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Religion in Postsoviet Armenia: Pluralism and Identity

Formation in Transition*1

ANI SARKISSIAN

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the role of religion in identity formation and political development in

postsoviet Armenia. It argues that the equation of Armenian identity with membership in theArmenian Apostolic Church contributes to an atmosphere of intolerance toward ethnic andreligious minorities and inhibits the development of pluralism. This underdevelopment of a

democratic culture therefore leads to weak opposition movements and delayed democraticconsolidation. This paper is based primarily on interviews conducted in Armenia in 2005 withindividuals in the religious and civil society sectors, but also draws upon evidence from publishedmaterials which demonstrate attitudes toward minorities in Armenian society.

Introduction

More than fifteen years since becoming an independent country and launching itselfon the path toward democracy the Republic of Armenia remains caught in the midstof an incomplete transition. In 2007 Freedom House ranked Armenia as ‘partly free’and declared that ‘Armenia is not an electoral democracy’ because of seriousirregularities in the 1995 and 1999 parliamentary and 1996 presidential elections(Freedom, 2007). The country still faces problems with corruption, nepotism and theunfair distribution of justice. Public trust in government institutions is low and afterthe army the church is the most trusted institution in the country (Survey, 2007).

While political opposition movements are relatively weak, new religious groups arechallenging the ideological supremacy of the traditionally dominant ArmenianApostolic Church.2 Nevertheless, the growth of minority religious groups in Armeniais moving at a slow pace relative to the legal protections the groups enjoy. In thispaper I argue that this slow growth can be attributed to traditional notions of identitywhich remain firmly ensconced in Armenian national discourse. Such ideas are foundacross all sectors of society from official government pronouncements to the attitudesof the average citizen on the streets of the capital city. Because Armenian identity is soclosely tied to affiliation with the Armenian Apostolic Church, converts to other

*An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Conference of the CentralEurasian Studies Society in October 2007.

Religion, State & Society, Vol. 36, No. 2, June 2008

ISSN 0963-7494 print; ISSN 1465-3974 online/08/020163-18 � 2008 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/09637490802013230

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religions are viewed with suspicion and pluralism as a cultural concept is largelyunknown. I argue that a lack of understanding and acceptance of religious pluralism iscorrelated with a lack of diversity in social and political views. Together, cultural andsocietal closed-mindedness inhibits the development of a democratic political culture,which has thus stalled the country’s democratic transition.

In this paper I first discuss scholarship on religious nationalism and democratisa-tion and explain how they relate to one another in the postcommunist region. I thenbriefly trace the history of religious relations in Armenia since the communist periodand explain how that experience has helped to shape religious relations today. Next, Iexamine the legal status of religious groups and show that despite some advantagesgiven to the Armenian Apostolic Church, religious minorities should be able to thrivegiven the freedoms they enjoy. I discuss some of the minority religious groups whichare present in the country and the challenges they have had to face sinceindependence. Finally, using data gathered from personal interviews of individualsin the religious and civil society sectors in 2005, I demonstrate how notions ofArmenian identity are based upon a traditional conception of religiously basednationality and lack incorporation of pluralist notions which are commonly seen asnecessary for the development of a democratic culture and political system.

Religious Nationalism and Democratic Development

This paper builds upon two different but related literatures. First, it addressesscholarship on nationalism and identity politics, focusing on religion as a vitalcomponent of nation building and identity construction in the postsoviet space.Second, it relates religiously based nationalism to the development of pluralism andcivil society, two vital components of successful democracy. By tracing the sources ofpolitical identity and their manifestations in post-independence Armenia, I explainhow history and contemporary political and demographic realities interact to affectthe country’s political development.

Nationalist ideology imposes a homogenising impetus on cultural groups (Gellner,1983). Interestingly, however, nationalism often draws upon invented traditions and‘imagined communities’ that rewrite the past and ignore those events and situationswhich may disrupt the narrative of a unified history (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983).Brubaker (1996) characterises the multiethnic former communist countries as ascribingto a ‘nationalizing’ nationalism as opposed to civic or multinational forms of stateformation. This type of nationalism sets up the idea of a core nation that, because of itslegitimate ownership yet weak control over the current state, requires compensation inthe form of state power to promote the core nation itself. A variety of tactics can beused to justify the unity of the ‘nation’, including common language, history, culturaltraditions and religion. Any (and all) of these may, in turn, be employed in excludingparticular groups. This characterisation can be extended to more homogenous formercommunist countries as well, as these countries have used similar tactics to marginalisesmall minorities and justify exclusion of all nontitular groups.

Hoppenbrouwers (2002) defines religious nationalism as ‘any religious manifesta-tion of national self-determination or ideological superiority within a restrictedgeographical or ethnic area’ (p. 306). Churches espouse religious nationalism forseveral reasons, including a fear of western cultural imposition and the need todevelop an alternative to a pluralist society which draws upon indigenous religioustraditions. Religion is also used to legitimate national values (Ramet, 1995).Throughout the former communist countries, nationalist rhetoric is also being used

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to justify religious establishment and exclusionary legislation. Excluding minoritiesfrom the concept of the ‘nation’ allows countries then to justify their exclusion frompolitical life as well and to retain a monopoly on power.3

In most cases, scholars argue, successful democratisation requires a high levelof economic development (Huntington, 1991; Lipset, 1963; Olson, 1993; Przeworskiet al., 1996; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997), a supportive international environment(Huntington, 1991), legitimacy of the regime and its leaders (Diamond et al., 1995;Linz, 1978) and a democratic political culture or prior experience with democracy(Almond and Verba, 1963; Diamond, 1999; Huntington, 1991; Putnam, 1993). Ademocratic political culture, in turn, is defined as one which supports a politicallyactive citizenry which is aware and informed about the political system as well as onewhich is involved in a variety of societal organisations which help to fosterinterpersonal trust and political competence (Almond and Verba, 1963; Putnam,1993). Moreover, pluralism in both society and politics ensures that individuals orsmall groups are not able to seize control of institutions and consolidate power overthe rest of the country (Dahl, 1971).

