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SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
The proposed study entitled, ‘FDI in Banking and Insurance
sector’ would prove significant in analyzing and critically examining
the latest trends and strategies of FDI in Banking and Insurance
Sector in India. Study on the basis of present scenario distinctively
approaches to highlight the future prospects for the upliftment of
FDI in the Banking and Insurance Sector in India. It would be
useful for the policy makers to draft suitable strategies to facilitate
FDI for the growth and development of Banking and Insurance
Sector. The study would also prove to be an asset for all those
researchers who would be interested to study the FDI in Banking
and Insurance Sector in the future. The proposed study will place
great importance to the researcher to acquire deep and thorough
knowledge about the topic.
FOCUS OF THE PROBLEM
The present study focuses on the trends and patterns of FDI in the
Banking and Insurance Sector in India. The study would be focus
on critically examine the FDI policies related to Banking Sector and
suggest policy reforms necessary to attract FDI in the specified
sector.
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OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
1. To analyse the trend and pattern of FDI.
2. To make an assessment of determinants of FDI.
3. To study the FDI policies / legislative framework.
4. To suggest policy reforms necessary for attracting FDI.
5. To recommend various measures to improve the FDI.
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Research Methodology comprises of defining the problem,
collecting, organizing and evaluating data, making deductions,
reaching conclusions and suggesting solutions.
NATURE OF RESEARCH:
The proposed research will be of analytical and descriptive in
nature in which the facts and information already available
will be used by the researcher.
UNIVERSE AND SURVEY POPULATION SAMPLE:
In this study whole of the Banking and Insurance sector
represents universe and few Banking and Insurance firms (with in
Delhi Gurgaon region) will constitute the sample for the study.
DATA COLLECTION:
The study would be based on both Primary as well as Secondary
data.
The Secondary data would be collected to know the trends and
pattern of FDI and various policies of FDI related to Banking and
Insurance Sector.
In order to collect factual information and to know the ground
realities of existing FDI policies and the extent of thereeffectiveness, Primary data will be collected by the researcher.
• SOURCES OF DATA:
Secondary data will be collected through following sources:
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- Various reports of government like RBI reports, Planning
Commission reports, Reports on reforms in Banking and
Insurance sector etc.
- IMF reports, World Bank reports and UNCTAD reports.
- Reports of CII and Chamber Of Commerce.
- Various Newspaper, Journals, Magazines and Research
Articles.
- Internet.
Primary data will be collected through a survey of the executives
of selected Banking and Insurance companies.
• SAMPLING PLAN:
To conduct the proposed survey, researcher will make a list of
existing Banks and Insurance Companies operating in Delhi-Gurgaon region.
From the above list prepared, on the basis of convenient
sampling, five Banking and five Insurance companies would be
selected for the study.
•
RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS:
To conduct the survey, a structure questionnaire consisting both
Open-ended and Close-ended questions will be prepared which
will be filled through personal interview with the respondents by
the researcher.
ANALYSIS PATTERN:
In order to analyze the available data, the researcher will use
various statistical and geographical tools.
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LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
The study would include sample size of five Banking and five
Insurance companies.
• Time may be the biggest constraint as many times it will not be
possible to meet senior officials to collect such information. But
all efforts will be made to get all the relevant information
required for this study.
• There may be biases on the part of the Company Executive while
providing the information.
• Some of the respondents may be reluctant to provide theinformation.
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CONCEPTUALIZATION
Emerging markets possess a lot of potential for foreign direct
investment (FDI). FDI in India is on the increase but the country has
not experienced a rapid growth of FDI inflow. Theories of FDI
suggest that firm size, profitability, trade, interest rates, economy
and inflation wield significant influence in attracting FDI. This study
explores the factors that contribute to the explanation of FDI in
India.
FOREIGN INVESTMENT TRENDS
FDI approved in 2003 is US$ 3.1 billion as against US$ 4.43
billion in 2002.
FDI inflows approved in the period April 1991-April 2003 stood
at US$ 78 billion, of which US$ 35.5 billion has been realized.
USA accounted for $ 16 billion (24.9%). The other major
investor countries are Mauritius, UK, Japan, South Korea,
Germany, Netherlands, Australia, France, Malaysia, Singaporeand Italy in that order.
Even Chinese firms have started investing in India. For
example, ZTE of China is investing $ 50 million in the telecom
sector. Haier is investing 200 million dollars to manufacture
refrigerators and set up a Rand D facility.
Sector-wise break-up of FDI is as follows: fuels -26.7%,
telecom-19.6%, electrical equipments-9.9%, transportation-
7.5%, services-6.5% and metallurgical industry-5.3%
Major FDI destinations are Maharashtra-17.4%, Delhi-12%,
Tamilnadu-8.6%, Karnataka-8.2%, Gujarat-6.5%, and Andhra
Pradesh- 4.6%.
MNCs , which have invested in India include GE, Dupont, Eli
Lily, Monsanto, Caterpillar, GM, Hewlett Packard, Motorola,Bell Labs, Daimler Chrysler, Intel, Texas Instruments,
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Cummins, Microsoft, IBM, Toyota, Mitsubishi, Samsung, LG,
Novartis, Bayer, Nestle, Coca Cola and McDonalds.
FII investment increased by almost ten times in 2003 reaching
a record US$ 7.59 billion, as against a mere 739 million dollarsin 2002. FII investment in the first quarter of 2004 stood at $ 4
billion. Cumulative FII investment since the equity market was
opened in the early 1990s is $ 25 billion. The number of
registered FIIs in India is 540.
CALPERS (California Public Employees Retirement System ),
the world's biggest pension fund with a base of US$ 165 billion
has recently decided to include India in their list of countriesfor investment.
US$ 6.5 billion of the FII funds in 2003 went into equities FIIs
have 50 percent stake in one third of the 30 companies which
make up the BSE-30 Index and hold about 10 percent of the
stakes in public sector undertakings.
Foreign Investment - Policies and Procedures The Common Minimum Programme of the government states
that "FDI will continue to be encouraged and actively sought
particularly in areas of infrastructure, high technology and
exports where local assets and employment are created on a
significant scale. The country needs and can easily absorb at
least two to three times the present level of FDI inflows".
Foreign investment can be done in all sectors except foursectors: retail trade, housing and real estate, agriculture and
lottery and gambling. In most of the sectors foreign investors
can go through the Automatic Route without need for any
approvals. The investor has to merely keep the Reserve Bank
of India informed of the flow of funds and issue of shares. In
some sectors ( examples: courier services, gas pipelines and
trading ), prior approval is needed
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There are maximum limits on foreign investment in some
sectors. Examples: telecommunications (49%), insurance
(26%), banking (74%), mining (74%) aviation (40%),defence
equipments(26%), cable network(49%),trading (51%),printmedia(26%) and small-scale industries (24%). FDI in excess of
24% is permitted in small-scale industry at 50% export
obligation.
Prior approval of the government is needed for those cases,
which need industrial license ( examples: alcoholic beverages,
cigarettes,defence equipments, gunpowder and hazardous
chemicals. ) and those involving investment beyond themaximum limits. Such cases are cleared by the Foreign
Investment Promotion Board in a transparent, efficient, time-
bound and predictable manner. The FIPB meets once a week.
The Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion is the nodal
agency for information and assistance to foreign investors.
Their website www.dipp.nic.in has comprehensive information
for foreign investors and gives weekly update on proposals forforeign investment under consideration. It also gives
information on projects available for foreign investors and
contains online applications for clearances.
The Various state governments in India offer competitive
incentives and attractions to foreign investors.
Intellectual Property Rights Laws of India are well on track
with the rest of the world. With the third amendment to the
already substantially revised Patents Act by end 2004, India
would be TRIPS-Compliant before the deadline of 1st January,
2005.
Capital account convertibility for foreign investors.
Potential for investment in India
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The Government is focusing on expansion and modernization
of roads and has opened this up for private sector
participation. 48 new road projects worth US$ 12 billion are
under construction. Development and upgradation of roadswill require an investment of US$ 24 billion till 2008. Private
sector participation in road projects will grow significantly.
Special incentives and tax-breaks are given for certain sectors
such as power, electronics, telecom, software, hydrocarbons,
R&D and exports.
The railway sector will need an investment of US$ 22 billion
for new coaches, tracks, and communications and safetyequipment over the next ten years.
Upgradation and modernization of airports will require US$ 33
billion investment in the next ten years.
There is potential for investment in the expansion and
modernization of ports. The government has taken up a
US$22 billion 'Sagarmala' project to develop the Port andShipping sector under Public-Private Partnership. 100 percent
FDI is permitted for construction and maintenance of ports.
The government is offering incentives to investors.
The Ministry of Power has formulated a blueprint to provide
reliable, affordable and quality power to all users by 2012.
This calls for investment of US$ 73 billion in the next five
years. Opportunities are there for investment in powergeneration and distribution and development of non-
conventional energy sources.
There is potential for investment in urban infrastructure
projects. Water supply and sanitation projects alone offer
scope for annual investment of US$ 5.71 billion.
The entire gamut of exploration, production, refining,
distribution and retail marketing present opportunities for FDI.
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India has an estimated 85 billion tones of mineral reserves
remaining to be exploited. Potential areas for exploration
ventures include gold, diamonds, copper, lead zinc, cobalt
silver, tin etc. There is also scope for setting up manufacturingunits for value added products.
The telecom market, which is one of the world's largest and
fastest growing, has an investment potential of US$ 20-25
billion over the next five years. The telecom market turnover
is expected to increase from US$ 8.6 billion in 2003 to US$ 13
billion by 2007.
The IT industry and IT-enabled services, which are rapidlygrowing offer opportunities for FDI.
India has emerged as an important venue for the services
sector including financial accounting, call centers, and
business process outsourcing. There is considerable potential
for growth in these areas.
Biotechnology and Bioinformatics, which are in thegovernment's priority list for development, offer scope for FDI.
There are over 50 R&D labs in the public sector to support
growth in these areas.
The Indian auto industry with a turnover US $ 12 billion and
the auto parts industry with a turnover of 3 billion dollars offer
scope for FDI.
The government is encouraging the establishment of world-class integrated textile complexes and processing units. FDI is
welcome.
While India has abundant supply of food, the food processing
industry is relatively nascent and offers opportunities for FDI.
Only 2 percent of fruits and vegetables and 15 percent of milk
are processed at present. There is a rapidly increasing
demand for processed food caused by rising urbanization and
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income levels. To meet this demand, the investment required
is about US$28 billion. Food processing has been declared as
a priority sector.
The Healthcare industry is expected to increase in size fromits current US$ 17.2 billion to US$ 40 billion by 2012.
The Government has recently established Special Economic
Zones with the purpose of promoting exports and attracting
FDI. These SEZs do not have duty on imports of inputs and
they enjoy simplified fiscal and foreign exchange procedures
and allow 100% FDI.
The travel and tourism industry which has grown to a size of
US$ 32 billion offers scope for investment in budget hotels
and tourism infrastructure.
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INDIA’S SHARE
India’s share in FDI inflows among developing countries reached a
peak of 1.9 per cent in 1997. It declined sharply to 1 per cent in
1999 and 2000 but has recovered sharply to 1.7 per cent in
2001(Table 3.2). India’s performance on the FDI front has shown a
significant improvement since last year. FDI inflows grew by 65 per
cent to US$ 3.91 billion during 2001-02 thus exceeding the previous
peak of US $ 3.56 billion in 1997-98 (as per BOP accounts of RBI).
This growth of 65 per cent is particularly encouraging at a time
when global FDI inflows have declined by over 40 per cent.1 The
upward trend in FDI inflows has been sustained during the current
financial year with FDI inflows during April-June 2002 about double
that during the corresponding period of 2001 (as per DIPP data).
In 2000, China with 17 per cent had the highest share of developing
country FDI followed by Brazil with 13.9 per cent of developing
country FDI. The gap between the shares of these two countriesnarrowed during the nineties with Brazil gradually catching up with
China, but has again widened in 2001. Though the share of
Argentina, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia and Taiwan is much
lower than that of China and Brazil, it was, till 2000 two to five times
that of India’s measured inflow.
The most remarkable transformation has occurred in South Korea,whose share in developing country FDI inflows was identical to that
of India in 1993, and which fell below that of India in 1994 and 1995,
but was four times that of India’s in 2000 (Figure 3.2). Because of
the Asian crisis in 1997-98 and the effect of sanctions on investor’s
sentiment, India’s share of developing country FDI fell at the end of
the nineties. There has however been a significant improvement
during 2001.
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India’s measured FDI as a percentage of total Gross Domestic
Product(GDP) is quite low in comparison to other competing
countries (Table 3.3). India the 12 th largest country in the world interms of GDP at current exchange rates is able to attract FDI equal
only to 0.9 per cent of its GDP in 2001. In contrast FDI inflows into
Vietnam were 6.8 per cent of its GDP in 2000. Even Malaysia, which
has recently developed an image of being somewhat against the
globalisation paradigm, receives FDI equal to 3.9 per cent of its
GDP. Similarly China attracts FDI equal to 3.8 per cent of its GDP.
Thailand, which has a relatively low FDI-GDP ratio among the majordeveloping country recipients of FDI, had a ratio four times that of
India in 2000. This gap probably narrowed in 2001 and could narrow
further in 2002 if the recent acceleration in growth of FDI into India
can be sustained.
India’s FDI inflow estimates, in the Balance of Payments do not
include reinvested earnings (by foreign companies), inter-company
debt transactions (subordinated debt) and overseas commercial
borrowings by foreign direct investors in foreign invested firms, as
per the standard IMF definitions. Methodologically, reinvested
earnings are required to be shown notionally as dividends paid out
under investment income in current account and as inflow of FDI.
The other capital, in turn, covers the borrowing and lending of funds
– including debt securities and suppliers’ credit – between direct
investors and direct investment enterprises. From a technical point
of view, it is well recognized that it is quite difficult to capture
‘reinvested earnings’ through the reporting arrangements for
foreign exchange transactions, mainly because such transactions do
not take place though it have to be imputed in the balance of
payments statistics. Direct investment, other capital transactions
between direct investors and direct investment enterprises,
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however, pass through the banking channel. There exists, however,
the problem of identifying and isolating mutual borrowing and
lending of funds among direct investors and direct investment
enterprises. Recognizing the above-mentioned constraints, greaterreliance needs to be placed on collection of such data through direct
investors’ survey. The proper coverage of such transactions in India
depends, therefore, upon the availability of information through the
survey. The data on inward FDI for India at present do not include
reinvested earnings and ‘direct investment other capital.’ In this
context, the National Statistical Commission recommended
conducting periodical surveys on dividends and profits arising out of
foreign direct investment and portfolio investment separately. In
pursuance of the recommendation, a survey is being launched by
the Reserve Bank of India to collect detailed information on FDI.
Some estimate on reinvested earnings and other capital would be
available from the survey and the data on inward FDI could be
subsequently revised to include the data on reinvested earnings and
other capital .
This issue has come into sharp focus because Dr. Guy Pfefferman,
Chief Economist of the IFC estimated that India’s actual FDI inflow
might be between US$ 5 billion and US$ 8 billion during 2001.
The upper limit of US$ 8 billion is based on the assumption of a 40
per cent return on equity to foreign investors, which seems on the
face of it to be somewhat high. It should be remembered, however,
that in contrast to several other countries in Asia FDI inflows into
India started over a half century ago. If the retained earnings from
all these are cumulated, then the current returns on the stock of
retained earnings would have to be added to the returns on
measured FDI. Added together, these total returns would be high
relative to the stock of measured FDI.
