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E. 1935 Constitution

In the 1935 Constitution, Filipino citizenship was defined, classified and regulated by Article

IV, which stated that:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of thisConstitution

(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoptionof the Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines, and upon reaching the age of

majority, elect Philippine citizenship(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Section 2. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.[18]

Those who were considered citizens at the time of the adoption of the constitution included

those deemed citizens under the Jones Law: all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, who were

Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1989, and then residing in the said islands, and their

children born and subsequent thereto... This was in turn a reproduction of Section 4 of the

Philippine Bill of 1902.[19]

Those who were naturalized according to the Naturalization Law of Act No. 2927 (March

26, 1920), come under the scope of Section 1(1). Under this Act, the privilege of naturalization was

given to the following persons:(1) natives of the Philippines who were not citizens of the Philippines, because they werenot living in the Philippines on April 11, 1899, and were not subjects of Spain on that date,not were they children of Filipino citizens born after that date; (2) natives of the insularpossessions of the United States, such as natives of Guam, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the

Virgin Islands; (3) residents of the Philippines who were citizens of the United States; and(4) residents of the Philippines who could become citizens of the United States under the

American laws if residing there.[20]

As can be seen from the previous citizenship laws, the principle ofjus sanguiniswas not

applicable prior to the 1935 Constitution. Before Section 1, which considered citizens those whose

fathers were Filipino citizens, the prevailing doctrine had beenjus soli.[21]By recognizing the principle

ofjus sanguinis, it was recognized that a blood relationship would serve as a better guarantee of

loyalty to the country of ones parents [22]thanjus soli.
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Section 1(2), at the time the Constitution was framed, was said to be inserted for the benefit

of Delegate Fermin Caram of Iloilo. Since Caram was born of Syrian parents and had not been

naturalized, an anomaly of the Constitution being signed by one who is not a citizen would have

been an issue, if thus subsection had not been included. However, the Supreme Court has held that

the delegates would not have added such a provision without considering its effect on others.[23]

Section 1(4) contemplated a situation where only the mother was a Filipino citizen, and gave

the child an opportunity to elect Filipino citizenship only when he reached the age of majority. Prior

to his reaching such an age, he at most has an inchoate right to Filipino citizenship.[24]The provision

is also applicable to mothers who were Filipinos before acquiring the nationality of their foreign

spouses. To restrict its interpretation in such a way that the time of election was considered

controlling as to the status when the mother should be a Filipina would have nullified the particular

provision.[25]For illegitimate children however, this provision would not have been applicable, since

the citizenship of the father would not then be material, since an illegitimate child as a rule follows

the nationality of the mother.[26]

The right to elect is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 652, which states the

requirements and procedure for election, and must be express:Option to elect Philippine citizenship shall be expressed in a statement to be filed and swornto by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oath and shall be filed

with the nearest civil registrar. The party elected must likewise accompany theaforementioned statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and theGovernment of the Philippines. Where the party concerned resides abroad, he must makethe statement before any officer of the government of the Philippines authorized toadminister oaths and must forward such statement together with his oath of allegiance to thecivil registrar of Manila.[27]

On the naturalization of non-citizens, Section 1(5) possessed great significance. Desirable

aliens are welcomed, but a balance must be created wherein the law bars undesirables without

unduly discouraging the worthwhile aliens desirous of becoming Filipinos.[28]Naturalization has

been defined as the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the rights that belong to a

natural born citizen. Naturalization may be obtained through a general law of naturalization applied

through a judicial process.[29]
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F. 1973 Constitution

Article III, Section 2 enumerates the following as citizens of the Philippines:1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this

Constitution.2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines3. Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the

Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

The purpose of the first paragraph of the provision was to protect the continued enjoyment

of Philippine citizenship to those who already possess the right as of 17 January 1973.

The Section 2(2) followed the principle ofjus sanguinis. However, unlike the 1935

Constitution, Filipino mothers were placed by the 1973 Constitution on equal footing with Filipino

fathers as far as the determination of the citizenship of their children was concerned. The father or

mother may be a natural-born Filipino or a Filipino by naturalization or by election. The only

important consideration here was that the mother must be a Filipino at the time of the birth of the

child. It must be reiterated that this rule applied only to those born of a Filipino mother on or after

17 January 1973.

As the 1973 Constitution followed the doctrine ofjus sanguinis, it disregarded the place of

birth of a person. As long as one was born of Filipino parents, he was considered a Filipino. If he

was born in a country where the rule ofjus soliwas the prevailing principle, it would be a case of dual

citizenship.

The Section 2(3) defined the status of individuals who elect Philippine citizenship under the

1935 Constitution. Under the said Constitution, a child born of a Filipina mother married to an alien

was considered an alien unless he elected Philippine citizenship within a reasonable period after

reaching the age of majority. However, if his mother reacquired her Philippines citizenship during

his minority there was no need for election since by operation of law, he is a Filipino citizen.


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Section 2(4) provided for a means by which even individuals, who were not Filipino citizens

by virtue of birth or of Filipino mothers, may become citizens of the Philippines through

naturalization.

G. 1987 Constitution

The 1987 Constitution builds on the previous Constitutions, but modifies provisions which

cannot be found in the 1973 and 1935 Constitution. Those who were citizens during the adoption of

the new Constitution were considered citizens. However, this does not rectify any defects in the

acquisition of such citizenship under the 1935 or 1973 Constitution. If a persons citizenship was

subject to judicial challenge under the old law, it still remains subject to challenge under the new

whether or not the judicial challenge had been commenced prior to the effectivity of the new

Constitution.[30]

The principle ofjus sanguinis still applies, and in following the lead of the 1973 Constitution,

the Filipino woman is placed on the same footing as Filipino men in matters of citizenship. It is

essential, however, that the mother is a Filipina when the child is born.[31]The principle of parental

authority is still applicable in the new Constitution, so this article only applies to legitimate children,

not to adopted or illegitimate ones. Mothers have parental authority over illegitimate children.

