SUMMARY REPORT

Regional Senior Leaders Seminar (RSLS) 2011

STRENGTHENING CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION FOR

CONFLICT AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT

16-19 May 2011, Pullman Reef Hotel, Cairns, Australia

Compiled by Sarah Shteir, Research Project Officer, Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence

July 2011

Table of Contents Acronyms...................................................................................................................................3

I. Executive Summary................................................................................................................4

II. Background ...........................................................................................................................6

III. Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Management.........................................................7

i. Context....................................................................................................................................7

ii. Progress Made .......................................................................................................................7

iii. Challenges & Gaps ...............................................................................................................9

iv. Priorities & Solutions - Where do we go from here? .........................................................10

IV. Protection of Civilians in a Multiagency Environment in Complex Emergencies.............................................................................................................................13

i. Context..................................................................................................................................13

ii. Progress Made .....................................................................................................................15

iii. Challenges & Gaps .............................................................................................................17

iv. Priorities & Solutions - Where do we go from here? .........................................................19

V. Common Issues ...................................................................................................................21

VI. Conclusion .........................................................................................................................23

VII. Key Readings, Resources & References ..........................................................................25

Annex A. RSLS 2011 Program................................................................................................29

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Acronyms ADF Australian Defence Force ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations AusAID Australian Agency for International Development C-34 UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations Centre Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence COE-DMHA Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and

Humanitarian Assistance CONOPS Concept of Operations DFS Department of Field Support (UN) DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN) DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo FPU Formed Police Unit ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross ISAF International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan) MINUSTAH UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti MONUC UN Mission in the DRC MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in DRC

(formerly MONUC) NDMO National Disaster Management Office NGO Non-Governmental Organisation POC Protection of Civilians POC Framework UN ‘Framework for Drafting Comprehensive POC

Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations’ RSLS Regional Senior Leaders Seminar R2P Responsibility to Protect T/PCC Troop/Police-Contributing Countries UNAMID African Union/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur UNAMSIL UN Mission in Sierra Lone UNCT UN Country Team UNDP UN Development Programme UNFPA UN Population Fund UNHCR Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCHR Office of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights UNICEF UN Children’s Fund UNIFIL UN Interim Force in Lebanon UNMIS UN Mission in Sudan UN OCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs UNOCI UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire WFP World Food Programme (UN)

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I. Executive Summary

The Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence (the Centre), in conjunction with the US Government’s Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (COE-DMHA), co-hosted the Regional Senior Leaders Seminar (RSLS) in Cairns, Australia, from 16-19 May 2011.1 The seminar - a civil-military coordination forum for emerging government and non-government leaders from the Asia Pacific region – was attended by 31 participants from ten countries and included representatives from the United Nations and a number of other relevant organisations.2 Participants considered contemporary civil-military challenges for conflict and disaster management. The subject of the three-day seminar was Strengthening Civil-Military Coordination for Conflict and Disaster Management. It focused on two predominant themes: 1) ‘civil-military coordination in Disaster Management – what progress has been made and where do we go from here?’; and 2) ‘Protection of Civilians in a multiagency environment in complex emergencies’. The final day included a session on ‘New Ideas - Working with hyperconnected information in conflicts and disasters’. The two main seminar themes were chosen because they reflect contemporary operational challenges for civil-military actors. In the context of disasters, not only is the Asia Pacific region the most disaster-prone in the world, but the number and complexity of disasters is increasing, as is the requirement for coordinated civil-military responses. In the context of protection of civilians (POC) in complex emergencies, since 1999, the UN Security Council has mandated POC in 10 UN peacekeeping missions. In these environments, protection actors continue to face significant challenges in achieving coherence, often with limited resources, insufficient guidance and under intense public scrutiny. Often working in a contested post-conflict environment, protection actors also may have to contend with armed groups, a hostile or incapable host state, and the lack of a coherent protection implementation plan. Despite these operational challenges, participants identified progress being made. In disaster contexts, the wealth of experience within the region is proving critically important. Countries, such as those represented by the RSLS participants, are gaining experience in multiagency and whole-of-government disaster management. These experiences have reinforced the importance of civil-military coordination, and helped to identify areas requiring attention and improvement. The utility of a Pacific Disaster Management Map was seen as a useful mechanism to understand the basic interactions between domestic and international actors in disaster response. In complex emergency contexts, the high level of activity to improve POC by UN peacekeeping missions has resulted in considerable progress, including the development of the ‘UN Framework for Drafting Comprehensive POC Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations’ (hereafter ‘POC Framework’); the development of POC training modules for

1 A Regional Senior Leaders Seminar was held in 2010 in Honolulu on ‘The Challenges of Multinational U.N. Peace Support Operations after a Natural Disaster’. 2 Participants represented the following countries: the Philippines, Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia, Tonga, Papua New Guinea, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and New Caledonia-France. The non-government organisations present were: Australia Aid International, Save the Children, Oxfam, ICRC, and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

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civilian, police and military personnel; and a focus on operationalising POC as a core strategic objective for (and within) UN peacekeeping missions. Despite advances in both these contexts, participants noted that considerable work still lies ahead. Participants highlighted the challenges and gaps that presented obstacles to improved civil-military effectiveness. In disaster contexts, the obstacles identified included a lack of practical operational mechanisms for civil-military coordination, and the need for clearer reporting lines. In the POC context, challenges included a lack of POC doctrine and training, personnel and resource shortfalls, and the need for peacekeepers to act pre-emptively to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence, in the face of a helpless, unwilling or abusive host state. Participants did not shy away from these challenges, suggesting solutions and priorities to enhance civil-military collaboration in both disaster response and POC. These suggestions ranged from the more philosophical to the pragmatic and concrete. The central conclusion was that civil-military actors require knowledge and a ‘common understanding’ of the actual situation and of each others’ roles and responsibilities. In the context of disaster management, participants suggested various solutions and priorities. These included recognising the importance of prevention and preparation, the critical role of liaison officers, the critical need for relationships and trust, and the importance of joint training, exercises and doctrine. For POC, participants’ suggestions addressed the importance of engagement between peacekeepers and communities and the need for community liaison interpreters. They also prioritised the POC Framework and the POC strategy consultation process, the importance of responsive patrols, benchmarks, and an improved attitude about intelligence gathering, among other issues. The presentations and discussions during the seminar highlighted a number of common themes. These related to: the importance of achieving a common understanding; understanding the context for civil-military engagement (the nature or ‘typology’ of the crisis and the nature of the response effort); the multiplicity of actors involved in crisis environments; the utility of social media for civil-military crisis management; the unavoidable presence of political realities; and the importance of the ‘bigger picture’. The RSLS 2011 was an effective activity that drew upon the experiences of agencies and individuals working to address civil-military challenges in conflict and disaster situations. The RSLS encouraged a strong sense of information sharing and a strong focus on the need for common understanding, and directly enhanced relationships across the civil-military community.

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I. Background

The Regional Senior Leaders Seminar (RSLS) 2011 brought together 31 participants representing ten countries in the Asia-Pacific region; expert speakers from government, the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs); and staff from the Centre and COE-DMHA. The three-day seminar focused on two predominant themes: 1) ‘civil-military coordination in Disaster Management – what progress has been made and where do we go from here?’; and 2) ‘Protection of Civilians in a multiagency environment in complex emergencies’. In addition, the final day included a session on ‘New Ideas - Working with hyperconnected information in conflicts and disasters’. The seminar comprised keynote presentations, panel discussions, significant working group activity, supported by circulating mentors, and a conference dinner with a keynote address by LtGen (Ret) John Goodman, Executive Director of the COE-DMHA. Networking was a key objective and was prominent with working relationships developed and strengthened among civilian, police and military practitioners from the region. The aim of RSLS 2011 was to provide an opportunity for senior government and nongovernment officials from the Asia Pacific region to come together to workshop civil-military issues and challenges for conflict and disaster management. The seminar was framed by a series of background papers, circulated to participants in advance of the seminar (see section VII). The format of the event provided an environment for participants to develop a shared understanding of civil-military approaches to collaborating in multinational responses to conflict and disaster situations. The seminar was conducted under Chatham House Rule to encourage openness and sharing of information and opinions. The objectives of RSLS 2011 were to: • Provide senior regional leaders the opportunity to share and improve their

understanding of civil-military coordination in complex emergencies and disaster management;

• Enhance communication and coordination between participating countries and organisations; and

• Access senior experts in the fields of humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and conflict management.

