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REN-Rede Eléctrica Nacional,S.A.REN-Rede Eléctrica Nacional,S.A.
Can the California and New York Can the California and New York crisis occur in Europe ?crisis occur in Europe ?
Rui PestanaRui Pestana
IST - 25th October 2003IST - 25th October 2003
TopicsTopics
The California MarketThe California Market Portuguese outagesPortuguese outages International outagesInternational outages
– U.S. & CanadaU.S. & Canada– LondonLondon– Sweden & DenmarkSweden & Denmark– ItalyItaly
The California MarketThe California Market
Reserve MarginsReserve Margins– Unexpected increase of unit Unexpected increase of unit
unavailabilityunavailability California ExportsCalifornia Exports
– Buy at any cost & Price CapBuy at any cost & Price Cap
The California MarketThe California Market
The California MarketThe California Market
The California MarketThe California Market
California Exports
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
Mar-99
Mai-99
Jul-99
Set-99
Nov-99
Jan-00
Mar-00
Mai-00
Jul-00
Set-00
Nov-00
The California MarketThe California Market
Buy at any cost & Price CapBuy at any cost & Price Cap– The exports were bought back at The exports were bought back at
higher price, giving big revenues to higher price, giving big revenues to market players.market players.
– The final customer was protected by The final customer was protected by the price cap.the price cap.
– The TSO became bankrupt.The TSO became bankrupt.– The market design was wrong.The market design was wrong.
Portuguese OutagesPortuguese Outages
9-May-2000 : Lisbon & South9-May-2000 : Lisbon & South 6-September-2001 : South6-September-2001 : South 2-August-2003 : South2-August-2003 : South
Portuguese OutagesPortuguese Outages
Energy Not Supplied
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
MW
h
9-May-20009-May-2000
External cause : StorkExternal cause : Stork Internal causeInternal cause
– Inadequacy Maintenance ProcedureInadequacy Maintenance Procedure– Incomplete Commissioning of the bus Incomplete Commissioning of the bus
bar differential protectionbar differential protection– Design philosophy of backup Design philosophy of backup
protectionsprotections
9-May-20009-May-2000
9-May-20009-May-2000
9-May-20009-May-2000
9-May-20009-May-2000
Internal causeInternal cause– Inadequacy Maintenance ProcedureInadequacy Maintenance Procedure
(line fault -> bus bar fault)(line fault -> bus bar fault)
– Incomplete Commissioning of the bus Incomplete Commissioning of the bus bar differential protectionbar differential protection(bus bar fault -> double bus bar fault)(bus bar fault -> double bus bar fault)
– Design philosophy of backup Design philosophy of backup protectionsprotections(double bus bar fault -> Station fault)(double bus bar fault -> Station fault)
6-September-20016-September-2001
Lost two 400kV lines -> Network splitLost two 400kV lines -> Network split External cause : live insulator External cause : live insulator
washingwashing Internal causeInternal cause
– Backup protection with a wrong Backup protection with a wrong orientationorientation
– Lost thermal stability of a coal power Lost thermal stability of a coal power station (1200 MW).station (1200 MW).
2-August-20032-August-2003
Lost two 400kV lines -> Network splitLost two 400kV lines -> Network split External cause : bush FireExternal cause : bush Fire Internal causeInternal cause
– Lost thermal stability of a coal power station Lost thermal stability of a coal power station (1200 MW).(1200 MW).
Restriction in supplying the loadRestriction in supplying the load– The fire prevented to reconnect the linesThe fire prevented to reconnect the lines– The thermal units took 4 hours to The thermal units took 4 hours to
synchronisesynchronise
U.S. & CanadaU.S. & Canada
14 August 200314 August 2003 70.500 MW load lost70.500 MW load lost 50 million people 50 million people
– Ohio, Michigan, New York, New Jersey, Ohio, Michigan, New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts.Connecticut, Massachusetts.
– Ontario, Quebec.Ontario, Quebec.
U.S. & CanadaU.S. & Canada
The Network has to carry big The Network has to carry big quantities of energy to great quantities of energy to great distance.distance.– Any contingency causes voltage drop, Any contingency causes voltage drop,
limiting the capacity to carry power, and limiting the capacity to carry power, and it may evolve to a it may evolve to a Voltage CollapseVoltage Collapse..