Identity and democratic political culture interact when individuals choose if andhow they will become socially and politically involved. Citizens who perceive that theiridentity is not being protected may choose to act in its defence. This helps to explainpopular support for nationalist parties and other right-wing groups (Knox, 2005).However, elites may resort to nationalist rhetoric to consolidate power and avoidsurrendering political authority to popular sentiment and institutions (Snyder, 2000).In both instances, reliance on identity as a political motivator inhibits democraticdevelopment by focusing on exclusion of particular elements of society rather thaninclusion of a plurality of citizens in the democratic process. Thus we can expect thatcountries in which exclusionary nationalism enjoys support will have a less robust civilsociety and little support for pluralism, and therefore lack democracy.

The Church in Armenia before Independence

At different points in its history leaders of the Armenian church engaged in politicalactivity aimed at national preservation. Bishop Nerses Ashtaraketsi of Tiflis (latercatholicos) led Armenian volunteers aiding Russian forces against the Persians in theconquest of Yerevan in 1826 – 27 and Patriarch Khrimyan advocated nationalistuprising in the latter half of the century (Mouradian, 1988). However, the church itselfsuffered under Russian rule. Even before the bolshevik revolution, the tsaristgovernment had begun to repress the Armenian Church, seeing it as an obstacle to theconversion of Armenians to Russian Orthodoxy and a potential locus of separatistactivity (Matossian, 1962, p. 19). The government closed parochial schools, and in1903 ordered confiscation of all church property. Nationalist movements during thisperiod were secular, despite the historic contribution of the Armenian church tonational preservation (Matossian, 1962).

Government policies after the 1917 revolution further weakened the churches in theSoviet Union. In the early years of bolshevik rule, church property was confiscated,printing presses and libraries were closed and seminaries were shut down (Walters,1993). Monks were isolated from the population and religious ceremonies wereproscribed. The peasantry remained loyal to the church, however, and theantireligious campaign was met with resistance throughout the 1920s (Corley, 1996;Matossian, 1962, p. 91). In Armenia the international administration of the Armenianchurch was placed under state control. One of the major problems encountered by the

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Armenian church under Soviet rule was the lack of trained clergy to conduct servicesand provide religious education to parishioners (Tchilingirian, 2007). Later during theStalinist purges Armenian religious and literary figures were arrested or assassinated,including Catholicos Khoren (Matossian, 1962).

The period of the Second World War brought some relief to all religions in theSoviet Union, particularly the traditional churches. In Armenia, a seminary andprinting press were allowed to reopen. However, this period also heralded a new formof cooperation between church and state. While the church was allowed to resumesome of its activities, the state established itself within its administration, sendingrepresentatives to church councils and even dictating policy and personnel choices.Correspondence between the Soviet Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults andCommunist Party officials in Armenia shows that Moscow even dictated what wouldbe printed the in the church’s journal, Etchmiadzin (Corley, 1996).

The 1960s, 1970s and 1980s saw periods of repression mixed with relaxation ofpressure on churches. Statistics from 1972 reported that the Armenian church hadonly six bishops, eight monks and 100 priests to serve a population of approximatelyfour million Armenians throughout the Soviet Union (Guroian, 1991). In the late1980s there were reportedly 50 churches open in all of Armenia, with only three in thecapital city where the majority of the population was concentrated (Mouradian,1988). A report on religions and churches in the USSR issued by the Council forReligious Affairs in Moscow indicated that in 1984 only 8.4 per cent of all marriagesin Armenia were church marriages, while the number of baptisms in the republic wastoo insignificant to report (Corley, 1996). At the same time, however, gradualopenings in Soviet society in the late 1980s were accompanied by reports of a religiousrevival among the population. For example, Catholicos Vazgen noted that in the late1970s 90 per cent of Armenian infants were being baptised (Mouradian, 1988).

During the final years of the Soviet Union a religious revival was occurringthroughout the various republics. In Armenia the population looked to the church toprovide spiritual guidance in the aftermath of the 1988 earthquake and duringhostilities with neighbouring Azerbaijan over the disputed territory of NagornyKarabakh. Members of the clergy were criticised for not taking on the role of spiritualleaders and liberators, especially by diaspora Armenians who observed the actions ofchurch movements in Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia in advocatingpolitical change (Movsesian, 1990). Criticism came from elements within the churchitself as well. At an international meeting of Armenian clergy discussion focused onthe need to reform the internal infrastructure of the church through perestroika and toregain credibility for the Armenian church in the face of competing religiousmovements (Tchilingirian, 1991b).

The Soviet government tolerated many forms of national expression in theArmenian Soviet Socialist Republic as this nationalism was often directed againstTurkey rather than Russia (Suny, 1997). The government made concessions todemands for the construction and preservation of historical monuments and issuesrelated to language policy, keeping ‘dissident’ nationalism largely at bay (Suny, 1997,p. 376). However, events in the autonomous region of Nagorny Karabakh, located inAzerbaijan but inhabited by a majority of Armenians, helped to spur a broad-basednationalist movement that eventually led to the republic’s independence.

