+ All Categories
Home > Documents > René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised,...

René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised,...

Date post: 03-Jan-2016
Category:
Upload: charles-casey
View: 223 times
Download: 0 times
Share this document with a friend
68
René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) evised, 1/7/07
Transcript
Page 1: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

René Descartes(1596-1650 AD)

Meditations on First Philosophy (1641)

(Text, pp. 283-306)

Revised, 1/7/07

Page 3: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Descartes’ ProblemDescartes’ Problem

The problem of skepticism (D concentrates on 2 types of skepticism)

– General skepticism: There are NO indubitable beliefs or propositions.

– Skepticism concerning the existence & nature of the “external world”: The existence and nature of the “external world” cannot be known.

Background

Page 4: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

The overall structure of D’s The overall structure of D’s MeditationsMeditations(next slide)(next slide)

Page 5: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

General Cogito (existence of the “I”)

(Med. I) (Med. II)

Mind-Body Dualism

Skepticism

God (no deceiver)

External 1. My idea of God (III)

World 2. My contingent

(Meds. III-VI) existence (III)

3. The ontological

argument (again) (V)

(That piece of wax)

Page 6: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Meditation IMeditation I

Radical (General) Skepticism

Page 7: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Descartes’ “Foundationalism”Descartes’ “Foundationalism”

Epistemological Foundations & SuperstructureEpistemological Foundations & Superstructure

False Foundational

Belief

False Foundational

Belief

If the underlying foundations of our beliefs are false, then it is possible that all of our beliefs are false too!

Superstructural Beliefs

(also false?)

False Foundational

Belief

Page 8: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

D’s program of radical doubt D’s program of radical doubt

Treat any belief that is to the slightest extent uncertain & subject to doubt just as though it is obviously false.

Accept only those beliefs that are completely certain and indubitable.

Work on the foundations of my beliefs.

What are the underlying foundations of my beliefs?

Page 9: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Foundational Beliefs(common assumptions we make)

Naïve Empiricism: True beliefs are acquired through sense experience.

My beliefs are not products of insanity.

My beliefs are not products of my dreams.

Page 10: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Foundational Beliefs, cont’dFoundational Beliefs, cont’d

Physical objects: Even if we fail to perceive physical objects accurately, the “primary [measurable] qualities” of such objects (matter, extension, shape, quantity, size, location, time, etc.) are really real (i.e., physical objects do really exist).

Even if empirical beliefs are subject to doubt, mathematical propositions are indubitable (e.g., 3 + 2 = 5, a square has neither more nor less than four sides).

Page 11: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

How does Descartes challenge each of the foregoing foundational beliefs?

How does he use the ideas of God and the Devil in building his case in support of radical skepticism?

Page 12: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Meditation IIMeditation II

Descartes’ Refutation of Radical Skepticism

Page 13: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Descartes’ refutation ofDescartes’ refutation ofradical skepticismradical skepticism

“Cogito ergo sum!”

What does this mean?

Page 14: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

The most famous statement in The most famous statement in the history of philosophy:the history of philosophy:

“I think; therefore I am.”

Discourse on Method (1637)

Page 15: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

“If I am deceived,

then I must exist!”

I cannot doubt the truth of the statement, “I exist.”

I can't think that I am not thinking because then I am thinking; and if I am thinking, then I must exist. To doubt my own existence, I must exist!

Page 16: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Thus,Thus,

Radical (general) skepticism is refuted.

Page 17: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Meditation II, cont’dMeditation II, cont’d

The Mind-Body Problem &

Descartes’ Psycho-Somatic Dualism

Page 18: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Three metaphysical Three metaphysical perspectives relevant to the perspectives relevant to the

“mind-body problem”“mind-body problem”

Page 19: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Metaphysical Dualism: Reality is two-dimensional, partly material and partly non-material (minds, ideas, souls, spirits, consciousness, etc.).

Metaphysical Materialism: Reality is nothing but matter-in-motion-in-space-and-in-time. There are no non-material realities.

Metaphysical Idealism: Reality is nothing but Mind, Idea, Soul, Spirit, Consciousness, etc. Matter does not exist (it’s an illusion?).

Page 20: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Application to the “mind-body problem”

Metaphysical Materialism: A person is nothing but a physical organism (body only). "Mind" (consciousness) a feature (function, epiphenomenon) of the body.

Metaphysical Idealism: A person is “consciousness only” (mind, soul, spirit); not at all a material being.

Metaphysical Dualism: A person is a composite of (1) “mind” (consciousness, intellect, soul, spirit) and (2) body.

Page 21: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Cartesian Dualism

I know with certainty THAT “I” exist (Cogito ergo sum), but

WHAT am “I”? Am “I” my body? No, because I can doubt

the existence of my body, whereas I cannot doubt the existence of myself (the “I”).

