Remedial Law Review I Deigests

8/16/2019 Remedial Law Review I Deigests

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1. DUERO v. CA

FACTS: On June 16, 1995, petitioner filed before the RTC

a complaint for Recovery of Possession andOwnership with Damages and Attorney's Fees against

private respondent and two others, namely,Apolinario and Inocencio Ruena.

Herein private respondent Eradel was declared indefault for failure to file his answer to the complaint.Thus, petitioner presented his evidence ex parte and a

judgment was rendered in his favor.On June 10, 1996, private respondent filed a

Motion for New Trial, alleging that he has beenoccupying the land as a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr., since 1958. He explained that he turned over thecomplaint and summons to Laurente in the honest

belief that as landlord, the latter had a better right tothe land and was responsible to defend any adverseclaim on it.

However, the trial court denied the motion fornew trial. Meanwhile, RED Conflict Case No.1029, anadministrative case between petitioner and applicant-contestants Romeo, Artemio and Jury Laurente,remained pending with the Office of the RegionalDirector of the Department of Environment andNatural Resources in Davao City.

On July 24, 1996, private respondent filed before

the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment,reiterating the same allegation in his Motion for NewTrial. He averred among others that unless there is adetermination on who owned the land, he could notbe made to vacate the land.

On October 8, 1996, the trial court issued anorder denying the Petition for Relief from Judgment.In a Motion for Reconsideration of said order, privaterespondent alleged that the RTC had no jurisdictionover the case, as it was under the jurisdiction of themunicipal trial court. The motion for reconsideration

was denied by the RTC. On January 22, 1997,petitioner filed a Motion for Execution, which the RTCgranted. On March 12, 1997, private respondent filedhis petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition,maintaining that private respondent is not estoppedfrom assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC.

ISSUE:

WON private respondent is estopped fromassailing the jurisdiction of the RTC.

RULING:

NO. Private respondent was not estopped fromquestioning the jurisdiction of the RTC. Thefundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of thecourt over an action cannot be waived by the parties,or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or evenby their express consent. Further, a party may assail

the jurisdiction of the court over the action at anystage of the proceedings and even on appeal. Even ifprivate respondent actively participated in theproceedings before said court, the doctrine ofestoppel cannot still be properly invoked against himbecause the question of lack of jurisdiction may beraised at any time and at any stage of the action. As ageneral rule, the jurisdiction of a court is not aquestion of acquiescence as a matter of fact, but anissue of conferment as a matter of law. Also, neitherwaiver nor estoppel shall apply to confer jurisdiction

upon a court, barring highly meritorious andexceptional circumstances.

Thus, in Javier v. Court of Appeals: x x x The pointsimply is that when a party commits error in filing hissuit or proceeding in a court that lacks jurisdiction totake cognizance of the same, such act may not at oncebe deemed sufficient basis of estoppel. It could havebeen the result of an honest mistake, or of divergentinterpretations of doubtful legal provisions.

If any fault is to be imputed to a party taking suchcourse of action, part of the blame should be placed

on the court which shall entertain the suit, therebylulling the parties into believing that they pursuedtheir remedies in the correct forum. Under the rules,it is the duty of the court to dismiss an action'whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdictionover the subject matter.' (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules ofCourt) Should the Court render a judgment without

jurisdiction, such judgment may be impeached orannulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132,Ibid), within ten (10) years from the finality of thesame.

The doctrine of estoppel must be applied only inexceptional cases, as its misapplication could result ina miscarriage of justice. Furthermore, if the RTC'sorder were to be sustained, private respondent wouldbe evicted from the land prematurely, while REDConflict Case No.1029 would remain unresolved. Sucheviction on a technicality if allowed could result in aninjustice, if it is later found that he has a legal right totill the land he now occupies as tenant-lessee.

2. DONATO v. CA

FACTS:


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Petitioner Antonio T. Donato is the registeredowner of a real property located at Ciriaco TuasonStreet, San Andres, Manila. On June 7, 1994,petitioner filed a complaint before the MeTC ofManila for forcible entry and unlawful detaineragainst 43 named defendants and all unknown

occupants of the subject property.Of the 43 named defendants, only 20 filed a

consolidated Answer wherein they contended thatthey cannot be evicted because the Urban LandReform Law guarantees security of tenure and priorityright to purchase the subject property among others.Following trial under the Rule on Summary Procedure,the MeTC rendered judgment on September 19, 1994against the 23 non-answering defendants. As to the20 private respondents, the MeTC issued a separate

judgment sustaining their rights under the Land

Reform Law, declaring petitioners cause of action asnot duly warranted by the facts and circumstances ofthe case and dismissing the case without prejudice.Petitioner appealed to the RTC which sustained thedecision of the MeTC. Undaunted, petitioner filed apetition for review with the CA.

The CA dismissed the petition on two grounds: (a)the certification of non-forum shopping was signed bypetitioners counsel and not by petitioner himself, inviolation of Revised Circular No. 28-91; and, (b) theonly annex to the petition is a certified copy of the

questioned decision but copies of the pleadings andother material portions of the record as wouldsupport the allegations of the petition are notannexed, contrary to Section 3, paragraph b, Rule 6 ofthe Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals(RIRCA).

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration andhis Supplement to his motion for reconsiderationsubmitting the duly authenticated original of thecertification of non-forum shopping signed bypetitioner himself and the relevant records of the

MeTC and the RTC. However, the CA deniedpetitioners motion for reconsideration and itssupplement, ruling that petitioner’s subsequent

compliance did not cure the defect.

ISSUES:

1. WON the subsequent compliance of thepetitioner cured the defect.

2. WON Petition for Review under Rule 45 is theproper remedy.

RULINGS:

1. YES. The rules on forum shopping, which wereprecisely designed to promote and facilitate theorderly administration of justice, should not beinterpreted with such absolute literalness as tosubvert its own ultimate and legitimate objectivewhich is simply to prohibit and penalize the evils of

forum-shopping. The subsequent filing of thecertification duly signed by the petitioner himselfshould thus be deemed substantial compliance, prohac vice. Further, petitioner has adequately explainedhis failure to personally sign the certification which

justifies relaxation of the rule. It was physicallyimpossible for the petition to have been prepared andsent to the petitioner in the United States, for him totravel from Virginia, U.S.A. to the nearest PhilippineConsulate in Washington, D.C., U.S.A., in order to signthe certification before the Philippine Consul, and for

him to send back the petition to the Philippines withinthe 15-day reglementary period. A litigation is not agame of technicalities. When technicality deserts itsfunction of being an aid to justice, the Court is

justified in exempting from its operations a particularcase. Technical rules of procedure should be used topromote, not frustrate justice. While the swiftunclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective,granting substantial justice is an even more urgentideal. The Courts pronouncement in Republic v. Courtof Appeals is worth echoing: cases should be

determined on the merits, after full opportunity to allparties for ventilation of their causes and defenses,rather than on technicality or some proceduralimperfections. In that way, the ends of justice wouldbe better served.

2. NO. The proper recourse of an aggrieved partyfrom a decision of the CA is a petition for review oncertiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.However, if the error, subject of the recourse, is oneof jurisdiction, or the act complained of wasperpetrated by a court with grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the properremedy available to the aggrieved party is a petitionfor certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. It isnecessary to draw a line between an error of

judgment and an error of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in theexercise of its jurisdiction, and which error isreviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, anerror of jurisdiction is one where the act complainedof was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicialbody without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave

abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or inexcess of jurisdiction. This error is correctible only by


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the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Inasmuch as thepresent petition principally assails the dismissal of thepetition on ground of procedural flaws involving the

jurisdiction of the court a quo to entertain thepetition, it falls within the ambit of a special civilaction for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of

Court.

3. SPOUSES GONZAGA v. CA

FACTS:

In 1970, spouses Gonzaga bought a parcel of landfrom Lucky Home Inc. Said lot was specificallydenominated as Lot No. 19 and which the spousesmortgaged to the Social Security Commission as asecurity for their housing loan. Meanwhile, thespouses started to construct their house on Lot No.