This report summarises the two themes, examples of progress made, continuing challenges and gaps, and solutions and priorities identified and highlighted during the three days of presentations and discussions.3 This summary report also considers numerous common themes linking the distinct but related issues of disaster management and POC in multiagency complex emergencies. The report concludes with a list of the documents and resources that were referenced and circulated during the seminar, as well as useful links. 3 This report draws upon notes from Sarah Shteir, the RSLS rapporteur, PowerPoint presentations and talking points shared by participants, notes from working group discussions and their plenary feedback, comments posted on a communal whiteboard, and notes shared by participants via feedback sheets. The views expressed in this report do not represent Australian Government policy.

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III. Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Management i. Context The Asia Pacific is the most disaster-prone region in the world.4 Those living in the region are ‘four times more likely to be affected by natural disasters than those living in Africa, and 25 times more likely than those living in Europe or North America’.5 As participants heard, the vulnerabilities of this region are exacerbated by multiple factors including: limited resources; the remoteness of many locations and isolation of many communities; increasing urbanisation; reliance on outside assistance; and the loss of traditional coping mechanisms. Disasters can wipe out decades of development and investment. According to the United Nations, in 2010, disasters caused an estimated $109 billion in economic damage – ‘three times more than in 2009’.6 The estimated cost of the disasters in Queensland alone was $9-10 billion. Disasters distract governments from other critical priorities and activities and can weaken them politically. Due to the increasing use of social media, disasters and the efforts to manage them now face increasing media scrutiny. While decreasing global fatality rates from disasters suggest that preparedness efforts are reaping some rewards, the reality is that the number of catastrophes is increasing. These disasters are not only increasing, they are also increasingly complex, as is the response effort, comprised of an increasingly diverse range of actors. This reality demands effective civil-military coordination and engagement. While there is increasing acknowledgement and awareness of the importance of civil-military coordination, and significant advances in this area, considerable challenges and work remain.

• Over half of the 4 billion people living in Asia (60% of the world’s population), live near the coasts, ‘making them directly vulnerable to sea-level rise’ (The Working Group on Climate Change and Development, 2007).

• ‘In 2009, over 75 per cent of people killed by natural disasters worldwide were in Asia and the Pacific’ (OCHA Regional Office for Asia Pacific, ‘Briefing Kit’, 2011).

ii. Progress Made Australia’s Growing Experience of Civil-Military Coordination Australia has been developing strong skills and capabilities in civil-military coordination over the past two decades of its operations in disaster situations. These operations have shifted over time from arrangements in which the civilian and military efforts were run in parallel and in isolation from one another, to integrated, co-led operations, demonstrated most recently with the Australian Government’s contribution to the Pakistan Floods (2010) response. Under the unifying badge of the Australian Medical Task Force, a joint medical task force

4 OCHA Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, ‘Regional Trends and Implications for OCHA in Asia and the Pacific’, September 2010, viewed at http://ochaonline.un.org/ocha2010/roap.html. 5 UN ESCAP and UNISDR, Protecting Development Gains: Reducing Disaster Vulnerability and Building Resilience in Asia and the Pacific - The Asia-Pacific Disaster Report, 2010, p.vii, viewed at http://www.unescap.org/idd/pubs/Asia-Pacific-Disaster-Report%20-2010.pdf. 6 Laura MacInnis, ‘Cost of natural disasters $109 billion in 2010: U.N.’, Reuters, 24 January 2011, viewed at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/24/us-disasters-un-idUSTRE70N26K20110124.

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was deployed to Kot Adu. It was led under a diarchy arrangement, with leadership shared between a team leader from the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) and an Australian Defence Force (ADF) Commander. As one participant reflected, this arrangement ‘ensured a unity in decision-making, promoted a united front and allowed both the ADF and AusAID to take the respective lead on their collective and individual areas of responsibility’. A Pacific Disaster Management Stakeholder Map As was explained by one participant, the Pacific region provides a useful model of domestic arrangements for disaster response in the form of the Pacific Disaster Management Stakeholder Map copied below. The core domestic components of

the map are the national government, a National Disaster Management Office (NDMO), which can be civilian or military-led, a National Disaster Council, national societies of the Red Cross, and national NGOs and community-based organisations. These domestic components share the disaster management space with various international actors, including regional organisations and arrangements (Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], ASEAN Regional Forum [ARF], Pacific Islands Forum [PIF], FRANZ7 etc), the United Nations and international NGOs and donor countries.

Engagement between and among domestic and international actors is facilitated by various layers of informal, and formal domestic and international networks. These include the UN cluster system, regional networks such as the South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC), the Pacific Humanitarian Team, and informal networks. There are also strong informal networks in place. These may include church networks, and links between Pacific communities and Pacific Island nationals living in New Zealand and Australia who often provide assistance through their remittances and other forms of support.

7 FRANZ is an agreement between the three signatory states France, Australia and New Zealand, which facilitates cooperative emergency relief assistance to the South Pacific in situations of natural disasters. From Embassy of France in Canberra, ‘FRANZ meeting - Sydney (May 18)’,http://www.ambafrance-au.org/spip.php?article1641.

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Tools for Civil-Military Coordination (see Section VII) There is a wealth of existing tools to facilitate and enhance civil-military coordination in disaster management. As one participant noted, there is no need to reinvent the wheel. These tools include: • The Sphere Handbook - Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in

Humanitarian Response; • The Australian Council for International Development Code of Conduct, a

‘voluntary, self regulatory industry code’;8 • ‘Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent

Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief’; • International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Law, and Refugee Law; • Specific Terms of Reference and agreements (such as FRANZ); • Asia-Pacific Conferences on Military Assistance to Disaster Relief

Operations ‘Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines for the Use of Foreign Military Assets in National Disaster Response Operations’;

• ASEAN Standby Arrangements and Standard Operating Procedures; and • Joint contingency planning and simulation exercises.

These tools are especially important as disaster environments become increasingly crowded with greater numbers of agencies with their own distinct mandates, approaches and capabilities. According to one participant, the key question is how to engage with this multitude of tools. iii. Challenges & Gaps Policy and Doctrine While there is a substantial body of tools to help guide civil-military coordination and engagement, it was noted that there is a serious lack of explicit policy and doctrine within the region. In Australia, for example, there is no clear policy on the civil-military space. A civil-military policy would enable the development and production of effective civil-military doctrine. Such policy and doctrine is fundamental for effective civil-military coordination and cohesion, and it was noted that progress will be difficult without it.

‘We are only just managing to get by now…we need all the skills and coordinated effort we can get. ‘

Participant

Practical Mechanisms As one participant noted, while we have a good comprehensive set of philosophies, what we do not have are the practical mechanisms to allow for civil-military coordination to actually take place. This observation mirrors a comment made by Australia’s Foreign Minister, Kevin Rudd:

If we have a huge event affecting a major capital city in the region or across the world with a large loss of life, the international effort required would be massive, and I am not confident that currently the international system of cooperation and coordination would be up to

8ACFID, viewed at http://www.acfid.asn.au/code-of-conduct

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it…Our current arrangements are not sharp enough for that response to be as rapid and as large scale as it needs to be.9

As one participant remarked, ‘the first ten days we are not as good as we are on day 11…will the first ten days of the next disaster change and be improved or will we still face the same challenges? ‘Same same, but different’ Every disaster is different; not only the nature of the disaster (the ‘typology’) but

also the context in which it occurs (politics, culture, economics). For this reason, no single disaster response template is feasible, regardless of the convenience of the idea.