“I” am a thinking thing, a thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, imagines, and has sensations.

Page 22: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Is Descartes right?Is Descartes right?

Can you doubt the existence of your body (as well as other physical things)?

Why or why not?

Page 23: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

“I can conceive of myself as existing without a body, but I cannot conceive of myself

as existing without conscious awareness.”

Bryan Magee, The Great Philosophers (Oxford 1987)

Page 24: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

DetourDetour

Descartes' piece of wax

(What is this about?)

D' piece of wax is a physical object.How is it known? Through the senses? Through the power of imagination? Through the intellect (judgment, intuition)?

Page 25: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

That piece of wax….That piece of wax….

A major dispute running through the entire history of philosophy has to do with the source(s) of human knowledge. There are two major schools: rationalism and empiricism. The empiricists hold that knowledge is derived from sense perception and experience. The rationalists (such as Descartes) hold that knowledge is derived from clear logical thinking, from the intellect (i.e., from "reason").

In the "wax" section, which is a kind of detour from his main argument, Descartes is showing his support of rationalism. He argues that we know - through the intellect - that the wax is and remains what it is as it passes through time and change. Sense perception does not show the "substance" of the wax but only its various appearances. If we relied on sense experience rather than on "reason," then we would "know" that the wax is all of the following: cold and hard, warm and soft, hot and liquid. However, "reason" (not the senses) tells us that the substance (reality) of the wax is something more fundamental than its sensual appearances.

Page 26: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

So…So…in Descartes’ view,in Descartes’ view,

my body exists (if it exists at all) outside of my consciousness and is

therefore part of the “external world.”

Thus,

Back to the mind-body problem….

Page 27: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Descartes’ mind-body dualism Descartes’ mind-body dualism leads to . . . .leads to . . . .

Page 28: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Meditation III,Meditation III,which deals withwhich deals with

(1) skepticism concerning the existence & nature of the

“external world”

&

(2) the existence of God

Page 29: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

“I must, as soon as possible, try to determine (1) whether or not God exists and (2) whether or not He can be a deceiver. Until I know these two things, I will never be certain of anything else” (Text, 289).

Why does Descartes say this?

Page 30: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

And why does Descartes think it And why does Descartes think it necessary to prove the existence of God?necessary to prove the existence of God?

It's because he's looking for a guarantee that the "external world" (the world outside of his mind) is really real and not just an illusion. How does a proof of the existence of God help him with that problem?

The point is that God (who is no deceiver) guarantees that the world I perceive through my senses is really there. God authenticates my sensory experiences, thus making sensation generally reliable, not in and of itself, but because God (being perfectly good) will not allow me to be systematically deluded and deceived.

By the way, if Descartes trusted his senses, this "external world" issue would not be a problem for him. But Descartes, a "Rationalist" rather than an "Empiricist," does not trust sense experience. He needs something more than sense experience to convince him that the "external world" is real. He needs God.

Page 31: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Descartes’ standard of certainty

What does it take for a belief to be certainly (indubitably) true?

The belief must be “clear and distinct.” (But what does this mean?)

Descartes’ general rule: “Everything that I can clearly and distinctly grasp is true.”

Page 32: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Are the following beliefsAre the following beliefs“clear & distinct”“clear & distinct”

(indubitable)(indubitable)?? That there are things outside myself (such

as physical objects). That these external things cause my ideas of

those things in my mind. That my ideas of external things perfectly

“resemble” the things themselves. That 3 + 2 = 5 ?

Page 33: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Reasons for believing (1) that there Reasons for believing (1) that there are things outside myself, (2) that are things outside myself, (2) that

these external things cause my ideas these external things cause my ideas of those things in my mind, and (3) of those things in my mind, and (3)

that my ideas of external things that my ideas of external things “resemble” (accurately represent) the “resemble” (accurately represent) the

things themselves*:things themselves*:

*The epistemology represented by (1), (2), & (3) is known as “Representationalism.”

Page 34: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

I have a strong natural inclination to believe the preceding three propositions.

My ideas of external things arise in my mind independently of my will.

It seems obvious that external objects impress their own likenesses upon my senses.

(Do these reasons “clearly & distinctly” prove that Representational Realism is true?) (See 289-90)

Page 35: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Ideas & their causesIdeas & their causes

Page 36: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

When I think of an entity, I can When I think of an entity, I can distinguish between . . . .distinguish between . . . .

Substance (i.e., the entity itself, e.g., an automobile tire),

Modes (i.e., the ways in which the entity exists, e.g., the tire may be flat ), and

Accidents (i.e., the properties, qualities, or attributes of the entity, e.g., the color of the tire [blackness?] ).

