal elements.49 For Foreign Minister Moeller,however, the problem, more ominously, was that of theideological infiltration of the border.

In the summer of 2000, the Ecuadorian NationalSecurity Council (CSN), under the leadership of PresidentNoboa, announced that the war on drugs would be a priorityof the Ecuadorian government, and that the governmentwould devote special efforts to this objective through the

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creation of an Executive Unit that would focus upon socialand economic development in the region to be impacted byPlan Colombia.50At the same time, President Noboaendorsed Plan Colombia51 and asked the United States for$160 million in assistance to help create an economic bufferzone on its border with Colombia. In particular, Ecuadorsought assistance to deal with Sucumbios province whereColombian irregular forces congregated freely. Ecuador also sought additional assistance to acquire helicopters, fastboats, and reconnaissance equipment. The $160 millionwould be part of Ecuadors 4-year $300 million program tostabilize the border region.52 According to Noboa, most ofthe funds would be used to support social and economicdevelopment initiatives in the region. Ecuador had beenallotted $20 million in the emergency supplementalappropriation passed by the U.S. Congress in support ofPlan Colombia in 2000, but much more would be needed tostabilize the situation. Ecuador requested furtherassistance in financing five camps for refugees planned forlocation on the Colombian border. The United Nations hadwarned Ecuador to expect an influx of 25-30,000 refugees,with the number potentially exceeding 40,000. Refugeeswould be expected to stream into Ecuador from ColombiasPutumayo province once the southern offensive intoColombia began, and indeed Ecuador reported that 8,000refugees had arrived in the early days of the Colombianoperation.53 Without enhanced financial support, theEcuadorian President suggested that Ecuador might haveto reconsider its agreement with the United States to allowthe use of its territory by U.S. antidrug aircraft.

The U.S.-Ecuadorian agreement in question establisheda Forward Operating Location (FOL) at Manta Air ForceBase on Ecuadors Pacific coast. Under the terms of a50-year lease agreement and with a $62 million expenditure in runway, hangar, dormitory, and other constructionupgrades, Manta stood as one of the leading U.S. militaryinitiatives in the region.54 Manta would have 400 U.S.service personnel by October 2001, and would serve as a

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base for airborne warning and control system (AWACS)reconnaissance aircraft and tanker refueling capabilitydeployed in support of counterdrug reconnaissance.55 Fromthe FARC point of view, the establishment of the U.S. FOLat Manta constituted a declaration of war, and the FARCwarned that if U.S. aircraft were to fly out of Manta toeradicate crops, the guerrillas would strike targets inEcuador.

In response to the perceived threat, Ecuador stationed5,000 troops along the Colombian border in the provinces ofNapos and Sucumbios. According to Ecuadorian sources,the FARC had previously identified Sucumbios as astrategic area, and its intention was to hold this as asecure sanctuary.56 In sum, Ecuador faced intensepressures from virtually all quarters and, because of itsweakness, sought to stengthen its relationship with theUnited States, a measure that was likely to draw it moredirectly into Colombias crisis. Some Ecuadorianauthorities worried that Manta would transform Ecuadorinto the new Panama, stripping it of any sovereignpretensions and exposing it to even greater externalthreat.57

The Peruvian Response.

Unlike other states in the Andean Ridge, Peru hadconducted an intensive counterdrug and counterinsurgency offensive for over a decade. With President Fujimorisascent to power and subsequent initiatives, Peru developeda set of capabilities that enabled it to establish sovereigntyover its territory and to attack fundamental economicissues. While the process led to an increasinglyauthoritarian and violent pattern of rule, replete withhuman rights abuses and political repression, equilibriumappeared to be maintained within the system. A consensushad been forged between the political class, the businessclass, and the military over the courses of action that had tobe taken to reestablish sovereignty over Peruvian territory.

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Peru aggressively pursued narcotraffickers and insurgents, essentially winning a military victory over both groups.

One clear Peruvian advantage was a well-developed andcredible military capability and a willingness to use force. In addition, Perus insurgent forces never developed the kindsof links with narcotraffickers that proved to be sodevastating in Colombia. Further, Peru developed astrategy for defeating the insurgents that focused uponarming the rural population through the mechanism ofstate-sponsored rondas campesinas or self-defense forces.Compared to the Colombian self-defense forces that evolvedover time, the Peruvian rondas proved much moresuccessful, coming to serve as a legitimate auxiliary to thearmed forces of the state. Peru also adopted an aggressivepolicy of air interdiction of drug traffickers, shooting downscores of national aircraft involved in illicit activity.