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There is an additional problem of non-comparability when
comparing the FDI flows of different countries with China, which also
applies to China-India comparisons. According to Global
Development Finance, 2002, round tripping amounts to nearly 50per centof total FDI inflows into China in 1999 and 2000. This would
reduce China’s real FDI share to about 9 per cent of developing
country inflows and its adjusted FDI-GDP ratio to 1.8 per cent in
2000. Thus in 2000 the adjusted FDI-GDP ratio for China would be
only double the adjusted FDI-GDP ratio for India
Foreign Direct Investment is one of the key variables for achieving
an eight per cent growth during the Tenth Plan (2002-07). FDI isnecessary for achieving the growth targets of the Tenth Plan. The
Planning Commission constituted a Steering Committee on Foreign
Direct Investment in August 2001, to achieve these objectives.
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows are usually preferred over
other forms of external finance because they are non-debt creating,
non-volatile and their returns depend on the performance of the
projects financed by the investors. FDI also facilitates international
trade and transfer of knowledge, skills and technology. In a world of
increased competition and rapid technological change, their
complimentary and catalytic role can be very valuable.
Foreign Direct Investment in India has constituted 1 per cent of Gross fixed capital formation in 1993, which went up to 4 per cent in
1997. The Tenth Plan approach paper postulates a GDP growth rate
of 8 percent during 2002-07. Given the Incremental Capital-Output
Ratio (ICOR) and the projected level of domestic savings it leaves a
savings gap/current account deficit of around 2.2 per cent. This
implies an increase in FDI from the present levels of $3.9 billion in
2001-02 to at least around US $8 billion a year during 2002-07.
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‘Recognizing the importance of making a quantum jump compared
with the past performance, the Prime Minister directed the Planning
Commission to examine the feasibility of doubling per capita incomein the next ten years. With the population expected to grow at about
1.6 per cent per annum, this target requires the growth of GDP to be
around 8.7 per cent over the Tenth and Eleventh Plan periods. The
growth rate of 8.7 per cent is needed to double per capita income
over the next ten years, but it can be viewed as an intermediate
target for the first half of the period ’. With the average ICOR around
4.0 as witnessed during the Eighth and Ninth Plan periods, thesaving- investment requirement for an 8 per cent annual growth
works out to 32 per cent of GDP, since, Gr = 100 × s/k, s = Gr × k ×
100 = .08 × 4 ×100= 32 per cent.
Where, Gr = Growth rate, s = average propensity to save / rate of
investment, k = incremental capita output ratio (ICOR).
The rate of domestic savings has been in the range of 22-24 per
cent of GDP during the last four years. These rates are lower than
the earlier years, presumably due to decline in government savings
on account of payment of arrears etc. arising from Fifth Pay
Commission Recommendations. The base line savings rate has,
therefore, been assumed to be 26.3 per cent . This still leaves a gap
of another 6.3 per cent to reach the 32.6 per cent of savings rate.
Assuming further improvement, it is projected a domestic savings
rate of 29.8 per cent of GDP, for the Tenth Plan period. This still
leaves a gap of 2.8 per cent for the required investment. Quite
obviously, this calls for sourcing foreign savings to bridge the gap.
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CAUSES OF LOW FDI
Though economic reforms welcoming foreign capital were
introduced in the nineties it does not seem so far to be really
evident in our overall attitude. There is a lingering perception
abroad that foreign investors are still looked at with some suspicion.
There is also a view that some unhappy episodes in the past have a
multiplier effect by adversely affecting the business environment in
India. Besides the “Made in India” label is not conceived by the
world as synonymous with quality.
When a foreign investor considers making any new investment
decision, it goes through four stages in the decision making process
and action cycle, namely, (a) screening, (b) planning, (c)
implementing and (d) operating and expanding. The biggest barrier
for India is at the first, screening stage itself in the action cycle.
“Often India looses out at the screening stage itself” (BCG). This is
primarily because we do not get across effectively to the decision-making “board room” levels of corporate entities where a final
decision is taken. Our promotional effort is quite often of a general
nature and not corporate specific.
India is, moreover, a multi-cultural society and a large number of
multinational companies (MNC) do not understand the diversity and
the multi-plural nature of the society and the different stakeholders
in this country. Though in several cases, the foreign investor isdiscouraged even before he seriously considers a project, 220 of the
Fortune 500 companies have some presence in India and several
surveys (JBIC, Japan Exim bank, A T Kearney) show India as the most
promising and profitable destination. On the other hand China is
viewed as ‘more business oriented,’ its decision-making is faster
and has more FDI friendly policies (ATK 2001). Despite a very similar
historical mistrust of foreigners and foreign investment arising fromcolonial experience, modern (post 1980 China) differs fundamentally
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from India. Its official attitude to FDI, reflected from the highest level
of government (PM, President) to the lowest level of government
bureaucracy (provinces) is one of consciously enticing FDI with a
warm welcome. They recognise the multifaceted and mutualbenefits arising from FDI.
All investments, foreign and domestic are made under the
expectation of future profits. The economy benefits if economic
policy fosters competition, creates a well functioning modern
regulatory system and discourages ‘artificial’ monopolies created by
the government through entry barriers. A recognition andunderstanding of these facts can result in a more positive attitude
towards FDI.
POLICY FRAMEWORK
Most of the problems for investors arise because of domestic policy,
rules and procedures and not the FDI policy per se or its rules and
procedures. The FDI policy, which has a lot of positive features, is
summarised first, before highlighting the domestic policy related
difficulties that are commonly the focus of adverse comment by
investors and intermediaries (Appendix section 8.3).
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FDI Policy
India has one of the most transparent and liberal FDI regimes
among the emerging and developing economies.8 By FDI regime we
mean those restrictions that apply to foreign nationals and entities
but not to Indian nationals and Indian owned entities. The
differential treatment is limited to a few entry rules, spelling out the
proportion of equity that the foreign entrant can hold in an Indian
(registered) company or business. There are a few banned sectors
(like lotteries & gaming and legal services) and some sectors with
limits on foreign equity proportion. The entry rules are clear and
well defined and equity limits for foreign investment in selected
sectors such as telecom quite explicit and well known. Most of the
manufacturing sectors have been for many years on the 100 per
cent automatic route. Foreign equity is limited only in production of
defence equipment (26 per cent), oil marketing (74 per cent) and
government owned petroleum refineries (26 per cent). Most of the
mining sectors are similarly on the 100 per cent automatic route,
with foreign equity limits only on atomic minerals (74 per cent), coal
& lignite (74 per cent), exploration for oil (51 per cent to 74 per
cent) and diamonds and precious stones (74 per cent). 100 per cent
equity is also allowed in non-crop agro-allied sectors and crop
agriculture under controlled conditions (e.g. hot houses). In the case
of infrastructure services, there is a clear dichotomy. While
highways and roads, ports, inland waterways and transport, and
urban infrastructure and courier services are on the 100 per cent
automatic route, telecom (49 per cent), airports (74 per cent), civil
aviation (40 per cent) and oil and gas pipelines (51 per cent) have
foreign equity limits.
India also has a clear policy of FDI in services, with 100 per centautomatic entry into many services such as construction,
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townships/resorts, hotels, tourism, films, IT/ISP/ email/voice mail,
business services & consultancy, renting and leasing, VCFs and
VCCs, medical/health, education, advertising and wholesale trade.
The financial intermediation section has sectoral caps like banking(49 per cent), insurance (26 per cent), as do some services like
professional services (51per cent).
Subject to these foreign equity conditions a foreign company can
set up a registered company in India and operate under the same
laws, rules and regulations as any Indian owned company would.
Unlike many countries including China, India extends National Treatment to foreign investors. There is absolutely no discrimination
against foreign invested companies registered in India or in favour
of domestic owned ones. There is however a minor restriction on
those foreign entities who entered a particular sub-sector through a
joint venture with an Indian partner. If they (i.e. the parent) want to
set up another company in the same sector it must get a no-
objection certificate from the joint-venture partner. This condition isexplicit and transparent unlike many hidden conditions imposed by
some other recipients of FDI. There are also a few prudential
conditions on the sale of shares in unlisted companies and the
above market price sale of shares in public companies.
Domestic Policy
The domestic policy framework affects all investment, whether the
investor is Indian or foreign. To an extent, foreign companies or
investors that have set up an Indian company or Joint Venture have
become indigenised and thus can operate more or less
competitively with other Indian company. They adjust themselves to
the milieu. This is not, however, true of foreign direct investors who
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are coming into India for the first time. To the uninitiated the
hurdles look daunting and the complexity somewhat perplexing.
Among the policy problems that have been identified by surveys as
acting as additional hurdles for FDI are laws, regulatory systems andGovernment monopolies that do not have contemporary relevance.
Illustratively, the outdated Food Price Order (FPO) and Prevention of
Food Adulteration Act are a major hurdle for FDI in food processing.
The latter makes even a technical or minor violation subject to
criminal liability. As a Task force had recommended some years
ago, that we need to formulate a single integrated Food Act
(including weights & measures). This should also make provision for
a modern Food Regulatory system with a single integrated
regulator. Based on the announcement in the last budget a Group of
Ministers has been constituted to evolve a modern food law. The
Essential Commodities Act adds to the difficulty of entering the food
processing industry by making the procurement, storage and
transport of agricultural produce subject to many vagaries and
undermining the competitive advantage that India possesses. The
Central government has recently taken steps to reduce the ambit of
this act and eliminate controls on movement and storage of food
grain. Initial steps have also been taken in the
direction of putting this act into suspended state to be invoked only
by a Central government notification to be applied only to well-
specified emergency conditions like drought, floods and other
natural disasters for a specific area and duration. Othersimplification measures announced in the last budget were the
amendment of the Milk and Milk products Control Order to remove
restrictions on milk processing capacity, decanalisation of the export
of agricultural commodities and phasing out of remaining export
controls, expansion of futures and forward trading to cover all
agricultural commodities and amendment to the Agriculture Produce
Marketing Acts to enable farmers to sell directly to potentialprocessors.
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Similarly labour laws discourage the entry of green field FDI because
of the fear that it would not be possible to downsize if and when
there is a downturn in business. Labour laws, rules and procedureshave led to a deterioration in the work culture and the comparative
advantage that is even beginning to be recognised by responsible
Trade Unions. Pursuant to the announcement in the 2001-02 budget
that labour laws would be reformed, a Group of Ministers was set up
to work out the modalities. The Labour Commission has in the
meanwhile also submitted its report. The Group of Ministers will
suggest specific changes in the laws for the approval of the Cabinet.SSI reservations further limit the possibility of entering labour
intensive sectors for export. Dereservation of readymade garments
during the year 2000 and de-reservation of fourteen other items
related to leather goods, shoes and toys during 2001 is a welcome
development. About 10 per cent of the items on the list of items
reserved for the small-scale sector have been freed over the past
few years. These two policy constraints are particularly relevant forexport oriented FDI . More flexible labour laws that improve work
culture and enhance productivity and SSI de-reservations will help
attract employment generating FDI inflows of the kind seen in South
East Asia in the seventies and eighties and in China since the
nineties.
The Urban Land Ceiling Acts and Rent Control Acts in States are a
serious constraint on the entire real estate sector. This is anothersector that has attracted large amounts of FDI in many countries
including China. Like the labour-intensive industrial sectors it can
also generate a large volume of productive employment. These Acts
need to be repealed if a construction boom is to be initiated that
would reverse the decline in overall investment, attract FDI,
generate employment and make rental accommodation available to
the poor. The Centre has already repealed the Urban Land Ceiling
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Act but each State has to issue a notification to repeal the Act in
that State. Rent Control is a State subject and each State would
have to reform its Rent control Act. The Central government has set
up an Urban Reform Facility to provide funds to States that repealthe State Land Ceiling Act, reform the Rent Control Act and carry
out other urban reforms. Weak credibility of regulatory systems and
multiple and conflicting roles of agencies and government has an
adverse impact on new FDI investors, which is greater than on
domestic investors. All monopolists have a strong self-interest in
preventing new entrants who can put competitive pressure. In the
past, government monopoly in infrastructure sectors has slowed
down policy reform. FDI was discouraged by the fear that pressure
exerted by government monopolies through their parent
departments would bias the regulatory system against new private
competitors. As regulatory systems and procedures move up the
learning curve, initial problems stemming from lack of regulatory
knowledge/experience in sectors such as Telecom have been
gradually overcome. Similarly, in the past, strategy and
implementation problems connected with dis-investment created
great uncertainty and increased policy/regulatory risk, resulting in a
lack of interest of FDI investors in bidding for these companies. With
a much clearer strategy and effective implementation over the past
year and a half, there should be better inflow on this account.
According to some consultants, in the banking sector, controls on
activity dampen FDI inflows. It is alleged that persistent fears of
impending “fiscal crisis” is another constraint, and that a well
articulated strategy for medium term fiscal consolidations would
address these concerns. The absence of product patents in the
chemicals sector has reduced inflows into the drugs and
pharmaceuticals sector.
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Though the foreign trade and tariff regime for Special Export Zones
(SEZs) approximates a genuine free trade zone, the other elements
of the policy framework and procedures remain virtually the same
as in the Domestic Tariff Area. The SEZs are therefore still not fullyon par with the Export Zones of China with respect to Labour
Intensive production (Appendix section 8.4).
PROCEDURES:
According to Boston Consulting Group, investors find it frustrating to
navigate through the tangles of bureaucratic controls and
procedures. McKinsey (2001) found that, the time taken for
application/bidding/approval of FDI projects was too long. Multiple
approvals, excessive time taken (2-3 years) such as in food
processing and long lead times of up to six months for licenses for
duty free exports, lead to “loss of investors’ confidence despitepromises of a considerable market size.”
Bureaucracy and red tape topped the list of investor concerns as
they were cited by 39 per cent of respondents in the A T Kearney
survey. Of the three stages of a project, namely general approval
(e.g. FDI, investment licence for items subject to licence), clearance
(project specific approvals e.g. environmental clearance for specific
location and product) and implementation, the second was the most
oppressive.12 Three-fourth of the respondents in the survey
indicated that (post-approval) clearances connected with
investment were the most affected by India’s red tape. According to
a CII study, a typical power project requires 43 Central Government
clearances and 57 State Government level (including the local
administration) clearances. Similarly, the number of clearances
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for a typical mining project are 37 at the Central Government level
and 47 at the State Government level. Though the number of
approvals/clearances may not always be much lower in the OECD
countries such as the USA and Japan the regulatory process istransparent with clear documentation requirements and decision
rules based largely on self-certification, and generally implemented
through the legal profession.
The Government has set up an inter-ministerial Committee to
examine the existing procedures for investment approvals and
implementation of projects and suggest measures to simplify andexpedite the process for both public and private investment. The
Committee, which was set up in September 2002, has submitted
Part I of its report (dealing with Public sector projects) to the
Government, which is under examination. A sub-Group of the
Committee is specifically looking into simplification of procedures
relating to private investment. The respondents of the ATK survey
also indicated that the divide between Central and Stategovernments in the treatment of foreign investors could undermine
the FDI promotion efforts of the Central Government. The FICCI
(2001) study similarly cites centre-state duality as creating
difficulties at both the approval and project implementation stages.
These studies find that the bureaucracy in general is quite unhelpful
in extending infra-structural facilities to any project that is being set
up. This leads to time and cost overruns . At an operational level,multiple returns have to be filed every month. One effect of these
bureaucratic delays is the low levels of realization of FDI inflows vis-
à-vis the proposals cleared (CII). Although the realization rate has
improved to 45 per cent in 2000-01 compared to 21 per cent in
1997, it remains a matter of concern. The precise reason for the low
levels of realization is the post approval procedures, which has in
the past played havoc with project implementation.