And isn’t it obvious that substance is more real than mode or accident?

Page 37: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Ideas of things (substances, Ideas of things (substances, modes, accidents)modes, accidents)

must be caused to be in the mind, and

the cause of any effect must be sufficient to produce its effect, i.e.,

there must be at least as much reality in a cause as is represented in its effect.

Page 38: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Descartes thinks of ideas asDescartes thinks of ideas as

subjective representations of the realities that cause them to be in the mind.

He also believes that ideas cannot represent more reality (anything greater or more perfect) than is in the things the ideas represent.

But is this last point true? Suppose I perceive an automobile with a dented fender &, from my perception, an idea of the car arises in my mind. Why can’t I think of the car as NOT having a dented fender?

How might Descartes respond to this criticism?

Page 39: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

If one of my ideasIf one of my ideas

has something in it that is not within myself, then

I could not be the cause of that idea; whereas

if I could be the cause of all of my ideas, then

I will have no foolproof reason to believe that anything exists other than myself.

Page 40: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Ideas in my mind:Ideas in my mind:

of myself (could be caused by myself) of God of lifeless physical objects of angels of animals of other people

Could be composed from my ideas of myself, physical objects, and God (how?)

What about physical objects?

Page 41: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

The qualities of physical objects:The qualities of physical objects:

Primary qualities: size, length,

breadth, depth, shape, position, motion,

substance, duration, number, etc.

Secondary qualities: light, color,

sound, odor, taste, heat, cold, etc.

Page 42: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Since my ideas of the Since my ideas of the secondary secondary qualitiesqualities of physical objects of physical objects

are not “clear and distinct,” and since such qualities are almost

indistinguishable from nothing (i.e, they seem to represent very little reality),

I myself [a substance] could be the author of such ideas.

Page 43: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

I could also be the cause of I could also be the cause of my ideas of my ideas of primary qualitiesprimary qualities..

I am a substance. I have duration in that I exist now and have

existed for some time. I can count my several thoughts and thus the

idea of number may be grounded in my thought process.

But what about my ideas of extension, shape, position, and motion?

Page 44: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Although Although extensionextension, , shapeshape, , positionposition, or , or motionmotion do not do not

exist in me (since “I” am not a exist in me (since “I” am not a physical being), physical being),

these are only modes of existence, and, as a substance,

“I” have more reality than these modes and “I” am therefore sufficient to cause my ideas of them.

Page 45: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Thus,Thus,

I could be the cause of my ideas of both the primary and

secondary qualities

of physical objects.

However,

Page 46: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

I do not have what it takesI do not have what it takes

to produce the idea of God (an infinite substance)

from within myself (a finite substance).

Page 47: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Descartes’ first argumentDescartes’ first argument

for the existence of God . . . .

Page 48: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

““By ‘God,’ I meanBy ‘God,’ I mean

an infinite and independent SUBSTANCE, all-knowing and all-

powerful, who created me and everything else . . . . ” (Text, 291)

This idea represents more reality than there is in myself (since I am finite, limited in knowledge & power, etc.). Thus, the idea of God must be caused to be in my mind by something other than myself. And . . . .

Page 49: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

since there must be at least since there must be at least as much reality in a cause as as much reality in a cause as

there is in its effect(s),there is in its effect(s),

it follows necessarily that my idea of God must be caused by God Himself; and if

God is the cause of my idea of God, then

God must exist!

Page 50: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Descartes’ main point here is that I could not be the

cause of the idea of God that I find in my mind

since God is a being more perfect than myself.

How could I, merely from within myself, form the idea of a being more perfect than myself?

In that case, my idea would represent more reality than there is in its cause.

Only God is a sufficient cause of the idea of God in my mind.

Page 51: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

"Step 3" Presentation of D's 1"Step 3" Presentation of D's 1stst Argument Argument for the Existence of Godfor the Existence of God

(not sure about this)(not sure about this)

1. All events are caused.2. A cause must be sufficient to produce its effects.3. My idea of a perfect being is a mental event.4. Only a perfect being is a sufficient cause of my idea of a

Perfect being.5. If a perfect being is the cause of my idea of a perfect being,

then a perfect being exists.---------------------------------------------------------------------------

-6. A perfect being (God) exists.

Page 52: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Descartes’ second argument

for the existence of God . . . .

Page 53: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

I exist as a thinking thingwith the idea of God (an infinitely

perfect being) in my mind,

but my existence is not necessary -- it is contingent (i.e., my non-existence is conceivable,

logically possible) -- which means

that I must be caused to exist (at every moment of my existence) by something other than myself (292-3).

Page 54: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

If the cause of my existenceIf the cause of my existence

is itself a contingent being or a set of contingent beings (e.g., my parents or something else less perfect than God), then

it must also be caused to exist by something other than itself. But . . . .

this cause-and-effect process cannot go on to infinity since in that case

I could never begin to exist (the infinite regress problem again).

