Reinterpretando El Poder Autoritario. Siria (Joshua Stacher)

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Reinterpreting Authoritarian Power: Syria's Hereditary Succession Author(s): Joshua Stacher Source: Middle East Journal, Vol. 65, No. 2, Richard B. Parker Memorial Issue (Spring 2011), pp.

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Reinterpreting Authoritarian Power:

Syria's Hereditary Succession

Joshua Stacher

When Hafiz al-Asad died in 2000, his son Bashar became Syria's president. By

examining an unresolved inconsistency in the leading accounts about Syria's suc

cession, this article reveals the limitations of single-person rule analysis as the

causal explanation for Syria's hereditary leadership selection. I provide an al

ternative explanation by emphasizing the role of senior elites informing regime consensus around Bashar al-Asad's candidacy. Hereditary successions, there

fore, reveal an instance of authoritarian continuity rather than one likely to end

in regime breakdown.

Hafiz al-Asad died on June 10, 2000 after nearly 30 years at the helm of one of the

Middle East's most volatile regimes. Syria witnessed 15 successful coup d'etats be

tween 1949-1970,' external wars with Israel (1948, 1967, and 1973), vicious Pan-Arab

competition with regional states,2 and a near civil war between 1976-1984.3 Al-Asad

slowed the raucous domestic political upheavals by stitching together a "hard" state

compared to its regional counterparts.4 Much of the literature on Syria seems to suggest that the country requires a strong,

repressive leader to offset the state's early proclivity for regime turnover. As Flynt Leverett

argues, al-Asad transformed a coup-ridden "semi-state into a veritable model of authori

tarian stability."5 The country's politics are often explained through a sectarian lens, since

al-Asad hailed from Syria's minority Alawi sect.6 Other accounts describe al-Asad's polit ical dominance through the "personalized rule" framework.7 Using this framework, how

ever, influences how central events — such as presidential succession — are explained.

Joshua Stacher is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Kent State University. He

is currently completing a book that compares institutions and co-optation to explain authoritarian durability in Egypt and Syria. The author wishes to thank Jason Brownlee for his instructive suggestions on previous drafts of this manuscript. Also, Lisa Anderson's comments as discussant at the 2008 MESA panel on He

reditary Succession improved this article immensely. 1. James T. Quinlivin, "Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East," Inter

national Security, Vol. 24, No. 2 (1999), p. 134.

2. Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War 1958-1967: A Study of Ideology in Politics (London: Oxford

University Press, 1967).

3. Raymond Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba'thist Syria (Boulder,

CO: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 281-286, 291-299.

4. Steven Heydemann, Authoritarianism in Syria: Institutions and Social Conflict 1946-1970

(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 18-22.

5. Flynt Leverett, Inheriting Syria: Bashar's Trial by Fire (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution

Press, 2005), p. 28.

6. Nicolas Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Asad and the

Ba'th Party (London: I.B. Tauris, 1979), pp. 62-71.

7. Patrick Seale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley, CA: University of California

Press, 1988).

MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL ★ VOLUME 65, NO. 2, SPRING 2011

DOI: 10.3751/65.2.11



198 ★ MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

Al-Asad's death in 2000 gripped the region. The leader was widely rumored to be preparing his son, Bashar, for the presidency. Some, however, speculated that his

offspring's succession was far from certain.8 Israeli intelligence learned of al-Asad's death five hours before the media reported it but "held back" public reports so as not to invite a contentious transfer of power on its border.9 Instead of a contested succes sion process in a potentially unstable environment, Syria seamlessly became the first

hereditary republic in the Arab world. The day that al-Asad's death was announced, Parliament amended the constitution

to lower the eligibility age for presidential candidates, while the security forces closed

airports and sealed the Syrian and Lebanese borders to prevent outside opposition fig ures from entering the country to challenge the process. During the next 48 hours, the ruling Ba'th party's leadership inserted al-Asad's son at the top of its command structure as the military promoted and named him the armed forces' commander-in chief. The interim President dutifully oversaw Parliament's unanimous nomination of Bashar as the lone candidate for a national referendum. On the one-month anniversary of his father's passing, Bashar received over 97% of votes cast in the referendum. The

inauguration occurred a week later. In order to anoint him, senior elites from across the

political establishment proved swift in their decision-making and capable of sustaining the uncontested execution of consensus over a period of five weeks.

Rather than focus on the elites' coordinated response across the institutions of

Parliament, the ruling party, security services, and the military, scholars emphasize the personalized character of Syria's hereditary succession. Since Hafiz al-Asad pre sumably designated his son as heir, his incomplete preparation appears irrelevant. The

implication is that al-Asad's servants of power unhesitatingly installed his son. The President's dominating political reach appeared as extensive in death as it had been in life. Egyptian intellectual Sa'ad Eddin Ibrahim quickly coined the term, "Jumali

kaya," which combines the Arabic words for "republic" and "monarchy" to describe the event.10 The personalized rule narrative continues to prevail as the literature's ex

planatory norm over ten years after Syria's succession. This article contends that this narrative is — at best — a partial explanation.

An alternative narrative emerges after reviewing the single-person rule accounts of Syria's hereditary succession as well as examining information supplied by regime elites since the event. This article unpacks the puzzle of why elites settle on hereditary successors using the case of Syria. The argument is that senior elites" from different state institutions'2 cooperate in forming a consensus during autocratic leadership selec

8. Douglass Jehl, "Aide Says the Possibility of Succession of Assad's Son is Undecided," The New

York Times, August 6, 1999.

9. "Israel 'Held Back' Report on Assad Death," BBC News, June 12, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/

hi/world/monitoring/media_reports/787840.stm. 10. Sa'ad Eddin Ibrahim, "How I Spent my Summer Vacation: Diary of a Prisoner of Conscience" (lec

ture by the Professor of Sociology at the American University in Cairo, Cairo, Egypt, September 2000). 11. By "senior elites," I mean the individuals that occupy leadership positions in state institutions.