‘Be wary of the model that worked last time. It won’t necessarily work next time’.

Participant

Reporting Chains As operations become increasingly coordinated and even integrated, a key factor that requires consideration is the question of reporting lines. In the joint Australian Medical Task Force in Pakistan, for example, the dual reporting chains proved problematic, with the same information sometimes interpreted differently by civilian and military partners. This experience raises the question of whether some form of a centralised reporting system or a shared information system is required in such situations. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Participants acknowledged the critical civil-military coordination role played by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),10 including in ensuring that humanitarian principles are operationally applied in the civil-military space. They also acknowledged the pressing need for more OCHA civil-military coordination officers in the Asia-Pacific. iv. Priorities & Solutions - Where do we go from here? Participants identified the following key priorities and solutions during the seminar:

1. Preparation and Prevention: Participants noted that, in the civil-military disaster management space, the predominant focus tends to be on the response phase. However, the response should not be the endgame. Resources are needed to work with communities and NDMOs/Host Governments to enhance preparedness and disaster risk reduction - the prevention and mitigation aspects of disaster management, including the civil-military interface. After all, the preparatory and preventive efforts (training, preparedness, contingency planning, and exercises) play a critical role in determining and shaping the response effort.

9 Excerpt from Transcript from Joint media conference with Pedro Villagra Delgado, Dean of the Diplomatic Corps on ‘Diplomatic Corps visit to Queensland, Climate Change, Qantas, Tourism, ASX merger decision’, Brisbane, 6 April 2011 10 UN OCHA was ultimately unable to attend RSLS for reasons of current operational overstretch. They are currently preparing a study to address the Office’s future civil-military roles and priorities.

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2. Deployment of Liaison Officers: Professional and trained liaison officers are needed to facilitate civil-military coordination. These officers must be empowered to make decisions, have developed contacts and networks, and know what to look for, and who to talk to. If adequately resourced, OCHA could provide trained civil-military coordination officers for such roles. Given the limited capacity and capability issues for domestic disaster management structures, such as NDMOs, one participant cautioned that such personnel must be cognisant of the potential burden they place on national offices with their requests for information.

3. Credible Reference List of Coordination Arrangements: There are multiple regional, multilateral, and bilateral arrangements to support civil-military coordination in disaster management. OCHA plays a critical role in this effort, as does the UN Cluster system; ASEAN has a number of applicable arrangements, some theoretical and some operational; so too does the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. However, according to one participant, there is no credible list of these arrangements. Participants highlighted on a number of occasions the need for a clear and credible mapping of the full range of existing networks and arrangements.

4. Civil-Military Coordination Framework: Institutional processes or

frameworks need to be established to guide civil-military coordination and ensure it is not ad hoc and based solely on individual personalities and relationships. This will ensure that such coordination does not vanish with personnel changes.

5. Relationships and Trust: Relationships alone are insufficient, as the

above point highlights, but they are nonetheless critical for effective disaster response. Developing relationships prior to disasters – bilateral and multilateral relationships between countries and organisations, between civilian and military organisations, and between individuals - enables actors to know their counterparts (their approach, doctrine, sensibilities), can facilitate the development of a common understanding between diverse actors, and can facilitate improved coordination during the chaos and complexity of a disaster situation.

6. Joint Exercises and Training: Shared exercises and training increase

interoperability. While there is limited activity in this area – with NGOs often excluded from joint exercises - it was acknowledged that momentum is building. However, it was also acknowledged that the varying capacities and capabilities of civilian, police and military personnel present a challenge for such initiatives. For example, NGOs often have such limited resources and time that they may not be able to participate in joint exercises, even if they were invited to and wanted to.

7. ‘Double Counting’ Skills: One participant proposed ‘double counting’

skills; in other words proactively utilising the multiple core skills that many individuals bring to a disaster response. The multi-skilled nature of team members, such as reservists who have both a military and civilian

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career (with knowledge of both ‘sides’), could have great utility in a multidimensional, multiagency environment.11

8. Simplicity: As one participant reflected, there will always be tensions and

friction between civilian and military actors. Even with training, awareness-raising and exercises, the civil-military dynamic will always prove complex and complicated. Observing that we tend to overcomplicate things, this participant noted that ‘It behoves us to keep things as simple as possible’.

9. End-state: One participant asked the questions - why do we want to do

better? What is the desired end-state? It is critical that we remember we are there to save lives, reduce injury, and enable and support recovery. This is the driving need to enhance civil-military effectiveness.

11 At the same time, it was noted that double counting can be a ‘double-edged sword’, as reservists may face multiple competing demands for their capabilities.

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IV. Protection of Civilians in a Multiagency Environment in Complex Emergencies i. Context UN peacekeeping operations have been explicitly involved in the protection of civilians in 10 different missions over the past 12 years. Beginning with the 1999 mandate for the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), this journey has been challenging and difficult. The role of peacekeeping in POC has been controversial and contested, as it is bound up in sensitive issues of sovereignty and host nation consent. There have been differing levels of support and acceptance for POC among key Member States, including Security Council members and Troop and Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs). Among the latter, concern and resistance to a POC role has sometimes been reflected in national caveats limiting what their personnel are allowed to do when faced with civilians under imminent threat of violence. The controversial nature of POC is further compounded by its links to the politically charged ‘Responsibility to Protect (R2P)’ norm.12 Despite the challenges and resistance, today, there are seven UN missions, out of a total of 16, with a POC mandate: Sudan (UNMIS); Sudan-Darfur (UNAMID); Lebanon (UNIFIL); Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI); Liberia (UNMIL); Haiti (MINUSTAH); and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (MONUSCO). Across these missions, there are approximately 112, 000 personnel deployed under a POC mandate.13

We need to remember who protection is about.

Participant (paraphrased)

There are multiple protection players and stakeholders in a multiagency peacekeeping environment. The host state has primary responsibility for the protection of (its) civilians. Communities themselves are a central actor in their own protection, with often well-developed self-protection mechanisms and strategies (eg. ‘run, hide, negotiate, fight-back’). There are explicit protection-mandated organisations, including the ICRC, and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). There is the UN peacekeeping mission itself (military, police and civilian personnel). There is the UN Country Team (UNCT), which may include UN OCHA, UNHCR, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Program (WFP), the UN Population Fund (UNFPA),

12 R2P is a norm (also described as a concept and principle) that addresses the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. R2P was embraced by UN General Assembly Member States at the 2005 World Summit in paragraphs 138-139 of the Outcome Document. In 2009, the UN Secretary-General released the first comprehensive document outlining implementation of R2P. In this document he proposes a three-pillar approach for advancing the R2P agenda: ‘The protection responsibilities of the State’; ‘International assistance and capacity-building’; and ‘Timely and decisive response’. From International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘Core Documents: Understanding RtoP’, viewed at http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/publications/core-rtop-documents and UN General Assembly, ‘Implementing the responsibility to protect: Report of the Secretary-General’, A/63/677, 12 January 2009, p.2. 13 It is important to note that non-UN operations also include protection tasks. For example, in Afghanistan, ‘population protection’ has become a central focus for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

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UN Women, and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), as well as international NGOs. These organisations often coordinate among each other and with the peacekeeping mission through the UN protection cluster system. Other players and stakeholders include national NGOs and community-based organisations. These varied protection actors approach their protection efforts in diverse ways. Within the human rights and humanitarian field, there is a consensus-based definition that has been used for many years by many organisations, based on the ICRC definition and endorsed by the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee:

The concept of protection encompasses all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of the relevant bodies of law, i.e. human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law… A protection activity is any activity – consistent with the above-mentioned purpose – aimed at creating an environment conducive to respect for human beings, preventing and/or alleviating the immediate effects of a specific pattern of abuse, and restoring dignified conditions of life through reparation, restitution and rehabilitation.14

Protection actors who use this rights-based definition, such as the ICRC, have developed a conceptual reference known as the ‘protection egg’. The ‘protection response egg’ identifies three levels of protection action: responsive action; remedial action; and environment building.15 More recently, the UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Field Support (DFS) developed a Concept of Operations for the application of

POC in UN peacekeeping operations. The 2009 Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations outlines a ‘three-tiered approach’ to protection for peacekeeping missions: protection through political process; protection from physical violence; and establishing a protective environment (promotion of legal protection, facilitation of humanitarian assistance and advocacy, and support to national institutions).16

Examples of Successful Protection by Peacekeepers: • MONUSCO (DRC): Swift

intervention by peacekeepers led to the release of seven women on the same day they were abducted by rebels.

