Regulation and the Courts: Judicial Review in Comparative ...

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Regulation and the Courts: Judicial Review in Comparative Regulation and the Courts: Judicial Review in Comparative

Perspective Perspective

Francesca Bignami George Washington University Law School, [email protected]

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Recommended Citation Recommended Citation Bignami, Francesca, Regulation and the Courts: Judicial Review in Comparative Perspective (2016). COMPARATIVE LAW AND REGULATION: UNDERSTANDING THE GLOBAL REGULATORY PROCESS, Francesca Bignami & David Zaring eds., Edward Elgar, 2016 ; GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 2016-50; GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2016-50. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2845912

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Regulationandthecourts:judicialreviewincomparativeperspective

FrancescaBignami

Chapter10in:ComparativeLawandRegulation:UnderstandingtheGlobalRegulatoryProcess

(FrancescaBignami&DavidZaringeds.,EdwardElgar2016)

INTRODUCTION

Thepubliclawofgovernmentinterventionineconomyandsocietyhasalonghistorythathas

beendrivenbythepoliticsofdemocratizationandstateformationandthathashadprofound

consequencesforthelegitimacyandeffectivenessofthecontemporaryadministrativestate.In

largepart,thispubliclawhasbeenidentifiedwithjudicialreviewandthecourts:onwhatgrounds

will a court find the decisions of the political and administrative organs of the state to be

unlawful? At the same time, a considerable body of comparative scholarship has sought to

capture variation in judicial redress in different legal systems. The premise of much of the

comparative scholarship is that liberal societies can share roughly similar commitments to

principlessuchastheruleoflawandfundamentalrightsbutcanseektosafeguardsuchprinciples

throughdifferenttypesofcourtsandlegaldoctrines.Thethought isthat,byappreciatingthe

differences,itispossibletoobtainabetterunderstandingofthelegalandpoliticaloperationof

governmentpolicymakingbothathomeandabroadandtoengageinconstructivethinkingon

theproperdesignoflaw,courts,andtheadministrativestate.

Thischapterisdesignedasbothareviewofthecomparativeliteratureonjudicialreview

andasanoriginalcontributiontothatliterature.Itpresentstwoimportantcontraststhathave

beendrawnbetweensystemsofpubliclawinwesterncountriesandproposesathirdbasedon

Bignami—RegulationandtheCourts

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myownresearch.Thepurposeistodevelopacomparativeblueprintthatcanhelpthereader

navigatepublicpolicymakingandthecourtsindifferentjurisdictionsacrosstheglobe.Whilethe

three classifications covered in this chapter overlap in certain respects, they are mostly

complementary,notcompeting,andthereforetakentogethertheycreateamulti-dimensional

andfairlycompletepictureofthelandscapeofjudicialreview.Mostofthediscussionapplies

broadlytotheactivitiesoftheadministrativestate,notspecificallytotheregulatoryfunction,

since the public law of most countries does not expressly draw such distinctions. Mindful,

however,ofthelargerpurposesofthisvolume,thechapteralsohighlightstheimplicationsfor

regulationwhereappropriate.

The chapterproceeds as follows. Thenext sectionpresentsoneof the first andmost

enduring contrasts that has been drawn between systems of public law and judicial review:

judicialreviewofadministrativeactionbytheordinarycourtsintheEnglishcommonlawandby

a special body (Conseil d’Etat) connected to the executive branch in the French droit

administratif.InitiallyidentifiedbytheEnglishscholarA.V.Diceyinthelatenineteenthcentury,

the common law–droit administratif divide has since been re-examined and re-assessed by

several generations of comparative scholars (Dicey, 1885; Goodnow, 1893; Garner, 1924;

Schwartz,1949;Mitchell,1965;BrownandGarner,1967;Breyer,1993;BrownandBell,1998).

ThefollowingsectionturnstothedifferencebetweenthelitigiousandformalAmericansystem

of law and public policy and the informal and discretionary European policy process. These

categoriesofdifferencearelargelythebrainchildofRobertKaganandhistheoryofAmerican

“adversarial legalism” (1991, 1994, 1997, 2001), although they have also been developed in

rational-choicescholarshiponpolicymakingintheAmericanpresidentialsystemofgovernment

andEuropeanparliamentarysystems(MoeandCaldwell,1994;EpsteinandO’Halloran,1999:

242–44;Thies,2001;JensenandMcGrath,2011;Rose-Ackermanetal.,2015;Rose-Ackermanet

al.,thisvolume).Inthelastsection,Iproposeathirdmajorcontrastbetweensystemsofpublic

lawintheregulatorydomain:judicialreviewinformedbytheoriesoffundamentaleconomicand

socialrightsinEurope,asillustratedbythedoctrinesofproportionalityandequality,andjudicial

reviewdesignedtopromoteademocraticandparticipatoryadministrativeprocessintheUnited

States,whatIcallthe“ballot-boxdemocracy”paradigmofpubliclaw.Iarguethatthisdividehas


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the potential to extend to other jurisdictions in light of the global diffusion of written

constitutionsandconstitutionalcourts(Ginsburg,2008).Inexploringthethreeclassificationsof

nationalsystemsofjudicialreview,eachsectionexaminestheirhistoricaloriginsanddrawsout

their normative implications. Each section also considers the implications of these

classifications—developedinthemoregeneralcontextoftheadministrativestate—specifically

forregulation,whichisdefinedinthesenseofthisbookasrule-basedgovernancebyspecialized

administrativeauthoritiesunderthesupervisionofthelegislature,thepoliticalexecutive,and

thecourts.

Beforecontinuing,onepointofclarificationisinorder.Thefirstquestionthatislikelyto

cometomindiswherethisdiscussionofjudicialreviewfitsintheconventionalbreakdownofthe

legal discipline―constitutional or administrative law? Although the distinction may seem

obvious,asitturnsout,differentjurisdictionsandthedifferentsubfieldsthemselvesemploytheir

own criteria to delineate what law is covered.While constitutional lawyers tend to include

anythingthatiscontainedinaparticularsourceoflaw,thatis,theConstitution,administrative

lawyersfocusonthelawthatisappliedtoaparticulartypeofgovernmentinstitution,thatis,

publicadministration.Butthefocusofthisvolumeandchapterisneitheralegalsourcenora

governmentinstitution.Ratheritisaparticulardomainofstateactivity,i.e.,regulation,which

caninvolvebothlegislativeandadministrativeaction,andhowcourtsinterveneinthatdomain,

whichcanbebaseduponbothconstitutionalandsecondarysourcesoflaw.Withtheexception

ofthenextsection,therefore,thischaptercoversbothconstitutionalandadministrativelaw.The

next section on the early common law–droit administratif divide is the exception because it

focusesexclusivelyonadministrativelaw.Thereasonfortheearlyemphasisonadministrative

lawisfairlysimple:untilWorldWarII,administrativelawwastheonlyformoflitigatedpublic

lawinmostwesternjurisdictions,andevenafterWorldWarII,whenconstitutionalcourtswere

establishedinanumberofEuropeancountries,itwasdecadesbeforeathicklawandpracticeof

constitutionaladjudicationtookhold(Stone,1992:225–53).


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COMMONLAWVERSUSDROITADMINISTRATIF

Intheannalsofcomparativepubliclaw,thedifferencebetweenadministrativelitigationinthe

commonlawandthedroitadministratiftraditionsisoneofoldestandmostenduringsourcesof

debateandscholarship.IntheliberalmodelthattookholdacrossEuropeinthelatenineteenth

century,theconceptoftheruleoflawwascentral(MannoriandSordi,2001;Stolleis,2001).The

existenceofaprivatesphereofliberty,separatefrompublicpower,wastobeguaranteedbya

systemofgovernmentthatrespectedtheruleoflaw:individualsenjoyedrightsindependentof

thestate,anystateactionhadtobeauthorizedbylaw,andcitizenshadtobeabletogotothe

courtstoobtainreliefagainstoverreachingstateaction.Yetdespitethespreadofthepolitical

philosophy of liberalism, there were fundamental differences in how the rule of law was

operationalizedinEnglandandFrance,twoofthemostpowerfulnationstatesofthetime.As

theEnglishscholarA.V.DiceyfamouslypointedoutinLawoftheConstitution(1885),Francehad

aseparatesystemofjusticeforobtainingredressagainstgovernmentactorsinwhichofficials

hadtobesuedinaspecialcourt(Conseild’Etat)andaccordingtoaspecialsetoflegaldoctrines.

Bycontrast,governmentofficialsinEnglandwereheldaccountabletothelawbeforethesame

courtsandunder thesame legalprinciplesasprivate individuals.Thecommon lawmodel, in

Dicey’sanalysis,wasclearlythebetterguarantoroftheruleoflawandtherightsofindividuals

(Allison,1996:11; Lindseth,2005). Itwasalsoa reflectionof adeep-rooted,historicaldivide

between the limited government and liberty-driven tradition of the common law and the

absolutismof theContinentwhich, inDicey’sview,prevailedeven in the faceof thepolitical

transformationsofthenineteenthcentury.Inotherwords,thecommonlawmodelwaswhata

contemporarycomparativistmightcallthe“better”law(ZweigertandKötz,1998:47),notjust

becauseofthenicetiesoflegalforms,organization,andremediesbutbecauseitwasthemark

ofasuperior legaltraditiondeeplycommittedtoindividual liberties, limitedgovernment,and

theruleoflaw.

Thecommonlaw–droitadministratifdividepronouncedbyDiceyhasbeenbothhighly

influential and enormously controversial (Allison, 1996: 19–23). Perhaps the most widely

acceptedaspectofDicey’sanalysishasbeenhisviewofthehistoricaloriginsofthetwomodels.


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AswithmanyotherdifferencesbetweentheEnglishcommon lawandthe lawofcontinental

Europe,thetimingofthecentralizationofstatepowerappearstohavebeencritical.Compared

with continental Europe, political power was consolidated in the hands of the monarchy

relativelyearlyinEngland,insomeaccountsasfarbackastheNormanConquest(Ertman,1997).

This early state took the formof a centralized systemof law and courts but a decentralized

administrationthatrestedonlocaldignitariesservingonvariouslaybodiesandasjusticesofthe

peace, as the office would later be called (Lovell, 1962; Van Caenegem, 1998). Although

industrialization andother social and economic pressures produced significant growth in the

administrativecapacityofthestate,theearlyconfigurationofcentralized,commonlawcourts

and decentralized administration remains essential to understanding the institutions of the

Britishstate(Cassese,2010).Thisisparticularlytruewithrespecttotheabsenceofaspecialized

systemofadministrativejustice.Atvariousjunctures,thecommonlawbarsuccessfullyresisted

pressuretotransferpoweroverpubliclitigationfromthecommonlawcourtstoanalternative

setofcourtsthatwouldhavehadexclusivejurisdictionoverclaimsagainstpublicactors.1

InFrance,bycontrast,theconsolidationofstatepoweroccurredalmostfourcenturies

later,atatimewhenitwasbothtechnologicallypossibleandpoliticallynecessarytodevelopa

centralized administration and a special jurisdiction to hear complaints against that

administration.Ashasbeenrecountedbyothers,theoriginsoftheConseild’Etatcanbefound

intheAncienRégimeandabsolutism(MannoriandSordi,2001;Zoller,2008).Duringthe1600s

and1700s,royaladministratorsintheprovinces,knownasintendants,acquiredgreaterpowers

andadministrativecapacityasthemonarchysoughttoassertcontroloverthenobilityandother

local elites.Onemajor obstacle, however, to this formof centralized administrationwas the

regionalcourts(Parlements).Composedoflocaldignitaries,theParlementsusedtheirpowersto

refusetheregistrationofroyalordinances,therebydenyingthemeffect,andtohearcomplaints

againsttheroyaladministrators.Inresponsetothisinterference,themonarchysoughttogivea

special,centralbodyknownastheKing’sCouncil(ConseilduRoi)exclusivejurisdictiontohear

cases against theadministration. TheParlements, however, persisted in asserting jurisdiction

1PerhapsthebestknownepisodeisthedefeatoftheStarChamberduringtheEnglishRevolution(Mitchell,1965:96–97).