18, and not on Lot No. 19. They mistakenly identifiedLot No. 18 as Lot No. 19. Lucky Homes then informedthem of such mistake but the spouses instead offeredto buy Lot No. 18 to widen their premises, thus theycontinued building their house thereon. However forfailure on the part of the spouses to pay theirobligation to the SSS, Lot No. 19 was consequentlyforeclosed. The title thereto was cancelled and a newone was issued in the name of SSS. After suchforeclosure, the spouses offered to swap Lot Nos.18and 19 and demanded from lucky homes to reform

their contract. Lucky home however refused. Thisprompted the spouses to file an action forreformation of contract with damages before the RTC.

The RTC however dismissed the action for lack ofmerit and awarded lucky homes moral damages andattorney’s fees. Subsequently then, a writ of

execution was issued. Spouses urgently filed a motionto recall such writ, questioning now the jurisdiction ofthe RTC on the ground that the case falls within the

jurisdiction of the Housing and land use regulatoryboard. Subsequently, the spouses went to the CA to

annul RTC’s decision. CA dismissed the petition on theground that the spouses were estopped fromquestion RTC’s jurisdiction pursuant to the case ofTijam.. On the other hand spouses contended that thedoctrine in Tijam case has been abandoned.

ISSUE:

Whether the spouses Gonzaga is estopped fromquestioning the jurisdiction of the trial court?

HELD:

Yes. Petitioners claim that the recent decisions ofthis Court have already abandoned the doctrine laid

down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy . We do not agree. Incountless decisions, this Court has consistently heldthat, while an order or decision rendered without

jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be assailed at anystage, active participation in the proceedings in thecourt which rendered the order or decision will bar

such party from attacking its jurisdiction.In the case at bar, it was petitioners themselves

who invoked the jurisdiction of the court a quo byinstituting an action for reformation of contractagainst private respondents. It appears that, in theproceedings before the trial court, petitionersvigorously asserted their cause from start to finish.Not even once did petitioners ever raise the issue ofthe courts jurisdiction during the entire proceedingswhich lasted for two years. It was only after the trialcourt rendered its decision and issued a writ of

execution against them in 1998 did petitioners firstraise the issue of jurisdiction ─ and it was onlybecause said decision was unfavorable to them.Petitioners thus effectively waived their right toquestion the courts jurisdiction over the case theythemselves filed.

4. ESCOBAL v. GARCHITORENA

FACTS:

Escobal was a member of the of Armed Forces of

the Philippines and the Philippine Constabulary. OnMarch 16, 1990, Escobal was conducting surveillanceoperations on drug trafficking at the Sa Harong CaféBar and Restaurant located along Barlin St., Naga City.

He somehow got involved in a shooting incident,resulting in the death of one Rodney Rafael N. Nueca.On February 6, 1991, an amended Information wasfiled against him with the RTC of Naga City. Initially hefiled a motion to quash the info, questioning the RTC’s

jurisdiction, contending, among others, that as a PNPmember, his case should have been filed with the

court martial.His motion was denied. Trial then proceeded.After the prosecution has rested its case, Escobalagain filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that theRTC has no jurisdiction over him and the case, arguingthat since he committed the crime in the performanceof his duties, It is the Sandiganbayan which has

jurisdiction over the case. RTC then conducted apreliminary hearing as to whether Escobal committedthe crime charged in the performance of his duties.

Upon finding that Escobal was in the performance

of his duties when the crime was committed, RTCordered the public prosecutor to file a Re-Amended


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Information and to allege that the offense chargedwas committed by the petitioner in the performanceof his duties/functions or in relation to his office; and,conformably to R.A. No. 7975, to thereafter transmitthe same, as well as the complete records with thestenographic notes, to the Sandiganbayan. The

Sandiganbayan however remanded the case to theRTC, saying that under P.D. No. 1606, as amended byR.A. No. 7975, the RTC retained jurisdiction over thecase, considering that Escobal had a salary grade of23. Upon the remand of the records, the RTC set thecase for trial, for Escobal to continue presenting hisevidence. Instead of adducing his evidence, he filed apetition for certiorari, assailing the Order of thePresiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan remanding therecords of the case to the RTC.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Presiding Justice of the

Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of hisdiscretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdictionin ordering the remand of the case to the RTC.

HELD:

No. For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over crimes committedby public officers in relation to their office, it isessential that the facts showing the intimate relation

between the office of the offender and the dischargeof official duties must be alleged in the Information. Itis not enough to merely allege in the Information thatthe crime charged was committed by the offender inrelation to his office because that would be aconclusion of law. The amended Information filedwith the RTC against the petitioner does not containany allegation showing the intimate relation betweenhis office and the discharge of his duties. Hence, theRTC had jurisdiction over the offense charged whenon November 24, 1995, it ordered the re-amendment

of the Information to include therein an allegationthat the petitioner committed the crime in relation tooffice. The trial court erred when it ordered theelevation of the records to the Sandiganbayan. Itbears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 amending P.D. No.1606 was already in effect and under Section 2 of thelaw:

In cases where none of the principal accused are

occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27

or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No.

6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of

superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper

Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,

Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial

Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective

jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

5. AGAN, JR. v. PHIL INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINAL

FACTS: The contract for the construction and operation

for the NAIA IPT III was to PIATCO. Petitioners, whoare employees of service providers at the MIAA andNAIA Terminal I and II, and service providersthemselves, assails the following:

a) The provisions in the 1997 ConcessionAgreement and the ARCA which grantsPIATCO the exclusive right to operate acommercial international passenger terminal

within the island of Luzon;b)

The contracts further provide that upon thecommencement of operations at the NAIA IPTIII, the Government shall cause the closure ofNinoy Aquino International Airport PassengerTerminals I and II as international passengerterminals;

c)

With respect to existing concessionagreements between MIAA and internationalairport service providers regarding certainservices or operations, the 1997 Concession

Agreement and the ARCA uniformly providethat such services or operations will not becarried over to the NAIA IPT III and PIATCO isunder no obligation to permit carry overexcept through a separate agreement dulyentered into with PIATCO;

d) With respect to the petitioning serviceproviders and their employees, upon thecommencement of operations of the NAIA IPTIII, they alleged that will be effectiviely barredfrom providing international airport services

at the NAIA Terminals I and 2 as allinternational airlines and passengers will bediverted to the NAIA IPT III. The petitioningservice providers will thus be compelled tocontract with PIATCO alone for such services,with no assurance that subsisting contractswith MIAA and other international airlines willbe respected.

PIATCO alleges that the submission of thiscontroversy to the Supreme Court at the first instanceis a violation of the Rule on Hierarchy of Courts. They

contend that trial courts have concurrent jurisdictionwith the Supreme Court with respect to a special civil


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action for prohibition and hence, resort must first behad at the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether direct resort to the Supreme Court was a

proper rememdy?

HELD: YES.The rule on Hierarchy of courts will not

prevent this court from assuming jurisdiction over thecase at bar. The said rule may be relaxed whenredress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriatecourts or where exceptional and compellingcircumstances justify the availment of a remedywithin and calling for the exercise of this court’s

primary jurisdiction. It is easy to discern thatexceptional circumstances exist in the cases at bar

that call for the relaxation of the rule. The presentcase is of transcendental importance as it involves thethe construction and operation of the country’s

premier international airport.

6. LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY v. ATIENZA

FACTS: Liga is the national organization of all the

barangays in the Philippines, which pursuant toSection 492 of RA No. 7160 (LGC), constitutes the duly

elected presidents of highly-urbanized cities,provincial chapters, the metropolitan Manila Chapter,and metropolitan political subdivision chapters.

Section 493 of that law provides that “the liga at

the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan politicalsubdivision, and national levels directly elect apresident, a vice-president, and 5 members of theboard of directors.” All other matters not provided for

in the law affecting the internal organization of theleagues of LGUs shall be governed by their respectiveconstitution and by-laws, which must always conform

to the provisions of the Constitution and existing laws.Liga adopted and ratified its own Constitution and By-laws to govern its internal organization. Liga adoptedand ratified its own Election Code. Liga came out withits Calendar of Activities and Guidelines in theImplementation of the Liga Election Code of 2002,setting the synchronized elections for highlyurbanized city chapters, such as the Liga Chapter ofManila, together with independent component city,provincial, and metropolitan chapters.

Respondent City Council of Manila enacted

Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002, providing for theelection of representatives of the District Chapters in

the City Chapter of Manila and setting the electionsfor both chapters 30 days after the barangayelections. Liga sent respondent Mayor of Manila aletter requesting him that said ordinance be vetoedconsidering that it encroached upon, or evenassumed, the functions of the Liga through legislation,

a function which was clearly beyond the ambit of thepowers of the City Council. Mayor signed andapproved the city ordinance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Liga properly filed the case

directly with the Supreme Court.

