REMOVAL OF PVVH LEL ANALYZERS FAULT TREE ANALYSIS

REMOVAL OF PVVH

LEL ANALYZERS

FAULT TREE ANALYSIS

BY

HOWARD E. LAMBERT FTA ASSOCIATES

3728 BRUNELL DRIVE OAKLAND, CA . 94602

AND

BOND CALLOWAY WESTINGHOUSE SAVANNAH RIVER COMPANY

DECEMBER 10, 1993

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1

ACRONYM LIST 2

1.0 Introduction .. 4

2.0 Historical Perspective Regarding the SPC Process and Control Scheme • . . . . • • • • . • • • • . . • • • 8

2.1 Initial Study (1980 - 1986) ..• 2.2 HAN Process (1987 - 1991) 2.3 Late Wash Process (1991 - Present)

. . . . . . . 3.0 Operational Experience for the Precipitate Hydrolysis

8 9

19

Process During Cold Chemical Runs . . . • • • . 22

4.0 FTA Protocol .

5.0 Removal of PVVH LEL Analyzers FTA

6.0 Acknowledgments

7.0 References . . .

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX C

TABLES

FIGURES

Interlock List for HAN Addition/Nitrite Destruction Fault Trees

Interlock List for Late Wash Fault Trees

Fault Trees

26

29

32

33

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A probabilistic Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) was conducted for the Salt Process Cell (SPC) to determine the new frequency of fire and explosion and the new frequency of a formation of a flammable mixture in the DWPF Process Vessel Vent Header ( PWH) for the following case:

Assuming the PVVH Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) analyzers are permanently removed from service, two benzene analyzers are available to start a batch and at least one benzene analyzer is available at the end of the batch.

The new annual frequency of fire and explosion for all scenarios calculated in this FTA is 3. 3 x 10"5 yr· 1 which is less than the design goal of 1. o x 10·4 yr· 1 •

The basic conclusion of this study is that two benzene analyzers being available at the beginning of the run offers enough redundancy to insure an acceptable level of safety in the SPC operation without the existence of the Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) analyzers. Since the LEL analyzers provide the same level of process safety protection as the benzene analyzers, precipitate reactor feeding can be initiated with two LEL or two benzene analyzers or any combination of two PWH analyzers (LEL and benzene) .

Other topics discussed in this report are:

• Historical perspective regarding the SPC process and control scheme.

• Current SPC operating experience.

• FTA protocol to conduct the SPC FTA.

1

ACRONYM

APP

CPC

DCS

DWPF

FTA

gpm

HAN

HAZOP

ITP

LEL

LPPP

MOC

MOV

NFBL

OE

OECD

OECT

P&ID

PHA

PHEF

PHP

PHR

POP

PR

PRBT

ACRONYM LIST

DESCRIPTION

Auxiliary Pump Pit

Chemical Processing Cell

Distributed Control System

Defense waste Processing Facility

Fault Tree Analysis

Gallon Per Minute

Hydroxylamine nitrate

Hazard and Operability studies

In-Tank Precipitation

Lower Explosive Limit

Low Point Pump Pit

Minimum oxidant for Combustion

Motor Operated Valve

Negative Feedback Loop

Organic Evaporator

Organic Evaporator Condenser Decanter

Organic Evaporator Condensate Tank

Piping and Instrument Diagram

Precipitate Hydrolysis Aqueous

Precipitate Hydrolysis Experimental Facility

Precipitate Hydrolysis Process

Process Hazards Review

Process Operating Procedure

Precipitate Reactor

Precipitate Reactor Bottoms Tank

2

PRCD

PRFT

PVVH

PVVS

RPC

seve

SME

SOP

SPC

SRAT

SRS

SRTC

we

Precipitate Reactor Condenser Decanter

Precipitate Feeding Tank

Process Vessel Vent Header

Process Vessel Vent System

Remote Process Cell

Salt Cell Vent Condenser

Slurry Mix Evaporator

Standard Operating Procedure

Salt Process Cell

Sludge Receipt and Adjustment Tank

Savannah River Site

Savannah River Technical Center

Water Column

3

1.0 Introduction

A probabilistic Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) was conducted for the Salt Process Cell (SPC) which is located at the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The DWPF will immobilize radioactive wastes in borosilicate glass. As part of the permanent high level waste disposal plan, virtually all of the cesium-137 and strontium-90, as well as most of the plutonium, will be removed from concentrated salt solutions and redissolved salt cakes by the In-Tank Precipitation process (ITP) in H-Area. Salt solution and salt cakes are composed of potassium, nitrates, nitrites, aluminates and hydroxides of sodium as well as the radioactive compounds discussed. Sodium Tetraphenylborate will be added to salts solutions in Tank 48H to precipitate cesium and potassium and insoluble sodium titanate will be added to adsorb strontium and plutonium. Potassium tetraphenylborate will be the major insoluble component of the resulting tetraphenylboratej titanate slurry (Precipitate slurry). The slurry is concentrated via a crossflow filter and washed to decrease the soluble salts. Decontaminated filtrate is sent to Z-Area for immobilization in concrete monoliths.

Contaminated precipitate slurry is sent to the Late Wash process located in the Auxiliary Pump Pit (APP) between S and H areas. A crossflow flow filtration system similar to the filter system in ITP is used to remove nitrites. Higher aromatic carbon removal with lower levels high boiling side products (i.e., diphenylamine, biphenyl, terphenyl, tars, etc.) can be achieved by acid hydrolysis in the SPC when nitrite concentrations are reduced to less than 0.011 M. The resulting precipitate slurry stream from the Late Wash process is fed to the Precipitate Hydrolysis Process (PHP) which is located in the DWPF 221-S Salt Process Cell, ref (4].

An acid hydrolysis process is used to remove radioactive strontium and cesium from the feed stream in the SPC. Figure 3 shows a simplified flow diagram for the SPC. The function of the precipitate processing facilities is to receive precipitate slurry and hydrolyze it into two phases, organic and aqueous. The organic phase will be low in radioactivity whereas the aqueous phase will contain the majority of the radioactive components. The organic stream is transferred outside the vitrification building and

4

stored. The aqueous stream is fed to the Melter Feed Preparation System for feeding to the glass melter.

The major systems in the SPC are:

• Precipitate reactor feed system to receive/store/ sample the precipitate slurry from the Low Point Pit and feed the slurry to the Precipitate Reactor (PR) .

Precipitate reaction system where the precipitate slurry is hydrolyzed into an organic stream and an aqueous stream by reaction with formic acid. Aqueous stream is sampled and transferred to the Chemical Processing Cell (CPC) . The aqueous stream is mixed with sludge waste and eventually fed into the DWPF melter.

• Organic Evaporation system where the organic stream is decontaminated by water washing and evaporation.

• Organic evaporator condensate decontaminated organic stream prior to transfer outside of building.

system where the is stored/sampled the vitrification

• Salt process vent system to condense benzene in the off-gas stream and limit the release of benzene and mercury to the Process Vessel Vent Header (PVVH).

The SPC process vessels and Process Vessel Vent System ( PVVS) contain benzene and compounds of benzene which are flammable. The report entitled "Fault Tree Analysis for Fire and Explosion Within the Salt Process Cell (Late Wash)", ref (2] was completed in February of 1993. This study is referred to as the "Late Wash FTA" in this report. (See section 2.0 of this report for a description of Late Wash Process.) The Late Wash FTA attempted to consider all credible fire and explosion scenarios inside and outside of the process boundary of the SPC. Inside the process boundary includes SPC vessels and the PVVH. outside the boundary includes the air space within the cell where a benzene leak or a benzene vapor

5

release can occur. The SPC FTA is a stand-alone document used for critical design decisions. This means that the FTA contains the following properties: (1) is scrutable and understandable, (2) is a complete risk model within the state of the art and (3) can be readily updated before design changes are made (the intent of this study) . Potential risks of proposed design changes can be analyzed before spending design and construction dollars. Therefore, this FTA can actually lower future capital and operating costs of the DWPF SPC. This FTA is a living design document and should be used to assess risks of proposed design modifications before design changes are submitted to the design agency. After design and construction are complete, the FTA should then be modified to reflect as-build configuration of the plant. The protocol used to conduct the FTA is described in section 4.0 of this report.

The ultimate goal of the SPC FTA is to evaluate control schemes for the SPC and determine an acceptable control scheme in which the sum of the frequencies of all risk significant events (i.e., large fires and explosions) is less than 1. 0 x 10"4 yr· 1 , the design goal for the study.

Both benzene and LEL analyzers are used to detect flammables within the PVVS and activate interlocks in the event that an unacceptable concentration of flammables is present. During the course of the cold chemical runs that were conducted for the SPC, problems resulted from the use of the LEL analyzers in the PVVS due to silicon poisoning and were removed from service for testing and evaluation. In this study, the Late Wash FTA is modified to determine the new frequency of fire and explosion and the new frequency of a formation a flammable mixture in the DWPF PVVH for the following case:

Assuming the PVVH LEL analyzers are permanently removed from service, two benzene analyzers are available to start a batch and at least one benzene analyzer is available at the end of the batch. The batch cycle time is assumed to be 44 hours.

The new annual frequency of fire and explosion for all scenarios calculated in this FTA is 3. 3 x 10"5 yr· 1 which is less than the design goal of 1. o x 10·4 yr· 1 •

6

Section 2 gives an historical perspective regarding the evolution of the SPC chemical process, process safety, environmental considerations and the control scheme which is important in understanding the recommendations of the FTA with regards to the present control scheme in preventing fire and explosion within the SPC. Section 3 discusses current operating experience with the SPC. Section 4 describes the protocol used to conduct the SPC FTA. Section 5 discusses the FTA conducted for this report in which the LEL analyzers were removed from service.

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2.0 Historical Perspective Regarding the SPC Process and Control Scheme

Both a Process Hazards Review (PHR) and Fault Tree Analysis were conducted for the SPC for three time periods listed below:

1) 1980 - 1986 (Initial study)

2) 1987 - 1991 (HAN Process)

3) 1991- Present (Late Wash Process).

As listed below, three FTA reports were generated for each time period:

1) Fault Tree Analysis for Fire and Explosion and Explosion within the Salt Process Cell Savannah River Plant, 1986, ref [1], Referred to as the "1986 FTA," in this report.

2) Appendix A to PHR 32, Fault Tree Analysis for HAN Addition, 1991, ref [2], referred to as the "HAN FTA," in this report.

3) Fault Tree Analysis for Fire and Explosion Within the Salt Process Cell (Late Wash), 1993, ref (3], referred to as the "Late Wash FTA" in this report.

We discuss the evolution of the SPC process for each time period and the design changes that were recommended by the FTA.

2.1 Initial Study (1980 - 1986)

The SPC is part of the DWPF vitrification building as shown in figure lA. This building was built in the early 1980's and facility space and services were limited. The cell size is 22 1 x 54' and the vitrification building walls, general layout and embedded piping for process and services were already designed before the initial conceptual design and research and development for the PHP was completed. Since every additional horizontal foot of the 221-S building was estimated to cost $1 MM (million), enlarging the SPC beyond the 22 1 x 54' dimensions would not have been cost effective

8

given the DWPF budget in the mid-eighties. In March of 1984, the precipitate hydrolysis process was designed to operate at 100 psi. In 1985, the process was changed to run at atmospheric pressure by the use of a copper formate catalyst.

Figure 2 shows the simplified flow diagram of the SPC analyzed in the 1986 FTA study.

In the 1986 design, the PR received the precipitate feed directly from the Low Point Pump Pit (LPPP). The Precipitate Reactor Bottoms Tank (PRBT) which receives the aqueous product from the PR is contained within the SPC (see figure 1A). The PR, Organic Evaporator (OE) and Organic Evaporator Condensate Tank (OECT) are inerted with nitrogen. The fire suppression system consisted of a Halon system and water spray system. The 1986 FTA study estimated that the frequency of all fire and explosion scenarios to be 1. 0 x 10"3 yr· 1 • The dominant accident scenarios listed in that study were:

• small fire within the SPC air space due to a line or gasket leak

• loss of nitrogen purge within process vessels

• explosion within the PRBT because the PRBT transfer valve from the PR fails open

• explosion within the PVVH because butterfly valve 2034 fails open.

2.2 HAN Process (1987 - 1991)

Since 1986, the precipitate hydrolysis process was modified to allow for addition of hydroxylamine nitrate (HAN). This addition allows for nitrite destruction with good organic removal and precludes high-boiler formation.

The nitrite/HAN reaction produces nitrous oxide gas which can serve as a benzene oxidant. This reaction is about 2. 7 times more energetic than the benzene/air reaction. The nitrous oxide

9

flammability is controlled by dilution with inertant to below the Minimum oxidant for Combustion (MOC).

A process flow sheet used to conduct the FTA is shown in figure 4. This flow sheet uses zone indices and depicts the hardwired interlocks that were considered. Appendix A lists the control elements of control loops and interlocks that were considered in the HAN FTA study. The sequence of steps performed during the 44-hour batch cycle is shown in figure 5.

It is important to note that all the interlock actions described in the appendices are not included in the SPC FTA. For example,. the SPC FTA did not give credit to software interlocks listed in table A-4 of Appendix A.

Important safety and environmental control system design concerns are:

• Benzene/air explosive mixtures in the PVVH .

• BenzenejN2o explosive mixtures in the PR system •

• Benzene emissions .

• Benzene/air explosive mixtures in tank vapor spaces •

Concerns with regards to PR Operation are:

• N20 evolution versus PR temperature .

• Excess HAN decomposition .

• Accumulation of heavy organics in PR .

• Organic solids carryover .

Concerns with regards to Process Vessel Vent Operation are:

1) Dilute organics below LEL (feed step in high flow co2 is used)

• Limit inert flow from Salt Cell Vent Condenser (SCVC).

10

Control SCVC exit temperature.

Minimum air flow in PVVH.

2) Dilute organics below LEL (Normal, base load C02 is used)

• Minimum flow in PVVH.

• seve temperature.

General operation

• Minimize air inleakage.

The SPC design process employed three levels of protection:

• Hardwired Interlocks safety generally these interlocks were actuated at a set point that is the highest or lowest value of process variable(s) -- in this case, both the operator and software interlocks are unsuccessful in ameliorating the effect of the upset condition or process deviation.

• Software Interlocks - Control Logic Diagrams, Distributed Control System (DCS) actuated generally these interlocks were actuated at a set point that is the second highest or second lowest value of process variable(s) -- in this case, the operator is unsuccessful in ameliorating the effect of the upset condition or deviation.

• standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Process Operating Procedures (POPs) -- operator responds to the first level of alarms and tries to ameliorate the effect of process upset or deviation. DCS automation program responds to first level of alarms and tries to correct the effect of process upset or deviation.

In most cases, the FTA gave credit to hardwired interlocks only with the exception of operator response to alarms as described next.

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We give credit to an operator responding to the following alarms:

• Increase system pressure by adjusting MOV 1041 or MOV 9278 in the event of insufficient baseload purge to SPC process vessels, i.e., the Precipitate Feeding Tank (PRFT), PR, OE and OECT (see sheets 3, 4, 9 and 11 of the SPC Fire/Explosion fault trees in Appendix C).

Increase system pressure by adjusting MOV 1041 or MOV 9278 in the event of high oxygen concentration (see sheet 44 of the SPC Fire/Explosion fault trees in Appendix C).

These alarms are generated by the DCS and hence require that the DCS works properly. It is important to note that the SPC FTA used a conservative failure rate for air inleakage as 1.1 x 10·6 yr· 1 per connector or 1.1 x 10-4 yr- 1 ("'1 month) for the whole system (assuming 100 connections in the system, connectors include Hanford connectors, gaskets, flanges, etc.). During one year of operation, one air inleakage event has been observed. Based upon this data, a more realistic estimate of air inleakage for the entire system is "'1. o x 10-5 yr- 1 • In addition, a conservative estimate of 1.0 x 10-2/demand was assigned to operator error in responding to an alarm in the SPC FTA. What these two statements imply regarding assignment of conservative probabilities are that the operator action responding to the alarms regarding low flow purge and high oxygen concentration may not be required to achieve an acceptable accident frequency. However, another FTA run is required to verify this statement.

As a result of the safety and environmental concerns stated above, the following design operation philosophy was adopted in the SPC control scheme:

1. Prevent N20jbenzene deflagration in the PR by insuring that N2o concentration is below 60% of the MOC.

2. Prevent air/benzene deflagration in process vessels by insuring that 02 concentration is below 60% of the MOC.

3. Prevent air/benzene deflagration in PVVH by insuring that benzene concentration is below 60% of the LEL.

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4. Prevent system overpressurization and benzene vapor release to the SPC.

5. Prevent leaks in transfer lines by shutting off pumps in the event of high sump level.

6. Shut off ignition sources when sump level is high or exhaust tunnel LEL is above noise level.

As result of conducting the PHR and FTA, the following changes were made to the HAN process:

•

•

High flow C02 is used during PR feeding and boilup periods during steps 10 and 12 listed in figure 5. During step 10, HAN reacts with nitrites to evolve N2o. During all other periods, baseload C02 purge is used.

Carbon dioxide is used for fire suppression in the SPC instead of Halon, see figure 6 which depicts the fire protection system.

Carbon dioxide is used for process inerting instead of nitrogen. The use of co2 reduces benzene emissions.

• The overflowjrelief valves on the PRFT and OECT were removed and the tank nozzles sealed with a blank connector. In the event of overfill of the PR or PRFT, liquid will be discharged through the mercury seal on the agitator shaft. There is no overflow protection for the PRFT and OECT. If the OECT is overfilled, liquid will backup through the condenser/decanter condensate drain and then through the aqueous overflow from the OE and eventually to the PR, which has an available capacity of 3,000 gallons (considering the PR has 6,000 gallons of aqueous waste leftover from the previous batch). Any pressure buildup in the system will be relieved at about 2 psig through the mercury seals on the agitators for the PR and PRFT to the limit of the relief capacity.

Liquid carbon dioxide cylinders are provided for backup of the primary supply. Cylinder weight, instead of

13

pressure, was used to inhibit/stop operation of the precipitate feed pump before the C02 supply is too low to permit a safe shutdown during the PR feeding operation.

The PRFT takes the place of the PRBT in figs. 1 and 2. A new PRBT was located in the CPC (see figure lB).

• Close steam valves (HIS-1027A, HIS-9301) and open cooling water valves (HIS-1033, HIS-9307) to the PR and OE on any of the following hardwired interlocks:

SCVC Temperature HHH (TSHHB-9356)

seve Exhaust Flow HHH (FSHHB-9277)

PVVH Exhaust Flow LLL (FSLLB-5860)

PR Pressure HH (PSHH-1041)

OE Pressure HH (PSHH-9313)

Existing software switches and setpoints for the above interlocks will be used for alarms and shutdowns on both the PR and OE but credit will not be given in the FTA.

The FTA completed by June of 1989 showed that the frequency due to air inleakage was unacceptable. This is because there are over 100 connectors in the precipitate hydrolysis process system and since the system was under a slight vacuum, any one of these connectors leaking results in an air inleakage. Furthermore, the use of POPs to detect oxygen content in the process vessels was questionable because of the inherent inaccuracies in the flow measurements and the computation of air inleakage by difference. A new control scheme had to be devised to 1) detect leakage of air in the system and 2) perform mitigation to prevent the possibility of fire or explosion.

As a result, the following recommendations were made:

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The arrangement of the mercury seals on the PR and PRFT agitator shafts has been of concern because of the possible path for air inleakage into the vessels.

The total loss of mercury and subsequent air inleakage at pressure differentials in the range of 10-20 11 we is assumed to be highly unlikely. The reservoir is provided with a liquid level bubbler for continuous measurement of the mercury level with an alarm on low level. Assuming that the proper mercury level is maintained, the seal should be serviceable for pressures in the range of 20 11 we and vacuums up to 50" we in the process system. Because of the relative cross sections, the vacuum capability should be maintained after extensive periods of pressure relief.

However, during water run startup testing (8/92-11/92), pressure relief did indeed occur which forced some of the mercury from the agitator seals. Cups were installed to collect the mercury. After pressure relief, mercury will drain back into the seals and make the seals leak tight.

• Reduce the frequency of high oxygen from air inleakage as a result of process flange failure by a factor of 10 for fault tree calculations. The previous assumption has been that all leaks result in high oxygen concentration inside of process vessels. Because of the low pressure differential (~ 15 11 we) during operation, the probability of a leak or that a given leak will immediately result in high oxygen concentration is very low. The 221-Canyon data for Hanford flange leaks which are used for leakage frequency are based on operation in the 20-75 psig (600-2,00011 we) range.

· • Eliminate the use of POPs for calculation of oxygen concentration in the various vessel systems.

The use of POPs for calculating oxygen content in the process vessels were questionable because of the inherent inaccuracies in flow measurements and computation of air inleakage by difference. The use of carbon dioxide for

15

the inert gas makes it virtually impossible to calculate oxygen content within an acceptable ± 20% range because of the large changes in average molecular weight with changes in carbon dioxide concentration.

• Use the seve exhaust oxygen analyzers to monitor oxygen content continuously. Interlock oxygen concentration HHH (ASHHB-3405, ASHHB-3409) or a rate-of-change HHH (a new oes software interlock) in oxygen concentration to automatically raise the control pressure setpoint to atmospheric to stop any air inleakage. Activate the SPe interlock on the same signals to minimize ignition sources if the oxygen content exceeds 9% (60% of MOe for oxygen in an airjeo2jbenzene mixture) . Rate-of-change software interlocks were later deleted due to the complexity of control and interlock scheme. The FTA did not consider rate-of-change interlock as a safety interlock.

• In order to obtain an acceptable frequency for a flammable condition inside of process equipment, the entire system is tested for air inleakage between batches. The leak test may be performed by 1) reducing the system pressure to -10" we and measuring rate-of-rise in pressure or 2) momentarily stopping inert purge to process vessels and determining the air inleakage by the change in vesseljsystem exhaust flow. See section 2.3 for final method to determine air inleakage.

• If necessary, in order to obtain an acceptable frequency for a flammable condition inside of process equipment, interlock baseline flow LLL (loss of inert purge) to the PR (FSLLB-1103), PRFT (FSLLB-1108), OE (FSLLB-9315), or OEeT (FSLLB-9328) to raise the control pressure setpoint to atmospheric to stop any air inleakage and activate the SPe interlock to stop pumps and agitators to minimize ignition sources (this change was not implemented since an acceptable frequency was computed without this change).

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The HAN FTA computed the frequency of the following top events which were hazard rating 3 events, except for the small fire described below. As described in table 3, hazard rating events can result in a downtime greater than six months.

1. Fire or explosion in the PR system (including PRCD and SCVC) for periods including:

i) feeding ii) boil up.

2. Fire and explosion in the PVVH during all periods.

3 • Fire and explosion in the OE system (including OECD).

4. Fire and explosion in the OECT.

5. Fire or explosion in the PRFT system. (The PRFT C02 purge system is identical to the PR baseload and transfer and the ignition sources are the same.)

6. Large explosion causing overpressurization and reverse flow out of the Remote Process Cell (RPC) .

7. Large fire in the SPC caused by organic and aqueous spill greater than 3~0 gallons.

8. Small fire in the SPC (a fire which is quickly extinguished and causes no backflow and is not a hazard rating 3 event).

The HAN FTA study computed the total sum of risk significant events listed above as 5. 7 x 10"5 yr· 1 • overpressurization events during organic evaporation in the PR and OE (steps 12 and 23 in figure 5) dominated probabilistically~ During overpressurization, benzene is released to the SPC air space and a large explosion occurs as described in event 6 listed above. The FTA suggested the following improvements which were incorporated in the design.

1. Suggest where redundancy should be incorporated, e.g., incorporate a block valve in series with a flow control valve to provide a redundant means of shutting off flow for the

17

following streams (the zone index for the block valve is indicated in brackets, see figure 4):

i) PR feed (BV-1100, B-3]

ii) High flow C02 [BV-1109, D-2]

iii) Steam flow to PR [HCV-1038, E-3]

iv) steam flow to OE [G-6].

2. Install a doubly redundant interlock. There are approximately 100 connectors and flanges in the system. Leakage of any one of these connectors could lead to an explosive concentration. (The initiating event frequency of 100 connectors is 1. 3 x 10"4/hr, [ 1. 1 months].) Due to the high initiating event frequency of air inleakage, a doubly redundant interlock was installed to increase pressure, i.e., the inclusion of MOVs 1041 and 9278.

3. Specify inspection and calibration frequency for critical components, e.g., specify monthly inspection interval for the following components, OE and PR block valves for steam supply, PR and OE pressure sensors, 1041 and 9312 and the sump pump.

4. Install additional interlocks, e.g., two additional hardwired interlocks (interlocks 20 and 21 in Appendix A) were incorporated to shut off OE and PR steam in the event of high steam flow. In addition, interlocks 14 and 15 were modified so that high pressure in either the PR or OE will shut off steam to both vessels and provide redundancy in sensing pressure in the precipitate hydrolysis processing system.

5. Eliminate a master relay and incorporate a dedicated relay for each hardwired interlock.

6. In order to provide maximum dilution capability by the PVVS air flow, provide a tie-in for the seve exhaust to the PVVS that is downstream of all other exhaust streams. Provide a static mixer [C-8] to insure rapid dilution. It is important to note that the static mixer is the only location in the

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whole process where an explosive concentration normally exists most of the time.

It is important to note that the FTA demonstrated where changes were not required, i.e. , the design was adequate as is. For example, separate sensors/transmitters for Negative Feedback Loops (NFBLs) and interlocks were not required to sense flow for the PR feed and high flow C02 • Even though failures of these sensors were common cause initiating events, there were other interlocks whose sensors were not part of a NFBL, i.e., there were other redundant means to shut off flow to these streams which did not depend upon these sensors working properly. Therefore, the FTA can be used to save design and capital project costs by installing only those control schemes which have been rigorously analyzed as risk significant.

2.3 Late Wash Process (1991 - Present)

The HAN FTA was not a stand alone document and was an appendix to PHR 32. In addition, since the HAN FTA was conducted, additional changes were made to the SPC chemical processes and procedures. Changes which impacted the FTA were:

• Proposed addition of a late wash facility which would remove nitrite ions and eliminate the need for HAN addition in the PR feed step -- as a result, some hardwired interlocks and the N20 analyzers were removed. Nitrite ions cause formation of high molecular weight organics which can not be accepted by the melter. During research and development of the sludge process in the CPC, HAN was found to break down into ammonium. Ammonium would combine with nitrates in the PVVS to form ammonium nitrate which is a contact explosive.

• The Organic Evaporator (OE) steam block valve, which is functionally in series with the OE steam flow control valve, was removed. Calculations in the Late Wash FTA showed that other failures would have to occur in order that a stuck-open OE steam flow control valve would overpressurize the system.

• Interlocks were removed that automatically pumped spills in the sump back to the PR. This automatic action was

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replaced by a manual procedure in which the operator would wait for the PR to cool down to 5o•c before initiating the transfer. Pumping back to a hot PR can cause overpressurization and benzene release to the SPC.

• Air inleakage testing prior to batch processing was changed from the methods previously discussed in this report (see section 2. 2, HAN process) during initial testing of the system using the Late Wash process. The original design basis air inleakage rate was 1.5 lb/hr per vessel. Since the off gas flowmeters for each tank did not provide accurate readings, the procedure for calculating air inleakage was changed to calculate air inleakage based upon the combined total carbon dioxide purge for all vessels (nominally 2.5 scfm) and the oxygen concentration as measured using the seve 02 analyzers (higher value of the 2). The calculation provides the total air inleakage for the entire system. Since the oxygen concentration for each vessel is unknown, the acceptable operating air inleakage rate was changed to 1.5 lb/hr for the entire system. This rate is 4 times lower that the original design basis air inleakage rate. Nominal air inleakage rates during Cold Chemical run testing have been between 0.3 - 1.2 lb/hr (average 0.36 lbjhr for 5 batches). No credit for the new air inleakage test method was taken in the Late Wash FTA or in this FTA.

• The spraywater fire suppression system shown in figure 6 was deleted.

As the result of eliminating HAN addition during the PR feed step, hazards involving a benzenejN2o deflagration were eliminated. However, the use of high fiow co2 remained to dilute any unknown oxidants in feed stream. High flow of noncondensibles such as C02 in the PR feed step could result in high concentrations of benzene in the PVVH. This hazard was addressed in the Late Wash FTA as it was in the HAN FTA.

The process flow sheet used to conduct the Late Wash FTA is shown in figure 7. As in figure 4, this flow sheet uses zone indices and depicts the hardwired interlocks that were considered. Appendix B lists the control elements of control loops and interlocks that

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were considered in the Late Wash FTA. The sequence of steps performed during the 44-hour batch cycle is shown in figure 8.

The following scenarios dominated probabilistically in the Late Wash FTA:

Overpressurization during boilup and evaporation in the PR leading to a benzene release and large explosion in the SPC.

overpressurization in the PR because the operator erroneously pumps to a hot PR when a spill of organics in the sump occurs again leading to a benzene release and a large explosion in the SPC.

• Deflagration in the PR during feeding.