Adopted children, on the other hand, as they are not related by blood, do not follow their adoptive

parents citizenship, despite being under their parental authority.[32]

As for those who were born after the adoption of the 1973 Constitution of Filipino mothers,

the 1987 Constitution still provides the transitory provision that was also in the 1973 Constitution:

Those born before 17 January 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon

reaching the age of majority.[33]

Naturalization still remains one of the ways by which a person may acquire citizenship.

Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution defines natural born citizens:Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without havingto perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect
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In Section 5, the Constitution recognizes the problem of dual allegiance, but leaves

concrete ways of dealing with it to Congress.[40]The same may be said of dual citizenship, which is

not contemplated in the provision, it being a seldom intentional and perhaps never

insidious...condition that arises from the fact that Philippine law cannot control international law,

and the laws of other countries on citizenship. [41]Dual Citizenship is covered by RA 9225, which

provides that natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become

citizens of a foreign country shall retain their citizenship after taking the oath mentioned therein.

As can be seen, though there had been changes from the Spanish Laws to the Philippine

Constitutions, continuity has been maintained. Each Constitution usually includes a provision to

accommodate previous ones. Major changes include the transition fromjus solitojus sanguinisin the

1935 Constitution, the equalization of men and women (fathers and mothers) as regards citizenship

in the 1973 Constitution, and the classification of children of Filipino mothers who needed to elect

citizenship as natural-born, the retention of citizenship upon marriage to foreigners, and the

recognition of the problem of dual allegiance in the 1987 Constitution.

1. No. Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to elect Philippine citizenship within a

reasonable time. The reasonable time means that the election should be made within 3years from "upon reaching the age of majority", which is 21 years old. Instead, he elected

Philippine citizenship 14 years after reaching the age of majority which the court considered

not within the reasonable time. Ching offered no reason why he delayed his election of

Philippine citizenship, as procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is not a tedious and

painstaking process. All that is required is an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and

file the same with the nearest civil registry.
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LIMKAICHONG vs COMELEC

G.R. Nos. 178831-32, July 30, 2009

Facts:

In its April 1, 2009 Decision in G.R. No. 179120, the Supreme Court reversed the Joint

Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division dated May 17, 2007 in SPA Nos. 07-247

and 07-248 disqualifying Limkaichong from running as a congressional candidate in the

First District of Negros Oriental due to lack of citizenship requirement. Biraogo filed the

instant motion for reconsideration with prayer for oral argument.

The core issue in the consolidated petitions is the qualification of Limkaichong to run

for, be elected to, and assume and discharge, the position of Representative for the

First District of Negros Oriental. The contention of the parties who sought her

disqualification is that she is not a natural-born citizen, hence, she lacks the citizenship

requirement in Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In the election that

ensued, she was voted for by the constituents of Negros Oriental and garnered the

highest votes. She was eventually proclaimed as the winner and has since performed

her duties and responsibilities as Member of the House of Representatives.

The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a natural-born

citizen because her parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. They went on

to claim that the proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never

attained finality due to procedural and substantial defects.

Issues:

1. Whether the citizenship of Limkaichong's parents may be questioned in an election

case

2. Who has jurisdiction over the disqualification case

3. Whether the ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules apply to

disqualification based on citizenship

Held:

1. No. In assailing the citizenship of the father, the proper proceeding should be in

accordance with Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 which provides that:


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Sec. 18. Cancellation of Naturalization Certificate Issued.- Upon motion made

in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representative, or by

the proper provincial fiscal, the competent judge may cancel the naturalization

certificate issued and its registration in the Civil Register:

1. If it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or illegally;

2. If the person naturalized shall, within five years next following the issuance of said

naturalization certificate, return to his native country or to some foreign country and

establish his permanent residence there: Provided, That the fact of the person

naturalized remaining more than one year in his native country or the country of his

former nationality, or two years in any other foreign country, shall be considered as

prima facie evidence of his intention of taking up his permanent residence in the same:

3. If the petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention;

4. If it is shown that the minor children of the person naturalized failed to graduate

from a public or private high school recognized by the Office of Private Education [now

Bureau of Private Schools] of the Philippines, where Philippine history, government or

civics are taught as part of the school curriculum, through the fault of their parents

either by neglecting to support them or by transferring them to another school or

schools. A certified copy of the decree canceling the naturalization certificate shall be

forwarded by theClerk of Court of the Department of Interior [now Office of the

President] and the Bureau of Justice [now Office of the Solicitor General];

5. If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a dummy

in violation of the constitutional or legal provisions requiring Philippine citizenship as a

requisite for the exercise, use or enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege.

As early as the case of Queto v. Catolico, the Court held that:

x x x It may be true that, as alleged by said respondents, that the proceedings fornaturalization were tainted with certain infirmities, fatal or otherwise, but that is beside

the point in this case. The jurisdiction of the court to inquire into and rule upon such

infirmities must be properly invoked in accordance with the procedure laid down by law.

Such procedure is the cancellation of the naturalization certificate. [Section 1(5),

Commonwealth Act No. 63], in the manner fixed in Section 18 of Commonwealth Act

No. 473, hereinbefore quoted, namely, "upon motion made in the proper proceedings


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by the Solicitor General or his representatives, or by the proper provincial fiscal." In

other words, the initiative must come from these officers, presumably after previous

investigation in each particular case.

Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representativesdesignated by statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of

naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter

that may be raised by private persons in an election case involving the naturalized

citizens descendant.