HELD: No. Even granting arguendo that the present

petition is ripe for the extraordinary writ of certiorari,

there is here a clear disregard of the hierarchy ofcourts. No special and important reason orexceptional and compelling circumstance has beenadduced by the petitioner or the intervenor whydirect recourse to this Court should be allowed.

This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ ofcertiorari (as well as of prohibition, mandamus, quowarranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is notexclusive, but is concurrent with the RTC and CA incertain cases.

SC will not entertain direct resort to it unless the

redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriatecourts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy ofwrit of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary

jurisdiction. Petitioner’s reliance on Pimentel v.

Aguirre is misplaced because the non-observance ofthe hierarchy-of-courts rule was

7. MANILA BANKERS LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION

v.

EDDY NG KOK

FACTS: Eddy Ng Kok is a Singaporean businessman who

purchased a Condominium Unit located at Valle VerdeTerraces from the Petitioner. Kok paid the reservationfee then later on, paid 90% of the purchase price.Petitioner through its president executed a Contractto sell in favor of Kok which states that theCondominium will be completed and delivered to theRespondent within 15 months from February 1989 oron May 8, 1990. In April 1990 Kok went back to the

Philippines for the Unit only to find out that theturnover was reset to May 31, 1990. In July of the


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same year, Kok again went back to the Philippines butthe Unit was still uninhabitable for lack of electricityand water facilities, that the petitioner informed Kokthat he will move in on August 1990. Again, Kok wentback on October 1990 and learned that the unit wasstill unlovable.

Kok sent the petitioner a demand letter fordamages he incurred which the latter ignored. Thisprompted Kok to file a complaint for specificperformance and damages before the RTC of Makati.

Nevertheless, during the pendency of the action,Kok occupied the Unit, thus his cause of action waslimited for damages.

Judgment was rendered by the RTC in favor ofKok, which was affirmed by the CA. Petitioner filed amotion for reconsideration but the same was deniedby the appellate court, hence a petition for review on

certiorari with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC of Makati has Jurisdiction over

the case.

HELD:

On petitioner’s contention that the trial court has

no jurisdiction over the instant case, Section 1 (c) ofPresidential Decree No. 1344, as amended, it is theHLURB which has jurisdiction over the instant case.

The complaints for specific performance withdamages by a lot or condominium unit buyer againstthe owner or developer falls under the exclusive

jurisdiction of the HLURB.While it may be true that the trial court is

without jurisdiction over the case, petitioners active

participation in the proceedings estopped it from

assailing such lack of it. We have HELD: that it is an

undesirable practice of a party participating in the

proceedings and submitting its case for decision and

then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and

attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse. Here, petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before the trial court and the AppellateCourt. In effect, petitioner confirmed and ratified thetrial courts jurisdiction over this case. Certainly, it isnow in estoppel and can no longer question the trialcourts jurisdiction.

8. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v.

SARDILLO

9. KATON v. PALANCA

DISMISSAL; MOTU PROPRIO; RESIDUAL

JURISDICTION; RESIDUAL PREROGATIVE

FACTS:

On August 2, 1963, herein petitioner GeorgeKaton filed a request with the District Office of the

Bureau of Forestry in Puerto Princesa, Palawan, forthe re-classification of a piece of real property knownas Sombrero Island, located in Tagpait, Aborlan,Palawan for the purpose of eventual conversion orreclassification from forest to agricultural land, andthereafter for Katon to apply for homestead patent.

Then, in 1965, the Director of Forestry informedthe Director of Lands, that since the subject land wasno longer needed for forest purposes, the same istherefore certified and released as agricultural landfor disposition under the Public Land Act.

However, there were also several favorableendorsements that were made to survey the islandunder the request of herein respondents. Then, therecords show that, on November 8, 1996, one of therespondents Juan Fresnillo filed a homestead patentapplication for the portion of the island consisiting of8.5 hectares and the respondent Jesus Gapilango fileda homestead application on June 8, 1972. Therespondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued aHomestead Patent No. 14527 and OCT No. G-7098 onMarch 3, 1875 with an area of 6.84 hectares of

Sombrero Island.Petitioner assails the validity of the homesteadpatents and original certificates of title coveringcertain portions of Sombrero Island issued in favor ofrespondents on the ground that the same wereobtained through fraud. Petitioner prays for thereconveyance of the whole island in his favor.

The petitioner seeks to nullify the homesteadpatents and original certificates of title issued in favorof the respondents covering certain portions of theSombrero Island as well as the reconveyance of the

whole island in his favor. The petitioner claims that hehas the exclusive right to file an application forhomestead patent over the whole island since it washe who requested for its conversion from forest landto agricultural land.

Respondents aver that they are all bona fide andlawful possessors of their respective portions andhave declared said portions for taxation purposes andthat they have been faithfully paying taxes thereonfor twenty years.

Respondents contend that the petitioner has no

legal capacity to sue insofar as the island is concernedbecause an action for reconveyance can only be


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brought by the owner and not a mere homesteadapplicant and that petitioner is guilty of estoppel bylaches for his failure to assert his right over the landfor an unreasonable and unexplained period of time.

Respondents filed their Answer with Specialand/or Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim in due

time. On June 30, 1999, they also filed a Motion toDismiss on the ground of the alleged defiance bypetitioner of the trial court’s Order to amend his

Complaint so he could thus effect a substitution bythe legal heirs of the deceased, RespondentGapilango.The Motion to Dismiss was granted by theRTC in its Order dated July 29, 1999.

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the

July 29, 1999 Order was denied by the trial court in itsResolution dated December 17, 1999, for being a thirdand prohibited motion. In his Petition for Certiorari

before the CA, petitioner charged the trial court withgrave abuse of discretion on the ground that thedenied Motion was his first and only Motion forReconsideration of the aforesaid Order.

Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint becauseof prescription invoking residual prerogative.

ISSUE:

Is the Court of Appeals correct in invoking itsalleged ‘residual prerogative’ under Section 1, Rule 9of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in resolving the

Petition on an issue not raised in the Petition?"

HELD:

Yes. Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules ofCourt, defenses and objections not pleaded either in amotion to dismiss or in the answer are deemedwaived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over thesubject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and(4) prescription are evident from the pleadings or theevidence on record.

In the four excepted instances, the court shall

motu proprio dismiss the claim or action. In Gumabonv. Larin11 we explained thus:"x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a

case was traditionally limited to instanceswhen the court clearly had no jurisdictionover the subject matter and when theplaintiff did not appear during trial, failed toprosecute his action for an unreasonablelength of time or neglected to comply withthe rules or with any order of the court.Outside of these instances, any motu proprio

dismissal would amount to a violation of theright of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for

qualifying and expanding Section 2, Rule 9,and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rulesof Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules of CivilProcedure brought about no radical change.Under the new rules, a court may motuproprio dismiss a claim when it appears from

the pleadings or evidence on record that ithas no jurisdiction over the subject matter;when there is another cause of actionpending between the same parties for thesame cause, or where the action is barred bya prior judgment or by statute of limitations.x x x."12 (Italics supplied)

On the other hand, "residual jurisdiction" isembodied in Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules ofCourt, as follows:

"SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect

thereof. – A party’s appeal by notice of appealis deemed perfected as to him upon the filingof the notice of appeal in due time.

"A party’s appeal by record on appeal isdeemed perfected as to him with respect tothe subject matter thereof upon the approvalof the record on appeal filed in due time.

"In appeals by notice of appeal, the courtloses jurisdiction over the case upon theperfection of the appeals filed in due time andthe expiration of the time to appeal of the

other parties."In appeals by record on appeal, the courtloses jurisdiction only over the subject matterthereof upon the approval of the records onappeal filed in due time and the expiration ofthe time to appeal of the other parties.

"In either case, prior to the transmittal ofthe original record or the record on appeal,the court may issue orders for the protectionand preservation of the rights of the partieswhich do not involve any matter litigated by

the appeal, approve compromises, permitappeals of indigent litigants, order executionpending appeal in accordance with Section 2of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of theappeal." (Italics supplied)The "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts is

available at a stage in which the court is normallydeemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or thesubject matter involved in the appeal. This stage isreached upon the perfection of the appeals by theparties or upon the approval of the records on appeal,

but prior to the transmittal of the original records orthe records on appeal. In either instance, the trial


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court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction toissue protective orders, approve compromises, permitappeals of indigent litigants, order execution pendingappeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.