The great Lakes didn’t helpThe great Lakes didn’t help– Increased the transport distance.Increased the transport distance.– Amplified the Amplified the power swingpower swing..
U.S. & CanadaU.S. & Canada
Planned Outages (Generation and Planned Outages (Generation and Lines)Lines)– The network was less reliable.The network was less reliable.
Peak LoadPeak Load– Very humidVery humid
Computer problemsComputer problems– FirstEnergy had no alarms.FirstEnergy had no alarms.– MISO had the State Estimator down.MISO had the State Estimator down.
U.S. & CanadaU.S. & Canada
U.S. & CanadaU.S. & Canada
NERCNERC - - NNorth American orth American EElectric lectric RReliability eliability CCouncilouncil
Near-Term Actions to Assure Reliable Near-Term Actions to Assure Reliable OperationsOperations– Voltage and Reactive ManagementVoltage and Reactive Management– Reliability CommunicationsReliability Communications– Failures of System Monitoring and Failures of System Monitoring and
Control FunctionsControl Functions– Emergency Action PlansEmergency Action Plans– Training for EmergenciesTraining for Emergencies– Vegetation ManagementVegetation Management
LondonLondon
28 August 200328 August 2003 724 MW load lost724 MW load lost 410.000 customers410.000 customers
– London UndergroundLondon Underground– Network RailNetwork Rail
LondonLondon
Planned OutagesPlanned Outages
LondonLondon
““Buchholz alarm” at HurstBuchholz alarm” at Hurst
LondonLondon
Wrong Setting in a Backup Wrong Setting in a Backup ProtectionProtection
LondonLondon
N-1 criteria was usedN-1 criteria was used– but with 43.000 protection pieces, but with 43.000 protection pieces,
with 99,99% reliability, there are 4 with 99,99% reliability, there are 4 pieces malfunctioning.pieces malfunctioning.
The topology of the station The topology of the station requires that to remove a requires that to remove a transformer, it was first needed to transformer, it was first needed to remove a line.remove a line.
Sweden & DenmarkSweden & Denmark
23 September 200323 September 2003 3000 MW load lost in Sweden3000 MW load lost in Sweden 1850 MW load lost in Denmark1850 MW load lost in Denmark 1.6 million people in Sweden1.6 million people in Sweden 2.4 million people in Denmark2.4 million people in Denmark
– CopenhagenCopenhagen
Sweden & DenmarkSweden & Denmark
Sweden & DenmarkSweden & Denmark
N-1 criteriaN-1 criteria Double bus bar faultDouble bus bar fault
– Lost 6 lines, Lost 6 lines, – Lost 2 Nuclear units.Lost 2 Nuclear units.
The lack of generation (3000 MW) The lack of generation (3000 MW) and lines causes a and lines causes a voltage collapsevoltage collapse
Lesson to be learn - bus bar Lesson to be learn - bus bar faultfault
Bus bar fault is not a contingency used Bus bar fault is not a contingency used in the planning of the transmission grid in the planning of the transmission grid in Portugal.in Portugal.
REN has installed differential bus bar REN has installed differential bus bar protections.protections.
In the Operation handbook between In the Operation handbook between REN and EDIS, we have a description of REN and EDIS, we have a description of the regional blackouts related to the the regional blackouts related to the lost of one voltage level by station.lost of one voltage level by station.
ItalyItaly
28 September 200328 September 2003 21.000 MW load lost21.000 MW load lost 50 million people50 million people Frequency rose in the rest of Frequency rose in the rest of
EuropeEurope
ItalyItaly
ItalyItaly
3:01 - Line tripped in Switzerland (ATEL).3:01 - Line tripped in Switzerland (ATEL). 3:15 - Call from ATEL to GRTN to reduce 3:15 - Call from ATEL to GRTN to reduce
300 MW.300 MW. 3:25 - Line tripped in Switzerland (EGL).3:25 - Line tripped in Switzerland (EGL).
– 220 kV tielines IT-CH tripped by overload.220 kV tielines IT-CH tripped by overload. 3:27 - three 400 kV tielines IT-FR tripped.3:27 - three 400 kV tielines IT-FR tripped. 3:27 - 400 kV tieline IT-Slovenia tripped.3:27 - 400 kV tieline IT-Slovenia tripped.