In February 1988 Armenians in Karabakh and Yerevan began protests demandingthat the region be unified with the Armenian republic. While Moscow rejected thedemands, Azerbaijanis began a pogrom in Sumgait, killing at least 31 Armenians. TheKarabakh Committee formed in Armenia, and began to agitate against the authority

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of the Communist Party; its members were arrested in early 1989. Voters boycottedthe 1989 general elections, and mass demonstrations demanded the release of theKarabakh Committee members. After their release, several organisations joined toform the Pan-Armenian National Movement (Hayots hamazgayin sharzhum (HHSh)),headed by Levon Ter-Petrossyan, and led demonstrations in December 1989 callingfor the independence of Armenia.

The conflict in Karabakh escalated to a war in the spring of 1990. Elections inArmenia brought the HHSh to power with Levon Ter-Petrossyan as chairman ofparliament. Armenia declared its intention to become independent in August 1990 andelected Ter-Petrossyan president of the republic in October 1991. In the meantime,fighting continued in Karabakh, with Soviet troops aiding the Azerbaijanis. Armenia,along with the Baltic states, Moldova and Georgia, refused to participate in areferendum on Gorbachev’s new union treaty in March 1991. The Soviet Union wasdissolved on 25 December 1991.

The Armenian Apostolic Church was involved in the movement for independencein the same way in which it had been involved in politics in the past: by giving its tacitsupport to those in power with the stated aim of preserving the Armenian ‘nation’.Having backed Gorbachev and the official government position on the Karabakhmovement after the 1988 earthquake, Catholicos Vazgen switched allegiances andgave his support to the Pan-Armenian National Movement by giving an address to theparty’s congress in 1989. At this point, it was becoming apparent that the party was inde facto control of the republic. During that address, the catholicos emphasised theconnection between the idea of the Armenian nation and the Armenian ApostolicChurch, addressing the delegates as ‘children’ of the church by virtue of being ofArmenian heritage, no matter what their religious beliefs:

The national identity of the Armenian nation, the national ethos of theArmenian people, [and] the national ideology of the Armenian people havebeen forged here at Holy Etchmiadzin, especially, in the fourth and fifthcenturies . . . . Let it not be assumed that in the formation of the nationalideology the Armenian Church was a follower or a conformist. No. TheArmenian Church for the past seventeen centuries has been the author andthe leader [in these matters]. (Vazgen I, 1989, pp. 6 – 7)

In his speech the catholicos traced the beginning of Armenian national identity withthe acceptance of Christianity as the national religion and tied subsequent nation-forming events with milestones connected to the church, including the creation of theArmenian alphabet by a monk in the fourth century. By tying the fate of the church tothe Armenian nation, no matter who was to be in charge of it, the catholicosattempted to ensure the continuing presence of the church in the everyday life ofArmenians.

Religious Regulation in the Republic of Armenia

Since independence Armenia has been faced with the problem of how to legislatereligion and deal with new religious groups which have emerged. These includeEvangelical Protestant groups based in the USA, Europe and Asia, groups such as theJehovah’s Witnesses and Mormons from the USA, and other religious movementsincluding the Unification Church, the Scientologists and the Hare Krishna movement(Barrett et al., 2001). For populations accustomed to a severely restricted religious

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scene, the influx of these new groups sparked confusion and fear of externaldomination. While foreign groups considered the postsoviet marketplace to be openfor evangelising to atheists, those living within these countries held onto traditionalnotions of their religious backgrounds. Even though they may not have practised anyreligion for decades, traditionally they considered their people to be OrthodoxChristian, Sunni Muslim, Catholic or whatever religion their ancestors practisedbefore communism. The fact that they did not currently practise religion did not meanthat they were without religion and thus open to evangelisation. Rather, theyconsidered evangelisation to be ‘proselytisation’, or the stealing of adherents awayfrom traditional religions to these new movements. In response to the new groups,then, these traditional religions launched campaigns against them, lobbying post-independence governments for legislation that would protect them and restrict theactivity of new religious groups.

This trend was observed in every postsoviet republic regardless of what thetraditional religion was before communism. In the historically Orthodox Christiancountries, the majority churches attempted to keep out Pentecostals, the UnificationChurch, Mormons and Jehovah’s Witnesses – denominations which were attractingthose people the churches considered to be part of their flock. In Protestant Latviaand Catholic Lithuania, the law distinguishes between new and traditional religiousgroups, favouring those which were present in the countries before communism andlimiting the rights of those which arrived in the countries after independence. InIslamic Central Asia, governments set up (or retained from Soviet times) MuslimSpiritual Boards which asserted a state-sponsored form of moderate Islam in anattempt to keep out competing Islamic movements from Iran, Afghanistan and SaudiArabia.

Competition, pressure from international organisations and the historical connec-tion between nationalism and religion have structured the responses of traditionalreligious groups to a newly opened religious marketplace. The connection betweennationalism and religion is strongest in the traditionally Orthodox countries. TheEastern Churches in particular have attempted to continue their Byzantine traditionof close affiliation with the state to deal with changes in the religious arena.

