Commission of Inquiry (Godhra and post Godhra riots in Gujarat)
Consisting of
Mr. Justice G.T. Nanavati (Chairman)
And
Mr. Justice Akshay H. Mehta (Member)
Report
(PART – II)
Communal Riots in Gujarat after
the Godhra Incident
VOLUME-8
Other Material
INDEX
Sr.
No. Particulars Page
1 Other Material 1-67
2 Annexures 1 to 3 69-82
VOLUME-8
OTHER MATERIAL
1. We have dealt with the material relating to the incidents of communal violence in the
earlier volumes of this report. While doing so we have also referred to the evidence of
witnesses of the concerned districts, who have spoken about the role of the police and
involvement of other persons or organizations in the incidents which happened in their
areas. In this volume, we refer to the other relevant material. It consists of affidavits,
examination of some persons by the Commission, applications made by some persons
and the documents produced alongwith those applications and also some material
collected by the Commission. Some individuals have sent copies of applications made
by them to various authorities with their letters.
2. Shri Ashok Narayan, who was then the Additional Chief Secretary, Home Department
has filed an affidavit dated 1.7.2002.
2.1 With respect to the police force in the State, he has stated that the Bombay
Police Act, 1951, the Gujarat Police Manual, Vol.III and other Rules,
Regulations and Directions issued from time to time by the State Government
provide for organization, superintendence and control of the police force. The
law and order of the State is handled by the Director General of Police who is
assisted in his work by Officers working directly under him, Officers in the field
and the branches who report to him. The Commissioner of Police and District
Superintendents of Police who lead the district police force exercise various
powers and perform duties in their respective areas and are primarily responsible
for maintenance of public order within their areas. The District Superintendent of
Police of the district is under the control of the District Magistrate of that district.
The General Superintendence of police force vests in the State Government.
2.2 He has also stated that the earliest documented communal riots in Ahmedabad
took place in the year 1714. There were communal riots in Ahmedabad in 1715,
1716, 1732 and 1750. There were communal riots thereafter also. He has also
referred to some of the communal riots that happened in Ahmedabad in the 20th
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century, and to the communal riots which happened in Godhra between 1925 and
2010. He has then stated that the communal riots referred to by him are
illustrative examples of intensity, frequency, magnitude and spread of violence
in the State of Gujarat over the past many decades. He has also stated that
positive efforts are being made by the State in creating an atmosphere of
communal harmony. Referring to the situation prevailing in the State before 27th
February, 2002, he has stated that it was neither surcharged nor volatile inspite
of the programme of „Shilanyas‟ at Ayodhya on 15th
March, 2002 which was
announced a few months before. There was no intelligence input about any
likely communal disturbance in the State because of the Ayodhya programme.
2.3 Taking into account the gruesome nature of the Godhra incident and the past
communal history in the State, it was feared that there could be more violence in
the State. Considering inadequacy of the police force to deal with such situation,
a decision was taken on 27.2.2002 itself to requisition services of Rapid Action
Force stationed within the State. The Central Government made available 4 RAF
companies at about 15.20 hours. They were deployed immediately. To prevent
and deal with the disturbances, the whole State machinery was put on full scale
alert on 27th
itself. An alert message was sent from Home Department to the
local law enforcing authorities on 27.2.2002. On 1.3.2002, three companies of
BSF, one company of CIFS and one company of Border Wing Home Guards
became available for deployment. In view of the „bandh‟ call the State
Government had also felt the necessity of requisitioning Central Para Military
Force (CPMF) and therefore a request was made to the Central Government at
about 18.50 hours for 10 companies of CPMF. The State had requested the
Central Government to send 10 companies of Central Reserve Police Force
(CRPF). However, the same was not available as it was deployed at other places.
The Government of India approved deployment of 3 companies of CISF, 4
companies of BSF and 6 companies of Border Wing Home Guards which were
already present in the State. The first CPMF which became available on
28.2.2002 consisted of 3 companies of Central Industrial Security Force. They
were made available at Ahmedabad, Vadodara and Godhra.
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2.4 On 28.2.2002, by mid-day, a high level review of the situation at the Chief
Minister‟s level was made. By 14.30 hours, the Chief Minister made an oral
request to the Union Home Minister for army deployment. The Additional Chief
Secretary, Home, requested the Defense Secretary to make the army available
for internal security duties. At about 16.00 hours, the Chief Minister publicly
announced the decision of the State Government to call in the army. A formal
written request was also sent to the Central Government for that purpose. Earlier,
in the morning of 28th,
inquiries were made with the local army establishment
and it was revealed that no force was available as it was deployed in forward
areas. As withdrawal of the army at a critical juncture, when there was war like
situation, was an important decision, that was required to be taken at a very high
level at the centre. Decision in that behalf by the centre was taken within a short
time. The army personnel were airlifted from a forward position and they started
arriving at Ahmedabad by mid-night of 28th
. As many as 40 aircrafts were used
to airlift army personnel. The last plane arrived at Ahmedabad by 11.00 a.m. on
1st March. Deployment of army required, additional logistic support by the civil
administration in the form of Executive Magistrates, vehicles, Liaison Officers,
guides and maps. They were made available on a war footing. Some army men
were sent to Vododara by aircraft and they landed there by 4.30 p.m. Fourteen
aircrafts were used for taking the army to Rajkot and first plane landed at Rajkot
by 03.00 hours on 2nd
March. Actual deployment of the army in Ahmedabad
commenced by 11.00 hours on 1.3.2002 after a high level meeting with the Chief
Minister, Union Defence Minister, Sr. Officials of the army and the State
administration. In Ahmedabad, 9 columns of army were deployed on 1.3.2002.
On 2.3.2002, two columns were dispatched to Godhra at 01.30 hours. Two
columns of army were moved to Vadodara at 18.30 hours on 1.3.2002 and two
columns of army were moved to Rajkot at 11.00 hours on 2.3.2002. As more
incidents of violence were reported from Bhavnagar and Surat, army columns
were moved to Surat on 3.3.2002 and to Bhavnagar also on 3.3.2002.
2.5 The State Government had also made requests to the neighbouring States of
Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh for sparing services of some of
their armed reserve police. Only Maharashtra Government responded by sending
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two companies of SRP. The Government of Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh had
expressed their inability to spare any force. The State Government had requested
the Central Government to make available additional RAF and CRPF but the
Central Government could not spare any more RAF or CRPF. Para military
forces were deployed and moved from one place to another depending upon the
prevailing situations.
2.6 The alert message of 27th
was followed by another message from the Home
Department on 28th.
. One more message was sent by the Home Department on
28.2.2002 for keeping adequate Bandobast on 1.3.2002 as it was Friday, a day
for prayers by Muslims. He has then pointed out what other messages were sent
from time to time. He has also stated that every day high level meetings with the
Chief Minister and Sr. Officers were held and necessary instructions were given
for proper Bandobast and effective use of force in controlling the violence.
2.7 He has further stated that due to the enormity of communal violence and the fact
that it had spread to unexpected areas and interior parts of the State, Para
Military Forces made available to the State were found inadequate to meet with
the situation. He has further stated that there was wide spread reporting of
communal riots in violation of all journalistic norms and ethics by the media,
both electronic and print. That had inflamed communal passion. The media had
shown huge intemperate tendency to over emphasize certain aspects. For
instance some phrases used by the media were; “State sponsored terrorism”,
“State complicity”, “Genocide” and “Ethnic Cleansing”. The media had not
pointed out how fast the administration had moved fast to control violence and
provide succour. It also failed to point out how many sensitive areas of the State
had remained free from trouble. It also failed to report that many persons of
minority community were rescued by the police.
2.8 Shri Ashok Narayan was summoned by the Commission and allowed to be
questioned by the advocates of JSM, Central Relief Committee and Jamiat Ulma
E Hind. In reply to their questions, he stated that usually all important law and
order informations are received in the control room of the Home Department
from the office of DGP. On 27th
morning, he had discussion with the Chief
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Minister on the basis of the information which he had received by that time
regarding the Godhra incident. He had received information from the District
Magistrate, Godhra. By the time, a note was prepared in respect of that incident
for presenting it in the assembly, he had received information from other
agencies also. He was in constant touch with the DGP on telephone with a view
to keep himself informed about the Godhra incident. By afternoon he had a
complete picture of what had happened at Godhra. He has stated that he had
come to know that coach S-6 of the Sabarmati Express Train was set on fire and
by evening he could visualize that there could be many casualties. He has stated
that the decision to bring the dead bodies at Sola Civil Hospital was that of the
Chief Minister. A meeting was called by the Chief Minister at night on 27th
to
consider necessary steps to be taken and to ensure that the situation in the State
does not deteriorate. In that meeting the Chief Minister had given a direction that
all possible steps should be taken to suppress communal violence and to control
the situation as it was feared that there might be more communal violence on the
next day. He has stated that it was not necessary to give specific directions to the
police for implementing the riot scheme, which was already framed earlier by
each district and which specified how to deal with communal violence, as the
concerned authorities in the district have to implement it without waiting for any
order from the higher authorities. In reply to a specific question as to what
instructions were given by the Chief Minister, Shri Ashok Narayan stated that
the Chief Minister had instructed the officers to take all possible steps which
were required for maintaining law and order. As regards why action was not
taken against „Sandesh‟ newspaper inspite of request made by the Police
Commissioner of Vadodara and DSP, Bhavnagar, he stated that in view of the
freedom of expression available under the constitution, the Government had felt
that it was not advisable to create one more front with the media at that stage by
taking action against the said newspaper. He also stated that on 28.2.2002, in the
city of Ahmedabad, there was less violence in the areas which were known as
communally sensitive whereas more communal violence had taken place in the
areas which were not considered as communally sensitive. Many questions were
put to this witness about calling the army and other para military forces but
nothing contrary to what he has stated in his affidavit has been elicited. He has
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stated that the decision to deploy army was taken on 27.2.2002 at about 2.30
p.m., but the army was actually deployed on the next day as the army was not
present in Ahmedabad. As regards transfers of some police officers in the month
of March, he has stated that the proposal for transfer of IPS Officers is prepared
by the General Administrative Department (GAD) and placed before the Chief
Secretary. Thereafter, it goes to the Minister of State and then to the Chief
Minister. A proposal of transferring officers was initiated by the Home
Department through GAD. It was sent to the Government. The Government
decided to effect more transfers. He stated that in the initial proposal, it was not
proposed to transfer Shri Srivastav of Kachchha and Shri Rahul Sharma of
Bhavnagar. After issuance of the transfer order, DGP had written to the
Government to keep in abeyance certain transfers. He had also suggested that to
the Government but the said suggestion was not accepted. He stated that he had
come to know about the recommendation made by Shri Srikumar for transferring
the police officers of Ahmedabad city and he had a discussion in that behalf with
the DGP. He had told DGP to make an inquiry. As no concrete information was
available, no pinpointed action was taken. As regards the meeting held at the
Chief Minister‟s residence on 27.2.2002 at night, he stated that in that meeting
he was present, the DGP was present but he was not able to recollect who else
were present.
3. Shri V.V.Rabari, who was the Deputy Inspector General of Police from 20.4.2001 to
14.3.2002 has filed an affidavit dated 22.06.2002. He was examined (W.989) by the
Commission on 4.8.2004. He has stated how the State Police Control Room works and
how much police force was available between 27.2.2002 and 30.4.2002. As stated by
him, at the relevant time there were 69 companies of the State Reserve Police Force.