The onset of the Colombian crisis proved to be more thana match even for the tested Fujimori establishment. In part,the political failures of the 2000 electoral period may havebeen a manifestation of the exhaustion of Fujimorispolitical acumen, after years of apparent success. One couldnot argue that a revolt by civil society caused the defeat ofthe system, since Peruvian civil society was exceedinglydocile. Instead, the fundamentally corrupted character ofthe regime, coupled with the inflammatory nature of theFARC-arms trafficking allegations, triggered a collapse ofconsensus among the ruling political and military elites,causing the regimes profound deterioration beginning inthe summer of 2000. Neither rigged elections, norComandante Gonzalo, nor the Tupac Amaru RevolutionaryMovement (MRTA) seizure of the Japanese Embassy, northe contest of wills between the United States and Peru that often characterized their relationship in the 1990s couldcompare with the delegitimizing impact of the armstrafficking charges, especially as seen within the widercontext of massive government corruption. VladimiroMontesinos involvement in arms trafficking to theColombian FARC forces proved to be a far more devastating

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event than the accumulated difficulties of 10 years ofinternal war in Peru.58

In the meantime, evidence suggested that theweakening of the Peruvian state led opportunistic elementsin the drug industry to begin once again to revive cocaineproduction in Peru despite much progress on the issue.59

Although data show that coca production fell in 2000 for thefifth consecutive year, dropping from 233,168 acres plantedto 84,474, there were numerous indications that Peru facednew trafficking challenges ahead. The FARCs 14th frontwas reported to control labs in the Peruvian jungle betweenthe Napo and Putumayo rivers that ran directly into Brazil.Observers suggested that local narcotrafficking interestswere preparing to build up production in Peru inanticipation of the implementation of Plan Colombia,essentially by paying higher prices to producers. Prices rosesteadily in Peru; poppies were now being grown and morecocaine processing was evident, as was the development ofmore labs. More Colombians and Mexicans were found to beinvolved. Regrowth was observed in once abandoned areas,and many new fields and new seed beds were alsoobserved.60

Perus former Minister of Foreign Relations, former U.NRepresentative, and current chair of the Congresss ForeignRelations Commission, Francisco Tudela van Breugel-Douglas, argued that, within the context of the regionsstruggle for development, a major potential threat is therejection of globalization in the name of defendingreactionary utopias or bucolic utopias. Tudela suggested that bucolic reactionary politics may increasingly be linkedto drug trafficking in the Andean (and other regional) areasbehind what he terms the smokescreen of ethnic politics.In other words, some of those defending such bucolic utopias may be doing so disingenuously, using this political agendato mask their true illegal intentions. According to Tudela,Plan Colombia created huge awareness and big fears,principally the fear of injecting large amounts of money intoan economy with rampant illegal activity. Resources may

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fall into the wrong hands, producing far worse outcomes.There were also fears of diasporas and of a domino effect.For Peru, the spillover from the Colombian crisis wasexpected to come through Ecuador, which is contiguous toPeru. In addition, there was concern as to whether theFARC would move into eastern Ecuador, thus triggering the Colombianization of that country.61

The Bolivian Dilemma.

In the fall of 2000, Bolivia found itself confronted byprotests and labor strikes, leaving numerous dead andwounded. While teachers were part of the strikingcontingent, most of the rancor stemmed from the failure ofalternative development programs to adequately substitute for coca production. The United States had committed $25million for counterdrug efforts in the Chapare and Yungasregions and allocated $85 million for alternativedevelopment in these two areas.62 Coca growers unions,however, as they had for years, fought to stop theeradication program and to demilitarize the Chapare region by staging roadblocks throughout the nation, leadingBolivia to economic and political crisis. Bolivias capital city, La Paz, faced food shortages and was all but blocked off from the rest of the country, as 35,000 coca growers stood theirground. 63 Yet the Banzer government remained committedto the total eradication of illegal coca leaf by the end of the2002 presidential term. Even so, peasants who dependedupon the crop for their livelihood in one of the regionspoorest countries resisted: The government says it willtake our land and send us to jail if we persist in growingcoca. We will have no alternative but to defend ourselves,like in Colombia.64 The cocaleros were particularlyincensed over the news that the government wouldconstruct, with U.S. financing, several small garrisons inthe coca growing areas to insure that the crop would not bereplanted.