The 1995 Constitution of Armenia protects freedom of thought, conscience andreligion as well as the rights of national minorities to preserve their language andculture. Amendments to the constitution in 2005 further define the status of religiousgroups in the country. Article 8.1 states that church and state are separate but that‘The Republic of Armenia recognizes the exclusive historical mission of the ArmenianApostolic Holy Church as a national church, in the spiritual life, development of thenational culture and preservation of the national identity of the people of Armenia’(Constitution, 2005). Article 26 protects freedom of religion and the right to changeone’s religion, to be restricted only if it is necessary to preserve public security orindividual rights.

Prior to adoption of the first postsoviet constitution, however, Armenia passed alaw on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations in 1991. An amendedversion of this law still governs religious affairs in the country today. The 1991 lawbegins by declaring the Armenian Apostolic Church to be the ‘national Church of theArmenian people’ and ‘an important bulwark for the edification of its spiritual life andnational preservation’ (Law, 1991). At the same time it establishes the separation ofchurch and state, including prohibiting state funding of religious organisations.Among the rights enumerated exclusively for the Armenian Apostolic Church underthe law are the rights to construct new churches, to carry out instruction in state

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schools and ‘to take practical measures which enhance the moral standards of theArmenian people’. A 1997 amendment gives the exclusive right of religiousbroadcasting to the Armenian Apostolic Church.

The law defines religious organisations as citizens’ associations which are based on‘historically recognised scriptures’ whose doctrines form part of the ‘internationalcontemporary religious–ecclesiastical communities’ and are ‘free from materialismand intended for purely spiritual goals’. The 1991 law requires 50 members forregistration of groups, but a 1997 amendment raised this requirement to 200 andtherefore required re-registration of all groups (none previously registered weredenied).4 The State Council on Religious Affairs (Kroni harts’erov petakan liazormarmin) was entrusted with the role of registration of groups and mediating betweengroups and the government.

The 1991 law gives religious organisations certain rights, including the right toconduct services, rent meeting places, own property, educate members and trainclergy, use the media, perform charitable activities, receive tax exemption on gifts andcontributions and establish ties with religious organisations outside the country. Whilethe 1991 law does not specify the groups to which these rights apply, the 1997amendments make clear that only registered religious groups are given these rights.The law sets up certain restrictions as well. Religious organisations cannot be financedby spiritual centres located outside the country or by political organisations, and theymust obtain permission from the Council on Religious Affairs to hold public religiousservices, travel abroad and invite foreign guests. However, because of the lack ofresources and the difficulty of enforcement of some of these restrictions, the main taskof the council was registration of groups (Report, 2002). The law also forbids‘proselytism’, which is left undefined.5

In April 2000 the government and the Armenian Apostolic Church signed amemorandum indicating the intention of the two sides to negotiate a concordat togovern relations between the two bodies in the fields of property, education, moralityand media. This was completed in 2007. The law acknowledges the ‘special’relationship between the Republic of Armenia and the Apostolic Church andrecognises the church as the national church with its headquarters at the Mother Seeof Etchmiadzin. It states that the church is ‘an important and indivisible part of thefoundation of the national identity’ and gives the church authority over theconstruction and renovation of religious buildings, to be funded out of the statebudget. It reaffirms the church’s right to perform marriages and to send chaplains tosocial service agencies, military bases and prisons. It also grants tax exemption toincome generated by the church from donations and the sale of liturgical objects.Finally, the law gives the church the right to establish schools and receive statefunding equal to that of state schools, to participate in the preparation of textbooksused to teach church history and to organise voluntary religious courses in stateinstitutions (Law, 2007). These articles codify previous regulations establishing thatreligious education in state schools is permitted only by instructors appointed by theArmenian Apostolic Church. While students may choose to skip these classes, anyschool principal can request priests from the church to teach classes in religion andreligious history. In 2002 schools introduced the history of the Armenian ApostolicChurch as part of mandatory coursework on religion taught in middle schools. Otherreligious groups are not allowed to provide religious instruction in schools.

In March 2002 a presidential decree abolished the State Council on ReligiousAffairs. The Religious Affairs Council attached to the prime minister’s office(Varch’apetin arent’er kroni harts’erov khorhurd) was created by decree on 12 August

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2002 and comprises representatives of ministries dealing with religious affairs, theNational Academy of Science, the Armenian Apostolic Church, the ArmenianCatholic Church and the Armenian Evangelical Church.6 In addition, the cabinetestablished the Department for National Minorities and Religious Affairs (Azgayinp’ok’ramasnut’yunneri ev kroni harts’eri varch’ut’yun). Its duties are to advise thegovernment on matters and legislation pertaining to national minorities and religiousorganisations and to report on the activities of the department to the government(Document, 2004). Registration of religious groups was transferred to the Office of theState Registrar.

Religious Minorities

Legislation in Armenia does protect minority religions in that it allows for them toregister as legal entities. However, how the laws are enforced can depend on personnelin government offices and the attitude they have towards particular religious groups,especially the Jehovah’s Witnesses. Societal discrimination also forces groups to bediscreet in their practice to avoid attracting negative attention.

While Armenia has a small proportion of ethnic and religious minorities, most ofthe religious minorities today are ethnic Armenians who have converted to Protestantdenominations. Nevertheless, legislation has been targeted at protecting ethnicminorities, not religious ones. In 1997 Armenia signed the Council of Europe’sFramework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, which went intoforce in 1998. As part of the convention, Armenia was required to submit a report in1999 detailing its work toward meeting the stipulations of the convention. This reportwas submitted in 2001 (Report, 2001). As of May 2001 Armenia did not have a law onnational minorities. According to the report, on 15 June 2000 a Coordination Councilon National Minorities was created by presidential decree ‘to provide the protectionof national minorities, to activate their inter-community relationships, as well as tomake more effective the State care of the problems of education, culture, legal andother problems’ (Report, 2001, pp. 6 – 7). In 2001 the council had two representativesfrom each of eleven national minorities: Assyrians, Belarusians, Georgians, Germans,Greeks, Jews, Kurds, Russians, Poles, Ukrainians and Yezidis.