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over claims against the intendants and conflict between the two sets of judicial authorities

continueduntiltheRevolution.

After the Revolution, administrative disputes continued to be heard by a special

jurisdictionconnectedtotheexecutivebranch,butnowwithoutcompetitionfromthecourts.

ThedecisiontoestablishtheConseild’Etat,inmanyrespectsthesuccessortotheConseilduRoi,

wasthereflectionoftwopowerfulideologicalthreadsrunningthroughtheRevolution.Thefirst

wasthedelegitimizationofcourtsbecauseoftheirassociationwiththespecialprivilegesand

powerfullocalelitesoftheAncienRégime.Thesecondwastheglorificationofthegeneralwill

andtherepublicanformofgovernmentandthedesiretoshieldthepoliticalexpressionofthe

generalwill,inthelegislatureandtheadministration,fromthemeddlingofthecourts.Theoft-

repeatedaphorismthat“jugerestencoreadministrer”(tojudgeisstilltoadminister)expresses

thedistinctiveseparationofpowersdoctrineespousedduringtheRevolutionandafterwards:

thebalancebetweenthethreepowerswasatgreatestriskfromthejudicialbranchandtherefore

oversightoftheadministrationcouldnotbeentrustedtotheordinarycourtsbuthadtobevested

in a special body connected to the executive. In sum, in both the Ancien Régime and the

Revolution,centralizedadministrationandaspecialized jurisdictiontooverseeadministration

were essential to the consolidation of political authority, at first in the name of absolute

monarchyandlaterinthenameofrepublicanism.

The configuration of administrative justice has changed considerably since Dicey first

wrotebut therearestill importantdifferences inhowchallenges toadministrativeactionare

brought in England and France and, more broadly, the many jurisdictions that have been

influencedbythecommonlawanddroitadministratifmodels.2Tounderstandthesedifferences,

itisnecessarytobrieflytracetheevolutionofthetwosystems.Whenitwasoriginallyestablished

in1804,theConseild’Etatresembledmorecloselyanexecutiveadvisorybodythanafull-fledged

court.Bytheendofthenineteenthcentury,however,thereversewasthecase:itsprocedure

hadbeenjudicialized,ithadacquiredmandatoryjurisdictionoverdisputesbroughtagainstthe

administration,itsjudgmentshadbecomefinalandwerenolongerstyledasrecommendations

2Australia,NewZealand,India,Ireland,andtheUnitedStatesbelongtothecommonlawtraditionwhileBelgium,the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, Columbia, Morocco, Algeria, and Senegalbelongtothedroitadministratiftradition(Bignami,2011:92).


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totheheadofstate,anditsmembershad,asamatterofcustom,acquiredindependencefrom

the government (Brown and Bell, 1998: 47–50). In a set of developments that occurred

somewhatlater,theEnglishsystemofadministrativejusticebecamemorespecialized.Beginning

in the early 1900s, administrative tribunalswere establishedwithin the bureaucracy to hear

individualclaimsinareassuchaswelfarepolicyandlaborandemploymentlaw(Cane,2009:30).

Althoughtribunaldecisionsweretechnicallysubjecttoreviewbythecommonlawcourts,the

systemofadministrativetribunalswaslargelyfree-standing,withverylittleinterference,even

onpointsoflaw,fromtheordinarycourts.Justasimportant,anumberofchangeshavebeen

made to the common law system of access to justice, discovery, and remedies to facilitate

challengesagainstadministrativeauthorities,resultinginalitigationmodeltailoredspecifically

toobtainingredressagainstpublicactors(Allison,1996:23–29).

Despite these transformations, there remain a couple of keydifferences that fall into

roughly two categories―organizational and doctrinal. On the organizational front, in the

commonlaw,challengesagainstthestateareheardinthelastresortbyjudgeswiththesame

training, professional experience, and institutional safeguards as all other members of the

judiciary.Thesejudgeshearavarietyofcasesandenjoyallthetraditionalguaranteesofjudicial

independence,namelylifetenureandremovalfromofficeonlyforseriousdisciplinaryreasons.

By contrast, in thedroit administratif, administrative litigation is brought before the Conseil

d’Etat,which iscomposedofhigh-statusexecutivebranchofficialswhonotonlydecidecases

(adjudicatory function) but also give advice on proposed legislation and administrative rules

(regulatory function) and who regularly rotate through important departments within the

government(Fromont,2006:121–22).3Unlikethejudiciary,themembersoftheConseild’Etat

do not enjoy a formal guarantee of permanence in office (inamovibilité), meaning that it is

theoreticallypossible(butpracticallyunthinkable)thattheycanbetransferredfromonepostto

another foranyreasonandnotonly in thecaseofmisconduct.Training isdifferent fromthe

personnelselectionsystemforthejudiciary.Recruitsattendthesamehigh-statusinstitutionsof

higher learning(grandesécoles)asotheradministrativeandpoliticalelites,whichareentirely

3Since1953,therehasalsoexistedafull-fledgedsystemofloweradministrativecourtsthatarechargedwithhearingadministrativelitigationinthefirstinstanceandonappeal,andthatoperatesomewhatdifferentlyfromtheConseild’Etat(Morand-Deviller,2013:48–53).


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separatefromtheuniversitysystemandthespecializationschoolforjudges.Theyareselected

for the Conseil d’Etat based on the final exam administered by the École Nationale

d’Administration, the last, sequentially, of thesehigh-status educational institutions. In other

words,byvirtueoftheireducationalbackgroundandtheircareerpaths,thestateofficialsthat

adjudicateadministrativedisputesinFranceidentifylesswiththecareerjudiciaryandmorewith

theupperechelonsofthestateadministration.

On the doctrinal front, the French model is distinctive in the extent to which

administrative law,bothsubstantiveandprocedural,hasbeenexplicitlyandcomprehensively

informedbythespecificcharacteristicsofthepublicsphereandthespecialprerogatives,duties,

andrightsthatapplyinthefaceofstateaction.Onecrucialexampleofthisdoctrinalapparatus

istheconceptofservicepublic(Allison,1996:66–69;BrownandBell,1998:129–34,204,230;

Morand-Deviller,2013:455–98).Servicepublic(publicservice)servesasadoctrinaldevicefor

allocating cases between the ordinary and the administrative court systems. In addition,

administrative action involving a public service is subject to a special set of defenses and

liabilities. The state is authorized to take whatever measures are necessary to ensure the

continuityofthepublicserviceandtoadapttheservicetochangingcircumstances,rendering

lawfuladministrativeactionwhichmightotherwisebeconsidered illegalorultravires.At the

sametime,theadministrationisrequiredtotreatallusersoftheserviceequallyandneutrally.

Intherealmofgovernmentcontracts,theadministrationisunderadutytocompensateprivate

partiesforlossescausedbyanyunilateralmodificationofcontractsintheinterestofthepublic

service.Inthecommonlawtradition,thesameoutcomesmightverywellobtaininspecificcases.

However, the notions of policy discretion, expertise, the public interest, arbitrariness, and

fairnessthatjustifythoseoutcomeshavebeendevelopedseparately,indifferentlinesofcases

involving different types of administrative litigation, and have not evolved under the single

conceptualumbrellaofservicepublic.

MovingtotheproceduralprinciplesthatinformlitigationintheFrenchtradition,theytoo

reflect the distinctiveness of public law (Fromont, 2006: 164–68). To obtain access to

administrativecourts,individualsarenotrequiredtoallegeaparticularizedharmsincelitigation

against the state is conceivedasvindicatingan“objective” interest ina republicansystemof


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governmentfaithfultotheruleoflawratherthan“subjective”rightsinpropertyandliberty.In

contrast to thesequitegenerous ruleson standing, remedieshave traditionallybeen limited,

basedonthesametheoryoflitigationasameansofachievingtheproperoperationofthestate

ratherthan individual justice. Inthepast, theConseild’Etatcouldeitherannuladministrative

actsorcouldawarddamagesintortlitigationbutdidnothavethetoolstoaffordinjunctiverelief

to individualsor to forcerecalcitrantadministrativeauthorities tocomplywith its judgments.

Overthepastdecades,theadministrativecourtshaveobtainedamuchwiderarrayofremedial

powers to address the gaps and injustices causedby this situation.Overall, however, French

procedurestandsincontrastwithcommonlawprocedure,whereindividualstandingandlegal

remediesarepatternedontheprinciplesofindividualharmandredresscharacteristicofprivate

lawlitigation.

Like the doctrinal and organizational composition of the two systems, the normative

assessment of their relative merits has experienced a number of twists and turns over the

decades.Diceywasemphaticthatthecommonlawstoodonthesideof libertyandthedroit

administratif on the side of authority. This position was fairly representative of nineteenth-

centurypoliticiansandscholars.Formanycontinental reformers, thedifferencebetween the

commonlawanddroitadministratifrepresentedachoicebetweenliberalismandabsolutism.In

thefirstpartofthenineteenthcentury,most liberalthinkers intheGermanstatesadvocated

thatlegalcontroloveradministrationbevestedintheordinarycourtsresponsibleforciviland

criminal litigation (Stolleis, 2001: 215–18; Ledford, 2004: 208–11). Indeed, in the ultimately

unsuccessfulConstitutionoftheGermanEmpireof1849,theoldersystemofpurelyinternaland

hierarchical review of administrative decisionmaking was rejected in favor of jurisdiction

exercisedbythecourts:“Justiceundertheauspicesoftheadministrationshallcease;courtsare

todecideinallmattersofviolationsofthelaw.”(Article182)In1865,liberalcurrentsinfluential

atthefoundingoftheunifiedItalianstatesucceededinremovingresponsibilityforadministrative

adjudication from the Italian Council of State and vesting the power to decide individual

complaintsintheordinarycourts(Mattarella,2010:1016).4Inthecommonlawworld,Dicey’s

4In1890,however, judicialpowersweretransferredbacktotheCouncilofStateat least inpartbecauseof theineffectivenessoftheordinarycourtsincurbingthegrowingpowersofstateadministration(Mattarella,2010).


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assessment remained influential well into the twentieth century (Allison, 1996: 23–27). For

example,theAmericanlegalscholarBernardSchwartzwrotein1949:

Theabsenceofpublic-lawconcepts,intheContinentalsense,ratherthanbeinga

defect of our jurisprudence is, thus, its great strength. It enables control over

Executiveactiontobemaintainedthroughthesameinstitutionsthatadminister

thenormallawoftheland,andonthesamebasicprinciplesofjustice.Itprevents

theStatefromplacingitsownofficialsinaprivilegedpositionbyrefusingtoaccept

theassertionthatdifferentrulesareapplicabletotheiraction.(151–52)

Evenat the time thatDicey firstpronounced thegreatdivide,however, therewerea

numberofthinkerswhoquestionedhisassessmentofthetwosystems.Asearlyas1893,the

AmericanscholarFrankGoodnownotedinhiscomparativestudyonadministrativelawinFrance,

Germany,andtheUnitedStates,“thegreatregardwhichthe[French]administrativecourtshave

forprivaterights”(231).TheAmericanpoliticalscientistJamesGarnerprefacedhisexpositionof

the French system in the Yale Law Journal by noting the “extremely liberal and progressive

character”(1924:597)ofFrenchadministrativelawandspeculatedthat“[i]fanAmericanmay

venture to criticize its [Conseil d’Etat’s] jurisprudence he would say that it has been too

progressive”(1924:627).InhistreatiseJusticeandAdministrativeLaw(1928),theEnglishpublic

lawscholarWilliamRobsonwroteenthusiasticallyoftheFrenchsystem,praisedtheemerging

system of English administrative tribunals for their expertise and flexibility, and advocated

entrustingmostappeals to specializedadministrative courts thatwerequiteobviously in the

moldofthedroitadministratif.