Prior to 27.2.2002, 8 Companies were already allotted separately for Bandobast at
certain important places and 52 companies were deployed in districts. Thus, out of 69
companies, 59 companies were already deployed and only 9 companies and 1½
platoon were available for further deployment on 27.2.2002. In view of the Godhra
incident, one more company was made available for Ahmedabad city, 2 for Surat city,
1 for Anand town and 2 for Godhra Town. Two platoons were made available for
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Mehsana town and 1 platoon was sent to Himatnagar. Thus, 7 more companies of SRP
were deployed on 27.2.2002.
3.1 He further stated that the DGP, after obtaining permission of the Central
government through the Home Department, deployed 4 companies of Rapid
Action Force on the same day. The post of Inspector General of Police of Surat
Range was vacant. Therefore, Inspector General of Police Shri P.P. Pande was
sent to Surat. As I.G.Range, Vadodara was busy with the Godhara incident,
Inspector General of Police Shri Meena was given additional charge of Bharuch
district. The Gujarat Government had requested the Central Government for
making available para military force on 27.2.2002 and pursuant to that request, 3
companies of BSF were made available. Two companies reported on 28.2.2002
and one company reported on 1.3.2002. Soon after they reported, they were
deployed at Ahmedabad, Vadodara and Surat. Some more companies of CISF
were made available on 28.2.2002 and 1.3.2002. Out of them, one company was
deployed in Ahmedabad and one in Vadodara on 28.2.2002. Two companies
were made available for Ahmedabad city on 1.3.2002 and one company was
made available for Godhra district. On 2.3.2002, one company of CISF was
made available for Surat city.
3.2 He has further stated that some companies of Border Wing Home Guards
(BWHG) were under the army operation control. One company of Border Wing
Home Guard was allotted to DSP Rajkot rural, one company to DSP Palanpur,
one company to DSP Kheda, one company to DSP Patan and one company to
CP Ahmedabad. On 28.2.2002 the Commandant General of the BWHG made
two more companies from Banaskantha and three companies from Bhuj
available. Accordingly, the Government directed that one company be sent to
Rajkot rural, one company to Palanpur, one company to Kheda and one company
to Patan. On 1.3.2002 the Commandant General was requested to make one
more company available at Ahmedabad to work as DGP reserved. The company
which was thus kept reserved, was sent to Anand on 2.3.2002. On 3.3.2002 the
company which was deployed at Rajkot was sent to Bhavnagar considering the
situation in Bhavnagar.
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3.3 On 1.3.2002 the State of Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra were
requested to send ten companies each of Armed Police. Only Maharashtra State
responded and made available two companies of SRP on 3.3.2002. One company
was allotted to Banaskantha district and one company was allotted to Surat city.
3.4 Thus, by 3.3.2002, apart from its own police force, four companies of RAF, 11
companies of BSF, 5 companies of BWHG, 2 companies of Maharashtra SRP
and 6 companies of CISF were deployed by the State Government. One more
company of BSF was made available on 4.3.2002 and it was sent to Kheda
district. Five more companies of BSF were received on 8.3.2002. One company
was allotted to Mehsana, one company to Sabarkantha, one company to
Kachchha, one company to Dahod and one company to Bhavnagar. One more
company of BWHG was received on 10.3.2002 and that was sent to
Banaskantha. The extra police force thus received, was deployed at different
places from time to time depending upon the situation prevailing at those places.
On 24.3.2002 two platoons were made available and they were deployed in
Sabarkantha district. One company of SSB was received on 27.3.2002 and that
was deployed in Patan district. In the month of April 2002, some additional force
was made available and that was deployed at different places. He has also
produced a statement showing deployment of army from 1.3.2002. The
statement is annexed with this volume and marked as Annexure 1.
3.5 In reply to the questions put to him by the commission, he stated that ordinarily
directions are given by the Government to the high police officers through State
Control Room and they are sent through DGP. On 28.2.2002, no message was
sent by Shri I.K.Jadeja through the SCR. On 26.2.2002 there were 52 companies
of SRP in Ahmedabad city. Twelve columns of army were deployed in
Ahmedabad on 1.3.2002. He has also stated that apart from deploying the regular
police force and SRP, the State Government had made attempts to get additional
police force and that it was deployed as and when the same had become
available.
4. Shri K. Chakravarthi was the Director General (DGP) of Police of Gujarat State at the
relevant time. He had taken charge of that post on 1.4.2001. As the head of the State
9
Police force, he was responsible for the supervision of the whole police force in the
State. He has filed an affidavit dated 31.1.2004. He has stated therein that at the
relevant time there were 4 Police Commissionerates, 7 Ranges and 30 Police Districts
in the State. There were 88 Sub-divisions, 96 Circles and 464 Police Stations. He
supervised the functioning of the State Police Control Room which was manned by 4
Police Inspectors under a Dy. SP round the clock. The sanctioned strength of the State
Police as on 31.12.2001 was 53158 police personnel and 3438 police officers. In
addition, there were 11 SRP Groups having 69 Companies.
4.1 He has further stated that in the morning of 27.2.2002 at 8.25 hours, he got a
telephonic intimation from the State Police Control Room that a mob had stoned
Sabarmati Express Train at Godhra Railway Station. Subsequently, he was
informed that a bogie of that train was set on fire. Considering seriousness of the
incident, he gave instructions through State Control Room to sound red alert for
placing the entire police machinery on round the clock duty with immediate
effect. In the afternoon, he had given directions to senior police officers to
proceed to communally sensitive areas immediately and supervise the law and
order situation there. Through a fax message sent on that day he had instructed
all the Commissioners of Police, Superintendents of Police and Range Heads to
take precautionary measures to avert any fall out effect of the Godhra incident in
their jurisdictions by maintaining strict vigil at all sensitive points, to mobilize
their forces, to requisition vehicles and to promptly attend to even minor
incidents in order to nip the trouble in the bud. Another crash fax message was
also sent on that day directing all officers to thwart any attempt on the part of
communal and anti-social elements to foment disturbance by making preventive
arrests. On that night, he had appeared on Doordarshan Channel and appealed to
the public to maintain peace.
4.2 He has stated that due to repeated telecast of the Godhra Train incident by the
electronic media, the psyche of the people at large was affected. Consequently,
on 28th
morning and thereafter unprecedented crowds started pouring into streets
at many places in the State and targeted members of the minority community as
well as their properties on a large scale. Earlier the hyper sensitive areas in the
walled city area of Ahmedabad used to get affected; but, on this occasion even
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outlying areas were badly affected. In the districts, violence spread to even
remote villages and tribal areas were also affected. The Police Force was
confronted with an extraordinary situation. It had to deal with the same with
limited number of police personnel. The police had resorted to teargas shelling
and firing to control the violence. The extent of usage of tear-smoke shells was
so high that the available stock of the State got exhausted soon and Ministry of
Home Affairs was required to be moved 4 times for sending additional tear gas
munitions. He has given details regarding the teargas shells and rounds fired by
the police force in a separate statement. Between 27.2.2002 and 30.4.2002,
police had fired 9739 rounds and lobbed 13639 tear gas shells. Police had
arrested during this period 14965 persons (10432 Hindus and 4533 Muslims) in
connection with the offences registered till then. The police had also made
preventive arrests of 24215 persons (20082 Hindus and 4133 Muslims). At
various places the local police had rescued affected members and taken them to
safe places. He has given details of such instances in a separate statement
annexed as Annexure III to his affidavit. The said statement contains 27 such
instances which happened between 27.2.2002 and 4.3.2002. A copy of that
statement is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure 2. During the
communal disturbance, about 6000 „Haj‟ pilgrims had returned to Ahmedabad.
Special arrangements were made for safely escorting them from Ahmedabad
Airport/Railway Station to their respective places. During March/April-2002,
SSC/HSC Board Examinations were held and due to effective police Bandobast
98% of the students could appear in those examinations. He has also given
details regarding directions/instructions given by him from 27.2.2002 to
5.4.2002.
4.3 He has stated that the State Police was functioning under severe man power
constraints even in terms of the then existing 1960 yardstick. There was a short
fall of approximately 70000 personnel in various police ranks as found in 1988
when shortfall was assessed. He has given details regarding the requests made to
the Government of India and other State Governments for providing Police
Force, Para Military Force and the Army.
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4.4 During his examination before the Commission, in reply to the questions asked
by JSM, he stated that he retired from the service on 31.1.2004. On that day he
filed an affidavit before the Commission as he had noticed that all relevant
informations were not disclosed in the affidavit of Shri V.V.Rabari. There were
many important instructions and directions given to the field officers, from time
to time, but they were not included in the affidavit of Shri Rabari. He also stated
that the work of collecting intelligence is done by State CID through its officers
and the head of Intelligence Bureau then analyses the same. His attention was
drawn to important informations received by them. No information was received
by the Intelligence Bureau regarding return journey of the Kar Sevaks. There
was no information about any conspiracy to attack the Sabarmati Express Train
at Godhra. He had drawn attention of the Government to the newspaper reports
which were published then, regarding the Godhra incident and the subsequent
events, and which were likely to instigate people to lead to violence. He had told
the Government that if action was not taken against the persons publishing such
reports that would make it difficult for the police to control the riots. Till he
attended the meeting called by the Chief Minister at his residence on the night of
27.2.2002, he did not know that BJP had also declared its support to the Bandh
call given by VHP. He also stated that it was not brought to his notice by the
State Intelligence Bureau that no proper investigation was done in the Naroda
Patia and Gulberg incidents. With respect to the report dated 26.4.2002 of the
Additional Director of the State Intelligence Bureau, he stated that it was an
opinion of the said Officer. He further stated that as a result of the action taken
by the police in many districts, the riots had stopped and Bhavnagar was one
such district. As regards transfer of officers, he stated that they were made
without his knowledge but the officers who were sent in their place were quite
competent as their predecessors to deal with the situation. He stated that Shri
I.K.Jadeja, who was a Minister then, had come to his office on 28.2.2002 and
had remained there for about 15 to 20 minutes. Regarding the meeting of
27.2.2002 called by the Chief Minister, he stated that the Chief Minister had not
told him that the majority community should be allowed to give vent to its anger.
He stated that in the said meeting he had suggested to make a request for
additional police force and to inquire about availability of the army. As regards
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the Gulberg incident, he stated that on 28.2.2002 at about 2‟O clock he had come
to know that the said society was surrounded by a big mob. He had contacted
the Police Commissioner who had informed him that some police officers and
policemen were already sent to that place. At about the same time he had come
to know about the incident of Naroda Patia also. He had come to know only at
night that some persons were burnt alive in Naroda Patia incident. He stated that
till 6.3.2002 he used to remain in his office as information was constantly
received from all the districts regarding the situation there and after considering
the same, he had to give instructions. In the meeting of 27th,
apart from him, the
Home Secretary and the Police Commissioner of Ahmedabad city were present.
He stated that if he was told by his superior officer or by any Minister or the
Chief Minister to do anything beyond the scope of his powers and duties, he
would not have obeyed such orders or instructions. He would have also not
instructed any subordinate to do such an act. While explaining why no Muslim
police officer of IPS rank was given field duty, he stated that not a single IPS
Muslim officer was on an executive post at that time. During the relevant time,
there were 8 Muslim IPS officers in Gujarat Police Force. Two were under
training, two were in SRP, one was in Police Housing Corporation, one was in
Human Rights Commission, one was in CID Crimes and one was in Traffic
Branch.