The report to the Council of Europe notes that as of January 2000 there were 14religious organisations officially registered with the state: the Armenian ApostolicChurch, the Armenian Catholic Church, the Russian Orthodox Church, the Yezidireligious community, the Jewish community, the Pagan (Heathen) community, theBaha’i community, the Mormons, the Baptists, the Evangelicals, the ‘Christians ofEvangelical Faith’ (Pentecostals), the Charismatics, the Seventh-Day Adventists, andthe New Apostolic Church (Report, 2001, p. 13). The Jehovah’s Witnesses and theHare Krishna movement were practising without registration. The Council ofEurope’s Advisory Committee suggested that Armenia ‘step up their efforts toimprove both the dialogue between the different religious groups and religioustolerance’ (Council, 2002, pp. 11 – 12). In response to this comment, the Armeniangovernment denied that religious intolerance existed in the country, but at the sametime assured the council that it was working on preventing and abolishing intolerancetoward religious minorities (Comments, 2004).

Historically Armenian society has been relatively homogenous, both ethnically andreligiously. Compared to other democratising countries, new religious movementshave grown slowly in Armenia. Figures from the World Christian Database show thatthe percentage of Protestants grew from 0.53 per cent of the population in 1990 to

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only about 2 per cent of the population in 2005 (Database, 2004). Rates of Protestantgrowth remain low in other postcommunist countries as well, a trend likely to be dueto the strong role which traditional religion plays in these societies. By contrast,during their political transitions Latin American countries saw Protestant groupsincreasing rapidly. For example, in Brazil Protestants grew from 13.23 per cent of thepopulation in 1970 to 30.24 per cent of the population in 2005 (Database, 2004). Thistrend of Protestant growth is found in many other democratising countries, suggestingthat historical suppression of traditional religious groups, organisational featuresunique to the Orthodox churches and the ‘foreign’ nature of missionary groups in thepostcommunist states might help to explain the lower level of religious diversity foundin the region as compared to other areas in transition.

Official and societal attitudes toward religious minorities underscore the atmo-sphere of intolerance which exists in Armenia. The minister of religious affairs,Ludwig Khachatryan, discussing the religious situation in 1991, explained that whileArmenia had chosen to pursue a democratic political system, and that it understoodthat as a democracy the country needed to accept religious freedom, pluralism and theseparation of church and state, the country also recognised that special privileges hadto be given to the Armenian Apostolic Church to make up for losses sustained underSoviet rule (Tchilingirian, 1991a). He addressed the problem of the ‘cults’ as one ofmisinformation among a population which had been raised atheistically under thecommunist regime, and he evidently operated under the assumption that if theArmenian Apostolic Church, as the ‘father of the Armenian people,’ is givenadvantages over other denominations in the country, then its ‘children’ will naturallyreturn to it (Tchilingirian, 1991a).

Khachatryan’s statement is interesting at many levels. First, he justifies givingspecial privileges to the Armenian church because it suffered losses under communism,not admitting that all religious groups had been so repressed by the Soviet authorities.The reason he singles out the Armenian church is not because of the extent of thelosses, or the fact that the church needs to be able to serve a large number of currentadherents, but rather because of its role as the ‘father of the Armenian people’. As aninstitution identified with the nation the Armenian Apostolic Church needs to bebolstered in the immediate post-independence era. Second, stating that even thoughthe country has decided to pursue a democratic course it needs to favour one groupover all others betrays a lack of understanding of religious pluralism and democracyitself.

More recent statements also allude to ideas of this type among people in Armenia.One official at the Holy See at Etchmiadzin differentiated between two types ofreligious organisation in Armenia, the ‘sister churches’ to the Armenian ApostolicChurch (the Catholic Church and the Armenian Evangelical Protestant Church) andthe ‘nondesirable elements, which are primarily the cults and sects’ (Interviews, 2005f).He accused the latter of competing with the Armenian church not through their beliefsbut by using unlimited funds from the West as well as psychological means. This viewwas also expressed in the following statement issued by the church following theregistration of the Jehovah’s Witnesses: ‘The activities of totalitarian religiousorganizations, including Jehovah’s Witnesses, run counter to our national and stateinterests and aspirations’ (Danielyan, 2006). Another official at Etchmiadzin accusedminority religious groups of attracting followers by criticising the church’s traditionsand customs and thus ‘promoting unfounded intolerance against the Armenianchurch’ (Interviews, 2005f). A group he did identify as cooperating with the ArmenianApostolic Church was the Catholic Church, which was willing to preserve the status

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quo in the country and not evangelise. These statements are interesting in that thepriest identifies minority religious groups as being intolerant toward the ArmenianApostolic Church. This turns the debate around to assert that it is the church which isbeing harmed by the influx of new groups – not the other way around. The priestclaims that these new groups blame the Armenian Apostolic Church for problemscaused by years of existing under Soviet rule. Entering the country after independence,those groups have not had the same problems to overcome and therefore unjustly castthe Armenian church in a negative light. By turning the Armenian church into thevictim rather than the oppressor, the spokesman for the Patriarchate presentsjustification for its support of laws which restrict religious minorities and giveadvantages to the majority church.