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In the 1990s, Bolivia in fact achieved dramatic success in reducing national acreage devoted to coca production. Cocacultivation was reduced from 78,400 illegal acres to 4,000,according to U.S. sources.65 According to Bolivian sources,this signified a loss of some $700 million in illegal drugincome in just 2 years.66 Ironically, the economic deficitcreated by success in the counterdrug effort helped toplummet Bolivia into financial and social crisis. Thegovernment responded by appealing to Washington for debtrelief and for improvement in trade relations in textiles, aneconomic sector emphasized by Bolivia to provide laboralternatives to the drug industry. Such appeals appeared tohold little promise, particularly vis--vis textiles. As U.S.Secretary of State Madeleine Albright noted during herAugust 2000 visit to Bolivia: We did discuss the issue oftextiles. I have to tell you, though, that this is a verycomplicated problem as far as our trade relations with anycountry is concerned. Nevertheless, Albright noted thatBolivia had received $450 million in debt forgiveness fromthe period 1991 to 1999 and also received $115 millionannually in other assistance.67

Bolivias economic problems continued to worsen duringthe years of the counterdrug regime and the Banzergovernment. In the spring of 2000, the nation was grippedby a paralyzing strike involving a water project that was toprivatize water investments, dramatically raising prices for the population. Ambushes, protests, and small-scaleinsurrections increasingly became the stuff of everydayBolivian life.68 While few observers believed that thegovernment faced a threat to its existence solely due to theincreasing ferment, it was unable to quell rising levels ofdiscontent. In an attempt to mollify those who decried thegovernments mistreatment of the indigenous populationand who urged the white population to leave the country,the government agreed to appoint a minister for peasantand indigenous affairs. An array of economic concessionswere also promised, suggesting that the cycle of protest andconcession would continue to spiral farther. In this context,

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the potential for a balloon effect in Bolivian narcoticsproduction was a real concern despite the governmentspledge to end all illegal coca production by the end of 2002.

The Challenge to Panama.

Despite Panamas desire to maintain a pose of neutrality as its best shield against being drawn into the Colombiancrisis,69 Carlos Castano, the head of Colombias feared AUCparamilitary self defense forces, accused PanamasNational Guard of openly cooperating for financial gainwith Colombias insurgents and declared that he regardedthe Guard as a military objective.70 Despite these threats,some such as Ricardo Arias Calderon argued that Panamamust insist upon maintaining its neutrality to safeguardthe Canal, and further suggested that a Contadora-likeeffort be developed to forge a regional peace, with Brazilpotentially taking the lead in the effort.71 Panamasambassador to the United States, Guillermo Ford,commented that Plan Colombia is for Colombia. Panamadoes not want to get involved in the internal problems ofColombia. Weve been shying away from that in everyway.72

Threats to Panamanian citizens were escalating. TheRoman Catholic bishop of Darien, Romulo Emiliani, wasforced to flee the province because of threats from theColombian paramilitary forces. While Panamas PresidentMireya Moscoso promised more support to those attempting to police the border, Panamanian territory wastransgressed and utilized with impunity by insurgents andparamilitary forces. Colombian civilians fled in increasingnumbers to Panama as refugees from both insurgents andparamilitaries. Although Panamanian police twice engaged with FARC insurgents in Panamas Darien province during2000, these Panamanian forces had little or no capacity torespond and were no match for the well-equipped andcomparatively well-trained forces of the FARC and theAUC.

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Panama has been used continuously as a major venue for arms shipments, a practice that was likely to increase as the FARC boosts its forces to an expected 30-35,000 combatantsin response to Plan Colombia. By the same token, the AUCwas expected to increase its forces in response to theexpected FARC increases. To the extent that armsshipments traversed Central America and implicatedCentral America, the expansion of the network of corruption and criminality could only be expected to expand further.73

Indeed, the problem of arms-for-cocaine trafficking reacheddeeply into Mexico, Americas own neighbor, where FARCcooperation with Mexicos Tijuana Cartel was under attackby Mexicos new Fox administration.

Since the implementation of the Panama CanalTreaties, discussions have taken place concerning thepossibility of establishing a new arrangement for a U.S.presence in Panama. At the time of final implementation,negotiations had taken place to establish a MultinationalDrug Center, but final agreement was never reached. Theprospect of a return of U.S. forces to Panama was a difficultmatter for Panamanians, but the Panamanian governmentwas able to forge an agreement with the United States forthe training of 1,000 Panamanian police assigned to borderpatrol.

Panamas substantial involvement in money launderingactivities was a source of continuing concern. In July 2000,the U.S. Department of Treasury included Panama on ablacklist of states that were not cooperating with efforts tocontrol money laundering activities.74 Panama wasincluded on the U.S. Financial Action Task Force list ofNon-Cooperative Countries and Territories. Panama,however, pressured the United States to be removed fromthe list as acknowledgement of its cooperation in receivingPerus Vladimiro Montesinos into the country on atemporary asylum basis at the request of the United Statesand the OAS. Panama did so because it had been allegedthat a military coup was in the offing in Peru as a result ofthe Montesinos affair.