The Late Wash FTA produced an occurrence frequency of 5. 0 x 10"5 yr- 1

for fire and explosion which is very nearly the frequency computed for HAN FTA which is 5. 7 x 10·5 yr· 1 • The reason for this is that the frequency of the scenario involving overpressurization in the OE diminished because the OE steam valve failing fully open was not sufficient to cause overpressurization. However, a new scenario is introduced into this analysis that was not considered in the HAN FTA study, i.e., the operator pumping organics into a hot PR. The frequencies of these two scenarios offset.

21

3.0 Operational Experience for the Precipitate Hydrolysis Process (PHP) During Cold Chemical Runs

During the initial design and construction of the Salt Process Cell, several internal, ref [5], and external audit groups (DOE, Stone & Webster) raised questions concerning the process operability given the complex control scheme outlined in the design and mandated by the SPC FTA and design PHR 32. Several of the control devices in this process have multiple interlocks (>100) which can cause potential shutdowns. Operating experience with the small scale process at the pilot plant TNX (Precipitate Hydrolysis Experimental Facility, PHEF) has indicated that without proper maintenance and process control, this process can experience multiple shutdowns during a given batch. However, operating experience to date with the SPC PHP has been very good considering complex control scheme and experience levels of the operating and supporting engineering staff.

During Cold Chemical Run Batch 1, the PR feeding cycle was concluded without interruption. Approximately 2800 gallons of precipitate slurry was fed into the PR with an average feed rate of 24 gpm. Temperature control during feeding was poor while the controller was in automatic control. However, PR temperature remained within operating parameters during the entire feeding cycle, ref [6].

Batch 1 had two interruptions during the PR 5 hour hold cycle. The first was caused by an inoperable benzene analyzer. Process control design allows for the PHP operation to continue with only 1 of 2 analyzers on-line once the batch has started. The second interruption was caused by the process chiller cycling off. A high alarm was received on the seve chilled water inlet supply temperature indicator (software interlock). Two additional shutdowns during aqueous boiling of the PR were due to the Process Chiller cycling off. The chiller problems were corrected by changing the operating setpoint from 41•F to 43•F. The chiller temperature switches were eventually recalibrated to prevent this problem.

Batch 1 OE operation was completed without interruption.

22

The operating experience gained with Batch 1 was evident during Batch 2 as the run was completed with few interruptions. PR feeding was completed without interruption. One interruption occurred during the 5 hour hold period. The cause of this interruption is not known. Aqueous boiling was completed without interruption. The initial problems which occurred with the PVVH benzene analyzers were corrected. The benzene and oxygen analyzers continue to perform well during the last 4 batches.

Two interruptions occurred during the OE cycle. High oxygen concentration caused an interruption during organic boiling. The high oxygen concentrations are speculated to be the result of increased air inleakage at jumper connections caused by unequal thermal expansion. The second interruption occurred during OE aqueous boiling and was caused by a high Organic Evaporator Condenser-Decanter (OECD) exit gas temperature. This high exit gas temperature was apparently caused by inadequate cooling water flow. Standard operating procedures were changed to place the OECD cooling water return valve in manual at 65% open during the entire batch. This has corrected the problem. A similar change was made to the Precipitate Reactor Condenser-Decanter (PRCD) cooling water valve operation, ref [7].

Batch 3 PR feeding was completed without interruption with an average feed rate of 30 gpm. The five hour hold and aqueous boiling periods were also completed without interruption. The OE cycle was completed without interruption. It is important to note the PHP system was in a lay up condition for 14 weeks prior to starting Batch 3 due to the melter flooding incident, ref (8].

Batch 4 and 5 reports have not been issued to date. However, several interruptions occurred which are note worthy. During Batch 4, a feed interruption occurred involving the operation of the PVVS blowers. Feeding was started with the PVVH operating at 35" we vac. Feeding was interrupted due to a PR pressure spike of 1.0" we. It was noted the configuration of the PVVS had changed since Batch 3 due to both Canister Decon Chambers being connected to the PVVS. At 35" we vacuum and 1600 scfm, the blowers were not able to maintain the SPC vessels at -4" we when PRFT to PR feeding was initiated.

23

The vacuum in the PVVS was increased to -50 11 we with a header flow at 1900 scfm. Feeding was reinitiated at 18 gpm and manually increased to 30 gpm in one step change. This caused an instantaneous spike in benzene in the PVVH. The spike did not exceed 60% of the LEL. A high LEL alarm was received which caused feeding and steam to the PR to shutdown. Operating procedures have since been modified to gradually increase PRFT to PR feed flow.

Other interruptions during Batch 4 and 5 were due to the PRFT transfer pump losing prime after feeding was initiated. These interruptions were apparently caused by operating the pump at a very low level with the PRFT agitator running. The simulated precipitate slurry experiences some tendencies to foam, and with the agitator running at a low tank level, air can easily become entrained in the slurry. This can cause the pump to lose prime. The causes and solutions to the pumping problems experienced with all DWPF remote canyon pumps is being studied by the DWPF engineering staff, ref (9).

In general, precipitate hydrolysis aqueous (PHA) and the organic products from this process have been high in quality. Some initial problems with high benzene concentrations in the PHA were experienced. These problems were easily corrected by purging the PR with carbon dioxide (35 scfm) during the cool down cycle. Apparently, some benzene vapor was being trapped in process and service jumpers and condensing out into the PR during the cool down cycle. The carbon dioxide purge during cool down has corrected this problem, ref [6-8].

Process gas analyzer performance has been excellent with the exception of the PVVH LEL analyzers. During Batch 5, a high calibration drift was experienced on the LEL analyzer causing more frequent calibrations (daily, manufacturer recommends every 30 days) . Recent studies on these analyzers appear to indicate that silicone poisons the LEL sensor causing it to malfunction. The antifoam agent used in the Sludge Receipt and Adjustment Tank (SRAT) and Slurry Mix Evaporator (SME) process has silicone listed as a component. As a result, this FTA study was commissioned to determine if these analyzers could be permanently removed from service.

24

Before discussing what was done in this FTA with regards to removing the LEL Analyzers in the PVVS, we discuss the FTA protocol that was used to conduct the FTA for the HAN and Late Wash fault trees.

25

4.0 FTA Protocol

As described in the introduction, the FTA conducted for the SPC is a stand-alone document used for critical design decisions. This means that the FTA contains the following properties: ( 1) is scrutable and understandable, (2) is a complete risk model within the state of the art, (3) can be readily updated as design changes are made, and (4) can be used during initial design conception to calculate risk associated with new control schemes (as was done in this report) .

It must be emphasized that the SPC FTA was conducted by a highlyqualified team of professionals, familiar with the SPC process, who understood every step that was conducted in the FTA. The team was trained in FTA before the study started. The FTA was not conducted by a sole individual.

The steps to conduct the SPC FTA are listed below.

Step 1 -- Top Event Definition - identify hazards from HAZOP, experience or narrative description. For this study, hazards that required FTA were benzene deflagration both inside and outside the SPC process boundary.

Step 2

• •

•

•

• •

System Understanding

Examine P&IDs Generate simplified flow diagram with zone indices from P&IDs (e.g. figures 4 and 7) For batch systems, generate a bar chart that shows the sequence of operations and their duration (e.g., figures 5 and 8) Identify active control loops, e.g., negative feedback and negative fo~ward loops and associated control elements (e.g., Table A-2 of Appendix A and Table 3 of Appendix B) Describe interlock strategy (as described in section 2. 2) Identify important control elements that comprise these interlocks, identify control element failures that are common-cause initiating events, i.e, failures of elements

26

Step 3

Step 4

Step 5

Step 6

•

Step 7

•

comprising control loops which simultaneously fail one or more interlock actions (e.g., Appendices A and B) Describe important operator procedures

Fault Tree Construction

List assumptions Top level fault tree List control system failure modes that are dependent on Top Events -- explain the directed graph approach for generating fault trees from directed graphs for complex control systems (true for the SPC process) see figure 11 for PWH Generation of AND gates, e.g., a) conditions for firejexplosion b) redundancy c) mitigation by interlocks/operators d) common-cause initiating events

Qualitative Analysis, generate min cut sets

Reliability Data for the basic events

Identify initiating and enabling events Identify maintenance policies for components Failure rates, A Inspection intervals, 0 Data sources

Probabilistic Analysis

Establish acceptable frequencies ( 1. 0 x 10"4 yr" 1 for this study) compute instantaneous top event occurrence frequency Compute expected number of occurrences over a specified time interval (e.g. plant life) which is the integral of the instantaneous top event occurrence frequency

Importance Analysis

Weighting functions (frequency of a defined set of events divided by top event occurrence frequency)

27

step 8

Importance measures for 1} initiating events, 2} enabling events, 3} total importance and 4) min cut set importances Display component failure modes that dominate probabilistically Generate summary fault trees from min cut sets that dominate probabilistically, i.e., concept of cumulative and residual importance of min cut sets

Conclusions, recommendations and results

• Suggest where redundancy should be incorporated • Suggest additional interlocks • Specify inspection and calibration frequency of critical

components Iterate fault tree steps as necessary

• Describe important failure modes in terms of a summary fault tree description

step 9 -- Peer Review

28

5.0 Removal of PVVH LEL Analyzers FTA

The basic conclusion of this study is that two benzene analyzers being available at the beginning of the run offers enough redundancy to insure an acceptable level of safety in the SPC operation without the existence of the LEL analyzers. Below, we discuss the basis of this conclusion.

As described in the introduction, the Late Wash FTA is modified to determine the new frequency of fire and explosion and the new frequency of a formation a flammable mixture in the DWPF Process Vessel Vent Header (PVVH) for the following case:

Assuming the PVVH LEL analyzers are permanently removed from service, two benzene analyzers are available to start a batch and at least one benzene analyzer is available at the end of the batch. The batch cycle time is assumed to be 44 hours.

This means that interlock 12 in table 6 of Appendix B has been removed.

To conduct this FTA, the following three fault trees were modified:

1) Fire/explosion within the PVVS during PR feeding when high flow C02 is used

2) Firejexplosion within the PVVS during all other periods in which the high flow co2 is not used

3) Fire/explosion within the PR during the feeding period.

The complete set of modified fault trees for this study is contained in Appendix c.

The reason that the PR fault tree must be modified is that a spurious false signal indicating trouble in the PVVS can lead to an unsafe shutdown of the PR, i.e., a fault condition in which feeding in the PR occurs without high flow co2 being available.

29

Tables 12 and 13 in the Late Wash FTA were used as the reliability data for the basic events. It is assumed in the FTA that the benzene analyzer performs the same function as the LEL analyzer in detecting benzene and the compounds of benzene within the PVVS. It is further assumed that the benzene analyzers will not detect flammables such as hydrogen and ammonia.

Table 1 lists the new annual frequency of fire and explosion for all the top level events considered in the Late Wash FTA. Table 2 lists the same information except the frequency of an explosive concentration is listed. The table 2 frequencies are upper bound frequencies for table 1 since table 2 assumes that an ignition source exists all the time.

The new annual frequency of fire and explosion for all scenarios calculated in this FTA is 3. 3 x 10-5 yr· 1 which is less than the design goal of 1. 0 x 10-4 yr- 1 • The new frequency, 3. 3 x 10-5 yr- 1 , is actually less than the 5. 0 x 10-5 yr- 1 computed in the Late Wash FTA.

Below, we discuss this discrepancy.

There were two errors in the Late Wash fault trees that were corrected. The first error described below resulted in a non-conservatism but was not significant. The second error had the opposite affect and was significant in reducing the frequency.

When Savannah River Technical Center (SRTC) conducted a peer review of the fault trees in the Late Wash report, the review identified different basic event descriptions (i.e., failure modes) that were assigned to interlock relays whose contacts were both normally closed and opened. Assigning separate descriptions to these failure modes gave the appearance that these failure modes were independent when in fact the failure involved the same relay. This error actually increases the frequency but did not do so significantly. Figure 9 shows by an example how this error was corrected.

Another error made in the Late Wash FTA is the assumption that failure of PR high flow co2 flow transmitter, FI-1107, in the inactive mode was unannounced when in fact the failure is announced. For example, during feeding, if the DCS erroneously

30

generates a signal to close BV-1109, then high flow purge to the PR is stopped. If FI-1107 still indicates nominal flow, then FI-1107 fails in the inactive mode. However, this failure would be detected before the start of the next run. This means that the fault duration time for the transmitter failure is one operating cycle as opposed to six months assumed in the Late Wash FTA. The six month inspection interval corresponds to the assumed inspection frequency for flow transmitters. When correcting this error in the fault tree, a lower frequency for PR deflagration during the feeding period is computed.

Since the Late Wash FTA was conducted, interlock 16 on table 4 in Appendix B was deleted. In addition, the control actions in interlock 6 to close the PR steam flow control valve and block valve and opening the PR cooling valve were deleted. These deletions have no effect on the Late Wash FTA since these control actions were not included in the Late Wash FTA.

It is interesting to note that in the Late Wash FTA, some conservative assumptions were assumed regarding the availability of the PVVH analyzers during feeding. It was assumed that only one benzene and one LEL analyzer was available. However, during all other periods, it was assumed that two benzene analyzers and two LEL analyzers are available at the beginning of the run. Hence, during the feeding period, the assumption was made that two analyzers are available in the new study as well as in the Late Wash FTA, and hence the new frequency for PVVH fire or explosion during feeding did not increase significantly.

During all other periods (called the normal period in the study) reducing the number of PVVH analyzers did not significantly change the frequency of PVVH firejexplosion. The reason for this is that the scenario involving loss of dilution air during OE evaporation dominated probabilistically -- failure of the OE steam valve 9301 to close was a single event resulting in failure of the interlock action. See figure 9 which shows the summary fault tree for the PVVH during the normal period. The failure of the analyzers in this case would involve two separate failures and would not be as significant probabilistically as a single failure of the OE steam valve.

31

6.0 Acknowledgments

The authors wish to thank Eric Browne and Anthony Sarrack for their comments regarding the errors in the Late Wash FTA. These errors were corrected when the FTA was conducted for this study.

The authors also wish to thank those members of the BNI, DuPont Engineering, WSRC DWPF and WSRC SRTC design team who participated in the SPC FTA development.

32

7.0 References

Reference 1

Reference 2

Reference 3

Reference 4

Reference 5

Reference 6

Reference 7

Reference 8

Reference 9

"Fault Tree Analysis for Fire and Explosion Within the Salt Process Cell," Walter Chen and Howard Lambert, September 1986. Letter and Report, from K.G. Miller to R.J. Cunningham BD-8599, dated September 10, 1986.

Process Hazards Review, System No. 32, Precipitate Processing Facilities, Rev. 1, for the Defense Waste Processing Facility; Bechtel National, Inc., March 7, 1992.

"Fault Tree Analysis for Fire and Explosion Within the Salt Process Cell (Late Wash)", by H.E. Lambert for Westinghouse savannah River Company, Erin Engineering & Research, Inc., February 1993.

"Defense Waste Processing Facility: Technical Basis for HAN Precipitate Hydrolysis Process," WSRC-TM-90-11 Rev. o, by M.A. Baich, R.A. Jacobs, J .c. Marek, WSRC-SRTC, December 1990.

"Precipitate Process Operability," D.A. Orth to R.A. Harral, March 1989.

"Salt Process Cell Batch 1 Report (U)," D.P.Lambert, R.E. Edwards & Others, WSRC-RP-93-466, 4/29/93.

"Salt Process Cell Batch 2 Report (U)", S.R. Young, R.E. Edwards & Others, WSRC-PR-93-560, 4/13/93.

"Draft Salt Process Cell Batch 3 Report (U)", H.B. Shah, R.E. Edwards & Others, WSRC-93-1297, 7/21/93

"SPC Batch 4, PRFT to PR J.E. Occhipinti to W.R. 7/29/93.

33

Feed Interruption (U)," Davis, OPS-DTC-930018,

APPENDIX A

INTERLOCK liST FOR HAN ADDITION/NITRITE DESTRUCTION

FAULT TREES

TABLE A-2

TABLE A-3

TABLE A-4

TABLE A-5

TABLE A-6

LIST OF TABLES IN APPENDIX A

CONTROL ELEMENTS ON NEGATIVE FEEDBACK LOOPS

CONTROL ELEMENTS COMPRISING HARDWIRED INTERLOCKS THAT PREVENT BENZENE-N20 FIRE/EXPLOSION IN PR

CONTROL ELEMENTS COMPRISING HARDWIRED AND DCS DEPENDENT INTERLOCKS FOR PREVENTION OF BENZENE-AIR FIRE/EXPLOSION IN PRECIPITATE PROCESS SYSTEM

CONTROL ELEMENTS COMPRISING HARDWIRED INTERLOCKS FOR PREVENTION OF BENZENE-AIR FIRE/EXPLOSION IN PVVH SYSTEM

CONTROL ELEMENTS COMPRISING HARDWIRED INTERLOCKS FOR PREVENTION OR ORGANICS FIRE IN SPC

TABlE A-2 (HAN ADDITION)

CONTROl ElEMENTS ON NEGATIVE FEEDBACK lOOPS

~ ~-- - ---- - -------------------------

SENSOR CONTROLLER OTHER CONTROL ELEMENTS NFBL DESCRIPTION [LOCATION] [LOCATION] [LOCATION]

CONTROL PUMP SPEED DURING FEEDING Fl-1106 FC-1106 SPEED CONTROLLER 1173 [B-1] I

[B-2] [B-2] FEED PUMP [B-1]

CONTROL HIGH FLOW C02 DURING FT-1107 FC-1107 FCV-1107 [D-2] FEEDING [D-2] [C-2] CONTROL STEAM FLOW TO PR DURING FI-1027 FIC-1027 PR FLOW CONTROL VALVE 1027 [E-3] FEEDING/BOILUP/STEAM STRIPPING [E-3] [E-3] I/P TRANSDUCER FY 1027 [E-3]

CONTROL STEAM FLOW TO OE DURING FI-9301 FIC-9301 OE FLOW CONTROL VALVE 9301 [G-5] DISTILLATION/STEAM STRIPPING [G-5] [G-5] I/P TRANSDUCER 9301

CONTROL FLOW OF DILUTION AIR IN FT-5860 FIC-5860 FLOW CONTROL VALVE 2034 [D-7] PVVH [C-10] [D-10]

CONTROL SCVC EXHAUST TEMPERATURE Tl-9356 TIC-9356 PROCESS CHILLED WATER FLOW CONTROL [C-6] [C-6] VALVE 9356 [C-6]

E:\WSRC\REPTB93\APPEND\APPA\A-2 12/13/93 3:23pm


CONTROl ElEMENTS COMPRISING HARDWIRED INTERlOCKS THAT PREVENT BENZENE-N20 FIRE/EXPlOSION IN PR ------

INTERLOCK TRIP CONDITION SENSOR/ (INTERLOCK NUMBER, ANALYlER SWITCH RELAY CONTROL ACTION [LOCATION]

L_ VESSEL OR SPC PROTECTION) [LOCATION]

PR HI-FLOW C02 PURGE FLOW LLL FI-1107* FSLL11078 HR5 PRFT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1173) STOPPED [B-1] (6, PR) [D-2] PRFT-PR BLOCK VALVE (MOV-1100) CLOSED [B-2]

PRFT-PR PPT FEED FLOW HHH FI-1106* FSHH1106B HR2 SAME AS INTERLOCK 6 ABOVE (7, PR) [B-2] SCVC EXHAUST N20 CONC HHH AI-3406 ASHH3406B CR3D PRFT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1173) STOPPED [B-1] (8, PR) [C-6] PRFT-PR BLOCK VALVE (MOV-1100) CLOSED [B-2]

AI-4798 ASHH4798B CR6D PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3] [C-6] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED [E-3]

PR COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-1033) OPEN [E-4] SPC BACKUP C02 WEIGHT LLL WI-2779 WSLL2779B HR7 PRFT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1173) STOPPED [B-1] (9A, PR) [F-2] PRFT-PR BLOCK VALVE (MOV-1100) CLOSED [B-2]

PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED [E-3] PR COOLING WATER VAlVE (HCV-1033) OPEN [E-4] PR HI-FlOW C02 VAlVE (FCV-1107) ClOSED

(5 MIN DElAY) [D-2] PR HI-FlOW BLOCK VAlVE (HCV-1109) CLOSED

(5 MIN DELAYl [D-2J

SPC BACKUP C02 PRESSURE LLL PI-2778 PSLL2778B HR7 SAME AS INTERLOCK 9A ABOVE (9B, PR) [F-3}

PR HI-FLOW C02 FLOW LLLLL FI-1107* FSLL1107D HR8 PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3] (16, PR) [D-2] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED [E-3]

PR COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-1033) OPEN [E-4] I

* COMPONENT ON NFBL, FAIL HIGH OR LOW FAILURE MODE IS COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT

- - ----- ------ ------ -~-

INTERLOCK TRIP CONDITION SENSOR/ (INTERLOCK NUMBER, MALYlER SWITCH RELAY CONTROL ACTION [LOCATION]

VESSEL OR SPC PROTECTION) [LOCATION]

SCVC EXHAUST FLOW HHHH FI-9277 FSHH9277C HR9 PRFT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1173) STOPPED [B-1] (4, PVVH, PR) [C-6] PRFT-PR BLOCK VALVE (MOV-1100 CLOSED [B-2]

PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3] PR STEAM BlOCK VALVE (HCV 1038) CLOSED [E-3] PR COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-1033) OPEN [E-4] PR HI-FLOW C02 VALVE (FCV-1107) CLOSED

(5 MIN DELAY) [D-2] PR HI-FLOW C02 BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1109) CLOSED

(5 MIN DELAY) [D-2] OE STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-9301) CLOSED [G-6] OE STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-XXXX) CLOSED [G-5]

TABLE A-4 (HAN ADDITION) CONTROL ELEMENTS COMPRISING HARDWIRED AND DCS DEPENDENT INTERLOCKS FOR PREVENTION OF BENZENE-AIR FIRE/EXPLOSION IN PRECIPITATE PROCESS SYSTEM

INTERLOCK TRIP CONDITION (INTERLOCK NUMBER,

VESSEL OR SPC PROTECTION)

SCVC OXYGEN CONCENTRATION HHH {10, All PROCESS VESSELS, All THE TIME)

** HARDWIRED INTERLOCK *** DCS INTERlOCK

-------

SENSOR/ MALYlER SWITCH RELAY

[LOCATION]

AI-3405 ASHH3405B CR3C AI-3409 ASHH3409C CR6C

- --------····------

CONTROL ACTION [LOCATION]

RAISE SPC VESSEl SYSTEM PRESSURE TO POSITIVE (PI-1041 & 9312) ** [D-3], [G-4]

AGITATORS STOPPED: PRFT (HIS-1140), PR (-1042), OE {-9317) *** [B-1], [E-3], [G-5]

CATALYST FEED TANK TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1008) STOPPED ***

FORMIC ACID FEED TANK TO PR BlOCK VALVE (HIS-2056) CLOSED ***

HAN FEED TANK TO PR BlEED VALVE (HCV-8829) OPENED ***

HAN FEED TANK TO PR DOWN STREAM TRANSFER VALVE (HCV-8830) ClOSED ***

HAN FEED TANK TO PR UP STREAM TRANSFER VALVE (HCV-8828) CLOSED ***

lPPT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-7162A) STOPPED *** OE COOLING WATER VAlVE {HCV-9307) OPENED ***

[G-6] OE TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-9316) STOPPED *** [G-5] OECT SAMPlE PUMP (HIS-9333) STOPPED *** [F-4] OECT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-9337) STOPPED *** [F-4] PR SAMPLE PUMP (HIS-1044) STOPPED *** [E-3] PR TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1057) STOPPED *** [E-3] PRFT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1173) STOPPED *** [B-1] PRFT SAMPlE PUMP (HIS-1172) STOPPED *** [B-1] PRFT-PR BLOCK VALVE (MOV-1100) CLOSED*** [B-3] PR STEAM flOW VAlVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED *** [E-3] PR STEAM BlOCK VAlVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED *** [E-3] PR COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-1033) OPEN *** [E-4] PR HI-FLOW C02 VALVE (FCV-1107) CLOSED ***

(5 MIN DELAY) [D-2] PR HI-FLOW C02 BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1109) CLOSED ***

(5 MIN DELAY) [D-2] OE STEAM FLOW.VALVE (FCV-9301) CLOSED*** [G-6] OE STEAM BLOCK VAlVE {HCV-XXXX) CLOSED *** [G-5]

r

I


CONTROl ElEMENTS COMPRISING HARDWIRED INTERlOCKS FOR PREVENTION OF BENZENE-AIR FIRE/EXPlOSION IN PVVH SYSTEM

INTERLOCK TRIP CONDITION SENSOR/ (INTERLOCK NUMBER, ANALYlER SWITCH RELAY CONTROL ACTION [LOCATION]


PR HI-FLOW C02 PURGE FLOW HHH FI-1107* FSHH1107B HR4 PRFT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1173) STOPPED [B-1] (1, PVVH) [D-3] PRFT-PR BLOCK VALVE (MOV-1100) CLOSED [B-2]

PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED [E-3] PR COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-1033) OPEN [E-4] PR HI-FLOW C02 VALVE (FCV-1107) CLOSED


(5 MIN DELAY) [D-2] OE STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-9301) ClOSED [G-6] OE STEAM BlOCK VALVE (HCV-XXXX) CLOSED [G-5]

PVVH FLOW LLL FI-5860* FSLL5860B HR3 SAME AS INTERLOCK 1 ABOVE (2, PVVH) [C-10]

PVVH TEMPERATURE HHH TI-6041 TSHH6041B HR1 SAME AS INTERLOCK 1 ABOVE (3, PVVH) [C-9]

SCVC EXHAUST FLOW HHHH FI-9277 FSHH9277C HR9 SAME AS INTERLOCK 1 ABOVE (4, PVVH) [C-6]

SCVC EXHAUST TEMPERATURE HHHH TI-9356* TSHH9356C HR6 SAME AS INTERLOCK 1 ABOVE '---(5, PVVH)

---_ [C-6]


I

INTERLOCK TRIP CONDITION SENSOR/ (INTERLOCK NUMBER, MALVZER SWITCH RELAY CONTROL ACTION [lOCATION]


PVVH C6H6 CONCENTRATION HHHH AI3407 ASHH3407C CR3A PRFT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1173) STOPPED [B-1] (11, PVVH) [C-10] PRFT-PR BLOCK VALVE (MOV-1100) CLOSED [B-2]

AI-3408 ASHH3408C CR6A PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3] [C-10] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED [E-3]

PR COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-1033) OPEN [E-4] PR HI-FLOW C02 VALVE (FCV-1107) CLOSED


(5 MIN DELAY) [D-2] OE STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-9301) CLOSED [G-6] OE STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-XXXX) CLOSED [G-5] SCVC MOV'S 1041 & 9278 CLOSED [C-7]

PVVH LEL HHHH AI-4713 ASHH4713C CR3B SAME AS INTERLOCK 11 ABOVE (12, PVVH) [C-10]

AI-4714 ASHH4714C CR6B [C-10]


TABLE A-6 (HAN ADDITION)

CONTROL ELEMENTS COMPRISING HARDWIRED INTERLOCKS FOR PREVENTION OF ORGANICS FIRE IN SPC

INTERLOCK TRIP CONDITION SENSOR/ ~ (INTERLOCK NUMBER, MALVZER SWITCH RELAY CONTROL ACTION [lOCATION]

ESSEL OR SPC PROTECTION) [LOCATION]

PR PRESSURE HH PI-1041 PSHH1041 PSHHX1041 PRFT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1173) STOPPED [B-1] (14, SPC) [D-3] PRFT-PR BLOCK VALVE (MOV-1100) CLOSED [B-2]

PR STEAM FLOW VAlVE (FCV-1027) ClOSED [E-3] PR STEAM BlOCK VAlVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED [E-3] PR COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-1033) OPEN [E-4] PR HI-FLOW C02 VAlVE (FCV-1107) CLOSED

(5 MIN DElAY) [D-2] PR HI-FlOW C02 BLOCK VAlVE (HCV-1109) CLOSED

(5 MIN DElAY) [D-2] OE STEAM FLOW VAlVE (FCV-9301) ClOSED [G-6] OE STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-XXXX) CLOSED [G-5] OE COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-9307) OPENED [G-6]

OE PRESSURE HH PI-9313 PSHH9313 PSHHX9313 PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3] (15, SPC) [G-5] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED [E-3]

PR COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-1033) OPEN [E-3] OE STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-9301) CLOSED [G-6] OE STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-XXXX) CLOSED [G-5] OE COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-9307) OPENED [G-6]

SPC C02 FIRE SUPPRESSANT XS-4030 X54030 X54030 OE TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-9316) STOPPED [G-5] RELEASED OECT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-9337) STOPPED [F-4] {17, SPCJ OECT SAMPLE PUMP (HIS-9333) STOPPED F-4]

SUMP PUMP lEVEl HHH li-5925 LSHH59258 lSHHX5925B SPC SUMP PUMP (HIS-5925B) STARTED [D-2] (18, SPC) [E-2] LSHH5927B LSHHX5927B SUMP PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE (MOV-5928) OPENED [D-2]