4.5 Shri Chakravarthi was again summoned by the Commission to appear before it
on 9.8.2011 for recording his further evidence. He did remain present before the
Commission on that day. When he was about to be examined, Jan Sangharsh
Manch, supported by Jamiyat Ulma A Hind and the Congress Party raised an
objection that he should not be examined again. At that time it was made clear to
the parties opposing further examination of Shri Chakravarthi that he was called
to make clear one relevant aspect viz. presence of Shri Sanjeev Bhatt at the
meeting of 27.2.2002 at the residence of the Chief Minister and also to enable
them to put questions to him on the said aspect. However, they continued their
objection and therefore Commission did not proceed further with examining him
on that day and told him to put in writing whatever he had to say and send it to
the Commission. Thereafter, by his letter dated 19.12.2011, he placed certain
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facts before the Commission. Since those facts were not supported by an
affidavit, he was informed by the Commission that if he wanted those facts to be
considered, it would be proper for him to state those facts on an affidavit. He
thereafter filed an affidavit dated 21.2.2012. In the said affidavit he has stated
that though Shri Jadeja had come to his office and remained in the office for
about 15 to 20 minutes, he had not given any instruction to him or to his officers.
He has further stated that Shri Jadeja had remained in another room of his office
for some more time and had left thereafter. He has stated that allegations made
by Shri Sreekumar in this behalf are false. He has further stated in the affidavit
that on the night of 27.2.2002 he had gone straight to C.M.‟s residence from
Doordarshan office at Ahmedabad. Shri. Sanjeev Bhatt had not accompanied
him in his car to C.M.‟s residence on 27th
night nor Shri Bhatt had attended the
C.M.‟s meeting that night.
5. Shri R.B.Sreekumar was Additional D.G.P. of Police (Intelligence), Gujarat State.
5.1 In his first affidavit dated 6.7.2002, he has stated that he took charge as
Additional D.G.P., State Intelligence Bureau (CID-IB) on 9.4.2002. The State
Intelligence Bureau (SIB) is entrusted with the duty of collecting intelligence
having a bearing on various aspects of maintenance of law and order and internal
security of Gujarat State. The functions of the bureau are “(a) The collection and
collation of information regarding political, industrial and other similar
developments or movements in the State; (b) Verification of character and
antecedents, protection and security of VIPs, watch over anti-national activities,
movements of foreigners and all matters pertaining to internal security, etc.; (c)
Collection of intelligence regarding all types of communal activities will be an
important work of this Branch, and (d) To keep the Government informed of all
the above activities from time to time.” The bureau functions under the
Additional Director General of Police (Intelligence). He was at the relevant time
assisted by I.G. (Security), D.I.G. (Political & Communal) and 3 Dy.
Commissioners of Intelligence (SP Rank) and other officers and supporting
office staff. Apart from the head-quarter at Gandhinagar, State Intelligence
Bureau has 8 Regions headed by Assistant Commissioners of Intelligence
(Dy.SP Rank) located at (1) Ahmedabad, (2) Gandhinagar, (3) Vadodara, (4)
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Surat, (5) Rajkot, (6) Junagadh, (7) Kutch-Bhuj and (8) Disa. Besides State
Intelligence Bureau (SIB), there were intelligence units working independently
under the direct supervision of jurisdictional police officers.
5.2 He has stated that the SIB had intelligence about the activities of VHP in
connection with „Ram Maha Yagna‟, which was held at Ayodhya and the
movement of Kar Sevaks from Gujarat to Ayodhya. Proper co-ordination was
maintained with Uttar Pradesh Police, regarding movement of Kar Sevaks to
Ayodhya. However, there was no intimation from Intelligence Branch of Uttar
Pradesh Police or Central Intelligence Bureau which has extensive nation-wide
network to collect intelligence on developments relevant to internal security,
about the return journey of those Kar Sevaks/Ram Sevaks who had gone to
Ayodhya from Gujarat. Uttar Pradesh Police had not informed the Gujarat Police
about any unruly behaviour of some Ram Sevaks, on their return journey at
Rudauli Railway Station on 24.2.2002. The alert message dated 27.2.2002
addressed to all DGPs of the country regarding return journey of Ram Sevaks
was received from I.G., Intelligence, Uttar Pradesh only on 28.2.2002 at 8.15
hours after the Godhra incident had happened. He has stated that the ghastly
incident of arson on the railway bogie that took place at Godhra on 27.2.2002,
resulting in the death of 59 Ram Bhakts, evoked extreme communal passions
and vindictiveness amongst the Hindus particularly in Ahmedabad city, as 25 of
the total 59 victims belonged to Ahmedabad. The Bandh call given by VHP,
Bajrang Dal, and their fraternal bodies had created an atmosphere conducive for
mobilization of Hindu mobs, particularly in communally sensitive areas of the
State. The SIB had inputs about the likely repercussions of the Godhra incident.
Accordingly, the SIB had sufficiently alerted all the Police Commissioners and
Superintendents of Police of all districts for taking precautionary steps to prevent
likely communal clashes in their jurisdictions. The SIB had sent 3 separate
messages on 27.2.2002. He has produced copies of the messages sent by SIB on
27.2.2002 and 28.2.2002.
5.3 He has referred to his report of 15.4.2002 sent to C.P., Ahmedabad about the
move of extremist and fundamentalist elements among the Muslims to resist
large scale house-to-house search operation by Police. Therein he indicated that
15
there was a plan of radical Hindu elements to organize a large scale assault in
Juhapura, a predominantly Muslim Colony. A detailed analytical report on the
communal scenario in Ahmedabad City was sent by him to Additional Chief
Secretary on 24.4.2002, suggesting specific measures for achieving normalcy in
the city. He has also stated that State of Gujarat has a long history of communal
strife and between 1970 and 2002, Gujarat had witnessed 443 major communal
incidents. Even minor altercation over trivial matters like kite flying had led to
communal violence. The ghastly incident of Godhra was unprecedented in the
history of Gujarat. Giving the gory details of this incident and showing charred
bodies of the victims by the print and electronic media inflamed passions of the
people of Gujarat to a very high pitch. As regards the return of Kar Sevaks from
Ayodhya the only intelligence received from the GRP was that the Ram Bhakts,
led by Prahladbhai J. Patel, President of Bajrang Dal, Mahesana were to start
from Ayodhya on 26.2.2002, and return to Ahmedabad on 28.2.2002. He has
stated that the incident at Godhra took place in such a short spell of time that
even before the nearest police reinforcements could reach the spot, the damage
was already done. The meagre deployment of R.P.F. or Police personnel at
Godhra Railway Station could not counter effectively the determined mob of
nearly 5000 miscreants.
5.4 He has stated that the response of the State Government to the Godhra incident
was immediate and prompt. Rescue and rehabilitation efforts commenced
instantaneously. The Chief Minister, Senior Ministers and other officials visited
the scene and the District Magistrate imposed curfew in Godhra town
immediately as a precautionary measure. As a matter of fact, no major incident
took place in Godhra town even during the most notorious phase of the
communal violence in the State viz. the period between 28.2.2002 to 3.3.2002.
He has stated that there is “highly communally charged socio-political
atmosphere in many parts of the State of Gujarat. Consequently many in Gujarat
Civil Society have no hesitation in indulging in violence against members of
their “enemy” community on any trivial issue or at the instigation of their
communal masters. Many who take recourse to crimes as part of mob action do
not commit offences in normal course of time, nor are they habitual or
16
professional offenders”. He has stated that “the effective, biting and chilling live
reportage by various news channels had a deleterious effect on the overall law
and order situation. Also, the print media had published news on communal
violence in a grossly irresponsible manner. This factor had played a decisive role
in keeping up communal tension”.
5.5 He has further stated that the pattern of violence this time was unique,
particularly in Ahmedabad City. The traditionally sensitive pockets are in the
walled city area, where both communities live close to each other. Accordingly,
most of the security forces were deployed in such places in anticipation of
communal violence there on 27 and 28 February, 2002. However, such areas
were mostly devoid of any major incidents for the first few days and horrendous
violence took place in the outer periphery of Ahmedabad city, which were not
perceived as sensitive areas. Moreover, in most cases, looting and pilferage were
reported in well-to-do localities, by people belonging to middle class, who are
not habituated to mob violence. Crowds, which assembled in Ahmedabad city
were huge and were determined to counter and resist police action. It became
hazardous even to implement the curfew. Police forces available at the non-
sensitive places of communal violence were totally inadequate to deal with the
situation, particularly in the initial stages. It is appreciable that despite being
heavily out-numbered, police took effective and decisive action, which is evident
by the fact that 2200 persons were arrested in the first few days of whom 1800
were Hindus. The police firing in the first few days resulted in the death of
nearly 100 people of whom 60 were Hindus. The Police did not hesitate to use
force to suppress the communal violence.
5.6 He has stated that the going by statistics of communal violence from 27.2.2002
to 30.4.2002 the total number of deaths (including those killed in police firing)
comes to 851. Of these 80.73% of death had taken place during the first five
days (27.2.2002 to 3.3.2002), i.e. 13% of the time span of review period and the
rest 19.27% of violence took place in the period from 4.3.2002 to 30.4.2002, i.e.
87% (time span) of the review period, if one goes by the death figures alone.
17
5.7 He has stated that another unusual, disturbing and unparalleled feature of these
riots was occurrence of widespread incidents in remote villages. As those areas
were not well connected by road network and so not easily reachable, the
intimation about those incidents reached the Police late and by the time Police
could reach there, much damage was already done. This was a new trend in the
history of communal violence in Gujarat.
5.8 He has stated that the scale and magnitude of the violence were so vast and
intense, and mob frenzy was so ferocious that it was not feasible for the available
security resources to cope up with the situation. However, due to sustained
efforts and reinforcements received from the Central Government, major
incidents of violence were contained by the law enforcing agencies within first
five days of the commencement of communal violence subsequent to the Godhra
incident.
5.9 During his examination before the Commission, on 31.8.2004, he stated that Mr.
G.C.Raiger was his predecessor in office. He stated that his department had
information as regards the return movement of some Karsevaks as indicated in
the fax message which is Appendix – 11 to his affidavit. As regards the
analytical note dated 24.4.2002 submitted by him, he stated that it was made on
the basis of reliable and credible information. After taking over as Additional
DGP (Int.) he found that the fundamentalists of the minority community had
taken more belligerent postures as they wanted to take revenge. On examination
of the previous records, he had found some material showing activities of
fundamentalists of both the sides. In the very first week of his taking over as
Additional DGP, he had received inputs on the basis of which he felt that there
would be some more attacks on religious places and some other centers of Hindu
religion and cultural places. On 18.4.2002 he had issued an advisory note to his
junior officers. He further stated that what he has stated in para one of Annexure
24 regarding perception of the persons of the Minority Community is not on the
basis of his personal knowledge but it is on the basis of feed back obtained from
the bulk of Muslim community and police officers. He also stated that he was
told by police officers that FIRs were not properly recorded by the police and
that Hindu leaders were not arrested even though their names were mentioned in
18
the FIRs. He stated that he found his officers depressed and helpless and when
he asked them for the reason for feeling handicapped, they had informed him
that the officers of the level of Inspectors were ignoring instructions given by
higher officers because of instructions which they used to receive directly from
political leaders. He then stated that what was stated by him in this behalf was in
connection with investigation of offences and not in respect of actions taken by
them at the time of happening of the incidents. He also stated that the remedial
measures suggested by him were taken from 2nd
week of May, 2002. As regards
the reports about the incidents which took place on 28.2.2002 and 1.3.2002, he
sated that he found from the record in his Bureau that they were simple incident
reports. When asked about names of political leaders, who were trying to
interfere with investigations, he stated that he cannot reveal their names as they
were given to him in confidence. He stated that he had not made any specific
study about the manner of incidents that took place in the districts.