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President Moscosos position was that Plan Colombiawas a matter between Colombia and the United States, anddeclared her intention to avoid having Panama becomeinvolved in the program. At the same time, Panama wassingularly ill-equipped to grapple with the illegal andcriminal operations that were at the root of the Colombiancrisis. Some would argue that Panama faced the choice ofbecoming entirely overwhelmed by Colombian forces orseeking to establish, once again, what could only amount toa protectorate relationship with the United States.Ultimately, concern for the security of the Panama Canalmay further increase pressures on Panama to take moreformal steps in that direction. The recent seizure of aircraftby FARC forces from a former U.S. base may indicate arising threat in Panama.

The Brazilian Calculus.

At the Fourth Defense Ministerial of the Americasconvened in the city of Manaus, Brazil, Brazilian presidentFernando Henrique Cardoso issued a call for sharedcooperation to deal with the drug problem. This would form part of a new concept of security for the region. We share abroad concept of regional security which depends ondemocracy and sustainable development, values that havetaken root from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego.75 One of thepresidents greatest concerns was the need to shield theAmazon region from the further spread of narcotrafficking.Toward that end, some years ago the Brazilian governmentlaunched its plan for the Surveillance of the Amazon System (SIVAM/SIPAM). The $1.7 billion system of radars andsensors, to be supported by reconnaissance and fighteraircraft, was to provide the eyes and the reach for theBrazilian government into the Amazon to establishsovereignty in its vast, unwatched, and uncontrolled areas.The system, according to Cardoso, would enable thegovernment to reinforce our presence with technology, notjust with men.76 Yet Cardoso stated at the DefenseMinisterial meetings held in Manaus that the problem is a

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domestic problem, and that we are not interested at all inany kind of Brazilian intervention in Colombia.77

There was no doubt about Brazils deep concern over itsborder areas and its Amazon territories. Brazilscommitment to its new enormously expensive surveillancesystem came in a period of dramatically reduced overalldefense spending for the Brazilian state. Further, itdovetailed with the wholesale redesign of Brazilian defensepolicy that shifted the focus of the nations defenses fromBrazils southern border with Argentina to its northern andwestern borders in the Amazon region. In addition topreparations for the deployment of SIVAM/SIPAM, Brazilalso deployed additional police along its 1,000 mile borderwith Colombia. More dramatically, in reaction to pressureon its border, Brazil stationed a total of 23,000 troops alongthe border in 63 locations, up from a force of 6,000 in 1991.These forces were to remain stationed in these positionsthroughout the duration of Plan Colombia.78

Put most directly, however, Brazilian authorities did not support Plan Colombia. While they supported a negotiatedsettlement, they did not support what was viewed as amilitary approach to the problem. They feared U.S.intervention in the region, worried about sovereigntyissues, and wished to preserve their own leadership optionsas the major regional power. Brazilian officials chose tocharacterize the insurgent crisis as an exclusively internalpolitical matter (much as did the United States) that wouldhave to be resolved politically within Colombia. As withother states in the region, the government feared thatheightened military activity in Colombia would simply push the problem across Brazils borders. Moreover, Brazilianauthorities worried about the environmental effects of cropfumigation in Colombia and the potential for winds fromColombia to carry chemicals over the Amazon.

According to General Alberto Cardoso, PresidentCardosos chief security advisor, For Brazil, Colombia iscausing the biggest worry. Our attention is dedicated to the

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effects it could have on Brazil, like the flight of guerrillasand the transfer of [drug] laboratories and plantations.79

Although President Cardoso indicated that PresidentPastrana deserves our firm support,80 Foreign MinisterLampreia clearly delineated Brazils intent during anAugust 2000 visit to Brasilia by U.S. Secretary of StateAlbright who was seeking Brazils support for PlanColombia. The Foreign Minister outlined Brazilian policywith regard to possible cooperation with the United Statesand Colombia as follows:

Now, your question about possible common action programs:No, I would say that we do not have the same degree ofcommitment with the drug trafficking program of PresidentPastrana or his peace plan. But that being said, weve toldPresident Pastrana that we will review with interest, and ofcourse, within our possibilities, we will try to answerpositively to any request from Colombia to try to help theirdevelopment and their peace process, but we have no intention of participating in any common or consorted internationalaction in the country.81

According to one newspaper report, Minister Lampreiastressed the autonomy of Brazil, Latin Americas largestcountry, and said Brazil would not participate in the majorWashington campaign to help battle Colombian drugtraffickers.82 In a similar vein, Minister Lampreia alsooutlined Brazils disagreement with regional calls forsanctions on Peru for its electoral irregularities of the spring and summer 2000.