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FIPB
It should be noted, that the delays mentioned by foreign investors
are not at the stage of FDI approval per se i.e. at the entry point
whether through RBI automatic route or FIPB approval.14 The FIPB
considers application on the basis of notified guidelines and
disposes them within a 6-8 week timeframe, as has been laid down
by the Cabinet. The entire process of FIPB applications, starting
from their registration through to listing on FIPB agenda and their
final disposal and despatch on official communication is placed on
the website, which adds to the transparency of decision-making andenhances investor confidence. Similarly, the underlying advisory
support in the form of online chat facility and dedicated email
facility for existing and prospective investors has created an
investor friendly image. A FICCI Study on, “Impediments to
Investment” (January 2002) has acknowledged that the Central level
FIPB clearances have been successfully streamlined. The FIPB
approval system has also been rated as world class by independentsurveys conducted by CII and JICA. The FIIA framework has also
been strengthened recently by adoption of a six-point strategy. This
includes close interaction with companies at both operational and
board room level, follow up with administrative ministries, State
Governments and other concerned agencies and sector specific
approach in resolving investment related problems. The major
implementation problems are encountered at the state level, asproject implementation takes place at the state level. FICCI in its
study on “Impediments to Investment” has observed that the
Regional meetings for foreign investors under the FIIA chaired by
the Industry Secretary are now turning out to be problem-solving
platforms.
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Quality of Infrastructure
Poor infrastructure affects the productivity of the economy as a
whole and hence its GDP/per capita GDP.15 It also reduces the
comparative advantage of industries that are more intensive in the
use of such infrastructure. In the context of FDI, poor infrastructure
has a greater effect on export production than on production for the
domestic market. FDI directed at the domestic market suffers the
same handicap and additional costs as domestic manufacturers that
are competing for the domestic market. Inadequate and poor quality
roads, railroads and ports, however raise export costs vis-a-visglobal competitors
having better quality and lower cost infrastructure.16 As a foreign
direct investor planning to set up an export base in
developing/emerging economies has the option of choosing
between India and other locations with better infrastructure, India is
handicapped in attracting export oriented FDI. Poor infrastructure is
found to be the most important constraint for construction and
engineering industries. “Law, rules, regulations relating to
infrastructure are sometimes missing or unclear e.g. LNG and the
power sector is beset with multiple problems such as State
monopoly, bankruptcy and weak regulators” McKinsey 2001).
State Obstacles
Taxes levied on transportation of goods from State to State (such as
octroi and entry tax) adversely impact the economic environment
for export production. Such taxes impose both cost and time delays
on movement of inputs used in production of export products as
well as in transport of the latter to the ports. Differential sale andexcise taxes (States and Centre) on small and large companies are
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found to be a deterrent to FDI in sectors such as textiles (McKinsey
2001). Investments that could raise the productivity and Quality of
textiles and thus make them competitive in global markets remain
unprofitable because they cannot overcome the tax advantagegiven to small producers in the domestic market.
Globally the service sector received 43 per cent of total investment
in emerging markets in 1997 (ATK 2001). As this is a State subject,
the States have to take the lead in simplifying and modernising the
policy and rules relating to this sector. At the local level (sub-state)
issues pertaining to land acquisition, land use change, power
connection, building plan approval are sources of projectimplementation delay. The State level issues are also being
considered by the Govindarajan committee with a view to seeing
how they can be alleviated.
Legal Delays
Though India’s Anglo Saxon legal system as codified is considered
by many legal experts to be superior to that of many other
emerging economies it is often found in practice to be an obstacle
to investment. One of the reasons is the inordinate delay are the
interlocutory procedures that characterise judicial procedures. As a
result the “Rule of law,” which has often been cited as one of the
attractive features of the Indian economy for foreign investors, isfound to be a significant positive factor by only 3 per cent for FDI in
India. In contrast, 26 per cent of all those surveyed by ATK (2001)
cited this as an important factor in their global investment
decisions.
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There is scope for greater FDI inflow in the insurance sector if the
cap of 26 per cent foreign equity is raised. The experience of
opening up of this sector to FDI has set at rest the fears that were
expressed earlier regarding the effect of such opening. The publicinsurance monopolies have responded to private entry by trying to
increase their efficiency and effectiveness. This process would be
enhanced and sustained by more effective competition. The
regulatory system is in place and the Insurance Regulatory
Authority (IRDA) is functioning effectively. The Committee feels that
foreign equity cap can now be raised to 49 per cent.
With a large and mature banking system about 80 per cent of whoseassets are in the public sector, the entire private sector is a
relatively small player. Despite this the private sector has
introduced new products and processes into banking and forced the
public sector banks to compete in these areas. This process would
be accelerated and enhanced if the FDI limits for private banks are
raised from 49 per cent to 100 per cent, as few new foreign players
have entered so far. With RBI recognized as one of the mostcompetent regulators in the country, both domestic and foreign
entrants can be effectively regulated.
Given effective regulation, the entry of large foreign banks will
enhance competition in the private banking and eliminate any
temporary monopolies that may have arisen with innovation. The
minimum investment norms for FDI investment in Non-Bank
Financial
Companies no longer serve a useful purpose (as all NBFCs have to
satisfy regulatory norms) and should be deleted. Similarly the equity
limits on investing companies (for infrastructure and social sectors)
should be raised to 100 per cent (from 49 per cent) and put on the
automatic route. 100 per cent foreign equity is already allowed in
courier services and this can be transferred to the automatic route.
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plantations at and after Independence right till the forced dis-
investment in the seventies. Other (non-tea) plantations are
generally smaller with a much larger proportion owned by small
farmers. A gradual approach that allows these owners to bring inforeign equity while retaining majority ownership is therefore
preferable. There is currently a somewhat complicated regime for
FDI in non-retail trading. Automatic 100 per cent FDI is allowed in
bulk handling, storage and transport of food and 51 per cent in
export trading. 100 per cent equity is also allowed through the FIPB
route in SSI products, hi-tech products, e-commerce (with 26 per
cent disinvestments in 5 years), cash and carry wholesaling and
warehousing. At least as far as these permitted areas of trading are
concerned the regime should be simplified by allowing 100 per cent
foreign equity through the automatic route with clearly spelt out
conditions (if any). The retail sector in India is dispersed,
widespread, labour intensive and disorganised. In the light of this it
is not thought desirable at present to lift the ban on FDI in retail
trade
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Definition of Foreign Direct Investment
FDI is the process whereby residents of one country (the home
country) acquire ownership of assets for the purpose of controlling
the production, distribution and other activities of a firm in another
country (the host country).
IMF Definition
According to the BPM5, foreign direct investment is the category of
international investment that reflects the objective of obtaining a
lasting interest by a resident entity in one economy in an enterpriseresident in another economy. The lasting interest implies the
existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor
and the enterprise and a significant degree of influence by the
investor on the management of the enterprise.
Benefits of FDI
Host countries derive several benefits from FDI.
o Additional equity capital from whose profits yield tax
revenues
o Transfer of patented technologies
o Access to scarce managerial skills
o Creation of new jobs
o Access to overseas market networks and marketing expertiseo Reduced flight of domestic capital abroad
o Long term commitment to successful completion of FDI
projects
o A catalyst for associated lending for specific projects, thus
increasing the availability of external funding.
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Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been one of the most
fascinating and intriguing topics among researchers in international
business. It is one significant form of rapid international expansion
to increase ownership of assets, derive location-specific advantagesand acquire additional knowledge. Many scholars have followed
either of two schools of thought in explaining FDI. The
microeconomic approach [Hymer 1976; Caves 1974; Kindleberger
1969] attempts to explain why firms of one country are successful in
penetrating into other markets while the macroeconomic approach
[Aliber 1970; Buckley and Casson 1976; Grosse and Trevino 1995]
tries to examine why firms seek international expansion. Our study
follows the latter approach, focuses on the impact of
macroeconomic variables on FDI and seeks to explain the recent
increase of inflow of FDI into India.
While studies of FDI in the US, Japan and Europe have been
prevalent, similar research on FDI in India is however limited.
Restricted policy environment towards FDI and weak property
protection rights have been described to cause significant R&Dspillovers in Indian pharmaceutical sector [Feinberg and Majumdar
2001]. The relatively slow growth of FDI from Japanese MNCs in
India as compared to China is attributed to the desire to gain only
market access in India [Anand and Delios 1996].
FOREIGN INVESTMENTS
Foreign investment can take two forms: foreign equity investors can
simply buy a stake in an enterprise or take a direct interest in its
management. The first, indirect form of investment is called foreign
portfolio investment. Foreign direct investment (FDI) involves
more than just buying a share or a security. It is the amount of
financing provided by a foreign owner who is also directly involved
in the management of the enterprise. For statistical purposes, the
International Monetary Find ( IMF ) defines foreign investment as
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(FDI) when the investor holds 10% or more of the equity of an
enterprise.
Foreign investment has clearly been a major factor in stimulating
economic growth and development in recent times. Thecontribution that transnational corporations can make as agents of
growth, structural change and international integration has made
FDI a coveted tool of economic development. Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) is one of the most important sources of capital. FDI
links the host economy with the global markets and fosters
economic growth.
In India, too, there has been a growing recognition that any credibleattempt towards economic reforms must involve up gradation of
technology, scale of production and linkages to the integrated
global production system through the participation of transnational
corporations. In 1991, India began a liberalization process. The
government opened 33 sectors to majority- owned foreign
investment (up to 51%) with “automatic” approval by the Reserve
Bank of India (rather than an inter- ministerial committee managedby the Ministry of Industry). In addition, a cabinet-level Foreign
Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) was established in the Prime
Minister’s office to approve higher levels of foreign ownership in the
33 industries, as well as in other industries. The FIPB has now been
put under the Ministry of Industry.
FDI potential is determined by seven factors -- market, access to
resources, low production costs, access to export markets, cultural-
cum-geographic proximity, competitor presence and a host of
government incentives.
In India, Foreign Investment Promotion Board of India (FIPB) has
approved projects worth $54 billions till now, since the opening up
of the economy. However the actual investment that has flown into
the country till now is $ 17 billion. In 1998,the FDI inflows in India
fell by $1 billion to $2.3 billions.
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India figures at the bottoms rung of the transnational index of the
host countries. UNCTAD calculates this index. It is calculated as an
average of four factors: FDI inflows as a percentage of Gross fixed
capital formation for the last three years; FDI inward stock as apercentage of GDP; the value added by foreign affiliates measured
as a percentage of GDP; and employment by foreign affiliates as a
percentage of total employment.
The FDI policy determines the ease of accessing the domestic
market and the terms and conditions of entry. But the other policy
regimes and the operating environment are also very important.
Interface between Trade and FDI
Liberalization of external trade can provide a strong stimulus to and
growth rate can be a potent factor in attracting FDI. Market size and
growth rate are the principal determinants of FDI flows. On the
other hand, reduction in import duties, which is a crucial element of
the trade liberalization agenda, can have a dampening effect on FDI
inflows. This mainly occurs, as the foreign firms are able to service
these markets through exports rather than setting up production
capabilities overseas. However given the size of the Indian market
and an expectation of a reasonable rate of growth in personal
income, this danger may not be there for India.
Export expansion, an important element of the Economic Reforms
process, can get a strong boost from FDI, as the experiences of
China, Thailand and Malaysia reveal. FDI can help in achieving
international competitiveness by changing the scale of competition
in the domestic market, thereby forcing the local producers to
upgrade their product profile in a cost effective way. However it is
also possible that the inflow of FDI can throttle competition when
global brand-holders manage to acquire leading domestic brands or
drive them away. It may therefore be necessary to develop a
collateral legal system to prevent the occurrence of such events,
which will prove anti-competitive.
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ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES OF FDI
Foreign direct investment brings in investible resources to host
countries, introduces modern technologies and provides access to
export markets. The trans-national companies (TNCs/MNEs) are the
driving force behind foreign direct investment. They have large
internal (inter-firm) markets, access to which is available only to
affiliates. They also control large markets in unrelated parties
having established brand names and distribution channels spread
over several national locations. They can, thus, influence granting of
trade privileges in their home (or in third) markets. In other words,
they enjoy considerable advantages in creating an initial export
base for new entrants. While there are TNCs/MNEs with sales
turnover larger than the national incomes of many developing
countries, there are also many new entrants, which are small and
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) . Many of these firms find it
necessary to invest overseas to overcome lack of opportunities for
growth at home, access skilled labour abroad and reduce cost. An
increasing number of such firms are from developing countries.
Some of these firms belong to ‘economies in transition’ that
previously had isolated themselves from international investment.
As a result, the number of MNEs has increased substantially and is
estimated to have gone up to more than 50,000 by the end of the
1990’s. Between the end of 1960’s and the end of 1990’s, the
number of MNEs in fifteen of the most important developed
countries itself had gone up from 7000 to 40,000. FDI inflows mirror
this expansion that has gone up from an investment level of $ 56
billion at the beginning of the 1980’s to $ 693 billion in 1998. It
reached an investment level of $ 188 billion in developing countries
alone.
The changing context and the quest for location for manufacture
and trade have brought about a change in corporate strategies.
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According to the UNCTAD, United Nations (1999 ) , following
developments are particularly noteworthy:
A shift from stand-alone, relatively independent, foreign affiliates
to integrated international production systems relying on
specialized affiliates to service the entire TNC/MNE system.
Within the framework of this international intra-firm division of
labour, any part of the value-added chain of an enterprise can be
located abroad while remaining fully integrated into a corporate
network. Corporate strategies of this kind seek to exploit regional
or global economies of scale and a higher degree of functional
specialization.
This shift broadens the range of resources sought by MNEs in
host countries, making firms more selective in their choices.
However, it can also encourage FDI in countries that cannot
provide a wide range of resources but have some specific assets
that are sought by MNEs ( e.g. accounting or software skills).
A shift towards greater use of non-equity and cooperative
relationships with other enterprises, such as alliances,
partnerships, management contracts or sub-contracting
arrangements. These arrangements serve a variety of corporate
objectives. They can provide better access to technologies or
other assets allowing firms to share the cost and risk of
innovatory activities. They can reduce the production cost of labour-intensive products.
Emerging of a network type of organization. This expands the
scope of interactions between TNCs and enterprises from host
countries, and also the forms of these interactions. These
changing corporate strategies bring a different pattern of
international economic integration. Originally, this involved the
integration of markets through arm’s length trade – “shadow”
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integration. Integrated international production moves this
integration to the level of production in all its aspects – “deep”
integration.
In the process, a significant part of international transactionsbecomes internalized, i.e. takes the form of transactions between
various parts of transnational corporate systems located in different
countries. The ability of firms to allocate their economic assets
internationally, and the international production system created in
the process, have become themselves a part of the new context.