The CA’s motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s

Complaint could not have been based, therefore, on

residual jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably, suchorder of dismissal was not one for the protection andpreservation of the rights of the parties, pending thedisposition of the case on appeal. What the CAreferred to as residual prerogatives were the generalresidual powers of the courts to dismiss an actionmotu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and under authorityof Section 2 of Rule 1 of the same rules.

To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances inmind when it dismissed the Complaint motu proprio

"on more fundamental grounds directly bearing onthe lower court’s lack of jurisdiction" and for

prescription of the action. Indeed, when a court hasno jurisdiction over the subject matter, the onlypower it has is to dismiss the action.

10. FIGUEROA v. PEOPLE

ESTOPPEL;

FACTS:

On July 8, 1994, an information

for recklessimprudence resulting in homicide was filed againstthe petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofBulacan, Branch 18. The merits ensued and on August19, 1998, the trial court convicted the petitioner ascharged. In his appeal before the CA, the petitionerquestioned, among others, for the first time, the trialcourt’s jurisdiction.

The appellate court, however, in the challengeddecision, considered the petitioner to have activelyparticipated in the trial and to have belatedly attacked

the jurisdiction of the RTC; thus, he was alreadyestopped by laches from asserting the trial court’slack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the active participation of theFigueroa in the trial of the case, which was initiatednot by him but the public prosecutor constituteslaches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v.Sibonghanoy?

HELD:

No. In applying the doctrine of Sibonghanoy, thepetitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailingthe jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raisedthe lack thereof in his appeal before the appellatecourt.

At that time, no considerable period had yet

elapsed for laches to attach. True, delay alone, thoughunreasonable, will not sustain the defense of"estoppel by laches" unless it further appears that theparty, knowing his rights, has not sought to enforcethem until the condition of the party pleading lacheshas in good faith become so changed that he cannotbe restored to his former state, if the rights be thenenforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title,intervention of equities, and other causes. In applyingthe principle of estoppel by laches in the exceptionalcase of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein considered the

patent and revolting inequity and unfairness of havingthe judgment creditors go up their Calvary once moreafter more or less 15 years. The same, however, doesnot obtain in the instant case.

We note at this point that estoppel, being in thenature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to beapplied rarely—only from necessity, and only inextraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must beapplied with great care and the equity must be strongin its favor. When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppelmay be a most effective weapon for the

accomplishment of injustice. Moreover, a judgmentrendered without jurisdiction over the subject matteris void. Hence, the Revised Rules of Court provides forremedies in attacking judgments rendered by courtsor tribunals that have no jurisdiction over theconcerned cases. No laches will even attach when the

judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction.

Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal isnot affected by the defenses or theories set up by thedefendant or respondent in his answer or motion todismiss. Jurisdiction should be determined by

considering not only the status or the relationship ofthe parties but also the nature of the issues orquestions that is the subject of the controversy. Theproceedings before a court or tribunal without

jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void,hence, susceptible to direct and collateral attacks.

11. HANNAH SERANA v. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, a high-ranking

public officer, being then the Student Regent of theUniversity of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City,


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with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a privateindividual, were charged with estafa before thrSandiganbayan for alleged misappropriation of publicfunds Amounting to Php 15 Million issued by theOffice of the President, for their personal use andbenefit, and despite repeated demands.

Said funds were for the renovation of the VinzonsHall of the University of the Philippines which will berenamed as "President Joseph Ejercito EstradaStudent Hall. However, the said project did notmaterialize prompting the succeeding student regentto file a case against her. Petitioner moved to quashthe information.

She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does nothave any jurisdiction over the offense charged or overher person, in her capacity as UP student regent. Sheposited that as a student regent, she was not a public

officer since she merely represented her peers. Sheadded that she was a simple student and did notreceive any salary as a student regent nor does shefall under Salary Grade 27.

ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the

case?

HELD:

Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over

other felonies committed by public officials in relationto their office. Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 provides:B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple orcomplexed with other crimes committed by the publicofficials and employees mentioned in subsection a ofthis section in relation to their office.

Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirementsthat (a) the offense is committed by public officialsand employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No.1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is

committed in relation to their office. It is not only thesalary grade that determines the jurisdiction of theSandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has

jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No.1606.

In Geduspan v. People, We HELD: that while thefirst part of Section 4(A) covers only officials withSalary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specificallyincludes other executive officials whose positions maynot be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are byexpress provision of law placed under the jurisdiction

of the said court.

Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of theSandiganbayan as she is placed there by expressprovision of law. Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdictionover Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers ofgovernment-owned or controlled corporations, state

universities or educational institutions or foundations.Petitioner falls under this category.

As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BORperforms functions similar to those of a board oftrustees of a non-stock corporation. By expressmandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officeras contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.

It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined bythe averments in the information. More than that,

jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theoriesset up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a

motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirelyupon the whims of defendant or respondent.

The Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over estafa was

reiterated with greater firmness in Bondoc v.Sandiganbayan. Pertinent parts of the Court’s ruling inBondoc read: xxxthe inability of the Sandiganbayan tohold a joint trial of Bondoc’s cases and those of the

government employees separately charged for thesame crimes, has not altered the nature of theoffenses charged, as estafa thru falsification

punishable by penalties higher than prisioncorreccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine ofP6,000.00, committed by government employees inconspiracy with private persons, including Bondoc.These crimes are within the exclusive, original

jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannotbe taken cognizance of by the regular courts, apartfrom the fact that even if the cases could be sotransferred, a joint trial would nonetheless not bepossible.

12. PAT-OG SR. v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

FACTS:

Robert Bang-on (Bang-on), then a 14-year oldsecond year high school student of the AntadaoNational High School in Sagada, Mountain Province,filed an affidavit-complaint against Pat-og, a third yearhigh school teacher of the same school, before theCivil Service Commission-Cordillera AdministrativeRegion (CSC-CAR) for misconduct and a criminal caseagainst Pat-og for the crime of Less Serious Physical

Injury with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bontoc,Mountain Province. Ruling of the CSC-CAR: In its


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Decision, dated September 19, 2006, the CSC-CARfound Pat-og guilty of Simple Misconduct.

On December 11, 2006, the motion forreconsideration filed by Pat-og was denied for lack ofmerit.

The Ruling of the CSC: In its Resolution, dated

April 11, 2007, the CSC dismissed Pat-og’s appeal andaffirmed with modification the decision of the CSC-CAR and adjudged Pat-og guilty of grave misconduct.Pat-og filed a motion for reconsideration, questioningfor the first time the jurisdiction of CSC over the case.He contended that administrative charges against apublic school teacher should have been initially heardby a committee to be constituted pursuant to theMagna Carta for Public School Teachers. CA affirmedthe resolutions of the CSC. It agreed that Pat-og wasestopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC

as the records clearly showed that he activelyparticipated in the proceedings.

CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed byPat-og. Hence, the present petition with the following

ISSUE:

WON CSC has jurisdiction over the administrativecase filed against Pat-og?

HELD:

In Puse v. Santos-Puse, it was HELD: that the CSC,

the Department of Education (DepEd) and the Boardof Professional Teachers-Professional RegulatoryCommission (PRC) have concurrent jurisdiction overadministrative cases against public school teachers.Under Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, the CSC isthe body charged with the establishment andadministration of a career civil service whichembraces all branches and agencies of thegovernment. Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (theAdministrative Code of 1987)12 and PresidentialDecree (P.D.) No. 807 (the Civil Service Decree of the

Philippines) expressly provide that the CSC has thepower to hear and decide administrative disciplinarycases instituted with it or brought to it on appeal.

Thus, the CSC, as the central personnel agency ofthe government, has the inherent power to superviseand discipline all members of the civil service,including public school teachers.

Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessedover the same parties or subject matter at the sametime by two or more separate tribunals. When the lawbestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to

hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it isto be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive

unless it be proved that another body is likewisevested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, bothbodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in severaltribunals, the body that first takes cognizance of thecomplaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion

of the others.