Warning of the likely flight of drug operatives into Brazil once Colombias southern offensive began in December2000, representatives of the USSOUTHCOM reportedlysought to encourage collaboration with Brazil and proposedpolice, military, and intelligence cooperation, but found aless than enthusiastic response.83 On the other hand, whileBrazil did not support what it viewed as the militaryapproach taken by the United States and Colombia, itnonetheless expressed willingness to share intelligencegathered from the SIVAM system with Colombia. Although

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the Brazilian legislature in 1998 passed an aggressiveshoot-down policy designed to control aircraft enteringBrazilian airspace illegally,84 the policy had yet to beimplemented to the consternation of some military and lawenforcement authorities. Nevertheless, Brazil reportedlyintended to spend $3.5 billion for fighter aircraft andtransport aircraft to support its new surveillance system,and planned to refurbish 100 jets in support of theprogram.85 Brazil also reportedly entered a partnershipwith the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS) to support Amazon surveillance operations andheld discussions for purchase of heavy troop transporthelicopters with Russias Rosoboronexport.86 In sum, Brazilmoved aggressively to respond at the national level to theperceived regional threat despite its marked reluctance toparticipate in region-wide, collective security solutions tothe crisis.

FARC insurgents routinely used Brazilian territory assanctuary and to obtain food, medicine, and supplies. Brazilalso served as an important transshipment venue fornarcotics, and had become a substantial source of precursorchemicals. Brazilian territory had already been the site (onrare occasion) of military engagement involving Colombianforces. Yet a precedent was set when Colombian troops fledto Brazilian territory following the FARC assault in Mitu in1998. Although Colombian forces counterattacked andpartially retook the city by staging from Brazil, Brazilianauthorities preferred to declare this use of Braziliannational territory as primarily involving humanitarianconsiderations for the beleaguered Colombian troops inorder to avoid a confrontation with Colombia over theissue.87

Brazils overall policy conformed to its longstandingprinciples of independence and reluctance to cooperate informal military terms with projects involving the UnitedStates. More than any other state touched by the spreadingcontagion, Brazil had the resources to marshal a defense ofits territory and sovereignty largely on its own terms, yet

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this would be no guarantee of success because of theelusiveness and mobility of opposing forces and theinsidiously corrupting influences upon what were nowout-manned law enforcement and military forces.

At present, despite the fact that there are 23,000 troopsstationed in the Amazon area, they are poorly prepared totackle the agile forces that constitute the potentialadversary. Further, Brazil currently only has a handful ofpolice outposts available to contest illegal entry and illegalactivities. While Brazil recognized that the border must befortified, it did not adopt a Maginot lineapproach. It feared more the onslaught of massive drug use, drugmanufacturing, and arms trafficking, recognizing thatdomestic Brazilian drug consumption levels had latelyskyrocketed. Brazil has already suffered spillover effects for 2 decades in its border region with Colombia: cocaine pastehad routinely been routed in from Peru, and the refineddrug was imported from Colombia for export or for domesticconsumption. Brazil also feared the prospects of U.S. armedforces on its border, owing to longstanding suspicions aboutU.S. intentions in the Amazon region. In recognition ofthese growing fears, Brazil recently announced a 3-year $10million program dubbed Operation COBRA which wouldincrease police presence at border crossings, on waterways,and in air space. The program involved seven Brazilianfederal agencies as well as the army. 88

A NEW AGENDA

Although U.S. authorities readily admitted thatattention would have to be paid to the regional implicationsof both the crisis in Colombia and Plan Colombia, theapproach taken tended to be bilateral and reactive ratherthan proactive on a multilateral basis. As Ecuadors Foreign Minister admitted, Colombia had provided no informationabout its plan to neighboring states. Indeed, few withinColombia had much of a sense of the plans objectives. Yet,the regional nature of the problem was clearly noted by

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senior U.S. officials. Former Under Secretary of StateThomas R. Pickering observed that, with respect to requests for aid to the region, I think this is evolving now into notjust a pure Colombia issue, but an Andean regional issue,something it has always been. I think in future years therewill be a broader regional aspect to this as we plan andpropose to the Congress new budgets for this kind ofactivity.89

Though the Clinton administrations reaction to thegrowing crisis in the Andes had focused narrowly uponColombia, the hemispheric summit process had also tendedto overlook the explicit regional threat. Indeed, at the 1998Santiago summit, virtually no mention was made of thethreat to Colombia and adjacent states, although the issueof narcotrafficking was certainly addressed.90 The situationwould change in important ways with the advent of the 2001 Quebec Summit.