This would include, for example, members of the ruling party's regional command, government min

isters, heads of intelligence agencies, and senior military generals. 12. By "institutions," I mean state structures that contribute to the security and bureaucracy of

governance. In the case of Syria, this includes the institutions of the Ba'th Party, the military, security services, and Parliament.



SYRIA'S HEREDITARY SUCCESSION ★ 199

tions. Rather than invite a struggle for power that may threaten the regime's survival, senior elites will bandwagon and compromise to preserve the system.13

Re-conceptualizing Bashar's succession as a process guided by senior elites acti vates their role in the collective consensus-making process. Because such elites operate and are supported by the state's various institutions, the structures become instruments

of ensuring that the regime consensus is implemented. As hereditary succession is a

phenomenon on the rise,14 injecting notions of elite consensus and collective decision

making contribute to explaining how power functions during autocratic leadership suc cessions. These findings extend beyond Syria and apply to other authoritarian regimes

confronting hereditary leadership selections.

I pursue this inquiry by reviewing the theoretical developments within authoritar

ian studies before relating them to single-person rule accounts of Syrian politics. Then, a discussion of Syria's succession exposes the inherent contradictions in personalized rule frameworks. This is followed by a theoretical examination of hereditary succession

before returning to an explanation of why Syrian elites consented to a hereditary suc

cession. The article concludes by providing generalizable claims for other authoritarian

political systems based on the Syrian experience.

THEORETICAL CONCERNS

The literature on non-democratic governments outlines different types of autocra

cies.15 Although existing theories explore party dictatorships,16 military regimes,17 and

bureaucratic-authoritarianism,18 the literature on authoritarianism historically focuses

on a system's personalized character or the blending of a leader's personality with a

state's institutions. Both classifications emphasize the absolute weakness of authori

tarian institutions. While scholarship on other regions has advanced, personalized or

single-person rule remains the predominant theoretical staple of authoritarian studies

in the Middle East and Africa.

Rosberg and Jackson's book Personal Rule in Black Africa aptly characterizes this

branch of literature. They argue that such regimes maintain "non-institutionalized gov

ernment, where persons take precedent over rules, where the officeholder is not effec

13. This argument draws similarities with Herb's study on "elite bandwagoning" in monarchical

leadership transitions in the Arabian Gulf. See Michael Herb, All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolu

tion, and Democracy in the Middle East (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1999).

14. There are six cases of hereditary succession in the past 14 years. Until the political uprisings

of the Arab world began in January 2011, it was thought that such hereditary successions would be

attempted in Egypt, Yemen, and Libya in the near future. Currently, only the non-Arab case of Equito

rial Guinea still remains primed to attempt a hereditary transfer of power.

15. Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government, & Politics (London: Macmil

lian Press, 2000), pp. 24-25, 37-58.

16. Samuel Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems," in Samuel

Huntington and Clement Henry Moore, eds., Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics

of Established One-Party Systems (New York: Basic Books, 1970).

17. Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians,

and Revolutionary Soldiers (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977).

18. David Collier, The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer

sity Press, 1979).




tively bound by his office and is able to change its authority and powers to suit his own

personal or political needs ... the state is a government of men and not laws."19 Scholars

continue to recast this argument. When autocrats undermine institutions and strengthen the state they merge state and regime. Barely constrained by other actors or agencies, such rulers personify the state. This produces a "sultanistic regime."20 As Chehabi and

Linz argue, "Sultanistic leaders do not conceal the highly personalistic nature of their

rule. Outwardly this personalism has two facets: a pronounced cult of personality around

the leader or a tendency towards dynasticism."21 Although ruling parties, militaries, or

ministries represent the state and are present, they do not serve as sites for political contestation. Rather, these institutions exist as flimsy facades to placate Western gov ernments.22 Such institutions and political systems are understood to be inherently weak

and prone to collapse if confronted with a challenge or moment of uncertainty. An example of the second scholarly branch is neo-patrimonialism. Neo-patri

monialism focuses on an institutional type of personalism. Bratton and van de Walle

explain neo-patrimonialism as "political systems in which the customs and patterns of

patrimonialism co-exist with, and suffuse, rational-legal institutions. As with classic

patrimonialism, the right to rule in neo-patrimonial regimes is ascribed to a person rather than to an office, despite the official existence of a written constitution."23 While

the authors mention institutions, the latter serve as exploitable fagades without vested

political power. Personalized rulers rely on the institutions as safety valves to relieve

social tension or overcome challenges. A neo-patrimonial institution, therefore, is not

well positioned to defend itself against a power-hungry dictator wishing to appropriate the appearance of structural autonomy from the executive.

Legions of scholars use the theory of neo-patrimonialism to examine various pro cedural aspects in authoritarian regimes. These works focus on the many legal and

institutional manipulations autocracies pursue to maintain power. Diamond's concept of "hybrid regimes" is particularly prominent in the literature. Hybrid regimes main tain "the existence of formally democratic political institutions, such as multi-party electoral competition, that mask the reality of authoritarian domination."24 Competitive authoritarianism examines how "formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as

the principle means of obtaining and exercising political authority."25 Elections, leg islatures, judiciaries, and the media become areas of contestation where "opposition forces may periodically challenge, weaken, and occasionally even defeat autocratic incumbents."26 Such regimes fall into governing purgatories because they are neither

19. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat,

Prophet, Tyrant (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982), p. 10.

20. Houchang E. Chehabi and Juan Linz, eds., Sultanistic Regimes (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hop kins University Press, 1998), pp. 10-11.

21. Chehabi and Linz, Sultanistic Regimes, p. 13.


23. Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transi

tions in Comparative Perspectives (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 62.

24. Larry Diamond, "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 2

(April 2002), p. 24. 25. Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism," Journal of De

mocracy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (April 2002), p. 52.

26. Levitsky and Way, "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism," p. 54.




fully democratic nor fully authoritarian. A number of studies examine the role of elections and parties in the abstract.