Crowding-in and crowding-out impacts of FDI
Crowding-in is said to take place when foreign direct investment
stimulates new investment in downstream or upstream production
by other foreign or domestic producers. While investments in the
export sector has the potential for encouraging downstream
production, investments in infrastructure encourage upstreamproduction. The TNCs/MNEs may provide preferential opportunity for
exports through access to large internal (inter-firm) markets, which
is available only to affiliates set up in host countries. The capital-
flow induced growth and the accompanying higher efficiency of the
economy may, in turn, induce higher investments. However, if FDI
comes in sectors in which the domestic firms are themselves
contemplating investment, the very act of foreign investment maytake away the investment opportunities that were open to domestic
enterprises. Moreover, if the TNCs/MNEs raised funds for their
expansion programmes from the host country, this might out-
compete the domestic firms in the financial markets and thus
compete them out. The decision of TNCs/MNEs for acquisition (M&A)
of domestic firms might similarly lead to large inflow of foreign
exchange, appreciating in the process the exchange rate. Thismight in turn make the host country’s export less competitive and
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thus discourage domestic investment for export markets. All these
imperatives may have crowding-out impact on domestic firms. In
regard to the net impact of the crowding-in and crowding-out of FDI,
the UNCTAD, United Nations (1999) observed, ‘In an early example,relating to Canada, of the few studies addressing the question,
some regression coefficient, taken at face value implied that $1 of
direct investment led to $3 of capital formation’ (Lubitz, 1966). A
later study of FDI in Canada (Van Loo, 1977), with somewhat
different methods, a slightly longer time span and annual rather
than quarterly data, found a positive direct effect on capital
formation greater than the amount of the FDI. That is, in addition, to
FDI effect on investment, there was some complimentary effect on
fixed investment by domestic firms. However, when indirect effects
through other variables, such as exports (negative), imports
(positive) and consumption (negative), operating through the
accelerator was added, the addition to total capital formation was
much smaller, a little over half the inflow’. It has been, further
observed, ‘A recent study of the impact of FDI on economic growth,
utilizing data on FDI inflows from developed countries to 69
developing countries on a yearly basis from 1970 to 1989, has
found, among others, that FDI has stimulated domestic investment:
“a one dollar increase in the net flow of FDI is associated with an
increase in total investment in the host economy of more than one
dollar. The value of the point estimates place the total increase in
investment between 1.5 and 2.3 times the increase in the flow of
FDI” (Borensztain, et al, 1995). In view of the double edged nature
of FDI, namely, the crowding-out and crowding-in effects on
domestic industries, the host economies especially the developing
countries have been imposing some kind of performance
requirements in regard to: (a) local content (b) export commitment
(c) technology transfer (d) dividend balancing and (e) foreign
exchange neutrality. These regulations have been there to enhance
the quality of FDI against the simple increase in the quantity of FDI
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inflow. Imposition of performance criteria , however, comes in the
way of the relative openness of the trade regime and may make FDI
less attractive for MNEs while deciding the location for their
operations. In other words, a trade-off is involved betweenPERFORMANCE and OPENNESS.
Crowding-in took place in the case of Argentina’s communications
privatisation, where the development of domestic sub contractors
was part and parcel of the privatisation agreement with foreign
investors and appears to be working well. Countries in East Asia,
namely, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand encouraged FDI inmicroelectronics related items like toys and other consumer goods
for export markets. Many of these foreign affiliates were essentially
assemblers with few linkages to the rest of the economy . Overtime,
however, domestic suppliers of services and inputs have emerged.
The UNCTAD, United Nations (1999), nevertheless, further remarked
there are also examples of economies that have chosen to stimulate
domestic investment in new activities rather than to rely on FDI. This was the rationale for limiting FDI in certain high-technology
industries in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China . In
these cases, the vision by policy makers that domestic firms could
in fact emerge paid off. In many cases, however, the emergence of
successful domestic producers in a new, technologically advanced
industry is unlikely or might take a long time with uncertain results.
An example of a costly intervention in favour of domestic firms inhigh-technology industries is the Brazilian Informatics policy of the
early 1980’s, which involved restrictions on FDI in information
technology activities’.
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REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE
Y V Reddy: India and the global economy
The presence of foreign banks in India has benefited the financial
system by enhancing competition, resulting in higher efficiency.
There has also been transfer of technology and specialised skills
which has had some “demonstration effect” as Indian banks too
have upgraded their skills, improved their scale of operations and
diversified into other activities. At a time when access to foreigncurrency funds was a constraint for the Indian companies, the
presence of foreign banks in India enabled large Indian companies
to access foreign currency resources from the overseas branches of
these banks. Creating inter-bank markets in money and foreign
exchange is a challenge in several developing countries. In India,
however, the presence of foreign banks, as borrowers in the money
market and their operations in the foreign exchange market,resulted in the creation and deepening, in terms of both volumes
and products, of the inter-bank money market and forex market
though by virtue of their skills and resources, the foreign banks tend
to dominate in some financial markets. In the days ahead, the
challenge for the supervisors would be to maximise the advantages
and minimise the disadvantages of the foreign banks' local presence
by synchronising the emerging dominance of their local operationswith the progress in the domestic financial markets as well as in
liberalisation of capital account.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) on the insurance industries of developed
countries. We find that the insurance industries of most of the
developed countries in our sample have significant negative
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spillover effects from the GLBA. Further, we find that the impact of
this deregulation on the insurance industries of any two countries is
not same. After controlling for country specific effect we find that
only profitability can explain the impact of the GLBA on insurancecompanies of developed countries. This result is robust whether we
use OLS or bootstrap as the estimation technique. However, we
don’t find any evidence that the impact of the GLBA is statistically
different for firms that are from a EU member country versus those
that are not.
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1. Atomic Energy.
2. Railway Transport.
Highlights of the Foreign Direct Investment Policy
India welcomes foreign investment in virtually all sectors except
defence, railway transport and atomic energy.
No government approval required for FDI except for the small
negative list notified by the government.
• Sector specific guidelines for FDI ( As on 26 June 2002 )
• The Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB), considers
proposals for foreign participation that do not qualify for
automatic route. Decisions are usually taken within 30 days of
application.
• Free repatriation of capital investment and profits thereon is
permitted, provided the original investment was made in
convertible foreign exchange.
• Use of foreign brand names/trade marks for sale of goods in
India is allowed.
• Indian capital markets are open to foreign institutional
investors.
• Indian companies are permitted to raise funds from
international capital markets.
• Agreements with over 88 countries to avoid double taxation.
• Bilateral investment protection agreements with 37 countries.
• Special investment and tax incentives for exports and for
certain sectors like power, electronics, software and food
processing.
Single window clearance facility provided in certain states to
simplify the approval process for new ventures.
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FINANCIAL SERVICES (BANKING AND NON-BANKING)
• India has one of the most developed financial markets in the
developing world. Tremendous scope exists for both banking and
non-banking financial institutions from other countries. The
insurance sector, nationalised since 1971, has been opened up
according to an announcement made in November 1998.
Legislation to this effect is expected by early 1999.
• Top companies from the United Kingdom and the United
States among others are already active in India's financial markets.
Some of the big names are: Merrill Lynch, Oppenheimer, J.P.
Morgan, Morgan Stanley, Grindlays, Standard Chartered, Hong
Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation among others.
• Foreign institutional investors (FIIs) have been allowed to
invest in the stocks and securities markets with rights of full
repatriation and withdrawal. Their presence has added a new
dynamism to the market.
• India already has foreign exchange reserves of US$27 billionwhich is considered very comfortable, but the country needs to use
foreign skills and networks to be able to manage the huge sums for
its development needs.
• Local financial Institutions such as the Industrial
Development Bank of India (IDBI), Industrial Credit and Investment
Corporation of India (ICICI), Industrial Finance Corporation of India ,
Unit Trust of India and the Shipping Credit and InvestmentCorporation of India have raised billions through the most
sophisticated financial instruments including Deep Discount Bonds.
• Indian firms are showing increasing liking for Global
Depository Receipts (GDR) listed in London. American institutions
are trying to promote American Depository Receipts (ADR) listed in
New York.
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• After much dithering, India has finally opened up the
insurance sector to private and foreign investors.
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INDIAN BANKING SECTOR SCENARIO
In India there are 100 commercial banks, 196 regional rural banks
(RRB), 51 urban cooperative banks (UCB) and 16 state cooperative
banks (SCB) at the end fiscal year 2000-01 (March to April is India’s
fiscal year).
The central banking authorities are in phases implementing
prudential and supervisory norms matching the best international
practices.
The on-going economic reforms in the country aim at ensuringgreater operational flexibility to commercial banks. Total
investments of banks in shares, convertible debentures/bonds and
bonds of equity-oriented mutual funds should not exceed 20 percent
of their net worth.
A consolidated balance sheet of Indian banking sector reveals that
scheduled commercial banks (excluding RRBs) closed FY 2000-01
with higher operating expenses leading to fall in net profits, lower
‘other income’ and higher provisions for bad doubtful accounts
(normally known as sticky accounts) and contingencies.
Indian banking sector registered 14.9 percent growth in income and
16.7 percent growth in expenditure during 2000-01 FY. Growth in
other income which constitutes a big chunk of banking sector’s total
income, suffered significantly with 8.8 percent compared with 23.5
percent in 1999-2000 FY. On the other hand operating expenditures
shot up by 23.9 percent from 8.8 percent.
The State bank group and state-run banks registered 15.8 percent
and 12.7 percent, respectively, growth in income during FY 2000-01.
While foreign banks witnessed 16 percent growth in income, new
and old and private sector Indian banks recorded income growth of
38.8 percent and 9.8 percent, respectively.
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commercial banks increased to 1.79 percent in FY 2000-01 from
1.67 percent in FY 1999-2000. Foreign banks however could lower
the wage bill to asset ratio to 1.23 percent in FY 2000-01 from 1.39
percent in FY 1999-2000.Assets of scheduled commercial banks (excluding RRBs) have
increased by 17.1 percent in 2000-01 FY- up by 0.8 percent over
previous fiscal’s 16.3 percent. In terms of assets holding, the public
sector banks account for 48.4 percent and the State Bank of India
31.1 percent. Foreign banks account for 7.9 percent and the Indian
private sector banks (old and new) hold 12.6 percent.
Shares of investments in total assets during FY 2000-01 stood at 38percent and loans and advances together at 40.6 percent.
Capital of scheduled commercial banks in total liabilities declined by
0.2 percent at 1.5 percent during 2000-01 FY from previous fiscal’s
1.7 percent. Reserves and surplus dropped marginally by 0.1
percent at 3.8 percent from 3.9 percent in FY 1999-2000.
There was decline in banks’ cash-reserve ratio during the fiscal2000-01 at 6.8 percent from 7.7 percent in fiscal 1999-2000. The
credit-deposit ration as per sanctions) was higher at 58.5 percent in
FY 2000-01 compared with 56 percent. Scheduled commercial banks
registered 18.4 percent growth in deposits in FY 2000-01 which is
about 5 percent higher than previous fiscal’s 13.9 percent.
The deposit growth include the inflow of Rs 25,662 crore under the
India Millennium Deposits (IMD) schemes. The IMD deposit accountsfor 3.2 percent of total bank deposit growth in FY 2000-01.
Total bank credit extended by the scheduled commercial bank in FY
2000-01 was up by 17.3 percent against 18.2 in FY 1999-2000. Food
credit increased by 55.7 percent and non-food credit by 14.9
percent. Credit-deposit ratio in terms of outstanding stood
marginally lower at 53.1 percent compared with 53.6 percent in
previous fiscal.
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Investments of banks in government and other approved securities
increased by 19.8 percent against 21.3 percent in FY 1999-2000.
On incremental basis, investments were up by 41 percent. The
investment-deposit ratio, on an outstanding basis, was marginallyup at 38.5 percent against 38 percent in FY 1999-2000.
Total flow of resources from scheduled commercial banks to the
commercial sector (excluding food credit) was up by 16.1 percent.
The increase was however lower than 17.8 percent growth
registered in FY 1999-2000.
Industrial credit as a percentage to net bank credit in FY 2000-01
declined by over 3 percent to 46.8 percent from 50.3 percent.Growth in industrial credit decelerated to 9.3 percent from 11.8
percent in FY 1999-2000.
Bank credit to medium and large industries together was lower by
10.5 percent in FY 2000-01 compared with 12.9 percent in the
previous fiscal year. Credit to wholesale trade significantly
decelerated to 6.1 percent against 20.4 percent in FY 1999-2000.
Credit to real estate sector accelerated. Credit to priority sector
increased by 17.1 percent in FY 2000-01 against 15 percent in FY
1999-2000.
In terms of credit growth, infrastructure tops the list with 56.7
percent followed petroleum 29 percent, gems and jewelleries 21.7
percent, electricity 15.5 percent and cotton textiles 13.4 percent.
Among 7 industries that witnessed major declines in bank credit
absorption include ‘other textiles’ (7.6 percent), drugs and
pharmaceuticals (5.3 percent).
Bank credit to sick/weak industries in FY 2000-01 was higher at 11.9
percent compared with previous fiscal year’s 10.9 percent.
The operating profit of all scheduled commercial banks together
increased by 7.9 percent. Operating profits by public sector banks
was up by 5.8 percent but State Bank group registered 1.7 percent
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decline in operating profit. Profits of old banks increased by 11
percent and new banks by 10.1 percent. Foreign banks operating in
India registered 15.6 percent increase in operating profit.
Scheduled commercial banks’ net profit dropped by 11.3 percent inFY 2000-01. The decline in case of public sector banks and foreign
banks was 15.6 percent and 2.4 percent, respectively. Only the new
private sector banks registered 12.3 percent in net profits.
The ratio of net profit to total asset declined further to 0.50 percent
in FY 2000-01 from 0.66 percent in 1999-2000. The decline in case
of public sector bank was 0.15 percent, in the case of old bank
decline was 0.19 percent. In respect of foreign banks net profit tototal asset ratio declined to 0.93 in FY 2000-01 from 1.17 percent in
FY 1999-2000.
The Indian government has decided to dilute its stake in public
sector banks to 33 percent. The Narasimhan Committee had
suggested mergers among strong Indian banks, both public and
private. The Committee also suggested merger with financial
institutions and non-banking financial institutions (NBFCs). Among
banks whose shares are being traded, Karur Vysya Bank's scrip
registered highest growth of 47.48 percent followed by Corporation
Bank's 44.11 percent and Bank of Baroda's 31.41 percent in 2000-
01 compared with previous year's. Among those whose share prices
nosedived include Global trust Bank (-56.65 percent) followed by
IndusInd Bank (-49.64 percent).
The Reserve Bank of India has decided to divest its stake in various
public sector institutions. These institutions include State Bank of
India (SBI), National Housing Bank (NHB), Infrastructure
Development Finance Company (IDFC), Deposit Insurance and
Credit Gurantee Corporation (DICGC), NABARD, Bharatiya Reserve
Bank Note Mudran Ltd, Discount and Finance House of India (DFHI),
and Securities and Trading Corporation of India (STCI). RBI Deputy
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Governor Y V Reddy suggested formation of a holding company for
public sector banks.
Privatisation of public sector banks would take off once the existing
banking Acts (Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 and BankingRegulation Act, 1949) are amended. RBI has already sent
recommendations to the federal government to this effect.
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FDI IN BANKING
THE presence of foreign players in India's banking sector is set to
increase. As the competition unleashed by financial liberalisation
squeezes margins and forces banks to build their bottom line by
expanding the volume of their business, a process of consolidation
in the banking business seems inevitably under way. And since
financial liberalisation has permitted an increase in the stake held
by foreign investors in Indian banks from 20 to 49 per cent, the
expectation is that this consolidation would also see an increase in
the presence of foreign banks in the domestic market.
Foreign banks have existed in the domestic market, with some like
Citibank and Standard Chartered (which through a global
arrangement acquired ANZ Grindlays in India) having seen a
substantial expansion of their operations in recent years. But these
have largely been in the nature of subsidiaries with a focus on
corporate and merchant banking. The presence of these banks in
the retail market has been limited. However, the new liberalised
environment, in which entry conditions are easier and profits
depend on expansion, is seeing a change in strategy.