Prior to the Summit, regional leaders traveled toWashington in unprecedented numbers (for such an earlypoint in a new U.S. administration) to consult about theurgency of the regional crisis and to appeal for a newapproach. While the Bush administration sought to movecautiously, it was clear that even the more limitedcounterdrug option that had previously characterized U.S.policy in the region was facing more and more complexchallenges. The State Departments annual report onnarcotics stated:

With the drug trade now an organic part of the Colombian civilconflict, the question facing the antidrug coalition will be how toreduce the supply of illegal drugs without exacerbating localconflicts that threaten regional stability.91

Several factors appear to have converged to encourage aseries of new initiatives from regional leaders concerningthe crisis. To begin with, the election of Vicente Fox inMexico appeared to have facilitated Colombias apparentrapprochement with President Chavez of Venezuela,

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leading to the revival of the long moribund Group of Three(Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico). The subsequentimproved spirit of amicability, following intense diplomatic efforts to mend relations, led to new initiatives in theColombian-Venezuelan relationship, including theannouncement of joint border operations with theColombian and Venezuelan armed forces.92

This measure of progress in turn facilitated theconvening of the meeting of the Andean leaders inCartegena, Colombia, on April 19, 2001, immediately priorto the Quebec Summit. This meeting produced severaldramatic developments. First, in a remarkable turnabout,President Chavez announced that he no longer had anyreservations concerning Plan Colombia. While denying that his policy had changed, he declared, What we had warnedabout, not against Plan Colombia, but against its militarycomponent, that chapter has been closed. Doubts thatexisted in any instance regarding Plan Colombia have nowbeen clarified.93 Chavez elsewhere explained that thebriefings he had received revealed a plan for socio-economicdevelopment that addressed inequality and that deservedsupport.

With Chavez no longer an obstacle to a regionalapproach, the Andean leaders next developed what theytermed a Regional Counternarcotics Strategy.94 Thestrategy called for the formation of a bloc for politicalcooperation to deal with the scourge of illicit drugs and tocreate alternatives for development that would promotelegal employment.95 As a cornerstone of the approach, theAndean leaders called for renewal of the U.S. Andean TradePreferences Act set to expire in December 2001 to stimulateeconomic growth and employment in the region. Theproposal called for the inclusion of Venezuela in the group ofbeneficiary nations. The leaders asked that the Act beamended to cover all products manufactured in the region,specifically emphasizing the inclusion of textiles.96 It alsoprovided for a full exemption from tariffs and quotas forAndean production. The new strategy, among other things,

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called for cooperating states to create joint policies and toreach border agreements in order to combat drug cartels.97

At the Quebec Summit, the Andean leaders presented aletter to President Bush, again urging renewal of a moregenerous Andean Trade Preferences Act, declaring Weneed real help. Together, the leaders of Colombia, Peru,Bolivia, and Ecuador (acting on their own and Venezuelasbehalf) urged swift action to improve the regions economicprospects. While a spirit of cooperation prevailed despitePresident Chavezs declaration that Venezuela might not be able to join the Free Trade of the Americas Act (FTAA)unless approved by popular referendum, the prospect forAndean regional cooperation in problem-solving appearedto have brightened considerably.

For its part, the Bush administration unveiled itsproposal for Fiscal Year 2002 support for the region. ItsAndean Regional Initiative proposed to triple the amount ofsupport for Colombias neighboring states and substantially increased the proportion of funds devoted to economicdevelopment as compared to interdiction. While appearingto be responsive to calls for a broader approach to theregions problem, the Andean Regional Initiativenonetheless established performance goals of a 30 percentreduction in Colombian coca production between January2000 and December 2002, and called for the elimination ofall illegal coca production in Bolivia by the end of calendaryear 2002.98

While the performance goals identified by the initiativeappear to be predictably one-dimensional, the Summit alsoproduced a commitment to support investment in the region preparatory to the FTAA. The World Bank and the IADBreportedly pledged $20 billion to strengthen democraticfoundations in the region.99 Performance criteriaassociated with these funds were likely to targetfoundational issues of national development as stipulatedby the programs purposes.

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The multifaceted crises of the Andean Ridge states andspillover from the acute Colombian crisis threatenedstability, democracy, and economic prospects in the region.The complexity and the reverberatory internationalcharacter of these threats outstripped the capability of themajority of states in the region to resist these pressures.Within the context of expanding globalization, one mighthave expected that the first inclination on the part of thebesieged states would have been a collaborative approach tomeeting these challenges. Yet, as globalization increasinglyundermined state sovereignty, leaders in turn found itcorrespondingly more difficult to embrace approaches thatfurther reduced national sovereignty, even for plausiblepurposes. This is particularly the case in the LatinAmerican environment where the political culture of foreign policy tradition has so emphatically elevated to primacy theprinciples of non-intervention, national self-determination,and sovereignty.

The Andean crisis had reached such proportions in theminds of regional leaders, however, that they began toconsider the benefits of collective action. While theseleadershad yet to agree upon a regional security approach to the crisis, their efforts to coordinate economic policy,develop an avenue to cooperative border management,arrive at coordinated counterdrug policies, and, perhapsmost importantly, reach a unified position on the UnitedStates, were positive steps toward fashioning a regionalstance. At the same time, optimism had to be tempered bythe record of prior efforts toward Andean regionalcooperation that have proved disappointing.