For example, Schedler's electoral authoritarianism concept "takes seriously both the authoritarian quality these regimes possess and the electoral procedures they put into

practice."27 This authoritarian type is distinct from single-person regimes because "it limits the degree of personalism" since organizations are at the center of even asym metrical electoral competition.28 In this theory, the analytic focus is between the state, citizens, and the opposition parties. Senior elites within state institutions are assumed to be part of the leader's circle. As such, the state's political elites are passive actors. A chief criticism of this literature is that it fails to show how surrounding actors and institu

tions affect significant events and decisions. Recently, scholars have been reconsidering the importance of senior elites and state institutions in authoritarian political systems.

Academic works that explain the durability of authoritarian regimes from insti

tutional or elite power-sharing perspectives are gaining traction in authoritarian stud

ies.29 In these works, personalities operate within a structural framework that constrains

their options and shapes their preferences.30 Institutions become "the nerve center of

authoritarianism"31 because they explain regime collapse and survival. Institutions, such as a ruling party, maintain non-personalized attributes that encourage and facilitate elite

cooperation. As Brownlee argues, "ruling parties underpin durable authoritarianism by

providing a political setting for mediating elite disputes and preventing defections to

the opposition."32 Slater agrees, and observes that institutions limit a ruler's governing abilities. As he argues, "Highly institutionalized authoritarian regimes also typically exhibit regularized succession mechanisms and collective decision-making procedures that curtail a ruler's personal power."33

Scholars previously viewed authoritarian institutions as weak because they were

personalized. Yet, as the case of Malaysia reveals, "Unlike democracies, authoritarian

regimes can be highly personalized and highly institutionalized at the same time."34 The

institutions of authoritarian governments are gaining importance within the academy as units of analysis. Consequently, such institutional analysis, which focuses on how

27. Andreas Schedler, "The Logic of Electoral Authoritarianism," in Andreas Schedler, ed., Elec

toral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Pub

lisher, 2006), p. 5.

28. Schedler, "The Logic of Electoral Authoritarianism," p. 14.

29. Dan Slater, "The Architecture of Authoritarianism: Southeast Asia and the Regeneration of

Democratization Theory," Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Vol. 2, No. 2 (December 2006), pp. 1-22;

Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats,"

Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 40, No. 11 (November 2007), pp. 1279-1301; Milan W. Svolik,

"Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes," American Journal of Political

Science, Vol. 53, No. 2 (April 2009), pp. 477—494.

30. Ellen Lust-Okar, Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and Institu

tions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

31. Jason Brownlee, Authoritarianism in the Age of Democratization (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge

University Press, 2007), p. 10.

32. Brownlee, Authoritarianism in the Age of Democratization, p. 42.

33. Dan Slater, "Iron Cage in an Iron Fist: Authoritarian Institutions and the Personalization of

Power in Malaysia," Comparative Politics, Vol. 36, No. 1 (October 2003), p. 81.

34. Slater, "Iron Cage in an Iron Fist," p. 84.




senior elites develop and execute their consensus, is more useful in explaining au thoritarian durability than personalized accounts. Conceptualizing institutions as such makes them vehicles that support the system's agents and help to explain authoritarian

durability. As Gandhi argues, "By now, it should be evident that dictators do not rule

alone. They govern with institutions that are particular to their type."35

Despite this shift in the literature, some analysts continue to describe the workings of authoritarian regimes based on a regime's personalized character. The case of Syria is a clear example of this. Research employing historically-grounded, institutionally based, or path-dependent approaches remains underutilized when discussing Bashar

al-Asad's succession.36 Rather, Syria's hereditary succession reinvigorates descriptions of a personalized political order. Indeed, a number of publications that explain suc

cession and ongoing political struggles only consider the personality of Bashar or the

"new guard-old guard" frame.37 Interviews carried out in Syria between 2003-2005

also show that even many opposition analysts understand the country's politics in such

terms.38 As the unfolding arguments illustrate, such accounts are incomplete presenta

tions of how power works or succession unfolded in Syria.

SYRIA'S SINGLE-PERSON RULE

With an overly invasive personality cult, which Wedeen's scholarship masterfully chronicles,39 the Syrian government portrayed Hafiz al-Asad as the state. The scholarship on Syria also disproportionately reflects on his personality. Few will easily forget the

powerful anecdotes that Seale shares in his exhaustive biography on al-Asad. The most

striking incident occurs during the climax of a near coup in 1984. When the paramilitary units of al-Asad's brother (Rifa'at) encircle the capital during his standoff with al-Asad, the president unleashes the starkest of statements. As Seale wrote, "the brothers were at last face to face. 'You want to overthrow the regime?' Asad asked. 'Here I am. I am the

regime.'"40 In addition to Kissenger's descriptive41 and Friedman's sensationalist42 ac

counts, many understand Syria's politics and stability though al-Asad's personality. In works that examine the state's institutions, such as Perthes' important book, al

Asad is positioned above any institutional constraints in an "authoritarian presidential

35. Jennifer Gandhi, Political Institutions Under Dictatorship (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 34.

36. Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution from Above (London: Routledge, 2001); Heydemann, Authoritarianism in Syria; David Waldner, State Building and Late Development (Ithaca, NY: Cornell

University Press, 1999).

37. Volker Perthes, "The Political Economy of Syrian Succession," Survival, Vol. 43, No. 1 (2001),

pp. 146-148.

38. Ammar 'Abd al-Hamid (co-founder of al-Thawra Project), interviews by the author, Damascus,

Syria, December 1, 2003; December 28, 2003; and March 2, 2005. Ayman 'Abd al-Nour (Editor of All 4

Syria electronic newsletter), interviews by the author, November 9, 2003 and December 22,2003. 39. Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary

Syria (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). 40. Seale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East, p. 435.