The most recent indication of this was Hong Kong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation's (HSBC) acquisition in early December of a 20
per cent stake in UTI (Unit Trust of India) Bank from the
Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC). HSBC is
understood to have bought the 20.08 per cent stake from two
private funds - 12.37 per cent from CDC Financial Services
(Mauritius) Ltd and 7.71 per cent from the CDC-controlled South
Asia Regional Fund. Though this was a transfer from one foreign
investor to another, the implications were significant because HSBC
is a foreign bank looking to expand its presence in the Indian
market. UTI Bank's Chairman and Managing Director P.J. Nayak
optimistically declared that he believed that HSBC's picking up stake
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in the bank was "an investment" and that UTI Bank would prefer to
remain a standalone bank.
But there are a number of factors that militate against this prsopect.
First, HSBC's stake is likely to exceed 20 per cent soon since itwould, as per Securities and Exchange Board of India guidelines,
have to make an open offer to other minority shareholders, and
could end up acquiring another bunch of shares. At the time of
acquisition the shareholding pattern of the bank included the
following players: Citicorp Banking Corporation 3.83 per cent,
Chryscapital 3.83 per cent, Karur Vysya Bank 1 per cent, South Asia
Regional Fund 7.71 per cent and 16.91 per cent with the public.Second, if acquisition aimed at realising economies of scale is an
objective that is driving banking strategy in India then HSBC would
have an interest in merging its operations with UTI Bank. When such
considerations lead to a reverse merger even between ICICI and
ICICI Bank, it would be naive not to expect it to happen with the
more aggressive foreign banks, if circumstances permit.
Third, indications are that the government would be soon revisingupwards the cap on foreign shareholding in private banks from the
prevailing 49 per cent (raised from 20 per cent in 2001). In a reply
to Parliament on December 16, Finance Minister Jaswant Singh said
that the government has in principle decided to enhance the limit of
foreign direct investment (FDI) in banking companies. This, he felt,
would invite greater foreign investment in private banks. Though he
did not indicate any fresh limit, the government had announced inits 2003-04 Budget that non-resident equity in private banks could
be raised to 74 per cent. In fact, this is known to have triggered the
interest of foreign banks in the acquisition of a stake in private
Indian entities. Finally, other experiences suggest that once the
acquisition process begins in a particular bank, it is bound to
continue.
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A classic case is that of the acquisition of a stake by ING Bank in
Vysya Bank. The ING Group initially acquired 54.36 lakh fully paid-
up equity shares of Rs 10 each of Vysya Bank, representing 23.99
per cent, from GMR group. These shares were purchased by itswholly-owned subsidiary - Banque Brusells Lambert (BBL) Mauritius
Holdings. In September 2002, following the revision in the foreign
equity cap in banking to 49 per cent, ING increased its equity share
to that level. Since then the effort has been to convince the
government to permit an increase in equity holding initially to 51
per cent, so as to ensure full Dutch control and then to 74 per cent,
as and when the new regulations announced in the 2003-04 budget
are put in place.
There is no reason to expect that HSBC's strategy would be any
different. In fact, when recently asked whether HSBC's stake in UTI
Bank would increase, Niall S.K. Booker, CEO, India Region, HSBC,
reportedly said: "Quoting Mark Twain, let me say, as facts change so
will our opinions." On a more cautious note he indicated: "The
legislation would have to change and there should also beshareholders' consent from the Indian promoters, UTI, Life Insurance
Corporation and General Insurance Corporation for HSBC to increase
stake. The FDI limit should ideally be lifted to 74 per cent and voting
rights should be aligned with it." Voting rights are currently
restricted to 10 per cent.
Based on the premise that such expectations regarding policy would
be realised, there is a growing interest in private bank acquisition byforeign firms. Development Bank of Singapore (DBS) is at an
advanced stage of discussions with the Global Trust Bank (GTB) to
pick up 49 per cent equity holding. DBS has thus far just one branch
in Mumbai, which is primarily engaged in the corporate and treasury
businesses. Similarly, Bank Muscat is reportedly merging operations
with Centurion Bank.
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THE acquisition drive by foreign players is increasing the pressure
on other banks, including the public sector banks to look to business
expansion, capital infusion and mergers. There is talk of a merger of
Ashok Leyland Finance with IndusInd Bank and the entry of RelianceCapital into the banking business. These marriages between non-
banking financial companies (NBFC) and banks are problematic
inasmuch as the existing law does not impose any obligation on the
part of either the bank or the NBFC to seek the Reserve Bank of
India's approval before filing the scheme of amalgamation in the
courts. This, RBI Governor Y. Venugopal Reddy admitted, is a lacuna
that needs to be redressed and RBI has proposed amendments to
the Banking Regulation Act, which require that amalgamation of an
NBFC with a banking company is on the same lines and requires the
same clearances as the merger of two banking companies.
The spate of mergers has resulted in a rise in the value of bank
stocks, with investors expecting to make a profit when any acquiring
institution makes an open offer. The speculative factor cannot be
ruled out here, as indicated by a number of large "block deals" inshares of banking companies. In early December, on a single day
there occurred block deals in ICICI Bank stock valued at Rs.700
crores. That was possibly the largest transaction to take place in
any one scrip on a single day. There were four deals involved: one
for 15 lakh shares, the second for 1.99 crore shares, the third for 40
lakh shares and the last for 9.98 lakh shares. A total of around 2.63
crore shares of ICICI Bank were traded in these transactionsaccounting for 4.28 per cent of the bank's equity.
A few days later, as many as 20,00,800 shares of Global Trust Bank
changed hands in the Bombay Stock Exchange in a single
transaction. Overall, as many as 35,94,686 shares were traded on
BSE at a value of Rs.10.09 crores while 28,65,546 shares changed
hands on the National Stock Exchange amounting to Rs.8.09 crore.
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These transactions occurred at prices that were the highest they
had touched over a whole year.
Thus, clearly, trading in bank shares, often through proxy buyers, is
on the increase, indicating strong buyer interest. While thoselooking for speculative gains are partly responsible, the whole
process is being driven by the interest in acquisitions that
accompanies the consolidation wave in the banking sector. That
consolidation has been unleashed by the process of liberalisation,
which is also easing the conditions for entry of foreign players and
paving the way for foreign acquisitions of private Indian banks.
While these changes are currently restricted to the private banks,changes in policy are likely to see the process affecting the public
sector banks as well. In the months to come, therefore, a significant
change in the institutional structure of the Indian banking system is
likely.
These developments are occurring at a time when the build up of
reserves owing to large inflows of foreign capital is leading to a
substantial relaxation of restrictions on foreign exchange utilisation.With a much larger international network, foreign banks would be in
a position to facilitate foreign exchange transactions to a much
greater degree, exploiting the loopholes available under the diluted
regulations governing foreign exchange use. This would render the
fine distinction the government makes between partial and full
convertibility difficult to sustain. Since the resulting larger outflows
are not likely to be covered by foreign exchange earnings alone,India's dependence on foreign capital inflows would be substantial.
Unfortunately the full implications of this would emerge only when
unforeseen conditions generate a climate encouraging capital flight.
But, as experience the world over indicates, that would be too late.
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MISPLACED OPTIMISM
Public sector banks are now in euphoria of mergers and acquisitions,
concerned more about size than synergy. Liberalisation of the
Indian banking sector seems to be entering into a new phase with
the Union finance minister’s announcement of allowing the foreign
banks to own up to 51 per cent of the private sector banks. Low
capital base of most of the older private sector banks is a very
conspicuous weakness of these banks. A few of them have
unsatisfactory levels of capital adequacy ratios and NPA ratios
slightly higher than the tolerable level. How far the influx of foreign
capital would be able to improve the financial strength andoperational efficiency of these banks is a moot question.
Foreign banks in India
The rapidly changing banking scenario since the dawn of public
sector banking era, saw the foreign banks here attuning themselves
to deal with domestic borrowers. They have entered into retail credit
in a big way recently. At present there are 33 foreign banksoperating in India with 222 branches.
These banks are interested in class banking and not mass banking.
They have a profit ratio (ratio of operating profit to total assets)
higher than that of Indian banks as a whole. It is 3.79 per cent
against 2.87 per cent as on March 2004. It may also be noted that
six of them have incurred losses during FY2004.
Based on the type of banking business entertained by these foreignbanks, it could be observed that they prefer to handle only those
advances, where the interest spread is high. There are instances
when the blue chip companies financed by them turn red; they have
expressed their desire to write-off the amount, than to rehabilitate
the ill-fated company. Even now, some of them prefer to walk out of
the corporate debt restructuring schemes, than fall in line with other
banks to make some sacrifices. Sick units, rightly or wrongly have
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THE FUTURE AND IMPACT
It is a matter of time before foreign banks can move into India, with
the government appearing intent on raising the foreign investment
cap in banking to 74 percent regardless of objections from its
Communist allies. The issue is expected to be addressed in the Feb
28 budget presentation by the finance minister.
The Left parties, which support the Congress-led United Progressive
Alliance (UPA) from outside, had in a draft note specified their
objections to increasing foreign investment in banking citing
guidelines of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), India's central bank,
among other things.
Under existing norms foreign banks cannot pick up more than 49
percent equity in the private banks. However, the previous National
Democratic Alliance (NDA) regime had announced that the FDI cap
would be raised to 74 percent in the interim budget of February
2004.
There are 30 privately owned banks in India, and American banks
are reportedly waiting to move in once the rules are liberalised. The
government is under pressure to ensure against hostile takeovers of
domestic private banks.
The Left has also strongly opposed the move to amend the Banking
Regulation Act to grant greater voting rights to foreign investors in
private banks, which is pending before the cabinet, and hasdemanded a "status quo".
The Budget is expected to focus on the financial sector in a big way.
Sources close to the developments said the government was
expected to outline its plan for raising the foreign direct investment
(FDI) in private banks to 74 per cent and sort out the voting rights
issue, announce guidelines for mergers and acquisitions and a
package for managerial autonomy for public sector banks.
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Banking industry sources said the government might go ahead with
its plan for lifting the 10 per cent cap on voting rights in private
sector banks if it managed to convince all its constituents over the
next fortnight.
The NDA government last year had notified the hike in FDI in private
banks but the guidelines were never made public. The current
government, in consultation with the Reserve Bank of India, has now
finalised the norms and they are expected to be announced in the
Budget. This will give an opportunity to foreign banks to pick up a
limited stake in an Indian entity and raise it gradually.
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ANALSYIS
The RBI's decision to allow foreign direct investment in Indian banks,
the lifting of sectoral caps on foreign institutional investors and a
series of other policy measures could ultimately lead to the
privatisation of public sector banks.
THE series of policy announcements in recent weeks promises to
unleash a shakeout in the Indian banking industry. A major policy
change, effected through an innocuous "clarification" issued by the
Reserve Bank of India (RBI) a few weeks ago, set the stage for the
increased presence of foreign entities in the industry. The RBI's
move to allow foreign direct investment (FDI) in Indian banks, has
been followed by the announcement in the Union Budget lifting
sectoral caps on foreign institutional investors (FII). There are also
reports that the RBI's forthcoming credit policy may feature more
sops for private and foreign banks.
These changes are likely to hasten the process of consolidation of
the banking industry. Although there is some doubt over whetherthe moves will have any immediate impact, there is consensus that
the changes are merely a prelude to the wholesale privatisation of
the public sector banks (PSBs). IDBI, the promoter of IDBI Bank, has
already announced its intention to relinquish control of the bank.
Foreign banks have also mounted pressure on the Finance Ministry,
seeking the removal of legislative hurdles that set limits to private
and foreign holdings in PSBs.
In the short term, the action is likely to be focussed on the Indian
private banks. Of the 100 banks in India, 27 are PSBs (including
eight in the State Bank of India group). There are 31 private sector
banks, of which eight are of recent vintage (for example, ICICI Bank
and HDFC Bank); and there are 42 foreign banks with branches in
India.
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The RBI's decision is seen as enabling foreign banks to extend their
operations, primarily by acquiring other banks. Initially, foreign
banks are likely to acquire control of private banks. The PSBs are
likely to be put on the block after their balance sheets have beencleaned up and the workforce trimmed to meet the demands of
their foreign suitors.
The private banks are a mixed bag. Many of the older private banks
cater to niche markets. Some of these banks have played a useful
role because they have adapted to local and regional requirements.
It is likely that a few of the international banks are knocking at the
doors of these banks. However, takeovers may not be easy. Thepromoters of especially the older private banks, who have a long
tradition of banking and linkages with local communities, may resist
takeover bids. It is contended by some of the respondents that the
government's "negative attitude" to small savings and provident
funds may pave the way for foreign financial institutions to extend
their operations to include pension funds.
The banking industry is likely to undergo consolidation. Some of theprivate banks are already wooing foreign banks. Vysya Bank, whose
promoters have sold 20 per cent stake to Bank Brussels Lambert
(BBL), part of the Dutch ING Group, is likely to offer a controlling
stake to the foreign bank. Vysya Bank already has a tie-up with ING
to sell insurance products in India. Since the International Finance
Corporation, promoted by the World Bank, has a 10 per cent stake
in the bank, BBL can increase its stake by only 19 per cent becauseof the 49 per cent ceiling on foreign stake in Indian banks. However,
banking industry sources say that even if BBL has a stake of 39 per
cent, it can control the private bank effectively. In fact there have
been suggestions that the RBI "clarification" came mainly because
BBL decided to test the regulatory regime governing FDI in banking
after acquiring 20 per cent of the stake in Vysya Bank.
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in new areas. Incidentally, this has also been the route pursued by
some of the new generation private banks like ICICI Bank and HDFC
Bank. While ICICI Bank took over Bank of Madura, HDFC Bank
bought Times Bank. The current market capitalisation (market value of a company's
stock) of the 11 private banks whose shares are listed is about
Rs.1,600 crores. The under-capitalised old private banks are clearly
vulnerable. A 49 per cent stake in each of these banks can be
bought by foreign banks at a total cost of less than Rs.800 crores. A
49 per cent stake in Dhanalakshmi Bank would cost Rs.13 crores; in
Nedungadi Bank Rs. 21 crores; in Lakshmi Vilas Bank Rs.28 crores;in United Western Bank Rs.32 crores; in City Union Bank Rs.27
crores; and in Federal Bank Rs.73 crores. Although the CARs of
many of these banks are higher than the RBI-stipulated norm, it is
argued that this alone does not offer them protection. The private
banks are "certainly easy takeover targets" owing to the fact that
the money required for such takeovers is "piffling amounts, by the
standards of foreign banks". However, foreign banks will examinethe quality of the targeted banks' assets before making their moves.
It is argued by some respondents that although the minimum CAR of
10 per cent may be the norm, in reality banks may need to maintain
it at about 12 per cent to enjoy some measure of comfort.
Some respondents prefers to look at financial sector reforms in
terms of how they address the question of economic development.
They argue that ten years of reforms have failed. "Every indicator of
banking," suggests that there has been a serious setback." Foreign
capital, has a "certain management culture, a certain method of
operation and certain types of customers that they would like to
cultivate". "Rural and urban employment cannot be sustained
without credit. Economic development needs institutional
instruments. Neither the foreign banks nor the private banks are
likely to be the right instruments for the objective of development."
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The structure of the Indian economy and its needs dictate a
different approach to banking. Foreign banks, are not increasing
their share of deposits. Instead, their profits are mainly on account
of "playing in the money market and external transactions".Although the new private banks have increased their deposits, their
influence is limited.
The real significance of the RBI announcement is widely perceived
to be in terms of what is in store for the PSBs, which are at the core
of Indian banking. The financial sector reforms have had a pincer
effect on the PSBs. They have been under pressure to carry the
burden of another era - one in which banks were seen as essentialinfrastructure in the task of economic development. A perverse
result of that era was the parasitism of Indian industry, which
siphoned off funds on a massive scale from these publicly-owned
institutions. Since liberalisation, banks have been forced to set aside
a large proportion of their profits to cover the losses arising out of
the banks' devalued assets, euphemistically termed non-performing
assets (NPA).Liberalisation also forced the PSBs to generate quicker profits,
compelling them to behave like clones of their private counterparts.