Thedebateonwhichofthetwomodels issuperiorcontinuestoday.Somehavecome

downonthesideofthecommonlawbasedontheabsenceofajurisdictionaldividebetween

administrative and ordinary courts, thus avoiding expensive and lengthy litigation on the

appropriateforumforhearingclaimsagainststateactors(seegenerallyBrownandBell,1998:

297–99). Harking back to the nineteenth-century liberty–authority dichotomy, the European

Court ofHumanRights has recently questionedwhether the institutionof a Council of State


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satisfiestherequirementofindependencethatispartoftherighttoafairtrial(Article6ofthe

EuropeanConventiononHumanRights).Inthisregard,theCourthascriticizedthepracticeof

mixingregulatoryandadjudicatoryfunctionsintheCouncilofState.5Ithasalsosoughttoreduce

theinstitutionalpresenceoftheCommissairedugouvernement,amemberoftheCouncilofState

who does not actually sit in judgment but is taskedwith advising the judges on the correct

outcomeofthecaseandwhoseroleisconceivedasinformingthejudgesontheobjectivestate

ofthelaw(Bell,2010).

Others,bycontrast,havehighlightedthevirtuesoftheFrenchmodel.Inthe1960sand

1970s,theScottishscholarJ.D.Mitchelllamentedtheabsenceinthecommonlawofacoherent

systemofpubliclawsimilartowhathaddevelopedinFranceandwentsofarastostatethatthe

great“tragedy”ofthecommonlawwasthattherewasnogeneralconceptof“administrative

morality” (1965: 113). His criticism was based on a number of absurdities that had been

generatedinthepiecemealandevolutionaryprocessofseekingtoextendthecommonlawto

theadministrativestate.IntheUnitedStates,thelegalscholarandnowSupremeCourtJustice

StephenBreyerhassuggestedthatacentralexecutivebodysimilartotheConseild’Etatmight

be the answer to improving the quality of federal regulation (1995: 70–72). InBreaking the

ViciousCircle,Breyerwroteanearlyaccountofthefailureoffederalregulationtoadequately

prioritizeinpolicyareassuchaspublichealthandconsumerwell-beingandtodevelopcoherent

andcost-effectivestrategiestotacklerisk.Hisproposedsolution,acentralizedgroupofcareer

bureaucrats with the power to oversee the regulatory initiatives of federal agencies,

incorporated many of the key attributes of the Conseil d’Etat. Like the Conseil d’Etat, the

executivebodywouldhavethepowertoreviewandannuldraftregulations,wouldbestaffedby

officialsrecruitedthrougharigorousselectionsystemwithtechnicalexpertiseinspecificareas

ofregulation,andwouldbebuiltonacareermodelinwhichofficialsregularlyrotatedinandout

ofregulatoryagencies.Theseinstitutionalfeatureswouldallguaranteetheprestigeandtechnical

competenceoftheregulatoryoversightbody.AlthoughBreyermostlydrewinspirationfromthe

regulatory functionof theConseild’Etat,healso suggested thathisproposedoversightbody

5Procolav.Luxembourg,326Eur.Ct.H.R.(ser.A)(1995).


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wouldbewellsuitedtoadjudicate legaldisputesoverregulationandthat itmighteventually

supplantorevenentirelyreplacethejurisdictionofthefederalcourts(Breyer,1995:72).

This isnot theplace toweigh inonaclassicdebate in thecomparative law literature

which, as demonstrated above, has a long history and shows no sign of abating. It is clear,

however,thatthetwomodelshave importantconsequencesforculturesof judicialreviewin

France, the United Kingdom, and the many jurisdictions across the world that have been

influencedby the two legal traditions.Theyalsohave ramifications specifically for regulatory

governance.Oneof themost significant transformationsof the administrative state that has

occurredwith the rise of regulatory governance is the shift fromdirect state intervention in

importantsectorsoftheeconomytotherelianceonrulestogovernacompetitiveprivatemarket

andtoachievesomeof thesamepolicyoutcomesasdirectmanagement.Theserules,unlike

mostoftheinstrumentsusedinstateownershipandindustrialpolicy,areformalandaresubject

tolegalchallengesfromthemarketandcivilsocietyactorsgovernedbytherules.Suchchallenges

canbeexpectedtooperatesomewhatdifferentlyinthecommonlawandthedroitadministratif

traditions. One difference relates to access to justice. The procedural rules of the French

tradition,aimedatsafeguardingtheruleoflawandtherepublicanformofgovernment,should

makeitrelativelyeasyandquicktoobtainjudicialreviewofadministrativerules.Bycontrast,in

thecommonlawmodel,thenecessityofsatisfyingstandingrequirementsanalogoustothose

applicable in private litigation should make judicial review less widely available and less

immediate.

Inaddition,theorganizationalattributesofthetwosystemsofadjudicationarelikelyto

influencehowrulesarescrutinized.Aswillberecalled,theregulatoryandadjudicatoryfunctions

are institutionally mixed in the French system. The members of the Conseil d’Etat have

significant,directexperienceintheupperechelonsoftheadministration.Whentheyserveon

theConseild’Etat, theyarecalledupon,atdifferentpoints in their career,both toadviseon

proposedlawsandregulations,andtodecideonchallengestoregulationsaftertheycomeinto

effect.Althoughdifferentsectionsareresponsiblefortheregulatoryandadjudicatoryfunctions,

thevoluminousfilegeneratedwhentheruleisproposedisgenerallyalsoconsultedifthatsame

ruleissubsequentlychallenged(Latour,2010).Thiscombinationoffunctionsdoesnotmean,as


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Dicey would have it, that the Conseil d’Etat is necessarily more deferential towards state

authority;indeeditmightverywellbelessdeferentialbecauseithasprofessionalknowledgeof

regulation and administrative agencies. It does suggest, however, that arguments on the

technicalandlegalsubstancethatarenotsquarelyraisedatthetimeoftherulemaking,both

withinthegovernmentand inthecontextofregulatoryreviewbytheConseild’Etat,are less

likelytobetakenseriouslyonjudicialreview.Bycontrast,inthecommonlawtradition,where

thejudgesthatdecideadministrativecasesaregenerallyoutsiderstotherulemakingprocess,

argumentsthatwereperipheralintherulemakingprocessmayfindgreateracceptanceatthe

timeofjudicialreview.

ADVERSARIALVERSUSDISCRETIONARYPOLICYMAKING

Intheearly1990s,scholarlyattentionturnedtoasecondmajorsplitinsystemsofjudicialreview

ofgovernmentpolicymaking,thistimenotbetweenEnglandandFrancebutbetweentheUnited

StatesandEurope(andforsomepurposes,Japan).Reflectingontheexperienceinthe1960s

and1970swithlawandpoliticsinadvanceddemocracies,RobertKagandevelopedthetheoryof

“adversariallegalism”(1991,1994,1997,2001).Tomakehiscomparativeargument,Kagandrew

on a number of cross-national studies in the law-and-society tradition that examined the

operationoftheadministrativestateonthegroundinWesternEurope,Japan,andtheUnited

States.HearguedthatpolicymakinganddisputeresolutionintheUnitedStatesinvirtuallyevery

area of social and economic lifewasmore lawyer-driven and court-dominated than in other

democracies,which insteadreliedmoreheavilyondiscretionarypolicymakingbybureaucrats

andpoliticiansandhierarchicaldisputeresolutionbyjudges.6Histheoryappliesacrosstheboard

tomost areas of law but has special relevance for the law of the regulatory process. Kagan

demonstrated that American legislation is more vulnerable to legal challenges, involving

aggressive lawyering, novel theories of constitutional law, and activist courts. The American

system also relies more heavily on litigants and courts for regulatory implementation and

6Thedifferencein“regulatorystyles”wasalsoidentifiedbyDavidVogelinanearlymonographonenvironmentalpolicy(1986).


14

enforcement than other jurisdictions, which give bureaucracies greater powers and have

relativelyrestrictiverulesonclassactionsandotherproceduraldevicesthatcanfacilitatelitigant

accesstocourts(seealsoHensler,thisvolume).RulemakinginAmericanbureaucraciesismore

proceduralizedandlawyer-driventhaninmostothercountries(seealsoWagner,thisvolume;

Smismans,thisvolume).EnforcementbyAmericanadministrativeagenciesismorelegalisticand

punitive. And,most relevant for thischapter, the regulatorypoliciesenactedby thepolitical

branchesandimplementedbybureaucraciesaremorelikelytobechallengedinthecourtsand

defeated under theories of administrative and constitutional law than in other advanced

democracies.

Kagan’sexplanationfortheemergenceofadversariallegalismrestedbothonhistorically

deep-rootedstructuralandideologicaldifferences,aswellasmorerecenteventsassociatedwith

thepost-materialturntakeninmostwesterndemocraciesinthe1960sand1970s.Tosimplifya

highlynuancedaccount,Kaganarguedthatadversarial legalismwasbroughtonbyaburst in

citizendemandforpublicinterestregulationcombinedwithalong-standingAmericancultureof

distrustinthestateandaninstitutionalframeworkofsmallanddividedgovernment.Incontrast

withEurope,theambitiousregulatoryprogramsofthe1960sand1970soperatedinacontextof

legal and institutional fragmentation. When the new programs were designed by Congress,

implementationwasnotdelegatedexclusivelytoalargestatebureaucracy,aswasthecasein

manyotherdemocracies,buttoacombinationoffederaladministrativeagencies,stateandlocal

governments,andprivateattorneysgeneralwith thepower toenforce regulationdirectly, in

court.Tocompensateforthepolicyslippagecreatedbythisfragmentedarrangement,Congress

wrotelawsthatwerehighlydetailedonboththesubstanceandtheprocedureandthatwould

enableprivatelitigantstosuethedifferentgovernmentbodiesincourttoenforcetheirstatutory

mandates,namely,toobtainjudicialreview.Thusthelegalframeworkforadversariallegalism

wasputintoplace.Astheconceptuallabelindicates,Kagan’snormativeassessmentwasfairly

negative.Hesuggestedthatthemoreinformal,consensual,andadministrativelydrivensystem

atworkinEuropewasjustaseffectiveormoresoatdeliveringpolicygoodsandguaranteeing

socialwelfare,butwithoutthecostanduncertaintygeneratedbythemanylayersoflawyers,

courts,andcontestationcharacteristicoftheAmericansystem.


15

AtroughlythesametimeasKaganwrote,anumberofpoliticalscientistsworkinginthe

rational-choice tradition came to focus on the administrative law component of adversarial

legalism(McCubbinsetal.,1987,1989;EpsteinandO’Halloran,1994,1999;HuberandShipan,

2002).Thislineofinquiryelaboratesonwhyjudicialreviewofagencypolicymakingcanbeso

demandingintheAmericansystemandhasbeeninfluentialinbothpoliticalscienceandthelaw.