• MINUSTAH (Haiti): Peacekeeper patrols in an IDP camp helped reduce crime and improve security for camp residents.

There has been considerable activity over the past three years to improve POC in UN peacekeeping operations. Much of this activity has been guided by requests 14 ICVA, ‘What Is Protection?: A Definition by Consensus: A Background Note for the Workshop on the Development of Human Rights Training for Humanitarian Actors’, 2001, viewed at http://www.icva.ch/doc00000663.html. 15 ICRC, Strengthening Protection in War: A Search for Professional Standards, 2001, viewed at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p0783.htm. 16 DPKO/DFS, ‘Draft DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’, 2010, pp. 1, 9.

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from Member States, in particular through the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (the C-34). This flurry of activity also has been driven by challenging and difficult environments faced by a number of the UN’s larger missions. The UN missions in Haiti, Sudan, Darfur, DRC and Côte d’Ivoire have all had to grapple with difficult events and, as one participant explained, their ability to protect civilians ‘has been put to the test’. There have been highly publicised failures, where peacekeepers were unable to reach civilians in time to protect them, due, among other factors, to inaccessibility and lack of resources. There have also been many, less publicised, cases where peacekeepers have successfully protected civilians in the mission area; participants heard success stories from DRC, Darfur and Haiti. ii. Progress Made UN ‘Framework for Drafting Comprehensive POC Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations’ The newest POC tool to be developed by DPKO is the UN ‘Framework for Drafting Comprehensive POC Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations’ (hereafter the ‘POC Framework’). Developed through extensive consultation, it is designed as an ‘umbrella’ to help missions build a mission-wide strategy responsive to their context and situation, while ensuring they have all the necessary elements, and are consulting and coordinating with all the right protection actors. A core component of the POC Framework template is a POC risk analysis, ‘in many ways the focus of the Framework’, according to one participant. A POC risk analysis must be conducted jointly with other UN protection actors, including the UNCT, ‘in order to ensure a common understanding and prioritization of those risks’.17 Through this analysis, and a candid assessment of a mission’s capacities and capabilities, the mission can then prioritise their POC tasks and activities, in coordination with other protection actors. The POC Framework is now official guidance for the field, following its recent approval by the C-34.

Template for Comprehensive POC Strategies

A. Purpose and scope of the

strategy B. Analysis of POC risks and

undertaking risk assessments

C. POC activities D. Information-gathering and

sharing system E. Early warning systems and

crisis response F. Analysis of mission

capacities, resources and national caveats

G. Roles and responsibilities of mission components and other protection actors

H. Coordination mechanisms I. Expectations Management J. Monitoring and reporting on

implementation of POC mandates

Development of UN POC Training Modules DPKO is developing a series of training modules for military, police and civilian personnel working in missions with POC mandates. The modules address the conceptual underpinnings of POC and are based on realistic scenarios. As one participant outlined, the modules have been shared with Member States and will shortly be pilot tested with peacekeeping training institutes and missions, after which they will be finalised and shared again with Member States in July 2011.

17 DPKO/DFS, ‘Framework for Drafting POC Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations’, 2011, p.8.

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Regional training-of-trainer courses on the modules will be conducted from July 2011 to July 2012, pending resources. Once finalised, the modules will be delivered as part of pre-deployment training as well as in-mission training. UN Scenario-based Training Modules on Sexual Violence DPKO is working with UN Women and UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict on scenario-based training modules on sexual violence for military personnel. These modules present military personnel, prior to deployment, with ‘real-life sexual violence situations’ to teach them how to respond.18 Resource and Capability Requirements for POC Upon a request from Member States, DPKO has begun to outline the resource and capability requirements for implementing POC mandates. A resource and capability matrix has been drafted and shared with the C-34 and UN missions for feedback. The matrix is intended to clarify requirements based on specific POC activities. This tool is intended to provide insight into the planning for future POC missions. Concept of Operations DPKO has begun assessing existing mission Concept of Operations (CONOPS) to determine their adequacy in achieving POC-mandated requirements. A review of existing police and military CONOPS for POC missions has revealed considerable variation: some make explicit mention of POC; and some indirect reference. According to one participant, an explicit statement on POC in the CONOPS is desired. An example of this is the police CONOPS for UNAMID, in which ‘contributing to the protection of civilians’ is cited as a strategic objective. South Sudan UN Mission Planning As one participant explained, POC is an integral part of the ongoing planning for a new mission in South Sudan. It has been defined as a core responsibility. With the recent release and finalisation of the POC Framework, and other developments on POC, the South Sudan mission represents a litmus test for assessing the impact and benefits of these new and ongoing reforms and developments on the ground. UN Police According to one participant, through their varying roles, it can be said that police engage in all three tiers of POC (as delineated in the Operational Concept mentioned above). Based on this assessment, the increasing number of missions involving police is a significant and promising trend.19 So too is the increase in 18 The training modules on sexual violence draw upon the resource Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence - An Analytical Inventory of Peacekeeping Practice, a collaborative initiative between UNIFEM and DPKO, on behalf of UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict. The Inventory provides a detailed listing of concrete practices utilised by peacekeeping missions to address sexual violence. 19 According to a 2010 report by the Stimson Center, ‘[A]s of spring 2010, there were over 13,000 UNPOL officers (individuals and members of FPUs) deployed in 12 DPKO-led missions worldwide…’This is compared to 1988 when there were only ‘35 UN police officers…serving worldwide, all in a single UN mission, in Cyprus’. From W.J. Durch and M.L. England, eds., ‘Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law’ (Revised and Updated), Stimson Center Report No. 63, August 2010, p.17, viewed at

RSLS 2011 Summary Report 16

deployment of special police units, called Formed Police Units (FPUs). Police ‘are on the front-edge of the security apparatus of a mission’; they may engage in criminal investigations, forensic analysis, counternarcotics, training and capacity-building, and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. These roles may be further

diversified in situations where there is a critical dearth of local policing capacity.

‘POC can be seen as the raison d’etre [of UN police]’.