U-5927 -----····--·-··-

[_E-2] --···- -- -~


INTERLOCK TRIP CONDITION SENSOR/ (INTERLOCK NUMBER, ANALVZER SWITCH RELAY CONTROL ACTION [LOCATION]


SUMP PUMP LEVEL HHHH LI-5930 LSH5930 LSHX5930 SPC SPRAY WATER VALVE (SV-7276) CLOSED (19, SPC) [E-2] LSH5931 LSHX5931

LI-5931 [E-2]

tR STEAM FLOW HH FSH-1027* FSHH1027 FSHHX1027 PR STEAM FlOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3] (20, PR & PVV SYSTEMS) [E-3] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) ClOSED [E-3]

OE STEAM FLOW HH FSH-9301* FSH9301 FSHX9301 OE STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-9301) CLOSED [G-6] (21, PR AND PVV SYSTEMS) [G-5] OE STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-XXXX) ClOSED [G-5]


APPENDIX B

INTERLOCK LIST FOR LATE WASH

FAULT TREES

TABLE 3

TABLE 4

TABLE 5

TABLE 6

TABLE 7

LIST OF TABLES IN APPENDIX B


CONTROL ELEMENTS COMPRISING HARDWIRED INTERLOCKS THAT PREVENT BENZENE FIRE/EXPLOSION IN PR DURING FEEDING

CONTROL ELEMENTS COMPRISING HARDWIRED AND DCS DEPENDENT INTERLOCKS FOR PREVENTION OF BENZENE-AIR FIRE/EXPLOSION IN PRECIPITATE PROCESS SYSTEM

CONTROL ELEMENTS COMPRISING HARDWIRED INTERLOCKS FOR PREVENTION OF BENZENE-AIR FIRE/EXPLOSION IN PVVH SYSTEM


TABLE 3 (LATE WASH)


SENSOR CONTROLLER OTHER CONTROL ELEMENTS NFBL DESCRIPTION [LOCATION] [LOCATION] [LOCATION]

CONTROL PUMP SPEED DURING FEEDING FI -1106 FC-1106 SPEED CONTROLLER 1173 [8-1] [B-2] [B-2] FEED PUMP [B-1]

CONTROL HIGH FLOW C02 DURING FT-1107 FC-1107 FCV-1107 [D-2] FEEDING [D-2] [C-2] CONTROL STEAM FLOW TO PR DURING FI-1027 FIC-1027 PR FLOW CONTROL VALVE 1027 [E-3] FEEDING/BOILUP/STEAM STRIPPING [E-3] [E-3] 1/P TRANSDUCER FY 1027 [E-3] CONTROL STEAM FLOW TO OE DURING FI-9301 FIC-9301 OE FLOW CONTROL VALVE 9301 [G-5] DISTILLATION/STEAM STRIPPING [G-5] [G-5] 1/P TRANSDUCER 9301 CONTROL FLOW OF DILUTION AIR IN FT-5860 FIC-5860 FLOW CONTROL VALVE 2034 [D-7] PVVH [C-10] [D-10] CONTROL SCVC EXHAUST TEMPERATURE TI-9356 TIC-9356 PROCESS CHILLED WATER FLOW CONTROL

[C-6] [C-6] VALVE 9356 [C-6]

E:\WSRC\REPTB93\APPEND\APPB\TABLE3 12/13!93 3:52pm

II

TABlE 4 -- INTERlOCK TABlE (lATE WASH)

CONTROl ElEMENTS COMPRISING HARDWIRED INTERlOCKS THAT PREVENT BENZENE FIRE/EXPlOSION IN PR DURING FEEDING

- -

INTERLOCK TRIP CONDITION SENSOR/ (INTERLOCK NUMBER, ANALYZER SWITCH RELAY CONTROL ACTION [LOCATION]


PR HI-FLOW C02 PURGE FLOW LLL FI-1107* FSLL1107B HR5 PRFT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1173) STOPPED [B-1] (6, PR) [D-2] PRFT-PR BLOCK VALVE (MOV-1100) CLOSED [B-2]

PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3]** PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED [E-3]** PR COOLING WATER VALVE JHCV-1033J OPEN [E-4]**

PRFT-PR PPT FEED FLOW HHH FI-1106* FSHH1106B HR2 SAME AS INTERLOCK 6 ABOVE (7, PR) [B-2]

SPC BACKUP C02 WEIGHT LLL WI-2779 WSLL2779B HR7 PRFT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1173) STOPPED [B-1] (9A, PR) [F-2] PRFT-PR BLOCK VALVE {MOV-1100) CLOSED [B-2]


(10 MIN DELAY) [D-2] PR HI-FLOW BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1109) CLOSED

(10 MIN DELAY) [D-2]

SPC BACKUP C02 PRESSURE LLL PI-2778 PSLL2778B HR7 SAME AS INTERLOCK 9A ABOVE (9B, PR) [F-3]

PR HI-FLOW C02 FLOW LLLLL FI -1107* FSLU107D HR8 PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3] (16, PR) *** [D-2] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED [E-3]

--- ~-- '~~-- -~

PR COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-1033) OPEN [E-4]

* COMPONENT ON NFBL, FAIL HIGH OR LOW FAILURE MODE IS COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT ** INTERLOCK ACTIONS ELIMINATED *** INTERLOCK 16 REMOVED FROM SERVICE

-----

INTERLOCK TRIP CONDITION SENSOR/ {INTERLOCK NUMBER, ANALYZER SWITCH RELAY CONTROL ACTION [LOCATION]


SCVC EXHAUST FLOW HHHH FI-9277 FSHH9277C HR9 PRFT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1173) STOPPED [B-1] (4, PVVH, PR) [C-6] PRFT-PR BLOCK VALVE (MOV-1100 CLOSED [B-2]

PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV 1038) CLOSED [E-3] PR COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-1033) OPEN [E-4] PR HI-FLOW C02 VALVE (FCV-1107) CLOSED


(10 MIN DELAY) [D-2] OE STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-9301) CLOSED [G-6]

* COMPONENT ON NFBL, FAIL HIGH OR LOW FAILURE MODE IS COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT ** INTERLOCK ACTIONS ELIMINATED *** INTERLOCK 16 REMOVED FROM SERVICE

TABLE 5 -- INTERLOCK TABLE {LATE WASH) CONTROL ELEMENTS COMPRISING HARDWIRED AND DCS DEPENDENT INTERLOCKS FOR PREVENTION OF BENZENE-AIR FIRE/EXPLOSION IN PRECIPITATE PROCESS SYSTEM

INTERLOCK TRIP CONDITION (INTERLOCK NUMBER,

VESSEL OR SPC PROTECTION)

SCVC OXYGEN CONCENTRATION HHH {10, ALL PROCESS VESSELS,

I ALL THE TIME)

** HARDWIRED INTERLOCK *** DCS INTERLOCK

SENSOR/ ANALYZER SWITCH RELAY

[LOCATION]

AI-3405 ASHH3405B CR3C AI-3409 ASHH3409C CR6C

CONTROL ACTION [LOCATION]

RAISE SPC VESSEL SYSTEM PRESSURE TO POSITIVE (PI-1041 & 9312) ** [D-3], [G-4]

AGITATORS STOPPED: PRFT (HIS-1140), PR (-1042), OE (-9317) *** [B-1], [E-3], [G-5]

CATALYST FEED TANK TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1008) STOPPED ***

FORMIC ACID FEED TANK TO PR BLOCK VALVE (HIS-2056) CLOSED ***

HAN FEED TANK TO PR BLEED VALVE (HCV-8829) OPENED ***

HAN FEED TANK TO PR DOWN STREAM TRANSFER VALVE (HCV-8830) CLOSED ***

HAN FEED TANK TO PR UP STREAM TRANSFER VALVE (HCV-8828) CLOSED ***

LPPT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-7162A) STOPPED *** OE COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-9307) OPENED ***

[G-6] OE TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-9316) STOPPED *** [G-5] OECT SAMPLE PUMP (HIS-9333) STOPPED *** [F-4] OECT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-9337) STOPPED *** [F-4] PR SAMPLE PUMP (HIS-1044) STOPPED *** [E-3] PR TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1057) STOPPED *** [E-3] PRFT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1173) STOPPED *** [B-1] PRFT SAMPLE PUMP (HIS-1172) STOPPED *** [B-1] PRFT-PR BLOCK VALVE (MOV-1100) CLOSED *** [B-3] PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED *** [E-3] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED *** [E-3] PR COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-1033) OPEN *** [E-4] PR HI-FLOW C02 VALVE (FCV-1107) CLOSED ***

(10 MIN DELAY) [D-2] PR HI-FLOW C02 BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1109) CLOSED ***

(10 MIN DELAY) [D-2] OE STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-9301) CLOSED *** [G-6]

!

I: 1TERLOCK TRIP CONDITION (INTERLOCK NUMBER, VESSEL OR SPC PROTECTION)

TABlE 6 -- INTERlOCK TABlE (lATE WASH)

CONTROl ElEMENTS COMPRISING HARDWIRED INTERlOCKS FOR PREVENTION OF BENZENE-AIR FIRE/EXPlOSION IN PVVH SYSTEM

SENSOR/ ANALYZER SWITCH RELAY CONTROL ACTION [LOCATION] [LOCATION]

PR HI-FLOW C02 PURGE FLOW HHH FI-1107* FSHH1107B HR4 PRFT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1173) STOPPED [B-1] (1, PVVH) [D-3] PRFT-PR BLOCK VALVE (MOV-1100) CLOSED [B-2]



(10 MIN DELAY) [D-2]

PVVH FLOW LLL FI-5860* FSLL5860B HR3 SAME AS INTERLOCK 1 ABOVE {2, PVVH) [C-10]

PVVH TEMPERATURE HHH TI-6041 TSHH6041B HR1 SAME AS INTERLOCK 1 ABOVE (3, PVVH) [C-9]

SCVC EXHAUST FLOW HHHH FI -9277 FSHH9277C HR9 SAME AS INTERLOCK 1 ABOVE (4, PVVH) [C-6] OE STEAM FLOW VALVE CLOSES (FCV-9301}

SCVC EXHAUST TEMPERATURE HHHH TI -9356* TSHH9356C HR6 SAME AS INTERLOCK 1 ABOVE (5, PVVH) [C-6] OE STEAM FLOW VALVE CLOSES (FCV-9301)

* COMPONENT ON NFBL, FAIL HIGH OR LOW FAILURE MODE IS COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT ** SOFTWIRED INTERLOCK

INTERLOCK TRIP CONDITION SENSOR/ (INTERLOCK NUMBER, ANALYZER SWITCH RELAY CONTROL ACTION [LOCATION] VESSEL OR SPC PROTECTION) [LOCATION]

PVVH C6H6 CONCENTRATION HHHH AI3407 ASHH3407C CR3A PRFT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1173) STOPPED [B-1] (11, PVVH) [C-10] PRFT-PR BLOCK VALVE (MOV-1100) CLOSED [B-2]

AI-3408 ASHH3408C CR6A PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3] [C-10] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED [E-3]

' PR COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-1033) OPEN [E-4] PR HI-FLOW C02 VALVE (FCV-1107) CLOSED


(10 MIN DELAY) [D-2] OE STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-9301) CLOSED [G-6]** SCVC MOV'S 1041 & 9278 CLOSED [C-7]**

PVVH LEL HHHH AI-4713 ASHH4713C CR3B SAME AS INTERLOCK 11 ABOVE (12, PVVH) [C-10]

AI-4714 ASHH4714C CR6B [C-10]

* COMPONENT ON NFBL, FAIL HIGH OR LOW FAILURE MODE IS COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT ** SOFTWIRED INTERLOCK

TABLE 7 ~- INTERLOCK TABLE (LATE WASH)


II INTERLOCK TRIP CONDITION I SENSOR/ I I I

I' (INTERLOCK NUMBER, ANALYlER 1 SWITCH RELAY CONTROL ACTION [LOCATION]

I VESSEL OR SPC PROTECTION) [LOCATION]

PR PRESSURE HH PI-1041 PSHH1041 PSHHX1041 PRFT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1173) STOPPED [8-1] (14, SPC) [D-3] PRFT-PR BLOCK VALVE (MOV-1100) CLOSED [B-2]

PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED [E-3] PR COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-1033) OPEN [E-4] PR HI-FlOW C02 VALVE (FCV-1107) CLOSED

(10 MIN DELAY) [D-2] PR HI-FLOW C02 BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1109) ClOSED

(10 MIN DELAY) [D-2] OE STEAM FlOW VALVE (FCV-9301) CLOSED [G-6] OE COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-9307) OPENED [G-6]

OE PRESSURE HH PI-9313 PSHH9313 PSHHX9313 PR STEAM FlOW VAlVE (FCV-1027) ClOSED [E-3] (15, SPC) [G-5] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) ClOSED [E-3]

PR COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-1033) OPEN [E-3] OE STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-9301) CLOSED [G-6] OE COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-9307) OPENED [G-6]

SPC C02 FIRE SUPPRESSANT XS-4030 X54030 X54030 OE TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-9316) STOPPED [G-5] RELEASED OECT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-9337) STOPPED [F-4] (17, SPC) OECT SAMPLE PUMP JHIS-9333) STOPPED F-4] SUMP PUMP LEVEL HHHH U-5930 LSH5930 LSH5930 INITIATE SPC INTERLOCK, TURN OFF All SPC PUMPS, (18, SPC) [E-2] LSH5931 LSH5931 TURN OFF STEAM TO OE AND PR, TURN ON COOLING WATER

U-5931 TO OE AND PR [E-2]

PR STEAM FLOW HH FSH-1027* FSHH1027 FSHHX1027 PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3] (20, PR & PVV SYSTEMS) [E-3] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED [E-3]


TABLE 7 -- INTERLOCK TABLE (LATE WASH)


II I SENSOR/ I I

------·····-·-

INTERLOCK TRIP CONDITION ,. (INTERLOCK NUMBER, ANALYlER I SWITCH RELAY CONTROL ACTION [LOCATION]


PR PRESSURE HH PI-1041 PSHH1041 PSHHX1041 PRFT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-1173) STOPPED [B-1] (14, SPC) [D-3] PRFT-PR BLOCK VALVE (MOV-1100) CLOSED [B-2]



(10 MIN DELAY) [D-2] I OE STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-9301) CLOSED [G-6]

OE COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-9307) OPENED [G-6] OE PRESSURE HH PI-9313 PSHH9313 PSHHX9313 PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3] (15, SPC) [G-5] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED [E-3]

PR COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-1033) OPEN [E-3] OE STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-9301) CLOSED [G-6] OE COOLING WATER VALVE (HCV-9307) OPENED [G-6]

SPC C02 FIRE SUPPRESSANT XS-4030 X54030 X54030 OE TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-9316) STOPPED [G-5] RELEASED OECT TRANSFER PUMP (HIS-9337) STOPPED [F-4] (17, SPC) OECT SAMPLE PUMP (HIS-9333) STOPPED F-4]

SUMP PUMP LEVEL HHHH LI-5930 LSH5930 LSH5930 INITIATE SPC INTERLOCK, TURN OFF All SPC PUMPS, (18, SPC) [E-2] LSH5931 LSH5931 TURN OFF STEAM TO OE AND PR, TURN ON COOLING WATER I

LI-5931 TO OE AND PR [E-2]

PR STEAM FLOW HH FSH-1027* FSHH1027 FSHHX1027 PR STEAM FLOW VALVE (FCV-1027) CLOSED [E-3] (20, PR & PVV SYSTEMS) [E-3] PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE (HCV-1038) CLOSED [E-3]


SALT PROCESS CELL FIRE/EXPLOSION (PVVS LEL ANALYZERS REMOVED FROM SERVICE)

F1RE DR EXPLmmN RE OR EXPLOSION \JITH WITHIN PRECIPITATE PRECI ITA TE REACTOR <PRl S EM

FEED TANK <PRFTl (IN UDES PR. SCVC AND P CDl

CD-FE-01 + CD-fE-Q2 +

SHEET 2 SHEET 4

(TOP-PRFT) * (TOP-PR--) *

FIRE DR EXPL.mmN VITHIN PROCESS

SYSTEM

F"E-ot-ot ---.--DR

RE OR EXPLOSION \JITH DR ANIC EVAPORATOR SYS

NCLUDES DE AND OECD

CO-FE-03 +

SHEET 8

(TOP-OE--)

+ EVENTS TO BE ANALYlED SEPARATELY

* SEVERITY THREE EVENTS IN PHR

FIRE OR EXPLDSIDN M WI N ORGANIC EVAPDRA

DENSA TE TANK <DEC l

CO-FE-Q.4. +

SHEET 10

* (TOP-OECT)

C SUMP NOT :TINGUISHED

CD-F"E-08

+

SHEET 25

(TOPSFIRE)

R

T+ SHEET 12

* (TOP-PVVH)

SHEET 1

CELL <SPCl AIR SPACE <DUTSI PROCESS BOUNDAR'() USING BACKFI

FROM R£MDTE P IJCESS CELL <RPC) TD COJPIED AREA

T+ SHEET 23 SHEET 30

(TOPLFIRE) * (TOPLARGE) *

*

MASTER LOGIC DIAGRAM

10-25-93 13:21 F: \FIRE\FlRE1

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

AIR LEAK THRU PRrT FEED

PUMP FLANGE

9FU1lPPL ---.--

AlR LEAK THRU PRFT AGITATOR

FLANGE

SFLAGITL --,-

OXYGEN CONC IN PRFT

INCREASES

DR

PURGE SUPPLIER FAILURE - 02

INSTEAD OF" C02

1.3E-6/H 22-H t3E-6/H 22-H

* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT

OPERA TOR FAILS TO SHUT DOWN

PRDCESS

DPER!\TIJR ---.--

LOE-e 1.0 ,.

lO

CD-FE-IE --,-

SHEET 33

1.0 •

AIR LEAKAGE IN PRFT HIGHER THAN

DESJGN RATE

BFLSAPPL ---.--

:1.3E-6/H 22.H

PRFT TANK STATIC CHARGE

LOE-!7/H ee.H

AIR LEAK THRU ANY I OF' 15

HANFORD CONNECTORS

8DPPRFTL ---.--

!.3E-6/H .'Sf

3.4E-5H

PRFT lGNlTIDN SOURCES

DR

O,:SH

---!ZJ AND

± LPPT-PRFT VALVE FAILS

TO CLOSE

=r:= o6TKI

8.3E-6/H Z2.H><

PRFT SAMPLE PUMP IGNITION SOURCE V44

6.8E-!5/H O.:iH

AIR LEAK THRU PRFT THERMO 'WELL FLANGE

I SI'L±ERL I

I OTCSTCI

4.6E-4/H

SHEET

22.H

PRFT /PR FEED PUMP IGNITION SOURCE 2/44

SPP-TR-1 --.--

e.OE-4/H

2

LOH

02-02-9:3 12::38 F: \FI RE\FI RE2

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

<LD PRF'T PURGE DRAIN VALVES DPEN

<ANY 1 OF' 2)

'9VDIDF'2X ...........,..-

~.6E-6/H 22H

HCV 1017 TRANSFERS

CLOSED

1.2£-5/H

HCV 1017 CLIJSED

<ALL CAUSES)

22.H

F'E-63-()4 ---r-

DR

BASELDAD PURGE iD PRFT

INADEQUATE

n::-03-02 ---r-

DPERATDR

INADVERTANTLY CLOSES HCV 1017

DR

PRF'T PURGE F'IL.TER

PLUGGED

9F'R-IP ___,.-

LOE-6/H

I.OE-5/H 22-H


e<,H

!.OE-5/H

NEEDLE VALVE SV H CLOSED <ALL CAUSESl

FE-03-o5 ---,-

DR

22/H

CPERATDR FAll.S ID ADJUST

MDV 1041/"9278

UVMI041T ---r-

l.OE-2

PRF'T PURGE MANUAL VAL~ CL.DSED

<ANY 1 CF' 4l

9VTlDF"4X ~

LIE-6/.H 2C.H

LO "

NEEJlLE VALVE SV 74 FAILS

CLIJSED

PCV 1016 FAll.S CLOSED

9VTSV74C -.,..-

LSE-6/H 22H

9Vl1016C ---,--

LGE-6/H

DCS FAILS iD

ALARM

7CPDCS-F ...........,..-

Z.OE-4/H

PSV 716 RELIEF VALVE

OPEN

9VY-716D -r--

2.0E-9/H 22.H

22H>!

LOSS Dr NORMAL

PURGE SUPPLY

22.H

n::-03-67 --,---

DR

PRFT PURGE MANUAL VAL YES CLOSED

<ANY I CF 2l

INSUFFICIENT PURGE SUPPLY

8VTIDF2X ...........,..-

5.6E-71H 22.H

CC-FE-29 ~

SHEET 17

SHEET 3

DR

n 1018

INACTIVE

9SFI018F -,--

7.8E-5/H 3.0M><

LOSS CF PURGE

SUPPLY

F'E-03-Q6 ---,-

AND

LDSS OF' BACKUP

PURGE SUPPLY

CD-FE-72 ...........,..-

SHEET 45

PRrT PURGE CHECK VALVE

PLUGGED

9VX-10 -r--

3.0E-7/H 22.H

seve MDV 1041/n78

INACTIVE

UVMBCTHF ----.---

'9.00E-6/li LO ~

01-08-93 11:21 F: \FIRE\FIRE3

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

* DENOTES ENABLING EVENT (1} CONCENTRATION MAY EXIST WHEN PR

TIEMPERA TURE IS LESS lHAN 88"C

PR-EL-----r-

1.0 1.0 ..

INTERLOCK 10 FAILS TO INCREASE SYSTEM PRESSURE

CD-FE-70 --.-

SHEET 44

TD

Cll-fE-15

SHEET 5

RE

PR AGITATOR lGNlTION

SOURCE 275/44

PAG-1 --,.---

CD-F"E-Q2

SHEET 1

F1RE OR EXPLOSION \.fiTH~N PR SYSTEM \JHEN HIGH Hl FLll¥1 C02 IS USED

TDPPR----r-

0.0 0.0 •

PR TANK STATIC CHARGE

PTK--l --,.---

LS>E-4/H H.OH LOE-9/H

OXYGEN CDNCENTRA TJON lN

PR INCREASES

(1) DR

AIR LEAKAGE lN PR lS MIGHER THAN

DESIGN RATE

CD-fE-H

SHEET 6

PURGE SUPPLIER fAILURE - De

INSTEAD OF' C02

NTK--u

LOE-7/H 2e.H

lGNITI!JN SIJURCES PRESENT

INPR

DR

PR TRANSFER PUMP IGNITION SOURCE 2/44

ez.H

PPP-TR-1 -.--

L4E-+/H

SHEE 4

LOH

PR SAMPLE PUMP IGNrTIDN SOURCE 1/44

PPP-SA-1 ----r--

6.8E-5/H O.SH

10-19-93 15:20 F: \FJRE\FIRE4

SPC FIRE/EXP

<LCl PR PURGE DRAIN VALVES OPEN <ANY 1 OF 2)

QVD1DI'2X --r-

v 5.6E-7/H CZH

l2E-51H

HCV liOC CLOSED

<ALL CAUSES)

DR

22.H


OSION

D~ERATDR

INADVERT ANTLY CLOSES HCV-liOC

QVSU02U

BASELDA» PURGE TO PR INA»EQUA TE

F"E-o5-02 --,-

OR

PR PURGE FIL 1"ER ~LUGGED

QF'R--IP -r--

LOE:-6/H

l.OE-5/H 22.H

2Z.H

QVTSV74U

l.OE-5/H

FAILS

NEEDLE VALVE CLOSED

<ALL CAUSES)

22.H

OPERATOR FAILS TD AD.JUST

MOV-104V927S

UVH1041T ----.--

DCS FAILS

TO ALARM

7CPDCS-F --r-

DR

l.OE-e 1.02 2.0E-41H 22.H~

PR PURGE MANUAL VAL YES CLOSED

<ANY 1 OF -4-l

NEEDLE VALVE SV 74 FAILS

CLOSED

QVTSV74C --,--

QVTIDF4X ---r-

l.1E-61H

2.2E-6/H 22.H

22,H

PR PURGE MANUAL VALVES CLOSED

<ANY 1 OF 2)

QVTIDF2X ---r-

PSV 180 RV OPEN

QVY-1800 -r--

eoE-~IH

5.6E-7/H 22.H

FT 1103 INACTIVE

llSFU03F -.----

7.8E-5/H

~eH

3.0M2

LOSS OF NORMAL PURGE

SUPPLY

F"E-05-07 ---,.-

DR

INSUFFICIENT PURGE

SUPPLY

CD-FE-~9 ---r-

SHEET 17

AND

SHEET 5

seve MDV lO'Il./n7a INACTIVE

UVMBOTHF -,---

9.00E-61H LO "'

SHEET 59

LOSS OF BACKUP

PURGE SUPPLY

CD-F"E-72 ----.-

SHEET 45

PR PURGE CHECK VALVE

PLUGGED

QVX-10 ----.-

::l.OE-7/H 22.H

PCV 1101 FAILS

CLOSED

G>VIUOLC --,-

1.6E-5/H CZH

10-26-93 15:19 F: \FIRE\FlRE5

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

SHEET 7

PR PRESSURE RELlEf VALVE FAILS

Ol'EN

PVf--·

c.OE-6/H cz.H

OPERA TOR F" AILS TD SHUiDD\IN

PROCESS

DPERATIJR -,-

l.OE-2 1.0 ..


"'* REQUIRES SIMULTANEOUS FAILURE OF 4 VACUUM

REUEF VALVES AND FAILURE OF VESSEL VENT EXHAUSTERS

CD-F"E-12 --.--

SHEET 33

AIR fUN FROM

DR

SUMP PUMP

LIMIT S"w'IT CH AILURE CAUSES VAL'

TO REMAIN DPEN

!LSD= --.--

L2E--6/H cz.H

SHEET 4

PRBT DIP TUBE

LEAKS

JHCD!PTL -.---

L3E--6/H !S(

PRBT MOV 1056 fAILS

OPEN

JVM10560 --.--

LOE-7/H

DR

!S(

SHEET 6

0.0

PRBT PRESSURE HIGHER

THAN PR

CLD FAILS TD CLDSE ISDLATIDN

VALVE 1056

7CL1056f -.---

3.0E--6/H .5Y

JTKGTPR3 -,--

.01 1.0 1M

o.o ..

01-11-93 12:32 F: \FIRE\FIRE6

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

AIR LEAK THRU PR THERMO

'WELL fLANGE

PfLPR-L ---r--

l.3E-6/H 22.H

AIR LEAK THRU PR SAMPLE

PUMP FLANGE

PfLSAPPL ---,-

1.3E--6/H 22.H

AIR LEAK THRU PR TRANSFER PUMP FLANGE

PFLFDPPL ---,.-

1.3E--6/H 22.H

DR

AIR LEAK THRU PR AGITATOR

FLANGE

PFLAGffi ----.--

1.3E--6/H 22.H

CQ-fE-1~

SHEET 6

AIR LEAK THRU PRCD VAPOR UNE fLANGE

PFLPRCDL ---,-

l3E--6/H 22.H

AIR LEAK THRU PRESSURE REUEF

VALVE SEAT

PfLVTVLL ----.---

l3E-6/H 22.H

SHEET 7

AIR LEAK THRU ANY l OF 16

HANFORD CDNNECmRS

PHC-16L ----.--

2JE-5/H 22.H

01-08-93 11:50 F: \FI RE\FI RE7

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

LD

AIR LEAK THF<U DE AGITATOR

FLANGE

DFLAGffi --r---

1.3E-6/H


22.H

1.0 ..