6. After the Terms of Reference of the Commission were widened by the Government by
its Notification dated 20.7.2004, Shri R.B.Shreekumar filed another affidavit dated
6.10.2004. Therein, he has stated that the communal violence in the whole State
during the month of May, 2002 had shown a trend of marked decline, in comparison to
the previous month i.e. April, 2002. He has referred to the meeting called by Shri
K.P.S. Gill on 4.5.2002. According to him in that meeting, Shri Maniram, who was
Additional D.G. (Law and Order) had stated that the police personnel particularly of
Ahmedabad city were in a state of demotivated demoralization, on account of constant
extraneous pressures on their operational duties, both in handling of communal
incidents and investigation of riot affected cases. He had endorsed the appraisal of the
situation made by Shri Maniram and had added that the assessment regarding
Ahmedabad city was generally relevant to other communally sensitive localities like
Vadodara city and certain rural areas. He has then referred to a note captioned
„actionable points‟ prepared by him and submitted to Shri Gill. He has also stated that
during the month of May, 2002, SIB had provided useful intelligence to field officers
and has referred to 9 such communications. In the meeting called by Shri K.P.S. Gill
on 10.5.2002 of SIB officers, all officers who attended the meeting had endorsed his
assessment given in his analytical note dated 24.4.2002 and his note captioned
19
„Actionable points‟. Later on, in August, 2002, he had submitted to Shri P.S.Shah,
Additional Secretary of Law & Order, a report about the law and order situation in the
State. However, the Additional C.S. (Home), Shri Ashok Narayan had not agreed with
his assessment. As regards implementation of recommendations and directions given
by NHRC, he has stated that in his report captioned „Run up to the Assembly Poll –
emerging Law and Order trends‟, it is pointed out that non implementation of
recommendations of NHRC was also delaying normalization of communal situation.
He has recommended certain administrative measures which should be taken to
prevent and deal with communal riots.
7. Shri Sreekumar filed a further affidavit on 9.4.2005 stating that on account of his
deposition before the Commission on 31.8.2004 and submission of the 2nd
affidavit on
6.10.2004, higher authorities in the State Government were harassing and victimizing
him. He wanted the Commission to consider the said affidavit and order remedial
measures. He has stated that on 21.8.2004 i.e. before his examination by the
Commission on 31.8.2004, he was approached by Shri Dinesh Kapadia, Under
Secretary (Budget & Coordination), Home Department, and during the long
interaction with him, the said officer had tried to persuade him to be favourable to the
Government while deposing before the Commission on 31.8.2004. The said officer
felt hat he was biased in the assessment of the situation and so he should avoid telling
more facts and providing additional material to the Commission. However, there was
no element of coercion in the entreaty of Shri Dinesh Kapadia. Thereafter, Shri G.C.
Murmu, Secretary (Law & Order), Home Department had summoned him on
24.8.2004 and he was briefed about questions likely to be asked during examination
before the Commission. Shri. Arvind Pandya, one of the Government Pleaders was
also present in the said meeting and he also gave elaborate briefing. Both of them
directed him to avoid giving any statement which could embarrass the Government.
He was specifically asked to be careful about the questions which may be put to him
by the advocate appearing for JSM. He was threatened that if he gave any statement
contrary to the State Government‟s interest, he would be declared a hostile witness
and dealt with suitably later. Inspite of the threat, he had told them that he would
depose before the Commission as per the statutory requirements and not suppress the
truth. He has further stated that the whole meeting was pre-planned and well focused
20
massive exercise to coerce him to suppress facts and present data before the
Commission in such a manner that would not expose the Government functionaries,
senior politicians and others, who played diabolical and criminal role during the post
Godhra incidents.
7.1 He has further stated that what transpired in the meeting with Shri Murmu was
recorded by him through a scientific gadget provided to him by Shri Rahul
Sharma, SP, CBI and the same was put in CD disk by him. He has then stated
that inspite of what he was told by Shri Murmu and Shri Pandya, he had
presented true facts before the Commission, and that became a major irritant to
the Government and particularly the Chief Minister. He also stated that such
posture by Shri Murmu was possible only if he had the specific support and
clearance from the higher authorities in the Government i.e. Home Minister and
Chief Minister. On 21.9.2004, DGP had directed all concerned subordinate
officers to file their further affidavits dealing with the additional terms of
reference. Again, few Sr. Police Officers had approached him and advised him
not to file an affidavit. Yet, he had filed the 2nd
affidavit as there was a directive
of the DGP. The filing of 2nd
affidavit further annoyed the authorities and
therefore, his further explanation has been called for in respect of old actions
taken by him in good faith. He stated that his appraisal about the law and order
situation presented to the full member meeting of the Central Election
Commission held on 9.8.2002 in Ahmedabad was contrary to the perception of
higher officers in the State Government. Because of his reporting about the
speech delivered by the Chief Minister to National Commission for Minorities
on 16.9.2002 and his refusal to comply with some unlawful instructions given to
him, there is a bias against him and that has also led to his supersession. He has
then stated that the Commission should take notice of the facts stated by him
regarding harassment and victimization and direct the State Government
authorities to desist from initiating any further acts of ill treatment and
persecution against him. In the said affidavit he has made a request for
summoning him to give more details. He has annexed with his affidavit a
transcript of his conversations with Shri Dinesh Kapadia, Shri Pandya and Shri
Murmu.
21
8. Shri Sreekumar has filed one more affidavit dated 27.10.2005. Therein he has mainly
referred to initiation of a departmental inquiry on the basis of nine charges leveled
against him. After referring to those nine charges, he has narrated his submissions in
respect of those nine charges. While doing so, he has explained why he had
maintained a register for recording verbal instructions received from higher officers.
He has stated that after he took over as ADGP (Int.) on 9.4.2002 on many occasions
the Government functionaries including the Chief Minister were giving verbal
directives, amounting to subversion of the Constitution of India and tampering with
the structured administrative apparatus in the State, for satisfying the perceived
political interests and tactics of the ruling party and particularly the Chief Minister,
Shri Narendra Modi. He has further stated that “the opening of the register was on my
own initiative and it was not done basing on any administrative directives but as a
prudent way of intelligence collection and collation.” He has also stated that “vast
majority of the field officers and their seniors were actually complying with such
illegal verbal directives, as narrated in his register and this has impacted the quality,
integrity and the speed of justice delivery system.” He has also alleged that few
jurisdictional officers, were reportedly transferred overruling even DGP‟s objection in
March, 2002. He has named Shri Rahul Sharma, SP of Bhavnagar, Shri Vivek
Srivastav, SP of Kachchha, Shri Himanshu Bhatt, SP of Banaskantha, Shri
M.D.Antani, a Police Officer of Bharuch distrct and Shri Satishchandra Varma, DIG,
Kachchha as persons who were transferred for that reason. Explaining further, he has
stated that “the register was a record kept for his assistance and there was no question
this being handed over to any other person than to appropriate judicial and
investigative authorities.” He has stated that in February, 2005 he was superseded
while considering promotion to the rank of DGP, on a baseless ground that a criminal
case is pending against him since 1987. On 15.7.2005, the State Government had
asked his explanation for obtaining a duplicate sim card. On 6.9.2005, he was served a
chargesheet in the departmental proceedings initiated against him. He has explained
why the charges leveled against him are frivolous. In para 84 of his affidavit, he has
made certain allegations and explained that he had not referred to them earlier, as the
earlier affidavits were filed as per the orders of competent authorities and as they were
filed in his capacity as ADGP (Int.). He has stated that before he took over as ADGP
on 9.4.2002, he was ADGP in Armed Unit, State Reserve Police Force. On 28.2.2002,
22
he had met Shri Chakravarthi in his chamber to inform him about mobilization of
SRPF personnel and during the discussion, he was told that the activists of VHP,
Bajrang Dal, BJP and its sister bodies were leading the riots and the police officers
were not intervening effectively as they were keen to avoid crossing swords with the
supporters of the ruling party. Shri Chakravathi had also told him that on 27.2.2002,
there was a meeting convened by the Chief Minister in his chamber after his return
from Godhra and in that meeting, the Chief Minister had said that “in communal riots
police takes action against Hindus and Muslims on one to one basis. This will not do
now. Allow Hindus to give vent to their anger.” He has stated that no officer present in
the meeting did express any comment or objection to those verbal instructions of the
Chief Minister. Shri Chakravathi had told him that this posture of the Chief Minister
was a major obstacle to police officers in initiating action against Hindu communal
elements, who were on a rampage against minorities. Shri Chakravathi had also stated
that the act of parading dead bodies in Ahmedabad city, of those killed in Godhra train
burning, including dead bodies of those who did not belong to Ahmedabad city, was
highly objectionable and this had made the atmosphere and rage of Hindu communal
elements against the minority community more volatile. Later in March, 2002, on two
or three occasions Shri Chakravarthi had told him that ruling party supporters were
attacking the minorities and the CM and Cabinet Ministers were responsible for such a
situation. He has also stated that Shri Chakravarthi had told him that positioning of a
Cabinet Minister, Shri I.K.Jadeja, in DGP‟s office, during the days after the Godhra
incident, was adversely affecting his supervision of riot situation. He has then stated
that Senior Officers who had done gross dereliction of duty by not filing an affidavit
relating to additional terms of reference to the Commission are (1) Shri Ashok
Narayan, Addl. Chief Secretary, (Home), (2) Dr. P.K.Mishra, Principal Secretary to
CM, (3) Shri K.Chakravarthi, DGP, (4) Shri K. Nityanandam, Home Secretary, (5)
Shri P.C.Pande, CP, Ahmedabad city, (6) Shri K.R.Kaushik, ADGP (Crime), (7) Shri
A.K.Bhargav, ADGP (Crime), (8) Shri Maniram, ADGP, (9) Shri G.C.Raiger, ADGP
(Int.), (10) Shri Sanjeev Bhatt, S.P., (11) Dr. K.N.Sharma, Range IGP, (12) Shri
Deepak Swaroop, Range IG, (13) Shri M.K.Tandon, Addl.C.P., (14) Shri Amitabh
Pathak, Range IG, (15) Shri Shivanand Jha, Addl.CP, (16) Shri D.D.Tuteja, CP, (17)
Superintendents of Police of districts Mehsana, Banaskantha, Sabarkantha, Patan,
Gandhinagar, Ahmedabad Rural, Anand, Kheda, Vadodara Rural, Godhra and Dahod
23
and (18) District Magistrates/Collectors of the said districts. He has then given a list of
issues regarding which the Government officers have not satisfactorily filed their
affidavits or stated about the same during their examination before the Commission.
The following are the main issues raised by him:
(a) Why no minutes of the meetings held by the CM and other senior officers for
review of the situation from 27th
Feb., 2002, onwards were prepared and
circulated to the concerned?
(c) Why dead bodies of Godhra train fire victims were paraded through the streets of
Ahmedabad city and that too when many of the deceased persons belonged to
places out side Ahmedabad city and a few dead bodies were not even identified
at that juncture?
(g) Why the Communal Riot Scheme was not put into operation in relevant areas,
from 27th
Feb., 2002, evening onwards?
(i) Why no action by nearly 100 police mobiles in Ahmedabad city and similarly in
Vadodara city against crowds which congregated in small numbers in the
morning of 28th
February, 2002?