Participant

Sphere Handbook 2011 Edition The Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, also known as the Sphere Handbook, sets out the ‘core principles that govern humanitarian action’ and compiles minimum standards and indicators in various technical areas.20 Building on the 2004 edition, the new 2011 edition integrates new emerging issues including civil-military relations, disaster risk reduction, climate change, and urban settings21. It also includes a stronger focus on protection, after the consultation process revealed ‘the need to address protection more substantially’.22 iii. Challenges & Gaps Conceptual Dilemmas and Operative Inconsistencies According to one participant, the lack of clarity in a mandate’s POC language creates difficulties and burdens for a mission’s leadership. How should ‘imminent’ be interpreted? How imminent is imminent? Where does ‘vicinity of a base’ start and end? A military commander (and other component heads) needs to define these terms and turn this vague mandate language into operational language for troops. The manner in which commanders (and component heads) define this language may differ considerably one from the other. More understanding and consistency is required at UN Secretariat and mission levels, cognisant that the language in UN Security Council mandates will always reflect political realities and may sometimes be open to interpretation. Personnel and Resource Constraints

Critical personnel and resource shortfalls are a continuing constraint for POC efforts in peacekeeping missions. Reflecting on the insufficient troop numbers in one mission, a participant reflected that it was ‘unrealistic that they could accomplish anything’. To compound the situation, troops that are deployed often do not

meet the capability requirements of the mission. Troops may lack the expeditionary capabilities required by the mandate, or at the most basic level,

‘300 troops with basic equipment in charge of a sector of 80,000 square kilometres’.

Participant (paraphrased)

http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Enhancing_United_Nations_Capacity_2010_revision.pdf. 20 The Sphere Project, ‘About Us’, viewed at http://www.sphereproject.org/content/view/91/58/lang,english/. 21 Ibid. 22 The Sphere Project, ‘What is new in the 2011 edition of the Sphere Handbook’, viewed at http://www.sphereproject.org/component/option,com_docman/task,doc_details/Itemid,203/gid,393/lang,english/.

RSLS 2011 Summary Report 17

arrive with substandard equipment (‘guns held together with duck tape’). As one participant reflected, ‘troops are on one side of the world and assets are on the other side of the world’. In one mission with a POC mandate, many troops were deployed without mobility assets, including night flying capability. Such asset shortfalls make critical protection activities, such as long-term patrols, next to impossible. Complementarity versus Competition No single protection intervention strategy will be sufficient. Yet, according to one participant, it has proven to be a challenge for the multiple protection actors working in a multiagency environment to respect each others’ roles and try not to do each others’ jobs. The multiple protection approaches need to be complementary not competitive. As one participant proposed, what is needed is a ‘reflex in our planning to measure whether our approach is damaging or complementing other approaches’. This is especially important with regards to civilian roles in UN peacekeeping missions. Specifically, it has been observed that civilian peacekeeping personnel can be a source of confusion for local authorities and communities who have difficulty differentiating them from other civilian protection actors. This can damage the long-term POC efforts of other non-UN civilian actors.23

‘There is a need to be smart about engaging with other actors’.

Participant

Independence of Action What happens when peacekeepers find themselves face-to-face with a host nation that is unable or unwilling to engage in POC, directly impeding peacekeepers’

POC tasks, or worse, perpetrating abuses against their own citizens? These situations place T/PCCs in a very difficult situation, both from a safety perspective and also a political perspective (uncertain about political backing if they chose to

engage). Such challenging situations are receiving increasing focus and acknowledgement. Yet there is still ongoing disagreement among Member States about the role of missions and their peacekeepers in this kind of scenario. One participant, while acknowledging the controversial nature of this issue, recommended that the UN recognise that policing and security is an issue for management on the ground, not at UN Headquarters in New York.

‘A lot of TCCs are at the pointy end of POC’.

Participant

23 In contrast, military and police personnel are much more easily distinguishable from other non-mission POC efforts.

RSLS 2011 Summary Report 18

UN Police As one participant explained, highly-skilled police are rarely in surplus in any society. Taxpayers pay for police to be deployed in their own countries, not sent abroad. There are few countries where there are paid police roles dedicated to deployment; Australia is one example, through its International Deployment Group within the Australian Federal Police. When police are deployed, except for FPUs, they are deployed individually. For peacekeeping missions, this means that a timely deployment of skilled police personnel is very difficult to achieve. Often, police that are sent are minimally trained; some have been known to have fewer skills than those of the national police force they are there to support. To fill the capacity gap, personnel from FPUs have sometimes been reassigned as police officers, though they are minimally trained for such work; the training they have received has little utility and applicability in a mission where policing involves a broad range of activities.

‘The issue is about having enough people in enough jobs, not about the right people in the right jobs’.

Participant

Non-UN Peace Operations Considerable advances have been made on POC in UN peacekeeping, but less attention has been given to POC guidelines, doctrine and training for non-UN missions. For example, while ‘population protection’ has been emphasised by ISAF in Afghanistan there is no agreed doctrine on how this should be achieved. The same applies for other non-UN peace operations where protection is more loosely interpreted under a ‘security’ banner, and primarily from a military perspective. More work is required to leverage the UN’s work on POC for application in non-UN peace operations. iv. Priorities & Solutions - Where do we go from here? Participants identified the following key priorities and solutions during the seminar: .

1. Peacekeepers’ Engagement with Communities: Participants emphasised the need for more regular engagement between peacekeepers (civilian and military) and local communities. After all, it was noted that ‘the beneficiaries of protection are often those least consulted’. Such engagement enables peacekeepers to gain better situational awareness, build on and support existing self-protection measures adopted by the communities, and also helps manage communities’ expectations of the peacekeeping mission. As one participant explained, regular communication with communities is the only way to achieve realistic expectations of the mission, as a two-way dialogue enables communities to ask questions and be given explanations. Women interpreters are essential for such engagement, though, in at least one mission, the few women interpreters that had been hired were based solely in the capitol. To implement protection effectively, UN missions require information and communications systems that enable information flows with communities.

2. Community Liaison Interpreters: Interpreters help bridge both the

language and cultural divides that exist between peacekeeping personnel and communities; in this way they provide a community liaison function

RSLS 2011 Summary Report 19

as well. As one participant explained, communities often appreciate and trust these interpreters. While these interpreters are often located on military bases to support peacekeeping troops, concern was voiced that military commanders tend to view them solely as interpreters and have a limited understanding of, and appreciation for, their cultural liaison skills.

3. Responsive Patrols: There was consensus that more work is needed by

peacekeeping missions to make patrols more responsive to the protection needs of communities. Numerous good practices exist, including locating peacekeepers near checkpoints, organising firewood and market patrols, as well as patrols to help villagers access their fields. Responsive patrols are only possible with regular communication between peacekeepers and communities, including through such arrangements as firewood patrol committees in refugee/displaced persons camp settings. Differences were recognised between POC implementation requirements in rural and urban environments.

4. Timely Implementation of the Strategic Framework: There was

widespread agreement among participants of the need to begin moving the POC Framework forward by ‘getting it out there’. Participants proposed numerous next steps including turning the POC Framework into doctrine; incorporating it in training; making sure there is clarity and consensus on the terminology used; and also facilitating a timely feedback process so the POC Framework can be improved and strengthened where needed. It was also recommended that a dedicated focal point be identified to coordinate and manage this important process.24 There was also agreement that the POC Framework has utility for non-UN mission environments such as the Solomon Islands, Libya, and Afghanistan, and therefore should be shared as a potential tool for actors in those operations.

development of the new mission strategy.

acekeepers would help to ensure the military approach is consistent.

5. Cross-reference in POC Strategy Consultation Process: During the

consultative process to develop a mission’s POC strategy, it is important to cross-reference with available experiences, initiatives, and documentation. Cross-referencing will help to ensure that lessons and good practices from previous POC efforts are integrated in the

6. POC Strategic Directive for Military Peacekeepers: It was noted that

military personnel are not technically POC specialists, yet they are increasingly engaged directly in a mission’s POC efforts and activities. Given the inconsistent POC language in mandates, as noted above, there is a need for an ‘unambiguous orientation’ to POC specifically targeting military personnel. Though the Operational Concept and POC Framework are critical overarching guidance, a UN strategic directive on POC by military pe

24 A representative from DPKO pointed out that some of the comments made about the POC Framework by participants reinforce input they have already received from the field. It was noted that participants’ comments on the POC Framework would be shared with DPKO HQ.