INTERLOCK 10 FAILS TO INCREASE SYSTEM PRESSURE

AIR LEAK THRU DE THERMO

\YELL FLANGE

CFLFDPPL ----..,.-

l.::lE-6/H 22.H

(1} CONCENlRAllON MAY EXIST AT TEMPERATURES BELOW 70'C

AILS

IGNITIDN SOURCES

PRESENT IN DE

OE AGITATOR IGN!TION SOURCE:

12.5/«

OAG--·

L4E-~/H 6.3H 1.0E-UH

OXYGEN CIJNC IN DE

INCREASES

DR (3)

AIR LEAKAGE IN OE IS HIGHER THAN

DESIGN RATE

AIR LEAK THI<U DE THERMO

VELL FLANGE

OFLTHERL -,----

1.3E-6/H 22.H

AIR LEAK THRU OECD VAPOR LINE FLANGE

OFLOECDL -,----

L.:JE-6/H 22.H

PURGE SUPPUER F AlLURE -- OE

INSTEAD CF" C02

DFLVTVLL ----.---

1.3E-6/H 22.H

(2} OR

22.H

(2) AGITATOR AND lRANSFER PUMP SHUT OFF WHEN OXYGEN CONCENlRAllON EXCEEDS 60% OF MOC

(3) BASED ON THE CONSERVAllVE ASSUMPTION THAT THERE IS ENOUGH AIR LEAKAGE TO THE OE GIVEN PURGE FAILURE

SHEET 8

~lE-4/H

AIR LEAK THRU ANY 1 OF 12

HANFORD CONNECTORS

CHC-12l --r---

!.GE-5/H 22.H

3.0H

01-08-93 11:57 F: \FI RE\FI RE8

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

<LC> DE PURGE DRAIN VAL YES CPE:N <ANY 1 DF 2)

LVD1CF2X --.-

5.6E-7/H 22.H

HCV 9314 TRANSFERS

CLOSED

LV$931-4-C ----,-

HCV 9314 CLOSED

(ALL CAUSES)

BASELOAD PURGE TO DE INADEQUATE

f'E-09-02 -.---DR

0~ FILTER PLUGGED

OPERATOR !NADVERTANTL V

CLOSES HCV 931-4

LVS9314U ----,-

1.oE--6/H 22.H

OPERATOR JNADVERTANTL Y CLOSES SV 74

LVTSV74U --.--

l.OE-2

NEEDLE VALVE CLOSED <ALL CAUSES)

DR

DCS FAILS

"TO ALARM

7CPDCS-F

:1.02 e.OE-4/H e2.H2

DE PURGE MANUAL

NEEDLE VALVE SV 7-4- FAILS

CLOSED

LVTSV74C --.--

VAL YES CLOSED <ANY 1 OF 4)

LVT1DF4X

LlE-6/H e2.H

LOSS DF NORMAL PURGE

SUPPLY

I'E-o9-07 ---r-OR

1.2E-5/H 22.H LOE-5/H 22.H l.OE-5/H 22.H 2.2E-6/H 22.H


DE PURGE MANUAL VALVES CLOSED

<ANY 1 OF 2>

LVTlDFeX ----,-

5.6E-71H 22.H

JNSUI't!CIENT PURGE

SUPPLY

CD-FE-e9 -,--

SHEET 17

SHEET 9

tT 9315

INACTIVE

lSf9315F --..--

7.8E-5/H 3.0M2

SCVC MDV 104119276 INACTIVE

UVMBDTHF ---..--

9.00E-6/H

PSV 161 RV

OPEN

LVY-1810 ---,-----

2.0E-9 22.H

LOSS OF llACKUP

PURGE SUPPLY

CD-FE-72 ----,-

SHEET 45

DE PURGE CHECK VALVE

PLUGGED

LVX--10 ---r-

3.0E-7/H 22.H

LO "

PCV 9315 F'An.S

CLOSED

LVI9315C ---,-----

1.6E-5/H 2e.H

1o-26-93 13:25 F: \FIRE\FIRE9

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

AIR LEAK THRU ANY 1 OF' 18

HANFORD CONNECTORS

BHC1-18L -----;--

OECT-uE---,--

1.0

2.3E-5/H ez.H

(1)

1.0 ~


(1) CONCENTRATION EXISTS WHEN OECT

TEMPERATURE IS LESS 1HAN s2•c

AIR LEAK THRU THERHD WELL

fLANGE

BF'L THERL ---,----

L3E-61H ez.H

OXYGEN CDNC IN DECT

INCREASES

AIR LEAK THRU DECT SAMPLE PUHP fLANGE

BFLSAPPL ----,--

THRU 0\JST DIP TUBE

OR

1.3E-61H $'(

I

PURGE SUPPUER FAILURE -- 02 INSTEAD DF C02

I PURGE SUPPLY TO D\IST

u LOE-S/H

OPPPDRYU

!.OE-5/H 22.H

DECT TIINK STATIC

CHARGE:

BTK--1 -,....--

LOE-9/H

I I

22.H

HCV 9176 FAILS TD

CLOSE

1VS9176K

!.OE-3

22.11

LO•

SHEET 1 0

IGNmCN SOURCES PRESENT

IN DECT

DR

OECT TRANSFER PUMP IGNITIDN SOURCE: 1/44

BPP-TR-1 -----,-

DECT SAMPLE PUHP lGNITIDN SOURCE 1/44

BPP-SA-I ---,----

6.8E-5/H O.SH 6.8E-51H 0.5H

AIR LEAK THRU DECT TRANSFER

PUHP FLANGE

BFLTRPPL --.-

L3E-61H

DR

1:2.11

2.0E-4/H

AIR llACKF1JJ\I FROM 0\oiST YIASTE LINE AFTER HCV 9176

I AIR LEAK THRU DECT /D\IST TRANSFER >LANGE CONNECTION

=r= OFLDECTL

0

AIR LEAK THRU HCV 9176 SEAL

1.3E-6/H 22.H 2.SE-5/H 22.H

22.H><

01-08-93 12:02 F: \FIRE\FIRE1 0

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

DECT PURGE DRAIN V.._VES OPEN <ANY 1 or 2>

AVD1lJF2X ----y-

:5.6E-7/H &.H

HCV 9327 TRANSFERS

CLOSED

AVS9327C --,-

HCV 931:!7 CLOSED

(ALL CAUSES:>

OPERATOR INADVERTANTLY

CLOSES HCV 9327

AVS9327U -.-

BASELDI\ll PURGE TD CECT

INADEQUATE

FE-11-Il2 --,--

DECT PURGE F'D...TER

PWGGED

AF"R-lP -,..--

LOE-6/H

DR

22.H

OPERATIJR INADVERTANTLY CLOSES SV 74

AVTSV74U ----r--

NEEDLE Vl'd..VE CLDSED (ALL CAUSES)

OPERATIJR FAILS TD ADJUST

MDV 104V9278

UVH1041T --.-

l.OE-e

NEEDLE VALVE SV 74 fAILS CLDSED

AVTSV74C

l.02

PCV 9329 FAILS

CLDSED

ME-6/H

1.2E-5/H 22.H I.OE-5/H 22.H I.GE--5/H &.H 2.2E-6/H 22.H


DECT PURGE MANUAL VALVES CLOSED

(ANY 1 OF 2)

AVTIDF2X --r--

5.6E-7/H 22.H

DCS FAILS TD

ALARM

7CPDCS-f -.-

eoE-4/H ce.H•

LDSS Df

ec.H

FE-11-07

DR

INSUFFlCJENT PURGE SUPPLY

CD-FE-e9 --r--

SHEET 17

DR

FT 93C8

INACTIVE

ASf93CSF -.-

7.SE--5/H 3.0Ml<

I I OECT PURGE MANUAL VALVES CLOSED

<ANY 1 or 4)

~ LIE-6/H C2.H

LOSs or BACKUP

PURGE SUPPLY

T SHEET 45

DECT PURGE CHECK VALVE

PLUGGED =r= AVX-10

0 3.0E-71H ee.H

SHEET 11

SCVC MDV 1041/9e78 INACTIVE

UVMBOTHF --,-

~.OOE-6/H 1.0 ..

PSV 182 RV

DI'EN

AVY-1920 -.-

C.OE-9 &.H

10-26-93 13:29 F: \FI RE\FI RE11

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

HIGH C02 F'UlV DURING PR HEA TUP

AND STEAM Sl"RIPPING

C!l-F"E-73 ---,--

SHEET 46

HIGH C02 FLD\1 DURING DE HEATUP AND EVAPDRA TlDN

CIJ...FE-74 ---,--

SHEET 47


FIRE DR EXPLDSIDN IN VVH 'JHEN HIGH Fl[ ClJZ IS USED IN PR

illPPVVH~

FE-12-oG ---,-

C!J--FE-23 --.--

SHEET 13

DR

CD-FE-24 --.--

SHEET 13

DR

SHEET 1

LOSS OF DILUTION AIR IN PVVH DURING :BENZENE GENERATION

FE-12-07 --,--

DR

LOSS DF DILUTION AIR IN PVVH - BENZENE

GENERA TIDN IN PR

CD-FE-75 --,---

SHEET 48

PVVH STATIC CHARGE

:LOE-'9/H

LOSS OF DDLUTIDN AIR IN PVVH - BENZENE

GENERA TIDN IN DE

CD--FE-76 --,---

SHEET 49

22.H

SHEET

IGNITIDN SOURCE

PRESENT

LlE-6/H 22.H

12

PWH BLIJ\IER MECHANICAL

IGNITION SOURCE

TBL--I ---y--

l.lE-5/H 22.H

01-08-93 12:05 F: \FI RE\FI RE12

SPC FIRE/EXP

INTERLOCK 5 BYPASSED

7IT--5U -.--

LOE-3

INSUFFICIENT seve

CODLING

CO-FE:-27 --.--

SHEET 14

~ .07

LO•

NCE

!.0 "

33E-5/H

OSION

INTE:RUJCK LOOP 11 ACTIVE <PR> EXHAUS

C6H6 CONC HHH

CO--FE-92 --.--

SHEET 57

INTERLOCK LOOP 5 INACTIVE

SCVC TEMP HHH

F"E-!3-04

DR

I

ez.H• 3.0E--6/H


INSUFFICIENT seve

CDOUNG

CD-tE-27

SHEET 1+

3o0M"

PRCD COOLING

INSUfFICIENT

CIJ-FE-19 --.--

SHEET 19

6ZE-5/H

INTERLOCK 5 BYPASSED

m--:su --.--

DECD COOUNG

INSUFFICIENT

CIJ-FE-:58

SHEET 34

2Z.Ho

l.O~

SHEET 12

Tl 9356

INACTIVE

UST9356f --.--

INTERLOCK LOOP :S INACTIVE.

SCVC TEMP HHH

DR

RELAY HR6 FAILS

TO OPEN

7RYHR6-D --.--

3.3E-:S/H ez.H~ 3.0E--6/H

INTERLOCK LOOP ll INACTIVE <DD PVVH

AUST C6H6 CDNC HH

CIJ-FE-91

SHEET 55

3.0M•

PR STEAM BLOCK VALVE

!'"AILS TO CLOSE

6.2E-5/H 0.5MMI

SHEET

:BENZENE GENERATION DURING HEAT-UP AND

STEAM S1RIPPING 4/44

PRSTEAMO ..............-

.09 1.0 Mt

PR STEAM VALVE 1027

!'"AILS TO CLOSE

13

6.2E-5/H 22.H•

1()-26-93 13:33 F: \FIRE\FIRE13

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION INSUFFICIENT COOLING SCVC

9356 VALVE

REVERSED

PRESSURE REGULATOR

FAILURE <Hl-HD

NVI-ZZ ---,---.

1.6£ -6/H CC.H

seve TEHP CONTROL UJDP

REVERSED

DR

9356 TIC

REVERSED

l.OE-5/H


22.H

9356 VALVE STUCK

UVL9356F -,--

6.2£-5/H

9356 TEHP SENSOR

REVERSED

2.2E-6/H 22.H

TII[+Il CHILLED ';/ ATER

TEMP HIGH

22.H><

9356 TC

STUCK

UCN9356F" ---,---.

2.1E-4/H

9356 TIC SET POINT

HIGH

USP9356U --,-

l,OE:-5/H

22.H<

FE-14-03 -,---DR

22.H

OR

9356 TEMP SENSOR

STUCK

UST9356F" ---,---.

3.3E-5/H 22.H•

SHEETS 13, 18

TI 9356 FAILS LD\1

CHILLED YATER FLD\1 LDV MIS [-!OJ

INSTRUMENT AIR HIGH 'RESSURE [+D CAUSES

rev 9356 TO PARTIALLY CLOSE

PRESSURE REGULATOR

FAILURE <HIGH)

NVI---z ----r-

l6E-6/H 22.H

9356 TC

STUCK

UCN9356F ---r--

2.1E-41H

SHEET 14

MODERATE D!Si\JRBANCES ENTER

INACTIVE LOOP

9356 CONTROLLER FAILS HIGH

FE-14-04 ---.-OR

lJ~ m::.,"V.L'-~ M'r<:.C. .LAM!::fiiVE

22.H><

I

AND

DE:VlCES ARE INACTIVE

OR

9356 TEMP SENSOR

STUCK

UST'9356F --.----

3.3E-5/H 22.H"

10-26-9.3 1.3:.36 F: \FI RE\FIRE14

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

936-4 TEMP SOISDR

REVERSED

CST9364U ----,-

l.OE--6/H

LDOP IS

REVERSED

DR

<ZH

~36-4

TIC REVERSED

CCN9364U ---.----

l.OE--6/H


<ZH

~364 nc F"AILS

HIGH

CCN9364-Z ----,-

Z.!E-5/H 2Z.H

CALlS

T11 [+1]

CHJUED VATER

"TEMP HIGH

DR

LARGE a.JNCIJNTRDLLABLE>

DISTURBANCES

HEATER S'WITCH !'"AILS

CLOSED

CSV9364-C -.-

::l.OE-5/H

DR

CZ.H

CD-FE-29

SHEET 14

936-4 TIC SETPOINT

HIGH

CSX9364U ----,-

:LOE-5/H CZ.H

9364 TEMP SENSOR

FAILS LD'W

=r::::= CST9364Y

0 3.3E-6/H 2Z.H

'9364 TIC

STUCK

=r= CCN93G4F

0 2.1E-4/H 22.H><

SHEET 15

MllllERA TE INPUT DISTURBANCES ENTER

INACTIV'E LDDP

LOOP IS

INACTIVE

FE-1S--o5 ---,--

OR

9364 TEMP SENSOR

STUCK

CST93G4F ----,-

3.3E-5/H 22.H•

AND

PROCESS CHJUED VATER SYSTEM fAILS

TO REMD'WE HEAT

CO-FE-61 --,--

SHEET 38

POYER

SWITCH SIUCK

CSVPD'WRF ---;-

3.0E-51H 22.H•

01-08-93 12:35 F: \FIRE\FIRE15

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

CHEH REACTION NOT COMPLETED IN PR DUE TO DPERA"TOR ERROR

LOE-3 1.0 •

BAD PR

SAMPLE

JTICBADST ---,--

I.OE-5/H

DR

22.H

BENZENE PRESENT AND YITHIN D<PLDSIYE

LIMITS

ABNDRMALL Y HIGH CONCENTRATION OF

NZENE F'RDM PR <TH FtDl UNE TD PRBD

BENZENE EXISTS IN THE PR AI'TER

HYDROLYSIS

BAD CHEMICAL ANALYSIS

JTI<llADCT ---,--

LOE-S/H

DR

2ZH

7CL1056F'

3.0E-61H

JPRllTMDC ---,--

1.0 1.0•

AGITATOR IGNITIDN

SOURCE 22/44

JAG--I -,--

1.5E-4/H

ORGANIC VAPOR PASSED THRU

TRANSI'I:R VALVE

PRBT TRANSFER VALVE OPEN <ALL CAUSES)

DR

:sf l.OE-7/H

PRBT DIP TUBE

LEAKS

L3E-61H

.SY

.5Y

ll.OH

TANK STATIC CHARGE

JPT--1 -.-

l.OE-'3/H

SHEET 16

IGNITION SOURCES PRESENT

IN PRBT

DR

TRANSFER PUMP IGNITION SOURCE 6/44

22.H

JPP-TR-1 -.-

4JE-4/H 3.0H

SAHPLE PUMP IGNITION

SOURCE 2/44

JPP-SA-I -.-

1.4E-4/H LOH


** TOP EVENT TO BE ANALYZED SEPARATELY

PRBT IN CHEMICAL PROCESS CELL

10-26-93 13:39 F: \FIRE\FIRE16

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

3.0E-7/H 2Z.H 1.~-6/H ez.H l8E-8/H Z2.H l.6E-51H


CD-FE-29

SHEETS 3,5,9,11

SOLENOID VALVE 7600X

F'AILS CLOSED

~

2Z.H I lZE -!5/H I I

2Z.H

I VAPORIZER FAn.S I I 1 NO

ELE:CTRIC PDIVER TO VAPORIZER

TD PROVIDE HEAT

NVPC02-F' ---r-

6.9E-6/H 22.H

LOSS DF' DFFSITE PO>JE:R

LDSP---,

0.33Y 22-H

2.2E-6/H

SHEET 17

2Z.H l.OE-7/H Z2.H

01-08-93 12:37 F: \FIRE\FIRE17

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

PR STEAM FUJ'w' VALVE FCV 1oe7 FAILS VIDE OPEN

RVA1027D -,-

2.2E-61H

** 22.H

INTERLOCK 20 FAILS TD SHUT Off PR STEAM

CD-f"E-59 ---,-

SHEET 61

IIP TRANSDUCER FT 10e7

FAILS LD'W

R!Pl027Y ----.---

PR STEAM SUPPLY

PROVIDES TlJil MUCH HEAT

6.4E-6/H 22.H

CIJ-FE-16

SHEET 33

FLD'W THRU FCVro27 TDO HIGH

rE-lS-Il3 ----.---DR

2.1E-5/H 22.H

** COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT (SHEET 58)

*** COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT (SHEET 37)

7.SE-6/H 22.H

SHEET 34

DE STEAM FLD'W VALVE FCV ~01 FAILS VIDE OPEN

GVA~O!D

*** 22E-6/H 22.H

FLD\1 THRU rev 9301 TOO HIGH

FE-19-Il4 ----.---OR

IIP TRANSDUCER FT nm

FAILS LIN

GlP9301Y

6.4£-6/H e2.H

INTERLOCK 21 FAILS TD SHUT OFF DE :sTEAM

CO--I'E-79 -,-

SHEET 61

FLD'W CONTROLLER 9301 FAILS

LDI>I

GCN~O!Y --,..-

2lE-5/H 22.H

SHEET 18

seve COOUNG

INSUFF!ClENT

CO--I'E-27 -,-

SHEET 14

FLOW' ELEMENT ~01 FAILS

LDV

GSF'930JY ----.---

7.9E-6/H 22.H

10-26-93 13:46 F: \FlRE\FIRE18

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSIO

SHEET 3~


TCV 1116 FAILS CLOSED

(RANDOM CAU=)

PRCD HEAT EXCHANGER

FOULED

KHX--H

L5E-:S/H

Z.2E-6/H ZZ.H

ee.H

liP 1116 TRANSDUCER FAILS l.IJ\{

MIPI116Y -.---

6.4E-6/H 22.H

CIJ-F"E-18

SHEETS 13, 33

MANUAL VALVE CLOSED

<ANY I OF 2)

HV•

INADEQUATE FLIJY/ ITHRU PROCESS COOLIN•

VATER SYSTEM

1-f!'C-'

5.6E-7/H reH SHEET 20

TEMP CONTRCLLER 1116 FAILS

LOll

2.1£-5/H 22.H

TEMP ELEMENT 1116A

tAILS LOll

3.3E-6/H 22.H

SHEET 19

1o-2S-93 13:50 F: \FIRE\FIRE19

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

PUMP 021 FAILS

TO RUN

XPP-o21F" -r--

5.7E-SIH

PUHP oe1 FAILS

<ALL CAUSES)

DR

~eH

lNSUFnCIENT POWER CN BUS 702

INSUFnCIENT PIJ'WER CN

BUS BlO

CD-FE-38 --.,-

SHEET 40

PUMP 022 FAlLS

TD RUN

XPP-o2ef" --.-

5.7E-S/H

OR

-MANUAL VALVE

CLOSED <ANY 1 CF 4)

~ lJE-6/H 22.H

PUHP!:l FAILS <ALL CAUSES)

-DR

C.:.H

INSUFFICIENT POVER CN

BUS 802

INSUFFICIENT PCVER CN

BUS B9

CD-FE-17 ----.-

SHEET 40

CD--F'E-32

SHEETS 19, 34

I VALVE

HCV 39:54 FAILS CLOSED

=r= XVA3954C

0 2.2E-6/H

(1) ASSUME THAT THE PROBABIUTY OF FAILURE OF VALVES ON SUCTION OR DISCHARGE OF PUMPS TO BE NEGUGIBLE

22.H

XVS39540 -,....--

1.2E-51H 22.H

SHEET

!PERATDR ERRCNEDUSL'

CLD= VALVE HCV 3954

XVA3954U -.,--

I.OE-5/H 2:<.H

20

01-08-93 12: 46 F: \FIRE\FIRE20

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION OVERCOOLIN G seve

PRESSURE REGULATOR

FAILURE <LO LID

NVI--YY -----,-

!.6E-5/H 22.H

seve TEMP CONTROL LDDP

REVERSED

DR

CH2DT-!O --,--

!.OE-5/H


22.H

9356 VALVE STUCK

UVL'!1356F ----,-

6ZE-5/H

9356 TEMP SENSOR

REVERSED

UVL93560 ----,-

2.2E-6/H

22.H><

22.11

seve TEHP CONTROL LDDP

INACTIVE

FE-21-oe ----,-

UCN93S6f ----,-

9356 TIC

SETPDINT L!l1ol

clE-4/H 22.H>!

FE-21--o3 --,--

DR

Til (-1)

CHILLED \lATER TEMP LDV

9356 TEHP SENSOR

STUCK

UST9356f -.---

3.3E-5/H cc.H><

SHEETS 30, 36

TI 9356 FAILS HlGH

CHILLED YATER FLDY HIGH MIS (-.!0)

INSTRUMENT GAS LDii PRESSURE C-U CAUSES

TCV 9356 TO PART! ALL T CLDSE

GAS REGUU\TDR

FAILURE <LDI.I)

NVI---Y -----,-

l6E-5/H 22.H

9356 CONTROLLER FAILS LOW

9356 TC

STUCK

UCN9356F -----,-

2.1E-4/H cc.H~

SHEET 21

MODERATE DISTURBANCES ENTER

INACTIVE LOOP

FE-21...()4 --,--

OR

DR

9356 TEMP SENSOR

STUCK

UST9356F ----,-

3.3E-5/H 22.Hlf

01-11-93 11: 39 F: \FIRE\FIRE21

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION OVER COOLING seve

9364 TEI1P SENSOR

REVE:RSED

CST9364U ----,--

l.OE-6/H

LOOP IS

REVERSED

DR

ZZ.H

9364 nc

REVERSED

CCN9364U --,---

!.OE-6/H


9364 TIC

FAILS UJV

CCN936+T

zaH C.IE--5/H

HEATER S\I!TCH rAILS

OPEN

CS\1~361-D

&.H 3.0E-5/H

TU <-D CHILLED \lATER

TE:MP UJV

DR

ec.H

CD-FE-34

SHEET 21

9364 TIC

SETPOrNT LDV

CSP9364U

l.OE-5/H ec.H

9364 TEMP SENSOR FAILS HIGH

CST9364Z -,.--

3.3E-6/H

9364 TIC

STUCK

2.1E--4/H

2C.H

22.Ho<

SHEET 22

LOOP I$

INACTIV£

FE-2Z-o:5 --,--

OR

9364 TEMP SENSOR

STUCK

3.3E-5/H 22-H•

CHILLED \lATER TEMP

LD\1 (-1)

=r= CH2D-T-!

0 1.0/D &.H

==:J POWER

SWITCH STUCK =r=

CSVPDVI<F

0 3.oE-5/H 22.H•

01-08-93 12:57 F: \FIRE\FIRE22

SPC FIRE/EXP OSION

L

OPERATOR FAILS TO PUMP ABIJVE

HI-HI SUMP LEVEL

ORGANIC AND AQUEOUS SPILL GR£1\TER L_____.l

CD-FE-39 -r-

SHEET 27

THAN 300 GALLONS

DE IS FULL <A~SUMING 50;1, OF THE nNE

DUF!rNG EACH PROCESS CY

DTKFULL-----.-

0.5 1.0 ~

AND

CD-FE-35

SHEET 32

DE RUPTURE DR LEAK RESUL TJNG

IN A SPILL GR£A TER THAN 60 GPM

DE SYSTEM LEAK RESULTING IN A SPILL GREATER THAN 60 GPM

DTKT.DAYR --.-- +

7.3E-101H 3Sh

+ ASSUMED DURATION OF SPILL 7 DAYS


IGNmDN SOURCES PRESENT

~

SHEET 27

SHEET 24

SHEET 23

01-11-93 12:07 F: \FIRE\FIRE23

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

IGNffiCN SIJURCES PRESENT <SUMP PUMP

SYSTEM WRKS>

:-«

SHEET 27

PPSUMP,

1.0 1.0 •

DE RUPTURE OR LEAK RESULTING IN

A SPILL GREATER THAN 60 GPM

DE SYSTEM LEAK RESULTING IN SPILL

GREA TE:R THAN 60 GF'M

OTK12MNL ---.- +

7 3E -10/H .osH"

+ ASSUMED DURAllON OF SPILL IS BASED ON 30 GPM PUMPING CAPACITY OF SUMP PUMP

* DENOTES ENABUNG EVENT

SHEET 24

SHEETS 30. 53

CTKF"ULL--,--

o.s 1.0 ,.

01-08-93 13:24 F: \FIRE\FIRE24

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

SHEET 28

EVENT D PR SPILL I OF 3

H4NnJRD CONNECTORS L.d.K

PHCIDF3L ---,-

3.9E-6/H


4.0H

SHALL FIRE CAU= BY ORGANIC AND AQUEOUS SPILL

CO-FE-39 -,.-

SHEET 27

PR SPILL IS

FLAMMABLE

PTKSPIL3 --,--

OR

OTHER SPILLS CAUSE POiENTIAL

F"OR nRE

RUPTURE: OF

DECT

B1l<ll.HL -.,.--

LDE-Z 1.0,. 7.3E-!O/H

OR

:5.5H

SHEETS 1, 30

CD-f'E:-3$

SHEET 32

ORGANIC AND AQUEOUS

SPILL

DR

RUPTURE OF PRCD DR PRCD

DRAIN LINE

KPIS.OHL -.,.--

7.3E-9/H 4.0H

SHEET 41

FAILS FIRE

IGNITlDN SOURCES RESENT DPERATOR/SUMI

PUMP SYSTEM FAILS

CO-FE-41 -,.-

SHEET 27

RUPTURE OF DECD DR DECD

DRAIN LINE

3P!ll.HL -r-

7.3E-9/H 5.5H

UN£: OR GASKET LEAK, EVENT A OF PHR 32

SUMP PUMP FAILS

CD-FE-42 -,.-

SHEET 26

SHEET 25

10-26-93 13:54 F: \FlRE\FlRE25

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION


TRANSFER UNE FROM DECT TO OECD LEAKS

CYCLE DURING BOIL!

1.3E-6/H 3.SH

LEAK RESUL TlNG FROM TRANSFER

FROM OECT TO OWST

2 HANtORD CONNECTORS

LEAK

OHCl.llHL ---.-

2.6£:-6/H .:SH

73E-!OIH 5.5H

OTHER SPILLS

DR

OECT SAMPLING UNE LEAK

1.3E--6/H

7.3E-!OIH

.SH

5.5H

OR

CD-FE-42

SHEETS. 25, 30

LEAKS RESULT FROM TRANSFER tROM THE

DE TO THE PRCD

1.3E-6/H

LOE-e

O.SH

RESULTING

SPILL lS FLAMMABLE

1.0><

PRCD ORGANIC LINE LEAK RECYCLE DURING BOtLUP

PHC3.0HL ----y-

1.3E-6/H

INVENTORY OF DRGANlCS

IN SUMP

l.OE-2

L5H

1.0 "

SHEET 26

DECD ORGANlC

LINE LEAK

1.3E-6/H 3.5H

10-26-93 13:59 F: \FIRE\FIRE26

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

SUHP DISCHARGE VALVE IGNmDN

SOURCE

1VMl8HI ---.--

UE-6/H .08H

DR

OTHER IGNmDN SDURC£S.. JUMPERS

BANGING. ETC.