So . . . .

Page 55: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

there must be a First Cause

whose existence is necessary (rather than contingent).

Furthermore . . . ,

Page 56: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

this necessarily existing First Cause,this necessarily existing First Cause,

which is the ultimate cause of my existence, must have the idea of God in it, and since it is a First Cause, its idea of God

must be caused by itself and nothing else, which means

that this First Cause must be God (since only God can be the original cause of the idea of God in any mind).

Page 57: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

"Step 3" Presentation of D's 2d Argument "Step 3" Presentation of D's 2d Argument for the Existence of Godfor the Existence of God

(not sure about this)(not sure about this)

1. All contingent beings must be caused to exist.2. I exist as a contingent and thinking being, with the idea of a perfect being in my

mind [and as contingent, I must be caused to exist--premise 1].3. If something causes existence only if it is itself caused to exist, then its causal

series is infinitely long.4. An infinite (or infinitely regressing) series of causes leading up to my present

existence is logically impossible, since, in that case, I could never begin to exist [i.e., I would have no existence at all].

5. A cause must be sufficient to produce its effects.6. To be a sufficient cause of my existence, the "first cause" of my existence must

be a necessarily existing [premises 4 and 5] and thinking being possessing the idea of perfection [premise 2].

7. The "first cause" of my existence is the cause of its own idea of perfection and is therefore, itself, a perfect being [otherwise it would not be "first"].

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------8. A perfect being (God) exists.

Page 58: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Why does Descartes reject the claim that

his existence as a contingent being with the idea of God in its mind might be the effect of

several natural causes, each representing a different kind of perfection? (see 293)

Page 59: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Conclusion of the 3rd Meditation

"From the simple fact that I exist and that I have in my mind the idea of a supremely perfect being, that is, God, it necessarily follows that God exists . . . . The whole argument rests on my realization that it would be impossible for me to exist as I do -- namely, with the idea of God in my mind -- if God didn’t exist. It also follows that [since God is perfect] God cannot be a deceiver [because fraud and deception are caused by defects] . . . ."

Page 60: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

The idea that God cannot The idea that God cannot be a deceiverbe a deceiver

leads to

Slides on Meditation IV under construction – but see next slide for a brief summary….

Page 61: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

The Basic Thrust of Meditation IV:The Basic Thrust of Meditation IV:

If God is no deceiver, how is human error with respect to truth and falsity possible, and how is that error to be explained?

Human nature is equipped with an intellect (faculty of knowing) and a free will (faculty of choosing), which interact in the pursuit of truth. The intellect is capable of forming beliefs that can't be doubted and therefore are certainly true. However, the intellect can also consider claims that are subject to doubt and that therefore may be false. The human will is free to affirm or deny propositions proposed to it by the intellect. Error results when the will (1) denies the truth, or (2) affirms claims that are false, or (3) asserts knowledge where there is doubt.

Error is avoidable where a person limits her his affirmations and denials to "those matters that are clearly and distinctly [indubitably] shown to . . . [the will] by the intellect . . . . " and remains (more or less) neutral with respect to all claims that are subject to doubt.

Why does God permit human error? If human nature were created both free and incapable of error, it would be more perfect than it now is; but it may be that the apparent imperfection of human nature in this respect is necessary to "a greater perfection of the universe as a whole."

Page 62: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

God & the removal of doubt as to

the existence of the external world

Page 63: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

The content of Meditation VThe content of Meditation V

Mathematical thinking & its (physical & non-physical) objects: clarity & distinctness again -- what is clear & distinct must be true

D’s “ontological” argument for the existence of God

God & certainty

Page 64: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Descartes’ third argument

for the existence of God

(the ontological argument again)

Page 65: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

1. If the nonexistence of God (an infinitely perfect being) were possible, then existence would not be part of God’s essence (that is, existence would not be a property of the divine nature).2. If existence were not part of God’s essence (that is, a property of the divine nature), then God would be a contingent (rather than necessary) being.3. The idea of God as a contingent being (that is, the idea of an infinitely perfect being with contingent rather than necessary existence) is self-contradictory.4. It is impossible to think of God as not existing.

5. The nonexistence of God is impossible.

Page 66: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Certainty about God

is the basis of certainty about everything else.

Page 67: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

Meditation VIRemoval of doubt as to the

existence of the external world

Since God exists & is no deceiver, it follows necessarily that the external world can be

known to exist.

Page 68: René Descartes (1596-1650 AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp. 283-306) Revised, 1/7/07.

To be continued….To be continued….

(There's a lot more in the 6th Meditation than is covered in this presentation…so far.)


Recommended