Accordingly, it is not enough that one's qualification, or lack of it, to hold an office

requiring one to be a natural-born citizen, be attacked and questioned before any

tribunal or government institution. Proper proceedings must be strictly followed by the

proper officers under the law. Hence, in seeking Limkaichong's disqualification on

account of her citizenship, the rudiments of fair play and due process must be

observed, for in doing so, she is not only deprived of the right to hold office as a

Member of the House of Representative but her constituents would also be deprived of

a leader in whom they have put their trust on through their votes. The obvious

rationale behind the foregoing ruling is that in voting for a candidate who has not been

disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the people voted for her bona

fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the

candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise

of the powers of government.

2. Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken

her oath of office, and she was allowed to officially assume the office on July 23, 2007.

Accordingly, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), and no longer the

COMELEC, should now assume jurisdiction over the disqualification cases.

x x x The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed,

taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the

COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, andqualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. It follows then

that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction

over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning

his qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET,

the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of

the House of Representatives with respect to the latter's election, returns and


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qualifications. The use of the word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution

and in Section 2509 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals'

jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.

The fact that the proclamation of the winning candidate, as in this case, was alleged tohave been tainted with irregularity does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction.

3. No. The 1998 HRET Rules, as amended, provide for the manner of filing either an

election protest or a petition for quo warranto against a Member of the House of

Representatives. In our Decision, we ruled that the ten-day prescriptive period under

the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to disqualification based on citizenship, because

qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not

only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the

officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be

seasonably challenged. Accordingly, the 1987 Constitution requires that Members of the

House of Representatives must be natural-born citizens not only at the time of their

election but during their entire tenure. Being a continuing requirement, one who assails

a member's citizenship or lack of it may still question the same at any time, the ten-day

prescriptive period notwithstanding.

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LIMKAICHONG VS COMELEC

Posted by kaye lee on 11:32 PM

G.R. No. 178831-32, 30 July 2009 [Citizenship; Naturalization; C.A. No. 473]

FACTS:

Two petitions were consolidated on the issue about the qualifications of Jocelyn Limkaichong to run for, be

elected to, and assume and discharge the position as Representative of the 1st District of Negros Oriental. The

contention of the parties who sought her disqualification is that she is not a natural-born citizen, hence, she

lacks the citizenship requirement in Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In the election that ensued,

she was voted for by the constituents of Negros Oriental and garnered the highest votes. She was eventually
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proclaimed as the winner and has since performed her duties and responsibilities as Member of the House of

Representatives.

The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a natural-born citizen because her

parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. They went on to claim that the proceedings for the

naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to procedural and substantial defects.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the citizenship of Limkaichong's parents may be questioned in an election case.

2) Whether or not the HRET should assume jurisdiction over the disqualification case.

3) Whether or not the 10-day prescriptive period under 1998 HRET Rules apply to disqualification based on

citizenship.

RULINGS:

1) No. The proper proceeding in cancelling the naturalization certificate of one person should be in accordance

with Section 18 of CA No. 473. Clearly under the law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through the Solicitor

General or the representative designated by statute, that may question in the appropriate denaturalization

proceeding.

2) Yes. Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken her oath of office,

and she was allowed to officially assume office on July 23, 2007. Accordingly, the House of Representatives

Electoral Tribunal, and no longer the COMELEC, should now assume the jurisdiction over the disqualification

case. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and in Section 2509 of the OEC underscore the

exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunal's jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.

3) No. The ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to disqualification based on

citizenship, because qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not

only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure.

Categories:

G.R. Nos. 178831-32 April 1, 2009


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JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG,Petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NAPOLEON N. CAMERO and RENALD F.VILLANDO,Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 179120 April 1, 2009

LOUIS C. BIRAOGO,Petitioner,vs.HON. PROSPERO NOGRALES, Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Congressof the Philippines, and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG,Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. Nos. 179132-33 April 1, 2009

OLIVIA P. PARAS,Petitioner,vs.HON. PROSPERO NOGRALES, in his capacity as Speaker of the House ofRepresentatives; HON. ROBERTO NAZARENO, in his capacity as Secretary General ofthe House of Representatives; HON. RHODORA SEVILLA, in her capacity as DeputySecretary General for Finance of the House of Representatives; THE COMMISSION ONELECTIONS and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG,Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. Nos. 179240-41 April 1, 2009

RENALD F. VILLANDO,Petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG,Respondents

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J .:

Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as aMember of the House of Representatives, the jurisdiction of the House of RepresentativesElectoral Tribunal begins

over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications, and mere allegationas to the invalidity of her proclamation does not divest the Electoral Tribunal of its

jurisdiction.

At the core of these contentious consolidated petitions are: (1) the Joint Resolution1of theCommission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division dated May 17, 2007, disqualifyingJocelyn D. Sy Limkaichong (Limkaichong) from running as a congressional candidate for the
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First District of Negros Oriental; (2) the COMELEC En BancResolution2dated June 29, 2007,affirming her disqualification; and (3) the COMELEC En BancResolution3dated August 16,2007, resolving that all pending incidents relating to her qualifications should now be determinedby the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

The facts are uncontroverted. On March 26, 2007, Limkaichong filed with the COMELEC her

Certificate of Candidacy4(COC) for the position of Representative of the First District of NegrosOriental.