41. Henry Kissenger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1982), pp. 431-436.

42. Thomas L. Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1989),

pp. 76-105.




system with distinct neo-patrimonial traits."43 Senior elites and structures matter only

second to the President, despite suggesting that the regime is de-emphasizing his cult of

personality. Throughout the book, the President remains the consummate puppet mas ter managing feckless political elites. As Perthes argues, "The Party was transformed ... In addition, an institutional frame was built which, if needed, would allow Asad to balance the party against other political forces."44 Works antithetical to personalized

or neo-patrimonial readings of Syrian politics are either overlooked or not considered when explaining Syria's succession.45

In the academic literature as well as the popular media, there is an overwhelming consensus that Hafiz al-Asad "groomed" his son to take over the presidency. Journalists

contemplate the reforming image of the younger al-Asad because he is an ophthalmolo gist who lived in London before returning to Syria after his brother (Basil, the original heir apparent) died in a car accident in January 1994.46 Rather than make his own deci

sion, the President's son is always described as being "recalled" or "summoned" by his father to start the process of assuming power.47 Other journalists focus on the details of the son's ascent within the Syrian military as well as the personnel purges conducted in

the years prior to his becoming President.48 The consequence of either narrative confirms and reinforces the elder al-Asad's position as the state. Such analysis suggests that Hafiz al-Asad unilaterally managed succession with minimal consultation from his elites.

The academic explanation of the country's impending hereditary succession also reflects on Syria's personalized system. Zisser published extensively on al-Asad's push to make his son President. He argues that al-Asad's succession plans for Bashar were

an "open secret" after Basil's death, credits the President with overseeing the ousting of the "old guard" in the army and intelligence services, attacking the remnants of his brother's loyalists, and transferring the important "Lebanon folder" to his heir's pur view.49 Al-Asad's desire for his son to follow him comes at the expense of the country's other pressing issues. As Zisser argues, "Syria reached an impasse in the final decade of his rule. To make matters worse, this decline took place at a time when the regime found itself faced with many urgent issues: succession, socioeconomic crisis, global ization, ferment in Lebanon, and relations with Israel. In a word, al-Asad left his son

a country in total decline."50 Although Bashar is not formally installed when his father

dies, he becomes president "as smoothly as though his father were still alive,"51 which

transmits al-Asad's omnipotent political reach. Zisser is industrious in his scholarship and he reiterates this version of events

43. Volker Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria Under Asad (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995), p. 133.

44. Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria Under Asad, p. 135.

45. Gandhi, Political Institutions Under Dictatorship.

46. Derek Brown, "Syria: A Family Business," The Guardian, June 12, 2000.

47. James Bennet, "The Enigma of Damascus," The New York Times Magazine, July 10,2005; Foreign

Commonwealth Office, "Middle East & North Africa: Syria," revision as of Sept. 17,2010, http://www.

fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/country-profiles/middle-east-north-africa/syria?profile=politics&pg=7. 48. Douglas Jehl, "Syrian President Positions Son as his Successor," The New York Times, May 9,

1999.

49. Eyal Zisser, "Will Bashshar al-Asad Last?," Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2000), pp. 8-10.

50. Zisser, "Will Bashshar al-Asad Last?," p. 10.

51. Zisser, "Will Bashshar al-Asad Last?" p. 12.




in subsequent peer-reviewed publications.52 In each rendering, the narrative develops but the state's character remains consistent. First, Zisser questions whether the new

President will survive in power because he lacks his father's toughness.53 In another

article, Bashar is portrayed as lacking control of the Ba'th party, intelligence services, or the military. As he states, "it is not clear who is running Syria or where the country is headed."54 The difference between the father and the son is linked to personality. As Zisser argues, "if any difference does exist between the two men, it has less to do

with their policies and outlooks than with the fact that the father was perceived as an

authoritative and powerful leader, while the son's image remains that of an upstart."55

Many of the other scholars that write about Bashar's Syria uncritically accept Zisser's

personalized model and echo his assumptions.

Although nuances and differences exist, books by Leverett and Lesch use the

leader's personality to explain the political system. Institutions, such as the party and

military, exist in these works but they do not contribute in constraining the Syrian presi dent. Leverett is explicit about Hafiz al-Asad's centrality and describes him as standing above the institutional arena. This leads to al-Asad's failure to "develop a succession mechanism that was not completely personalized" as well as a political system without the "substantive capabilities of a modern executive."56

Lesch's book is devoid of judgments about the younger al-Asad's intentions. Yet, there are signifiers that point to personalized politics. For example, Lesch compares Bashar to the Michael Corleone character in the Godfather films. Just as Corleone is a reluctant leader of a mafia family, so is Bashar a reluctant president drawn into the

"family business."57 He notes that "there was only a facade of institutionalism present at the time of Hafiz al-Asad's death, and the constant reference to how the institutional

apparatus brought Bashar to power is disingenuous, and, at best, wishful thinking."58 Lesch ultimately admits that had Syria had an institutional process, succession would have likely been a "much more ugly affair."59

The intellectual production based on the theory of personalized rule constructs a restrictive framework for understanding Syrian politics despite these scholars' useful contributions. Al-Asad's patrimonial rule dominates the political landscape so entirely that even after his death, the senior elites in the ruling party, bureaucracy, military, and

intelligence services do his bidding. They ensure hereditary succession and the estab lishment of a family's ruling dynasty. As Leverett argues,

52. In addition to the aforementioned article please see, Eyal Zisser, Asad's Legacy: Syria in

Transition (New York: New York University Press, 2001); Eyal Zisser, "Does Bashar al-Assad Rule

Syria?," Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2003), pp. 15-23; Eyal Zisser, "Bashar al-Assad:

In or Out of the New World Order?," Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2005), pp. 115-131;

Eyal Zisser, Commanding Syria: Bashar al-Asad and the First Years in Power (London: I.B. Tauris,

2007). 53. Zisser, "Will Bashshar al-Asad Last?," p. 10.