IHCOTHRI -.--

1.0

SUMP DISCHARGE: VALVE IGNmDN

SOURCE

lVM!l.HI -,.--

llE-6/H l.OH

SUMP PUMP IGNITION SOURCE

IPP2.oHI ---.,-

3.0£-3/H

SHEETS 24-,28,30,53

SUMP PUMP

IGNITION SOURCE

1PP.18HI ---.,-

3.0£-3/H .OSH

6 VALVES

PR.I PRf"T, DECT <2l, seve IGNmDN SOURCES

OVMl.OHI ---.--

6.6E-61H .SH

IGNmDN SOURCES, 7 PUMPS, PR. PRFT, DE

AND OEeT

OPPILHI ---.,-

6.0£-3/H

** 5.5H

CO-fE-41

SHEETS 23. 25, 32

VALVES - PR. PR DECT <Z>, seve <Z> IGNmDN SOURCES

LOH

3 AGITATORS PR, PRFT, DE

IGNITION SOURCES

DAGllHI ---.,.-

DVM0.5HI -.--

G.6E-6/H .5H

ACTUATION


** ASSUME 2 PUMPS OPERATING ALL THE TIME DURING THE SPECIFIED TIME INTERVAL

BUBBLER 5~

INACTIVE

1SL5~25F

2.0E-4/H 3.0M•

5925 FAILS

7RY:sn5K

3.0E-6/H 3.0M•

BUBBLER :sn7

INACTIVE:

1SL5927f ----.---

2.0E-4/H

SHEET 27

7 PUMPS Pit PRFT, DE, DECT

IGN!TIDN SOURCE

3 AGITATORS PR, PRFT, DE

IGNmDN SDURC£

OPP13.HI ---.--

b.OE-3/H

** 6.5H

DAG13.HI --,-

9.0E-4/H 6.5H

SHEETS 23,25,32

3.0Ml<

OR

SUMP PUMP FAILS TO

START

lPPSUHPA ----.---

8.3E-6/H

ACTUATION 5927 FAILS

DR

RELAY 5927 FAILS TO

CLOSE:

7RY5927K -.-

3.0E-6/H 3.0Ml<

22.tfl<

OPERATOR FAILS TO PUHP OUT SUMP

lPPOPERT ----.---

l.OE-4 10 "

10-26-93 14:02 F: \FIRE\FIRE27

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

OTHER SPILLS CAUSE POTENTIAL FOR FIRE

SUMP PUMP VDRKS

CD-FE-46 -,---

SHEET 29

1.0

EVENT D

:LO•

PR SPILL 1 DF 3 HANFORD CDNNS LEAK

PHC.33HL ---.--

3.9E-6/H .17H


PR SPILL IS

FLAHHABLE

PTKSPIL3 -,.--

1.0E-2 1.0 "

RUPTURE OF

DECT

BTK.33HL ---.--

7.3E-10/H .17H

SPILL CONTAINED IN DITCH COVERS EVENT C DF PHR

FE-28-Q<I--,-OR

SHEET 27

7.3E-9/H l7H

SHEET 29

7.3E-9/H l7H

SHEET 28

10-26-93 14:06 F: \FIRE\FIRE28

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

TRANSfER LINE

I iRANSF"ER

FROM DECT TD fRDI1 DECD LEAKS DECT TD

D'w'ST BHC.3H1L

L3E-6/H .17H

2 HANfORD CONNECTORS

LEAK =r= BHCD\ISTL

0 2.6E-6/H

7.3E-!0/H


.!7H

.!7H

OTHER SPILLS

DR

I

1.3E-6/H .17H

7.3E-!O/H .!7H

DR

AND

SHEET ZB

TRANSFER FROM THE DE TD THE PRCD LEAK

KHC.3HRL

1.3E-6/H .17H

SHEET ZB

RESULTING SPILL IS

FLAMMABLE

PR!PRFT CONTENTS ARE

FLAMMABLE

!.OE-2 1,0 M

DR

PRCD ORGANIC

LINE LEAK

PHC.3HRL.

1.3E-6/H .17H

l.OE-2 LO •

DECD ORGANIC

llNE LEAK

VHCOECllL

1.3E-6/H .17H

SHEET 29

10-26-93 14:09 F: \FIRE\FIRE29

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

SMALL FIRE NCT

EXTINGUISHED

CD-fE-08 --,-

SHEET 25

MDV 9278 INADVERTENTLY

CLOSES

UMY9278C -,..-

l.OE-7/H CZ.H

APCR CLOUD E:XPLOSICI CAUSED BY PRESSURE

RELIEF TO SPC

CD-FE-49 ----r-

SHEET 33

T SYSTEM CN DE;. DEl D. OECD PLUGGED CAUS 'ESSURE: REl..IEl'" TO SP

MDV 1041/9278

CLOSES

DR

MllV 1041 INADVERTANTLY

CLOSES

UVM1041C -,.----

l.OE-7/H 22.H

OR

!PERA TOR INADVERT AN CLOSES HOY

1041/9278

UVMI041Y -.----

seve PLUGGED

DVERCDDLED

LOE-5/H 22.H

CO-FE-21 ---,-

SHEET 21

DAMPERS fAll CLOSED <ALL CAUSES>

CD-FE-52 -----,-

SHEET 31

+ INCLUDES; DC MOTOR FOR CAMERA. UGHTING, ELECTRIC WIRE. ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS


CD-FE-SG -----,-

SHEET 32

SPC VENTILA TIDN

FAlLS

DR

SHEET 1

YlTRIF1CATION BUILDING

HVAC FAlLS

CD--FE-53

SHEET 31

I.OE-3 1.0 )li

SUMP PUMP SYSTEM 'JDRI<S

71TSPC-2 --,-

SHEET 30

GN!TllJN SOURCES SUM MP lNTERLDCK WRKS\--------7

<ALL CAUSES)

CD-FE-48

SHEET 33

1.0 1.0 ,.

SUFnCIENT :BENZENE VAPOR PRESENT

IN SPC

(\ OR

SPlLLS CAUSE POTENTIAL FOR

SMALL nRE

CO-F"E-51

SHEET 28

IGNITlON SOURCES PRESENT OPERATOR/

SUMP PUMP \JDRKS

~ SHEET 24

DTHE:R lGN!TllJN SOURCES OPERATOR/ SUMP PUMP \JDRKS

4\JKSPCDl ----r- +

LOE-4 LO •

UME DR GASKET LEAK EVENT A Of PHR 32

SUMP PUMP FAILS

CD-FE-42 ---,--

SHEET 26

10-26-93 14:13 F: \FIRE\FIRE30

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

ALL iHREE DAMPERS FAILS

CUJSED

VBSYI4AB -.--

RUPTIBLE POVER SUPPLY, UPS Yl4

OR

LOSS OF" POlNER

SOURCES

FE-31-o4 --.--AND

CD..f'E-52

SHEETS 30, 32

OPERATilR ERRONEOUSLY

CLOSES DAMPER

'nSYI4BB -.--

I.OE-8/H 22.H lOE-8/H 22.H

BATTERY DEAD

LOE-6

BATIERY DEAD

<ALL CAUSESl

22.H

RECTIF'IER LOSS OF" FUNCTION

VRE--f' -,---

!.OE-6/H 22.H

INVERTE:R LOSS OF FUNCTIDN

EIN--F" ---,-

LOE-4/H

(1) ASSUME DAMPERS FAIL TIGHTLY CLOSED

(2) BASED ON A 2-0UT-4 SUCCESS CRITERIA

LDSS OF" AC POWER

INPUT

OR

22.H

llLD\IER I FAILS

<RANDOM CAusal

VBL--1-V -.--

BLOlNER I F'AD..S

<ALL CAu=

OR

INSUF"F'lCIENT PO\IER ON

J!US !)<}

CO-FE-17 ---,-

7.6E-S/H 22.H SHEET 40

INSUFFICIENT POYER

ON BUS 701

INSUF"F'lCIENT POWER ON

BUS :BlO

CD-FE-33 ---,--

SHEET 40

BLOlNER 2 FAILS

<RANDOM CAUSES>

VBL-2-V ---,.-

7.6E-51H 22.H

BLOlNER 2 F'AlLS

<ALL CA=l

FE-31-o9 ---,-

DR

INSUmCIENT POWER ON

BUS ll'9

co-FE-17 ---,-

SHEET 40

SHEET 31

CD..f'E-53 I FE-31-Q7 I

I (2) SHEETS 30, 32

BLOlNER 3 FAILS

<RANDOM CAUSES)

VBL-3-V ---,.-

BLOlNER 3 FAlLS

<ALL CA=)

OR

INSUF"FICIENT PC\IER ON

BUS BIO

CD-FE-33 -.--

7.6E-5/H 22.H SHEET 40

BLO\IER 4 F'AILS

<RANDOM CAUSESl

VJ!L-4-V -,---

7.6E-5/H 22.H

BLDWER 4 FAILS

<ALL CAUSES)

FE-31-U ---r-

OR

lNSUF"F'lCIENT POlNER ON

BUS BlO

CO..f'E-33 -.--

SHEET 40

01-08-93 13:34 F: \FIRE\FIRE31

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

DAMPERS FAIL

CLIJSED

cc-rr-se ---.--

SHEET 31

SPC VENTJLA TIDN

FAILS

FE-32-05 ---,--

DR

VTTRIFICATIDN BUD..DTNG

HVAC FAILS

~

SHEET 31

SHEET 27

sumCIENT BENZENE VAPOR PRESENT

TN SPC

ORGANIC AND AQUEOUS SPILL > 300 GALLIJNS

~

SHEET 23

FE-32-06 ---,--

DR

SPILLS CAUSE POTENTIAL FDR

SMALL FIRE

~

SHEET 25

OTHER IGNITION SOURCE <SUMP PUMP

SYSTEM FAILS)

4FLSPCDI -.-

LOE-3 1.0 "

+ INCLUDES: DC MOTOR FOR CAMERA, LIGHTING, ELECTRICAL WIRE, ELECTRICAL CONNECTOR


SHEET 32

IGNITlDN SOURCES PRESENT, SUMP PUMP

SYSTEM FAILS

CD-FE-41 -,.--

SHEET 27

+

10-26-93 14:18 F: \FIRE\FlRE32

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

SYSTEM PRESSURIZES 'oiHILE OE IN ORGANlC

EVAPORATION

CE: STEAM SUPPLY PROVIDES TDO

MUCH HEAT

CD-FE-31 ----,--

SHEET 18

FE-33-()5 --.-DR

LDSS OF" CONDENSING <tlECD AND SCVC) DUE T

INERT :BLANKETING

CD-FE-54 -----.,.-

SHEET 36


£NZ£NE OVERPR£SSU DURING OE

EVAPORATION

AND

DE ORGANIC EVAPORATION

21-43

.047 1.0•

CD-FE-30 -----.--

SHEET 37

DR

CO-FE-JZ

SHEETS 2, 6

liND

SPILL ACCUMlJLATES IN SUMP-DPERATOR

PUMPS iD A HOT PR

CO-FE-55 ---r--

SHEET 53

INTERLOCK 14 PR PRESS HH FAILS TD SHUT OFT DE STEAM

CO-FE-11 -,.-

SHEET 37

SHEET 30

BENZENE GE:NE:RATIDN IN PR 4/43

PRDlSTCY -.-----

.0~3 1.0 )II(

PR STE:AM SUPPLY PROVIDES iDO

MUCH HEAT

CO-FE-16 -----.--

SHEET 18

SHEET 33

OVERPRESSURE DURING BENZENE GENERA TIDN

IN PR

AND

SYSTEM PRESSURIZES 'WHILE BENZENE BEING

GENERA TED IN PR

FE-33-06 -.--OR

LDSS Df CCNDE:NSING <PRCD liND SCVC) DUE TD INERT BLANKETING

CD-FE-54 -----.,.-

SHEET 36

INTERLOCKS l+ & 15 fAIL iD SHUT Dff

PR STEAM

Cll-FE:-71 ----,--

SHEET 56

PRCD CODLING

INSUFfiCIENT

CD-FE-18 ---.--

SHEET 19

01-11-93 13:45 F: \FIRE\FIRE33

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

CO-FE-58

SHEETS 13, 18

l.SE-!5/H ez.H SHEET 35

MANUAL VAL YES CUJSEJ)

<ANY 1 OF 3) 'CV 9346 FAILS CLO

CALL CAUSES)

INADEG!UA TE fl. []VI HRU PROCESS COOUN

\1 A TER SYSTEM

TCV 9346 FAlLS CLDS£D

<RANDOM CAUSESl

\JVA934GC -or--

\IVA10F:lX -,--

S.3E-7/H

2.2E-6/H 22.H

22.H

II~ 9346 TRANSDUCER FAILS HIGH

\.IIP9:34GZ --,----

6.4E-6/H

FE-34-o3 -r--

DR

22.H

TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER 9346

FAILS HIGH

VCN9:34GZ --r--

CO-FE-32 -,--

SHEET 20

2.1E-5!H 22Ji

TEMPERATURE ELEMENT 9:l4G A

FAILS LDVI

\IST9346Y -.--

3.3£-6/H 22.H

SHEET 34

01-08-93 13:44 F: \FIRE\FlRE34

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

TEMP SENSOR

TE 2346 FAILS LIN

MSi2346Y -----,---

3.3£-6/H 2.0H

MCN2346Y -r---

2.1E-5/H


2.0H

VALVE: 2346 FAILS

CLDSED

MVL2346C --.----

2.2E-6/H 2.0H

PLATE HX006 FOULS

HHX-006H ----,---

!!iE-5/H

DR

CIJ-f"E-60

SHEETS 19, 34

INADEQUATE HEAT REMOVAL THRU HEAT

EXCHANGER 006

e.oH

OR

INADEQUATE HEAT REMOVAL TD CODLING

TD\JE:R SYSTEM

Wt;::::[

LOE-4/H e.oH

PLATE HJ( 016 F'DULS

MHX-016H ---,---

1.5E-5/H C.OH

OPERATOR FAILS TO S\I!TCH OVER

TD HX 016

MHX-<l16T ---,--

LOE-2 LO ><

SHEET

INADEQUATE HEAT REMOVAL THRU HEAT

EXCHANGER 016

FE-35-06 --,.-

OR

TEMPERATURE ALARM 2346

INACTIVE

MTA2346F -----,.-

1.9E-4/H .5M•

35

INADEQUATE HEAT REMOVAL TO COOLING

TO'W'ER SYSTEM

9W--F _____,.-

!.OE-4/H

TEI1PERA TURE SENSOR 2246

FAILS L0\1

MST2346Y -----,.-

3.3E-6/H

2.0H

2.0H

01-08-93 13:45 F: \FIRE\FIRE35

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION


CO-FE-21 --r--

SHEET 21

BENZENE PRESENT

10/44

Q.23 1..1)><

l.J)E-6/H cO.H

HOV-~7$ FAILS

CUJSED

I.OE:-7/H 22.H

CD-FE-:54

SHEET 33

~I 1041 FAILS

LOW

USP1041Y

:3.4E-5/H 22.H

I

~I 93L3 FAILS

LOY/

USP9313Y

3.4E-5/H

MOV-1041 FAILS

CLIJ=

l.J)E-7/H

22.H

22.H

SHEET 36

PIC 1041 FAILS LD'W

UCN1041Y ---.-

2.1E:-5/H 22.H

1o-2E>-93 14:22 F: \FIRE\FIRE36

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION


PSHH 9313

INACTIVE

GS\<193131'" -,---

3.0£:-5/H

PSHH 104-1

INACTIVE

RS\1104-!F" ---r-

3.0E-5/H


O.SMJM

O.SM><

INTERLOCK 15 :BYPASSED

DE PRESS HH

7IT-15U ---r-

LOE-3

INTI:RLOCK 14

:BYPASSED

m-14U -.--

1.oE-3

1.0>1

1.0~

DR

RELAY 9313 rAILS TD

OPEN

GRY9313D -r--

3.0E-6/H 3.0Mm.

CD-f'E-11

SHEET 33

RELAY 1041 FAILS

m OPEN

7RY1041D -.--

J.OE-6/H 3.0M~

DE STEAM fLDV VALVE >CV 9301 FAILS VIDE OPEN

GVA930l0 -,---

2.2E-6/H

**

22.H

DE STEAM FLDV VALVE FCV 9301 FAILS VIDE OPEN

GVA930lD ----,---

2.2E-61H

**

22.H

SHEET 37

02-01-93 15:00 F: \FIRE\FIRE37

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

*

MANUAL VALVES FAILS CLOSED <ANY 1 OF e>

CVAl102X

HEATER FAILURE

<HIGH T£11PERATURE>

HEATER CONTROLLER

FAILURE <HIGH)

CCNHEATZ -.---

2.1(-5/H 22.H

BUTTERFLY VALVE 188!i rAILS CLOSED

(ALL CAUSES>

DR

5.6E-7/H ZZ.H J

0 z.3E-SIH 22.H l.ZE-5/H

DENOTES ENABLING EVENT

11ANIJAL VALVES CLOSED

(Am 1 or 7)

L'9E-6/H 22.H

CHILLER i1 FAILS <OFf)

CCH--IF

6.9E-6/H

ez.H

CHILLER Ill FAlLS <DFF> ALL CAUSES

FE-38-04 -,-

[JR

ZZ.H

INSUF'f!CIENT PDVER

DN t1CC B7D2

INSUFFICIENT PO\iER ON BUS:BlO

CO-FE-33

SHEET 40

CQ-FE-61

SHEET 15

INSUF'FIClENT PD\IER

ON BUS BB02

INSUFFICIENT PD\JER ON

BUS B9

CO-FE-17

SHEET 40

CHILLER De FAILS (!JFF)

ALL CAUSES

FE-39-05 -r-

DR

1NSUFF1CIENT FL!l'J THRU PUMPS 201 AND 202

CO-F"E:-62 -r-

SHEET 39

CHWR M2 fAlLS <Dm

CCH---2F

G.9E-6/H

0 2.3E-5/H

ez.H

ez.H

SHEET 38

PLUG VALVE HCV 8318

rAlLS CLOSED

CVP8318C -.---

22E--GIH 22.H

:sufTERFLY VALVE 18~7 rAlLS CLOSED

<ALL CAUSES>

DR

0 teE-5/H ZZ.H

SV 9319 FAlLS

CLOSED

CVS8318C -.---

l2E-SIH 22.H

MANUAL VALVES rAlLS CLOSED <ANY 1 Or V

CVAE102X

S.GE-7/H 22.H

0 LOE-e LO•

01-08-93 13:52 F: \FIRE\FIRE38

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

DPERATIJR TURNS OfF PUMP 201

CPP-eO!U --,--

l.OE-5/H 2Z.H

PUI1P ZOL FAILS TD RUN CALL CAI.JSO)

DR

INSUFFICIENT P!l'viER

ONMCC 702

INSUFFICIENT PO'W'ER ON

BUS BlO

Cll-FE-38 -----.-

SHEET 40

MANUAL VALVES CLOS£D

(AN'f 1 DF Zl

CVA3LD2X -----.-

5.6E-71H 22.H

PUMP 201 rADLS TD RUN

<RANDOM CAUSES)

CPP-201V ---,--

5.7E-5/H 2Z.H

MANUAL VALVES CLOSED

(AN'f 1 OF Zl

CYA4102X -----.-

5.6E-7/H 22.H

PUMP 202 rADLS TD RUN

(RANDOM CAUSES>

CPP-Z02V -r--

5.7E-5/H ZZ.H

PUI1P Z02 FAILS TD RUN <ALL CAUSES)

DR

INSUF'F'IC!ENT PO'W'ER ON MCC

202

INSUITICIE:NT' PO'W'ER ON

BUS B9

C!J-I"E-17 --,--

SHEET 40

SHEET 39

DPERATDR TURNS Orr PUMP 202

CPP-202U -.,..--

LOE-5/H ZZ.H

01-08-93 13:54 F: \FIRE\FIRE39

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION SHEET 40

INSUF"FlCIENT PDVER

BlO CD-IT -:33 ONHUS (1)

SHEETS 20,31,38.39,45 SHEETS 20.31.38,39.41

CCT BREAKER BlD-511 FAILS

TD CLOSE

ECBB105K ---.-

3.0E-3

LOSS DF OFFUTE PC\IER

DR

1.0 "

PO\IER F"RDM BUS BlO

UNAVAIUIBLE

DR

CD-fE-80

THIS SHEET

DIESEL DG 200 FAILS TD

START OR RUN

EDG-200A ---.--

3.0E-2 LO "


DIESEL DG 100 FAILS TO START DR RUN

<ALL CAU$ES)

UNDERVIJLTAGE RELAY FAlLS

TD CLOSE

ERYWD9K --.--

3.0E-61H 3.0M><

TIMER F"AILURE

3.0E-f

TIE BREAKER FAILS TD

CLOSE

ECB-TlEK ---r--

3.0E-3

1.0 )II

l.O~

LOSS OF OFFSlTE POWER

TIE BREAKER FAlLS TO

CLOSE

ECB-TIEK ---r--

3.0E-3 1.0 ~

TIMER F"AILURE

3.0E-4

PC\tER FROM BUS B9

UNAVAILABLE

UNDER VOLT AGE RELAY FAILS

TO CLOSE

ERYUVlOK ---r--

DR

3.0E-6/H 3.0M~

l,Q M

DIESEL DG 200 FAILS TD START DR RUN

<ALL CAUSES>

DIESEL DG lOll fAILS

CCT BREAKER B9-5B FAlLS

TO CLOSE

ECBB9-5K

3.0E-3

TD START OR RUN 1----.1 <ALL CAUSES>

DR

1.0 "'

CD-IT-81

THIS SHEET

DIESEL DG 100 FAILS TO START

DR RUN

EDG-lOOA

** J9 1.0 "

** CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY OF THE SECOND DIESEL GENERATOR (DG) FAILS TO START GIVEN THAT FIRST DG FAILS TO START

(1) SHORTS AND OPEN CIRCUITS NOT MODELLED ()1-08-93 13:55

F: \FIRE\FIRE40

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

ISOLATION

DAMPER #! FAILS TO Cl.IJSE

VDA-1-K -..-----

3.0C-3 10.

VDA-2-K -,----

S.OE-3


1.0•

ISOLATION

DAMPER 'i13 FAILS TO CLOSE

VDA--3-K -,----

3.0E-3

HS"w"JNITK --,--

l.OE-5

1.0 ..

1.0 ..

ISOLATION DAMPERS f"AIL TO CLOSE <1\LL CAUSES>

MANUAL SlGNAL F"AILS

OPERATOR FAILS TD MANUALLY INITIATE

CDe SYSTEM

H-oP-A-T -,---

coe

AUTOMATIC SIGNAL FAILURE

CD-fE-67 ---,.-

SHEET 42

i.OE-2 1.0 )I

BATTERY DEAD

EllA--F ---,.-

1.4E-6/H

OR

:BATTERY !'"AILS

<1\LL CAUSES>

DR

3.liM><

CD-fE-63

SHEET 25

NO RELEASE DR ONLY PARTIAL RELEASE 01'"

CDe THRU NOZZLE$

SHEET 41

l.OE-4 LOHD

SS Of UNINTERRUPTIBUE Po\IER SUPPLY

RECTinER fAILURE

ERE--F -,---

LOE-6/H 3.0M"

INSUFI'"ICIENT PO\IER ON

BUS B710/B10

CD-fE-33 -..-----

SHEET 40

UPS 'f!S

OR

CC-FE-66

SHEET 43

INVERTER fAILURE

EINCDe-F -r--

LOE-4/H

OPEN DR SHORT CIRCUIT ON Yt5 DC BUS

El!SY15DB -r--

LOE-8/H

3.0M~

3.0M"

01-08-93 13:56 F: \FIRE\FIRE41

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

THERMAL DETE:CTDF< BOARD #l FAILURE

HPE--117 -,-----

3.0E-6/H SY.

CONTROL RELAY *1 CONTACTS

FAIL TO CLOSE

HF<Y--lK ----.-

3.0E-6/H 3.0M><


VOLTAGE COMPARITOR llol

lNACiiVE

HCL--lF -,-

3.0E-6/H .SY ..

LOVER THERMISTOR #1

RESIST AHCE LDV

HDT-lY -,-

15E-5/H .SY><

VOLTAGE: COMPAR!TllR ,;2

INACTIVE

HCL-2F ---,----

3.0E-6/H .5Y•

UPPER

THERMrSTllR 112 RESISTANCE Lll'J

HDT--2Y ---,----

lSE-5/H .SY•

SHEET 42

CONTROL RELAY ~CONTACTS

FAIL TO CLIISE

HRY---21< ---,----

3.0E-GIH 3.0M><

THERMAL DETECTOR llOARDI!2 FAILURE

HPE--2F ---,----

3.0E-6/H .SY><

01-08-93 13:57 F: \FIRE\FIRE42

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

MASTER VALVE FAILS

"TO OPEN

HVSMASTD --,--

l.OE-3 LO "

LOSS OF UNlNTERRUPTIBLE

PCIJER SUPPLY

CQ-FE-66 --,--

SHEET 41


INITIAL DISCHARGE C02 SUPPLY

FAILURE

OR

INITIAL DISCHARGE VALVE FAILS

"TO OPEN

HVSINITD ----,---

1.0E-3 1.0 "

NOZZLES PLUGGED

HNZ--P ----,--

2.7E-7/H .SY><

LOY PR=URE C!le STORAGE

TANK :11

HTK-1Y -,.--

1.0E-4 LO "

ALARM SIGNAL NOT GENE:RATED F'RDM C02 DNTRDL SYSTEM PANE

ca-FE--64 ----,--

SHEET 41

MASTER VALVE FAILS

TO OPEN

HVSMASTD --,--

1.0E-3

C!le SYSTEM CONTROL PANEL

FAILURE INACTIVE

HPE--F ----,--

3.0E--6/H .SY><

SHEET 41

1.0 2

LOCKED OPEN VALVE

CLOSED

HVMLOC-c ---.,-

t.OE-4 1.0 •

AlARM SIGNAL NOT GENERA' YEN INITIAL DISCHAR C02 SUPPLY FAILURE

FE-+3-o5 ----,--

DR

REMOTE MANUAL C02 eNDED REl.EASE SIIITtH FAILURE 'TlJ CLOSE

HSVEXTDK ---,--

LOE-5 1.0><

EXTENDED DISCHARGE C02

SUPPLY FAILURE

DR

HVSEXTDD ---,--

!.OE-3

OPERATOR FAILS 'TlJ MANUALLY INITIATE

C02 SYSTEM

l.OE-2 1.0,.

1.0 2

SHEET

LIN PRESSURE C02 STORAGE

TANK 82

HTK--lY -,.--

43

1.0E-4 l,02

LOSS OF UNII<TERRUPTIBLE PCVER SUPPLY

CD-FE-66 --,--

SHEET 41

10-26-9.3 14:26 F: \FIRE\FIRE43

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

MDV 1041 FAILS TO

PI\RTIAU Y CLOSE

DR

seve MOV 1041

INACTIVE

~

3.0E-3

OPERATOR F"AILS 10 C1lJS£ MDV 1041

co-Ft:-BG ---r--

SHEET 52

02 ANALYZER 3"105

INACTIVE

C!lNTRCLLER 1041 FAllS TO PARTIALLY

CLOSE MDV 1041

SOLID STATE CDNiRDLLER 1041

INACTIVE

OR

RELAY CR3C CONTACTS FAIL

TO OPEN

UAI3+05F" I ** -...---- 7RYCR3CD --.,.-

3.4E-5/H ~.H~ 3.CE-6/H 3.0M"

1.0,.

1HIS SHEET, SHEET 52

~ ANAL 'IZER 340~ FAILS TO GENERATE

CLOSE SIGNAL

02 ANALYZER 3+0~

INACTIVE

UA1340~ J *** ----,-

DR

RELAY CR6C CONTACTS

F"AILS TO OPEN

7RYCR6CD ---,..--

3.0E-3

6.8E-4/H ~Z.Hll 3.0E-6/H 3.DM~

10

MOV 9278 FAILS 10

PARTIALLY CLOSE

OR

LQm

OPERATOR FAILS TO PARTIALLY CLOSE

MOV 9~78

CD-F"E-96 --.---

SHEET 52

SHEET 44

CIJNiRIJLLER '9278 FAILS TO CLOSE

MDV 9Z78

SOLID STATE CONTROLLER '9~78

INACTIVE

UCN9Z78F ---r--

Z.1E-5/H 3.0t1J!

CD-FE-84 ----.---

THIS SHEET


** ANNOUNCED FAILURE

*** UNANNOUNCED F AlLURE

01-08-93 14:05 F: \FIRE\FIRE44

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

6.3E-7/H ZO.H 3.2E-:5/H ZO.H

VAPORIZER FAILS TO

PROVIDE HEAT

ZVPBCIJ2F ----,-

6.'3E-61H 22.H

CO-F'E-72

SHEETS 3,~,9,11

INSUmCIENT PO'w'ER ON

BUS B9

CO-F'E-17 -r--

SHEET 40

2.0E-~/H 22.11 !.OE-6/H 3.0M

SHEET 45

01-08-93 14:06 F: \FIRE\FIRE45

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

PCV 1104 FAILS OPEN

QVD1040 ----,--

1.6E-6/H 22.H

= fUl\1 INCREASES

FROM PR

F"E-46-02 ---r--

DR

PERA TOR ERRONEDUSL TURNS ON PR

HIGH fUl\1 PURGE

QOPPRPRU ---r-

:LOE-5/H 22.H


PCV 1101 FAILS OPEN

QVIUOlD -r--

1.6E--6/H 22.H

CD-F"E-93 ---r--

SHEET 57

PR STEAM fLDIJ VALVE 1027

FAILS TO CLOSE

RVAJOC7K --,--

6.&-5/H 22-li"


FAILS TO CLOSE

RVK--K ~

6.eE-5/H O.:;M>E

SHEET 12

FlC-1107 INTERLOCK LOOP 1

INACTIVE

FE-46-03 ---r--

DR

FT 1107

INACTIVE

QSfU07F -----,---

7.9£-5/H

FI-92<!7 INACTIVE

QSf9227f ---r--

7.SE-5/H 3.0M•

3.0M>o<

.tl9

RELAY HR4 fAILS

TO OPEN

7RYHR4-D ------.,---

3.0E-6/H

RELAY HR9 FAILS

TO OPEN

7RYHR9-D ---r--

3.0E-6/H 3.0M•

3.0M•

SHEET 46

LO •

IN"I'E:RLDCK 1 BYPASSED

7IT-IU --,---

LOE-3

INTERLOCK 4

BYPASSED

7IT--4U ---r--

LOE-3 1.0 N!