((k) Why delay in imposition of curfew, particularly in Ahmedabad city? In
Ahmedabad city curfew was imposed as late as 13.00 hours on 28th
February,
2002?
(p) Why more casualties of Muslims in police firing and riots?
9. Shri R.B. Sreekumar filed one more affidavit on 3.5.2010 stating that sometime before
that date, he received two sets of reliable information regarding the Godhra incident.
One was that the State unit called Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau of the Central
Intelligence Bureau Head-quarters did not share vital information with the Gujarat
Police regarding the belligerent profile of Karsevaks proceeding to Ayodhya, their
quarrels and clashes with vendors and others en-route, during their onward and return
journey. He has stated that the informant had told him that the Intelligence Bureau
“assets” had reported the quarrels and fights of Ram Bhakts with vendors and others at
railway stations Rudali and Dahod. This was an instance of IB functionaries ignoring
24
their constitutional obligation and acting for the political agenda of BJP and Sangh
Parivar. Those functionaries were keen to support the announcement of Union
Minister Shri L.K.Advani and Gujarat Chief Minister, Shri Narendra Modi on
27.2.2002, forenoon, that the Godhra train burning incident was outcome of a deep
rooted conspiracy. He has stated that Central IB may deny about any coverage of
Karsevaks going to Ayodhya and receipt of reports about train fire by “friends” of IB.
In that case non coverage of Karsevaks should be regarded as culpable dereliction of
duty by them.
9.1 He has stated that the second set of sensitive information received from UP
Police was that the UP Police had directed 3 to 4 Police personnel to accompany
the Gujarat Contingent of Karsevaks returning from Ayodhya. Accordingly,
about 3 to 4 policemen had travelled by the Sabarmati Express Train, alongwith
the Rambhaktas and kept watch on them upto Godhra. In fact, they were directed
to do surveillance on the Gujarat group of Karsevaks. These policemen had
witnessed the whole Godhra train fire incident and subsequent developments at
the Godhra Railway Station. They had also submitted their reports to their
superiors. He suggested that the Commission should get those reports from the
DGP of Uttar Pradesh.
10 Shri R. B. Sreekumar has filed one more (6th
) affidavit on 1.9.2010. Therein, he has
stated that numerous riot victims had met him and conveyed their suggestions and
proposals about further line of investigation of riot cases by the SIT. They also
expressed their disillusionment about certain alleged acts of omission and commission
by SIT, apprehension about further course of action by SIT and public prosecutors and
articulate about future expectation from SIT and the Criminal Justice System (CJS).
On the basis of their conspiracy theory, he has submitted a copy of suggestions to the
Special Investigation Team for further action on the inquiry (Investigation) on Mrs.
Jafri‟s complaint and other riot cases. A xerox copy thereof has been submitted by him
to the Commission by way of an affidavit. In the said letter to SIT, he has stated that
the Central Para Military Force and the Defence Contingents, who have standing
statutorily structured and streamlined system, must have kept and preserved the
records about the disturbed situation they were asked to tackle and restoration of law
and order. Proceeding on this assumption he requested SIT to get those records in
25
order to make deeper investigation to establish the truth behind the charge of culpable
negligence of duties, acts of omission and commission by the State Government
functionaries, particularly, the district Magistrates, the police officers in-charge of riot
affected areas and auxiliary departments like, Fire Brigade, Hospitals, etc. He has also
criticized the role of SIT and called upon the SIT to keep in mind his suggestion while
assessing evidence of these officers and evidence against them. He has also stated that
according to his information, consistent policy of the Government was to punish those
officers who deviated from the unholy hidden agenda of the State Government and
performed their duties according to law on the one hand and to reward those officers
who promoted killings, rape and arson by going alongwith the unlawful plans of Chief
Minister and his party. They were rewarded by giving them post retirement
assignments. He has stated that the said information is the sum total of impressions of
riot victims about the ambience in Gujarat bureaucracy and Police.
10 His 7th affidavit dated 3.8.2011 is with respect to Shri Sanjiv Bhatt‟s deposition on
alleged role of Shri Narendra Modi in trying to undermine Mallika Sarabhai‟s writ
petition. He has stated that he has no authentive information about the same and that
he has learnt about the same from media reports.
11 He has filed one more affidavit (8th) on 15.9.2011 with respect to the role of certain
Government officials relating to Miss Mallika Sarabhai‟s Public Interest Litigation in
the Supreme Court. Alongwith his affidavit he has filed three Annexures-„A‟, „B‟ and
„C‟. He has further stated that the material presented in the affidavit except the
Annexures „B‟ and „C‟ should be treated as confidential as the said materials pertain to
sensitive internal security duties performed by him during his tenure as ADGP (Int.) in
2002.
12 His last affidavit is dated 12.1.2012. Therein he has stated what was his interaction
and interface with the Home Department officials during his tenure as ADGP (Int.)
from 9.4.2002 to 18.9.2002. During that period he had an informal meeting with Shri
Ashok Narayan. He has stated that he had recorded main points of talk between him
and Shri Ashok Narayan in his diary. According to him the ACS in that meeting had
told him that (1) the CM did not give any illegal order and so he should not speak
26
about political inference, (2) action against press for objectional reports was not taken
and that his proposals were referred to the Information Department, (3) no action
against APP was taken as they were not under Home Department, (4) The CM had
described his 24th
April report as one which deserved to be put in waste paper basket
and (5) he did not want to comment on political side of the riots. He has produced
alongwith his affidavit a copy of the notes made by him in his personal diary. He has
also annexed as Annexure-„B‟ a verbatime conversation stated to have taken place
between him and Shri Ashok Narayan. He has further stated that audio recording in
that behalf is available. What he has indicated by referring to all this material is that
the Chief Minister was intimated about the manipulation of criminal justice system
and yet no remedial action as suggested by him in his report dated 24th
April, was
taken by the Government. He has also referred to the remedial measures which he had
suggested on 10.5.2002 to Shri KPS Gil and has made a grievance that the State
Government did not implement the corrective measures as suggested by him to
energize the criminal justice system and correct anti minority posture of the political
leaders, officials, prosecutors etc.
13 Shri Amarsinh Chaudhary, who was the President of the Gujarat Pradesh Congress
Committee at the relevant time and a former Chief Minister of Gujarat, has filed an
affidavit dated 1.7.2002. He has stated that having worked as a Minister in the
Government of Gujarat from the year 1972 to 1985 and as Chief Minister from June,
1985 to December, 1989 and also as Leader of Opposition in Gujarat Legislative
assembly from 1995 to 1997 and again from 1998 to 2001, he has sufficient
experience of administration run by the Government. He used to control communal
violence. The Chief Minister of the State has to act firmly against those persons who
are believed to be responsible for the riots without any descrimination between
persons belonging to his party or the opposite party, as he himself did. Referring to the
Godhra incident he has stated that it was “a heinous and condemnable attack” and was
“at the root of all that happened from that day to almost to the end of May, 2002”. He
has stated that “the coach was attacked by a crowd of 2000-3000 people with petrol,
diesel bombs and which included stoning, burning and killing the people by that
crowd. It is relevant to note that the determined crowd of miscreants had targeted the
coach, as perhaps it was known that it is occupied by Karsevaks returning from
27
Ayodhya.” He has also stated that “the incident of Godhra is a planned one and is an
act of conspiracy and it could not have happened suddenly and spontaneously.” He has
then raised a question why gathering of such large number of persons was not noticed
by the State police or Railway police, though Godhra is the head quarter of District
Suprintendant of Police as well as the Collector and there are 8 police stations and
number of police chokies in Godhra town. Moreover the law and order authorities
very well knew that Godhra town has a record of communal sensitivity. Even though
the incident happened in the morning at about 7.30 a.m., not a single policeman was
there to prevent the assembling of crowds of more than thousand persons with highly
inflammable materials. He has thereby suggested that there was intelligence failure
and also negligence on the part of local police in performance of their duty. He has
referred to the report published in Times of India, Ahmedabad Edition dated 29.5.2002
and stated that the said report seriously questioned the role of the Chief Minister
during the meeting which he had with the police and other authorities on 27.2.2002. In
the said report it is stated that “a story has been doing the rounds in Ahmedabad ever
since the riots broke out. It‟s about a meeting that purportedly took place late in the
evening on February 27 at which Narendra Modi is said to have told the police not to
take action against VHP activists who had called for a bandh the next day. Action was
not to be taken, whatever might be the provocation. The director general of police, K.
Chakravarthi, is said to have protested against such instructions, but he was shut up by
the Chief Minister. So goes the story.” It is further stated therein that “since none of
the dramatis persons who were said to have been in the meeting confirmed on the
record that such a thing happened, this newspaper did not run the story. But now –
after three months – a news magazine has gone ahead and run an article which is on
the lines of the story doing the rounds. The article is based on the testimony that one
minister is said to have given to the Concerned Citizen‟s Tribunal headed by former
Supreme Court judge, Justice Krishna Iyer.” According to that story in the said
meeting apart from others the Additional Director General of Police, G C Raigar and
Chief Secretary, G Subba Rao were present. The newspaper then states that Shri G
Subba Rao could not have been present at the meeting as he had gone abroad. He has
then stated that “if the story is true, then the charges are very serious; especially what
happened in the meeting the Government actually promoted the lawlessness from
February, 28 by directing his police chief to keep his forces under leash.” “If the story
28
is wrong then it is, to put it very mildly, nothing short of character assassination of
Narendra Modi, accusing him of killings that he did not order which is a very grave
charge and if made without basis should not be allowed to pass.” He has then stated
that he had received massages from his party leaders from the Districts about inaction
amounting to connivance of the police towards the communal riots. He has named
Shri B.K.Gadhvi, District superintendent of police Banaskantha as the person who had
drawn his attention about the prevailing situation. He was told by that DSP that “they
have instructions not to be panicy about what was happening those days.” As he did
not come across any denial of charges or a statement by Shri Narendra Modi Chief
Minister regarding the serious allegation appearing in the newspaper, he was of the
view that silence being half consent, it amounts to an admission of that allegation by
the Chief Minister. He has then referred to the debate in the Gujarat Legislative
Assembly regarding riots and particularly the Gulbarg society incident. He has stated
that Mr.Jafari had telephoned him about the danger to his life and that of his family
members and residents of Gulbarg society. So he had deputed some party workers to
that place. He has then stated that he had telephoned Shri Pandey, Commissioner of
Police but no help was coming from him. He therefore accompanied by Shri Naresh
Rawal, Leader of Opposition in Gujarat Legislative Assembly had met the Chief
Minister at about 2.00 p.m. and apprised the Chief Minister about the danger to the life
of Jafari and other occupants of Gulbarg society. He has stated that he did not find any
positive response from the Chief Minister. He has stated that on 1.3.2002, he had
called upon the Chief Minister Shri Naredra Modi and apprised him of the worsening
situation. When he and others pointed out that the situation was getting more and more
uncontrollable and communal violence was spreading in Ahmedabad, they found that
the Chief Minister was not prepared to curtail violence and prevent it from expanding
to new areas. Thereafter they sat on Dharna. The Chief Minister then stated that “he
may be given a day more to bring the situation under control”. On such assurance,
they had withdrawn the Dharna. Again after referring to some press report, he has
stated that the Chief Minister was not interested in stopping the violence. Placing
reliance upon the report of NHRC and findings of Human Rights Organizations he has
stated that there was “total in action, omission, connivance and instigation of State
Minister under the nose of the Chief Minister and all that has damaged the reputation
of Gujarat.” As regards the newspaper report about what Shri Naredra Modi, Chief
29
Minister told Mr. Chakravarthi, Shri Chaudhari has relied upon a report published in
the Times of India, Ahmedabad edition dated 29.5.2002. Shri Nalin Kantilal Bhatt,
General Secretary of Bhartiya Janta Party has filed an affidavit dated 9.6.2002 on
behalf of the Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP). After pointing out BJP‟s policy and how it
has conducted itself all through out, he has stated that during the relevant period after
the Godhra incident, BJP had not made provocative statements. Inspite of that an
attempt was made to create misunderstanding about the role of BJP, hence it is
necessary for him to file an affidavit to clarify the position. He has stated that after the
Godhra incident, the Congress Leaders made allegations against Ramsevaks and
projected them as the persons responsible for the incident. Therefore, the people of
Gujarat became angry. If Congress Leadership had condemned the attack on
Ramsevaks, then the incidents which followed would not have taken place. He has
further stated that some provocative incidents had happened on 28.2.2002 and that
also led to happening of more violence thereafter. He has narrated the incident of
driving a truck in Naroda Patia area towards a crowd and intentionally killing one boy
by knocking him down. He has also referred to Gulburg Society incident and stated
that before killing of the inmates of the society started, they had started firing from
inside the Society. The role of the Congress Party had remained one sided and no
attempt to stop the communal violence and restore the peace was made by it. He has
also referred to the Godhra incident and stated that one of the main persons involved
in the incident was a Congress Corporator, who was habitually indulging in
goondaism and illegal acts. After referring to some news items and statements, he has
stated that a mob had attacked the train at Godhra as Karsevaks were travelling in it.