In the following weeks, two (2) petitions for her disqualification were instituted before theCOMELEC by concerned citizens coming from her locality. On April 4, 2007, Napoleon Camero,a registered voter of La Libertad, Negros Oriental, filed the petition for her disqualification on theground that she lacked the citizenship requirement of a Member of the House ofRepresentatives. The petition, which was docketed as SPA No. (PES) A07-006,5alleged thatshe is not a natural-born Filipino because her parents were Chinese citizens at the time of herbirth. On April 11, 2007, Renald F. Villando, also a registered voter of the same locality, filed thesecond petition on the same ground of citizenship, docketed as SPA (PES) No. A07-007.6Heclaimed that when Limkaichong was born, her parents were still Chinese citizens as the

proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due toprocedural and substantial defects. Both petitions prayed for the cancellation of Limkaichong'sCOC and for the COMELEC to strike out her name from the list of qualified candidates for theRepresentative of the First District of Negros Oriental.

In her separate Answers7to the petitions, Limkaichong claimed that she is a natural-bornFilipinosince she was born to a naturalized Filipino fatherand a natural-born Filipinomother,who had reacquired her status as such due to her husband's naturalization. Thus, atthe time of her birth on November 9, 1959, nineteen (19) days had already passed after herfather took his Oath of Allegiance on October 21, 1959 and after he was issued a Certificate ofNaturalization on the same day. She contended that the COMELEC should dismiss the petitionsoutright for lack of cause of action. Citing Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections,8she averred

that a petition filed before an election, questioning the qualification of a candidate, should bebased on Section 78,9in relation to Section 7410of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC),11and notunder Sections 6812and 74 thereof in relation to Section 1,13Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules ofProcedure14and Section 5,15paragraph C (3.a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 7800.16She alsocontended that the petitions were dismissible on the ground that they were in the nature of acollateral attack on her and her fathers citizenships, in contravention of the well-established rulethat attack on one's citizenship may only be made through a direct action for its nullity.

The COMELEC consolidated the two (2) petitions and re-docketed them as SPA Nos. 07-24717and 07-248,18entitled IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO DISQUALIFY JOCELYNSY LIMKAICHONG FROM HER CANDIDACY AS FIRST DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVE OFNEGROS ORIENTAL(herein referred to as the disqualification cases), which remained pendingon May 14, 2007, when the National and Local Elections were conducted.

After the casting, counting and canvassing of votes in the said elections, Limkaichong emergedas the winnerwith 65,708 votes19or by a margin of 7,746 votes over another congressionalcandidate, Olivia Paras20(Paras), who obtained 57,962.
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On May 15, 2007, Paras filed with the COMELEC a Very Urgent Motion for Leave toIntervene and to Suspend the Proclamation of Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong as WinningCandidate of the First District of Negros Oriental.21

In a Joint Resolution22dated May 17, 2007, the COMELEC Second Division granted thepetitions in the disqualification cases, disqualified Limkaichong as a candidate for

Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental, directed the Provincial Supervisor of theCOMELEC to strike out her name from the list of eligible candidates, and for the ProvincialBoard of Canvassers (PBOC) to suspend her proclamation. In disposing the cases, theCOMELEC Second Division made the following ratiocination:

On the substantial issue of whether respondent Jocelyn Sy-Limkaichong is disqualified to run forthe congressional seat of the First District of Negros Oriental on the ground that she is not anatural-born Filipino, we hold that she is so disqualified.

Petitioners have successfully discharged their burden of proof and has convincingly shown withpieces of documentary evidence that Julio Ong Sy, father of herein respondent Jocelyn Sy-Limkaichong, failed to acquire Filipino citizenship in the naturalization proceedingswhichhe underwent for the said purpose.

An examination of the records of Special Case No. 1043 would reveal that the Office of theSolicitor General was deprived of its participation in all the stages of the proceedingstherein, as required under Commonwealth Act No. 473 or the Revised Naturalization Law andRepublic Act No. 530, An Act Making Additional Provisions for Naturalization.

x x x

The documents presented by petitioners showed that the OSG was not furnished copies oftwo material orders of the trial court in the said proceedings . One was the July 9, 1957

Ordergranting his petition for naturalization and the other was the September 21, 1959Orderdeclaring Julio Ong Sy as a Filipino citizen.

Moreover, from a perusal of the same page 171 of the OSG logbook, we have determinedthat the OSG did not receive a notice for the hearing conducted by the trial court on July9, 1959, prior to its issuance of the September 12, 1959 Order declaring Julio Ong Sy as aFilipino citizen.

As correctly pointed out by petitioners, this was fatal to the naturalization proceedings ofJulio Ong Sy, andprevented the same from gaining finality. The leading case in the matteris Republic v. Hon. Gabriel V. Valero, 136 SCRA 617 (May 31, 1985), wherein the SupremeCourt declared:

And as though that was not enough, the hearing prior to the oathtaking of respondent Tan wasconducted without the required notice to the Solicitor General. It is true, as it appeared later, thatFiscal Veluz, Jr. was authorized by the Solicitor General to represent the Government in thehearing of the application for naturalization. That authority, however, does not extend to Fiscal[Veluzs] right to appear for theState in the hearing preparatory to the oathtaking. Privaterespondent Tan was therefore under legal obligation to serve copy of his motion to be allowedto take his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen upon the Solicitor General which was notdone.
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Respondent argues that upon his taking of the Oath of Allegiance, Julio Ong Sy became aFilipino citizen for all intents and purposes, with all the rights appurtenant thereto.

This argument does not hold water, as was held by the Supreme Court in the same case ofRepublic v. Valero, supra:

That private respondent Tan had already taken his oath of allegiance does not in any waylegalize the proceedings relative thereto which is pregnant with legal infirmities. Compoundingthese irregularities is the fact that Tan was allowed to take his oath even before the expiration ofthe thirty (30)-day period within which an appeal may be made thus making the said oath notonly highly improper but also illegal.

In the same case, the Supreme Court added:

To sustain the same would be to sanction a monstrosity known as citizenship by estoppel. Thegrant of naturalization under such circumstances is illegal and cancellation thereof may be hadat any time. Neither estoppel nor res judicata may be set up as a bar from instituting thenecessary proceedings to nullify the certificate of naturalization so issued.