LO •

BOTH PR STEAM VALVES FAIL

TO CLOSE

Cll-FE-25 ---r-

THIS SHEET

1o-26-93 14:30 F: \FIRE\FIRE46

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

SHEET 55

PCY~ I PCV nH

I n n77

FAlLS FAlLS lNACTIYE OPEN OPEN =r_

L6E-6/H 22.H 1.6E-6/H 22.H 7.SE-5/H 3,()MD


I

DE STEAM RE!..AY HR9 VALVE I'AlLS FAILS

TO CLDSE TO OPEN

GVA9301K 7RYHR9-D

6.2E-5/H 22.HO< 3.0E-6/H

.07 I.o•

lNTERLDCK 4

BYPASSED

7IT--4U

3.0M>< l..OE-3

SHEET

LO ><

47

10-18-93 15:27 F: \FlRE\FIRE47

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

F"T-5960 >AILS HIGH

TSf"SSbOZ

7.BE-6/H


** COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT

PRSTEAMD -.---

.D9

22.H

1.0•

RELAY HR3 >AILS

TD OPEN

7RYHR3-D

:l.OE-6/H

INTERLOCK 2 INACTIVE -

Fl-5860

n:-4S-o2 -.---OR

3.0M>o

SHEET 50

INTERLOCK LOOP 2 BYPASSED

7lT--2U ----,.-

LOE-3 LO "

PR STEAM llLDCK VALVE

FAILS TD CLDSE

RVK--K ----,--

6.2£-5/H O!iM~

INTERLOCK LDDP 11 NACTIVE (PR) EXHAUS

C6H6 CIJNC HHH

co-F"E-'93 -.---

SHEET 57

PR STEAM VALVE 1027

FAILS TD CLDSE

RVA1027K -.,-

6.2E-5/H 22-HO<

SHEET 48

10-26-93 14:36 F: \FJRE\FIRE48

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

ENZENE GENERA TlON IDE DURING HEA TUP AN

EVAPORATTON 3/44

OESTEA>IO ---,--

.07 LO ><


F"T-5860 FAILS HIGH

TSFSB60Z I ** -..,.--

7.sE-6/H ee.H


RELAY CR3 FAILS

TO OPEN

7RYCR3-ll ------,---

3.0E-6/H

INTERLOCK e INACTIVE

I'I-5860

rE-49-02 ---,--

OR

3.0M•

INTERLOCK LOOP 2

BYPASSED

7!T--2U ~

:!.OE-3

SHEET 12

CO-rE-77 --.--

SHEET 50

1.0"

INTERLOCK LOOP U INACTIVE (!JE) PVVH

XHAUST C6H6 CONC HH

DE STEAM VALVE rAILS

TO CLOSE

GVA9301K -..,.--

CO-FE-91 -..,.--

SHEET 55

6.2E-51H 22-Hm

SHEET 49

1D-26-93 15:33 F: \FIRE\FIRE49

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

BASE LOAD CDNTR!L LCDP

REVERSED

~ DR

5960 FLD\ol SENSOR

REVERSED

TCN5a60U TSF5860U TVLZ034C

** ' LOE-6/H 22.H !.OE-6/H 22.H l.OE-6/H 22.H 2.2E-6/H 22.H

** DENOTES COMMON-CAUSE INITIATING EVENT

SHEETS 48.4-9

5860 FIC

FAILS HIGH

TCN5860Z --,.-

2.1E-SIH 22.H

LARGE <UNCONTROLLABLE>

DISTURBANCES

DR

i¥D I.OE-5/H 22.H

FT-5S60 FAR..S HIGH

TSF5860Z

7.8E-6/H

SHEET 50

** 22.H

DO\.INSTREAM PVVH PRESSURE INCREASES AUSES P4 TD INCREA:

CD-FE-78

~

SHEET 51

1o-26-93 14:45 F: \FIRE\FIRE50

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

PVV :BLD'w'ER FAILS TO

RUN

TBL-o20V --,-

7.6£-5/H

:BOTH BLD\IERS fAIL TO

FUNCTION

PVV BUJ'w'ER fADLS TO RUN <ALL CAUSES)

BALL VALVE 5962 JNADVERTENTL Y

Cl..IJSES

22.H

;;c: 'vK5862C --,-

22E-6/H 22.H

AND

STANDBY BLD\JER fADLS TO START

<ALL CAUSES>

OR

BALL VALVE SSG-4-FAILS TO

OPEN

TVK5864D ---,-

9.3E-6/H 22.H•


DIJI/NSTRE:AM PVVH PRESSURE INCREASES 1-----.,1

CAUSES P-'1 TO INCREASE CD-FE-78

SHEET 50

HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL LOIJP CAUSES

P4 TO INCREASE

STANDBY PVV BLD\IER FAILS

TO START

T9L-030A -..,.--

OR

3.0E-3 LO•

PD 5861 SENSOR

REVERSED

TPD5861U -.--

!.OE-6/H 22.H

HEADER PRESSURE CDIITRDL DEVICES

REVERSED

LOE-6/H e2.H

SlC REVERSED

TCN-SICU --.--

LOE-6/H

SHEET 51

e2.H

01-08-93 14:16 F: \FIRE\FIRE51

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION


2 ANAL VZERS 340!5 A 409 FAIL TO GENERA.

CLOSE SIGNAL

C!l-FE-8f --.--

SHEET 44

DCS INACTIVE

7CPDCS-F -..-

Z.OE-4/H

DR

22.Hl<

SHEET 44

PIC 10~1

INACTIVE

UCNPIC-F ---.--

z.tE-4/H zz.H><

OPERATOR FAILS TD INCREASE SYSTEM

PRESSURE

UCNPREST --.--

l.OE-2 1.0 "

SHEET 52

01-08-93 14: 17 F: \FIRE\FIRE52

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

SPILLS CAUSE POTENTIAL FDR

SMALL FIRE

co-n:-st -,.-

SHEET 28


ORGANIC AND AQUEOUS SPILLS

GREATER THAN 300

CD-fE-37 --r--

SHEET 24

SHEET 27 ().3';> LO•

OPERATOR ERRDNEOUSL Y

PUMPS TO HOT PR

QPRPUMPT --.--

1.oE-o3 LO •

DCS INACTIVE

7CPCCS-F ---.-

2.0E-4/H 22.HM

PR TEI1P SENSOR

INACTIVE

QST1030F ----r-

3.3E-5/H

SHEET 53

22.HM

01-13-93 16:31 F: \F1RE\F1RE53

~ L()

fw w I (/)

z 0 (/)

0 _j o_ X w ~ w ~

LL

u o_ (/)

::::s::: z <( _I

m >_j _I <( z 0 fz w fz w 0 <( 0....

(f)

I f-

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION



*** UNANNOUNCED FAILURE

BENZENE ANAL VZER 1\I-3+07

INACTIVE

UAl3+07f --,---

3.4E-5/H

.....

4.®

SHEETS 13,47,49

6.2E-5/H 2BH"

ANAL YIER I I ANAL YIER Al-3407 INACTIVE

CALL CAUSES)

DR

'w'RONG CALII!RATION

GAS USED

UAI3407U ---,-

I.OE-4 1.0 2

RELAY CR3A FAILS

TO CLOSE

7RYCR3AK ---r-

3.0E-6/H 3.0Ml<

:BENZENE ANALYZER 1\I-3408

INACTIVE

UAI3408f --,--- ••

G.SE-4/H 12.0H2

AI-3408 INACTIVE CALL CAUSES)

OR

RELAY CRGA fAILS

10 CLOSE

7RYCR6AK ---r-

3.0E-6/H 3.0M"

SHEET 55

\/RlJNG CALIBRJ\ liON

GAS USED

UAl3407U --r--

LOE-4 1.0 "

1o-2S-93 14:47 F: \FIRE\FIRE55

~ L()

1-w w I (/)

z D t----i

(/)

D _j o_ X w ~ w Ci t----i

u_

u o_ (/)

~

~ co

t w _j

>-::l <( z 0 F z ~ z

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

SHEET 55


PR STEAl'! FLD>I BLDCK VALVE

fAILS TD CUISE

RVK--K ---.---

b.2E-5/H O.SM><

PR STEAl'! VALVE 1027

FAILS TO CLOSE

RVA1027K -.--

6.2E-5/H 22.H•

SHEET 57

1o-26-93 14;50 F: \FIRE\FIRE57

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION

AND

OR

PSHH PR STEAM '9313 VALVES FAlL

INACTIVE T1l CLOSE

GSV/931:3f CO-fE-13

) :3.0E-5/H O.SMl< 1.0E-3 LO " 3.0E-6/H 3.0M>< THIS SHEET



SHEET 33

PSHH 1041

INACTIVE

3.0E-5/H D.sM•


fAILS TO CLOSE:

RVK--K ____,.-

PR STEAM VALVES fAIL

TO CLOSE

fE-58-D4 ----,--AND

6.ZE--5/H O.!SM><

PR HH PRESSURE INTERLOCK 14 FAILS

D SHUT OFF PR STEA

OR

THIS SHEET

PR STEAM FLD'w' VALVE FCV 10C7 FAILS 'HIDE OPEN

RVA10e70 ----,--

ZZE-6/H

**

22.H

SHEET 58

RELAY 1041 fAILS

TO OPEN

7R'I'1041D ------,--

3.0E-6/H :3.0M•

lNTERLDCK 14 BYPASSED

<PR PRESS HH>

m-14U ------,--

l.OE-:3 1.0 "'

1o-2S-93 15:37 F: \FIRE\FIRE58

OJ L()

~ w w I (f)

z 0 (f)

0 _j Q_

X w ~ w a:: LL

u Q_ (f)

~ z <t: _j

rn

>_j _j

<t: z 0 1-z ~ z w 0 <t: Q_

(})

I 1-

0 CD

f---w w I (/)

z 0 (/)

0 _j

Q_

X w ~ w cr: LL

u Q_ (/)

y: z ~ _j

co >_j _j

~ z 0 1-z ~ z w 0 ~ Q_

(J)

I 1-

SPC FIRE/EXPLOSION



FLIN ELEMENT 1027 FAILS

LD\1/INACTIVE

RSF"1027Y

7.BE-6/H

FLDV ELEMENT 9301 FAILS

LOWINACTIVE

GSF"9301V ----,-

** 22.H

** 7.8£-6/H 22.H

DR -RELAY 1027

FAlLS TO OPEN

7RY1027D

3.0£:-6/H

7RY93010 ----,-

3.0E-6/H

3.0MJK

3.0M"

SHEET 18

PR STEAM VALVES F"AIL

TD CLOSE

SHEET 58

CO-F"E-79

SHEET 18

DE STEAM VALVE FCV 9301 FAILS 'wTIIE OPEN

GVA93010 --r-

2.2£-6/H 22.H

SHEET 61

01-11-93 14-:01 F: \FIRE\FIRE61

PR DEFLAGRA ON PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED

(PVVS LEL ANALYZERS REMOVED FROM SERVICE)

BENZENE CCNC BET\JEEN LEL AND UEL

ITRUEl

C6HGUEL---,--

LO 10.


DXIDI\NT CCNC

ABOVE HOC

C02 FL0\.1 RATE TOO LCV AT

LDCATTDN 6

MCC2 (6)_.<S1)1<35>,C:32:> [-!J

OUTPUT [Jf BV-1109

CD-PR-QI ----.-

SHEET 2

PRCil"'-

0.0 0.04~

PR TANK STATIC CHARGE

PTK--1 ---.-

!.OE-9/H !.OH

PR AGITATOR IGNlTIDN SDURC£

'OPERATES !OCJ"/. Of TIMSl I

PAG--1 ---.-

3.llE-4/H l..OH

SHEET 1

11-02-93 10:33 F:\PR\PR1

PR DEFLAGRATION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED


INTERLOCK LDDP 6 INACTIVE PR

C02 fLIN LLL

CO-PR-Q.4. ----.-

SHEET 5

CLOSE SIGNAL GENERATED

FOR BV-U0'9

CD-PR-11 ---,-

SHEET 9

DR

:BV-1109 NADVERTENTL 'f CLOSES!

<RANDOM CAUSES>

QVKUO~ ---,-

2.2£:-6/H lOH

SHEET 1

SHEET::>

DCS GENERATES SIGNAL TO CLIJSE

BV-1109

7CPDCS-I -.----

2.DE--4/H LOH

SHEET 2

11-02-93 10:35 F:\PR\PR2


C02 SETPCINT

LDV

QCN1107X --,---

l.OE-5/H !.OH

CLOSE SIGNAL GENERATED

fOR FCV-1107

SHEET 10

FCV-1107 FAILS CLOSED <ALL CAUSES)

PR-Q3-06 --,---DR

DCS GENERATES SIGNAL TD a..DSE

BV-1109

71

2.0E-4/H !,OH


FC-1107 FAILS HIGH

QCN!l07Z --,--

2.1E-SIH

INTERLOCK LDDP 6 INACTIVE PR

Cll2 FLC\1 LLL

CD-PR-Q4. ---r-

SHEET 5

ARGE aJNC!lNTRCLLAB' DISTURBANCES

!.OH

HI FLO\/ C02: NFBL

PR-03-Il:l ----r--

OR

'-...-/ 7.8E-6/H !.OH

fCV-1107 FAILS

FULLY CLOSED

e.cE-6/H l.OH

** COMMON CAUSE INillAllNG EVENT

0 3.3£-5/H

SHEET 8

Cll2 Nfl!L CAUSES/ PASSES DISTURBANCES

REisULTS IN MCil2 (3!B) Ct!J

•• l.OH

OR

MCil2 f57) C-lOJ

PR--o3-o5 ___,.-

AND

LOSS Of NORMAL Cll2

SUPPLY

SHEET 40

FT-!W7 REVERSED

••

SUPPLY FAILURE OXYGEN INSTEAD

OF C02

NTK---u ---,---

Hl FLDV C02 Nfl!L

REVERSED

QCN1107U --,---

LOE:-6/H

!.OE-7H !.OH

LIJSS OF BACKUP

PURGE SUPPLY

SHEET 41

SHEET 3

LOH

FCV-1107 REVERSED

QVL1107U ---,-

l.OE-6/H LOH

11-02-93 10:44 F:\PR\PR3

PR DEFLAGRA Tl ON

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

SHEET 4

01-12-93 12:58 F:\PR\PR4


INTERLOCK FT-1107 INACTIVE. LDDP 6 FAILS HIGH DR

BYPASSED REVERSED Cll--PR-07

7IT-6U lHIS SHEET

DR

I..OC-3 1.0 ..

FT-1107 FT-1107 INACTIVE REVERSED

QSF:J:1F I QSF1107U

** ** 7.8E-5/H 1.0Hlf 7.BE-61H l.nH 1.0E-b/H LOH



HIS-1173 FAILS TD

OPEN

\J 3.0E-5 LO,.

RELAY HRS FAILS TD

CLOSE

7RYHR5-I<

3.0E-b/H 3.0M><

SHEETS 2,3

BLOCK VALVE 1100 FAILS TO CLOSE

\J ME-3 LO><

"---->.

THIS SHEET

SHEET 5

10C-3 1.0 "

01-12-93 13:02 F:\PR\PR5

CD

fw w I (/)

z 0 f<( 0:::: C) <( _j

LL w 0

0:::: ()_

~ z <:( _j

m

>_j _j <( z 0 1-z w 1-z

w 0 <( (]_

(f)

I I-

I'--

~ w w I (/)

z 0 ~ <(

cr: 0 <( _j

LL w 0

cr: Q_

::,<::: z <:( .....J m >-~ z 0 F z w fz w 0 <:( 0..

(f)

F

cor--'<til:: .. o._

~~ 1'1~ 'fi.L C))

I 0 ~

PR DEFLAGRA TION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED

INTERLOCK HIS-1173 PI-2779 RELAY HR7

LOOP 9 FAILS TO lNACTIVE FAILS TO BYPASSED OPEN CLOSE

7IT--9U 7S\11173D QSP2778f" 7RYHR7-K

LOE-3 1.0 • 3.0E-5 :1.0• :l.4E-4/H 0.5M .. 3.0E-6/H 3.0M•


BLOCK VALVE PI-2778 1100 FAILS INACTIVE TO CLOSE

PVKllOOK OSP2778F

3.0E-3 LO • 3.4E-4/H D.SM•

SHEET 8

INTERLOCK LOOP 9

BYPASSED

71T--9U

I.OE-3 1.0.

REJ...AY HR7 rAILS TO

CLOSE

7RYHR7-K

3.0E-6/H 3.0M>~

01-12-93 13;08 F:\PR\PR8


RELAY PSHHX1041 CONTACTS OPEN <ALL CAUSES>

PR

RELAY PSHHX104l CONTACTS

OPEN

7Rn04u -.-

3.0E-6/H l.OH

OR

RELAY HR4 CONTACTS

OPEN

7RY-HR41 --.-

3.0E-6/H

&

l.OH

CO-PR-46 ---.--

SHEET 39

CD-PR-13 --.-

SHEET 11

RELAY HR3 CONTACTS

OPEN

7RY-HR31 --.-

3.DE-6/H

** CLOSE SIGNAL DUE TO TWO CAUSES:

(1) SPURIOUS FAILURES OR

3.0E-6/H I.OH

~ ~

l.OH SHEET 12

(2) TROUBLE IN PWH WHICH REQUIRES PR FEEDING TO STOP

NOTE: INACTIVE INTERLOCK MEANS FAILURE TO STOP PR FEED

CD-PR-U 1 r .... -.,..-u,. 1 **

SHEET 2 OR

TI -60'1-1 F"AILS HIGH AND INTERLOCK LOOP

3 INACTIVE

CO-PR-15

SHEET 13 ::l.OE-6/H t.oH

RELAY HR9 CONTACTS

OPEN IN

7RY-HR91 co-pR-16

3.0E-6/H LOH SHEET 14

I

I COX17

SHEET 16

RELAY CR3A CONTACTS

E OPEN

7RYCR3Al

3.0E-6/H LOH

SHEET 9

p

SHEET 20

AI-34C7 GENERATES EXHAUST C6H6 HHH

LOCK LOOP 11 INAC

CO-PR-18

SHEET 19

11-02-93 10:53 F:\PR\PR9

PR DEFLAGRA ON PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED

RELAY PSHHX1041 CONTACTS

OPEN

7RY10411 ----,--

3.0E-6/H l.OH

RELAY HR4 CONTACTS

OPEN

7RY-HR41 -.--

3.0E-61H !.OH

PTf-1041 GENERATES PR & ~NTERLDCK LOOP 14 F,

TD SHUTDOWN PR F'EED

CD-PR-46 --,---

SHEET 39

Ctl-PR-13 -.--

SHEET 11

RELAY HR3 CONTACTS

OPEN

7RY-HR31 -.-

3.0E-6/H

** CLOSE SIGNAL DUE TO TWO CAUSES:

(1) SPURIOUS FAILURES OR

3.0E-6/H

!.OH

RELAY HRl CDNT ACTS OPEN

<ALL CAUSES)

TI-6041 F'Ail.S H[GH AND INTERLOCK LOOP

3 INACTIVE

CO-PR-15

t.oH SHEET 13

RELAY HR9 CONTACTS

OPEN

T 7RY-HR91

SHEET 12 3.0E-6/H

(2) TROUBLE IN PWH WHICH REQUIRES PR FEEDING TO STOP


SHEET 3

RELAY HR6 CONTACTS

OPEN

SHEET 10

RELAY CR3A CONTACTS OPEN

<ALL CAUSES)

DR

SHEET 20

7RY-HR61 T :l.JlE-6/H l.OH

-9277 GENERATES SCV EXHAUST F'LOV HHH & ERLDCK LOOP f lNACTI E

CO-?R-16

1.0H SHEET 14

SHEET 16

RELAY CR3A CONTACTS

OPEN

7RYCR3A1

30C-6/H l.OH SHEET 19

11-02-93 10:59 F:\PR\PR10


FC-1107 REVERSED

l.OE-6/H

PR C02 CONTROL LOOP

REVERSED

I I

1.0H

FCV-1107 I REVERSED

D67UI l.OE-6/H !.OH



I INSTRUMENT AIR HIGH

PRESSURE

I

1.6E:-5/H

SHEET 11

CD-PR-20 -.,---

SHEET 28

PR C02 fLIN CONTROL DDP CAUSE:$ DR PASSE

DISinJRl!ANCES CAUSE: M32 t .. ll

I

DR

MODERATE EXTERNAL

DISTURBANCES

I UPSTREAM

CONTROL LOOPS ARE INACTIVE

0-I I

SHEETS 9,10

F"T-1107 GENERATES HHH SIGNAL

DR

INTERLIJCK LOOP 4 INACTIVE seve

EXHAUST Flll\4 HHHH

FCV-1107 FAILS OPEN

7.& -6/H LOH

FC-1107

FAILS LIN

ARGE <UNCDNTRDLLABL DISTURBANCES PR CDE

FLO\./ CONTROL

DR

:INSTRUMENT ADR HIGHHIGH PRESS [ +lOJ

CAUSES FCV-110 TO FAIL FULLY CLOSED

QCN1107Y -----.--

! 62E=blH ] DH 2.1E-5/H I I I

LOH

I GVLll07F

l.OH 2.1E:-4/H l.OH~ 6.21:-5/H l.OH~

F1 1107 SENSOR

INACTIVE

llSf'l107F -----.--

7.&-5/H UIHl<

C02 PRESSURE RE:GULI'>TDR FAILS

HIGH HIGH [+lOJ

QPC1107Z ---.---

1.6E-6/H LOH

nc-11o7 SETPIJINT

HIGH

QSPll07U -----.--

l.OE-5/H l.OH

1Q-26-93 09:33 F:\PR\PR11


2034 VALVE

REVERSED

l.GE-6/H


BASE LOAD CONTROL LOOP

REVERSED

l.OH

f!C-5860 REVERSED

l.OE-6/H

FJ-5860 fAILS

LD\ol

TSF5860Y ----.,-

f!-3860 GENERATES PYYH EXHAUST FLO\/

LLL SlGNAL

IN[ERLDCK LDDP 2 INACTI! GIV N THAT Fl-5960 GENER~ TES

PVV EXHAUST FLIJV LLL siGNAL

DR

INSUFT!CIENT DILUTION AIR M2

C-!J

CO-PR-22 --,--

SHEET 30

7 .BE -6/H l.OH

UJH

c034

BASE UlfiD AIR FLD\ol CONTROL LOOP

CAUSES M2 C-!J

DR

FC VALVE FAILS CLOSED

3860 FC

FAILS HIGH

2.2E-6/H LOH 2.1E-5/H LOH


LARGE OJNCDNTRDLLABLD

DISTURBANCES

LOE-5/H LOH

n-sa6o FAILS HIGH

7.8E-61H

SHEET 12

LDH

P4 [·1-!0J DDWNSTREfiM PVVH PRESSURE

INCREASES

CO-PR-23 --,--

SHEET 26

01-12-93 14:34 F:\PR\PR12


9 AND

I TI-6041 rAILS L0\1

=r= TST6041Y

0 7.BE-61H l,OH

---FAILURE u SHUTDC\JN

PR FEED PUMP

[]

OR

INTERLOCK HIS-1173 LOOP 3 FAILS TO

BYPASSED OPEN

71T--3U 7SVI1173D

l.OE-3 LO " 3.0E-5 1.0 •



SHEETS 9,10

RELAY HRl BLOCK VALVE CONTACTS FAll. 1100 FAll.S TO TRANSFER TO CLOSE

7RY-HRlD PVKllOOK

3.0E-6/H 3.QMJ< 3.0E-3 1.0 "

FAILURE TO CLOSE PPT MDV-1100 <ALL CAUSES:>

DR

RELAY HRl CONTACTS FAIL

TO TRANSF"ER

7RY-HR!D

3.0E-6/H 3.0M•

SHEET 13

INTERLOCK LOOP 3

BYPASSED

71T-3U -----r-

l.OE-3 1.0 "

1(}-26-93 09:42 F:\PR\PR13



Fl-'JF::I I Ut.NI:.!<:A II:..~ HHH ::>J.\1 I

SHEET 32

n-9277 FAlLS HIGH

USF9277Z ---,-

7.SE-6/H LOH

SHEETS 9,10

M6NC [+ll TOTAL FLOYRATE

JNPUT TC seve

SHEET 15

SHEET 14

01-12-93 14:47 F:\PR\PR14


FT-1107 REVERSED

QSFI!O?U ---,-

LOE-6/H l.OH

PR C02 CONTROL LOOP

REVERSE:D

QCNI!07U ---,-

LOE-6/H UlH

NOTE: INACTIVE INTERLOCK MEANS

FAILURE TO STOP PR FEED


FCV-1107 REVERSED

QVL1107U

LOE-6/H

.... LOH

HIGH AIR

PRESSURE [-ll

L6E-5/H


DI,}jl U~.OMNt...L~ 1....1-'!U.lJ::. l'l~C. F I

DR

'-./ 7.8E-6/H

!.OH 7.0C-5/H l.OH•

-l.OH

SHEE1S 14-. 21

F"IC 1107 INTERLOCK LDDP 1 INACTIVE

PR C02 FLll\1 HHH

Z.IE:-5/H

:J UPSTREAM

CONTROL LOOPS ARE INACTIVE

I PR-r-07 I DR

2.1E-4/H LOH•

LOH

ARGE <UNCONTRDLLABI IISTURllANCES ENTER Pi

C02 FLO\J CONTROL

QVL1107D ----.---

6.2E-6/H

6ZE-5/H !.OH><

I.OH

SHEET 15

FIC-1107 SETPDINT

HIGH

QSPII07U ---,-

LOE-5/H LOH

PCV-1108 tAILS HIGH

1.6E-6/H LOH

01-12-93 14:50 F:\PR\PR15



INA

SHEET .34

TI-9356 FAlLS HIGH

UST9356Z ----.--

2.3E-6/H

SHEETS 9,10

TIC-9356 GENERATES

seve TEMP HHH

LOH

Cll-PR-29 -,..--

SHEET 17

SHEET 16

01-12-93 14-:51 F:\PR\PR16


'9356

PRESS HI HI UOJ CAUSES TCV '9356 TD FAIL FULLY CLOSED

PRESSURE REGULI\TDR

FAILURE <HI-HI)

NVI--ZZ ------r--

1.6E-6/H l.OH

SCVC TEMP CIINTRDL LO!lP

REVERSED

I

DR

I

CH2DTHO --,---

!.OE-5/H

I 9356

l.OH

NOTE: INACTIVE INTERLOCK MEANS F AlLURE TO STOP PR FEED


9356 VALVE

fAlLS CLOSED

UYL9356C ----,--

2.26:-6/H

9356 VI\LVE STUCK

UVL9356f ----r-

6.&-5/H lOH•

!.OH

SCVC TEMP CONTROL LOOP C PASSES DISTUR!lAN

RESULTS IN T7 [ .. ll

CD-f'R-~8 PR-17-ot

SHEET 16

935& TIC

SETPDINT HIGH

USP9356U ------r--

LOE-5/H

MOD

seve TEMP CONTROL LOOP

INACTIVE

9351> TC

STUCK

OR

UCN9356F ---.-

2.1E-4/H LOH"

CD

DR

CHILLED \tr/ATER FLO\ol LD\1 Ml8 [-101

9351> TEMP SENSOR

INPCTIVE

UST9356F -.----

3.3E-5/H !.OH><

'9356 CDNIRDLL£R FAILS HIGH

INSTRUMENT AIR PRESS HI (+ll

CAUSES TCV 9351> TD AlL PARTIPoLL'f CLO:

PRESSURE REGULATOR

FP.rLURt: <HIGH>

L6E-5/H !.OH

SHEET

MODERATE DISTURBANCES ENIER

INP.CTIVE LOOP

PR-17-o4

9356 TC

STUCK

UCN~356F ------r--

e.lE-4/H

OR

LOH>

OR

93:56 TEMP SENSOR

STUCK

USH356F ------r--

3.3E-5/H

17

LOH•

01-14-93 08;57 F:\PR\PR17


9364 TEMP SENSOR

REVE:RSED

CST9364U -,---

I.OE-6/H l.OH

LDDP IS

REVERSED

DR

9364 TlC

REVERSED

et:m:J6.4U ---,--

I.OE-6/H I.OH

TC-9364

FAILS HIGH

CCN936H -,---

Z.!E-5/H



UIH

HEATER SVIICH

FAILS CLOSED

CSV9:J6.4C -,---

3.0E-5/H

TU !-tll CHILLED II ATER

TEMPERATURE HIGH

DR

lOH

CD-PR-29

SHEET 17

TlC-9364

SETPOINT HIGH

~

l.OE-5/H lOH

9364 TEMP SENSOR

FAILS UlVI

CCN93641" -,---

2.1E-4/H I.OH><

LOOP IS

INACTIVE

CST93641" -,---

3.3E-5/H

SHEET 18

1.0HM

CHILLED \1 ATER TEMPERATURE HIGH

C+U

CSIIPDVRI" ----r--

31>E-5/H I.OH><

01-12-93 14:57 F: \PR\PR18


PR-30

SHEET 36

INTERLOCK LOOP 11 -3+07 INACTIVE PVV

1AUST C6H6 CDNC HHI

CO-PR-34 -----.---

SHEET 35


EVENTS \JHICH CAUSE C6H6

CONC C+ll

CO-PR-32 --,--

SHEET 21

SHEE1S 9,10

AI-3407 FAlLS HIGH

UAI3407Z --r--

~.4E-5/H 1JlH

SHEET 37

SHEET 19

11-02-93 11:06 F:\PR\PR19


lNTERLDCK LOOP U

BYPASSED

1.0E-3 1.0 II(

FAILURE TO SHUT D[]YIN PR

FEED PUMP

7S\JU73D --,--

3.0E-5 1.0 "


RELAY CR6A CDNT ACTS FAIL TO TRANSFER

7RYCR6AD ----,--

3.0E-6/H 3.0Mo<

RELAY CONTACTS

CR6A OPEN

7RYCR6A1 ----,--

3.0E-6/H 1.0H

AND

BLOCK VALVE UOO FAILS TO CLOSE

PVKIIOOK --,-

3.0E-3 1.0•

SHEETS 9, 10

INTE:RLDCK LOOP U -3407 INACTIVE PVV HAUST C6H6 CDNC HH

CD-PR-34 ----,--

SHEET 35

FAIL.UE TO CLOSE PPT HCV-1100 <ALL CAUSES)

7RYCR6AD ----,--

3.0E-E./H 3.0M•

SHEET 20

AI-3406 GENERATES PVVH EXHAUST C6H6 CDNC HHH -=r

AI-340-B ___ -fAILS HIGH

::r= UAI3'108Z

6 3.4E-51H l.OH

--INTERLOCK LOOP U

BYPASSED

~ T 1.0E-3 1.0 M SHEET 37

Q-ND EVENTS \JHICH

CAUSE C6H6 CDNC C+IJ

CD-PR-32 --,-

SHEET 21

11-02-93 11:14 F:\PR\PR20


CR

EXCESSIVE :BENZENE FLOV fRDM seve

M7BZ [+ll

CAU

SCVC VENT GAS TEMP TOO HIGH T7 [ +ll

INTERLOCK 5 INACTIVE

eD-PR-36 ---,--

SHEET 2.2

AND

INTERLOCK LOOP 5 INACTIVE SCVC

TEMP HHH

eo-PR-:37 --r--

SHEET 33

DR



EXCESSIVE NON-CllNllENSmU::S

GET INTD SCVC CAUSE M7BZ [.,.ll

INTERLOCK LOOP 4 INACTIVE SCVC

EXHAUST FLCW HHH

CQ-PR-21 -,.---

SHEET 31

SHEETS 19, 2.0

N6NC [Til TOTAL F"L0\1 RATE INPUT

TO seve

SHEET 15

INSUmCIENT DILUTION AIR

M2 [-!]