He has referred to the report of Council for International Affairs and Human Rights
which was made by a team headed by Justice Tevatia, Former Judge of Calcutta High
Court. He has stated that during the post Godhra riots, Shri Suryakantbhai Acharya, a
BJP Leader of Junagadh had appealed to BJP workers to give shelter to the affected
Muslims. In Bhavnagar district, it was because of the information given by Shri
Rajendrasinhji Rana, President of Bhartiya Janta Party that 250 Muslims who were in
a Madressa were saved and the Muslims of Bhavnagar had appreciated that gesture of
Shri Rajendrasinhji Rana. The Muslims also appreciated the work of Shri Sunil Oza,
BJP, MLA from Bhavnagar for helping the Muslims of Bhavnagar. He has stated that
the BJP supported the efforts made by other organizations for establishing peace and
30
actively participated in the peace rallies organized by them. He has stated that it was
also required to be examined whether attacks on Muslims were due to communal
frenzy alone or it was also due to economical and social exploitation of Adivasis. He
has pointed out that to create chaos some anti social elements had made attacks on
Government properties and Government employees and they were also responsible for
the increase in violence. He has alleged that though the communal violence which
started on 27th
had stopped by 3rd
March, certain interested elements made attempts to
continue the violence. The incidents which happened thereafter, were continued with
intent to over-throw the BJP government led by Shri Narendra Modi. Alongwith the
affidavit he has produced many press cuttings and some documents in support of his
statement.
14 Shri Kaushik J. Mehta, in his capacity as Joint General Secretary of Vishwa Hindu
Parishad (VHP) has filed an affidavit dated 10.6.2002. After narrating the objectives
and activities of VHP, he has referred to the movement of „Shri Ramjanmabhumi
Mandir Nirman‟. He has traced the history of Muslim invasions and Rulers from the
year 712 and tried to show that the Muslim rulers, Muslim religious leaders and some
writers in their publications about Muslim religion, have tried to create division
between Hindus and Muslims and hatred towards each other. He has stated that
„Ramjanmabhumi Andolan‟ is not a matter of building one more temple, but is the
movement of restoration of faith and national pride, and therefore the Saints of India
decided to do „Jirnodhdhar‟ of Ramjanmabhumi Mandir, when the religious
parliament met at the time of Kumbhamela at Prayag in January-2001. The first step in
that direction was „Jalabhishek‟ and it was followed by „Jap Yagna‟ throughout India.
A closing ceremony, i.e. „Purnahuti Maha Yagna, was to be performed at Ayodhya
starting from 27.2.2002. Large number of Rambhaktas were to go from Gujarat to
Ayodhya to participate in that „Maha Yagna‟. The first batch of 2200 Ramsevaks from
north and central Gujarat had left for Ayodhya on 22nd
February from Ahmedabad.
They had reached Ayodhya on 25th
February. They were to return on 26th
February
and reach Ahmedabad on 27th
February. Shri Mehta has stated that on 27th
morning
when that batch of Ramsevaks reached Godhra it was attacked. It was a pre-planned
attack in pursuance of a conspiracy of the fundamentalist Muslims of Godhra and
others, as they are interested in seeing that Rammandir is not built at Ayodhya as
31
proposed and the Hindus and Muslims do not live together peacefully. He has pointed
out the history of communal violence in Godhra and has further stated that the leaders
who were involved in the Godhra incident were Muslims belonging to the Congress
party. He has then stated that in order to give „Shradhdhanjali‟ to those persons who
lost their lives in the Godhra incident, VHP had declared a Bandh on 28.2.2002. The
communal violence which took place on that day was confined to central and north
Gujarat as the persons who were killed in the incident largely belonged to those areas.
There were no serious incidents in Kutch, Saurashtra and South Gujarat and that
clearly indicates that those violent incidents were the result of anger generated by the
Godhra incident and that they had no connection with the declaration of Bandh by
VHP. The violent incidents had happened in 10 districts and in other districts the
Bandh was peaceful. That clearly indicates that the communal events did not happen
because of the „bandh‟. He has stated that mainly because of the repeated telecast of
the Godhra incident by the electronic media, the Hindu community had become very
angry and that had led to incidents of attacks on Muslims as a reaction and the
communal violence so generated was till 1st March-2002 and not thereafter. In the
incidents which had happened thereafter Muslims were the aggressors and Hindus
committed such acts against Muslims for their own protection. According to him,
instigation of Muslims was done by political parties, pseudo secularists and Muslim
religious leaders to achieve their own goals. He has stated that the violence in Adivasi
areas had taken place because of exploitation of Adivasis by Muslim traders for a long
time. In order to maintain peace, VHP had decided not to arrange any „Smashanyatra‟
or „Shraddhanjali‟ meetings. He has extensively referred to the report titled “a field
study by Hon‟ble Justice D.S. Tevatia and others” in which it is stated that it is
therefore, hard to reject the Chief Minister‟s contention that the Congress party has a
vested interest in getting him ousted. According to the said report, communal violence
in Gujarat has become politicized. In support of what he has stated in his affidavit, he
has produced certain booklets and other publications and also the report made by
Justice D.S. Tevatia and others and published by Council for International Affairs and
Human rights.
15 Shri Amrish Patel, an Advocate and an active member of Jan Sangharsh Manch has
filed an affidavit on behalf of JSM. He has stated that JSM is a voluntary Civil Rights
32
Organization. His affidavit mainly relates to the Godhra incident and he has tried to
establish that the Godhra incident was not a preplanned or premeditated attack but it
was the result of a spontaneous scuffle at the Godhra railway station. He has referred
to two incidents which happened in Ahmedabad city. We have already referred to that
part of his affidavit earlier, while dealing with the incidents mentioned therein.
16 Ms. Teesta Setalvad, co-editor of „Communalism Combat‟ and General Secretary of
People‟s Union for Human Rights, in her affidavit dated 1.7.2002, has stated that for
almost a decade, her organization and herself have been exposing divisive forces
which are dangerous to the Nation‟s unity and integrity. Since February 1998 when
BJP took over, she has tracked developments in Gujarat that have severely eroded the
constitutional framework and the rule of law. She has authored five cover stories on
the subject. She has then stated that after the ghastly incident of February, 27, she had
remained in contact with policemen, army personnel and victims until she arrived in
the State on March, 4. She had come to Ahmedabad and stayed there for a fortnight.
Thereafter she again visited Gujarat twice and prepared a report “Gujarat-Genocide
02”. She has annexed a copy of that report with her affidavit. She has further stated
that details mentioned in the report “are authentic, recorded by me personally from
testimonies from victims as I travelled in different districts of the State”. She has
further stated that she wishes “to present direct evidence when the Hon‟ble
Commission summons me on the method and planning behind the mass massacres, the
tools and chemicals used in the killings, the ideological preparation for the hate speech
and writing, the infiltration in educational and police ranks, the largescale police
atrocities as well as direct witness testimonials on Gulberg society, Chamanpura,
Visnagar, Abasana, Ghodasar, Pandarvada and Kabadi Market Behrampura and
Ahmedabad that reveal a sinister pattern in the genocide”.
17 In the article titled “Build up” relating to Ayodhya published in the March-April 2002
issue of magazine “Communalism Combat”, Ms Setalvad has quoted some statements
stated to have been made by some VHP and BJP leaders. She has then referred to the
Godhra incident and expressed the view that “nothing, absolutely nothing can justify
the killing of innocent people, whatever the provocation. But for Gujarat‟s Chief
Minister, Narendra Modi, and many leading lights of the Sangh Parivar, this heinous
33
crime became the justification for the „natural reaction‟ against Muslims across the
State”. Thereafter, she has referred to certain incidents which happened in some of the
districts of the State. The report records her views about the functioning of the
Government, the police and the Sangh Parivar.
18 On 14.5.2010, Ms. Teesta Setalvad filed two applications through an advocate. The
first application mainly contains analysis of the phone call records as contained in the
CD produced before this Commission by Shri Rahul Sharma. The second application
is really not an application but they are written submissions mostly based upon what
Shri Sreekumar has stated in his affidavit submitted to this Commission. According to
her, analysis of the said phone calls data indicates involvement of the Chief Minister,
some of his Ministers, Police Officers and the BJP leaders in the violence which
followed the Godhra incident. She has also produced along with her first application,
two volumes of the Concerned Citizens Tribunal‟s Report-Gujarat 2002 titled Crimes
Against Humanity and a copy of the Editor‟s Guild Report, 2002. On the basis of
analysis of the telephone calls, she has also tried to show how some police officers viz.
Shri P.C.Pande, Shri M.K.Tondon and Shri P.B.Gondia were negligent in performace
of their duty. She has further stated that no action was taken by the Government
against the negligent officers and that indicates that the Government was not agitated
by the intentional lack of compliance of its legal orders by large sections of the
Gujarat police. On the basis of the submissions made in the application, she wanted
this Commission to summon Shri P.C.Pande, Shri M.K.Tondon and Shri P.B.Gondia
for examining them again, to summon the concerned persons with all details of the
departmental inquiries ordered by the State Government against its police officials and
administrators, to summon official photographers and the videographers of the police
department, order investigation into destruction of certain crucial records, to collect
copies of all station diaries and analyze all the data thus collected. She has narrated
certain circumstances which according to her would support the charges made in the
application.
19 She has stated that the conduct of Government advocates in handling the riot cases,
threats and intimidations to policemen to commit forgery, the level of subversion of
criminal justice system by following a policy of reward and punishment qua the police
34
officers and the officers of the administration support her views expressed in her
application. She has further submitted that former DGP Shri K Chakravarthi, former
CP Shri P.C. Pande, former Jt.CP Shri M.K.Tondon, former Addl.CP Shri Shivanand
Jha, former Dy.CP Shri P.B.Gondia, former Dy.CP Shri R.J.Savani, former ACP Shri
G.L.Singhal and former DGP Shri R.B.Sreekumar should be summoned again by the
Commission. She has also suggested certain questions which according to her should
be put to those officers. She has stated that apart from the three officers of CMO, who
have been examined by this Commision, Shri Anil Mukim, Shri A.P.Patel, Shri.