Antipluralistic ideas have not been limited to rhetoric, and have carried over fromthe religious sphere into the civil one. In April and May 1995 armed paramilitarygroups reportedly belonging to the Yerkrapah veterans’ organisation carried out awave of violence against religious minority groups, without recrimination. Theseattacks were mostly aimed at Jehovah’s Witnesses and Pentecostals. During severalincidents, paramilitary troops would interrupt religious services, attack followers withiron pipes and guns, and destroy property. Before the attacks, the press publishedarticles critical of the groups, presumably contributing to the atmosphere ofintolerance. Yerkrapah was reportedly affiliated with government security agencies(Report, 1995).7

While laws protecting religious minorities were strengthened in the post-independence period and violence against these groups ceased after the mid 1990s,government officials and agencies tied to the government continued to betray a lack ofbelief in religious freedom and pluralism. In September 2004 the prime minister,Andranik Margaryan, argued that preventing the spread of ‘dangerous sects’ in thecountry, which he claimed posed a threat to national security, should take priorityover compliance with human rights commitments the country had made to theCouncil of Europe and elsewhere (Fuller, 2002). In November 2004 the Council ofYouth Affairs, a group associated with the speaker of the National Assembly ofArmenia, initiated a round table held in the National Assembly for the sole purpose ofdiscussing how to keep people away from sects. Speeches discussed the need to amendcurrent legislation on religion and organise groups which would draw young people‘closer to the roots of the Armenian church, history and spiritual values’ (RoundTable, 2004). These and other government representatives continued to rely on thelanguage of nationalism to justify giving advantages to the Armenian ApostolicChurch and preventing the growth of new religious movements in the country.

There are some bodies within the government which do exist to support minorityrights, however. Hranush Kharatyan, head of the Committee for Ethnic Minoritiesand Religious Organisations, pointed to the efforts of the committee to revise thereligion law to account for new issues which have arisen since the law was firstadopted in 1991. A former academic, she cited the many layers of the religion‘problem’ in Armenia, pointing to the lack of clarity in the law as one. For example,the law forbids ‘proselytisation’ but does not define it, a problem she asserted needsremedying. Kharatyan also pointed to a key problem within the Armenian ApostolicChurch: that by having the designation ‘Armenian’ in its name, it has limited itself andnot developed a missionary tradition, which thus prevents it from competing with newevangelisers in the country. She blamed the church for not wanting to accept people ofother nationalities, while also not wanting Armenians to follow any other religion(Interview, 2005g).

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A policy analyst at a Yerevan-based research centre described the religious situationin Armenia as part of a bigger problem of not recognising the rights of minorities(Interview, 2005a). In view of the fact that the Armenians have lived for most of theirhistory as a minority group under imperial rule, this betrays a surprising lack ofunderstanding for the plight of minorities, but this attitude does not characterise theArmenians alone. A comparative study of public opinion polls taken in Baku, Tbilisiand Yerevan in 2004 found that people in the Caucasus are intolerant of other ethnicgroups and have a limited understanding of the role of democracy in resolvingconflicts (Khachatrian, 2005).

A recent public opinion survey conducted by the International Republican Institute(IRI) found that 68 per cent of respondents disagreed with the statement ‘It is a goodthing for any society to be made up of people from different religions’ (Study, 2007).Forty-one per cent of respondents agreed with the statement ‘Whether peoplebelonging to religious minority groups can be fully accepted members of societydepends on which group they belong to’ (Study, 2007). Finally, questions regardingconfidence in institutions showed that the Armenian church was the most trusted of allnational institutions (76 per cent favourable responses), compared to the president’soffice (42 per cent), police (41 per cent), political parties (34 per cent) and parliament(32 per cent) (Study, 2007).

In a series of personal interviews I conducted in 2005 members of religiousminority groups detailed the types of repression they had experienced in the country.While all groups have the right to gather and practise their religions, manyexperience problems when they try to rent spaces for large gatherings, importliterature or evangelise. The problems appear to be compounded outside the majorurban areas. The Seventh-Day Adventist organisation reported difficulties withrenting meeting spaces and with members being excused from work on Saturdaysfor religious observance (Interview, 2005d). Members of the Church of Latter-daySaints (Mormons) reported being prohibited from teaching about their religion inthe context of performing humanitarian service (Interview, 2005h). Jehovah’sWitnesses complained about public misconceptions of them, citing general societalhostility toward members of their organisation and misunderstandings about theirteachings (Interview, 2005i).

Of all the religious minorities, Jehovah’s Witnesses in Armenia have experienced themost legal problems and societal discrimination. The group was not officiallyregistered as a religious organisation until October 2004; previous refusals citedtechnical problems with the group’s application and ‘illegal proselytism’ by membersof the group. According to group leaders, as of 2007 69 Jehovah’s Witnesses were inprison for refusing to perform military service or alternative labour service (Report,2007). Those in jail refuse the alternative service because they maintain that since it isunder military control it constitutes military service (Corley, 2007).

Societal discrimination is perhaps the largest hurdle which the Jehovah’s Witnessesmust overcome. People express suspicion about, and annoyance with, the group’sdoor-to-door evangelisation techniques. Rumours abound that the group pays poorpeople to convert, while members insist that they have received no form of payment orother types of assistance (Report, 2007). United States State Department reports overthe past several years have also noted multiple attacks on individual Jehovah’sWitnesses by private citizens, local officials and representatives of the ArmenianApostolic Church.