Cil-PR-:35 -r-

SHEET 25

SHEET 21

10-26-93 10:39 F:\PR\PR21

PR DEFLAGRA TION PR HIGH

9356

PRESS (+101 CAUSES TCV 9356 TO FAlL

FULLY CLOSED

PRES SUR£ REGULATOR

FMLURE <HI-HD

NVI--zz __...,.-

L6E-6/H !.OH

I

FLOW

I

C02

OR

+ 9356

CH2DT+10 ---,-

LOE-5/H

REQUIRED

I I

l.OH

I 9356

UVL9356C -,.--

22E-6/H l.OH

TU [+l.J CHILLED \lATER

TEMPERATURE HIGH



9356 VALVE STUCK

UVL9356F -,.--

SCVC TEMP CONTROL LDDP R PASSES DISTURBAN

R£SULTS IN T7 [ +ll

PR-22-01

DR

LARGE <UNCONTRDLLAl!LD

DISTURBANCES

PR-22-63

OR

9356 TIC

SETPDINT HIGH

TI-'9356 FAlLS LDW

9356 TC

STUCK

UCN9356F ---r-

DR

9356 TEMP SENSOR

IN .. CnvE

~

6.&-5/H l.OH"' e.JE-4/H 1.0~ 3.3E-5/H LOH"

** COMMON CAUSE IN IT! A TING EVENT

CO-PR-36

SHEET 21

CHILLED 'w'A"TER FLD'w' Ul';/ M18 [-!OJ

INSTRUMENT AIR SS HIGH [+1J CAUSE

TCV 9356 TO FAlL PARTIALLY CLOSED

PR£SSURE REGULATOR

F" AlLURE <HIGH>

NVI--Z __...,.-

1.6E-SIH l.OH

9356 CONTROLLER FAlLS HIGH

9356 TC

STUCK

UCN9356F --.---

etE-4/H l.OH~

SHEET

MODERATE

DISIURBANCES ENTER INACTIVE LOOP

PR-22-04

DR

DR

93!56 TEMP SENSOR

STUCK

UST9356F ----,---

3.3E-5/H LOH2

22

01-12-93 15:11 F:\PR\PR22


9364 TEMP SENSOR

REVERSED

CST9364U -r--

l.OE--6/H l.DH

LOOP IS

REVERSED

DR

936.4 TlC

RE:VERSED

CCN~364U -..---

l.OE--6/H 1.0H

9364 TIC

FAlLS HIGH

CCN936+Z -r--

C.!E-5/H



----- ---- --- -

!.OH

Til [+ll CHILLED \lATER

TEMPERATURE HIGH CO-PR-39

SHEET 22

JV~P11~ 'wf"''-»~ IU 1~+1] I

HEATER 936.4 S"oi!TCH TIC

FAILS CLOSED SETPCINT HIGH

CS'oi9364C CSP9364U

3.0E-S/H I.OH l.[E-5/H LOH

9364 TEMP SENSIJR

FAILS LD\J

CST9364'f

3.3E--6/H l.OH

'9364 TIC

STUCK

2J.E-4/H l.OHMI"

SHEET 23

LDDP IS

INACTIVE

PR-23-05 -..---OR

9364 TEMP SENSOR

STUCK

CST9364F" ---r-

3.3E-S/H l.OHJI(

CHILLED \1 ATER TEMPERATURE HIGH

C+U

CH2D-T+l --,--

l.Q/D

POWER SWITCH STUCK

CSVPOVRF" ----.----

3.0E-5/H

l.OH

l.OH»t

01-12-93 15:13 F:\PR\PR23

PR DEFLAGRATION

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

SHEET 24

01-12-9.3 15:14 F:\PR\PR24


BASE LOAD CDNORIJL LOOP

REVERSED

I R

2034 FC-5960 see.o VALVE REVERSED FLO\/ SENSOR

REVERSED REVERSED

TVL2034U TSF5B60U

l.OE--6/H l.OH l.OE--6/H l.OH LOE--6/H


-l.OH

INSUFTICIENT DILUTlDN

AIR

BASE LOAD AIR FLll\1 CONTROL LDDP

CAUSES 112 1 -U

DR

2084 FC VALVE

F AU.S CLOSED

TVL2034-C

2.2E-6/H LOH

M2 HJ CO-PR-35

SHEET 21

INiERLOCK LOOP 2 IS INACTIVE

VH EXHAUST F"LD\1

5Bb0 nc

FAILS HIGH

TCN5860Z

2.1E-5/H LOH

** DENOTES COMMON CAUSE INITIATING EVENT

LARGE <UNCONORIJL.LABLD

DISTURllANCES

5960 FIC

SETPD!NT L0\1

TSP!S960U

LOE-5/H LOH

n-5Be.o FAlLS HIGH

TSF5B60Z

7.BE--6/H

SHEET 25

** lOH

DD'w'NSTREAM PVVH PRESSURE INCREASES

CAUSES P4 1+101

CD-PR-23

SHEET 26

01-12-93 15:16 F:\PR\PR25


PW BLD\IER fADLS TO RUN <ALL CAUSES)

CR

BOTH BLDVERS FAIL TO

FUNCT!DN

AND

STANDBY BLD\IER FADLS TO START

<ALL CAUSES>

!lR

PVV BLDVER FAILS TO

RUN

BALL VALVE 5962 JNADVERTENTL Y

CLDSES

BALL VALVE 5964 FAILS TO OPEN

TBL-D20V -r--

7.6E-5/H LOH

TVK5862C ----r-

2.2E-61H I.OH



TYK5864D --.---

3.0E-3 LO•

DCI.INSTREAM

PWH PR£SSURE lNCREI\SES

CAUSES P4 C+!OJ

HEADER PRESSURE CCNTRCL LCCP

CAUSES P4 [+!OJ

STANDBY PW BLINER FAILS

TO START

TBL-o30A -,--

CR

3.0E-3 l.O•

CD-PR-23

SHEETS 12.25

PD 5861 SENSOR

REVERSED

!.OE--6/H l.OH

HEADER PRESSURE

CONTROL DEVICES REVERSED

DR

PDIC 5861 REVERSED

TCN5S61U ---.---

LOE-6/H LOH

SHEET 26

SIC REVERSED

!.OE-6/H LOH

01-12-93 15:18 F:\PR\PR26

PR DEFLAGRA Tl ON PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED

l.OE-3

FI-U07 INACTIVE

a37F I

7.8E-:S/H

1.0 "

1.0Hl<

FAILURE TO SHUTDDVN PR

FEED PUMP

7.8E-6/H l.OH

CR

FC-1107 REVERSED

QCNU07U

l.OE--6/H



\J 3.0E-:S

** '-.-/ l.OH 3.0E--61H


SHEET 15 AND

LO "

3.0tu<

BLOCK VALVE 1100 FAILS TD

CLOSE

PVKUOOK ---r--

3.0E-3 l.G~

FAIWRE TO CLOSE PPT MDV-1100 <ALL CAUSES>

OR

FT-1107 INACTIVE/FAILS LOW/REVERSED

CD-PR-41 ---r--

THIS SHEET

SHEET 27

INTERLOCK LCCP 1

BYPASSED

m-1u ---.---

l.OE-3 1.0"

01-12-93 15:21 r:\PR\PR27


INTERLOCK LOOP 1

BYPA=

7IT--IU ----y-

LOE-3 1.0•

FAILURE TD SHUTDO'w'N PR

F"EED PUMP

7S\11173D -.---

3.0E-5



1.0 ..

RELAY HR+ CONTACTS FAIL

TO TRANSFER

3.0E-6/H 3.011><

BLOCK VALVE 1100 FAILS TD

CLOSE

PVKIIOOK --.-

3.0E-3 LO "

FAILURE TO CLOSE PPT MCV-UOO <ALL CAUSES>

7RY-HR4D -r--

3.0E-6/H 3.0MM:

INTERLOCK LOOP 1

BYPASSED

LOE-3

SHEET 28

1.0.

10-26-93 10:44 F:\PR\PR28


INTERLOCK LDOP 2

!lYPASSED

7!T-2U --,--

l.OE-3

FT-:5860 INACTIVE

TSF5660F ---.-

7.8E -5/H l.OHl<

1.0"

FT-5860 FAILS HIGH

TSF5860Z ---.-

7.8E-6/H

FAILURE TD SHUTDOWN PR

FEED PUMP

DR

FT-5860 INACTIVE/FAILS HIGH/REVERSED

** l.OH

PR-a-ll6 ---.--DR

CD-PR-42

THIS SHEET

FT-S860 REVERSED

TSF5860U ----r-

1.0E-6/H ** l.OH



HIS-1173 FAILS TD

DPEN ::::c

7SWI173D

0 3.0E-5

~ RELAY HR3 FAILS TD

CLOSE

=:c 7RYHR3-K

0 3.0E-6/H


Cll-PR-40

SHEET 25 AND

l.Ol< 3.0E-3 LO "

3.0MJ<

FAILURE TD CLOSE PPT MOV-1100 <ALL CAUSES)

DR

FT-5960 INACTIVE/FAILS HIGH/REVERSED

THIS SHEET

SHEET 29

INTERLOCK LDDP e

BYPASSED

m-w --,--

l.OE-3 1.0 "

01-12-93 15:27 F:\PR\PR29


INTERLOCK LDDP 2

BYPASSED

7IT--2U ---.-

I.OE-3 1.0 •

7S1Jl!73D ---.-

3.0E-5



1.0 ..

RELAY HR3 CONTACTS F"AILS

TO TRANSFER

7RY-HR3D --.--

3.llE--G/H 3.011•

CO-PR-22

SHEET 12

BLOCK VALVE 1100 F"AILS TO

QDSE

PVK!!OOK ----.---

3.0E-3 LO "

7RY-HR:lD ----r-

3.0E--GIH 3.0M>«

SHEET 30

lNTERLDCK LDDP 2

BYPASSED

7IT--2U ---,---

LOE-3 1.0.

1o-26-93 10:50 F:\PR\PR30


lNTERUJCK HIS-1173 FT-9277 LDDP 4 FAILS TO INACTIVE

BYPASSED OPEN

7IT--4U 7S\ffi73D USF9277F

f 10£-3 10• 3.0E-5 10. 7.9E-5/H



RELAY HR9 CONTACTS FAIL

TO TRANSFER

7RY-HR9D

LOH• 3.0£--6/H ::J.OM•

SHEETS 11 ,21

BLOCK VALVE 1100 FT-9277 FAILS TO INACTIVE

CLOSE

PVKl!OOK USF9277F

3.0E-3 1.0 " 7.9E-5/H I.OH><

SHEET 31

RELAY HR'9 CONTACTS FAIL l1J TRANSFER

7RV-HR9D

3.0E-6/H 3.0M><

INTERLOCK LDDP 4

:BYPASSEII

m-4U

10E-3 LO •

10-26-93 10:54 F:\PR\PR31


INTERLOCK LDOP 4

BYPASSED

m--4U ---.--

LOE-3 1.0 •

7S\J1173D ---.--

3.0E-5



1.0 )I

FI-:;,;, 1 !.Jt..1'4C.rtM u;y nnn ynJNI I

RELAY HR9 CDNT ACTS FAIL

TO TRANSFER

7RY--HR9D ----.--

3.0E --6/H 3.0M•

BLOCK VALVE 1100 FAILS m

CLOSE

PYK!IOOK -,-

:l.OE-3 LO ><

7RY-HR9D ---,---

3.0E-6/H 3.0M><

INTERLOCK LOOP 4 BYPASSED

7TT--4U --,---

LOE-3

SHEET 32

LO•

1o-26-93 10:57 F:\PR\PR32


FAD..URE TO SHUTDO'w'N PR

rEED PUMP

DR

Tl-9356 INACTIVE/FAILS

LO.,

DR \.._}

LOE-3 1.0"

T!-9356 TI-935G INACTIVE FAILS

LD'W

UST~356F UST'9356Y

** 3.3E--5/H l.OH~ 3.3E-6/H LOH



HIS-U73 FAILS TO

OPEN

Cll-PR-43 7S'w'l!73D

THIS SHEET

\_ 3.0E-5

3.0E--6/H 3.0M~


SHEET 21 AND

BLOCK VALVE 1100 FAILS TO

CLOSE

PVKUOOK

LO >< 3.0E-3 1.0 ~

I"AiiiiRE TO CLOSE PPT MOV-1100

<ALL CAUSES>

THIS SHEET

SHEET 33

INTERLOCK LOOP 5

BYPASSED

7IT-SU ----r--

l.OE-3 1.0 "

01-12-93 15:40 F:\PR\PR33


INTERLOCK LDDP 5

B'fl'ASSED

m--su ----,--

LOE-3 1.0 •

7S\11!73D --,-----

3.0E-5



1.0 ..

RELAY HF<6 CDNTACn F'AIL

TD TRANSFER

7RY-HR6D --...--

3.0E--6/H 3.0M•

BLDCK VALVE 1100 FAILS TD

CLOSE

PVK!!OOK ----,--

3.0E-3 LO "

7RY-HR6D --...--

3.0E-6/H 3.0M><

SHEET 34

INTERLOCK LOOPS

B'fl'ASSED

7IT--5U --,---

I.OE-3 LD•

10-26-93 11:01 F:\PR\PR34


FAILURE TD SHUTDOVN PR

FEED PUMP

OR

INTERLOCK LDIJP 11

BYPASSED

m--uu

DR \....._/

LDE-3 1.0 ..

AI-3407 \IRDNG INACTIVE CALIBRATION

GAS

UAI3407f UAIPVVHU

3.4E-5/H 1.0~ LDE-4 1.0 "



SHEETS 19, 20 AND

\.... 3.0E-5 LDl< 3.0E-3 1.0 ~

3.0E-6/H 3.0M~

FAILURE TD CLOSE PPT MDV-1100 <ALL CAUSES:>

DR

THIS SHEET

SHEET 35

INTERLOCK LDOP 11

BYPASSED

m--uu ~

l.OE-3 1.0 "

1G-26-93 12:14 F:\PR\PR35


INTERLOCK LOOP 11

B'IPASSED

7!T-11U ----,---

LOE-3 1.0.

7S\Jl173D -.,.--

3.0E-5



1.0 Ml

RELAY CR3A CONTACTS FAIL

TO TRANSFER

7RYCR3AD --y-

3.0E-6/H 3.0M=

CIJ-PR-30

SHEET 19

BLOCK VALVE 1100 FAILS TO

CLOSE

PVK!!OOK ---.---

:J.OE-3 LO "

7RYCR3AD -.-

3.0E-6/H 3.0M"

INTERLDCK LOOP 11

B'fi'ASSED

7!T-!1U ----,---

I.OE-3

SHEET 36

1.0.

1o-2S-93 11:09 F:\PR\PR36


A!-3408 INACTIVE/ FAILS LDIV

DR

!.OE-3 1.0 .. 3.0E-5 LO•

'WRONG CALIBRATION

GI\S

UA!PVVHU

3.4E-5/H LOHS! LOE-4 1.0 •

SHEETS 19, 20

BLOCK VALVE 1100 FAILS TD CLOSE

cc-PR-o6

1HIS SHEET

\J 3.0E-3 LO•

RELAY CR6A CONTACTS fAIL

TD CLOSE

7RYCR6AK

3.0E-6/H 3.0M•

"----"

1HIS SHEET

SHEET 37

INTERLOCK

LOOP U BYPASSED

7!T-11U

!.OE-3 1.0•

11-02-93 11:17 F:\PR\PR37


INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

SHEET 38

10-18-93 13:36 F:\PR\PR38


lNTERLDCK LOOP 14

BYPASSED

LOE-3 LD•

FAILURE TO SHUTD!l\JN

PR FEED PUMP

DR

H!S-1173 FAILS TO

OPEN

S,OE-5 1.0 ..

RELII Y PSHHX1041 CONTACTS FAIL TO TRANSFER

s.OE-6/H 3.011><



BLOCK VALVE 1100 FAD...S TO CLOSE

3.oE-3 :1.0•

<AlLURE TO CLOSE PPT MOV-1100 <ALL CAUSES>

DR

RELAY PSHHX1041 CONTACTS <AIL

TO TRANSITR

7RY1041D -----.-

AND

3.0E-6/H 3.011•

SHEETS 9.10

INTERLOCK LOOP 14

BYPASSED

7IT-14U ---,--

PT-1041 FAILS HIGH

PSP1041Z ---.----

PT-1041 GENERATES HH SlGNAL

CR

3.0E -5/H lOH

1,0E-3 LO •

SHEET 39

PR REACTOR PRESSURE IS HlGH

MDY-1041 SPURIOUSLY

CLOSES

PVK1041C ---,--

1.0E-7/H 1,0H

10-26-93 11:32 F:\PR\PR39


CHECK VALVE C12C

rAILS CLOSED

NVXC12CC ----.--

S.OE-7/H LOH

MANUAL VALVE CLDSE:D

ANY1Dr7

NVG1DF7X ----.--

3.2E-5/H LOH

PRESSURE RELIEf VALVE STUCK OPEN

ANYI01'"6

NVY1DF60 ----.--

l.SE-8/H l.OH

VAPORIZER FAILS TO

PROVIDE HEAT

NVPC02-f ----.--

6.9£-6/H I.OH

(1) SHORTS AND OPEN CIRCUITS NOT MODELLED


** CONDI'TlONAL PROBABIU1Y OF 'THE SECOND DIESEL GENERATOR (DG)

FAILS TO START GIVEN THAT FIRST DG FAILS TO START

LOSS 01'" Dri'"SITE PD"'IER

LOSP--

.33Y LOH

3.DE-3/H

DR

PRESSURE REGUU\ TING VALVE 7601X rAILS CLOSED

NO ELECTRIC PINER TO VAPORIZER

INSUFFICIENT POVER INPUT

TO BUS ll!O

NVI7601C ----r--

L6E-5/H l.OH

SOLENOID VALVE 7600

rAILS CLDSED

NVS7600C ----.--

L2E-5/H

POVER F'RDM DI=t. DG 200 BUS B9 rAILS TD :START

UNAVAILABLE OR RUN

DR **

3.0E-2 l.ll"

LO " OlS 1,0 •

LOH

SHEET

fLOW CONTROL VALVE 7600

rAILS CLOSED

NCV7600C ----.---

2.2E-6/H LOH

40

01-12-93 16:02 F:\PR\PR40


MANUAL VALVE CLOSED

ANY 1 OF" 3

ZVG1DF3X --.--

L4E-!5/H LOH

PR-41-ol --,--

DR

PR£SSURE REGULATING VALVE fAILS CLOSED

ANY 1 OF" 2

~

3.2E-!5/H LOH

CQ-PR-51

SHEET 3

IVYI239D ---,-

2-0E-9/H LOH

SHEET 41

01-12-93 16:03 F: \PR\PR41

PVVH DEFLAGRA TION lt.t< l..t"V v HJ JJ:='KlNU 1"'"1": ,. 11..C:DING

PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED

(PYVS LEL ANALYZERS REMOVED FROM SERVICE) 1

1 1

SHEET 11


~--··- '" .. " --~ ·~ I ~ ~Gc~ I I I:~; FEEDING 21 +4 HR:S PRESENT

AND

INSUFTICIE:NT DILUTION AIR

M2 [-IJ

CD--PV-01 ----,--

SHEET 5

CD-PV-()2 ---,-

SHEET 2

PRFEED---r-

.045 1.0~

EXCESSIVE BENZENE FLDV FRDM seve

M?BZ [+ll

TI-'9356 INTERLOCK LDDI'<S) S

INACTIVE

CD-PV-12 -,--

SHEET 10

DR

llE-5/H

EXCESSIVE N[JN--CDNDENS!BLES

GET INTO seve CAUSE M7:BZ [+IJ

:sf

FJ-9277 INTERLOCK LDDPC:S) 4

INACTIVE

MI>NC [+IJ TOTAL FLDVRATE INPUT TO SCVC

CD-N-10 ----,--

SHEET 9

CD-PY-04 ---,-

SHEET 4

DR

PVVH :BLDYIER MECHANICAL IGNITION

SOURCE

TBLj-1

IJE-5/H LOH

SHEET 1

1Q-16-93 10:34 F: \PVVH\PVVH1

PVVH DEFLAGRA TION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED

LOE-6/H

PRESS HI HI C +101 CAUSES TCV '93:56 TO rAIL FULLY CLDSEll

PRESSURE REGULATOR

FAILUR£ <HI-HI)

NVI--ZZ --..---

1.6E-6/H l.OH

SCVC TEMP

I CONTROL LOOP REVERSED

-OR

CH2CTHO ----.---

I.OE-5/H


++ COMMON CAUSE INJllATlNG EVENT

=-.,---

!.OH

TU t+ll CHDLLED VATER

TEMPERATURE HIGM

6.CE-5/H I.OHJ<

:SCVC~P CONTROL LC~ PASSES ll!STURB

............. ~ TU.,....,. r .• ,

DR

LARGE

I <UNCCNTROLLA1El

seve TEMP CCNTRDL LDDP

INACTIVE

9356 TC

STUCK

C!JE-4/H

DISTURBANCES

OR

9356 TIC

SETPillNT HIGM

I.OHJ<

9356 TEMP SENSOR

STUCK

3.3E-:S/H I.OH!<

SHEET 1

TI-9:356 rAILS LOV

CHILLED VATER fUlV LCV MIS [-!OJ

INSTRUMENT AIR HlGH PRESSURE t+ll CAUSES

TCV 9356 TO PARTIALLY CLOSE

PRESSURE REGULATOR

FAILURE <HIGH>

NVI--Z

L6E-5/H I.OH

9356 TC

STUCK

UCN9356F --,.-

2.1E-4/H

SHEET

MODERATE

DISTURBANCES ENTER INACTIVE LDOP

9356 CONTROLLER FAILS HIGH

DR

UPSTREAM DEVICES ARE

INACTIVE

I.OH~

DR

9356 TEMP SENSllR

STUCK

UST'9356F --,---

3.3E-5/H L.DH~

2

01-12-93 10:57 F: \PVVH\PVVH2

PVVH DEFLAGRATION PR HIGH FLOW C02 REQUIRED

936<4 TEMP SENSIJR

REVERSED

CSTI'364U ---,--

LOOP IS

REVERSED

CCNn64U

9364 TIC

FAlLS HIGH

CCN9364Z

!.OE-6/H l.OH !.OE-6/H !.OH C.!E-5/H


!.OH

T11 [+!J CHILLED \lATER TEMPERATURE

HIGH CO-PV--()5

SHEET 2

HILLED VATER CDNTRD llDP CAUSES OR PASSE

DIStuR!IANCES CAUSES Tn lr+!l

OR

HEATER 9364 S'w'ITCH TIC

FAILS CLOSED SETPOINT HIGH

CS\19364C CSP9364U

3.0E-5/H LOH l.OE-5/H !.DH

9364 TIC

STUCK

CCN9364F

Z..tE-4/H LOHIII

9364 TEMP SENSIJR

FAILS LOV

CST9364Y

3.3E-6/H LOH

9364 TEMP SENSOR

STUCK

CST9364F

3.3E-5/H l.OH><

SHEET 3

LOOP IS

PV-03-05 ----.-OR

POWER S\JITCH STUCK

CS\IPOVRF -----r--

3.0E-5/H l.OHlK

CH20-T+! ----,---

1.010 !.OH

01-09-9:> 15:19 F: \PVVH\PVVH3


PR C02 CONTROL LOOP

REVERSED

I R

FT-U07 >C-1107 REVERSED REVERSED

**

LOE--6/H l.OH lOE--6/H l.OH


>CV-ll07 REVERSED

QVLI!07U -.--

LOE-6/H


PV-04-05 ---,-

lOH

INSTRUMENT CD2 PRESS HIGH [+1J

CAUSES FCV-1107 TO PARTIALLY CLOSE

PRESSURE REGULATOR

FAILURE <HIGH>

NV!--z ---,-

L6E-!5/H lOH

AND

FT-1107 FAILS LDV

l!07 SENSOR STUCK

QSF1107F --,-

7.8E-5/H !.OHJ<

SHEET 1

FC-1107 FAILS LOV

1107 FIC

STUCK

OR

QCN!l07F --.--

2.!E-4/H LOH~

DR

FCV-U07 FAILS OPE:N

QVL11070 -,.....-

6.2E-6/H

1107 VALVE STUCK

QVL1107F -,.....-

6.2E-5/H

LOH

l.OH~

SHEET 4

OPERATOR SETS FIC-1107

SETPDINT HIGH

QSP1107U --.-

+.!5E-4/H lOH

INSTRUMENT C02 PRESS HI HI

CAUSES FCV -1107

TO FULLY CLOSE

PRESSURE REGULATOR I'" AlLURE

HL HI

NVl--zz ---,-

1.6E-6/H LOH

01-10-93 11:33 F: \PWH\PWH4


2034 VALVE

REVERSED

BASE LCAD CDNTRDL LCDP

REVERSED

5960 FL!]\,/ SENSOR

REVERSED

TYL21l34U -.-- TS!l860U I #

l.OE--6/H l.OH !.OE--6/H l.OH lOE--6/H l.OH


** COMMON CAUSE INITlATING EVENT

INSUFFICIENT DILUT][IN

AIR M2 [-lJ

BASE LOAD AIR FL0\1 CDNTRDL LOOP

CAUSES H2 [ -lJ

DR

2034-FC VALVE

fAILS CLOSED

TYL2034C -..---

2.2E-G/H lOH

CD-PY-01

SHEET 1

5960 tiC

FAILS HIGH

TCN5BE.OZ ----.---

2.l.E-5/H l.OH

LARGE <UNCDNTRDLLABLD

]!STURllANCES

TSP5860U ----.---

lOE-5/H !.OH

SHEET 5

FT-5960 FAILS HIGH

TS!l860Z I ++

7.9£--6/H LDH

D!]\,/NSTREAM PVVH PRESSURE INCREASES

CAUSES P4 [•!OJ

CD-PV-QE. ---,--

SHEET 6

01-10-93 11: 39 F: \PV'VH\PV'VH5


PVV BLD\tER D20 FAIL.S

TD RUN

TBL-02DV ----r-

7.6E-5/H

PW BLD\IER fAIL.S TD RUN <ALL CAUSES)

DR

LOH


MDV 5862 !NADVERTANTL Y

CLOSES

TVM5962C ----r-

LOE-7/H I.OH

MDV 5864 FAIL!