Another glaring defect in the said proceedings was the fact that Julio Ong Sy took his Oath ofAllegiance on October 21, 1959, which was exactly thirty (30) days after his declarationas a naturalized Filipino.

Even granting that the OSG was notified of the September 21, 1959 Order, this was still one dayshort of the reglementary period required under Sections 11 and 12 of C.A. No. 473, above-cited.

The thirty-day reglementary period is so required under the law so that the OSG could makeknown his objections and to appeal from the order of the trial court declaring the petitioner a

naturalized Filipino citizen. This is also the reason why a copy of the petitioners motion t o takehis oath of allegiance has to be furnished to the OSG.

The respondent insists that naturalization proceedings are in rem and are binding on the wholeworld.

She would have been correct had all the necessary parties to the case been informed of thesame. The OSG, being the counsel for the government, has to participate in all the proceedingsso that it could be bound by what has transpired therein. Lacking the participation of thisindispensable party to the same, the proceedings are null and void and, hence, no rights couldarise therefrom.

From all the foregoing, therefore, it could be seen that Julio Ong Sy did not acquire Filipinocitizenship through the naturalization proceedings in Special Case No. 1043. Thus, hewas only able to transmit to his offspring, Chinese citizenship.

Respondent Jocelyn Sy-Limkaichong being the daughterof Julio Ong Sy, and havingbeen born on November 9, 1959, under the 1935 Philippine Constitution, is a Chinesenational, and is disqualifiedto run as First District Representative of Negros Oriental.


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WHEREFORE, the Petitions are GRANTED and Jocelyn D. Sy-Limkaichong is declared asDISQUALIFIED from her candidacy for Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.

The Provincial Supervisor of the Commission on Elections of Negros Oriental is hereby directedto strike out the name JOCELYN SY-LIMKAICHONG from the list of eligible candidates for thesaid position, and the concerned Board of Canvassers is hereby directed to hold and/or

suspend the proclamation of JOCELYN SY-LIMKAICHONG as winning candidate, if any, untilthis decision has become final.

SO ORDERED.23

The PBOC received the Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division on the evening ofMay 17, 2007, and accordingly suspended the proclamation of Limkaichong.24

The following day, or on May 18, 2007, the COMELEC En Bancissued Resolution No.806225adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending the proclamation of winningcandidates with pending disqualification caseswhich shall be without prejudice to thecontinuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases.

On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong filed with the COMELEC a Motion for Reconsideration of theJoint Resolution of May 17, 2007 and Urgent Motion to Lift the Order SuspendingProclamation.26

On May 22, 2007, Limkaichong filed another motion for the lifting of the directive suspending herproclamation, insisting that she should be proclaimed as the winner in the congressional racepursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8062.27On same date, Villando, one of the petitioners inthe disqualification cases, filed an Urgent Manifestation Clarifying COMELEC ResolutionNo. 8062 with Motion,28praying that the COMELEC should not lift the suspension ofLimkaichongs proclamation.

On May 25, 2007, the PBOC, in compliance with COMELEC Resolution No. 8062, reconvenedand proclaimed Limkaichong as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives forthe First District of Negros Oriental.29

Thereafter, or on May 30, 2007, Paras filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Nullify and/orAnnul the Proclamation of Jocelyn Sy-Limkaichong as First District Representative ofNegros Oriental in relation to the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution of the COMELEC SecondDivision,30stating, among others, that Limkaichong's proclamation violated the earlier order ofthe COMELEC Second Division suspending her proclamation. The petition, docketed as SPCNo. 07-211, was dismissed by the COMELEC First Division,31ratiocinating that thedisqualification cases were not yet final when Limkaichong was proclaimed. Accordingly, her

proclamation which was valid or legal, effectively divested the COMELEC of its jurisdiction overthe cases. The COMELEC First Division explained its ruling in this wise:

The Commission has made its intention in issuing Resolution No. 8062very clear in thatthere shall be no suspension of proclamation of winning candidates with pendingdisqualification cases involving, among others, issues of citizenship. As thedisqualification cases involving Limkaichong were still pending reconsideration by the enbanc,the underlying policy which gave rise to the issuance of the Resolution: to respect the will
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of the Filipino electorate, applies to the suspension of proclamation of the winning congressionalcandidate for the First District of Negros Oriental.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is dismissed.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis ours)

Dissatisfied, Paras moved for the reconsideration of the above Resolution.32

Meanwhile, in a Resolution33dated June 29, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc, in an equallydivided vote of 3:3, denied Limkaichongs motion for reconsideration of the Joint Resolution ofthe COMELEC Second Division in the disqualification cases. The pertinent portions of theResolution denying her motion reads:

Anent the issue of jurisdiction, We rule that the Commission has jurisdiction to rule onRespondent Limkaichongs Motion for Reconsideration notwithstanding her proclamation as it isonly this Commission, and not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which

has jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by adivision or en banc. As stated by the Supreme Court in the leading case of Codilla v. DeVenecia, G.R. No. 150605, December 10, 2002, respondent herself seasonably challenged thevalidity of the resolution of the Second Division in her motion for reconsideration. Hence, theissue of respondents disqualification was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of theComelec En Banc to resolve, and HRET cannot assume jurisdiction on the matter, to wit:

To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of theResolution of the COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner inhis Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of theComelec En Banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.

In Puzon v. Cua, even the HRET ruled that the "doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation hasbeen made and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this Tribunal that has jurisdictionover an election contest involving members of the House of Representatives, could not havebeen immediately applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the very COMELECpronouncements themselves." This is because the HRET has no jurisdiction to reviewresolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by a division or en banc.