In my conversations with private citizens and leaders of local nongovernmentalorganisations it was clear that the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ beliefs regarding abstinence

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from civic participation (including voting), their refusal to take part in ceremonies andtheir policies regarding blood transfusions all contributed to the deep public suspicionof the group’s motivations and plans. Refusal to take part in ceremonies challengesArmenian cultural practices and thus highlights the group’s foreign origins. Objectionto the Witnesses’ refusal to vote or otherwise participate in civil society is interestinggiven the low level of political participation of the population at large. For example,voter turnout in the 2003 parliamentary elections was about 51 per cent of registeredvoters (Guide, 2007).

Church Activities and Perceptions

Soviet rule devastated the Armenian Apostolic Church. According to the WorldChristian Encyclopedia, Armenian Apostolic adherents dropped from 87.8 per cent ofthe population in 1900 to 33.9 per cent in 1970. After a few years of independence, thisfigure had grown to 73.4 per cent in mid-1995 and 78.2 per cent in mid-2000 (Barrettet al., 2001).8 During the Soviet period the Armenian Apostolic Church was strippedof most of its property and personnel. A major post-independence problem has beentraining new clergy and finding places for worship. Catholicos Vazgen identified thelack of trained clergy as the most pressing need of the church after independence(Tchilingirian, 1992). In the capital city, Yerevan, only three Armenian Apostolicchurches remained standing when the country gained independence, and one of thesecould hold only about 10 parishioners at a time. A priest at Etchmiadzin alsodiscussed the need for clergy, but noted that conditions had improved and that therewas no shortage of people who wanted to be priests in Armenia. Rather, the biggerproblem was that there was a ‘hunger for the faith’ among the Armenian people thatthe church could not meet because it did not have the funds to build enough structuresto house all the potential attendees. The problem was especially bad in the villages,where priests were forced to serve several villages, holding services out of their cars(Interviews, 2005f).

After 1991 the church began programmes to strengthen its position in the country.It has embarked on campaigns to increase enrolment in the seminaries, providereligious education to the people and increase its presence in the daily life of thecountry. One such initiative was the Christian Education Center (K’ristoneakandastiarakutyan kentron) which was created as a department of the Mother See atEtchmiadzin to publish religious literature and provide training and materials toteachers in both state schools and Sunday schools (Etchmiadzin, 2003).

A common complaint about the Armenian church has been the image of the churchas lacking a mission or desire to spread the gospel. An academic who visited SovietArmenia in 1991 (before independence) commented that

The unmistakable mark of expediency in the church’s shift fromcooperation with the Communist regime to sacralizer of the newnationalism was worrisome; its neglect of the spiritual needs of the peoplewas conspicuous and unforgivable. The gospel pure and simple needed to bepreached and practised in the cities and in the remotest villages. Thehierarchy and clergy seemed more comfortable wearing ethnic pride undergold filigreed ecclesiastical robes. (Guroian, 1995, p. 11)

The Yerevan-based policy analyst echoed this sentiment, complaining that theArmenian Apostolic Church did not want to ‘modernise’ and focus on evangelisation

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in order to compete with new groups in the country and hoped to use the law to secureits monopolistic position (Interview, 2005a). According to the Etchmiadzin priest, thechurch recognises these shortcomings and has increased its social services, openinghospitals, aiding orphans, opening youth centres and soup kitchens for the elderly andpreaching to military conscripts and prisoners (Interviews, 2005f).

Another common view expressed among people in Armenia is that there is a lack ofreligious belief among citizens and a related pejorative connotation associated withthe notion of being a ‘believer’. With the Armenian Apostolic Church havingsuccessfully portrayed itself as a preserver of national identity, it has all but lost itsassociation with actual religious faith. According to the chairman of a human rightsadvocacy group in Armenia, leftover sentiments from the Soviet era give negativeconnotations to the term ‘believer’ and thus members of religious minorities, by beingreferred to in this way, are immediately cast in a negative light (Interview, 2005c). Thisview was echoed by the head of the Committee for Ethnic Minorities and ReligiousOrganisations, who justified her support for religious freedom in the following terms:‘I say, whoever wants to be brainwashed in any way, let them be brainwashed’(Interview, 2005g). There is the sense that those who consider themselves to be truereligious believers are not to be trusted, for they go against the traditional role ofreligion in the country.

Survey data support the notion that the level of religious belief remains low inArmenia. According to a survey conducted in Armenia in 1997, while 87 per cent ofrespondents claim to belong to a religious denomination (84 per cent of respondentsbelong to the Armenian Apostolic Church) only 8 per cent of respondents reportattending religious services once a week or more (Values, 2006). Forty-six per cent ofrespondents report attending religious services once a year or less. A survey of 50experts conducted by the Armenian Center for National and International Studies(Razmavarakan ev azgayin hetazotutyunneri haykakan kentron) in 2004 found 74 percent of respondents answering that the role of the spiritual world in Armenian life was‘small’; 88 per cent did not think that Armenian society currently had clearly definedvalue-based guidelines, and 62 per cent answered that faith was fully or nearly absentfrom Armenian society (Benchmarks, 2004).