Thepremiseofthisrational-choicescholarshipisthattherelationshipbetweenlegislaturesand

administration can be conceived as a principal–agent relationship in which the legislature

(principal) has incentives to delegate the power of policy implementation to administration

(agent)butadministration,inturn,hasincentivestodefectfromthepolicypreferencesofthe

legislature. Legislators, therefore,build into the lawanumberofdevices tocontrolwayward

bureaucrats.Theinnovationoftheleadingproponentsofthisapproach,MatthewMcCubbins,

Roger Noll, and BarryWeingast (McNollgast), was to conceptualize control tools broadly to

include not only statutory commands and Congressional oversight but also administrative

procedureand judicial review.McNollgast argued that,notwithstanding theoutcome-neutral

appearance of many administrative procedures, they were designed to entrench legislative

bargainsandtoensurethattheintereststhathadprevailedinthelegislativeprocesswoulddo

soalso in theadministrativeprocess. In their framework,procedural requirements related to

transparency,participation,andreason-givingwithinthebureaucracy,andtherighttoenforce

such requirements through judicial review, allowed the interest groups behind the enacting

coalition tomonitor and influence, either directly or through their legislators, administrative

outcomes.McNollgast captured awide array of procedural requirements, backed by judicial

review,someofwhichwererelativelynew,forinstancespecificreportingrequirementswritten

intoenvironmentallegislation,andsomeofwhichweremoregeneralandofoldervintage,such

as the rulemakingprovisionsof theAdministrativeProcedureAct. Thevastmajorityof these

requirements,conceivedinrational-choicetheoryasprincipal–agentcontrolinstruments,were

alsoamongthoseblamedbyKaganforadversariallegalism.

Mostoftherational-choicescholarshiponregulatorydesignisfocusedspecificallyonthe

UnitedStatesandtherelationshipbetweenfederaladministrativeagenciesandCongress.Afew

scholars,however,haveengaged incomparativeanalysis tohighlightandexplaintherelative


16

absenceelsewhereofformalproceduralsafeguardsintheregulatoryprocess,togetherwitha

reduced role forcourtsand judicial review (MoeandCaldwell,1994;EpsteinandO’Halloran,

1999:242–44;Thies,2001;Strøm2003;JensenandMcGrath,2011;Rose-Ackermanetal.,2015;

Rose-Ackermanetal.,thisvolume).Theyfocusonthedifferentstrategicincentivesthatexistin

the institutional context of American presidentialism—an important aspect of fragmented

Americangovernment—andparliamentarism,theformofgovernmentprevalentinEuropeand

muchof the restof theworld. In linewithprincipal–agent theory,procedural constraintson

administrativeactionare conceptualizedasadevice for locking inpoliticaldealswhenpolicy

implementationisdelegatedtoadministrativeactors.Althoughtheaccountsvary,theyconverge

on a couple of characteristics of parliamentary government thatmake procedural rights and

judicial review a less likely strategy of political control for legislatures. First,when the same

majority party or coalition of parties controls both the legislature and the government, the

likelihoodofdefectionislower:administrativeagencieshavefeweropportunitiesandfaceless

pressuretodefectfromthelegislativebargainsincetheyreportonlytoonepoliticalprincipal

and not to the multiple principals of Congress and the President (especially problematic in

periodsofdividedgovernment).Secondly,formalizationisacostlymechanismforentrenching

political deals because it reduces administrative flexibility, imposes cumbersome and time-

consumingprocedures,andintroducesthird-partymonitorsintheformofinterestgroupsand

the courts which themselves may be a source of principal–agent slack. Thirdly, there exist

alternative, less costly forms of control in parliamentary systems, such as the political

appointmentofministersandjuniorministerswhocanmonitortheworkofbureaucraciesand

can,inthecaseofamultipartycoalition,ensurethatthecoalitionagreementratherthanany

onepartyinthecoalitionprevailsintheadministrativepolicymakingprocess.Fourthly,because

of the concentration of legislative power in the governing coalition or majority party,

administrativeprocedureoperatesasarelativelyineffectiveandthereforeunlikelyinstrument

of control in parliamentary systems: even if a particular legislature did enact administrative

procedure,asubsequentlegislaturewouldbelikelytoquicklyundoit,incentivizedbythelimited

benefitsandextensivecostsofproceduredescribedabove.


17

Amongthosewhohaveconsideredtheramificationsofthis institutionaldifferencefor

comparativepubliclaw,theworkofSusanRose-Ackermanisamongthemostsignificant.Inan

earlierstudyonGermanandAmericanenvironmentalpolicy(1995:125–33)andrecentresearch

on policymaking procedure in a number of legal systems (Rose-Ackerman et al., 2015; Rose-

Ackermanetal.,thisvolume),shehasarguedinfavorofAmericanrulemakingprocedureand

judicialreview.Thenormativeargumentcloselydovetailsthepositive,rational-choiceanalysis:

inhertheoreticalaccount,transparency,participation,andreason-givingintheadministrative

process,backedbyjudicialreview,enablebothlegislatorsandcitizenstooverseeadministrative

agenciesandthereforerenderexecutivepolicymakingdemocraticallyaccountable.Atthesame

time,Rose-Ackermanarguesthatprocedureandjudicialoversightensurethatbureaucratswill

makedecisionsinatechnicallycompetentfashionthatcomportswithmeans–endsrationality.

ReturningfullcircletothemoregeneraldifferencestracedbyRobertKaganbetweenAmerican

adversarial legalism and the European administrative state, it should be clear that Rose-

Ackermandepartssignificantlyfromhisassessmentofthetwosystems.Inheranalysis,thecosts

associatedwith procedure and judicial revieware outweighedby the benefits to democratic

accountabilityandpolicymakingcompetence.

Tosummarize,adversariallegalismandtheinstitutionalstructureofpresidentialismhave

significant implications for the judicial reviewcomponentof governmentpolicymaking in the

United States. As compared with other established democracies, policymaking within

administrativeagenciesismoreformal,proceduralized,andadversarial.Americanbureaucrats

are more likely to be sued in court, both for having breached the onerous procedural

requirements and for having failed to satisfy the substantive standards of administrative

rationality. The difference applies precisely to the activities specifically associated with the

regulatoryfunction—designinggenerallyapplicablerulesthatregulateliberalizedmarkets.Other

administrative activities such as themass adjudication of individual claims in the context of

welfareprogramstendtobeproceduralizedandamenabletojudicialrevieweverywhere,driven

by the liberal commitment to fairprocedure in individualizeddeterminations.With the rising

prominenceof regulation,making itan important formofgovernancenotonly in theUnited

StatesbutalsointheEuropeanUnionandotherpartsoftheworld,somehavesuggestedthat


18

rulemaking toowill become adversarial everywhere (Kelemen, 2011; Kelemen, this volume).

Whetherthisisindeedthecaseisanopenquestionthatwillcontinuetobethesubjectofdebate

forsometimetocome(BignamiandKelemen,forthcoming).

RIGHTSVERSUSDEMOCRACY

Inrecentyears,athirddividebetweensystemsofjudicialreviewofgovernmentpolicymaking

hasbecomeincreasinglyapparent.Thisisthecontrastbetweenjudicialreviewbasedontheories

offundamentaleconomicandsocialrights,whichisprevalentinEuropeanlegalsystemsand,a

growingbodyofevidencesuggests,jurisdictionsinotherpartsoftheglobe;andjudicialreview

conceivedasahandmaidenofthedemocraticprocess,whichdominatesintheUnitedStates.As

I have begun to elaborate elsewhere, outside of policing administrative actors for fidelity to

statutorymandates,AmericanandEuropeancourtstakefundamentallydifferentapproachesto

the judicial review of public policymaking (Bignami, 2011: 898–902; 2012: 148–60). While

European courts safeguard a wide range of liberties from the burdensome action of

policymakers, American courts seek to advance a particular vision of democracy in the

administrative process. In the rest of this section, I elaborate on the two theories of judicial

review,suggestanexplanationforthedifferentjurisprudentialtrajectories,andexploresomeof

thepossibleimplicationsofthedifference.

To begin with Europe, the most prominent example of judicial review driven by

fundamental rights is the principle of proportionality. It is associatedwith the samepolitical

philosophy of liberalism discussed earlier in connection with the historical development of

administrative litigation. Proportionality’s origins are generally traced to nineteenth-century

Prussiaandthegradualshiftfromabsolutismtotheruleoflawor,inthelanguageofthetime,

theshiftfrom“derPolizeistaat”tothe“Rechtstaat”(Barak,2012:175).InGermany,asinmuch

oftherestofcontinentalEurope,oneofthedefiningelementsofliberalismandtheruleoflaw

wastherecognitionofaprivatesphereoflibertyandpropertyindependentofthestate(Stolleis,

2001).Tosafeguardthatprivatesphere,itwascriticalthatallgovernmentinterferenceswith

propertyand libertybeauthorizedby lawand that individualsbeable togo tocourt if state


19

officialsexceeded theboundariesof that law.The ruleof law,however,wasalso tied to the

identificationofasetofrightsguaranteedbynaturallawandjudicialcontroldesignedtoprotect

thoserights.Thiswasespeciallyapparentintheshiftingterrainofthepolicepower.Although

localauthoritiesstilloperatedundervaguestatutoryprovisionsdirectingthemtoprotectpublic

healthandsecurity,afairlyelaborateconceptualapparatuswasdevelopedinthelawtolimit

their powers and their intrusion upon liberty and property, including the principle of

proportionality.

Proportionalitywasused inPrussiancourtsand legalscholarshiptocurtail thetypeof

action, if any, that could be used by local authorities to protect public health and security.

Today’s legal scholarship generally defines proportionality as comprised of three elements:

whetherthegovernmentactioniscapableofachievingthestatedend(suitability);whetherthe

governmentactionisnecessarytoachievethestatedend(necessity);andwhetheronbalance

thebenefitsfromthegovernmentactionoutweightheburdensonindividualrights(balancingor

proportionalitystrictosensu)(Grimm,2007).Thefirsttwoelementsinparticular(suitabilityand

necessity)wereapparentinPrussianlaw.Astheleadingadministrativelawscholarofthetime,

OttoMayer,explained:

Thebasisofthepolicepowerinnaturallawrequiresthatthe[protectionofthe

goodorderofthepublicthing]beinproportiontothedisturbance;thisdefines

theextentof theactionof thepolice. It shouldnotbepresumedthat the law,

through general authorizations by virtue of which the authority of the police

operates,wishedtopermitsuchprotectiontoexceedthisnaturallimit.(1904:29)

Thus, for instance, inacasedecided in1880,thePrussianSupremeAdministrativeLawCourt

found against the police because they had banned all women likely to be prostitutes from

enteringthehomeofasuspectedpimpratherthanresortingtothelessintrusivesurveillance

measuresavailabletothem(1904:32).Althoughthethirdelementofproportionality(balancing)

ishardertodiscern,thereisevidenceoftheconceptinthelegalscholarshipofthetime.Again

referringtoOttoMayer,hearguedthatwhenpublicauthoritiesexercisedthepolicepowerthey


20

wereboundtodemonstratethatthebeneficialeffectsofpublicactionoutweighedtheburden

onprivatelife(1904:20–21n.2).AtissueintheparticularcaseunderconsiderationwasaBerlin

ordinanceforbiddingtheuseofstove-pipekeysinhomes,whichaccordingtoMayerconstituted

anespeciallyburdensomeinterferencewiththeprotectedsphereof“privatelife.”