Finally, in disposing the Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration with Partial Motion forReconsideration filed by intervenor Olivia P. Paras praying that she be proclaimed as thewinning candidate for First District Representative, suffice it to say that in the same case ofCodilla v. De Venecia, supra, the Supreme Court held, thus:

More brazen is the proclamation of respondent Locsin which violates the settled doctrine thatthe candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner incase the winning candidate is disqualified. In every election, the peoples choice is theparamount consideration and their expressed will must, at all times, be given effect. When themajority speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving him the highest number of votescast in the election for the office, no one can be declared elected in his place. In Domino v.COMELEC, this Court ruled, viz.:
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It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right tosuffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimedwinner and imposed as representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positivelydeclared through their ballots that they do not choose him. To simplistically assume that thesecond placer would have received that (sic) other votes would be to substitute our judgment forthe mind of the voters. He could not be considered the first among the qualified candidates

because in a field which excludes the qualified candidate, the conditions would havesubstantially changed.

x x x

The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an office is only that the electionfails entirely, that the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to therepudiated loser because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration in favor of theperson who has obtained a plurality of votes, and does not entitle the candidate receiving thenext highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such case, the electors have failed tomake a choice and the election is a nullity. To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate totake over the elective position despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the

electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance and meaning ofdemocracy and the peoples right to elect officials of their choice.

All told, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of this Commission (SecondDivision) in its Joint Resolution promulgated on May 17, 2007.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration of RespondentJocelyn Sy-Limkaichong is hereby DENIED.

The Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration with Partial Motion for Reconsideration filedby Intervenor Olivia P. Paras praying that she be proclaimed as the winning candidate for theFirst District Representative of Negros Oriental is hereby denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.34

On July 3, 2007, Limkaichong filed in the disqualification cases against her a Manifestationand Motion for Clarification and/or To Declare the Petitions as Dismissed in Accordancewith Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.35She contended that, with herproclamation, her having taken her oath of office and her assumption of the position, theCOMELEC was divested of jurisdiction to hear the disqualification cases. She further contendedthat, following Section 6,36Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the disqualificationcases would have to be reheard, and if on rehearing, no decision would be reached, the actionor proceedings should be dismissed, because the COMELEC En Bancwas equally divided in

opinion when it resolved her motion for reconsideration.

On an even date, Paras wrote the House of Representatives informing it of the COMELEC EnBanc Resolution dated June 29, 2007 upholding the Joint Resolution of the COMELEC SecondDivision dated May 17, 2007, which disqualified Limkaichong as a congressional candidate.37

In the interim, then Speaker of the House of Representatives Jose de Venecia, Jr. (De Venecia)allowed Limkaichong to officially assume the office as a Member of the House ofRepresentatives on July 23, 2007, as shown in the Journal of the House of Representatives.38
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Despite Limkaichongs repeated pleas for the resolution of her manifestation and motion forclarification,39the COMELEC did not resolve the same. Hence, on August 1, 2007, she filed withthis Court a Petition for Certiorari40under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules ofCivil Procedure docketed as G.R. Nos. 178831-32 praying for the annulment of the May 17,2007 Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division and the June 29, 2007 Resolution ofthe COMELEC En Banc in the disqualification cases for having been issued with grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. She averred that since she was already proclaimedon May 25, 2007 as Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental, had assumed officeon June 30, 2007, and had started to perform her duties and functions as such, the COMELEChad lost its jurisdiction and it is now the HRET which has jurisdiction over any issue involvingher qualifications for the said office.

On August 16, 2007, the COMELEC En Bancruled on Limkaichongs manifestation and motionfor clarification,41with the following disquisition:

In view of the proclamation of Limkaichongand her subsequent assumption of office onJune 30, 2007, this Commission rules that all pending incidents relating to thequalifications of Limkaichong should now be determined by the House of

Representatives Electoral Tribunalin accordance with the above-quoted provision of theConstitution.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission resolved, as it hereby resolves, that allpending incidents relating to the qualifications of Jocelyn S. Limkaichong as Member of theHouse of Representatives should now be determined by the House of Representatives ElectoralTribunal.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis ours)

On August 24, 2007, Louis Biraogo (Biraogo), as a citizen and a taxpayer, filed with the Courta Petition for Prohibition and Injunction with Preliminary Injunction and/or TemporaryRestraining Order42under Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, docketedas G.R. No. 179120, seeking to enjoin and permanently prohibit: (a) De Venecia from allowingLimkaichong to sit in the House of Representatives and participate in all its official activities; and(b) Limkaichong from holding office as its Member.43

Meanwhile, on August 28, 2007, Paras has instituted before the Court a Petition for QuoWarranto, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a TemporaryRestraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction44under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules ofCivil Procedure, docketed as G.R. Nos. 179132-33, seeking, among others, the ouster ofLimkaichong from the House of Representatives on account of her disqualification and for theholding of special elections to fill the vacancy created by such.45

On even date, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution46denying Villando'smotion to suspend the proclamation of Limkaichong, which denial was affirmed by theCOMELEC En Banc in a Resolution47dated February 1, 2008.

On September 5, 2008, Villando also filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari andInjunction with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order48under Rule 65 ofthe 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed as G.R. Nos. 179240-41, contending, amongothers, that the COMELEC En Bancgravely abused its discretion in issuing the August 16, 2007
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Resolution49because it still acted on Limchaikongs manifestation and motion for clarification,notwithstanding that the same was not set for hearing and considering that its June 29, 2007Resolution had already become final and executory.

As the four (4) petitions are interrelated, the Court resolved to consolidate them in itsResolutions dated September 4 and 11, 2007.

