Date post: | 13-Jul-2015 |
Category: |
Environment |
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Luca TacconiCrawford School of Public Policy
The Australian National University
Environmental Governance
Regional Synthesis of PESin the Greater Mekong Region
Definitions of PES
Cambodia country study uses: a ‘transfer of resources between social actors, which aims to create incentives to align individual and/or collective land use decisions with the social interest in the management of natural resources’ (Muradian et al. 2010)
With a focus on: •importance of the economic incentive•directness of the transfer, i.e. role of intermediary
•degree of commodification of ES
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Definitions of PES
Laos country study uses:
‘a voluntary transaction where a well-defined ES [environmental service] (or a land-use likely to secure that service) is being ‘bought’ by a (minimum one) ES buyer from a (minimum one) ES provider, if and only if the ES provider secures ES provision (conditionality)’ (Wunder 2005)
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Definitions of PES
In the review I note that PES schemes should:•be transparent•provide additional environmental services (ES)•with conditional payments •to voluntary providers
And I make explicit all the key elements on a PES scheme, and use them to consider PES scheme in the region
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Lessons learnt from implementation
1. Lack of understanding of the contribution of ES to social and economic activities in Thailand Cambodia and Laos – Continued information dissemination and capacity
building activities targeting senior government officials
1. Capture by political elite and corruption are obstacles to improved resource management and PES, but PES could also contribute to improved governance– Promote the design of accountable and transparent
PES schemes
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3. In Laos there is view that all citizens should contribute to the conservation of ecosystems without implementing benefit sharing programs, not due to the political system– Need further consideration of how that view could be
influenced in order to provide more benefits to rural people through PES schemes
4. There is no necessary conflict between the use on of a policy tool such as PES and the maintenance of a socialist system, as demonstrated by Vietnam
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Lessons learnt from implementation
5. PES schemes in the region do not consider the ES providers’ opportunity costs This is a concern cause ES providers could be negatively affected. – Implementers of PES schemes in the region should
address this issue as a matter of priority
6. Payments for the conservation of forest areas (Vietnam) do not closely reflect differences in quality of forest– Important issue from an economic perspective, but
needs to be carefully managed given possible social tensions if implemented
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Lessons learnt from implementation
7. Provision of benefits to the ES providers is unlikely to occur, or simply be viable, unless resource use or property rights are attributed to them – This is a priority issue for consideration by governments
8. PES schemes in the region do not measure and monitor ES that are supposedly provided by the schemes– This a priority issue that needs capacity building
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Lessons learnt from implementation
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To conclude…
• The countries considered are at different stages of PES development. The experience of the most advanced ones can be usefully considered by the other countries
• The most advanced PES scheme has several positive features, but there are concerns identified in relation to all the schemes analysed
• These concerns should be addressed to ensure that rural people, the ES providers, benefit as much as possible from the PES schemes