The reorganisation of banking operations has effectively reduced
the spread of the activity of these banks. The recent statement by a
senior RBI official that banks need to concentrate on their main
areas of business - in terms of geographical coverage as well as
profitability - bears the imprint of this mindset. The new regime,with its emphasis on "virtual banking, instead of brick-and-mortar
banking", has caused banks to indulge in "mindless downsizing".
Despite this, the 27 PSBs account for 81 per cent of all bank
deposits; the 31 private banks account for 13 per cent; and the
foreign banks 6 per cent. The position is almost similar in the case
of advances by banks. The profitability of PSBs is lower not merely
because of higher wage costs, but because of their lower per-branch
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business. This, in turn, is largely on account of the extensive reach
of their business, particularly in the rural areas.
Banking statistics reveal several disquieting trends in the last few
years. For instance, the credit-deposit (CD) ratio in the rural areashas declined significantly. The combined CD ratio of the rural
branches of all banks in India has declined from about 65 per cent to
40 per cent between 1996 and 2001. This implies that a diminishing
proportion of rural deposits is being ploughed back as credit in rural
areas. This tendency is particularly adverse in States like Bihar,
Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh.
The sharp decline in interest rates on bank deposits implies adverseconsequences for rural savings. There is evidence to show that rural
and agricultural credit, and lending to small-scale industries, have
suffered seriously since the 1990s. The evidence from diverse
sources indicates that the squeeze on rural credit has forced rural
borrowers to seek credit from moneylenders and other informal
sources of finance. In short, while high-street urban banking has
been on the rise, aimed at skimming the cream of the market, theuse of rural credit as a lever for economic development has been
seriously undermined.
The entry of foreign banks is likely to have serious implications for
balanced regional development and also widen the rural-urban
divide.
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Till end of 1999-2000 fiscal year, two state-run insurance
companies, namely, Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) and General
Insurance Corporation (GIC) were the monopoly insurance (both
life and non-life) providers in India. Under GIC there were foursubsidiaries-- National Insurance Company Ltd, Oriental Insurance
Company Ltd, New India Assurance Company Ltd, United India
Assurance Company Ltd. In fiscal 2000-01, the Indian federal
government lifted all entry restrictions for private sector
investors. Foreign investment insurance market was also allowed
with 26 percent cap.
GIC was converted into India’s national reinsurer from December2000 and all the subsidiaries working under the GIC umbrella
were restructured as independent insurance companies.
Indian Parliament has cleared a Bill on July 30,2002 delinking the
four subsidiaries from GIC. A separate Bill has been approved by
Parliament to allow brokers, cooperatives and intermediaries in
the sector.
Currently insurance companies- both private and public-- has to
cede 20 percent of its reinsurance with GIC. GIC is planning to
increase re-insurance premium by 20 percent which works out at
Rs 3000 cr. GIC is actively considering entry into overseas
markets including West Asia, South-east Asia and SAARC region.
To regulate, promote and ensure orderly growth of the insurance
business and re-insurance business, a regulatory authority --
Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA) -- was
set up under IRDA Act, 1999. IRDA is composed of a chairman,
five whole time members and four part-time members. There are
four types of Indian insurance business: Life, Fire, Marine, and
Miscellaneous. In life insurance more than 80 percent business
relates to Endowment Assurance (Participating) and Money Back
(participating). Motor Vehicles insurance is compulsory in India.
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In India, motor vehicle insurance premium is 2.5 percent of the
vehicle cost against international standard of 6 percent.
The Indian insurance regulatory authorities has asked the insurance
companies operating in the country to take into account theinvestment income earned on the funds earmarked for outstanding
claims, unreported claims and unexpired risks while calculating the
underwriting margins. These funds are called technical funds
belonging to the policyholders. Hence the income earned on such
funds should be considered as contributions from the policyholders
of the concerned insurance companies.
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FDI IN THE INSURANCE SECTOR
The Finance Minister, while presenting the first Budget of the UPA
government, has proposed to raise the FDI cap in three sectors.
Elaborating upon the decision he said, “The NCMP declares that FDI
will continue to be encouraged and actively sought, particularly in
areas of infrastructure, high technology and exports. Three sectors
of the economy fully meet this description. They are
telecommunications, civil aviation and insurance.” The specific
proposal for the insurance sector is to raise the FDI cap from 26 to
49 percent.
The IRDA supports a hike in the FDI limit in the insurance sector to
49 percent and also encouraging health insurance. According to
IRDA, the opening of the sector to private insurers has only helped
companies to become more competitive and come out with
innovative products not to mention the growth in GDP from 2.32 per
cent in 2000 to 2.88 per cent in 2003.It is also to be noted that there has been a strong revival of interest
by global insurance majors to set up life insurance venture in India.
AXA, Mitsubishi and Samsung have sent feelers in the Indian
market, and made enquiries with the regulator, the Insurance
Regulatory and Development Authority.
The life insurance industry has witnessed growth rates in excess of
65 per cent during the current fiscal. Life insurance premium in thefirst six months rose to Rs 8,425 crore as per Irda's figures.
The US-based Principal has also applied to the IRDA for a licence to
set up a life insurance entity in India. Samsung has obtained a
licence from the regulator to set up a liaison office in Mumbai, as it
hunts for a joint venture partner.
The IRDA has not received any interest from reinsurance companiesor global non-life players. Samsung Life Insurance is the largest
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insurer in South Korea, controlling almost one-third of the Korean
market.
Global players are not waiting for a hike in the FDI (foreign direct
investment) to 49 per cent. The problem today stems on their abilityto find good Indian partners having a strong marketing presence.
Ability of Indian players to bring in capital is also another problem
area. A key hurdle many global players face here is the difficulty in
finding an Indian entity that is willing to commit capital without
expecting any returns for the next 7-8 years, which is seen as the
break-even point.
Currently, global insurance companies can commence operations in
the country only through joint ventures, where the foreign entity
can hold a maximum of 26 per cent.
This means Indian partners have to shell out 74 per cent of the
funds into an entity that has a strong appetite for capital.
The Union budget had proposed a hike in FDI to 49 per cent, but
with the Left, a key ally of the Central government, opposing themove, FDI remains at current levels.
Private Players, Foreign Equity and Profitability
The Union Government had opened up the insurance sector for
private participation in 1999, also allowing the private companies to
have foreign equity up to 26 per cent. Following the opening up of
the insurance sector, 12 private sector companies have entered the
life insurance business. Apart from the HDFC, which has foreign
equity of 18.6%, all the other private companies have foreign equity
of 26 per cent. In general insurance 8 private companies have
entered, 6 of which have foreign equity of 26 per cent.
Among the private players in general insurance, Reliance and
Cholamandalam does not have any foreign equity. The following
table gives an aggregate picture of the current scenario of the
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insurance sector in India. (A full list of private companies in life and
non-life insurance is given in the Appendix).
TYPEOF
BUSINESS
NOS. OFPUBLIC
SECTORCOMPANIES
NOS. OFPRIVATE
SECTORCOMPANIES
TOTAL
LifeInsurance
01 12 13
GeneralInsurance
06 08 14
ReInsurance
01 0 01
Total 08 20 28
According to the Annual Report of the IRDA, 9 out of the 12 private
companies in life insurance suffered losses in 2002-03. The
aggregate loss of the private life insurers amounted to Rs. 38633
lakhs in contrast to the Rs.9620 crores surplus (after tax) earned by
the LIC. In general insurance, 4 out of the 8 private insurers suffered
losses in 2002-03, with the Reliance, a company with no foreign
equity, emerging as the most profitable player. In fact the 6 private
players with foreign equity made an aggregate loss of Rs. 294 lakhs.
On the other hand the public sector insurers in general insurance
made aggregate after tax profits of Rs. 62570 lakhs.
Not only are the public sector insurance companies more profitable
than the private ones, the private insurer which is most profitable
(Reliance) is one which has no foreign equity. If profitability is taken
to be an important indicator of efficiency, it is clear that the case for
further hike in the FDI cap in the insurance sector cannot be made
on efficiency grounds.
Questionable Reputation of the Foreign Partners
The record of some of the foreign companies who have started
operating in India is being questioned abroad. A recent article
published in The Economist (May 4, 2004) on ‘AIG’s Accounting
Lessons’ (AIG is Tata’s partner in India)came with the screaming
headline which said it all: “ The world’s largest insurance company
shows how to polish profits statement” . The Prudential Financial
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Services (ICICI’s partner in India) is facing an enquiry by the
securities and insurance regulators in the U.S. based upon
allegations of having falsified documents and forged signatures and
asking their clients to sign blank forms (New York Times, May 31,2003 and Wall Street Journal, May 31, 2003). This follows a payment
of $2.6 billion made by Prudential to settle a class-action lawsuit
attacking abusive life insurance sales practices in 1997 and a $ 65
million dollar fine from state insurance regulators in 1996. It is
evident that the questionable activities of these insurance
companies are not deterred by state imposed penalties and
litigations. The financial health of many of the foreign insurance
companies operating in India is also a cause of serious concern. The
Economist (April 1, 200 4) reports the sorry plight of Standard Life of
UK (HDFC’s partner in India), which is unable to remain afloat
without the possibility of raising money in debt or equity markets.
AMP closed its life operations for new business in June 2003. Royal
Sun Alliance also shut down their profitable businesses in 2002. A
recent report by Mercer Oliver Wyman, a consultancy, found that
European life insurance companies are short of capital by a
whopping 60 billion euros. The reason for the short fall in
capitalization, among other things, is due to European Unions’ new
regulation on solvency called ‘Solvency 2’ that will be enforced
across Europe from 2005 through 2007.
According to the Mercer Oliver Wyman Report the German, Swiss,
French and British insurers suffer from severe capital inadequacy,which is a result of undertaking risky investments in equity and debt
instruments in the past. Several issues of Sigma , a reputed Swiss
journal on insurance, have reported that the U.S. and Europe based
insurance companies are faced with gloomy growth prospects in the
advanced country markets, with several companies experiencing
negative growth in the recent past. Moreover, tighter capital
adequacy norms and other regulations that are currently beingimposed in the advanced countries are forcing these insurance
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companies to seek less regulated markets in developing countries to
undertake their high-risk ventures. Raising the FDI cap in India at
this juncture would expose our financial markets to the dubious and
speculative activities of the foreign insurance companies at a timewhen the virtues of regulating such activities are being rediscovered
in the advanced countries.
Competition in the Insurance Sector
Even after the liberalisation of the insurance sector, the public
sector insurance companies have continued to dominate the
insurance market, enjoying over 90 per cent of the market share. In
fact, the LIC, which is the only public sector life insurer, enjoys over98 per cent of the market share in Life insurance.
Market Share of Life and non-Life Insurance Sectors
(as % of total premium underwritten by insurers)
Insurance Sector 2001-2002 2002-2003
Life
Insurance
Private sector 0.54 1.99
Public Sector 99.46 98.01
General
Insurance
Private sector 3.68 8.64
Public Sector 96.32 91.36
Source: IRDA Annual Report, 2002-03
Given the huge market share enjoyed by the public sector
companies, the argument, which is often made by advocates of greater liberalisation, that the entry of private players would bring
down the cost of insurance due to enhanced competition, does not
seem to be convincing. The price making capacity of the market
leaders in the public sector is likely to remain intact for the time
being. The foreign insurance companies do have the reputation of
charging less premium compared to the risks involved and
promising abnormally high returns, in order to grab greater marketshare. Such competition, however, although capable of bringing
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down the ‘cost’ of insurance for a while, has often led to gigantic
frauds and bankruptcies.
Moreover, as is the case in other markets, the initial flurry of entries
into the Indian insurance market would invariably be followed by aphase of mergers and acquisitions that would lead to cartelisation,
precluding the possibility of competition driving down the costs in
the medium run. In the long run, other forms of non-price
competition like aggressive advertisement wars, are likely to lead to
increasing costs, eventually harming the interests of the consumers.
These phenomena in the insurance market have been observed in
several advanced countries. If the public sector companies startimitating the strategies of the foreign insurance companies in order
to defend their market shares, it would be at the cost of
undermining their important social objectives, which they have been
fulfilling so impeccably till date.
Implications for Resource Mobilisation
A major role played by the insurance sector is to mobilize national
savings and channelise them into investments in different sectors of
the economy.
However, no significant change seems to have occurred as far as
mobilizing savings by the insurance sector is concerned, following
the liberalisation of the insurance sector in 1999. Data from the RBI
show that the trend of the savings in life insurance by the
households to GDP ratio, while showing a clear upward trend
through the 1990s signifying increasing business for the insurance
sector, does not show any structural break after 1999 (see chart
below). It can be inferred therefore that the foreign capital which
flowed in after the opening up of the insurance sector has not been
accompanied by any technological innovation in the insurance
business, which would have created greater dynamism in savings
mobilization.
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Ratio of Savings in Life Insurance by Household to GDP
Years Ratio of Savings in Life Insurance to GDP
1992-93 0.011993-94 0.013
1994-95 0.014
1995-96 0.0145
1996-97 0.0146
1997-98 0.0148
1998-99 0.015
1999-00 0.017
2000-01 0.018
2001-02 0.02
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
Ratio of Savings in Life Insurance toGDP
Source: Handbook of Statistics, Reserve Bank of India
Far from expanding the market for the insurance sector, the
business activities of the private companies are limited in urban
areas, where a fairly good market network of the public sector
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market has remained by and large the same and from this market
the private companies are picking up the creamy sections in the
metros seriously eroding the ability of public sector to cross
subsidize its products in the rural areas.Flow of funds for infrastructure a myth:
Life insurance is all about mobilising the savings for long term
investment in social and infrastructure sectors. It was also argued
that opening up of insurance market would enable huge flow of
funds into infrastructure. The record of private companies on this is
dismal. More than fifty percent of the policies they sell are unit-
linked insurance where the decision on investment of savingselement in insurance is taken by the policyholders. In fact as per a
press report, ninety five percent of policies sold by Birla Sun Life and
over 80 percent of policies sold by ICICI Prudential were unit-linked
policies during 2003-04. Under these schemes, nearly 50 percent of
the funds are invested in equities thus limiting the fund availability
for infrastructural investments. As against this, the LIC has invested
Rs.40, 000 crores as at 31.3.2003 in power generation, roadtransport, water supply, housing and other social sector activities.
The Law Commission of India released a consultation paper on 16th
June 2003 on the revision of the Insurance Act, 1938. The
consultation paper proposes a suitable amendment to Section of
27C of Insurance Act allowing insurers especially carrying on
general insurance business to invest funds outside India. So, once
the law is amended to allow insurers to invest funds abroad, the
exports that these private companies would generate, would be the
export of savings of the people.
Raising the FDI cap also does not seem justifiable as far as
channelising savings into investments are concerned. The life
insurance sector invested a total of Rs. 31335.89 crores in the
infrastructure sector in 2002-03. Out of this the contribution of the
LIC was Rs. 30998.16 crores, which was 98.92 per cent of the total
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investment in infrastructure by the entire life insurance sector. The
figures provided by the IRDA Reports further suggest that the share
of the public sector life and non-life insurance companies in
investment in infrastructure is greater than their market share.Despite the FDI cap being set at 26%, the investment from the
insurance sector to the infrastructure sector was predominantly
from the public sector companies. Therefore, the argument that
raising the FDI cap in the insurance sector would help in mobilizing
resources for infrastructure, does not hold. On the other hand,
greater foreign control is more likely to lead to a decline in the share
of investment of the private insurance companies into the
infrastructure sector, given the record of the foreign insurance
companies in siphoning resources for speculative financial ventures.