– The Italian network became isolated.The Italian network became isolated.
ItalyItaly
49.96049.98050.00050.02050.04050.06050.08050.10050.12050.14050.16050.18050.20050.22050.24050.26050.280
2:15:00
2:18:20
2:21:40
2:25:00
2:28:20
2:31:40
2:35:00
2:38:20
2:41:40
2:45:00
2:48:20
2:51:40
2:55:00
2:58:20
3:01:40
3:05:00
3:08:20
3:11:40
3:15:00
3:18:20
3:21:40
3:25:00
3:28:20
3:31:40
3:35:00
time
f (H
z)
Incident at : 28-Set-2003 03:25:34 [CET] Duration of the incident: 00:44:47 máx deviation: 260 mHz
ItalyItaly
The deficit of load wasThe deficit of load was– 300(Swiss)-3700(pump)=-3400 MW300(Swiss)-3700(pump)=-3400 MW
The deficit of generation wasThe deficit of generation was– 6700(imp)+3650(units)+2000(dist.)=12350 MW6700(imp)+3650(units)+2000(dist.)=12350 MW
Total deficitTotal deficit– -3400+12350=8950 MW-3400+12350=8950 MW
Remaining generationRemaining generation– 21000-6700-3650=10650 MW21000-6700-3650=10650 MW
Percentage of load to shedPercentage of load to shed– 8950/10650=84%8950/10650=84%
ItalyItaly
N-1 criteria, admits that some lines can N-1 criteria, admits that some lines can be temporarily overloaded.be temporarily overloaded.
The overload was not eliminated in The overload was not eliminated in time, due to the lack of communication time, due to the lack of communication between ETRANS (6 TSO) and GRTN.between ETRANS (6 TSO) and GRTN.– The GRTN control room has a button to The GRTN control room has a button to
loadshed 1000 MW of pumping.loadshed 1000 MW of pumping. The Italian under-frequency loadshed The Italian under-frequency loadshed
was unable to hold the frequency.was unable to hold the frequency.
Lesson to be learn - N-1 Lesson to be learn - N-1 criteriacriteria
The computation of the Interchange The computation of the Interchange Capacity is based in the N-1 criteria.Capacity is based in the N-1 criteria.– Any increase of security, implies a Any increase of security, implies a
decrease of interchange capacity.decrease of interchange capacity. With the creation of the Iberian With the creation of the Iberian
Market the need for interchange Market the need for interchange capacity is essential to avoid capacity is essential to avoid market splitmarket split..
Iberian SplitIberian Split
27 December 199927 December 1999– We were not connected to UCTE We were not connected to UCTE
during 1:51:17during 1:51:17 The frequency droppedThe frequency dropped
– Spain was importing from FranceSpain was importing from France– Spain became supplier of south of Spain became supplier of south of
FranceFrance
Iberian Split Iberian Split
Iberian Split Iberian Split
Iberian Split Iberian Split
Iberian Split Iberian Split
49.55049.600
49.65049.70049.750
49.80049.850
49.90049.95050.000
50.05050.100
19:45 19:50 19:55 20:00 20:05 20:10 20:15
Split at 19:52:52 Split at 19:52:52
Iberian Split Iberian Split
49.940
49.960
49.980
50.000
50.020
50.040
50.060
21:30 21:35 21:40 21:45 21:50 21:55 22:00
Synchronous with UCTE at 21:44:09 Synchronous with UCTE at 21:44:09
Iberian SplitIberian Split
Due to the reduced Interchange Due to the reduced Interchange capacity between France and capacity between France and Spain it was possible to control the Spain it was possible to control the frequency.frequency.
REN-Rede Eléctrica Nacional,S.A.REN-Rede Eléctrica Nacional,S.A.
Can the California crisis occur in Can the California crisis occur in Europe ?Europe ?
- No, because there are too many institutional - No, because there are too many institutional players working together (EC, ETSO, CEER, players working together (EC, ETSO, CEER, EuroPEX, …).EuroPEX, …).
Can the New York crisis occur in Can the New York crisis occur in Europe ?Europe ?
- Never in Italy (Berlusconi)- Never in Italy (Berlusconi)
- Yes (Rui Pestana)- Yes (Rui Pestana)