AfterWorldWar IIand theadoptionof theGermanBasicLaw,proportionality rapidly

becameanoverarchingprincipleofbothadministrativelawandconstitutionallaw.Inthe1950s,

the conceptwas elaborated by administrative law scholars to include the three elements of

suitability,necessity,andbalancing,andcametobeappliedtoallformsofadministrativeaction

(vonKrauss,1955;Lerche,1961).Soonthereafter,theconceptmigratedtoconstitutional law

withthejudgmentoftheFederalConstitutionalCourtinthePharmacyCase.7Thisfamouscase

involved a challenge to a Bavarian statute that set down criteria for granting permits to

pharmacies,includingeconomicviabilityandthepotentialharmtocompetitors.Apharmacythat

wasdeniedapermitsuedbasedontheconstitutionallyguaranteedrighttochooseandexercise

aprofession.TheCourt, inholdingfor thepharmacy,assessedthe libertyclaimbasedonthe

proportionalityprincipleandindoingsoprovidedthefirstclearendorsementoftheprinciplein

constitutional law. In the judgments that immediately followed, it became clear that

proportionalitywouldapplyinanycaseinvolvingrightsandliberties.Sincethen,ithasbecome

acornerstoneofconstitutionallawandhasbecomeoneoftheleadingGermanlegalexportsto

therestoftheworld(Barak,2012:182).

Givenhowprominentproportionalityhasbecomeinconstitutionallaw,itiseasytofocus

oncasesinvolvingpoliticalandcivilrightssuchasfreedomofexpressionandracediscrimination

andtolosesightofhowtheprincipleoriginatedintheclassiceconomicrightsimplicatedbythe

administrativestate.Today it isstillused intheeconomicdomain. Acoupleofexampleswill

illustratethepoint.Thefirst istheGermancasethat ledtotheadoptionofproportionality in

EuropeanUnion (EU) law. In InternationaleHandelsgesellschaft, aGermancompany failed to

exportthequantitiesofmaizestipulatedinanexportlicenseithadobtainedpursuanttoanEU

7 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 11, 1958, 7EntscheidungendesBundesverfassungsgerichts[BVerfGE]377.


21

Councilregulationand,asaresult,pursuanttothetermsoftheregulation,itforfeitedtheentire

amountof thedeposit ithadprovidedat thetime ithadobtainedthe license.8Thecompany

challengedtheregulationbeforeaGermanadministrativecourtbasedontherightsoffreedom

ofactionandeconomicfreedomguaranteedunderArticles2(1)and14oftheGermanBasicLaw.

TheGermancourtreferredtheproportionalityquestiontotheCourtofJustice,whichrecognized

forthefirsttimethatsuchliberties,alongwiththerelatedproportionalityprinciple,werepartof

EUlaw.TheCourtofJusticethenconductedtheproportionalityinquiry:itfoundthatforfeiture

ofthedepositwasbothsuitableandnecessarytotheendofensuringthattheCommissionwas

properly informed of the overall volume of exports and imports, essential to regulating the

market in agricultural commodities. Turning to the balancing component of the test, namely

whethertheburdenontheindividualrightwasdisproportionatetothepublicbenefitsfromthe

policy,theCourtfoundthatsincetheamountofthedepositwasminimalandtherewasaforce

majeureexceptiontotheforfeiture,theEUregulationsatisfiedproportionalitystrictosensu.

ReturningtotheGermanFederalConstitutionalCourt,ithasroutinelyactedtoprotect

therightofoccupationalfreedomandtherelatedproportionalityprincipleatissueinthehistoric

PharmacyCase.Inachallengebroughtbyacandymanufacturertoafederalregulationbanning

thesaleofcocoa-likeproductsbecauseoftherisktoconsumersofconfusingsuchsweetswith

real chocolate, the Court found that the necessity prong had been violated because of the

availability of a less-restrictive measure—a labelling requirement—to prevent consumer

confusion.9Inanothercase,occupationalfreedomlostouttoanimalwelfare.10TheCourtfound

thatafarmingregulationprescribingtheminimumdimensionofchickencoopswastoofavorable

tofarmerrightsanddidnotadequatelyguaranteetheanimalwelfareinterestsprotectedunder

theenablingstatute.Morerecently,basedonthesamerightofoccupationalfreedom,theCourt

struckdownalawbanningsmokinginpublicrestaurantsbecauseofthefailureofthestatutory

schemetoconsistentlypromotethepurportedaimofprotectingagainstsmoke.11

8Case11/70,InternationaleHandelsgesellschaftv.Einfuhr,1970E.C.R.1125.9BVerfG,Jan.16,1980,53BVerfGE135.10BVerfG,Apr.13,1999,101BVerfGE1.11BVerfG,June11,2008,121BVerfGE317.


22

Ashasalreadybeensuggested,proportionalityisnotconfinedtoGermanlaw,buthas

becomecentraltoEuropeanlaw,inbothnationaljurisdictions(Fromont,2006:255-61;Barak,

2012: 186–87; Rose-Ackerman et al., this volume) and the supranational European Union

(Tridimas,2006:136–241)andEuropeanCourtofHumanRights(Letsas,2006:711).Ithasalso

spreadto legalsystemsoutsideofEurope, including Israel,Canada,SouthAfrica, India,South

Korea, and Taiwan (Barak, 2012: 188–204; Huang and Law, this volume). Important for the

purposesofthischapter,itprotectslibertyfrombothlegislativeandadministrativeaction,and

itextendstoalltypesofrights,althoughwithdifferentlevelsofintensity,includingcivil,political,

andeconomicrightsandeven,insomecases,positivesocialandeconomicrights.

AnotherimportantexampleofhowfundamentalrightsareusedinEuropeanlawtocurb

government policymaking is the principle of equality. While German law is at the origin of

proportionality,thegenealogyofequalityisoftentracedtoFrenchlaw.Inthejurisprudenceof

the Conseil d’Etat on general principles of law (principes généraux du droit)―higher-law

principles rooted in political theories of liberalism and republicanism and enforced against

administrationandthepoliticalexecutive—equalityisoneoftheoldestandmostfundamental

(Longetal.,2013:418).TheprincipleofequalityislooselylinkedtotheDeclarationoftheRights

ofManandoftheCitizenof1789,andwasfirstrecognizedbytheConseild’Etatin1913inthe

Roubeaucase.12Itappliestobothpolicymakingandindividualdecisionmakingandhasevolved

intoaseriesofspecificprinciplesapplicabletocertaintypesofgovernmentactivity:equalityin

the operation of public services,13 equality in taxation,14 equality in bearing public burdens

(chargespubliques),15equalaccesstothecivilservice,16equalitybetweenmembersofthecivil

service, 17 sex equality, 18 equality between nationals and non-nationals in the domain of

fundamental rights, 19 equality between users of public services or state-owned property

12CEMay9,1913,Rec.Lebon521.13CESect.,Mar.9,1951,Rec.Lebon151.14CESect.,Feb.4,1944,Rec.Lebon45.15CENov.30,1923,Rec.Lebon789.16CEAss.,May28,1954,Rec.Lebon308.17CESect.,Oct.26,1979,Rec.Lebon396.18CEAss.,July3,1936,Rec.Lebon721.19CEAss.,Dec.8,1978,Rec.Lebon493.


23

(domainepublic),20andequaltreatmentundereconomicregulation.21Theprincipleisgenerally

formulatedasthedutytotreatequalsituationsequallyanddifferentsituationsdifferentlyand

requiresthatanydifferenceintreatmentbejustifiedinlightoftheobjectivesoftheenablinglaw

(Fromont,2006:254).

Acoupleofexampleswillillustratethereachoftheequalityprincipleandhowdeeplyit

cutsintotheoperationoftheadministrativestate,includingtheregulatoryfunction.Inwhatis

generally recognized as the foundational case for equality in the area of public services, the

Conseild’EtatannulledadecisionofRadiodiffusion français (apublicbroadcastingservice) in

whichitrefusedtobroadcastconcertsorganizedbytheSociétédesConcertsduConservatoire.22

TheConseild’Etatfoundthatastheproviderofapublicservicethebroadcasterwasboundby

theequalityprinciple,thatithadviolatedthatprinciplebysinglingoutSociétédesConcertsdu

Conservatoire and refusing to broadcast its concerts, and that it was consequently liable in

damages. In 1985, a Paris police regulation restricting permits for sidewalk vendors to war

victims,personswithfamily,andneedypersonswasfoundtoimpermissiblydiscriminateagainst

othertypesofapplicants.23TheConseilfoundthatthe“generalinterest,whichislinkedtothe

socialprotectionofpersonssodefinedwasnotsufficientlyimportanttoentirelyexcludeallother

applicants.”In2011,theConseilannulledaprovisionofthehighwaycodedelegatingthetaskof

automobilesafetyinspectionstoautorepairshopsthatweremembersofanationalorganization

onthegroundsthatitviolatedtheprincipleofequalityasbetweenaffiliatedandindependent

autorepairshops.24Evenmorerecently,theConseilannulledasocialsecuritydecreeincreasing

pensionbenefits formineworkerswhichonlyapplied toworkerswitha lengthyemployment

historyon thegrounds that theministryhad failed to justify thedifferencebetweenthe two

20CESect.,Nov.2,1956,Rec.Lebon403.21CEOct.26,1949,Rec.Lebon433.22CESect.,Mar.9,1951,Rec.Lebon151.23CESect.,Dec.18,1985,Rec.Lebon380.ForasimilarsetoffactsandlegalargumentsinacasedecidedbytheSouthKoreanConstitutionalCourt,seeHuangandLaw(thisvolume).24Société Auto Bilan France, 6/1 SSR, 342498, Oct. 21, 2011, reported in Jurisprudence desformationscontentieusesduConseild’Etat,Oct.2011,at17.


24

classes ofmineworkers.25Of course, there are numerous instances inwhich the Conseil has

rejected equality claims, indeed probablymore numerous than those inwhich it has upheld

them. For instance, in a casedating to1983, theConseil hearda challenge toa government

decreedeclaringacertainterritorytobeanaturalreserveandregulatingtheuseofthereserve.26

Oneofthecomplaintswasthatthegovernmenthadimpermissiblysingledoutcertainareasof

thereserveforcampingandbivouacing,totheexclusionoftherest,buttheConseilfoundthat

differenceintreatmentwasjustifiedbytheobjectiveofnatureprotection.

Aswithproportionality, theequality principlemade itswayearly on to the European

CourtofJustice.Itfirstappearedinthe1950sincaseschallengingcivilservicedecisionsofthe

EUinstitutions27aswellasHighAuthoritydecisionsinvolvingthedifferentialtreatmentofcoal

and steel producers and users. 28 Somewhat later, the principle emerged in challenges to

regulatory decisions in the common agricultural policy area which discriminated between

differenttypesofproducers.29Itisalsocommontotheadministrativelawofthememberstates,

inparticularthejudicialreviewofadministrativerules(Fromont,2006:253,293),andtonational

constitutional law (Baer, 2012; Kommers and Miller, 2012: 419–40), including French

constitutionallawsincetheexpansionoftheConstitutionalCouncil’spowersinthe1980s(Stone,

1992). Although there has been less attention to equality than to proportionality in the

comparative literature, it appears to operate as a cross-cutting principle in a number of

jurisdictions outside of Europe too (Huang and Law, this volume). In addition, similar to

proportionalityandimportantforunderstandingjudicialreviewinthecontextoftheregulatory

state,equalityisaprincipleapplicableinboththeadministrativeandlegislativedomains,and

generally protects against all forms of discrimination, including social and economic

classifications.