13. BOSTON EQUITY v. CA

FACTS:

On 24 December 1997, petitioner filed acomplaint for sum of money with a prayer for theissuance of a writ of preliminary attachment againstthe spouses Manuel and Lolita Toledo. Therespondent Lolita Toledo filed an Answer dated 19March 1998 but on 7 May 1998, she filed a Motion for

Leave to Admit Amended Answer in which shealleged, among others, that her husband and co-defendant, Manuel Toledo (Manuel), is already dead.The death certificate of Manuel states “13 July 1995”

as the date of death.As a result, petitioner filed a motion, dated 5

August 1999, to require respondent to disclose theheirs of Manuel. In compliance with the verbal orderof the court during the 11 October 1999 hearing ofthe case, respondent submitted the required namesand addresses of the heirs. Petitioner then filed a

Motion for Substitution, dated 18 January 2000,praying that Manuel be substituted by his children asparty-defendants. It appears that this motion wasgranted by the trial court in an Order dated 9 October2000.

Pre-trial thereafter ensued and on 18 July 2001,the trial court issued its pre-trial order containing,among others, the dates of hearing of the case. Thetrial of the case then proceeded. Herein petitioner, asplaintiff, presented its evidence and its exhibits werethereafter admitted. On 26 May 2004, the reception

of evidence for herein respondent was cancelled uponagreement of the parties.On 24 September 2004, counsel for herein

respondent was given a period of fifteen days withinwhich to file a demurrer to evidence. However, on 7October 2004, respondent instead filed a motion todismiss the complaint, citing the following as grounds:(1) that the complaint failed to implead anindispensable party or a real party in interest; hence,the case must be dismissed for failure to state a causeof action; (2) that the trial court did not acquire

jurisdiction over the person of Manuel pursuant toSection 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court; (3)


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that the trial court erred in ordering the substitutionof the deceased Manuel by his heirs; and (4) that thecourt must also dismiss the case against Lolita Toledoin accordance with Section 6, Rule 86 of the Rules ofCourt.

The trial court, in an Order dated 8 November

2004, denied the motion to dismiss for having beenfiled out of time, citing Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997Rules of Court which states that: “*W+ithin the time

for but before filing the answer to the complaint orpleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may bemade.”

Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the

order of denial was likewise denied on the groundthat “defendants’ attack on the jurisdiction of this

Court is now barred by estoppel by laches” since

respondent failed to raise the issue despite several

chances to do so.Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for

certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that thetrial court seriously erred and gravely abused itsdiscretion in denying her motion to dismiss despitediscovery, during the trial of the case, of evidence thatwould constitute a ground for dismissal of the case.

The Court of Appeals granted the petition on theground that when Boston filed the complaint,defendant Manuel S. Toledo was already dead. Suchbeing the case, the court a quo could not have

acquired jurisdiction over the person of defendantManuel S. Toledo. Thus, the court’s denial of the

motion to dismiss as based on the attack on the jurisdiction of the court.

The CA also held that the attack on the jurisdiction of the court is not barred by laches,despite her active participation on the proceedings. Itis well-settled that issue on jurisdiction may be raisedat any stage of the proceeding, even for the first timeon appeal. By timely raising the issue on jurisdiction inher motion to dismiss is not estopped from raising the

question on jurisdiction. Moreover, when issue on jurisdiction was raised by respondent, the court a quohad not yet decided the case, hence, there is no basisfor the court a quo to invoke estoppel to justify itsdenial of the motion for reconsideration.

It should be stressed that when the complaint wasfiled, defendant Manuel S. Toledo was already dead.The complaint should have impleaded the estate ofManuel S. Toledo as defendant, not only the wife,considering that the estate of Manuel S. Toledo is anindispensable party, which stands to be benefited or

be injured in the outcome of the case.

The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion

for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

1.

Whether or not Lolita Toledo is alreadyestopped from questioning the trial court’s

jurisdiction?2. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over

Manuel Toledo?3.

Whether or not the estate of Manuel Toledois an indispensible party?

4.

Whether or not the inclusion of Manuel asparty-defendant is a mere misjoinder of partynot warranting the dismissal of the casebefore the lower court?

HELD:

1. No.Petitioner’s argument that respondent’s motion

to dismiss questioning the trial court’s jurisdiction was

filed more than six years after her amended answerwas filed. Further, respondent had severalopportunities, at various stages of the proceedings, toassail the trial court’s jurisdiction but never did so for

six straight years. This argument is misplaced becauseit failed to consider that jurisdiction has severalaspects. The aspect of jurisdiction which may bebarred from being assailed as a result of estoppel by

laches is jurisdiction over the subject matter.The aspect of jurisdiction which may be barredfrom being assailed as a result of estoppel by laches is

jurisdiction over the subject matter. In Tijam, the caserelied upon by petitioner, the issue involved was theauthority of the then Court of First Instance to hear acase for the collection of a sum of money in theamount of P1,908.00 which amount was, at that time,within the exclusive original jurisdiction of themunicipal courts. In subsequent cases citing the rulingof the Court in Tijam, what was likewise at issue was

the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subjectmatter of the case.Accordingly, in Spouses Gonzaga v. Court of

Appeals, 394 SCRA 472 (2002), the issue forconsideration was the authority of the regional trialcourt to hear and decide an action for reformation ofcontract and damages involving a subdivision lot, itbeing argued therein that jurisdiction is vested in theHousing and Land Use Regulatory Board pursuant toPD 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium BuyersProtective Decree). In Lee v. Presiding Judge, MTC,

Legaspi City, 145 SCRA 408 (1986), petitioners arguedthat the respondent municipal trial court had no


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jurisdiction over the complaint for ejectment becausethe issue of ownership was raised in the pleadings.

Finally, in People v. Casuga, 53 SCRA 278 (1973),accused-appellant claimed that the crime of graveslander, of which she was charged, falls within theconcurrent jurisdiction of municipal courts or city

courts and the then courts of first instance, and thatthe judgment of the court of first instance, to whichshe had appealed the municipal court’s conviction,should be deemed null and void for want of

jurisdiction as her appeal should have been filed withthe Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.

In all of these cases, the Supreme Court barredthe attack on the jurisdiction of the respective courtsconcerned over the subject matter of the case basedon estoppel by laches, declaring that parties cannotbe allowed to belatedly adopt an inconsistent posture

by attacking the jurisdiction of a court to which theysubmitted their cause voluntarily.

Here, what respondent was questioning in hermotion to dismiss before the trial court was thatcourt’s jurisdiction over the person of defendant

Manuel. Thus, the principle of estoppel by laches findsno application in this case. Instead, the principlesrelating to jurisdiction over the person of the partiesare pertinent herein.

If the objection to the jurisdiction is not raisedeither in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, the

objection to the jurisdiction over the person of theplaintiff or the defendant is deemed waived. Since thedefense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of aparty to a case is not one of those defenses which arenot deemed waived under Section 1 of Rule 9, suchdefense must be invoked when an answer or a motionto dismiss is filed in order to prevent a waiver of thedefense. If the objection is not raised either in amotion to dismiss or in the answer, the objection tothe jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff or thedefendant is deemed waived by virtue of the first

sentence of the above-quoted Section 1 of Rule 9 ofthe Rules of Court.

2. No.

The jurisdiction over the person of Manuel wasnever acquired by the trial court. A defendant isinformed of a case against him when he receivessummons. “Summons is a writ by which thedefendant is notified of the action brought againsthim. Service of such writ is the means by which thecourt acquires jurisdiction over his person.”

In the case at bar, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel since there was

no valid service of summons upon him, preciselybecause he was already dead even before thecomplaint against him and his wife was filed in thetrial court.

3. No.

An indispensable party is one who has such aninterest in the controversy or subject matter of a casethat a final adjudication cannot be made in his or herabsence, without injuring or affecting that interest. Heor she is a party who has not only an interest in thesubject matter of the controversy, but “an interest of

such nature that a final decree cannot be madewithout affecting [that] interest or leaving thecontroversy in such a condition that its finaldetermination may be wholly inconsistent with equityand good conscience. It has also been considered that

an indispensable party is a person in whose absencethere cannot be a determination between the partiesalready before the court which is effective, completeor equitable.” Further, an indispensable party is one

who must be included in an action before it mayproperly proceed.