54. Zisser, "Does Bashar al-Assad Rule Syria?," p. 23.

55. Zisser, "Bashar al-Assad: In or Out of The New World Order?," p. 115.

56. Leverett, Inheriting Syria, p. 28.

57. David Lesch, The New Lion of Damascus (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005), pp. 2-3.

58. Lesch, The New Lion of Damascus, p. 80.

59. Lesch, The New Lion of Damascus, p. 80.




Through this [grooming] process, not a hint of opposition to Bashar was heard from

within the Asad family, the inner circle, or the military and security apparatus. In

deed, in the end, there seemed to be a fairly well understood arrangement of mutual

convenience between Bashar and the key pillars of Hafiz's regime that facilitated a

smooth transition.60

The ramification of such an explanation is that senior elites exist only to carry out an autocrat's directives. Thus, these elites are shown to be faceless and voiceless in the

process of a hereditary succession.

SYRIA'S LEADERSHIP SELECTION

Syria's senior elites executed the succession with tremendous discipline. As

Quilty reports, "They began Bashar's succession ritual before Hafiz was even in the

ground."61 Yet, what transpired was not the work of elites unconsciously following a dead president's command. The evidence indicates that leading elites from the central

regime branches united behind Bashar's candidacy unanimously. The elites came to a decision about al-Asad's successor and then returned to their home institutions to ensure that the consensus was executed without disruption or dissent. The elites, who

derived power bases from their positions within these institutions, consulted with each other in the lead-up to selecting Bashar and then delivered the party, Parliament, mili

tary, or intelligence services' support. After the President's death was pronounced officially on June 10, 2000, Parlia

ment convened immediately to glorify his reign. The assembly unanimously voted to

amend constitutional Article 83 to lower the age of an eligible president from 40 to

34, which was Bashar's age. The constitutional amendment's precision is notable as

Bashar's younger brother, Mahir, was 33 at the time. While Mahir neither made public claims to the presidency nor was visibly groomed, the regime's caution appears linked to his position as a colonel in the elite Republican Guard.

The security services and military went on high alert as airports and borders were

secured in Syria and Lebanon.62 In reference to any unauthorized or unscreened presi

dential contenders, Ba'thist leader and parliamentary speaker 'Abd al-Qadar Qadora stated that no individual would be permitted to "affect the security situation in the

country."63 The Ba'th party's Regional Command nominated al-Asad's son for presi dent on the same day. The next day, Vice President and Interim President 'Abd al-Halim

Khaddam promoted the son to the position of the armed forces' Commander-in-Chief

following the military's recommendation.

The succession process formally continued at the 9th party congress held June

17-20, 2000. As a journalist covering the event recalls, "The death of Hafiz al-Asad

the previous week undermined the original agenda, and the congress was hurriedly transformed into a forum to legitimize the heir apparent."64 Bashar al-Asad was elected

60. Leverett, Inheriting Syria, p. 68.

61. Jim Quilty, "The Politics of Mourning," Middle East International, June 30, 2000.

62. Najm Jarrah, "Changing the Guard in Damascus," Middle East International, June 16, 2000.

63. Jarrah, "Changing the Guard in Damascus."

64. Quilty, "The Politics of Mourning."




to his father's former post of party Secretary-General. The congress also named him "leader of the party and people." Despite the grandiose propaganda that advertised that the first Ba'th congress in 15 years would introduce reform, continuity reigned. As

Quilty remarked, "the old guard was not overturned, but supplemented."65 Parliament formally voted to nominate Bashar al-Asad for president on June 26.

Rather than wait 90 days to conduct a national referendum, the Vice President sched uled it for July 10. The sole candidate obtained 97.2% of the vote. Some observers noted that the high percentage did not reflect public support. Rather, the support mani fested the approval of the elite's institutional bases of the military, intelligence services,

ruling party, and bureaucracy.66 One week after the referendum, on July 17, Bashar was

inaugurated, establishing the first hereditary succession in an Arab republic. Did Hafiz al-Asad want his son to succeed him? Possibly, but his personal wishes

did not predetermine the outcome. The events suggest that top elites from different

parts of the state developed a consensus on Bashar's candidacy. This required leading elites in the military, intelligence services, and ruling party to cooperate in forming a consensus as well as delivering their institution's support. It is in this respect that elites had to agree and subsequently act to prevent elite dissent and factionalism. As Hin nebusch concludes, "The actual outcome was remarkably smooth but something less

than an institutional-mediated succession: the party and army elite closed ranks and, to prevent a power struggle, ratified the process Hafiz had began, but not completed."67 This explanation differs from the personalized rendering of Syria's succession. Instead, the alternative analysis activates the role of senior elite participation. Suggesting that

Syria's institutions determined who succeeded Hafiz al-Asad is inaccurate. Yet, the oretical blind spots unsurprisingly remain because the predominant interpretation of

Syrian politics relies on single-person rule accounts. The fact that power is expressed non-violently during a delicate and uncertain

event such as a presidential selection indicates that, while institutions do not operate in accordance with a classic definition,68 top elites require institutional platforms to actu alize the political processes. Elites, privileged by the virtue of their command of these

institutions, are positioned to guide and preside over the power transfer. Otherwise, these individuals would have had no status or ability to act in this way.

THE PARADOX OF PERSONALISM

In the accounts of single-person rule, intuition about how succession operates asks scholars to accept incredible assumptions. For example, the fruits of Hafiz al-Asad's labor and engineering explain the son's succession. One could anticipate that his prema ture death may have invited elites to struggle for control. One of the chief arguments that Chehabi and Linz make is that personalistic regimes tend to break up as the leader fades from the arena. In their words, "A sultanistic regime can endure a long time, but experi

65. Quilty, "The Politics of Mourning." 66. Correspondent, "Consolidating Bashar," Middle East International, July 14, 2000.

67. Raymond Hinnebusch, "Modern Syrian Politics," History Compass, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2008), p. 274.

68. Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990).




ences show that most end in more or less a chaotic way,"69 particularly because such

regimes "disintegrate" when "faced with a serious challenge."70 And yet, succession oc curs as if al-Asad's hand is on the tiller throughout the installation. Upon closer review, a paradox in the personalized account of Syria's hereditary succession stands out.

Zisser's work is illustrative of the fallacies in single-person treatments of authori tarianism. Since his early and numerous publications serve as the scholastic foundation

for others,71 the description of the Syrian state as built solely on personalized institutions

is problematic. In the same publications that detail the President's meticulous and focused

preparation for his son to follow him, al-Asad is also portrayed as a detached and sick

ened leader who is incapable of leading. Numerous examples elucidate the inconsistency of a dying leader who is also subjugating any and all elite and institutional politics.

The decline of al-Asad's health during the 1990s features prominently in person alized accounts. Zisser refers to him as the "hidden" president. He notes that al-Asad

only delivers two public speeches between 1994 and 2000 because of his health.72 Al

Asad's mental prowess is also characterized as in steady decline. At the March 2000

al-Asad-Clinton presidential meeting in Geneva, the Syrian leader purportedly had so

much trouble speaking as his medication wore off that his translator was compelled to finish his sentences.73 By such an account, he appeared incapable of conducting the

business of state. This leads to the speculation that "During the final months of his life

Asad appeared to become more aware of, or more concerned with, the deterioration of

his health, prompting him to accelerate the process of his son's succession."74 Herein

lies the narrative's stark and irreconcilable contradiction.

The time period when al-Asad's health is at its worst coincides with when his

most urgent presidential attention to senior elite maneuvers was required. On one hand, the President is obsessed with his son's succession to the extent that he is ridding Syr ian institutions of powerful elites and potential obstacles while carefully reshuffling the

cabinet and promoting his heir through the system. This includes convening the first

Ba'th party congress in 15 years. And, yet, he is so ill that he cannot make basic public

appearances or complete rudimentary tasks such as verbalize his thoughts intelligibly

during a meeting. A scenario in which a president's trusted elites are aware of his di

minishing facilities and remain idle in the face of an uncertain or incomplete leadership succession is hard to imagine.

Two assumptions about the process can be drawn from personalized rule ac

counts. Firstly, Syria's elites accept the leader's decision without debating, interacting, or challenging it. Secondly, the elites willingly directed the regime's survival to match

the position of a dying dictator's ultimate ambition. Not only does this analysis seem

impractical, it suggests that Syria's political elites are passive agents. By reducing he

reditary succession to a leader's personality, personalized authoritarian interpretations



71. Both works by Leverett and Lesch cite Zisser's scholarship numerous times in their chapters

when discussing Hafiz's succession plans. Also, Svolik and Gandhi both credit Zisser's scholarship

in their works.

72. Zisser, Commanding Syria, p. 1.






incompletely explain the outcome. Such accounts also fail to untangle the contradic tions produced in the literature or address the under-conceptualized logic.

Scholars seeking to explain uncertain leadership selection in autocracies can con

ceptualize a process that activates the role of elite collective decision-making. Additional

ly, recognizing that institutions in authoritarian arenas can be highly disciplined as well as

personalized contributes to a more beneficial theoretical model. While Syria's powerful elites were responsible for deciding who would succeed al-Asad, they needed to use the institutional arena to ensure it became a political reality. I will now turn attention to the conclusions of the hereditary succession literature to see how it informs the Syrian case.

THE CONTEXT OF SUCCESSION

Hereditary succession is emerging as a research area of inquiry that descends from the literature on autocratic leadership selection.75 While many newspaper articles on inherited republics appeared first,76 they lacked penetrating depth to explain the

increasing trend. Brownlee's work, however, established a theoretical foundation for

understanding the phenomenon. As his data reveals, the world has witnessed the ge netic transfer of executive power once every 2.5 years since 1994.77 This includes au tocracies across regions and cultures and includes North Korea (1994), Syria (2000), Azerbaijan (2003), Singapore (2004), Togo (2005), and Gabon (2009).78 Speculations were mounting that such transfers may occur in Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Equatorial Guinea — although recent events in Egypt, Libya, and now Yemen seem to have fore closed on that possibility.

Instead of citing an authoritarian leader's personal ambition, Brownlee points to the other commonalties among the diverse cases experiencing hereditary republican ism. Building on Tullock's work, he agrees "The benefits of hereditary succession ...

spread beyond the immediate ruler and successor, ensuring continued status for extra familial elites."79 Hereditary leadership selection, therefore, becomes the most preferred option for regime continuity because it benefits the system's core agents. As Brownlee

notes, "While many a ruler may dream of founding a dynasty, a son's rise hinges on the

response of the broader ruling elite. Those elites are more prone to abet hereditary suc cession when they lack an orderly precedent for leadership selection and are wary of a

leadership vacuum."80 Senior elites must agree on a consensual candidate that provides the greatest opportunity for their continuation. This option, by far, seems to outweigh a

potentially regime-threatening factionalized struggle for the presidency.

75. Such efforts to explain leadership selections in autocracies include Robbins Burling, The Pas

sage of Power: Studies in Political Succession (New York: Academic Press, 1974) and Valarie Bunce,

"Leadership Succession and Policy Innovation in Soviet Republics," Comparative Politics, Vol. 11, No.

4 (1979). 76. See Brian Whitaker, "Hereditary Republics in Arab States," The Guardian, August 28, 2001,

and Louis Delvoie, "Inherited Power Makes a Comeback," Options Politiques (July-August 2002). 77. Jason Brownlee, "Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies," World Politics, Vol. 59, No.

4 (2007), p. 595. 78. Jason Brownlee, "A New Generation of Autocracy in Egypt," Brown Journal of World Affairs,

Vol. 14, No. 1 (2007), pp. 73-85. 79. Brownlee, "Hereditary Successions in Modern Autocracies," p. 597.