It is also worth mentioning that the only insurance company
involved in insuring Indian exports is the Export Credit Guarantee
Corporation of India, which provides insurance cover to export
credit. The ECGC has been in existence since 1957. It is functioning
under the United India Insurance Co. No private player with foreign
partnership has ventured into this area. Moreover, the LIC and other
public sector units are the only ones to undertake overseas
operations, as reported by the Annual Reports of the IRDA. Foreign
participation has also not helped in marketing Indian insurance
products abroad.
Governments of the advanced countries like the U.S. continue to
applypressure on developing countries to open up their insurance sectors.
China, for instance was pressurized to open up its insurance sector,
in return of its entry into the WTO. However, the existing regulations
on foreign capital in the insurance sector in China has been a source
of continuing debate in the U.S.- China Economic and Security
Review Commission, where the Chinese side has resisted attempts
to force further deregulation. The unilateral move to further
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liberalize the insurance sector in India is unjustifiable. Events over
the decade of the 1990s have borne out the fact that financial
liberalisation does not contribute positively to investment and
economic growth. Countries which enthusiastically opened up theirfinancial sectors in order to attract capital inflows often experienced
enhanced volatility in their financial markets and speculative
attacks on their currency.
Further opening up of the insurance sector to foreign capital, which
serves as a vital financial intermediary of the national economy, is
therefore not warranted.
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CEO’S VIEW
CEOs of insurance companies are still to make up their minds
whether raising foreign direct investment limits in the sector is a
good move or not.
It is like being a child torn between two parents, one living in India
and the other overseas. Chief executive officers today are a
perplexed lot. When asked to give their views on foreign direct
investment in the pension industry, they simply cannot take a stand.
There are sub-plots within the main story, as the insurance industry
considers whether or not the FDI cap in the insurance sector willactually be raised.
The common man's picture of the fight for FDI was seen solely as a
political one -- where the Left is acting spoilsport in raising the FDI
cap from the current 26 per cent to 49 per cent.
The reality, however, is that the industry is as divided as the
political parties. Indian corporate chiefs like Deepak Parekh and
Rahul Bajaj are keen to dilute their holding in their respective
insurance joint ventures.
At the same time, they want to maintain their majority stakes. Says
Bajaj: "I do not support FDI beyond 49 per cent as I want control."
Bajaj Auto has two insurance joint ventures in partnership with
Allianz.
Parekh shares a similar view, stating that Housing DevelopmentFinance Corporation is bound to its foreign partners to sell up to 49
per cent. HDFC has signed MoUs with Standard Life for the life
insurance venture, and Chubb for the non-life entity.
India's financial and corporate giants will not let go of more; not
now, when life insurance companies are expected to break even in
the next couple of years. "I would rather dilute our stake [in SBI Life]
to the general public," says A K Purwar, chairman, State Bank of India.
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It is the smaller players who are eager for a hike in the FDI cap. The
current FDI limit will restrict the growth of private insurance players
because a sizeable working capital is required, points out Philip G
Scott, group executive director, Aviva Plc. He admits that growth atAviva could suffer.
"We have contingency plans in place but in a worst-case scenario,
business will need to grow much more slowly if FDI is not raised," he
adds. Aviva is a 26:74 joint venture with the Dabur group. The two
partners will proportionately infuse an additional Rs 77 crore (Rs
770 million) in January 2005 for this year's business growth.
Max India managed to take care of the want of capital for its lifeinsurance venture, Max New York Life. It raised Rs 200 crore (Rs 2
billion) by divesting 29 per cent equity in favour of a private equity
investor Warburg Pincus group and associates, through a
preferential equity offering.
The fresh infusion of funds will be deployed to meet Max's
investment in the life insurance and healthcare businesses, points
out the company's chairman Analjit Singh.
Foreign partners are equally keen to increase their share in
insurance joint ventures to make current investments worthwhile.
"Raising the FDI cap will give confidence to foreign investors to do
business on a scale that is not restrictive," says Sunil Mehta, country
head, AIG.
His view is shared by a number of global chiefs who have of latevisited India and met the regulator. There is some hesitancy among
international investors who have a limited appetite to invest in
equity capital, bring in the necessary IT and expertise, when they
can have only 26 per cent stake.
"There are many more choices for us [globally] to deploy capital
where we can best achieve the interest of shareholders," says
Aviva's Scott.
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entity could well have been on the block; or the Indian partner
would have been on the prowl for a new foreign partner.
At the moment, Indian promoters are apprehensive that should FDI
be raised, foreign partners will have an upper hand in the 10th yearof operation. Their concern follows the Insurance Act dictating the
dilution of Indian promoters' stake in favour of the general public.
This means that while Indian promoters would end up holding 26 per
cent according to the IRDA Act, their foreign counterpart could have
a higher stake of 49 per cent.
"Indian promoters have been absorbing a large portion of the losses
over the past three years. So the government will have to ensure
that at the time of reducing the shareholding in favour of the public,
the residual shareholding pattern ought to mirror the 51:49 ratio,
favouring Indian promoters," points out Deepak Satwalekar,
managing director HDFC Standard Life Insurance Company.
C S Rao, chairman of Insurance Regulatory and Development
Authority, says in response to industry's apprehensions that theclause would necessarily be amended, "else both the shareholders
will need to bring down their respective holding to 26 per cent." The
IRDA Act had not visualised foreign holding rising from the current
26 per cent to 49 per cent.
At the same time, India Inc hopes to make a killing when it sells its
stakes to foreign partners. "Dilution of shareholding will be at a
premium. I cannot see Indian promoters diluting at par after havingput in the majority of funds in the beginning when the venture was
taking off," says Shikha Sharma, managing director, ICICI Prudential
Life Insurance Company.
Foreign partners have already indicated their keenness to raise their
stakes, even if it is at a premium. Prudential Plc, the foreign joint
venture partner of ICICI, has beefed up plans to hike its stake in
ICICI Prudential Life Insurance Company.
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It has mopped up £1 billion through a rights issue from its investors
in the UK, which is aimed to fund expansion plans. The company has
the highest paid-up capital base in the industry at Rs 825 crore (Rs
8.25 billion), and is second to Life Insurance Corporation of India. The industry agrees that divestment of stake will only take place at
"the right price". However, what could be the fair price is currently
under dispute.
"If divestment has to happen, you want that to happen at a fair
value. This value cannot be determined unless you have greater
clarity on some of the issues of taxation....else you might end up
forcing an Indian promoter to sell his company cheap," saysSharma.
The next moot point is: what will happen to the shareholding pattern
on further dilution to the public? Some insurance companies feel
divestment to the general public will become irrelevant once the FDI
ceiling is raised.
"There is no need to take the company public if the idea is to ensureavailability of capital when both partners can easily bring in funds. If
foreign equity is raised to 49 per cent, the issue needs to be
approached differently and the clause will need to be amended,"
says Venkatesh Mysore, managing director, MetLife India.
Until a final decision is taken by the Centre on raising the FDI cap in
the insurance sector, many of the joint ventures will come under
pressure. This will largely be on the inability of shareholders to feed the
growing appetite for capital, although friction betweenshareholders could also be an issue.
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CONCLUSION
China’s roaring success in past twenty years is on the back of
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Chinese smartened up in 1980 and
enacted rules and regulations to welcome it. India, belatedly, has to
copy this concept. Initially FDI was thought to be Western economic
imperialism in modern times. Leaders brought up with Nehruvian
economic mould spurned upon it. Hence India missed the
investment bus for almost 25 years.
India needs FDI, and India needs it now. It needs it to boost the
economic growth, which is stuck at 6.5% (2004-05). A bigger
economic revival is possible if, money, technology and humanexpertise arrive from abroad on a much larger scale than it has
been coming in last few years. As the eighties progressed,
commercial bank lending, to fund economic growth in the third
world countries, declined. Instead the donors in the West promoted
FDI. Asian countries (with the exception of India) understood this
change and devised rules and regulations to attract it. China and
Asian Tigers (Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea etc.) werethe net beneficiaries. The West did not care, whether the recipients
were a former enemy or a friend. Money saw no enemies or friend,
instead it moved in the direction of minimum rules, pro-active
government help, lower wages, low priced products and an
understanding to deposit the proceeds of the export boom in
American Banks or bonds. China attracted about $20 Billion a year
from 1984 to 1997 and thereafter $40 Billion till 2003. Last year’sstatistics are still preliminary, but a momentous increase to $60
billion is indicated. The latter is a huge percentage of total of about
$150 Billion FDI spent all over the world. Asian Tigers received a fair
share but not as much as the Chinese did.
India received a meager $4.3 Billion. Although, Indians are rejoicing
at this amount, which is 40% higher than previous years, but it is a
drop in the bucket.
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What Does FDI Do the Manufacturing Economy?
It transforms the local economy into an export lead zero capital
cost growth wonder. FDI also brings with it expertise which is as
much important as the capital itself. Since, it is the multinationals,which are at the leading edge of the FDI lead exports, they ensure
free access to the market place. In other words these exports are
free from quotas and restrictions. As the exports grow, the brand
popularity grows. The consumer nations start to trust the quality
and reliability of the supply. It leads to more and more exports and
more incoming FDI. China is in that mode, currently. The Asian
Tigers were in that mode until 1998-99. India is nowhere near inattracting FDI compared to both the aforementioned economies.
That is why the Shanghai skyline resembles the West and Indian
cities present a dull and dreary look with lack of water and
restricted power supply. It is for IT and BPO boom that some
semblance of respectability exists for India in the world. Otherwise,
India as a nation would have disappeared from the mindset of the
West.FDI in India
Election of AB Vajpayee as Prime Minister of India in 1998 with his
right wing agenda was a welcome change. His prescription to speed
up economic progress included solution of all outstanding problems
with the West (Cold War related) and then opening gates for FDI
investment. In three years, the West was developing a bit of a
fascination to India’s brainpower, powered by IT and BPO. By 2004,
the West would consider investment in India, should the conditions
permit. By the end of Vajpayee’s term as Prime Minister, a
framework for the foreign investment had been established. The
new incoming government of Professor Manmohan Singh in 2004 is
further strengthening the required infrastructure to welcome the
FDI.
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Today, fascination with India is translating into active consideration
of India as a destination for FDI. The A T Kearney study is putting
India second most likely destination for FDI in 2005 behind China. It
has displaced US to the third position. This is a great leap forward.India was at the 15 th position, only a few years back. Thanks to the
hard work of the politicians in control in Delhi for the last five years.
A lot of politicians of the Nehruvian culture believe that outside
money will dominate the politics and may result in the rebirth of the
colonial past. It is untrue and is a figment of their imagination.
Colonialism is born with instability and disunity. British gained full
control of India, because the strong Mogul empire broke away.Piecemeal, the British were able to defeat everybody. Today, the
colonialists of the past in Europe are weak and disunited. They
cannot repeat the successes of the past. Iraq is a key example. The
world in two hundred years has changed so much that technology is
no longer monopoly of the West. The latter is well aware of it and
wishes to trade with former colonies and prosper. In return the
former colonies will have to prosper too.In addition, the economic management of the West under free
market system, need to be learnt and copied. This is possible only if
we eject the colonial rebirth mentality out of our mind set.
Agriculture & Manufacturing for Fuller Employment
Unemployment and under-employment is key cause of political
unrest in third world countries, India included. There are only two
known ways to tackle it. First is to make agriculture profitable and
more rewarding and the second is to industrialize speedily.
Agricultural reforms have been largely successful in India. These
have resulted in green revolution and food self-sufficiency. Fifty
percent of the population makes it’s living on it. Higher outputs with
additional investments will make agriculture and agro-industries
provide better returns and greater prosperity. But, it cannot provide
the clout, which India seeks. This has to come from India’s industrial
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FIPB. Township development qualifies for 100 percent through FIPB.
Telecom also qualifies for 74 percent through FIPB, 49 percent
through automatic approval already being permitted thanks to
India's WTO commitments. As reform signals, these changes areindeed welcome and the opening up of defense production reflects a
change in the mindset that the Left parties are likely to see red
over.
The moot question is whether these changes will lead to a surge in
FDI inflows, even if they do not touch the avowed target inflow of
U.S. $10 billion a year. India has fallen off the FDI map and inflows
haven't quite recovered since 1998, after the nuclear tests, relatedsanctions, and, perhaps, the East Asian currency crisis. Recognized
constraints remain and the fresh round of reforms, though welcome,
don't do much to remove these constraints. First, consumer goods
are plagued by excess capacity and there is no reason why such FDI
inflows should increase, especially since two dysfunctional
conditions remain -- in the case of existing joint ventures with Indian
companies, 100-percent foreign subsidiaries require no objectionsfrom existing joint venture partners, and mergers and acquisitions
(hostile as well as friendly) are frowned down upon. Second, if
defense production is being opened up, is there any sense in
retaining print media or broadcasting on the negative list? Third,
infrastructure projects have been plagued by flip-flops in policy --
power and telecom being two examples. Fourth, bureaucratic
procedures and red tape continue to be pervasive. After FIPB orautomatic approval clearance, an additional 40 to 60 clearances are
required at the state level. This explains why conversion ratios (ratio
of inflows to approvals) vary widely across states. Fifth, there are
serious problems with land acquisition (public interest,
compensation, resettlement) and environmental considerations.
Until these are resolved, FDI inflows are unlikely to shoot up
dramatically. However, the government should be applauded on twocounts. First, for the intent to reform, even though implementation
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may fall short. Second, for explicitly targeting services -- most
global FDI flows now relate to services, not manufacturing.
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APPENDIX
List of Private Companies in Life Insurance
Name of the Pvt. LifeInsurance Company % of Foreign Equity Name of the Foreign partner
Allianz Bajaj Life InsuranceCo. Ltd
26 Allianz
Birla Sunlife Insurance Co.Ltd
26 Sunlife
HDFC Standard LifeInsurance Co. Ltd.
18.6 Standard Life
ICICI Prudential LifeInsurance Co. Ltd.
26 Prudential
ING Vysya Life Insurance Co.Ltd.
26 ING
Max New York Life InsuranceCo. Ltd.
26 New York Life
MetLife India Insurance Co.Ltd.
25.99 Metlife
Om Kotak Mahindra Life
Insurance Co. Ltd.
26 Old Mutual
SBI Life Insurance Co. Ltd. 26 Cardiff
Tata-AIG Life Insurance Co.Ltd.
26 AIG
AMP Sanmar Life InsuranceCo. Ltd.
26 Sanmar Life Insurance Co.
Dabur-CGU Life InsuranceCo. Ltd.