Certainly U.S. reaction to these initiatives would be ofthe utmost importance in either encouraging ordiscouraging such innovation. Also important would beBrazils decision either to embrace a new approach on theissue, taking a cue from the Andean leaders, or to remainlargely aloof from regional security cooperation. Bycontrast, Mexicos new leaders appeared to be creating amodel for the region for a new era of regional security

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cooperation. For their part, as the Andean states sought torecover stability and defeat their adversaries, they werebeing forced to grapple with complexities in theinternational environment that would require changes intheir approach to interstate behavior, changes that theywere now apparently more willing to accept.

CONCLUSION

For the moment, despite speculation concerning itsfuture attitude to the Colombian crisis, the Bushadministration remains committed to supporting PlanColombia.100 Early reports from the administrationsuggested a degree of uncertainty regarding the overallpolicy approach, the heightened emphasis upon WesternHemisphere affairs notwithstanding. Indications have been that the entire policy will be undergoing extensive review.

In the interim, the administration has broadened itsfocus on the issue to include more emphasis upondevelopment programs along with more emphasis uponsupport for Colombias neighboring states.101 U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell has suggested that the AndeanRegional Initiative represents a more comprehensiveperspective. Powell stated that the

regional initiative that I will be defending before the Congress . . .allows us in future years not just to focus on narco-trafficking inColombia but to see the problem as a regional problem and toinvest in human rights activities, to invest in infrastructuredevelopment, to invest in economic opportunities that willencourage people to move away from narco-trafficking , and tosee this problem as a regional problem and not just a simpleproblem of narco-traffickers in Colombia alone. 102

The Andean Regional Initiative has been described asproviding comprehensive and coordinated assistance toseven different countries impacted by the Colombian crisis, and was developed in consultation with the seven recipientstates and with European and other potential donors. 103

This new level of coordination represents a positive

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beginning for what needs to be a systematic multistateanalysis of the problem. U.S. authorities have argued thatthis kind of coordination was not possible in the moment ofcrisis to which the $1.3 billion supplemental Plan Colombiaappropriation responded.104

According to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State forWestern Hemisphere Affairs William R. Brownfield, theshift resulted from criticism of the plan and of the UnitedStates package of support for the plan which was labeled asbeing too focused on security and law enforcement andoverly focused on Colombia.105 The complaints of interestgroups, the United States Congress, the news media, andEuropean donor countries; consultations in Bogota andMadrid; and the influence of Mexico and Brazil pushed theadministration to redirect its energies and resources to thethree dsdemocracy, development, and drugs. Elsewhere,other administration officials had argued that the initialpackage of U.S. support for Plan Colombia emphasizingsecurity and hardware acquisition had laid the necessarygroundwork that would permit more emphasis later uponprograms geared to social stabilization.

While the shift in emphasis had much to commend it, the conclusion implicit in the change was that Colombiassecurity situation had improved to the point thatsubstantial new sums could be profitably introduced intoColombian social programs designed to defend democracyand to promote development, including improvement ofjustice systems, alternative crop development, and so forth.Yet no evidence to that effect was presented or even hintedat. Indeed, Colombian government plans called for theaddition of 10,000 more soldiers per year to the army untilthe army and police are large enough to provide security fortheir entire country.106Moreover, the administration hadnot seemed to move closer to confronting a central dilemma:if it were to continue to identify drugs as its chief concern,then how would it respond to the Colombian DefenseMinister Ramirez Acunas assertion that fighting thedrugs has gone from being a criminal problem to a military

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one.107 The military aspect of the problem was driven bythe strengthening alliances between insurgents,paramilitary forces, and narcotraffickers. It would be lessand less possible to engage in the kind of semanticsleight-of-hand that characterized U.S. policy in the 1990s,driven by U.S. resistance to intervening in a civil war. Forhis part, General Pace observed in testimony to the HouseArmed Services Committee:

If you asked me to make a distinction between narcotraffickersand the insurgents, I can draw that line for you. But it is a very,very clouded line. And in fact in my mind it is a distinction thatprobably has lost its value. The bottom line from my perspectiveis that if you are trafficking in drugs, regardless of what else youdo, if you are trafficking in drugs you are a narcotrafficker. Andthe symbiotic relationship between the insurgents and thenarcotraffickers has so confused that distinction that its verydifficult to do.108

More worrisome still was that the apparent shift inemphasis in assistance to Colombia was based not upon astrategic analysis of the conflict, but rather upon theadministrations response to the political predilections ofinterested parties largely outside of Colombia. That is tosay, changes in policy emphasis appeared to be, now morethan ever, a function of political constraints rather thanstrategic analysis. This, in turn, calls into question thechances for the policys success. Given the weight of theseconstraints, the challenge for the administration will be tofind a way to observe the precepts of collective security while maintaining a coherent strategic policy.