80. Brownlee, "Hereditary Successions in Modern Autocracies," p. 598.




Cases where hereditary succession fails because of inter-regime fighting further

suggests that senior elites outweigh a sitting autocrat's patrimonial dominance. Re

gime elites in Paraguay blocked the hereditary succession of Alfredo Stroessner's son in 1989. In this example, a long-serving autocratic leader in declining health split the

political elite because of an uncertain succession process. Political fragmentation among the civilian parties led the Paraguay Colorado party

to invite a 42-year-old Air Force General, Stroessner, to assume power in 1954. He re

mained president for 35 years. With the support of his colleagues in the military, Stroess ner melded the party, military, and state into an indistinguishable entity. Stroessner's Par

aguay exhibits many of the characteristics of Hafiz al-Asad's Syria.81 As Roett argues,

Through a judicious mix of bribes, repression and paterfamilias politics, Stroessner

emerged as the undisputed leader of Paraguay. With the passing years, the general

grew more popular, on the evidence of his uncontested reelection every few years as

president of the republic. By the time the general was reelected for an eighth term of

office in 1988, few seemed to bother counting ... The general's formula for retaining

power was simple. He and his cronies co-opted potential opposition or repressed it,

often brutally.82

The succession crisis is attributed in part to Stroessner's declining health. As

Roett recalls, "Rumors circulated in 1998 that a palace 'gang of four'... were plotting to consolidate their personal position by using an ailing and visibly aging Stroessner

as a shield."83 Elites within the Colorado party factionalized between "militants" and

"traditionalists." As Harder Horst observed, "Serious disagreements between the mili

tantes, who planned to install Stroessner's son Gustavo when Stroessner was gone, and

the traditionalisms, who favored a political opening, divided the Colorado party."84 The traditionalists, led by the Supreme Court's former President, as well as Stroess

ner's closest confidant, General Andres Rodriguez, resisted Gustavo's succession. Con

fronted with competing elites that would potentially replace them, Rodriguez's fac

tion launched a coup against Stroessner in February 1989. Rodriguez, whose faction

enjoyed the military's support, became President. The militant faction's leaders were

purged from their positions and sentenced to prison. The former first family was exiled

to Brazil where Stroessner died in 2006 at the age of 93. Without an institutional mechanism for selecting a head of state, elites in Para

guay stepped into the political void to preempt regime fragmentation or collapse. The

comparison's evidence suggests that leadership selections depend on the ability of

elites in authoritarian systems to cooperate when the state is at its most vulnerable.

Sometimes this produces a hereditary succession and other times an alternative mem

81. Al-Asad and Stroessner's biographies read similarly. An Air Force General and Minister

of Defense during a period of tumultuous domestic political upheavals, al-Asad carried out a coup

against the Ba'th party's radically ideological faction in 1970. With the help of his military col

leagues, particularly Mustafa Tlas, al-Asad developed the regime's pillars and stabilized the politi

cal system during his 30-year reign.

82. Riordan Roett, "Paraguay after Stroessner," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 2 (1989), p. 128.

83. Roett, "Paraguay after Stroessner," p. 137.

84. Rene D. Harder Horst, The Stroessner Regime and Indigenous Resistance in Paraguay (Gaines

ville, FL: University of Florida Press, 2007), p. 138.




ber of the elite as president. This type of analysis activates the role of elites and injects politics into the process.

Elites in authoritarian political systems operate within state institutions. While such institutions cannot be characterized as acting autonomously, it is impossible for states to govern without structures. Structures collect the masses of personnel that are re

sponsible for carrying out a system's consensus. In this respect, authoritarian institutions can be understood through Allison's conceptualization of government structures. As he

argued, "a 'government' consists of a conglomerate of semi-feudal, loosely allied orga nizations, each with a substantial life of its own. Government leaders do sit formally, and to some extent in fact, on top of this conglomerate."85 The semi-feudal, loosely-allied linkages remain important for understanding the execution of elite consensus.

Even in personalized authoritarian arenas, a person's position within an institu tion influences elite behavior and encourages cooperation. As Gandhi and Przeworski

argue, "Autocrats maintain institutions to solicit cooperation or to extend their tenure in power... whenever they need to, autocrats govern with political institutions."86 In the case of a hereditary leadership selection in autocracies, elites develop a collective con sensus before overseeing compliance in the institutional arena. Such organs encourage political compliance and structurally advantage the political system against dissent.

WHY SYRIAN ELITES CONSENTED TO BASHAR

Senior elites are important in authoritarian systems because they are anchored in state institutions with networks of support. This provides them with opportunities to network with one another and gives them ready-made clientelist systems. With an ail

ing president that may or may not have been mentally competent, elites appear to have "anointed" Bashar more than the family patriarch did. These elites consulted each other and came to a consensus on his candidacy. In this sense, we see the influence of elites in the selection process. Before Bashar's appointment as the Ba'th party's Secretary General (a post previously held by his father), then-Minister of Defense Mustafa Tlas stated before the congress convened, "Bashar al-Asad will be secretary general. There is unanimity for him."87 While this may not suggest that a backdoor meeting of elites

occurred, other quotes by Tlas do. In one interview, Tlas suggests that elites from dif ferent institutions convened and agreed al-Asad's son would be the next president. As Tlas said at the time:

With Assad's death, we began to think that either I or Vice President Abd al-Halim

Khaddam were worthy of filling the shoes of the dead president. However, in view

of the fact that all of us were past seventy years of age, we were afraid of a situation

in which every year we would have to change the country's leader ... We reached

the conclusion that Bashar was indeed worthy of succeeding his father: after all, that

85. Graham Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," American Political Sci ence Review, Vol. 63, No. 3 (1969), p. 698.

86. Gandhi and Przeworski, "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats," p. 1293.

87. "Syria's Bashar Edges Towards Power," BBC News, June 18, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/ middle_east/794454.stm.