RSLS 2011 Summary Report 20

7. Intelligence Gathering: Intelligence enables a mission to know what is

going on in a community. Yet according to one participant, the ‘apparatus of intelligence has been a very difficult phenomenon’ to deal with, given the pervasive reality that intelligence has been used against civilian populations. For this reason, it has been a struggle to encourage people

25 to

see the benefits of intelligence and recognize its critical link to POC.

proach strengthens the nexus between peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

POC-specific benchmarks for mission drawdown and transition.

ing, and this should be conducted in a civil-military nvironment.

. Common Issues

mmon issues across these discrete but related elds, which are elaborated below.

8. Capacity-Building: Some participants observed that there can be an

unrealistic tendency to seek to build local capacity during a crisis, maintain it artificially, and then remove the support prematurely. If there is interest in building local long-term protection capacity, it is best to start before a crisis rather than at a time of peak crisis. It is also important to identify culturally appropriate capacity-building approaches. As participants heard, the right models are often those observed in the community. This ap

9. POC Benchmarks: Developing benchmarks for POC is a highly

analytical and challenging exercise. Benchmarks need to be context-specific. They also need to be linked to how the community perceives its own safety, and their own objectives and expectations. It was suggested that the UN may benefit from consulting with Member States on developing

10. POC Training for Mission Leadership: POC training is necessary for all

mission components. Beyond POC training for civilian and police personnel and military troops, targeted in the POC modules currently under development, commanders and senior leaders require more advanced traine

V The two themes of disaster management and POC were addressed separately during RSLS. Nonetheless, it was apparent that the civil-military interaction lens illuminated linkages and coherence between them. The presentations and discussions highlighted numerous cofi Achieving a Common Understanding In both a multiagency disaster and for POC in complex emergencies, an effective and sustainable response is only possible when there is a common understanding among the diverse actors. A common understanding is needed not only of the situation, but also of the needs, of who is doing what to address those needs, of

25 The Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) needs to be clearly directed to synthesise information through a ‘protection lens’ to enable coordinated, proactive and pre-emptive action by mission components.

RSLS 2011 Summary Report 21

the progress being made, and how to assess that progress. There are numerous cilitating a common understanding. These include regular communication and dialogue (‘Comms! Comms! Comms!’ was regularly reiterated by participants), and joint training and education. In a conflict environment, the POC Framework is a potential unifying mechanism for helping to achieve and implement a common understanding of POC among multiple protection actors with different protection approaches and activities. A common

understanding does NOT mean that all organisations and /or peacekeeping elements do the SAME thing, but rath

mechanisms and tools for fa

er that they understand how their specific fforts contribute to the overall effort.

ese different forms of ngagement and linking this engagement to the host state.

t, as was often reflected during the seminar, ‘no one will in the effort alone’.

h

e Understanding the Context for Civil-Military Engagement A clear understanding of the dynamics and context of a crisis will help to determine the nature of civil-military engagement in that crisis. The ‘typology’ and scale of a disaster, for example, – whether it is a single volcanic eruption, a cascading disaster such as in Japan (earthquake, tsunami, nuclear meltdown), or a natural disaster in a conflict zone – will affect the range and type of civilian and military actors deployed as well as the way in which they engage with one another. It is also necessary to understand the types of engagement involved. Are the diverse civil-military actors engaging at an intergovernmental, international, and/or interdepartmental level? These different types of engagement will present different challenges for civil-military engagement. OCHA civil-military coordination officers can play a critical role facilitating the Multiplicity of Players In both conflict and disaster management, it is often hard to identify who is the ‘conductor’ and get all the instruments to play the same tune. The diverse range of actors that converge on a crisis come from different ‘doctrinal bases’, and bring their own organisational cultural approach, and capabilities. This can create significant friction. Yew The Utility of Social Media26 Increasingly, connected networks of volunteers and their use of social media are playing a role in facilitating and supporting botmanagement. Following disasters or in response to growing unrest, connected communities such as the Standby Taskforce, Crisis Commons, and Crisis Mappers are activated and call upon volunteers to scan news media, and social technologies such as

disaster and conflict

26 The boxed quote is from C Fugate, ‘Understanding the Power of Social Media as a Communication Tool in the Aftermath of Disasters’, Statement before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery and Intergovernmental Affairs, Washington, DC, 5 May 2011, p. 2, viewed at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=e928effc-4bfd-4024-9017-130bb45b4ed4.

‘The public [is a] resource rather than a liabili

Craig Fugate, FEMA

lving diffe

Participant (paraphrased)

ty’.

‘How do we create a common understanding of the situation? Until you do, you are all so

rent problems’.

RSLS 2011 Summary Report 22

Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, blogs, and SMS to collect, verify and analyse information rapidly in real or near-real-time. Once validated and fully ‘de-identified’, this information can then be used by UN, governmental, and NGO actors to enhance situational awareness and influence operational planning. These connected communities have been activated in numerous disaster and conflict crises, beginning with the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004), and including the 2007-2008 post-election crisis in Kenya, the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, and most recently in response to conflicts in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. These connected networks, and the tools they use (including FrontlineSMS, Medic Mobile, Sahana, SwiftRiver, and Ushahidi – see Section VII) can help civil-military actors improve their disaster and conflict response efforts. For this reason, as one participant explained, civil-military actors ought to be engaging with these volunteer technical communities. However, low familiarity with these tools and the value they provide, as well as an institutional penchant for state-based security systems, has created resistance to engaging with them. This resistance is visible among many communities including the military. Given the utility of these communities and the tools they use, this field requires considerably more ttention, including in the areas of training, exercises, and doctrine.

ent and POC in a

illing (national caveats, for example) and able (capacity and capabilities) to o.

ed

gardless of whether they are on the Security Council agenda nd ‘UN theatres’.

I. Conclusion

theatre aParticipant (paraphrase)

out of the room’.

Partici

a Unavoidable Political Realities Politics plays a significant role in both disaster managemmultiagency complex emergency. The domestic political architecture has to allow action in the first place, be it international aid to a disaster (as the case of Cyclone Nargis so clearly illustrated), or the deployment of a peacekeeping mission. Politics also determines who and what is deployed to participate in a response and what deployed personnel are w

‘You can’t keep politics

pant

d Importance of the ‘Bigger Picture’

the importance of seeing the ‘bigger picture’. On Day 1, it was suggested ‘put yourself 100 years from now…are we being ambitious enough about what we want in terms of better civil-military coordination?’ On Day 2, in the context of POC, one participant encouraged a broader, more

proactive approach to POC. Recognising that poverty is a ‘pernicious’ root cause of violence, the participant encouraged greater support to impoverished fragile and failing states, re

Various participants highlight

‘Is there a difference between civilians in danger in a UN

nd not a UN theatre?’

a V RSLS 2011 provided a valuable opportunity to bring together senior government, military and non-government officials from the Asia Pacific region to workshop civil-military issues and challenges. The seminar helped develop a common understanding of civil-military approaches to improve collaboration (and recognise separation) in conflict and disaster situations. The seminar generated partnerships and new and expanded networks among regional and global

RSLS 2011 Summary Report 23

practitioners. RSLS 2011 enabled experts and practitioners to speak freely, and share opinions and ideas about civil-military issues and challenges. It was a working seminar; for three days, participants engaged in fruitful discussion, which was informed and stimulated by an outstanding array of speakers. As one

articipant remarked, ‘this is not a conference where you sit back and observe’.

tanding’ of the actual situation and of each thers’ roles and responsibilities.