J.M.Thakkar, Shri Harsh Bramhabhatt, Shri P.K.Mishra, Shri A.K.Sharma and Shri
Dinesh Thakore should also be summoned and examined by the Commission
regarding the phone calls received or made by them. She has also referred to some of
the observations made by NHRC in its report dated 31.5.2002.
20 Application filed by Ms Teesta Setalvad on 14.5.2010 (Ex. 6051) was kept for hearing
and after some adjournments, because of the request of the advocates, was finally
heard on 26.8.2010. On that day, Ms Teesta Setalvad remained present and she was
heard. She also produced three more sets of documents. They are numbered as Exs.
6052, 6053 and 6054. Document marked Ex. 6052 contains comparison of call records
made by certain persons on 27.2.2002. The comparison is made with the record
produced by JSM in this behalf. Document marked Ex. 6053 is titled as Reward and
Punishment – Subversion of Bureaucracy and Modiphobia. Document marked as Ex.
6054 consists of copies of three letters dated 30.1.2009, 14.10.2009 and 16.10.2009
written by the police authorities of Ahmedabad city.
21 Ms. Teesta Setalvad has filed one more affidavit dated 24.11.2010 in which she has
dealt with the allegations made against her and her Organization „Citizens for Justice
and Peace‟ by Shri Raiskhan. The allegation made against her that „she had prepared
the affidavits of victims or their relatives and produced them before the Supreme
Court‟ has been denied by her by stating that the affidavits contained versions given
by those persons in Ahmedabad and only logistical help was provided by the
organization. She has further stated that Shri Raiskhan has made false statements
against her as he has been removed from her Organization because of his irregular
35
attendance, objectionable style of functioning especially with victim survivors and
other crucial ethical issues.
22 Shri Chittaranjansingh, in charge Director General and Inspector General of Police,
Gujarat State has filed an affidavit on 29.1.2011 giving particulars about the measures
taken by the State administration and State police to control the post Godhra riots and
restore law and order in the State. He has stated that Godhra incident had prompted the
State machinery to be on a full scale alert and this was communicated to all district
authorities and Commissioners of Police. The first alert message of 27.2.2002 from the
Home Department emphasized taking of precautionary measures, adequate police
„bandobast‟ and preventive measures including issuance of prohibitory orders
depending upon the local situation. The said message also directed that anti-social and
hard-core communal elements should be dealt with firmly. It was also impressed upon
the administration to arrange proper „bandobast‟ when the dead bodies of Godhra
incident victims were to arrive at their native places and also at the time of their
funerals. He has then stated that on 27.2.2002 in the late evening, a meeting was called
at the residence of the Chief Minister to review law and order situation. The said
meeting lasted for about half an hour and in that meeting, Smt. Swarna Kanta Varma,
the then acting Chief Scretary, Shri Ashok Narayan, the then ACS (Home), Shri K.
Chakravarthi, the then DGP, Shri P.C.Pandey, the then CP, Ahmedabad City, Shri K.
Nityanandam, the then Home Secretary, Dr. P.K.Mishra and other PS of CM Shri Anil
Mukim were present. The Chief Minister had discussed about preparedness of the
administration including the police to deal with the possible situation arising out of the
Godhra incident and had directed them to see that law and order was maintained in the
State. The Chief Minister had also directed the concerned officers to inquire about
availability of the army in the local head quarters. On that day in the late evening, the
then Director General and Inspector General of Police had appeared on the Door
Darshan and appealed for peace. He has also referred to the alert messages and other
messages sent by the Home Department thereafter. On 28.2.2002 the then ACS
(Home) had instructed orally the police officers that mobile patrolling should be
intensified and adequate protection should be provided at places of worship of all
religions and that effective action should be taken to disperse unruling mobs and
unlawful assemblies by using required force. On that day, a message was sent to the
36
Addl. Director General & Inspector General of Police (Intelligence) to maintain
adequate „bandobast‟ for the security of returning Haj pilgrims at their point of entry.
Copies of the messages produced by him are annexed herewith and marked as
Annexure 3. Subordinate administration was also instructed to arrange for peace
committee meetings. Home Department had in all issued 14 messages. Apart from
these messages, Chief Secretary and Addl. Chief Secretary (Home) had arranged two
video conferences with CPs and the concerned officers on 4.3.2002 and 11.3.2002 and
important measures which were required to be taken were discussed. He has stated
that in accordance with the direction given by the State Government, peace committee
meetings and peace marches were arranged by the police authorities in the affected
districts. He has also stated that on every day right from 27.2.2002, high level
meetings with senior officers were held to review the law and order situation and to
give required instructions. Apart from the alert messages and other messages sent out
by the Government at the level of the Home Department, all Commissioners and
Superintendents of police were directed to strictly adhere to the instructions and the
directions given by the DG & IGP and pass on those instructions to the field staff. He
has produced alongwith his affidavit, instructions which were given to the DG & IGP
as an annexure to his affidavit. He has stated that high level review of the situation at
the Chief Minister‟s level was made by mid-day on 28.2.2002 and at that time CM had
made an oral request to the Union Home Minister for army deployment. Soon
thereafter, the Secretary (Home) had requested the Union Secretary to make the army
available for internal security. The CM publicly announced at 16.00 hours on that day
that decision was taken by the State Government to call the army and formal request
was sent to the Central Government for army deployment. In fact, informal interaction
was maintained with the local army formations both at Gandhinagar and Ahmedabad
since the evening of 27th
itself. Enquiries made with the local army had revealed that
the force was deployed at the border areas of the country. Because of the sustained
efforts made by the State administration army personnel were airlifted from the
forward positions of the country‟s border and they had started arriving by the mid-
night of 28.2.2002. For their airlifting 40 aircrafts were used and the first aircraft had
landed at Ahmedabad by the mid-night of 28.2.2002. Within a short time army was
provided with the required additional logistic support. Totally 131 vehicles were
provided to the army for their movement and 32 executive magistrates were made
37
available to them. Six aircrafts were used to airlift personnel to Vadodara and 14
aircrafts were used to airlift them to Rajkot. The deployment of army commenced in
the morning and by 11.00 hours on 1.3.2002 army had started reaching the affected
areas. He has stated that on 1.3.2002 requests were made to the neighbouring states
viz. Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh to allot some force of reserve police.
Police force was made available only by the Maharashtra Government. He has also
given details regarding deployment of SRP, Central para military force and home-
guards. Two columns of army were dispatched to Godhra on 2.3.2002. At the peak of
deployment, there were 26 army columns in the State.
23 He has also set out the steps were taken by the district authorities following the
instructions and guide lines given by the Police Commissioner/DMs/SPs. In the first 4
days preventive arrests were made by the police as stated in the following statement:-
Date Hindu Muslim Total
27.2.2002 137 80 217
28.2.2002 378 142 520
1.3.2002 443 125 568
2.3.2002 477 96 573
He has further stated that out of 469 police stations in the State, 163 police stations
were affected during the riots and in all those police station areas curfew was imposed
from 28.2.2002 onwards till normal situation was restored. He has annexed with his
affidavit a statement showing on which days curfew was imposed district-wise. He has
stated how many incidents happened during night time. About 1024 incidents had
happened at places far away from police stations. He has given district-wise details
about the said incidents. In all police had lobbed 15369 tear gas shells and 10559
rounds were fired by the police to quell the riots. In the first 3 days i.e. on 27.2.2002,
28.2.2002 and 1.3.2002, 5450 rounds were fired by the police. In police firing more
Hindus were killed. Maximum deaths were also reported during the first week i.e.
from 27.2.2002 to 5.3.2002 when almost 611 persons lost lives. During this period the
38
number of deaths due to police firing was 101. (Other material shows that out of them
60 were Hindus.) He has stated that analysis of the violence shows that there were four
phases of violence. The first phase of violence was from 28.2.2002 to 3.3.2002 and it
was the result of mob frenzy as a reaction to the Godhra incident. Thereafter,
normalcy had returned. Schools, colleges and other institutions had started
functioning. The second phase from 18.3.2002 to 28.3.2002 was partly because of
deliberate attempts by the fundamentalist elements to disrupt the board examinations
at various centres which started from 18th
March. In the first week of April, there was
normalcy for about a fortnight. Looking to the peaceful environment, the Government
started the second phase of the board examination of the left out students of
Ahmedabad and Vadodara from 18th
April. The third phase of violence was
engineered by miscreants to disrupt the second phase of board examinations and
apparently to influence the proceedings in the parliament. This phase first saw the
fatwas to boycott the examinations. However, there was no visible impact of the
fatwas. The Loksabha was to discuss the motion on Gujarat on next day of
Ramnavami i.e. 21.4.2002. Therefore, acts of violence and organized attacks were
started with a motive to create panic in the city of Ahmedabad and to give an
impression to the outside world and specially to the parliament that the situation is
grim and that the state government has failed in restoring normalcy in the State. In the
fourth phase i.e. from 5th
May 2002, attacks on the localities inhabited by the majority
community were noticed. The apparent intention was to influence the concluding
discussions on Gujarat in the Rajya Sabha on the next day. He has also given details of
registration of offences and details about the offences against women. He has pointed
out that as on 30.9.2010, departmental action was initiated against 190 investigating
officers and supervisory officers and departmental action was contemplated against 24
IOs and supervisory officers after review of „A‟ summary cases. He has also given
details regarding protection given to the victims of the violence and the witnesses. As
regards burning of shops in Surat city and non registration of FIRs by police
immediately in respect of the incidents, he has stated that in many cases due to the
„bandh‟ call and continuous curfew, no one turned up for filing a complaint.
Moreover, in many cases, the owners were not known to the police and therefore FIRs
could not be registered immediately.
39
24 On 19.10.2010, Shri Raiskhan Azizkhan Pahtan, a resident of Ajit Mill Compound,
Rakhial, Ahmedabad filed an affidavit before this Commission stating that he was
earlier working as a field co-ordinator with Citizen for Justice & Peace, a Mumbai
based NGO headed by Ms. Teesta Setalvad. He was stationed at Ahmedabad and was
in overall charge of the entire operation of CJP. Everything that he did was according
to the instructions given by Ms. Setalvad. He used to get funds from Ms. Setalvad
mostly by cash to cover the expenditure and also for payments to victims or witnesses
as instructed by Ms. Setalvad. According to him, Ms. Setalvad was working with
vengeance and she had instructed him to collect evidence from „wherever‟ or to
„create‟ it to fix persons as accused in criminal cases. He has stated that the relief
camps had become hub of political activities. When contacted, most of the victims
used to say that mobs of hundreds and thousands of people had attacked them and
destroyed their houses and that the affected persons were just running away for cover
to save their lives and actually they were not in a position to recognize anybody. On
instructions of Ms. Teesta, he used to prepare list of influential people of each locality,
inquire about their background and affiliation with political parties and criminal cases
pending against them and used to forward it to Ms. Teesta. He has further stated that
when most of the victims failed to give definite names of the accused persons, they
were asked to give names based on their animosity/enmity with the persons in their
locality to fix them. Accordingly, case wise names of accused and witnesses were
generally prepared and finalized in the relief camps and the same were sent to Ms.