25SyndicatnationalCFDTdesmineursetassimilésetdupersonneldurégimeminieretautres,1/6 SSR, 353703, 353707, 353781, Nov. 27, 2013, reported in Jurisprudence des formationscontentieusesduConseild’Etat,Nov.2013,at16.26CEAss.,May19,1983,Rec.Lebon205.27See,e.g.,Case1/55,Kergallv.CommonAssembly,1955E.C.R.151,169.28 See, e.g., Case 8/57, Hauts Fourneaux et Aciéries Belges v. High Authority of the European Coal and SteelCommunity,1958E.C.R.245.29See,e.g.,Case114/76,Bela-MüleJosefBergmannKGv.Grows-FarmGmbH,1977E.C.R.1211.


25

Thereareanumberofotherdoctrinesthatarealsodesignedtoprotect liberty in the

contextofthecontemporaryadministrativestate.Thesearegenerallyconcernedwithpositive

rightssuchasgovernmentbenefitsandhavebeenrecognizedintheprimarylawofconstitutions

and in the court-generated principles of non-retroactivity, legal certainty, and legitimate

expectations (Kommers and Miller, 2012: 622–23; Bignami and Spivack, 2014). While the

constitutional lawgenerallybegins fromthepremise that individualsareentitled toacertain

minimum level ofwelfare from the state, the judge-made principles are designed to restrict

changes to government programs once they have been put into place by legislative and

administrativeactors.

In theAmericansystem,bycontrast, individual rights rarely formthebasis for judicial

review of the market-regulating and welfare-distributing functions of the contemporary

administrative state. This is a product of the rigid hierarchy of fundamental rights which is

distinctive to theAmerican systemandwhichhasbeenamplydocumented in scholarshipon

comparative constitutional law (Mathews and Stone Sweet, 2011; Barak, 2012: 509–27).

Economicrightsandclassificationsarepartofthelowesttierofthehierarchy,whichisafforded

onlyminimal,so-called“rationalbasis”judicialreview;mostcommentatorsagreethat,oncea

caseisslottedintothe“rationalbasis”category,theoutcome,infavorofthestateandagainst

individualrights,isaforegoneconclusion(Sunstein,1985).AsAharonBarakexplains,incontrast

withproportionalityandequality,whichareappliedineverycasetobalancebetweentheinjury

to the fundamental right and the general interest thatmotivates state action, the American

approachseekstobalanceinadvance,throughtheconstitutionalhierarchyofrights(2012:512).

Rightsatthetopofthehierarchy,suchastherighttospeech,requireaverygoodjustification

fromthestatebeforetheinterferencewillbeconsideredpermissible.Rightsatthebottomof

thehierarchy,includingeconomicrights,requirevirtuallynojustificationatalltowarrantstate

interference. Therefore, cases involving rights such as the right to exercise a profession or

conduct a trade,whichhave a chanceof success under theprinciples of proportionality and

equality,automaticallyfailunderrationalbasisreview.

TheabsenceoffundamentalrightsfromjudicialreviewoftheAmericanadministrative

stateisalsoafunctionofthetendencyoftheSupremeCourt,incontrastwithotherconstitutional


26

courts, to define the scope of rights narrowly and to refrain from creatively interpreting

constitutionaltexttorecognizenewrights(Currie,1989).Thishashadanimpactespeciallyinthe

domain of the welfare state: the Supreme Court has not recognized any positive social and

economic rightsunder theConstitution and there are few judge-made constraints ondrastic

shiftsinentitlementprograms,eitheratthelegislativeortheadministrativelevels(Bignamiand

Spivack,2014).Inotherwords,thehardshipcreatedbytherevocationofgovernmentbenefits

andothertypesofadvantageoustreatmentisnottempered,asincertainEuropeanjurisdictions,

bypositiveconstitutionalrightsandjudicialdoctrinessuchaslegitimateexpectationsandlegal

certainty.

Astheliteratureonadversariallegalismanddelegationdemonstrates,Americancourts

dointerveneingovernmentpolicymaking.Theydoso,however,basedontheoriesrelatedto

thepreservationofthedemocraticprocess,orwhatIcallthe“ballot-boxdemocracy”paradigm

ofpubliclaw.Inreviewinglegislativeaction,Americancourtspoliceforfidelitytofederalismand

theotherstructuralguaranteesof theConstitution; in reviewingadministrativepolicymaking,

courts engage in what one leading administrative law scholar has labelled “proceduralized

rationalityreview”(Mashaw,2012:289).Intheinterestofspace,thissectionwillfocusonthe

latter form of review—judicial oversight of administrative actors when they engage in

policymaking.Proceduralizedrationalityreviewencompassesanumberofdoctrinalgroundsof

review,boththeproceduralrequirementsanalyzedintheprevioussectionandinotherchapters

in this volume (Wagner; Rose-Ackerman) and the substantive standard of “arbitrary and

capricious” review. Arbitrary and capricious review, also known as “hard-look review,” was

originally designed to capture instances of irrational agency action but evolved, in the early

1970s, into a highly demanding test (Breyer et al., 2002: 416; Schiller, this volume).30Itwas

layeredover the long-standingappellatemodelofAmerican judicial review (Merrill, 2011) in

whichthefactualrecord,policyanalysis,andlegalbasisforthedecisionweretobedeveloped

primarilybytheadministrativeagency,conceivedasanalogoustoatrialcourt.Theresultisthat

30Asamatterofformallegaldoctrine,thereareanumberofotherteststhatcanapplyinthecontextofjudicialreviewof the substanceofagencypolicydecisions,but thearbitraryandcapricious standard isby far themostcommon,andindeedsomearguethatthereisverylittledifferenceinhowthedifferenttestsoperateinpractice(Zaring,2010).


27

administrativeagenciesmustdemonstratebeforethecourtsthat,atthetimethepolicychoice

wasmade,theyconsideredandassessedalloftheavailablelegalandpolicyoptionsandcameto

a reasoned conclusion as towhich policywould best accomplish the underlying goals of the

regulatoryscheme.31

Therationaleforproceduralizedrationalityreviewwastiedtotwodistinctbutrelated

elementsofthedemocraticprocess.Inthe1960sand1970s,aburgeoningliteraturehadbrought

attentiontowhatwasbelievedtobethewidespread“capture”ofadministrativeagenciesby

regulated industries (Olson, 1965; Stigler, 1971, 1974). The response was twofold. First, by

enforcingademandingstandardofrationality,courtswouldensurethatadministrativeagencies

promoted the goals of the legislature rather than the special interests of the regulated

community.AsJudgeLeventhalsaidinhisseminalarticleonhard-lookreview,theobjectivewas

toensurethattheagency“’hasexercisedareasoneddiscretionwithreasonsthatdonotdeviate

fromorignoretheascertainablelegislativeintent....[Theentireprocess]isconductedwithan

awareness that agencies and courts together constitute a ‘partnership in furtherance of the

publicinterest’”(1974:511).Secondly,byensuringafairandrepresentativeagencyprocessthat

largelymimicked the pluralist system of interest group competition in the legislature, public

interestgroupssuchasconsumersandenvironmentaladvocateswouldbeheardfrombeginning

toendofthepolicymakingcycle.Surveyingandsynthesizingawiderangeofdevelopmentsin

thefieldofadministrativelaw,RichardStewartdubbedtheemergingpracticeofjudicialreview

the “interest representation model”: the use of judicial review “to ensure more adequate

representationforallinterestsaffectedbyagencydecisions”(1975:1669).

Beforeexploring the implicationof thesetwomodelsof judicial reviewspecifically for

regulatory governance, it bears askingwhy theyemerged in the first place. The comparative

31European courts also require that administrative agencies give reasons for their policy choices. Such reasons,however, can be advanced in the litigation and are not required to be developed in the context of the agencyrulemakinginresponsetotheregulatedparties(Allison,1996:207–34;Singh,2001:223–43).Thereforerationalityreviewisnotas“proceduralized”(andasdrawnout)asintheAmericancase.Moreover,thenotionofadministrativediscretion,understoodasadecisionmakingspherelegitimatelylefttobureaucraciesandillegitimatelyusurpedbytheinferenceofcourts,ismorerobustinGermanyandotherEuropeanlegalsystems(Maurer,2009:133–64).Asaresult,thereason-givinggenerallyrequiredinadministrativelawreview—asopposedtoreviewonconstitutionallibertygrounds—isarelativelycursoryexplanationofhowthepolicychoicesmadebytheadministrativeauthorityareconsistentwiththeoveralllegalframeworkofthegovernmentprogram.


28

analysis reveals two quite different theories of public law: one that explicitly calls upon

fundamentalrightstotheorizetherelationshipbetweencourtsandtheadministrativestateand

the other that is rooted in a duty to protect a specific understanding of democracy in the

policymaking activities of bureaucracy. On the American side, the explanation rests in the

experienceof courts in theearlydaysof judicial reviewanddemocraticgovernmentand the

impact of that experience on the subsequent development of legal discourse and judicial

behavior.InwhathasbecomeastandardnarrativeinAmericanconstitutionalhistory,inthefirst

decades of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court came into direct confrontation with

popularpoliticsandelectedlegislatures.Atthistime,itrepeatedlystruckProgressiveandNew

Deallegislationbasedonlibertyandpropertyrightsandanarrowvisionofthepolicepower.In

Lochner(1905),themostfamousofthesecases,theCourtstruckaNewYorklawregulatingthe

workinghoursofbakersasaviolationoftheDueProcessClauseandtheso-called“substantive”

guaranteeoflibertyundertheDueProcessClausetoenterfreelyintocontractsofemployment.32

The periodwasmarked by clasheswithin the legal establishment between legal realists and

adherents to the“classical”schoolof thought (Horwitz,1992)andbycontrastingviews,both

insideandtheoutsidetheCourt,onthecorrectnessoftheLochnerlineofcases.Itwasalsoa

periodofintenseconflictbetweenthePresidentandtheCourt.Inwhathasbecomeanotorious

episode in American constitutional history, Roosevelt sought to “pack” the Court with six

additionalJusticeswhopresumablywouldhaveensuredtheconstitutionalityoftheNewDeal

agenda(Ackerman,1998:312–37).

While the Court-packing billwas ultimately defeated in the Senate, the Court shortly

thereafterreversedcourseandbeganupholdingtheambitiousregulatoryprogramsoftheNew

Deal.Indoingso,itabandonedseveraldifferentdoctrinalthreads,includingthesubstantivedue

process jurisprudence of the Lochner era.33 At the same time, the Court articulated a new

philosophyofjudicialreview.InCaroleneProducts,theCourteasilydismissedasubstantivedue

processchallengetoafederalstatuteprohibitingthesaleofmilkthathadbeencompounded

32Lochnerv.NewYork,198U.S.45(1905).33Theseminal case isWestCoastHotelCo. v.Parrish,300U.S.379 (1937), inwhich theCourtdecided that theminimumwagesetdowninaWashingtonstatestatutewasconstitutional.