On the other hand, a “person is not an

indispensable party if his interest in the controversyor subject matter is separable from the interest of theother parties, so that it will not necessarily be directlyor injuriously affected by a decree which does

complete justice between them. Also, a person is notan indispensable party if his presence would merelypermit complete relief between him or her and thosealready parties to the action, or if he or she has nointerest in the subject matter of the action.” It is not asufficient reason to declare a person to be anindispensable party simply because his or herpresence will avoid multiple litigations.

Applying the foregoing pronouncements to thecase at bar, it is clear that the estate of Manuel is notan indispensable party to the collection case, for the

simple reason that the obligation of Manuel and hiswife, respondent herein, is solidary. Based on theprovisions and stipulations of the contract were thenfollowed by the respective signatures of respondentas “MAKER” and her husband as “CO-MAKER.” Thus,pursuant to Article 1216 of the Civil Code, petitionermay collect the entire amount of the obligation fromrespondent only. The aforementioned provisionstates: “The creditor may proceed against any one ofthe solidary debtors or some or all of themsimultaneously. The demand made against one of

them shall not be an obstacle to those which may


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subsequently be directed against the others, so longas the debt has not been fully collected.”

In other words, the collection case can proceedand the demands of petitioner can be satisfied byrespondent only, even without impleading the estateof Manuel. Consequently, the estate of Manuel is not

an indispensable party to petitioner’s complaint forsum of money.

Based on the foregoing, the estate of Manuel isnot an indispensable party and the case can proceedas against respondent only. That petitioner opted tocollect from respondent and not from the estate ofManuel is evidenced by its opposition to respondent’smotion to dismiss asserting that the case, as againsther, should be dismissed so that petitioner canproceed against the estate of Manuel.

4. No.Under Section 11 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court

states that “*n+either misjoinder nor non-joinder ofparties is ground for dismissal of an action. Partiesmay be dropped or added by order of the court onmotion of any party or on its own initiative at anystage of the action and on such terms as are just. Anyclaim against a misjoined party may be severed andproceeded with separately.” Based on the last

sentence of the afore-quoted provision of law, amisjoined party must have the capacity to sue or be

sued in the event that the claim by or against themisjoined party is pursued in a separate case. In thiscase, therefore, the inclusion of Manuel in thecomplaint cannot be considered a misjoinder, as infact, the action would have proceeded against himhad he been alive at the time the collection case wasfiled by petitioner. This being the case, the remedyprovided by Section 11 of Rule 3 does not obtain here.The name of Manuel as party-defendant cannotsimply be dropped from the case. Instead, theprocedure taken by the Court in Sarsaba v. Vda. de Te,

594 SCRA 410 (2009), whose facts, as mentionedearlier, resemble those of this case, should befollowed herein. As a result, the case, as againstManuel, must be dismissed.

In addition, the dismissal of the case againstManuel is further warranted by Section 1 of Rule 3 ofthe Rules of Court, which states that: only natural or

juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may beparties in a civil action.”

Where the defendant is neither a natural nor a juridical person or an entity authorized by law, the

complaint may be dismissed on the ground that thepleading asserting the claim states no cause of action

or for failure to state a cause of action pursuant toSection 1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, becausea complaint cannot possibly state a cause of actionagainst one who cannot be a party to a civil action.Since the proper course of action against the wrongfulinclusion of Manuel as party-defendant is the

dismissal of the case as against him, thus did the trialcourt err when it ordered the substitution of Manuelby his heirs.

Substitution is proper only where the party to besubstituted died during the pendency of the case, asexpressly provided for by Section 16, Rule 3 of theRules of Court. Since Manuel was already dead at thetime of the filing of the complaint, the court neveracquired jurisdiction over his person and, in effect,there was no party to be substituted.

14. PEOPLE v. HENRY T. GO

FACTS:

A certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaintwith the Office of the Ombudsman against severalindividuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019 (anti-graft).

Among those charged was herein Henry T. Go,who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO,for having supposedly conspired with then DOTCSecretary Arturo Enrile in entering into a contract

which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous tothe government.The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon

found probable cause to indict, among others, hereinHenry T. Go for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.While there was likewise a finding of probable causeagainst Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indictedbecause he died prior to the issuance of theresolution finding probable cause.

Thus an information was filed against Henrybefore the Sandiganbayan. Sandiganbayan however

ordered the prosecutor to show cause why this caseshould not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction overthe person of the accused considering that theaccused is a private person and the public officialArturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is alreadydeceased, and not an accused in this case.

On the other hand, Henry filed a Motion to Quashthe Information filed against him on the ground thatthe operative facts adduced therein do not constitutean offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.

, citing the show cause order of the SB, also

contended that, independently of the deceasedSecretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he was


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alleged to have conspired, Henry, who is not a publicofficer nor was capacitated by any official authority asa government agent, may not be prosecuted forviolation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.

The prosecution however argued that the SB hasexclusive jurisdiction over Henry’s case, even if he is a

private person, because he was alleged to haveconspired with a public officer.SB granted Henry’s

motion to quash.

ISSUE:

Whether Henry,, a private person, may beindicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A.3019 even if the public officer, with whom he wasalleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filingof the Information.

HELD:Yes. It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's

death, there is no longer any public officer with whomrespondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019.It does not mean, however, that the allegation ofconspiracy between them can no longer be proved orthat their alleged conspiracy is already expunged.

The only thing extinguished by the death ofSecretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death didnot extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis ofthe charge of conspiracy between him and private

respondent. Stated differently, the death of SecretaryEnrile does not mean that there was no public officerwho allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. Infact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzonfound probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile forinfringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.14Were it not for his death, he should have beencharged.

The requirement before a private person may beindicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019,among others, is that such private person must be

alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a publicofficer. The law, however, does not require that suchperson must, in all instances, be indicted togetherwith the public officer. If circumstances exist wherethe public officer may no longer be charged in court,as in the present case where the public officer hasalready died, the private person may be indictedalone.

15. CITY OF MANILA v. JUDGE CUERDO

FACTS:

Petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer,assessed taxes against private respondents SM Mart,Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star Appliances Center,Supervalue, Inc., Ace Hardware Philippines, Inc.,Watsons Personal Care Stores Phils., Inc., JollimartPhilippines Corp., Surplus Marketing Corp. and

Signature Lines. Said assessment covered the localbusiness taxes petitioners were authorized to collectunder Section 21 of the same Code.

Because payment of the taxes assessed was aprecondition for the issuance of their businesspermits, private respondents were constrained to paythe P19,316,458.77 assessment under protest. OnJanuary 24, 2004, private respondents filed [with theRegional Trial Court of Pasay City] the complaintdenominated as one for “Refund or Recovery ofIllegally and/or Erroneously-Collected Local Business

Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ ofPreliminary Injunction” before public respondent’s

sala [at Branch 112]. In its Order dated July 9, 2004,the RTC granted private respondents’ application for awrit of preliminary injunction. Petitioners filed aMotion for Reconsideration but the RTC denied it inits Order dated October 15, 2004. Petitioners thenfiled a special civil action for certiorari with the CAassailing the July 9, 2004 and October 15, 2004 Ordersof the RTC. CA dismissed petitioners’ petition for

certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction over the

said petition. The CA ruled that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents’ complaint for

tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested inthe Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to itsexpanded jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9282(RA 9282), it follows that a petition for certiorariseeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued inthe said case should, likewise, be filed with the CTA.

ISSUE:

WON the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil

action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory orderissued by the RTC in a local tax case?

HELD:

While it is clearly stated that the Court of TaxAppeals (CTA) has exclusive appellate jurisdiction overdecisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional TrialCourts (RTCs) in local tax cases originally decided orresolved by them in the exercise of their original orappellate jurisdiction, there is no categoricalstatement under RA 1125 as well as the amendatory

RA 9282, which provides that the Court of Tax Appealshas jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari assailing


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interlocutory orders issued by the Regional Trial Courtin local tax cases filed before it; The prevailingdoctrine is that the authority to issue writs ofcertiorari involves the exercise of original jurisdictionwhich must be expressly conferred by theConstitution or by law and cannot be implied from the

mere existence of appellate jurisdiction.While there is no express grant of the power to

issue writ of certiorari, with respect to the Court ofTax Appeals (CTA), Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicialpower shall be vested in one Supreme Court and insuch lower courts as may be established by law andthat judicial power includes the duty of the courts of

justice to settle actual controversies involving rightswhich are legally demandable and enforceable, and todetermine whether or not there has been a grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch orinstrumentality of the Government.