The Court heard the parties in oral argument on August 26, 2008, during which the followingissues were tackled:

1. Whether the proclamation of Limkaichong by the Provincial Board of Canvassers ofNegros Oriental is valid;

2. Whether said proclamation divested the Commission on Elections of jurisdiction toresolve the issue of Limkaichong's citizenship;

3. Whether the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal shall assume jurisdiction, in

lieu of the COMELEC, over the issue of Limkaichong's citizenship;

4. Whether the COMELEC Second Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly ruledthat Limkaichong is disqualified from running as a Member of the House ofRepresentatives on the ground that she is not a natural-born citizen;

5. Whether the COMELEC disqualification of Limkaichong is final and executory; and,

6. Whether the Speaker of the House of Representatives may be compelled to prohibitLimkaichong from assuming her duties as a Member of the House of Representatives.

On same day, the Court required the parties to simultaneously file within twenty (20) days their

respective memoranda, after which the petitions shall be deemed submitted for resolution, withor without the memoranda.

Section 6,Article VIof the 1987 Philippine Constitutionprovides for the qualification of aMember of the House of Representatives, thus:

Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years ofage, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in thedistrict in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one yearimmediately preceding the day of the election.

When Limkaichong filed her COC, she stated therein that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Itwas not true, according to the petitioners in the disqualification cases, because her fatherremained a Chinese citizen at the time of her birth. The COMELEC Second Division has sidedwith Camero and Villando, and disqualified Limkaichong to run as a congressional candidate inthe First District of Negros Oriental for having failed to comply with the citizenship requirement.

Accordingly, her proclamation was ordered suspended notwithstanding that she obtained thehighest number of votes during the elections. Nonetheless, she was proclaimed by the PBOCpursuant to the policy guidelines of COMELEC En BancResolution No. 8062, and she has
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since assumed her position and performed her functions as a Member of the House ofRepresentatives.

I

Whether Limkaichongs proclamation was valid.

The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. The COMELEC Second Division rendered its JointResolution dated May 17, 2007. On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong timely filed with theCOMELEC En Bancher motion for reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the incorporateddirective suspending her proclamation. The filing of the motion for reconsiderationeffectively suspended the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution.50Since theexecution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution was suspended, there was no impediment to thevalid proclamation of Limkaichong as the winner. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules ofProcedure provides:

Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration.A motion to reconsider a decision,resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgationthereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution for implementation of thedecision, resolution, order and ruling.

In G.R. Nos. 179132-33, Paras, however, maintained that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizenwho was disqualified to run as a congressional candidate by way of a final judgment of theCOMELEC. With that, her proclamation was questionable and the same was done in opendefiance of the Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division. Shealso stressed that Limkaichong's proclamation was procedurally defective, it appearing that oneof the PBOC members was not present on May 25, 2007, and that it took place in a restaurantand not at the provincial capitol. Finally, she argued that Limkaichongs proclamation was voidin accordance with the Court's pronouncement in the case of Codilla v. De Venecia.51

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Comment on the petition of Paras, expressingits support for the position taken by the latter.

A perusal of the arguments advanced by Paras and the OSG does not sway the Court to ruleagainst the validity of Limkaichongs proclamation. No less than the COMELEC First Divisionhas sustained the validity of her proclamation when it dismissed, by way of a Resolution datedJune 29, 2007, the petition filed by Paras to nullify the proclamation. Not only that. TheCOMELEC First Division has also adopted Limkaichongs argument that following her validproclamation, the COMELECs jurisdiction over the disqualification cases has ceased and thatthe same should be threshed out in the proper proceedings filed before the HRET. Notably, thedismissal of Paras petition was affirmed by the COMELEC in its Omnibus Order dated January

28, 2008.

In addition, the validity of Limkaichong's proclamation is in accordance with COMELEC EnBanc Resolution No. 8062. The disqualification cases filed against her remained pending as aresult of her timely motion for reconsideration. Villando (in G.R. Nos. 179240-41), however,maintained that Resolution No. 8062 is invalid; hence, it could not be used as basis to validateLimkaichong's proclamation. He argued that it must be published since it is a "policy-guideline"in the exercise of the COMELECs rule-making power. As such, it cannot supersede the Joint
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Resolution of the Second Division which was rendered pursuant to the COMELECs quasi-judicial power.

His argument is specious. Resolution No. 8062 is not only a policy- guideline. It is also anadministrative interpretation of the two (2) provisions of the 1987 Constitution, namely: (i)Section 17,52Article VI (ii); Section 2(2),53Article IX-C; Section 654of R.A. 6646; and Sections

24155and 243,56Article XX of the OEC. As such, it does not have to comply with the dueprocess requirement. The term "administrative" connotes or pertains to "administration,especially management, as by managing or conducting, directing or superintending, theexecution, application, or conduct of persons or things." It does not entail an opportunity to beheard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision or resolution thereon.57This isto be distinguished from "quasi-judicial function," a term which applies, among others, to theaction or discretion of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigatefacts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as abasis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.58

Resolution No. 8062 is a valid exercise of the COMELECs constitutionally mandated power topromulgate its own rules of procedure relative to the conduct of the elections.59In adopting such

policy-guidelines for the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections, the COMELEC had in mindthe objective of upholding the sovereign will of the people and in the interest of justice and fairplay. Accordingly, those candidates whose disqualification cases are still pending at the time ofthe elections, should they obtain the highest number of votes from the electorate, shall beproclaimed but that their proclamation shall be without prejudice to the continuation of thehearing and resolution of the involved cases. Whereas, in this case, the COMELEC SecondDivision having failed to act on the disqualification cases against Limkaichong until after theconduct of the elections, with her obtaining the highest number of votes from the electorate, herproclamation was properly effected by the PBOC pursuant to Resolution No. 8062.