Conclusion

While official corruption and opaque elections remain the main institutional causes ofstalled democratisation in Armenia, societal factors also come into play whenevaluating the success of political transitions. Moreover, the corrupt nature ofgovernance in the country contributes to the perception that political institutions arenot a viable means for effective action and change (Babajanian, 2005). The ArmenianApostolic Church has therefore been able to assert itself as a powerful and highlytrusted institution in this setting, and to this day it continues to advocate its position aspreserver of Armenian national identity, enjoying a level of power that is greater thanits actual spiritual influence. The church uses this position to lobby for governmentbenefits and legislation which restricts the rights, and subsequently the growth, ofminority religious groups. Aside from suppressing individual rights, the atmosphere ofintolerance generated by the dominance of the Armenian Apostolic Church has helpedto contribute to a lack of understanding of the notion of human rights amongArmenian citizens and the weakness of opposition movements in the country.

Leaders of civil society organisations acknowledge that a great majority ofArmenian citizens do not understand – or even reject – the basic concepts of

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democracy, liberty and human rights. According to the head of a democracyadvocacy organisation in the country, Armenians understand human rights tomean ‘the rights of homosexuals, antinational ideas coming from Europe that wehave to incorporate into our culture . . . the work of NGOs. Whatever is bad theyunderstand it to fall under the category of human rights . . . antinational,antireligion, antitradition, westernisation, those types of things’ (Interview,2005b). Another democracy advocacy organisation in Yerevan administers civiceducational programmes geared toward secondary and postsecondary students aswell as local leaders. Several of their employees noted the lack of understanding ofdemocratic concepts in Armenian society. While Armenian young people mayidentify democracy with elections, they are also known to talk about electing the‘king’ (Interview, 2005e). Inexperience with actual democracy combined with littleformal training in democratic theory is preventing the formation of potentialactivists and political leaders. These employees also echoed the previouscommentator’s observation that the idea of human rights is associated withEuropean values and the protection of Jehovah’s Witnesses.

Admittedly, shifting popular attitudes from rejecting all religion to accepting aplural marketplace of religious ideas and practices will require education and time.New generations will need to learn that democratic society accepts a plurality ofviewpoints regarding how politics and society should be structured and maintained.The government and leading societal organisations – including the ArmenianApostolic Church – can help to foster pluralism by indicating their willingness totolerate and even cooperate with competing groups. This has not yet occurred. Thefailure of external pressure from international organisations and diaspora groups todevelop a more pluralistic culture suggests that such changes need to be homegrown.While civil society organisations do exist in Armenia, many are funded by foreigndonors and public membership in NGOs is only about two per cent of the population(Walker, 2007). Without an indigenous movement for change, it is unlikely thatpopular sentiments will shift in the near future. Moreover, those involved in the civilsociety sector do not express much optimism regarding the potential for Armenianyoung people to become politically active. Finally, in the religious sector, theArmenian Apostolic Church must learn to play by the rules of democratic society andattract adherents through competition rather than by default as a result of legislationwhich restricts other groups. By engaging in internal reforms and developing outreachprogrammes, the church can convince citizens to choose adherence to the traditionalchurch because of the spiritual rewards it offers, rather than because of their patrioticduty or lack of alternative options.

Notes

1 Research for this paper was supported by funding from IREX and the National ScienceFoundation (Grant No. 0516836). The author would like to thank Richard Hovannisian andDaniel Treisman for comments on earlier versions, Nairi Melkomian in Yerevan for research

assistance and the Turpanjian Center for Policy Analysis at the American University ofArmenia for institutional sponsorship during the data collection process. All errors andomissions are the sole responsibility of the author.

2 Established as the state church of Armenia in 301, the Armenian Apostolic Church is an

independent church in the Oriental Christian family of religions. Its spiritual centre is at theEtchmiadzin Cathedral and Monastery in the Republic of Armenia. The Armenian ApostolicChurch also has a Holy See in Antelias, Lebanon, and patriarchates in Jerusalem and

Constantinople.

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3 This trend does not appear to be specific to the postcommunist experience, however. In Greece

religious nationalism is used to defend teaching religion in schools and including religiousaffiliation on national identity cards (Mavrogordatos, 2003; Molokotos-Liederman, 2003).

4 In 1999 there were 48 registered groups, and by the time the Jehovah’s Witnesses were finallyallowed to register in October 2004 this number had increased to 56.

5 The literal translation of the word ‘proselytisation’ in Armenian is ‘hunting for souls’.6 The Armenian Apostolic Church recognises two historically traditional churches in Armenia

in addition to itself: the Catholic Church and the Armenian Evangelical Protestant Church.

The Evangelical Protestant Church is an umbrella organisation, encompassing the majormainline Protestant denominations in the country, similar to the All-Union Council ofEvangelical Christians-Baptists in the Soviet Union. While all other Christian denominations

are considered ‘sects’ these two are considered to be ‘churches’ because of their historicalpresence in the country and because they acknowledge the Apostolic Church’s predominance.Neither is permitted to ‘proselytise’, however. Members of these two churches acknowledge

the arrangement and in return for their quiescence enjoy a relationship with the ArmenianApostolic Church that no other religious group can claim.

7 One interview subject claimed that the group was created under the command of VazgenSargsyan, prime minister of Armenia at the time.

8 Other percentages for the year 2000 were Roman Catholics (4.6 per cent), Protestants (1.1 percent) and atheists and nonreligious people (13.3 per cent). It is important to note thatstatistics from the Soviet period are often unreliable, particularly with regard to figures

related to religious membership and practice. Moreover, as a result of ideas about theequation of ethnic and religious identity, many ‘traditional’ religions in the postsovietrepublics overstate adherence figures, and thus the precise meaning of reported figures can be

difficult to interpret.

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(b) Interviews Conducted by the Author

Interview (2005a) with Armenian policy analyst, 8 October, Yerevan, Armenia.

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Armenia.

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