And a common understanding begins with ommunication and coordination.

st the 3rd Regional Senior Leaders Seminar in mid-2012. Details will be advised.

p Despite daunting operational environments, numerous examples of progress were identified and highlighted, including the growth of critical civil-military experience, the establishment of arrangements to facilitate civil-military coordination, and the development of training modules. Nonetheless, considerable work remains to be done. Participants highlighted challenges and gaps to improved civil-military effectiveness. Many of these challenges and gaps derive from the every-day reality of civil-military struggles on the ground, and reflect an expanding wealth of experience in this multiagency field. Participants did not shy away from these challenges and put forward solutions and priorities for enhancing civil-military collaboration in both disaster environments and complex emergencies. These ranged from the more philosophical to the pragmatic and concrete. The central conclusion was that civil-military actors require knowledge and a ‘common underso To paraphrase one participant, ‘how we move communication and coordination forward is a task for everyone’. It is no easy task; the chaos of a crisis situation, cultural tensions, and unavoidable political realities represent some of the challenges that confront actors responding to a crisis, be it a natural disaster or complex emergency with civilians under imminent threat of violence. However, it is a necessary task that must be appreciated and applied from political and strategic decision makers through to those implementing agencies on the ground. An effective and sustainable response is only possible when there is a common understanding among civil-military actors, and a full appreciation of the needs and capabilities of local actors. c COE-DMHA, in conjunction with the Centre, is currently planning to co-ho

RSLS 2011 Summary Report 24

VII. Key Readings, Resources & References [Background reading] Asia-Pacific Conferences on Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations, ‘Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines For The Use Of Foreign Military Assets In National Disaster Response Operations’, Draft version 8.0, November 2010, http://ochaonline.un.org/roap/APCMADRO/tabid/7303/language/en-US/Default.aspx Australian Council for International Development, ‘ACFID Code of Conduct for Non Government Development Organisations’, 2010, effective January 2012, http://www.acfid.asn.au//code-of-conduct/acfid-code-of-conduct-revised-effective-jan2012 S Collins, ‘Conflict and Disaster Management in a Hyperconnected World -Cooperative, Collaborative, Real Time’, May 2011, http://www.acidlabs.org/2011/05/19/conflict-and-disaster-management-in-a-hyperconnected-world-cooperative-collaborative-real-time/ W.J. Durch and M.L. England, eds., ‘Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law’ (Revised and Updated), Stimson Center Report No. 63, August 2010, viewed at http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Enhancing_United_Nations_Capacity_2010_revision.pdf. C Fugate, ‘Understanding the Power of Social Media as a Communication Tool in the Aftermath of Disasters’, Statement before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery and Intergovernmental Affairs, Washington, DC, 5 May 2011, p. 2, viewed at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=e928effc-4bfd-4024-9017-130bb45b4ed4 A Giffen, ‘Considerations for a New Peacekeeping Operation in South Sudan: Preventing Conflict and Protecting Civilians’, Working Paper, Stimson Center, April/May 2011, http://www.stimson.org/summaries/considerations-for-a-new-peacekeeping-operation-in-south-sudan/ [Background reading] Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘The Relationship between the Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict’, Policy Brief , May 2011, http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/The%20Relationship%20Between%20POC%20and%20R2P-%20Updated.pdf [Background reading] Government of Pakistan National Disaster Management Authority, Pakistan 2010 Flood Relief – Learning from Experience: Observations and Opportunities, 2011, http://www.ndma.gov.pk/Documents/flood_2010/lesson_learned/Pakistan%202010%20Flood%20Relief-Learning%20from%20Experience.pdf

RSLS 2011 Summary Report 25

[Background reading] ‘Hope For’ Initiative, ‘A Global Cooperative Framework to Improve the Effectiveness of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Relief Operations’ (initiative of Qatar), 2011 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief’, 1994, http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p1067.htm --, Strengthening Protection in War: A Search for Professional Standards, 2001, http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p0783.htm. ICVA, ‘What Is Protection?: A Definition by Consensus: A Background Note for the Workshop on the Development of Human Rights Training for Humanitarian Actors’, 2001, viewed at http://www.icva.ch/doc00000663.html. International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘Core Documents: Understanding RtoP’, viewed at http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/publications/core-rtop-documents L MacInnis, ‘Cost of natural disasters $109 billion in 2010: U.N.’, Reuters, 24 January 2011, viewed at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/24/us-disasters-un-idUSTRE70N26K20110124. Oxfam, ‘Engaging with Communities: The Next Challenge for Peacekeeping’, 141 Oxfam Briefing Paper, November 2010, http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp141-engaging-with-communities-221110-en.pdf K Rudd MP, Transcript from Joint media conference with Pedro Villagra Delgado, Dean of the Diplomatic Corps on ‘Diplomatic Corps visit to Queensland, Climate Change, Qantas, Tourism, ASX merger decision’, Brisbane, 6 April 2011, http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/2011/kr_tr_110406_joint_media_conference.html The Sphere Project, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response, 3rd edition, Practical Action Publishing, Rugby, UK, 2011 [Background reading] UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations/Field Support, ‘Framework for Drafting POC Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations’, 2011 --, ‘Draft DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations’, 2010 UN DPKO, UNIFEM, UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict, 'Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence - An Analytical Inventory of

RSLS 2011 Summary Report 26

Peacekeeping Practice', 2010, http://www.unifem.org/materials/item_detail.php?ProductID=172 UN ESCAP and UNISDR, Protecting Development Gains: Reducing Disaster Vulnerability and Building Resilience in Asia and the Pacific - The Asia-Pacific Disaster Report, 2010, p.vii, viewed at http://www.unescap.org/idd/pubs/Asia-Pacific-Disaster-Report%20-2010.pdf. UN General Assembly, ‘Implementing the responsibility to protect: Report of the Secretary-General’, A/63/677, 12 January 2009. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations Foundation, Vodafone Technology Partnership and Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, ‘Disaster Relief 2.0: The Future of Information Sharing in Humanitarian Emergencies, March 2011, http://www.unocha.org/top-stories/all-stories/disaster-relief-20-future-information-sharing-humanitarian-emergencies UN OCHA Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, ‘Regional Trends and Implications for OCHA in Asia and the Pacific’, September 2010, viewed at http://ochaonline.un.org/ocha2010/roap.html. --, ‘Briefing Kit’, p.4, viewed at http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&docId=1233156. United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs - Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery and Intergovernmental Affairs, Hearing on ‘Understanding the Power of Social Media as a Communications Tool in the Aftermath of Disasters’, May 2011, http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=e928effc-4bfd-4024-9017-130bb45b4ed4 Working Group on Climate Change and Development, ‘Up in smoke? Asia and the Pacific: The threat from climate change to human development and the environment’, The fifth report from the Working Group on Climate Change and Development, 2007, viewed at http://www.upinsmokecoalition.org/ World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development, 2011, http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/fulltext World Bank and the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), ‘Volunteer Technology Communities: Open Development’, 2011, http://www.gfdrr.org/gfdrr/volunteer-technology-communities-open-development ‘Guidelines On The Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets In Disaster Relief - “Oslo Guidelines”’, Updated November 2006 (Revision 1.1 November 2007), http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&docId=1084542

RSLS 2011 Summary Report 27

Useful Links • Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence: http://civmilcoe.gov.au/ • Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance

(COE-DMHA): http://coe-dmha.org/ • CrisisCommons: http://crisiscommons.org • CrisisMappers Net: http://www.crisismappers.net/ • FrontlineSMS: http://www.frontlinesms.com/ • Global Disaster Assistance Coordination System (GDACS):

http://www.gdacs.org/ • Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) (US Government):

http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoi/index.htm • Libya Crisis Map, OCHA: http://libyacrisismap.net/ • Medic Mobile: http://medicmobile.org/ • On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC), OCHA:

http://vosocc.unocha.org/ • Sahana Software Foundation: http://sahanafoundation.org/ • The Sphere Project: http://www.sphereproject.org/ • SwiftRiver: http://swift.ushahidi.com/ • Ushahidi: http://www.ushahidi.com/about-us

RSLS 2011 Summary Report 28

Annex A

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MMIILLIITTAARRYY CCOOOORRDDIINNAATTIIOONN FFOORR CCOONNFFLLIICCTT AANNDD DDIISSAASSTTEERR

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16-19 May 2011

Pullman Reef Hotel 35-41 Wharf Street

Cairns, Queensland, Australia

RSLS 2011 Summary Report 29

Background The Regional Senior Leaders Seminar (RSLS) is an annual opportunity for the Centre to co-host, in conjunction with the US Government’s Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (COE-DMHA), a civil-military coordination forum for emerging leaders from the Asia Pacific region. RSLS 2011 will be held in Cairns, Australia from 16-19 May 2011 with the Centre being the lead organisation. The RSLS uses specific case studies to provide platforms by which senior leaders can consider civil-military coordination in both conflict and disaster management and develop practical solutions in a workshop/discussion environment to exchange ideas, enhance knowledge and contribute to international engagement.