It can be fairly interpreted that the power of theCTA includes that of determining whether or notthere has been grave abuse of discretion amountingto lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTCin issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling withinthe exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court.

It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutionalmandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of

certiorari in these cases. Indeed, in order for anyappellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue,among others, a writ of certiorari.

In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealedtax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumedthat the law intended to transfer also such power as isdeemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of suchappellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reasonwhy the transfer should only be considered as partial,not total. Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the

present Rules of Court provides that when by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer,all auxiliary writs, processes and other meansnecessary to carry it into effect may be employed bysuch court or officer.

The Supreme Court agrees with the ruling of theCourt of Appeals (CA) that since appellate jurisdictionover private respondents’ complaint f or tax refund isvested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), it followsthat a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of aninterlocutory order issued in the said case should,

likewise, be filed with the same court.—If this Courtwere to sustain petitioners’ contention that

jurisdiction over their certiorari petition lies with theCA, this Court would be confirming the exercise bytwo judicial bodies, the CA and the CTA, of jurisdictionover basically the same subject matter — preciselythe split — jurisdiction situation which is anathema tothe orderly administration of justice.


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1. EVANGELINE ALDAY v. FGU INSURANCE

CORPORATION

FACTS:

FGU insurance filed a collection case withdamages, etc. against their insurance agent, Alday

who allegedly owed it unliquidated cash advances,unremitted costs of premiums and other charges.Alday filed her answer and by way of counterclaimasserted her right for the alleged unpaid commissionsand bonuses and damages against FGU.

FGU filed a "Motion to Strike Out Answer WithCompulsory Counterclaim And To Declare DefendantIn Default" because Alday's answer was allegedly filedout of time. Trial court denied the motion andrejected FGU's motion for reconsideration.

FGU filed a motion to dismiss Alday's

counterclaim, contending that the trial court neveracquired jurisdiction over the same because of thenon-payment of docket fees by Alday. In response,Alday asked the trial court to declare her counterclaimas exempt from payment of docket fees since it iscompulsory and that FGU be declared in default forhaving failed to answer such counterclaim.

Trial court granted FGU's motion to dismissAlday's counterclaim and consequently, deniedAlday's motion. The court found Alday's counterclaimto be merely permissive in nature and held that

Alday's failure to pay docket fees prevented the courtfrom acquiring jurisdiction over the same. The trialcourt similar denied Alday's motion forreconsideration. The Court of Appeals sustained thetrial court, finding that Alday's own admissions, ascontained in her answer, show that her counterclaimis merely permissive. The appellate court deniedAlday's motion for reconsideration, giving rise to thepresent petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Alday is required to pay docketfees?

HELD:

In determining if Alday is required to pay thedocket fees, the Supreme Court ruled first on theissue of whether or not the counterclaim of petitioneris compulsory or permissive in nature.

A compulsory counterclaim is one which, beingcognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises outof or is connected with the transaction or occurrence

constituting the subject matter of the opposingparty's claim and does not require for its adjudication

the presence of third parties of whom the courtcannot acquire jurisdiction.

In Valencia v. Court of Appeals, this Courtcapsulized the criteria or tests that may be used indetermining whether a counterclaim is compulsory orpermissive, summarized as follows:

1.

Are the issues of fact and law raised by theclaim and counterclaim largely the same?

2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit ondefendant's claim absent the compulsorycounterclaim rule?

3.

Will substantially the same evidence supportor refute plaintiff's claim as well s defendant'scounterclaim?

4. Is there any logical relation between the claimand the counterclaim?

Another test, applied in the more recent case of

Quintanilla v. Court of Appeals, is the "compelling testof compulsoriness" which requires "a logicalrelationship between the claim and counterclaim, thatis, where conducting separate trials of the respectiveclaims of the parties would entail a substantialduplication of effort and time by the parties and thecourt."

Tested against the abovementioned standards,petitioner's counterclaim for commissions, bonuses,and accumulated premium reserves is merelypermissive. The evidence required to prove

petitioner's claims differs from that needed toestablish respondent's demands for the recovery ofcash accountabilities from petitioner, such as cashadvances and costs of premiums.

The recovery of respondent's claims is notcontingent or dependent upon establishingpetitioner's counterclaim, such that conductingseparate trials will not result in the substantialduplication of the time and effort of the court and theparties. One would search the records in vain for alogical connection between the parties' claims.

This conclusion is further reinforced bypetitioner's own admissions since she declared in heranswer that respondent's cause of action, unlike herown, was not based upon the Special Agent'sContract.

However, petitioner's claims for damages,allegedly suffered as a result of the filing byrespondent of its complaint, are compulsory.

There is no need for need for petitioner to paydocket fees for her compulsory counterclaim. On theother hand, in order for the trial court to acquire

jurisdiction over her permissive counterclaim,petitioner is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees.


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The rule on the payment of filing fees has been laiddown by the Court in the case ofSun Insurance Office,Ltd. V. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion-

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint orappropriate initiatory pleading, but thepayment of the prescribed docket fee, that

vests a trial court with jurisdiction over thesubject-matter or nature of the action. Wherethe filing of the initiatory pleading is notaccompanied by payment of the docket fee,the court may allow payment of the feewithin a reasonable time but in no casebeyond the applicable prescriptive orreglementary period.

2. The same rule applies to permissivecounterclaims, third-party claims and similar

pleadings, which shall not be considered fileduntil and unless the filing fee prescribedtherefor is paid. The court may allow paymentof said fee within a reasonable time but alsoin no case beyond its applicable prescriptiveor reglementary period.

3.

Where the trial court acquires jurisdictionover a claim by the filing of the appropriatepleading and payment of the prescribed filingfee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a

claim not specified in the pleading, or ifspecified the same has been left fordetermination by the court, the additionalfiling fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the

judgment. It shall be the responsibility of theClerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy toenforce said lien and assess and collect theadditional fee.

2. KOREA TECHNOLOGIES CO, LTD., vs. LERMA

FACTS:

KOGIES, korean corp. entered into a contract withPacific General Steel (PGSMC), domestic corporation,whereby KOGIES would set up an LPG CylinderManufacturing Plant in Carmona, Cavite. The contractwas executed in the Philippines and an amendmentwas executed in Korea.

The contract and its amendment stipulated thatKOGIES will ship the machinery and facilitiesnecessary for manufacturing LPG cylinders for which

PGSMC would pay USD 1,224,000. KOGIES wouldinstall and initiate the operation of the plant for which

PGSMC bound itself to pay USD 306,000 upon theplant’s production of the 11-kg. LPG cylinder samples.Thus, the total contract price amounted to USD1,530,000. PGSMC paid KOGIES USD 1,224,000.

After the installation of the plant, the initialoperation could not be conducted as PGSMC

encountered financial difficulties affecting the supplyof materials. For the remaining balance for theinstallation and initial operation of the plant, PGSMCissued two postdated checks.

When KOGIES deposited the checks, these weredishonored for the reason PAYMENT STOPPED. Thisprompted it to send a demand letter to PGSMC onMay 7, 1998. The wife of PGSMCs President on theother hand on the same date faxed a letter to KOGIESPresident. She complained that not only did KOGIESdeliver a different brand of hydraulic press from that

agreed upon but it had not delivered severalequipment parts already paid for.

PGSMC replied that the two checks it issuedKOGIES were fully funded but the payments werestopped for reasons previously made known toKOGIES.

On June 1, 1998, PGSMC informed KOGIES thatPGSMC was canceling their Contract on the groundthat KOGIES had altered the quantity and lowered thequality of the machineries and equipment it deliveredto PGSMC, and that PGSMC would dismantle and

transfer the machineries, equipment, and facilitiesinstalled in the Carmona plant.PGSMC again wrote KOGIES reiterating the

contents of its previous letter.On July 3, 1998, KOGIES filed a Complaint for

Specific Performance, against PGSMC before theMuntinlupa City (RTC).

On July 17, 1998, PGSMC filed its Answer withCompulsory Counterclaim, asserting that it had thefull right to dismantle and transfer the machineriesand equipment because it had paid for them in full as

stipulated in the contract; that KOGIES was notentitled to the PhP 9,000,000 covered by the checksfor failing to completely install and make the plantoperational; and that KOGIES was liable for damagesamounting to PhP 4,500,000 for altering the quantityand lowering the quality of the machineries andequipment.