SYRIA'S HEREDITARY SUCCESSION *211

had been the will of his father, Hafiz al-Assad, to whom Syria owes so much.88

While the conclusion of Tlas's statement reinforces a personalized interpretation of succession, the first part suggests that an inter-elite debate occurred. Tlas indicates that options other than Bashar were considered before the elites settled on the young er al-Asad. Further supporting evidence that an elite consensus installed Bashar has

emerged since 2000. Former Vice President 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam retired from politics at the Ba'th

party's congress in June 2005. He went into exile to Paris in December 2005. He then conducted a series of interviews with Arabic newspapers and satellite channels about

his personal relationship to Hafiz al-Asad, the al-Asad family's possible role in the

Hariri assassination, and the succession process. Al-Arabiya and al-Sharq al-Awsat

conducted the most detailed interviews. In the former, Khaddam mentions that a "co

operative decision among us [elites] was taken to hand over power [to Bashar] in order

to protect Syria."89 Khaddam's post-defection interviews explain that elites supported Bashar's candidacy primarily because the alternative could have invited a leadership

struggle. Such a struggle produced fear among the elites that the regime may have col

lapsed. As Landis analyzes, "Khaddam implies that he wanted to take power but could

not. Presumably, this is because the other branches of regime were sitting there with

a gun to his head. Or conversely, he may have felt obliged because the country would

slip into chaos and perhaps civil war without a smooth succession."90 Who actually was

in the room does not matter. The key point is that senior elites cooperated to develop a

regime-wide consensus when faced with fragmentation. The preceding evidence suggests that senior elites, not the ailing President, were

the final arbiters of succession. This framework emphasizes the participation of elites

and reveals that they are necessary requisites for regime cohesion and stability in mo

ments of uncertainty. Reviewing the events after Hafiz's death reveals that succession

was an elite-guided process. Just as it seems improbable that a leader oversees a state

by utilizing various levers from a single corridor of power, it is as unlikely that leader

ship selection processes are monolithic and static political occurrences.

CONSENSUS AND CONTINUITY UNDER AUTHORITARIANISM

When Bashar al-Asad's presidency emerged as the most preferable option among the elites, the political arena seemed to drift towards an informal oligarchy. Some have

argued that Syrian elites accepted Bashar to bolster their positions within the system because they held influence over him. Ayman 'Abd al-Nour, a former consultant to

the new president, argued that a regional precedent already existed. As he observed, "Bashar's presidency is similar to Sadat's. He is either going to carry out a coup against

88. Zisser, "Does Bashar al-Assad rule Syria?," p. 17.

89. "Majlis al-Sh'ab al-Suri Yutalib b-Mahakma Khadam b-Tihma al-Khiana" ["Syrian People's

Assembly Request Khaddam be Charged with High Treason"], Al-Arabiya, December 31, 2005,

http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2005/12/31/19936.html. 90. Joshua Landis, Assistant Professor of History, Oklahoma University, e-mail to author, Novem

ber 14, 2008.



212* MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

them [the senior elites] or else he will be a toy in their hands."91 Bashar's consolidation

period indicates that political power was redistributed among the elites that elevated him to the presidency. As Hinnebusch argued shortly after the younger al-Asad became

president, "He almost certainly lacks the personal stature to govern except as a consen sual leader."92 Ammar Abd al-Hamid, the exiled civil society activist, described this as

the son being "one of the equals while his father was first among them."93 Michel Kilo, another civil society activist, quipped that the difference between the Hafiz and Bashar

presidencies was that, "it is no longer the Syria of al-Asad."94 While Bashar al-Asad

could inherit the presidency, he did not inherit the full powers that accompanied the

office when his father served at the helm. This partially explains why it took Bashar

nearly five years to rid the system of his father's elites. A close reading of the academic literature produced after al-Asad's death sug

gests that his son's weak personality explains Syria's redistributed political power. In

this respect, such readings demonstrate theoretical continuity with the portrayals of

Syria's hereditary succession. They fail to explain senior elites' calculations or con

sider how elites implemented the regime consensus. Senior elites have occasionally used institutions to limit Bashar's objectives and slow his consolidation.95 Most of the literature on Syria continues to rely on personalities as the causal variable to explain the

country's politics. Yet, the single-person rule narrative that emerges is — at its nexus —

inherently self-contradictory and incomplete. As this article demonstrates, the literature on Syria has not been engaged rigorously.

As succession loomed, elite cooperation and consensus showed that there was more to autocratic political systems than a leader's personality. Elites bargained over Bashar's selection and then returned to their institutional conglomerates to execute that consensus. While next-to-no political debate occurred within the institutions, they nevertheless con tributed to a smooth transfer of presidential power that created a hereditary republic. In

political systems thought to have personalized and "weak" institutions, it is worth recon

sidering that the senior elites are active agents that drive change and condition political outcomes through personalized but also highly disciplined state structures.

Studying leadership selections in autocratic regimes remains an analytical concern

worthy of continued inquiry. The evidence indicates that the longer an autocratic leader remains in power, the more likely such a regime will experience a hereditary succession. Rather than rush to attribute this to the ultimate personalization of political power, deeper consideration uncovers that greater agency for elites and structural characteristics are also factors in determining these political outcomes. As long as elites can agree on a consen sus and maintain an ability to execute it throughout the state's institutions, such cohesion

advantages the system's ability to endure. The role of senior elites — not just a leader's

personality operating in an unconstrained space — will have to be considered as who

primarily develops and implements consensus in the process of authoritarian leadership succession.

91. Ayman 'Abd al-Nour, interview by the author, Damascus, November 3, 2003.

92. Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution from Above, p. 165.

93. Ammar Abd al-Hamid, interview by the author, Damascus, October 8, 2003.

94. Michel Kilo (civil society activist), interview by the author, Damascus, September 30, 2003.

95. Joshua Alan Stacher, "Adapting Authoritarianism: Institutions and Co-optation in Egypt and

Syria" (PhD dissertation, University of St. Andrews, 2007), pp. 106-108.



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Reinterpretando El Poder Autoritario. Siria (Joshua Stacher)

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