Aim

The aim of the RSLS is to provide an opportunity for senior government and non-government officials from the Asia Pacific region to come together to workshop civil-military issues and challenges for conflict and disaster management. RSLS provides a secure space for participants to develop a shared understanding of civil-military approaches to collaborating in multinational responses to conflict and disaster situations.

Objectives

The objectives of RSLS 2011 are to:

• provide senior regional leaders the opportunity to share and improve their understanding of civil-military coordination in complex emergencies and disaster management;

• enhance communication and coordination between participating countries and organisations; and

• access senior experts in the fields of humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and conflict management.

The Conference will be conducted under the Chatham House Rule to encourage openness and the sharing of information. A summary report of the proceedings will be published by the Centre. The Conference will be conducted in English.

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MONDAY 16 May From 1600 Registration Venue: Pullman Reef Hotel

Michaelmas Cay Pre-Function Area

1800-2000 Welcome Reception Venue: Pullman Reef Hotel Pool Deck & Coral Lounge Welcome: GPCAPT Keith Brackenbury Hosts: MAJGEN (Ret) Michael G. Smith AO,

Executive Director APCMCOE and LTGEN (Ret) John F. Goodman, Executive Director COE-DMHA

TUESDAY 17 May Venue: Pullman Reef Hotel Michaelmas Cay 1

08.30 Registration (tea and coffee available) Opening Session

08.55 Welcome to Country 09.00 Administrative Announcements GPCAPT Keith Brackenbury, APCMCOE

09.10 Welcome remarks

MAJGEN (Ret) Michael G. Smith AO, Executive Director APCMCOE and LTGEN (Ret) John F. Goodman, Executive Director COE-DMHA

09.45 Official Photograph and Morning Tea

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SESSION 1: Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Management – what progress has been made and where do we go from here? FOCUS: To consider the civil-military challenges and lessons learnt from recent regional natural disasters. Panel sessions followed by breakout groups that will report back to plenary. Chair: Stacey Greene, Disaster Management Manager, APCMCOE 10.30 Keynote Address: The evolution of Civil-Military

Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region (through Australian eyes) Alan March Humanitarian Coordinator Assistant Director-General Humanitarian and Peacebuilding Branch, AusAID

11.15 Civil-Military coordination during the

Pakistan Floods Military Perspective on civil-military coordination in a

disaster zone WGCDR Ross Wadsworth, Australian Defence Force

Commanding Officer No1 Expeditionary Health Squadron

11.40 NGO perspective on civil-military coordination in a

disaster zone Jennifer Worthington Oxfam Australia

12.00 Discussion and questions to Panel 12.30 Lunch

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SESSION 2: Working Group Activity Q1: What progress has been made in civil-military coordination in disaster zones? Q2: What could be done to further enhance civil-military coordination in disaster zones?

FOCUS: Working groups will examine both civil-military issues and prepare 15 min report back to plenary. Chair: Mr Greg Flick, Senior Disaster Management Analyst, COE-

DMHA

13.15 Working Groups consideration Venue: Pullman Reef Hotel Michaelmas Cay 2

(Includes afternoon tea)

15.15 Working Groups report back Venue: Pullman Reef Hotel Michaelmas Cay 1

Discussion and comments by panel

17.00 Summary/Close Day 1 Commander Darryl Watters, APCMCOE 18.00-20.00 Networking Activity Venue: Cairns Wildlife Dome (Located adjacent to Hotel)

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WEDNESDAY 18 May Venue: Pullman Reef Hotel Michaelmas Cay 1

08.00 Tea and coffee available

SESSION 3: Protection of Civilians in a multi-agency environment in complex emergencies FOCUS: To consider the draft UN framework on protection of civilians and its use in complex environments 08.20 Administrative Announcements GPCAPT Keith Brackenbury, APCMCOE Chair: Dr Tony Murney, APCMCOE (Australian Federal Police

Secondee) 08.30 Keynote Address: Draft United Nations Framework

on the Protection of Civilians Ms Leanne Smith, UN DPKO

Deputy Chief, Peacekeeping Best Practices section, UN DPKO

09.30 Morning Tea 10.00 A Police perspective on POC Chief Superintendent (Ret) David Beer

Former UN Police Commissioner in Haiti 10.20 Enhanced protection of civilians: ICRC perspective Jeremy England

Head of Office Australia, ICRC 10.40 Grassroots protection: An NGO perspective Kirsten Hagon

Head of Office Oxfam International, New York 11.00 A military perspective on POC Major General Elhadji Mahamadou Kandji Former Force Commander MINURCAT (United

Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad)

11.20 Discussion and questions to panel

12.00 Lunch

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SESSION 4: Working Group Activity – Consideration of the Draft UN framework on the protection of civilians How does the POC mandate affect the way each of the elements of the mission approach its tasks? How can the draft POC framework be improved to assist the mission fulfil its POC mandate, and to capacitate the host state’s ability to protect civilians? How might the draft framework be used to develop POC specific benchmarks for mission drawdown and transition of responsibility/capability to the host state? Does the draft POC framework have utility for non-UN/AU missions where population protection is a key objective? FOCUS: Working groups will examine a civil-military issue and prepare 15 min report back. Chair: Dr Tony Murney, APCMCOE (Australian Federal Police

Secondee) 13.00 Working Groups consideration Venue: Pullman Reef Hotel Michaelmas Cay 2

(Includes afternoon tea)

15.30 Working Groups report back Venue: Pullman Reef Hotel Michaelmas Cay 1

Discussion and comments by panel

17.00 Summary/Close Day 2 Commander Darryl Watters, APCMCOE 18.15 CONFERENCE DINNER Venue: Pullman Reef Hotel Pre-dinner Drinks: Arlington Bar Dinner: Urchins 2&3

Co-Host: MAJGEN (Ret) Michael G. Smith AO, Executive Director APCMCOE Dinner Address: LTGEN (Ret) John F. Goodman, Executive Director COE-DMHA

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THURSDAY 19 May Venue: Pullman Reef Hotel Michaelmas Cay 1 08.30 Tea and coffee available

Closing Session: ‘New Ideas’ Presentation and Seminar wrap-up 09.00 Administrative Announcements GPCAPT Keith Brackenbury, APCMCOE Chair: SUPT Darren Rath, APCMCOE 09.15 ‘New Ideas’ Presentation

Working with hyperconnected information in conflicts and disasters Stephen Collins On-line Communications Co-ordinator APCMCOE

09.45 Plenary Feedback/Key Issues Opportunity to explore further issues by plenary 10.20 Rapporteur summary report

Sarah Shteir/Dave Lavers APCMCOE 10.40 Concluding Remarks MAJGEN (Ret) Michael G. Smith AO, Executive

Director APCMCOE and LTGEN (Ret) John F. Goodman, Executive Director COE-DMHA

11.00 Buses depart for Tjapukai Aboriginal Cultural

Centre 12.00-1630 Lunch and Cultural Activity

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