29

withnon-milk fats.34(In fact, the legislationat issue in thecaserecalls theGermanchocolate

regulationmentioned earlierwhich, in contrastwith the outcome inCarolene Products, was

struckbytheGermanConstitutionalCourtbasedontherightofoccupationalfreedomandthe

proportionality principle.) The Supreme Court declared that, in cases involving “regulatory

legislationaffectingordinarycommercialtransactions,”itwouldgenerallyassumearationalbasis

thatjustifiedtheuseofthepolicepowerunlessprovenotherwise“inthelightofthefactsmade

knownor generally assumed.”35Thus theeconomic liberties thatwehave seenare routinely

litigated in European legal systemswere dismissed as outside the power of courts with the

exceptionofegregiousviolations.Bycontrast,theCourtindicatedthatitwouldengageinmore

searching scrutiny in three categories of constitutional cases: (1) thosewhich involved rights

specificallyprotectedbytheBillofRights;(2)restrictionson“thosepoliticalprocesseswhichcan

ordinarilybeexpectedtobringaboutrepealofundesirablelegislation”andassociatedrightssuch

astherighttovoteandtherighttospeech;and(3)legislationcurbingtherightsof“discreteand

insularminorities...whichtendsseriouslytocurtailtheoperationofthosepoliticalprocesses

ordinarily tobe reliedupon toprotectminorities.”36These typesof claimswere identifiedas

legitimate for judicial review because they were specifically identified in the text of the

Constitutionorbecausetheyservedtoprotectthedemocraticprocess.

Thissetofevents,togetherwiththedominantinterpretationinthelegalestablishment,

has profoundly marked contemporary judicial review. Although the historiography has

undergonesignificantrevisionoverthepast20years(Gillman,1993;Mayer,2009),theprevailing

viewatthetimeandtosomeextentstilltodayisthattheLochner-eracasesweredrivennotby

principledlegalpositionsbutbytheconservativeideologicalpreferencesofthejustices.Indoing

so,theSupremeCourthadillegitimatelyinterferedwithdemocracyandthewillofthemajority

asexpressedbythedirectlyelectedbodiesofgovernment.Ithadimposedthepoliticsofthenine

membersoftheCourtonthenation.Asacontemporaryscholar,writingin1942,putit:

34U.S.v.CaroleneProducts,304U.S.144(1938).35Id.at152.36Id.at152n4.


30

A considerable number of the decisions under the expanded version of due

process...undoubtedlyareexpressiveofanextremelaissez-fairephilosophy...

. [T]heeconomicand social individualismof the seventies [1870s]andeighties

[1880s]wascreatedbythatgenerationratherthaninheritedfromthefounders.

Itwasthecreedofaminoritywhich,liketheFederalistsoftwogenerationsbefore,

wasfastlosingoutatthepolls.(Wright,1942:255)

ThenewphilosophyofjudicialreviewlaiddowninCaroleneProductsbothrepudiateda

generalmandatetosafeguardlibertyandidentifiedajudicialmissionlinkedtotextandtothe

democraticprocess.Itisacrucialelementofthe“ballot-boxdemocracy”paradigmofpubliclaw,

oneofthefourcategoriesofpubliclawpresentedintheIntroductiontothisvolume.Thistheory

ofjudicialreviewcanlargelybeseenasadeviceforrehabilitatingtheSupremeCourtandrefuting

chargesofideologicalpartisanshipandthe“counter-majoritarian”difficulty(Bickel,1962).Ithas

beentremendouslyinfluentialinboththecourtsandinlegalscholarship.Forinstance,basedon

aclosereadingofthepapersofthemembersoftheCourt,ElizabethBussierehasarguedthatin

thelate1960andearly1970s,theprogressiveWarrenCourtstoppedshortofrecognizingaright

towelfare—thekindofpositiverightthatisrecognizedbysomeEuropeancourts―becauseof

thedoctrinal legacyofCaroleneProductsand thedoublestandard thathadbeencreated for

socialandeconomic rights,on theonehand,andcivilandpolitical rights,on theotherhand

(Bussiere,1997:99–101;1999).Toillustratetheapproachtakenbytheacademy,takethework

oftheinfluentiallegalscholarJohnHartEly.In1980,hefamouslydefendedtheWarrenCourt’s

criminal procedure and social rights jurisprudence against charges of Lochner-style judicial

activismonthegroundsthattheWarrenCourthadbeenfaithfultoCaroleneProductsandhad

sought to further “‘participational’ goals of broadened access to the process and bounty of

representativegovernment”(1980:75).

Returning specifically to courts and administration, procedural rationality reviewwas

quiteclearlyinformedbythelargerconstitutionalcontextofCaroleneProducts.Withthefading

of confidence inadministrativeexpertise, the fearof regulatorycapture,and the riseofnew

social movements, courts were called upon in the 1960s to take a more active role in the


31

regulatoryprocess.Safeguardingageneralsphereof libertywasanathema in legaldiscourse.

Instead,consistentwiththedemocracy-enhancingtheoryofpubliclawmoregenerally,courts

responded with the interest representation model of the administrative process and the

requirementthatinthecourseoftherulemakingproceedingagenciescarefullyarticulatewhy

their policy choices further the statutory framework enacted by the legislature. Although

American judicial activism is common to both my analysis and the theory reviewed in the

previoussection,theemphasisofthetwoaccountsissomewhatdifferent:inadversariallegalism

andrational-choicetheory,theprincipalengineofjudicialactivismisCongressionallegislation,

whileinthepresentaccountitislegaldoctrineandjudicialphilosophy.

OntheEuropeanside,thehistoriographyisnotnearlyasextensive.Incontrastwiththe

UnitedStates,however,thereappearstobesignificantcontinuitybetweentheliberaltheories

thatanimatedlate-nineteenth-centuryandearly-twentieth-centurypubliclawandthetheories

thatinformcontemporarypubliclaw.Thisisevidentinthedoctrinalhistoriesofproportionality

and equality, both of which are traced to nineteenth-century and early-twentieth-century

sources.WhythereisruptureintheAmericancaseandcontinuityintheEuropeancaseisthe

question.At least inpart, theanswerappearstorest inthedifferentEuropeanexperienceof

courtsandelectedbodiesintheearlyyearsofdemocracyandtheinstitutionalreputationsthat

emerged from those events. European public law has been deeplymarked by the history of

authoritarianismand collaboration in the inter-war years andWorldWar II (Linz andStepan,

1978;Capoccia,2005).IncontrastwiththeUnitedStates,theexperienceofthenewdemocracies

ofthetimedemonstratedthatelectionsandparliamentaryregimescouldgiverisetoimmense

instabilityandcouldmakewayforauthoritarianregimes.Suchregimeswereestablishednotby

military coups but by formally democratic procedures that put into place dictators and that

abolishedthepoliticalfreedomsoftheearlierdemocraticregime.Thecelebrationofmajoritarian

democracyandthedirectlyelectedbranches,soapparentinpost-Lochnerjurisprudence,wasat

odds with the European inter-war experience. A certain suspicion of democracy and an

awarenessoftheneedtosafeguardrights,eveninthefaceofdemocraticprocedures,isevident

acrossanumberofareasofconstitutionallaw,andhasalsoinfluencedjudicialreviewinthearea

ofsocialandeconomicpolicymaking(ShapiroandStoneSweet,1994;Capoccia,2013).


32

At the same time, courts emerged as a central feature of the European post-war

architecture.Thesewereprimarilynewlyestablishedconstitutionalcourtsbutalsoincludedpre-

existing administrative courts, both of whichwere cast as safeguarding a set of higher-level

principles,includinganextensivesetofindividualliberties,intheoperationofthepoliticaland

social order. Why public law courts took on this role is something of a puzzle. Courts, like

parliaments, did not sport a stellar record during the 1930s and 1940s. In many cases, the

ordinary courts and administrative courts were complicit in enforcing and in some cases

stretchingthelawtodepriveJews,Communists,andothergroupsoftheirprivaterightsand,for

those employed in public administration, their civil service status (Fabre, 2001; Joerges and

Ghaleigh,2003).IntherepublicanideologyoftheFrenchRevolution,whichwasinfluentialnot

only in France but also much of the Continent, courts were regarded with suspicion and

parliamentswerecastastheprincipalmouthpieceofthepeopleandthegeneralwill.Onthe

otherhand,eventakingintoaccountadministrativecourts,powersofjudicialreviewintheinter-

warperiodwereverylimited,andthereforecourtscouldnotbetaintedtothesameextentas

parliamentsby their involvementwithauthoritarianorcollaborationist regimes.Settingaside

these questions, the fact remains that the political elites that emerged after World War II

regardedconstitutionalandadministrativecourtsandliberty-drivensupervisionofallbranches

ofgovernmentasafundamentalsafeguardfortheirnewlyestablisheddemocraticorders.

Toconcludethisdiscussionofthetwotheoriesofjudicialreview,letusconsidersomeof

their implications specifically for regulatory governance. To begin with, it is important to

acknowledgethatproceduralizedrationalityandfundamentalrightscanoverlaptosomeextent.

Inotherwords,theycanoperateaswhatisknownincomparativelawscholarshipas“functional

equivalents”(ZweigertandKötz,1998:44).ThetypesofclaimsthatareadvancedinEuropean

litigationinvolvingeconomicandsocialrightsareoftenlitigatedandadjudicatedinthecontext

ofproceduralized rationality review in theAmerican system. For instance, the claim that the

regulatorymeansadoptedtoaccomplishthepublicpurposewereinappropriate,familiarfrom

proportionality, or the claim that an agency unfairly burdened one group to the benefit of

another,familiarfromequality,areoftenraisedinAmericanlitigationallegingthattheagency

rulewasarbitraryandcapriciousorthattherulemakingprocedurewasinadequate.Toillustrate,


33

inthetextbookcaseofNovaScotiaFoodProducts,thelitigant(awhitefishprocessor)challenged

anagencyrulerequiringthatallsmokedfishbeheatedtohightemperaturestoprotectagainst

foodpoisoningonthegroundsthatitwas“arbitraryandcapricious.”37Thelitigantarguedthat

thetemperaturerequirementwasunnecessarytoachievefoodsafetyinthecaseofwhitefish

sincewhitefishdidnotcarrythesameriskofbotulismasothertypesoffishandthesafetyof

whitefishcouldbeguaranteedthroughalternativemeanssuchassalting.Thewhitefishprocessor

also claimed that the agency had failed to take into account the special characteristics of

whitefishprocessorsascomparedwithothertypesofprocessorsandtotreatthemdifferently

aswarrantedbytheirdifferentsituations.Thecourtofappealsdidnotreachthearbitraryand

capricious challenge but held in favor of the litigant on the related grounds that the agency

procedurewasdefectivesince ithad failed toanswer the litigant’sobjections in the“concise

general statementofbasis andpurpose”at the conclusionof the rulemakingprocedure.38In

otherwords,equalityandthenecessitycomponentofproportionality,centerpiecesofEuropean

fundamentalrights,wereadvancedandadjudicatedinthecontextofAmericanproceduralized

rationalityreview.

Eventhoughthereisacertaindegreeoffunctionalequivalence,therearealsoimportant

respectsinwhichtheconceptualdifferencesbetweenthetwotypesofjudicialreviewgiverise

todifferencesinlegalpractice.First,Americanproceduralizedrationalityreviewattachesgreat

importancetotheformalstatusoftheregulatorynorm.Ifitisenactedbythelegislature,then

thecourtcannotintervenebecausetheballotboxandlegislativepoliticsareseenasthebest

guarantorofademocraticpolicymakingprocess.If,ontheotherhand,theregulatorynormis

adopted by administrative authorities, then proceduralized rationality review applies. By

contrast, European liberty review applies equally to all types of state action, legislative and

administrative.Indeed,insystemswhichaffordeasyaccesstoconstitutionalcourts,theincentive

istoconcentrateeffortsonchallengingthelegislativeframework,nottheimplementingrules.