TD OPEN

TVM5964D ----r-

3.0E-3

DIJ\o/NSTREAM PWH PRESSURE

INCREASES CAUSES P4 C+lOJ

STANDBY BLDIJE:R FAIL.S TO START

<ALL CAUSES>

DR

1.0 )I[

STANDBY PVV BLD\IER 030

FAIL.S TD START

TBL-D30A -,--

3.0E-3 LO "

CD..PV-()6

SHEET 5

PD5861 SENSOR

REVERSED

TPD5861U ---.--

LOE-6/H !.OH

HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL DEVICES

REVERSED

DR

PDIC 5861 REVERSED

TCN~861U -r--

!.OE-6/H lOH

SHEET

SIC REVERSED

TCN-SICU -r--

!.OE-6/H lOH

6

01-10-93 11:44 F: \PWH\PWH6


PR C02 :BV-1109 fAILS TO

CLOSE

QVKU09K ---,-

3.0E-3

FIC-1107 INACTIVE

G!SF1107f ----.--

7.8E-5/H 1.01il'

1.0"'

FT-1L07 fAILS

LOW

QSFl107Y ----.--

7.8E--6/H


fAILURE TO CLOSE PR C02 BV-1109

<ALL CAUSES>

DR

FT-1107 INACTIVE/f" All.S LOW REVERSED

PV-Q7-Q6 --.-----DR

••

l.OH

** COMMON CAUSE INITIAllNG EVENT

CD-PV-15

lHIS SHEET

FC-1107 REVERSED

QCNU07U ----.--

l.OE--6/H

**

LOH

AND

INTERLOCK LOOP 1

:BYPASSED

~ m-w

0 1.0E-3 LOl<

:::=J.._ RELAY HR4 FAILS TO

CLOSE

=r:::::: 7RYHR4-K

0 3.0E--6/H 3.0111<

CD-PV--ll7

SHEET 4-

6.2E-5/H LOH><

f AlLURE TO CLOSE PR C02 fCV-U07

<ALL CAUSES)

DR

FT-1107 INACTIVE/FAILS LDV /REVERSED

CO-PV-15 -,......-

THIS SHEET

SHEET 7

INTERL!JCK LOIJP 1

BYPASSED

7IT-1U ---.--

LOE-3 LO ><

01-12-93 11:04 F: \PVVH\PVVH7


PR C02 BV-U09 FI-S660 FAILS TD INACTIVE/F AU.S

CLOSE HIGH/REVERSED

QVK1109K

DR

3.0E-3 1.0 ..

Fl-5960 rAILS HIGH

TSf5860Z

** 7.8£-5/H l.Otil< 7.8E-6/H l.OH


** COMMON CAUSE INillAllNG EVENT

INTERLOCK LOOP 2

:BYPASSED CD...PV-17

1HIS SHEET

\.J !.OE-3 10 •

FT--5860 REVERSED

TIF5860U

•• l.OE-6/H 1.0H 3.0E-G/H 3.0M>!

\.J "---"

6.2E-5/H LOH• THIS SHEET

SHEET

INTERLOCK LOOP 2

BYPAS<:ED

7IT-2U

I.OE-3 1.0 •

8

01-12-93 11:07 F: \PVVH \PV\IH 8


lNTERLOCK LOOP 4

BYPASSED

F AlLURE TO CLOSE PR CDZ BV-UO~

<ALL CAUSES>

PR CDe DV-110!7 FAILS TO

CLOSE

QVI(jj09K --,--

FI~en INACTIVE

USI'9277F -,--

LOE-3 1.0• S.OE-3 l.D • 7.8E-5/H


l.OH•

REU\Y HR!> FAILS TO

CLOSE

7RYHR9-K -,--

3.0E-6/H 3.0M><

PR C02 FCV-1107 F"AILS TO

CLOSE

QVL11D7K ---,--

6.2E-05/H LOH•

FI-~77

INACTIVE

USF92nF -,--

7.SE-5/H

F"AILURE TO CLOSE PR CDZ FCV-1107

<ALL CAUSES>

DR

l.OH>«

INTERLOCK LOOP 4

BYPASSED

7IT--4U ---,----

l.OE-3

SHEET 9

LO •

RELAY HR!> FAILS TO

CLOSE

7RYHR9-K -,--

3.0E-6/H 3.0MlK

01-13-93 09:16 F: \PWH\PWH9


INTERLOCK

LOOP 5 BYPASSED

71T-5U ---,--

l.OE-3 1.0 J(

RELAY' HR6 FAILS TD

Cl..IJSE

7RYHR6-K ---.----

3.0£-6/H 3.0M>!


FAILURE TD Cl..IJSE PR C0C DV-11~

<ALL CAUSES>

PV-IO-Q6 --,.-

DR

n-9356 INACTIVE

UST'J356F -----.---

3.3E-5/H WH~


THIS SHEET

TI-9356 FAILS LD'ol

UST9356Y ----.---

3.3E-6/H

PR C02 BV -1109 FAILS TD

Cl..IJSE

QVKII~K ---,-

3.0E-3

** l.OH

1.0 ..

PR C02 tCV-1107 FAILS TD

CLOSE

QVL1107K --,-----

6.2E-5/H l.OH><

FAILURE TO CLOSE PR COC FCV-1107

<ALL CAUSES:>

CD-PV-19 ---,--

THIS SHEET

SHEET 1 0

INTERLOCK LOOP 5

BYPASSED

71T-5U -----.---

l.OE-3 1.0 Ml

01-12-93 11:15 F: \PV\IH \PVVH1 0


INTERLOCK LOOP U

BYPI\SSED

m-nu -.--

f AlLURE TD CLOSE PR CC2 BV-1109

<ALL CAUSES>

QVK1109K -r--

BENZENE ANALVZERS ~07A~~08 L-----/

INACTIVE

AND

PV-II-Q4 -r-- THIS SHEET

AND

LOE-3 LO• 3.0E-3 10 •

BENZENE ANAL VZER A!-3407

lNACTIVE

3.4E-5/H LOH•



*** UNANNOUNCED FAILURE

ANALVZER AI-3407 INACTIVE

<ALL CAUSES>

UAI34-07U ----..---

LOE-4 :1.0 •

RELAY CR3A FAILS

TO CLOSE

7RYCR3AK -,.-

3JlE-6/H 3.0M•

BENZENE ANALyzER Al-3409

INACTIVE

UAI~OB~ -,.---

G.BE-4/H I.OH><

SHEET 1

PR C02 FCV-1107 fAILS TD

CLOSE

QVL1107K -,.---

6.2E-5/H !.OM><

ANALYZER AI-~08 INACTIVE

<ALL CAUSE:S>

7RVCR6AK -,.-

3.0E-6/H 3JlM><

fAILURE TO CLOSE PR C02 FCV-1107

<ALL CAUSES>

OR

BENZENE ANAL VZERS ~07 AND 3408

INACTIVE

CO-PV-20 -r-

THIS SHEET

RONG CAUBRA TlON GA USED FOR ANALYZERS

~07 A~ ~08

UAI34-07U -,.---

I.OE-4 10 •

SHEET 11

INTERLOCK LOOP 11

BYPASSED

m--uu --.-

LOE-3 1.0 "

10-18-93 11:14 F: \PVvH\PV\IH11

liST OF TABLES

TABLE 1

TABLE 2

TABLE 3

TOP EVENTS DESCRIBING FIRE/EXPLOSION

TOP EVENTS DESCRIBING EXPLOSIVE CONCENTRATION/FLAMMABLE MIXTURE

HAZARD SEVERITY

TABlE 1

TOP EVENTS DESCRIBING FIRE/EXPlOSION -- -···- ---

OlD 8 DIGIT lEVEl 3 ANNUAl NEW

TOP EVENT DESCRIPTION NAME FOR HAZARD SHEET FREQUENCY ANNUAl ClASSIFI- NO. * YR-1 FREQUENCY TOP EVENT CATION? lATE WASH YR-1

FTA

I INSIDE PROCESS VESSEl INCLUDING PVVH I I FIRE/EXPLOSION WITHIN PRFT (ALL PERIODS) TOP-PRFT YES FE-2 4.3 X 10-7 SAME

FIRE/EXPLOSION WITHIN PR (HI FLOW CO? REQUIRED) TOP-PR-- YES PR-1 1.4 X 10-5 2.6 X 10-6

FIRE[EXPLOSION WITHIN PR 1NON-FEEDING PERIOD) TOP-PR-- YES FE-4 8.5 X 10-7 SAME

I FIRE/EXPLOSION WITHIN OE (ALL PERIODS) TOP-OE-- YES FE-8 8.9 X 10-7 SAME

FIRE/EXPLOSION WITHIN OECT (ALL PERIODS) TOP-OECT YES FE-10 3.4 X 10-7 SAME

FIRE/EXPLOSION WITHIN PVVH (HI FLOW C07 REQUIRED) TOP-PVVH YES PV-1 3.7 X 10-9 2.8 X 10-8

FIRE/EXPLOSION WITHIN PVVH (NORMAL PERIOD) TOP-PVVH YES FE-12 2.3 X 10-8 2.4 X 10-8

I OUTSIDE PROCESS VESSEL (IN SPC) I I LARGE FIRE (WHEN OE IS FULL) TOPLFIRE YES FE-23 5.5 X 10-7 SAME

SMALL FIRE NOT EXTINGUISHED (DURING ORGANIC TRANSFERS) TOPS FIRE NO FE-25 1.1 X 10-4 SAME

EXPLOSION CAUSING REVERSE FLOW OUT OF SPC (ALL TOP LARGE YES FE-30 2.7 X 10-S SAME PERIODS)

I SUM OF LEVEL 3 HAZARD EVENT FREQUENCIES I ls.o x 10-5 13.3 X 10-5 I

E:\WSRC\REPTB93\TABLES\TABLE1 11/29/93 3:03pm

TABlE 2

TOP EVENTS DESCRIBING EXPlOSIVE CONCENTRATION/FlAMMABlE MIXTURE

FTAP INSTRUCTIONS SHEET OlD NEW NO.* ANNUAl ANNUAl

TOP EVENT DESCRIPTION FREQUENCY FREQUENCY PROCESS -- TRUE -- YR-1 YR-1 8 DIGIT 8 DIGIT lATE WASH NAME FOR NAME FOR fTA TOP EVENT IGNITION

SOURCE(S)

EXPLOSIVE CONCENTRATION WITHIN PRFT TOP-PRFT FE-02-02 FE-2 6.4 X 10-5 SAME 1 EXPLOSIVE CONCENTRATION WITHIN PR (HI FLOW C02 REQUIRED} TOP-PR-- PR-01-02 PR-1 2.4 X 10-2 4.3 X 10-3

EXPLOSIVE CONCENTRATION WITHIN PR (NORMAL PERIOD} TOP-PR-- FE-04-05 FE-4 7.4 X 10-5 SAME

EXPLOSIVE CONCENTRATION WITHIN OE TOP-OE-- FE-08-02 FE-8 6.3 X 10-5 SAME

EXPLOSIVE CONCENTRATION WITHIN OECT TOP-OECT FE-10-02 FE-10 1.1 X 10-4 SAME

EXPLOSIVE CONCENTRATION WITHIN PVVH (HI FLOW C02 REQUIRED} TOP-PVVH PV-01-07 PV-2 3.6 X 10-6 5.9 X 10-6

EXPLOSIVE CONCENTRATION WITHIN PVVH (NORMAL PERIOD) TOP-PVVH FE-12-03 FE-12 4.4 X 10-5 4.5 X 10-5

ORGANIC/AQUEOUS SPILL GREATER THAN 300 GALLONS FE-24-03 FE-24 3. 2 X 10-6 SAME SPILLS THAT CAUSE POTENTIAL FOR SMALL FIRE FE-25-03 FE-25 8.0 X 10-2 SAME

FE-27-01 EXPLOSIVE CONCENTRATION OF BENZENE IN SPC TOP LARGE FE-27-02 FE-30 SAME FE-30-09 3.8 X 10-4

FE-32-04

E:\USRC\REPTB93\TABLES\TABLE2 12/13/93 2:33pa

TABLE 3

HAZARD SEVERITY

HAZARD FATALITY/INJURY INVESTMENT DURATION RATING ($ MILLIONS) (DOWN TOWN)

3 Multiple fatalities > 10 > 6 months

2 Single fatality or 1 - 10 1-6 months multiple injuries

1 Serious injury 0.1 - 1 1 week-1 month

0 No injury < 0.1 < 1 week

E:\USRC\REPTB93\TABlES\TABlE3 12/13/93 2:39pm

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1A VITRIFICATION BUILDING LAYOUT (BEFORE HAN MODIFICATIONS)

FIGURE IB VITRIFICATION BUILDING LAYOUT (AFTER HAN MODIFICATIONS)

FIGURE 2 SALT PRECIPITATE PROCESSING FLOW DIAGRAM -INITIAL STUDY

FIGURE 3 PRECIPITATE HYDROLYSIS PROCESS OVERVIEW

FIGURE 4 SIMPLIFIED PRECIPITATE HYDROLYSIS PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM WITH HARDWIRED INTERLOCKS (HAN ADDITION/NITRITE DESTRUCTION)

FIGURE 5 SEQUENCE AND DURATION OF OPERATIONS (HAN ADDITION/NITRITE DESTRUCTION)

FIGURE 6 SALT PROCESS CELL FIRE PROTECTION

FIGURE 7 SIMPLIFIED PRECIPITATE HYDROLYSIS PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM WITH HARDWIRED INTERLOCKS (LATE WASH PROCESS)

FIGURE 8 PRECIPITATE HYDROLYSIS PROCESS TIME CYCLE (LATE WASH PROCESS)

FIGURE 9 SUMMARY FAULT TREE (SHEETS 1 AND 2)

FIGURE 10 PR FAULT TREE (SHEETS 28 AND 28A)

FIGURE 11 DIGRAPH FOR THE PROCESS VESSEL VENT SYSTEM (PWS)

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Figure 3

PRECIPITATE HYDROLYSIS PROCESS OVERVIEW Noncondensibles/Vapors To Process Vessel

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..

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!Ill OECT SAMPLE PUMP RUNNING ~~.:

Ill OECT SAMPLE ANALYSIS

Ill OECT TRANSFER PUMP RUNNING (OECT TO owsr TRANSFER)

T. B. CALLOWAY, D/28/D'A WBRC·DWPF TU:

'

'

FIGURE 8 PRECIPITATE H

I!J TOTAL CYCLE TOm= 46 HJU. u E:;:;:;:;:::;::l Note: Cycle tfme Is 46 hrs aooummlng

u the PRIT Is sampled before each

--+1:::;:;:::;:::::;:;:::;:;:::::;:::::::·:::;:;:::::::;:;:;:;:;:;:] PR batch and after the organlc In the OEC Is transferred to the OWST. Since the

u PRIT will store up to two batches of feed material, PHP Total Cycle tfme may

!:::::::::::::::! decrease after apertence Is gain with -, PRIT sample ~s!s procedure. No cred: u

1!:::::::::·:·:1 was taken for pr ormlng PRIT Operation

u (1), (2), (3) durtng OE cycle.

- t:::;::::::!:::j u

~:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:-:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·

I 27.8 -.. •• ,.,.,::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::.:::::::::::::::::::::::::! ...

f·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:j 10

~ F:···················;·;·;·;·;·3 u

11.8 _... 1::::::·:::·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:::;:;:;:;:::· v

10

TIME, l

:TATE HYDROlYSIS PROCESS TIME CYClE (lATE WASH)

II"S assummlng ore each 'rganlc In the OECI' ST. Since the 3 batches of Cycle tlme may e fs gain wtth ·ocedure. No credit ! PRFT Operations :!e .

• ·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:-:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:::1 ...

-----+-_.m ------1--_.i:!:!:::;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:.:!:!:!:::;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;l ...

__ ..;..... __ ---!-----------+-· 1:,:::::::::;.;.;::::::::::::.::::::::::::::::::::::::::::;::::::::::::::::::.;::::

l:!:!:!:!:i:i:ii u

l:;:;:;:!:!:!:;:;:::u::::::::::::;:;:;:::::::;:;:;:;:::::::l

--------~~------------------------+---------------~~ m:;:·:·>:·l

u

----------~--------------~[m ... ----------~----------------~CJ ... -------1---------------l--..~· ~::.:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:-:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·

12.0 :·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·: s.e

.. :·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·: s.e

----------~-------------------------+-------------------------• .. ~u .. [:!:·:·:·:·:·:!:!:!:!:!:i:!:!:!:i:!:!:!:!:·:·:·:!:!:!:;:::;:!:!:!l

--------~--------------------------~--------------------------+-----------~~ !:·:·:·m:·:l

20

TIME, HRS

30 u

40

FIGURE 9 SUMMARY FAULT TREE - CASE 9

FIRE OR EXPLOSION IN PROCESS

VESSEL VENT SYSTEM (PVVH)

(STANDBY PERIOD) liENZOE ctH;

IN PVYH ABCJ\IE LfJ..

IR

HIGH C02 I'UJV ~DE HEAiU" AND EVA~ATlDN

LOSS 1:1' mUI11ll'l AIR PVVH JU!IIE BENZE

GO£Rjt,TIIJ't.l

INSUmCJENT Fl.ll'O 1:1' DILUTIIJI AIR

lN PVYH

CD-9-Z --r--

SHEET 2

FT-~660 rAILS 1-«~

'-.../ 7.8£-6/H



JNTERLIJCI( 2 INACTIVE PVVH

EXHAUST FLITW LLL

t:E STEM J V/>J.VE FAILS TO a..DSE

... [C-10] [G-5]

22.H 6.2E-~/H 22Jf•

CXYGENMC -.-

1.0 t.o•

IlflERLIJCI( UJOP 11 lNACTIVE <DD, PVYH EXHAUST C6H6 CDNC HHH

DE STEAM VALVE tAILS

Til CLOSE

GVA9301K

6.2E-5/H 22. ...

SHEET 1

wT = 2.3 x 1 o-8/YR

IGNITION SDJRCES PRESENT

DR

PVVH I£A TER IGNITION

SOURCE

THEPVVHI -.-[C-9]

J.LE-6/H 22Jf

INTERLOCK LDDP 12 lNACTIVE (CD PVVH LfJ.. HHH

DE STEAM VALVE tAILS

TD ClllSE

GVA930ll( ---.----

6.2E-5/H 22.10<

PVVH BLDIIER HECHANIC'Il IGNI~ SOURCES

TBL--l ----.--

UE-:5/H

[C-11]

zaH

BENZENE GENERA TIIJN IN DE l:llJRIHG HEATLP

D EVAPDRATIIJN 3/4

DESTEAMD -.-

.tr7

[G-5]

I.Gll

11-29-93 17:17 E: \WSRC\REPT89J\FIGURES\SPCE1

FIGURE 9 (CONT.) SUMMARY FAULT TREE

FIRE OR EXPLOSION IN

VENT SYSTEM (PVVH)

CASE 9

PROCESS VESSEL

(STANDBY PERIOD)

Z03o4 VALVE

REVERS Ell

TVL2Q3.W

LO£-&!H 22.H

[D-7]

INSlFFICIENT f1..D\( IF DIWTIEINAIR 1--------,1

IN PVVH

G9-2-2 --r-

DR

2G:* F'C VALVE

FAILS CLOSED

2..2E-&IH

[D-7]

CD-9-Z

SHEET 1

22.H


** COMMON CAUSE INITIAllNG EVENT

:5960 F1C

PRSTEAMC --,---

.0'9 1.0 ..

F'AILS HIGH

TCN59(,0Z

2.1E-51H 22.H

[D-10]

[E-3]

INTERLOCK U INACTIV!: <PR> PVVH EXHAUST

C6H6 tH1

CD-9-4 ---.--

lHIS SHEET

!5860 F'IC

SETPDINT Lll\(

TSPSebOU

LOE-5/H ::l3.H

[D-10]

~-1

SHEET 1 AND

!Nlt:RLOCK 1Z INACTIVE <PR> PVVH LEL ~H

CD-9-4 --r-

THIS SHEET

FT-!5860 F'A!LS

HIGH

TSF5960Z u

JNTERI..DCI( e INACTIVE PVVH

EXHAUST LLL

OR

PR STEAM VALVE AND PR STEAM BLOCK 1------.1

'ALVE: F"AILS TO a...DS

PR STEAM Fl.ll\1 'l!UlCK VALVE

F' AILS T1l CLOSE

[E-3]

62E -5/H 3.0I!JOI

PO ~861 SENSOR

REVERSED

TPDSSG!U

AND THIS SHEET

PR STEAM VALVE 1027

F'A!LS TO CLOSE

[E-3] 6ZE-51H ee.H=

PDIC :se61 REVERS Ell

TCNSS61U .. 7.eE-&IH 22.H LOE-&IH 22.H LOE-6/H 22.H

[C-10] [C-9] [C-9]

I

SHEET 2

F'T-5960 FAILS HIGH

TSr.5860Z I •• --.---

7.8E-€./H

[C-10]

22.1-1

I SIC REVERSED

,r

6cu,

L0£-6/H 22.H

[B-11]

11-29-93 17:24 E:\WSRC\REPTB93\nGURES\SPCE2


INTERLIJCI( UIJ' l

BYPASSED

71T--'-f0 ~

LOI:-3 2.0• 3.0£~ 1.0 ..

RELAY 1'«1-F"AILS TO

OPEN

7RY-HR4D ---..--

3.0E~H 311M11

IIUJCI( VALVE 1100 F"AILS TD

a.oS£

3.0E:-3 LO•

DIFFERENT

FIGURE 10

vAlllJ:lE:- roa.= PPT lfJV-1100 <ALL CAUSES>

7RY-HR4K ---..--

3.01:-(;JH 3.o ...

lNTERLOCK LID' 1

BYPASSED

7IT---1U ---,..-

L0£-3

SHEET 28

LO•

ORIGINAL FAULT TREE AS APPEARED IN THE LATE WASH FTA NOTE: INACnvE INTERLOCK MEANS

FAILURE TO STOP PR FEED

., DENOTES ENABLING EVENT 12-13-93 12:25 E:\WSRC\REPTB93\AGURES\PR28


INTERLOCK LID' 1

JYPASS£1!

?lf--tu -.-

LIE-3 UIB 3.0£-5 1.0.

~El.AT I'R4 CIJNT ACTS I'" AIL.

TD TRANSI'"ER

7RY4R4D ---.-

3.0[-6/H 3.01411

AND

SHEET 11

DI..DCK VI'L vt 1100 FAILS TD

a.oS£

PV1<1100K -.--

3.111:-3

SAME

LO "

r AlLURE TD O.DSE PI'T ICJV-UOO <ALL CAUSES>

7RY-HR4D ---.-

3.0E-<SIH 3.0100

FIGURE 10 (CONTINUED)

SHEET 28

JNTER!..DCK LID' 1

JYPASSED

7IT---1U -,..--

LOE-3 LD•

REVISED FAULT TREE AS APPEARS IN APPENDIX C OF THIS REPORT

NOTE: INACTNE INTERLOCK NEANS

F"AIWRE TO STOP PR F"EED

• DENOTES ENABLING EVENT 12-13-93 12:30 E: \WSRC\REPT893\FIGURES\PR28A

l--;:;:<. I "" I \...~;;._.../

i't:t I•E·S, MS-.

f(l~~\ IAU9,1 ~L ~-".o \<:':"Ji.,;::: ,,,, • "'

T!):: , .. , \5) . ,. ,. ;~"~ , "" ~-~~-::~.TI-9356 BZ II' x:.:_···~.! Al-4713 ...--... "-. ':,;;:'

~ ~'l.:lL><•t n7 t1 -~. ,,~\ .- ~r "' •

'fS-HHH :@ L--,,,-1 1~:-/1.1 SHHH ~-'"" 1--::--•\,:!.) f -~~ '''"' ~---l ~ I ' ''....J) ..... ---.... .. M7 ~1-..-~i ~ '~:.:/ A::P1" ~-"'

L \ ":\._"::J •',,,I V•n' / .·: ~~\, - ---- :: .: ' CJ 'c. '~--~' ':\ l,,,v.} "-,,, ,,t NC l•g;::B [ J·'•~l ~~-- F _ _.JGJ:il, \ ~;· ..,:_, · ., '---"".... •;r·.r 111\i'' t..i.;, n-:o ..,.~-~ 1..- .,_ ''"/;.\

\ -~ - \ ~~-...!.~~./ ~I. t•j t y l"~ // 7'·1· ' \ '- _;:_ '~ I ~- t-27:" ,,r-••' .--!...{ / ,/ /- I Q

\ \ (I,;.:;. \...r..::. __ ./ -·-~A"t-t•fl-9277 ' 1~: ''• / _/ / G D

/~-:'\, ] t><.tr l

o_ .... ~/

"'' ·- - "'71- I -,-- ' / --,.~--., -.,_~- _.:..;;.•' .~5-HHH ~ / .--!----:· .· /·: Al-3407

'"" ~ . ::');:l<("~" .. :"\ . ··:~: ":V ~ "'!/' I"''" i •' "'-0, J ·~- '~'•'PR 1., •, ' ''" \_ I, l' _., i\ 1 \...:~...-· t.-... -r.~_.J

111 /.1' PRESSURE "''IJ/ir'1..i~:i\"\.. '1.--......_ \l I //

• ll' \....!_ l.. ~ \ \ r.' I ! -, \ --:0 .~. CONTROL. ~., PT-104-i' "' ~';· 1/\1 // I i .. ;:- 01 ~, LOOP .. ~"l ~ .... I'-- .... - / •~--· -- -i c»J • ~·~~,Yc._ '• ' ,,P.SrHHH ""- i ~~ / I ,/ '-~__) " __,.,......---_F. ~II J- ~ ...... ~ [;oo ---;~::~..' ••• , \ ... '-1-~i"' ""' I / )/ I /

.-. II \ , __ _::

1• @::"1·------:-c.,.~J "- 1 / / \ ,/

I ' "->=•I \'-,_ -_, "-- ~ ""' I ' I / \ ~ •• •.l"T \~ ----. ·-::-., "' \ / / -~\

I I '· .. _ • "' ' .. / ' I ' I - ... ..._____ ~-- -- --..___~.......__'L ,. \ / I'- :~v L::~~ -------------?f?BLO ,I( v.A:~VE I ,.'/ -----, <~·.-m:l1 1 ,~~;~... .r _.....-·---"'~!;;' // 1 \ sv- ~9\ 1 _..i

f .... i;:~ ~~~- ll l.CCP / ~ ~--~~~ll:J // ! \ \ •' ~- \ • •' ('-'" I " / _./ I \ \ I -~ \"-"· ! !'" / A ---- \ '--..\ I[ / FLOW _ ':;. / / />;- ;~;';';, 11 ----\:--~-- ~ i

'"""-----.J.. ,// 1 ~- ----=-""·r) CONTROL t.t.~l-Oq--:.,~- ~~l 1 J..$.,0..-;f."__;·./ _________ ,---- '\ ---------_rrL,: -'~" /?1 ]-~)V '0'' 1m ____ .--~

11 -------- 1 \ VALVE

r,--t, 1 ,._, 1 n~.---- --- \ I

·~~· (-;:;;;;.. .. Hi 4~ + _____ ...... / __ .... '!__:~:~~:;!}..----- -~~ t _..

TOP NODE FIRE/EXPLOSION

~~}--;7~~:~--J2~>' ' '

PWH BASELOAD RATE CONTROL

LOOP

:: -~·

f ·" \ "-.:.:'-~-· '\ ' ~/'-_:--=- ~~------ I 'F\.CV-1107

\ , .• ,L,~ •r-'}0 --- :!• "' '/ '--<------:-.;::~ ~-~ /I' ·~~~.;,

: . .- /' ~ o/ I r ' :.~ • • t ' r r • , ... ~ ~ l ,1 c~:c~:v/ ~ .. GTU 'I /;

/ .--· _,.,IJ.' + \ rro .• J. fl'1'"Ch ,/~ --- i ,, 1" 1 • I ~.:,.·j -r;.,-n

(,~~' I'' PR HAN N2 \.,,. --· \ i1 I J,,:: ' ,,.,_:L., CONTROL I'·_'·~· ~ ,,.,_m_,, / /

--,'··'4/-::~':~~):"" ~ / / ----.______ _ __ ______ ./~/ FS-LLL ~ ~·.... t ~akr· ... ~ •l,.bl.;.:• / /

""·"alJnno ,....~ .-.F

... ---x· '-") •:11)•' '.!~~·;·~ ~ ·1~·

,..-;....,~"'I 1'-~--·./

'•Jtll._..~1·----'<.j

!T'T- 'i ~·;'

FT-1107 FS-HHH

----~----:0!l::_~-~==~~~-~=----w/ Fig. 11 -- Digraph for the Process Vessel Vent System

howard_lambert

Typewritten Text

howard_lambert

Typewritten Text

howard_lambert

Typewritten Text

T11

howard_lambert

Typewritten Text

FT-1107 FS-HHH

howard_lambert

Typewritten Text

T11

howard_lambert

Typewritten Text

FLOW

:ONTROL

VALVE

~-1107 '>. .... ,

·,,

'

TOP NODE FIRE/EXPLOSION

PVVH BASElOAD

RATE

CONTROl

lOOP

-...... .,., ,,_ r~:-:rr~---

"_,__"i- 1;:_1 -- ;::::..21 "'.l

·~-~-~-----~-- ·. _____ .-----

- - ' "c·--~-4'f~.i(J_ .. -----·- ~ _l-; ,~r~· . ....__..~

PVVH PRESSURE CONTROl

FT-5860 FS-lll

Fig .. 11 -- Digraph for the Process Vessel Vent System

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REMOVAL OF PVVH LEL ANALYZERS FAULT TREE ANALYSIS

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