If there is to be any maturation of U.S. policy toward theAndean region, it will be incumbent upon the U.S.administration to conduct a sound strategic analysis of theregions destabilization, lead in the articulation of strategicobjectives, and design a defensible and feasible policy thatcan gain the support of critical congressional, interestgroup, and news media elements in the United States,above and beyond the concurrence of the Andean and otherimpacted states. Given the importance attached by the

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Bush administration to achieving a free trade agreement by2005 and given the difficulties faced in simply renewing theAndean Trade Preferences Act to the satisfaction of allparties, the United States will have to devote considerablepolitical resources to moving policy beyond the piecemealimprovisation that now substitutes for strategy.

The engagement responsibilities of the U.S. military inthe Andean area have been extensive. The United StatesSecurity Strategy for the Americas (2000) outlines U.S.military taskings in the Andean Ridge nations as focusingupon defense partnerships.109 The scope of support toAndean states in counterdrug interdiction has grownsteadily since the late 1980s. At the operational level, theproblem for USSOUTHCOM has remained that of resourcescarcity, particularly in the areas of intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and in national,theater and tactical collection and processing for signalsintelligence (SIGINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), andimagery intelligence (IMINT).110

In addition, SOUTHCOM Commander-in-Chief General Peter Pace has identified the need for improved budgetarysupport for foreign military sales and financing. Intestimony to the House Armed Services Committee, Pacenoted that Congress had allocated $220 million in 1991 forthis activity, but in 2000 the budget stood at only $3.5million, a drastic reduction in the amount of money that wespend in assisting our friends in the region to build theirown capabilities.111

Still another problem area may be the issue of the use ofcontractors to support Department of Defense (DoD) andother U.S. Government agencies commitments in theregion. Increasingly, the reliance upon contractors has beencalled into question by congressional critics and by theColombian government itself, as witnessed by thetermination of Military Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI) responsibilities for DoD-sponsored assistance to theColombian Ministry of Defense. How U.S. Government

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agencies, and DoD in particular, will replace these assetsremains to be determined and may gravely complicatematters.112

A major challenge facing the U.S. military in the nearterm will involve maintaining the support of regionalpartners in cooperative programs, given Washingtonsperceived strategic uncertainty. Enhancing the confidenceof partners in Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela will be of theutmost priority. As a matter of official policy, however, thecurrent U.S. military tasking in the Andean Ridge arearemains clear: counterdrug support. Without an overallstrategic reconsideration of the regions problem and of thethreat to hemispheric democracies, the U.S. military willcontinue to focus upon training and operational support forregional states counterdrug operations and assistingpartner nations with the enhancement of their owncounterdrug detection and interdiction capabilities.Ultimately, regardless of whether the overall policy guidingU.S. military tasking shifts marginally or dramatically, themore that U.S. military leadership can do to promoteregion-wide security cooperation and to build cooperativerelationships within the circle of impacted states, thusovercoming traditions of bilateralism, the greater theprospect for long-term success in reducing the level ofregional instability.

ENDNOTES

1. Bernard Aronson, Conference presentation on Supporting thePeace Process, CNA/NDU Workshop Colombia: Strategic End State,Goals and Means, October 6, 2000, Alexandria, VA.

2. Arie M. Kacowicz, Regionalization, Globalization, andNationalism: Convergent, Divergent, or Overlapping, Revised versionof paper presented at the IPSA Study Group II: New World Orders?Workshop on Globalisms and Regionalism, Center for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo, Norway, August 7, 1998.Columbia International Affairs Online, CIAO Working Papers, https://wwwc.cc.Columbia.edu/sec/dic/ciao/wps/kaa01.htm., p. 2.See also Simon Reich, What Is Globalization? Four Possible Answers,

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Columbia International Affairs Online, CIAO Working Papers,https://wwwc.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dic/ciao/wps/rhs01/. AlsoRobert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Globalization: Whats New?Whats Not? (And So What?), Foreign Policy, No. 118, Spring 2000, pp.104-119; Kenneth N. Waltz, Globalization and American Power, TheNational Interest, No. 59, Spring 2000, pp. 46-56.

3. Albright Garners Support for Colombia Plan, The Times ofIndia, August 20, 2000, wysiwyg://12/http://www.timesofindia.com/200800/20amrc10.htm.

4. Axel Bugge, Americas Defense Chiefs Have Eyes On Colombia,Reuters, October 16, 2000.

5. Plan Colombia Keeping U.S. Trade Off Track, Str