Litigantsoftentakethispathbecauseconstitutionaldoctrinerequiresthatparliamentarylaw—

notadministrativerules—limitrightsandanycourtvictorystrikinglawwillbemoredurablegiven

37U.S.v.NovaScotiaFoodProductsCorp.,417F.Supp.1364,1372–74(E.D.N.Y.1976),rev’d,568F.2d240,245(2dCir.1977).38U.S.v.NovaScotiaFoodProductsCorp.,568F.2dat252–53.


34

thepoliticalandpracticalhurdlestore-writinglegislation.Theoverallresultisthatthelegislative

componentofregulatorygovernanceissubjecttomoreextensivejudicialoversightinEurope.

Germancases like thePharmacyCase39or theSmokingBanCase40would failor,more likely,

neverbebroughtintheAmericansystem.

Thesecondnotabledifferenceproducedbythetwomodelsofjudicialreviewconcerns

the way in which courts assess the reasoning of administrative agencies and the hardship

imposed by regulatory policies. In European legal thinking, when courts strike government

regulatorypoliciesbasedonproportionality,equality,oranyoftheotherdoctrinesmentioned

earlier, theyare guaranteeing respect for the law,understoodnot in the statutory, positivist

sensebutasthehigher lawofrightsanddutiesfundamentaltoany liberaldemocraticorder.

Theyarenot,inthedoctrinaldiscourse,interferingwithadministrativediscretion,whichisleft

totheadministrationtocarryoutinlinewiththeparliamentarywillandthegeneralinterestand,

forthemostpart,fallsoutsideofthepurviewofcourts.Thischaracterizationofjudicialreview

standsincontrastwithAmericanlegalthinking,whichgenerallyframesjudicialdecisionsstriking

agencypolicydecisionsaspolicingtheexerciseofadministrativediscretion.Associatedwiththis

conceptual difference is a difference in how cases are decided on judicial review. On the

Europeanside, thetendency is to interfere inabsurdcases inwhichthereasonsarepatently

flimsyorthehardshipimposedoncertaingroupsappearstobeentirelyoutofproportionwith

theoverall purposesof the regulatory framework.On theAmerican side, theemphasis ison

carefullyscrutinizingeveryelementofthecaseforadministrativeaction—theempiricalstudies,

theinterpretationoftheenablingstatute,andmeritsofthedifferentpolicyoptions―toensure

that it stands up to the many objections made by the participants in the administrative

proceeding. If, however, the policy survives this analysis then it is irrelevant whether the

governmenthasunfairlysingledoutcertainsocialormarketactorsandnoamountofhardship

willleadtoreversaloftheregulatoryoutcome.Thusthetypesofcasesthatsurviveorfailjudicial

reviewarelikelytodifferbetweenthetwosystems.

39BVerfG,June11,1958,7BVerfGE377.40BVerfG,June11,2008,121BVerfGE317.


35

Thiscomparativeassessmentofthetypesofchallengestoregulatorypolicymakingthat

areviablebeforethecourtsraisesthequestionofhowthedifferenceisrelatedtothecontrast

presentedintheprevioussection.Inbothclassifications,theAmericansystemiscontrastedwith

European jurisdictions. But the adversarial legalism theory also posits American courts as

exceptionallypowerfulintheregulatoryprocess:morelegalchallengesarebroughttocourtsand

thecourtsaremoreactivist inreviewinggovernmentpolicies.Dotheformsof judicialreview

presentedinthissection—proceduralizedrationalityversusfundamentalrights—contributeto

thisjudicialactivism?Atfirstglance,thedifferencedoesnotlogicallysupportsuchanoutcome.

Becauseitaffectsthelegislativecomponentofregulatoryschemesandbecauseofthebalancing

dimensionofmanyofitsdoctrinaltests,thefundamentalrightsmodelcouldeasilybeconstrued

as giving courtsmore license to interfere with the regulatory process. Therefore, it may be

worthwhile revisiting someof the empirical claims of the adversarial legalismhypothesis. As

explainedearlier,adversariallegalismisasweepingconceptthatencompassesallaspectsofthe

regulatory state. It may be true that the fragmented American system outsources more

regulatory activities to private litigants and courts and therefore the system overall ismore

litigious than European regulatory systems. But if Congress decides to delegate regulatory

policymakingtoaclassicbureaucracythenitmaybethatjudicialinterventionisas,orevenmore,

deferentialthanjudicialinterventioninEuropeanlegalsystems.Tounderstandwhetherthisis

thecase,itwillbenecessarytoconductcarefullydesignedcomparisonsofdifferentpolicyareas

which take into account both constitutional and administrative law andwhich examine data

recentenoughtocapturethegrowingimportanceofconstitutionallitigationinEurope.

If, however, as someof theanecdotal evidence suggests,American courts are indeed

readiertostrikeregulatorypolicymakingthanEuropeancourts,thenitisplausibletosuggesta

relationship between the doctrinal theory and levels of court activism. It may be that the

requirements of full public participation in the administrative process and comprehensive

analysisinlinewithaclosereadingofthestatutoryframeworkaremoreburdensomethanthe

fundamentalrightsparadigmofjudicialreview.Althoughrightsaffectallstateaction,including

legislation, the fact is thatmost regulatory statutesmust be implemented by administrative

regulations.When those regulations are challenged in court, itmight be that the exhaustive


36

procedure and reason-giving required of American agencies is more burdensome than the

reasonsrequiredofEuropeanbodiestotrumprights.Iftrue,itbearsunderscoringtheironyof

suchanoutcome:Americandoctrinalthinkingoneconomicandsocialrightswasdrivenbythe

desire to prevent courts from striking regulatory programs but the democracy-enhancing

alternative(theballot-boxparadigm)mayhaveservedtolegitimateevenmorejudicialactivism.

Again,tounderstandwhethersuchaconnectionexists,itwillbenecessarytoconductcarefully

designedcomparativestudiesthatcapturethetypesoflegaldoctrinesthatareusedbycourtsin

different jurisdictions to strike regulatory policymaking. Itwill also be necessary to take into

accountthesocio-legalinsightthatinstitutionalandhistoricalcontext,aswellasorevenmore

sothanpositivelawanddoctrinalconstructs,areimportantforunderstandingjudicialbehavior.

Withoutknowingwhetherandhowthetwotheoriesofjudicialreviewaffectthelevelof

courtactivism,itisdifficulttoreachanyconclusionsregardingtheirrelativemerits.Itisimportant

tonote,however,thatthenormativequestionhasbecomehighlysalientwiththeglobaldiffusion

of regulatory governance (Levi-Faur, 2005) and public law (Ginsburg, 2008) and can only be

expectedtobecomemoresoastheglobalizationprocessunfoldsovertime.Theramifications

and opportunities for learning are especially significant for newer democracies. There is a

growingtrendinfavorofempoweringconstitutionalcourts(Lampreaetal.,thisvolume).Thus

newdemocraciesarelikelytofollowthepathofrights-drivenjudicialreview.Atthesametime,

thereisalsogoodreasontothinkthattheAmericanmodelwillserveasasourceoftransplants

tootherjurisdictions(Yackee,thisvolume;Zaring,thisvolume). Whetherandhowthesetwo

modelswillbecombinedandlayeredisanopenquestion.Atthisstage,itsufficestonotethat

anylessonstobegarneredfromtheUnitedStatesandEuropeshouldbeinformedbytherelative

competenceof courts,bureaucracies, and legislatures in theirparticularpolitical and cultural

settings.

CONCLUSION

Judicial review of the administrative state has served as a fertile source of comparative law

scholarshipforwelloveracentury.Incontrastwithsomeareasofcomparativelaw,whichfocus


37

onsimilarfunctionalneedsacrosslegalsystemsandseektopromoteconvergence,theliterature

onjudicialreviewhastendedtofocusonbroad-brushdifferencesbetweenlegalsystems,the

historicaloriginsofthosedifferences,andhowthosedifferencescaninformcriticalthinkingon

thedomesticpracticeofjudicialreview.Thischapterhasexploredtwoofthemostimportant

contrasts that have been drawn: between the common law and the droit administratif and

betweenaproceduralizedandadversarialpolicyprocessandaninformalanddiscretionaryone.

Ithasalsoidentifiedathirddivide:betweenjudicialreviewdesignedtosafeguardtheeconomic

and social rights most directly implicated by the administrative state and judicial review

dedicatedtopreservingdemocracyintheoperationofthebureaucracy.

Inadditiontoanalyzingthedifferencesandtheirhistoricalorigins,thischapterhasdrawn

outtheconsequencesofthethreeclassificationsofjudicialreviewspecificallyfortheregulatory

function of the administrative state. It is helpful to summarize them here. The spread of

regulatory governance is associated with certain types of instruments and institutions of

government:theelaborationofformalrulestoregulateprivatemarkets,theenforcementofthe

rulesagainstmarketactors,andtheallocationofextensivepowerstoadministrativeauthorities

tocarryoutthevarioustasksofregulatorygovernance.Thedifferencesinjudicialreviewtraced

inthischapterbitemostattherule-developmentasopposedtotherule-enforcementphaseof

thepolicymakingcycle.Althoughitcanbenotoriouslydifficulttodistinguishbetweenthetwo,

as a general matter, the enforcement of rules, in contrast with rulemaking, requires

individualized fact-finding to determine whether the terms of the regulatory program are

applicable.Theproceduresfollowedbyadministrativeauthoritiestofindindividualizedfactsand

thejudicialreviewofsuchadministrativedeterminationsdonotdiffersignificantlyamongthe

jurisdictionsconsideredinthischapter(Bignami,2004;cf.Asimow,2015).Theseadministrative

determinations—whetherdesignedtoculminateinamoneyfine,thegrantingorsuspensionof

alicense,orsomethingelse―tendtobeheavilyproceduralizedinviewofdueprocessrightsand

theinterestinreachingafairandaccuratedetermination.Judicialreviewoftheoutcomeseeks

toguaranteerespectforthevariousadministrativeproceduresandtoassesstheplausibilityof

thefactualdeterminationsmadebytheadministrativeauthority.Eventhoughtherecontinues


38

to be variation, especially between common law and droit administratif jurisdictions, their

practicalimplicationshavefadedconsiderablyovertime.

Turningtothepolicymakingandrulemakingactivitiesoftheregulatorystate,thischapter

hasarguedthatthereareindeedsignificantdifferencesinjudicialreview.Althoughstandingis

relativelyeasytoestablishintheConseild’Etat,ascomparedwithcommonlawcourts,itmaybe

moredifficulttosucceedonthemeritsofanindividualchallengebecauseoftheConseild’Etat’s

involvement in both rulemaking and judicial review. In American adversarial legalism, the

policymakingprocessinbureaucraciesisheavilyproceduralized,andregulatedpartiesandother

typesof litigants frequentlygo tocourt tochallengeboth theprocedureand thesubstantive

determinationsofadministrativeagencies.Bycontrast,administrativeauthoritiesinEuropean

jurisdictionsarenotsignificantlyconstrainedbyjudiciallyenforcedprocedurewhendeveloping

newrules.JudicialreviewinEuropefocusesontheburdensimposedbyregulatorychoiceson

economic rights and, in some cases, social rights, and employs the legal doctrines of

proportionalityandequalitytoassessthelegitimacyofthoseburdens,whetherimposedbythe

legislatureor thebureaucracy. In theUnitedStates, judicial review isdrivenbyaconcern for

safeguarding democracy when power is delegated to bureaucracies. It does so with legal

doctrinesdesignedtoensurepluralist,participatoryadministrativeprocessandcomprehensive

administrativerationalitytetheredtotheenablinglegislation.Theseimportantdifferencesserve

asaspringboardformappingjudicialreviewandforunderstandinghowcourtsacrosstheworld

interveneintheregulatoryprocess.

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