26 CGU Life Assurance
Company
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List of Private Companies in General Insurance
Name of the Pvt. GeneralInsurance Company
% Of Foreign Equity Name of the Foreign partner
Royal Sundaram AllianceInsurance Co. Ltd
26 Royal Sun Alliance
Reliance General InsuranceCo. Ltd
Nil
IFFCO-Tokio General
Insurance Co. Ltd
26 Tokio Marine
Tata-AIG General InsuranceCo. Ltd
26 AIG
Bajaj Allianz GeneralInsurance Co. Ltd
26 Allianz
ICICI Lombard GeneralInsurance Co. Ltd
26 Lombard
Cholamandalam General
Insurance Co. Ltd
Nil
HDFC-CHUBB General
Insurance Co. Ltd
26 CHUBB
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Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA)
Pasisrama Bhavanam5-9-58/B Basheer Bagh
Hyderabad - 500 004
Phone: +91 (040) 6820964
Fax: +91 (040) 6823334
Life Insurers
Life Insurance Corporation of India Yogakshema
Jeevan Bima Marg
Post Box No: 19953
Mumbai - 400 021
Phone: +91 (022) 2021383/2022151
Fax: +91 (022) 2824386
SBI Life Insurance Co. Ltd
2 nd Floor, APEEJAY House
3, Dinsha Vachha Road
Churchgate
Mumbai – 400 020
Phone: +91 (022) 2351000-07
Fax: +91 (022) 2351009
Allianz Bajaj Life Insurance Co. Ltd
GE Plaza
Airport Road
Yerawada
Pune - 411 006
Phone: +91 (020) 4026666
Fax: +91 (202) 4026667
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Om Kotak Mahindra Life Insurance Co. Ltd
Peninsula Chambers, Peninsula Corporate Park
6th floor, Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower ParelMumbai - 400 013
Phone: +91 (022) 56635000
Fax: +91 (022) 56635111
ICICI Prudential Life Insurance Co Ltd
ICICI Prulife Towers
1089, Appasaheb Marathe Marg
Prabhadevi
Mumbai – 400 025
Phone: +91 (022) 462 1600
Fax: +91 (022) 437 6638
HDFC Standard Life Insurance Co. Ltd
5 th Floor, IL&FS Financial Centre, Plot C-22
“G” Block, Bandra-Kurla Complex
Bandra (E)
Mumbai – 400 051
Phone: +91 (022) 6533666
Fax: +91 (022) 6533661
Birla Sunlife Insurance Co. Ltd
1 st Floor, Ahura Centre, ‘B’ Wing
Mahakali Caves Road
Andheri (E)
Mumbai - 400 093
Phone: +91 (022) 6928300
Fax: +91 (022) 6928301
ING Vysya Life Insurance Co. Ltd
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14, Sankey Road
Sadashivanag
Bangalore – 560 006
Phone: +91 (080) 3318300-312Fax: +91 (080) 3318305
Tata-AIG Life Insurance Co.Ltd
4 th Floor, Ahura Centre
82 Mahakali Caves Road
Andheri (E)
Mumbai - 400 093
Phone: +91 (022) 6930000
Fax: +91 (022) 6938265
Metlife India Insurance Co. Pvt. Ltd
Brigade Seshamahal, No. 5
Vani Vilas Road
Basavanagudi
Bangalore – 560 004
Phone: +91 (080) 6678617/18
Fax: +91 (080) 652 1970
AMP Sanmar Assurance Co. Ltd
9, Cathedral Road
Chennai - 600 086
Phone: +91 (044) 811 8411
Fax: +91 (044) 811 7669
Dabur CGU Life Insurance Co. Pvt. Ltd
5 th Floor, JMD Regent Square
Mehrauli Road
Gurgaon - 122 001
Phone: +91 (0124) 680 4141
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Fax: +91 (0124) 680 4151
Max New York Life Insurance Co. Ltd
11th
Floor, DLF Square Jacaranda Marg
DLF City, Phase-II
Gurgaon - 122 002
Phone: +91 (0124) 6561717
Fax: +91 (0124) 6561764
Non-Life Insurers
National Insurance Co. Ltd
3 Middleton Street
Kolkata - 700 071
Phone: +91 (033) 2472130/2401634
Fax: +91 (033) 2402369/2408744
New Indian Assurance Co. Ltd
New Indian assurance Bldg.
87 MG Road, Fort
Mumbai - 400 001
Phone: +91 (022) 2674617-22
Fax: +91 (022) 2672286
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd
A-25/27, Asaf Ali Rd
New Delhi - 110 002
Phone: +91 (011) 3279221-25
Fax: +91 (011) 3287192/7193
United India Insurance Co. Ltd
24 Whites Road
Chennai - 600 014
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Phone: +91 (044) 8520161
Fax: +91 (044) 8524227
Tata AIG General Insurance Co. LtdAhura Centre
4 th Floor, 82 Mahakali Caves Road
Andheri (East)
Mumbai - 400 093
Phone: +91 (022) 6930000
Fax: +91 (022) 8305888
Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd
GE Plaza
Airport Road, Yerawada
Pune - 411 006
Phone: +91 (020) 4026666
Fax: +91 (020) 4026667
IFFCO Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd
Palm Court, 4 th Floor, Plot No. 20/4
Sukhrali, Chowk, Mehrauli-Gurgaon Road
Gurgaon - 122 001
Phone: +91 (0124) 6220889/6220893
Fax: +91 (0124) 6220887
ICICI Lombard General Insurance Co. Ltd
ICICI Towers, Bandra-Kurla Complex
Bandra (East)
Mumbai - 400 051
Phone: +91 (022) 6531414
Fax: +91 (022) 6531111
Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd
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Direct Investment vs Portfolio Investment (U.S. $ million)
1991
-92
1992
-93
1993
-94
1994
-95
1995
-96
1996
-97
1997
-98
1997-
98
(April
-Dec)
1998-
99
(April-
Dec)
DirectInvestment
129 315 586 1314 2133 2696 3197 2511 1562
Portfolio
Investment4 224 3567 3824 2748 3312 1828 1742 -682
Total
foreign
investment
133 559 4153 5138 4881 6008 5025 4253 880
Source: Reserve Bank of India
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows to developing countries are
estimated to have gone up to U.S.$ 149 billion in 1997 from U.S.$
130 billion in 1996. India’s share of global FDI flows rose from 1.8per cent in 1996 to 2.2 per cent in 1997. On the other hand, India’s
share in net portfolio investment flows to the developing countries
declined to 5.1 per cent in 1997 after increasing to 8.7 per cent in
1996.
FDI in India in 1997-98 was lower at U.S.$ 5,025 million compared to
U.S.$ 6,008 million in 1996-97 because of a decline in portfolio
investment (Table 6.9). Although foreign direct investment (FDI)
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FDI has been widely seen as one of the most positive forces in
recent economic globalisation, with the supposed potential to
transform productive structures in developing countries and bring
about economic convergence across the different regions of the
world.
It has been one of the great beliefs of the age of globalisation: the
belief that foreign investment _ and foreign direct investment inparticular _ could and would transform the world by bringing more
capital to capital-scarce economies and causing great changes in
the productive structures of developing economies.
In this context, the actual evidence on the role of foreign
investment comes as something of a surprise. It turns out that
aggregate net capital inflows into developing countries have not
been all that significant as a share of developing country GNP in the
1990s. In fact, the average for the 1990s is only marginally higher
than that for the period 1975-82, and only stands out because of
the much lower net inflows during the period 1983-89, i.e. when the
external debt crisis was working itself out. Indeed, if China is
excluded, then it turns out that the 1990s shows a lower
quantitative significance for net foreign capital inflow, in all other
developing countries combined, the late 1970s turns out to havebeen the time when foreign capital was most significant relative to
national income, and the globalising 1990s comes a rather poor
second.
The big change across the different time periods has been in the
nature of the capital inflow. In the period 1975-82, half the net
inflow consisted of bank loans; official flows, including development
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assistance, amounted to another 32 per cent. FDI and portfolio
inflows together amounted to a measly 11 per cent.
By the 1990s, the picture had changed dramatically. All official
flows were down to 20 per cent, and bank loans to 24 per cent.Instead, portfolio inflows had increased to 21 per cent and FDI to 34
per cent of the net inflow.
External savings have contributed rather little to the development
process for all developing countries (including China) taken
together. Net resource transfer was actually negative in the 1980s,
but even in the period 1990-98, they amounted to only 2.65 per
cent of the GNP of developing countries, just slightly above thatratio for the late 1970s and early 1980s.
One of the reasons for this less than wonderful performance of net
transfer in the 1990s has been the change in the pattern of net
capital flows over the 1990s. Around 1992-93, a number of
developing countries across Asia and Latin America went in for
substantial financial liberalization, including deregulation of capital
account transactions.
In consequence, while capital inflow increased, so did capital
outflow, as more and more domestic residents found it both more
possible and more attractive to hold foreign assets.
Of course, the really big change in the pattern of capital flows, as
was mentioned earlier, is in the shift towards more FDI, especially
from the early years of the 1990s. Especially in the last three yearsunder consideration, FDI inflows to all developing countries has
reached quite impressive levels, in excess of $150 billions in each
year. And this is really what has excited the proponents of
globalisation, because FDI is seen as the most positive of the non-
debt creating capital flows. Not only does it not involve repayment
of principal and interest, it is supposedly long-term in orientation,
rather than short-term and possibly speculative like portfoliocapital.
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But there may be a need to rethink the effects of FDI as well, or at
least to examine more closely its nature and implications. While FDI
does not involve direct repayment of interest and other forms of
debt servicing, it is not without future foreign exchange costs. Itleads to foreign exchange outflow in the form of outward
remittances of profits and dividends; it can also mean large
payments of royalties and technical fees abroad; MNCs typically
have a production profile which is more import-intensive and in any
case can manipulate such production-related foreign exchange
flows through transfer pricing of subsidiaries.
All this means that the initial inflow of foreign resources can berapidly counterbalanced by the foreign exchange payments of
various sorts that are additionally made because of MNC operations.
This is especially the case when the FDI enters sectors in which
exports are not the main avenue of sales generation. As more and
more FDI is devoted to the services sectors, this becomes even
more the case, since the output is not exported but foreign
exchange outgo increases nonetheless.Even without this stark aspect, there are other features of current
FDI, which call for a more measured look at its nature and
implications.
These relate to its geographical concentration and sectoral
distribution, the fact that more of it comes in the form of mergers
and acquisitions rather than productive or `Greenfield' investment,
and so on.
Given all this, it may appear quite paradoxical world FDI flows
increased so sharply in 1998. But a more disaggregated analysis
can help explain this. Almost all of this increase in FDI was
concentrated in developed countries. Thus FDI inflows to developed
countries went up to $460 billions _ an increase of 68 per cent over
1997. This dramatic growth was essentially fuelled by a huge boom
in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. These amounted to as
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much as $544 billions in 1998, that is, $202 billions more than in
1997.
Since most M&As actually occurred between the developed
countries, this means that such cross-border M&As were effectivelymore than the total value of FDI flows. This is possible because
many large M&A deals do not necessarily require cash or new funds,
especially if they are based on mutual exchange of stock. Similarly,
payment for acquisition can be spaced out over several years, as in
the case of the privatization and sale to MNCs of the Brazilian
telecom giant, Telebras System, which involved only 10 per cent
transfer of cash for shares in the first year.Some of these M&As in the past year have been huge deals
involving major MNCs, which then dominate international industry in
that sector. T, that is, new creation of productive assets (greenfield
investment) rather than mere acquisition of already created local
assets. In addition, it can involve balance of payment problems in
future because of large invisible outflows associated with it. But
perhaps most important of all is the evidence that even FDI tends tobe strongly positively correlated with domestic savings rates. In
other words, only when the host country is already one with high
domestic savings and investment rates (and therefore with high
overall economic growth rates), does much FDI feel sufficiently
attracted to come in. And even then, it has contributed relatively
little to the process of industrialization. Thus, in the petroleum
sector there was a takeover by BP of Amoco for the record amountof $55 billions, creating the third largest Petroleum Company in the
world, following the Shell Group and Exxon. Similarly, in the
automobile industry, the latest in a wave of international mergers
involved the acquisition of Chrysler by Daimler-Benz for $44.5
billions. The sheer size of some of the larger merger deals has
contributed to the substantial increase in FDI flows, although, for
reasons mentioned above, it is difficult to quantify the exact extent
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yet. But this represents no increase in the net contribution of FDI to
domestic investment in host countries. Instead, it indicates a
change in management and control, and most importantly, an
increase in the concentration of production internationally.With this concentration, which is increasingly being forced upon
even very large MNCs as part of a wave of mergers resulting from
heightened international competition, the nature of international
production is likely to change dramatically. More and more, both
manufacturing and services sectors are being dominated by a
smaller and smaller number of companies. This has important
implications for consumers as well as workers. For consumers, theemergence of humongous international corporations controlling
huge shares of production and markets not just in one country but
internationally means that monopoly power of sellers has gone up.
For governments, the sheer size of the newly merged entities and
their market power makes their relative bargaining power that
much more skewed and difficult to countervail.
Also, typically with such merger, profits may go up, but typicallyemployment stagnates or falls. This often counterbalances or even
negates the increase in employment of MNC affiliates, so that
employment increase tends to be the least buoyant of all the major
variables associated with MNC production. From 1986 onwards, the
growth rate of employment of the foreign affiliates of MNCs has
been consistently lower than that of other important indicators such
as assets and sales.
Turning now to the FDI flows specifically to developing countries,
the pattern is not only one where mergers and acquisitions have
become more important, it is also one of continuing regional
concentration. In 1998, for the first time in the decade, FDI inflows
recorded a lower rate of growth than FDI inflows into developed
countries. Indeed, inward FDI flows actually fell by 4 per cent, from
$173 billions in 1997 to $166 billions in 1998.
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FDI inflows to developing countries have been dominated by Asia,
which has accounted for around half of all such FDI on average. The
second place is taken by Latin America, which has also shown
substantial inflows in the 1990s. Africa remains heavily under-represented as a host region for FDI.
Even within these broad categories, there has been very significant
concentration. A major role has been played by China, which in the
1990s became the second largest host nation for FDI, second only
to the US in the entire world economy. FDI inflows into China as a
share of FDI into all developing countries increased from just over
one-tenth in the late 1980s to between one-fourth and one-thirdover the 1990s.
Similarly, a group of five economies - that is, China, Singapore,
Hong Kong, Mexico and Brazil - accounted for well above half of the
FDI inflows to all developing countries over the 1990s. In 1998, the
top five countries received 55 per cent of all developing country FDI
inflows. The 48 least developed countries continued to receive
abysmal levels of FDI inflow of less than $43 billions for all of themput together. This amounts to only 1.8 per cent of the flow to all
developing countries and just 0.5 per cent of world FDI flows. This
despite a very liberal policy framework with numerous incentives for
FDI.
One important change in FDI to developing countries over the past
decade has been the change in its composition. The share of
manufacturing activity in total FDI inflows has declined considerably
between 1988 and 1997. By contrast, there has been a substantial
increase in the share of services in such FDI, to the point where
they accounted for more than 40 per cent of such FDI in 1997.
This has very important, and potentially negative implications, for
host developing countries. As mentioned above, services production
typically falls in the non-tradable sectors, and most of the
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investment has been concentrated in areas such as telecom, energy
and finance, which are definitely not tradable.
As a consequence, these activities generate no foreign exchange
either in the form of export incomes or import substituting activity.However, like all FDI, such MNC-based production involves
substantial foreign exchange outflow over time in the form of
increased imports of inputs and working capital, more royalty
payments and repatriation of profits and other incomes. This can
add to balance of payments problems in certain developing
countries.
All this suggests that FDI is not necessarily the universal panacea toensure development that it is often presented as. Not only does it
not go where it is most required, it is increasingly not in a form that
is desired by developing countries in attracting FDI rather than
being mainly concerned with ways of increasing domestic savings
rates, are not likely to be very successful in terms of achieving
industrial transformation.
Source: “FDI in developing countries - How much? How
effective?”Business Line, October 5, 1999 (taken verbatim)
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
• BOOKS:
KOTHARI C.R, RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, 2002
SETH A.K, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
CHERUNILUM FRANCIS, BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
• NEWSPAPER AND MAGAZINES:
THE BUSINESS INDIA
THE ECONOMIC TIMES
THE FINANCIAL EXPRESS
• WEBSITES:
www.ciionline.org
www.google.com
www.valuenotes.com
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REPORT
On
“A STUDY OF FDI IN BANKING &INSURANCE SECTOR”
Submitted to
Maharshi Dayanand University,Rohtak