The Court has held in the case of Planas v. COMELEC,60that at the time of the proclamation ofDefensor, the respondent therein who garnered the highest number of votes, the Division

Resolution invalidating his certificate of candidacy was not yet final. As such, his proclamationwas valid or legal, as he had at that point in time remained qualified. Limkaichongs situation isno different from that of Defensor, the former having been disqualified by a Division Resolutionon the basis of her not being a natural-born Filipino citizen. When she was proclaimed by thePBOC, she was the winner during the elections for obtaining the highest number of votes, andat that time, the Division Resolution disqualifying her has not yet became final as a result of themotion for reconsideration.

II

Whether, upon Limkaichong's proclamation, the HRET, instead of the COMELEC, shouldassume jurisdiction over the disqualification cases.

In her petition (G.R. Nos. 178831-32), Limkaichong argued that her proclamation on May 25,2007 by the PBOC divested the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over all issues relating to herqualifications, and that jurisdiction now lies with the HRET.

Biraogo, on the other hand, believed otherwise. He argued (in G.R. No. 179120) that the issueconcerning Limkaichongs disqualification is still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
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COMELEC En Banc to resolve because when Limkaichong was proclaimed on May 25, 2007,the matter was still pending resolution before the COMELECEn Banc.

We do not agree. The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has beenproclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed officeas a Member of the House ofRepresentatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his

election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins .61Itfollows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its

jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioninghis qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, theconstitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the Houseof Representatives with respect to the latter's election, returns and qualifications. The use of theword "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 25062of the OECunderscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests relatingto its members.63

Section 17, Article VIof the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representativesshall each have an Electoral Tribunalwhich shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, andqualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed ofnine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by theChief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House ofRepresentatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportionalrepresentation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under theparty-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be itsChairman.

Corollary thereto is Rule 14of the 1998 Rules of the HRET, as amended, which states:

RULE 14. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal is the sole judgeof all contests relating to the election,returns, andqualificationsof the Members of the House of Representatives. lavvphil.zw+

The COMELEC En Banc, in its Resolution dated August 16, 2007, had given paramountconsideration to the two (2) aforementioned provisions when it stated that:

In view of the proclamation of Limkaichongand her subsequent assumption of office onJune 30, 2007, this Commission rules that all pending incidents relating to thequalifications of Limkaichong should now be determined by the House ofRepresentatives Electoral Tribunalin accordance with the above-quoted provision of theConstitution.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission resolved, as it hereby resolves, that allpending incidents relating to the qualifications of Jocelyn S. Limkaichong as Member of theHouse of Representatives should now be determined by the House of Representatives ElectoralTribunal.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
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Worth citing also is the ratiocination of the COMELEC First Division when it dismissed thepetition of Paras seeking the nullity of Limkaichong's proclamation, thus:

The present situation is similar not to the factual circumstances of Codilla, which Paras invokes,but rather to that in Planaswhich adheres to the general rule giving jurisdiction to the House ofRepresentatives Electoral Tribunal. As at the time of Limkaichong's proclamation, her

disqualification was not yet final, her proclamation was valid or legal. This Commission nolonger has jurisdiction over the case. This, notwithstanding the Second Division's directivesuspending Limkaichong's proclamation.

The Commission has made its intention in issuing Resolution No. 8062 very clear in that thereshall be no suspension of proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualificationcases, involving, among others, issues of citizenship. As the disqualification cases involvingLimkaichong were still pending reconsideration by theEn Banc, the underlying policy which gaverise to the issuance of the resolution: to respect the will of the Filipino electorate, applies to thesuspension of proclamation of the winning Congressional candidate for the First District ofNegros Oriental.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners (in G.R. Nos. 179120, 179132-33, and 179240-41) steadfastly maintained thatLimkaichongs proclamation was tainted with irregularity, which will effectively prevent the HRETfrom acquiring jurisdiction.

The fact that the proclamation of the winning candidate, as in this case, was alleged to havebeen tainted with irregularity does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction.64The Court has shedlight on this in the case of Vinzons-Chato,65to the effect that:

In the present case, it is not disputed that respondent Unico has already been proclaimed andtaken his oath of office as a Member of the House of Representatives (Thirteenth Congress);hence, the COMELEC correctly ruled that it had already lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chato'spetition. The issues raised by petitioner Chato essentially relate to the canvassing of returns andalleged invalidity of respondent Unico's proclamation. These are matters that are bestaddressed to the sound judgment and discretion of the HRET. Significantly, the allegation thatrespondent Unico's proclamation is null and void does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction:

x x x [I]n an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate whohas taken his oath of office and assumed his post as congressman is raised, that issue is bestaddressed to the HRET. The reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of

proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard to thepeople's mandate.

Further, for the Court to take cognizance of petitioner Chato's election protest againstrespondent Unico would be to usurp the constitutionally mandated functions of the HRET.

In fine, any allegations as to the invalidity of the proclamation will not prevent the HRET fromassuming jurisdiction over all matters essential to a members qualification to sit in the House ofRepresentatives.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt64http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt64http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt64http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt65http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt65http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt65http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt65http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt64


25/66

The 1998 HRET Rules, as amended, provide for the manner of filing either an election protestor a petition for quo warrantoagainst a Member of the House of Representatives, to wit:

Rule 16. Election protest. --A verified petition contesting the election of any Member of theHouse of Representatives shall be filed by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate ofcandidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten (10) days after the proclamation of

the winner. The party filing the protest shall be designated as the protestant while the adverseparty shall be known as the protestee.

x x x

Rule 17. Quo Warranto. -- A verified petition for quo warrantocontesting the election of aMember of the House of Representatives on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to theRepublic of the Ph

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