On July 29, 1998, KOGIES filed its Reply to Answerand Answer to Counterclaim. KOGIES denied it hadaltered the quantity and lowered the quality of themachinery, equipment, and facilities it delivered to

the plant. It claimed that it had performed all the


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undertakings under the contract and had alreadyproduced certified samples of LPG cylinders.

It averred that whatever was unfinished wasPGSMCs fault since it failed to procure raw materialsdue to lack of funds. KOGIES, relying on Chung FuIndustries (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, insisted

that the arbitration clause was without question valid.RTC denied KOGIES motion to dismiss PGSMCs

compulsory counterclaims as these counterclaims fellwithin the requisites of compulsory counterclaims.

KOGIES filed an Urgent Motion forReconsideration of the September 21, 1998 RTC Orderdenying dismissal of PGSMCs compulsorycounterclaims. The CA held that the counterclaims ofPGSMC were compulsory ones and payment of docketfees was not required since the Answer withcounterclaim was not an initiatory pleading.

Hence, we have this Petition for Review onCertiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE: Whether or not PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S

COUNTERCLAIMS are ALL COMPULSORY NOTNECESSITATING PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES?

HELD:

As aptly ruled by the CA, the counterclaims ofPGSMC were incorporated in its Answer with

Compulsory Counterclaim dated July 17, 1998 inaccordance with Section 8 of Rule 11, 1997 RevisedRules of Civil Procedure, the rule that was effective atthe time the Answer with Counterclaim was filed. Sec.8 on existing counterclaim or cross-claim states, Acompulsory counterclaim or a cross-claim that adefending party has at the time he files his answershall be contained therein.

On July 17, 1998, at the time PGSMC filed itsAnswer incorporating its counterclaims againstKOGIES, it was not liable to pay filing fees for said

counterclaims being compulsory in nature. We stress,however, that effective August 16, 2004 under Sec. 7,Rule 141, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, docketfees are now required to be paid in compulsorycounterclaim or cross-claims.

3. MERCADO VS. CA

FACTS:

Leonides Mercado had been distributingrespondent San Miguel Corporation’s (SMC’s) beer

products in Quiapo, Manila since 1967. Then in 1991,SMC extended to him a P7.5 million credit line

allowing him to withdraw goods on credit. To securehis purchases, Mercado assigned three China BankingCorporation (CBC) certificates of deposit amounting toP5 million to SMC and executed a continuing hold-outagreement stating:

Any demand made by [SMC] on [CBC], claiming

default on my/our part shall be conclusive on [CBC]and shall serve as absolute authority for [CBC] toencash the [CBC certificates of deposit] in accordancewith the third paragraph of this Hold-Out Agreement,whether or not I/we have in fact defaulted on any ofmy/our obligations with [SMC], it being understoodthat the issue of whether or not there was factualdefault must be threshed out solely between me/usand [SMC]

He also submitted three surety bonds fromEastern Assurance and Surety Corporation (EASCO)

totaling P2.6 million.Consequently, on February 10, 1992, SMC notified

CBC that Mercado failed to pay for the items hewithdrew on credit. Consequently, citing thecontinuing hold-out agreement, it asked CBC torelease the proceeds of the assigned certificates ofdeposit. CBC approved SMB’s request and informed

Mercado.On March 2, 1992, Mercado filed an action to

annul the continuing hold-out agreement and deed ofassignment in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

Manila, Branch 55, claiming that that the continuinghold-out agreement allowed forfeiture without thebenefit of foreclosure. It was therefore void pursuantto Article 2088 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Mercadoargued that he had already settled his recentpurchases on credit but SMC erroneously applied thesaid payments to his old accounts not covered by thecontinuing hold-out agreement (i.e., purchases madeprior to the extension of the credit line).

On March 18, 1992, SMC filed its answer withcounterclaim against Mercado. It contended that

Mercado delivered only two CBC certificates ofdeposit amounting to P4.5 million and asserted thatthe execution of the continuing hold-out agreementand deed of assignment was a recognized businesspractice. Furthermore, because Mercado admitted hisoutstanding liabilities, SMC sought payment of thelees products he withdrew (or purchased on credit)worth P7,468,153.75.

On April 23, 1992, SMC filed a third-partycomplaint against EASCO. It sought to collect theproceeds of the surety bonds submitted by Mercado.

On September 14, 1994, Mercado filed an urgentmanifestation and motion seeking the dismissal of the


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complaint. He claimed that he was no longerinterested in annulling the continuing hold-outagreement and deed of assignment. The RTC,however, denied the motion. Instead, it set the casefor pre-trial. Thereafter, trial ensued.

During trial, Mercado acknowledged the accuracy

of SMC’s computation of his outstanding liability as ofAugust 15, 1991. Thus, the RTC dismissed thecomplaint and ordered Mercado and EASCO (to theextent of P2.6 million or the value of its bonds) to

jointly and severally pay SMC the amount ofP7,468,153.75.

Aggrieved, Mercado and EASCO appealed to theCourt of Appeals (CA) insisting that Mercado did notdefault in the payment of his obligations to SMC.

On December 14, 2004, the CA affirmed the RTCdecision in toto. Mercado and EASCO both moved for

reconsideration but their respective motions weredenied.

On October 28, 2005, EASCO filed a petition forreview on certiorari in this Court but eventuallyagreed to settle its liability with SMC. The petition wasterminated on September 19, 2007.

Meanwhile, Mercado passed away and wassubstituted by his heirs, petitioners Racquel D.Mercado, Jimmy D. Mercado, Henry D. Mercado,Louricar D. Mercado and Virgilio D. Mercado.

Petitioners subsequently filed this petition

asserting that the CA erred in affirming the RTCdecision in toto. The said decision (insofar as itordered Mercado to pay SMC P7,468,153.75) wasvoid. SMC’s counterclaim was permissive in nature.

Inasmuch as SMC did not pay docket fees, the RTCnever acquired jurisdiction over the counterclaim.

ISSUE:

Whether or not SMC’s counterclaim was

permissive?

HELD: No.A counterclaim (or a claim which a defending

party may have against any party) may be compulsoryor permissive. A counterclaim that (1) arises out of (oris necessarily connected with) the transaction oroccurrence that is the subject matter of the opposingparty’s claim; (2) falls within the jurisdiction of the

court and (3) does not require for its adjudication thepresence of third parties over whom the court cannotacquire jurisdiction, is compulsory. Otherwise, a

counterclaim is merely permissive.

When Mercado sought to annul the continuinghold-out agreement and deed of assignment (whichhe executed as security for his credit purchases), he ineffect sought to be freed from them. While headmitted having outstanding obligations, henevertheless asserted that those were not covered by

the assailed accessory contracts. For its part, asidefrom invoking the validity of the said agreements,SMC therefore sought to collect the payment for thevalue of goods Mercado purchased on credit. Thus,Mercado’s complaint and SMC’s counterclaim both

touched the issues of whether the continuing hold-out agreement and deed of assignment were validand whether Mercado had outstanding liabilities toSMC. The same evidence would essentially support orrefute Mercado’s claim and SMC’s counterclaim.

Based on the foregoing, had these issues been

tried separately, the efforts of the RTC and the partieswould have had to be duplicated. Clearly, SMC’s

counterclaim, being logically related to Mercado’s

claim, was compulsory in nature. Consequently, thepayment of docket fees was not necessary for the RTCto acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter.

4. ANTONIO NAVARRO AND GRAHMMS, INV. VS.

MBTC

DOCKET FEES; PAYMENT – FAILURE; EFFECTS

FACTS:

The private respondent Metropolitan Bank andTrust Company (respondent MBTC) filed with the RTCof Makati City a petition for the judicial foreclosure ofthe real estate mortgage executed by the petitionersin its favor. The petitioners filed a Motion forReconsideration of the decision, however the trialcourt issued an order denying the said motion.

On, the last day of the reglementary period, thepetitioners filed with the RTC a Notice of Appeal.

However, the petitioners failed to pay the requisitedocket and other lawful fees.

Thereafter, the respondent MBTC filed a Motionto Deny Due Course to Notice of Appeal with Motionfor Execution on the ground that the notice of appealwas not timely filed. Acting on the motion, the RTC,

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