Teesta for preparing affidavits on behalf of victims/witnesses. He has stated that
affidavits of affected persons used to be prepared in English and he used to get them
from Ms. Teesta and his duty was to get those affidavits notarized or sworn and then
handover them to Ms. Teesta. In this manner, hundreds of affidavits were prepared
and submitted to the courts. He was not authorized to give copies of the affidavits to
the persons who made them. They had simply signed their affidavits in good faith and
with the hope that Ms. Teesta would fight on their behalf and they would soon get
justice. After referring to the media reports published in August, September and
October, 2010, that some victims/witnesses during their cross examination in trial
courts have denied that they had „ever seen or said anything‟ that appear in their
affidavits filed in courts through CJP and on coming to know that some of those
witnesses have also alleged that he had deliberately and without their knowledge
40
added certain paragraphs in their affidavits, he was required to make an application to
the court and write a letter to Shri Raghavan, who was the Chief person of the Special
Investigation Team and also to the Commissioner of Police and inform them that he
was not responsible for those false and fabricated affidavits because it was Ms. Teesta
who got the said affidavits prepared and CJP had presented those affidavits in courts.
He has also stated in his affidavit that the witnesses in Best backery case were tutored
by Ms. Teesta in her office. He has also stated in his affidavit that since SIT and
Gujarat police have not taken any action on his complaints, he has no option left but to
approach this Commission of Inquiry, with a request to take appropriate action against
Ms. Teesta Setalvad who has misled various courts and forced innocent victims and
witnesses to file false affidavits which can lead to prosecution of innocent persons in
the ongoing trials in various courts.
25 Alongwith his affidavit, he has produced copies of certain receipts issued by the
victims/witnesses for payments made to them by Ms. Teesta Setalvad through him. He
has also produced copies of some accounts kept by him to show what payments were
made and what expenditure was incurred by him for the work entrusted to him by Ms.
Setalvad. He has also produced some newspaper reports and a copy of an affidavit
made by one Kadri Zahidhusain Muzafarhusain of Ahmedabad and sent to the Chief
Justice of India wherein he has made allegations against Ms. Setalvad. He has also
produced a copy of the letter written by him to Shri Raghavan, Chairman of SIT and
also to the Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad.
26 Thereafter, on 24.11.2010 Raiskhan was examined by this Commission for obtaining
clarifications regarding the affidavit filed by him. He confirmed what is stated by him
in the affidavit and stated that it is true. It was prepared by his advocate on the basis of
what he had told him and thereafter it was prepared, read over and explained to him.
He has also stated that he can understand and read English. As regards notarizing of
affidavits referred to by him, he stated that the persons making affidavits were buying
stamp papers. According to the instructions of Ms. Setalvad the affidavits were
notarized in the office of advocate Shri Tirmizi. All those persons were identified by
the junior lawyer attached to Shri Tirmizi. Some times, Shri Tirmizi himself got the
identification done. He has stated that what was written in the affidavit was not read
41
over to the persons who had made those affidavits. He has also stated that signatures
were taken on blank Vakalatnamas of Shri Tirmizi. He used to send those
Vakalatnamas alongwith affidavits to the office of Tirmizi. As regards the complaint
which was initially prepared in the name of Viththalbhai Pandya, he stated that it was
against Gujarat Government and certain leaders generally and therefore, he had merely
substituted the name and address of the complainant by that of Mrs. Zakia Jafari.
Thereafter on 29.12.2011, he produced a copy of the letter sent by him to the
Commissioner of Police on 24.10.1011 containing threats that were received by him.
He has also produced alongwith it, a record of the conversations which he had with
Shri R.B.Srikumar on 4.11.2010, with Shri Safdar Ankleshwariya, brother-in-law of
Mrs. Zakia Jafari on 27.11.2010 and with Firozkhan Pathan (eye witness in Gulberg
society case).
27 In view of the allegations made by Jan Sangharsh Manch, based upon the telephone
data obtained by JSM that the office of the Chief Minister was in contact with Shri
Jaideep Patel, a leader of VHP and other political leaders, the Commission had
directed officials in charge of the CMO to file affidavits. Accordingly Shri Sanjay
Bhavsar, who was working as officer on special duty in the office of the Chief
Minister filed an affidavit on 22.1.2010. Therein, he has stated that he was provided
with a mobile phone with No. 9825037432. It was his official duty to co-ordinate and
schedule meetings of visitors with the Chief Minister as well as to plan tours of the
Chief Minister on his official and private visits. In performance of the said duty, he
was required to communicate with various individuals including persons belonging to
political parties by using his office/mobile phone. He had on several occasions in the
past spoken to Shri Jaideep Patel, who is a leader of the VHP. As regards Shri Jaideep
Patel having contacted the office of the Chief Minister, he has stated that on
27.2.2002, 28.2.2002 and 1.3.2002 several officials, political leaders and others had
telephoned the office of Chief Minister and it is quite possible that Shri Jaideep Patel
might have called him on his official/cell phone during those days. However, because
of long lapse of time he was not able to recollect what conversation he had with Shri
Jaideep Patel. Shri Sanjay Bhavsar was then called for clarifying certain statements
made by him in his affidavit. During his examination by the Commission, he stated
that he does not recollect to have received any call from Shri Jaideep Patel on those
42
days because of long lapse of time. He clarified that he did not mean that he had any
talk with Shri Jaideep Patel. What he wanted to say was that because of long lapse of
time he did not recollect the nature of conversation, even if there was any.
28 Shri Tanmay Mehta was working as Personal Assistant to the Chief Minister. In his
affidavit, he has stated that he was provided with a mobile phone and its number was
9825000837. As Personal Assistant of the Chief Minister, he was required to remain in
contact with officials and non official persons in connection with various programmes
and visits of the Chief Minister with other political leaders and officials. He was also
required to travel alongwith the Chief Minister. Shri Jaideep Patel being the leader of
VHP, he had occasions to talk with him. Even in his personal capacity for various
reasons, he had occasions to talk with Shri Jaideep Patel. Therefore, it is quite likely
that he might have talked to Shri Jaideep Patel on 27.2.2002 and 1.3.2002. However,
he was not in a position to remember what talk he had with him. He also stated that no
register is maintained by the Government as regards the use of mobile phones. In his
examination by the Commission, he clarified that so far as his recollection goes, he
had not talked to Shri Jaideep Patel either on 27.2.2002 or 1.3.2002 but he cannot with
certainty say that and therefore, he has mentioned in the affidavit that he might have
talked with Shri Jaideep Patel on those days.
29 Shri Omprakash Sinh, was also Personal Assistant to the Chief Minister. He was
provided with cell phone and its number was 9825000836. In his affidavit, he has
stated that on 27.2.2002 he had accompanied the Chief Minister to Baroda from where
the Chief Minister alongwith other persons had left by helicopter for Godhra and he
had stayed back at Baroda. In the evening he had returned to Ahmedabad alongwith
the Chief Minister around 9.30 p.m. He has stated that because of long lapse of time
he was not able to remember what type of talk he had with Shri Gordhan Zadafia but it
was in connection with the visit of the Chief Minister to Godhra. As regards alleged
conversation with Shri Ashok Bhatt, he has stated that it was for communicating the
programme and location of the Chief Minister for his visit to Godhra. During his
examination by the Commission, he stated that apart from doing personal work as
Personal Assistant, he was accompanying Chief Minister on certain occasions while
on tour. He further stated that he and the Chief Minister left Gandhinagar some time in
43
the afternoon. They had traveled from Gandhinagar to Ahmedabad by road and from
Ahmedabad to Vadodara by a plane. Thereafter the Chief Minister had left for Godhra
by a helicopter. He further stated that he does not remember to have received any call
either from Shri Gordhan Zadafia or from Shri Ashok Bhatt or to have called them. As
Personal Assistant to the Chief Minister, he does not talk with any Minister directly.
He does not remember to have made any call to Shri Ashok Bhatt in the afternoon of
27.2.2002 or to have received a call from him. If at all, there was any call, then it must
have been in connection with the programme of the Chief Minister and his location.
He does not remember to have received any call from Shri Gordhan Zadafia. It was
not likely that he had on his own telephoned to Shri Gordhan Zadafia. He was not able
to remember all this because as Personal Assistant, he used to receive many calls
every day and also because of long lapse of time.
30 Shri Anil Gopishankar Mukim (W. 1029) who was the Additional Chief Secretary in
the office of the Chief Minister in the year 2002 was examined by the Commission.
He has stated that on 27.2.2002, he had accompanied the Chief Minister to Godhra
and had also returned with him. While he had reached the residence of the Chief
Minister, some officers were present for a meeting with the Chief Minister. So far as
he remembers Shri P.K.Mishra, Smt. Swarnakanta Varma, Shri Ashok Narayan, Shri
Nityanandam, Shri Chakravarthi and Shri P.C.Pande were present in the said meeting,.
He had remained present for about 5 to 7 minutes. Thereafter, he had left. While he
was present no instructions were given by the Chief Minister to anyone in the meeting.
He has stated that no written record is kept in respect of every meeting that is called at
the residence of the Chief Minister. It would depend upon the situation and the
occasion on which the meeting is called. It is not fixed as to when minutes of the
meetings should be kept and signatures of the persons attending the meeting has to be
taken. He stated that he knows Sanjeev Bhatt but he does not know him closely. He
further stated that he has given names of the persons who were present in the meeting
to the extent he remembers the same. While he was present in the meeting, the officers
had started briefing the Chief Minister about the current situation.
31 Shri Nityanandam (W.1030) was the Home Secretary in the year 2002. So he was
examined by the Commission. He has stated that the Chief Minister had called a
44
meeting on 27.2.2002 at his residence at about 11.00 p.m. He was present in that
meeting and as far as he remembers persons who were present in the meeting were
Smt. Swarnkanta, Shri Ashok Narayan, Shri Chakravarthi, Shri P.C.Pande and one
officer of the office of the Chief Minister. He has stated that in the said meeting, the
Chief Minister had first ascertained the law and order situation and had discussed
about the steps to be taken for maintaining law and order in the following days. He
had not given any instruction. The meeting had lasted for about 20 to 30 minutes.
There was no discussion about bringing the dead bodies to Ahmedabad. He has further
stated that apart from the persons whose names are given by him, some officers of the
Chief Minister‟s office were coming and going. In reply to the question put to him by
the advocate of the congress party, he stated that no Minister was present in the said
meeting. He stated that at that time law and order was being looked after by Shri
Prakash Shah but he was not present in the meeting. In reply to a specific question
whether apart from the persons named by him other officers were present in the said
meeting, he categorically stated that no other officer was present. In reply to the
question put to him by the counsel of Jamiyat Ulma A Hind, he stated that even
though he was not in charge of law and order, he had attended the said meeting
because he was so directed by the Additional Chief Secretary, Shri Ashok Narayan.
He also stated that there is no procedure of taking signatures of the persons attending
the meeting.
32 Shri I.K.Jadeja (W. 1038) who was the Minister in charge of Urban Development
Department in the year 2002 was examined as a witness. He has stated that he was
also the spoke person of the State Government. He was not having any responsibility
as he was not performing any function of the Home Department. In respect of the
communal incidents which happened between 28.2.2002 and 31.5.2002, his
department was not directly concerned. He had not given any instruction to the police
as regards those incidents or the law and order situation. In reply to a specific question
put by the Commission, he stated that on 28.2.2002 he did remain present in the office
of Shri Chakravarthi, DGP for few hours. When there is a natural disaster or when
such circumstances arise, all the Ministers of the State work as a team. Accordingly,
he had asked the then Minister of Home if he could do anything. The Minister had told
him to attend the office of DGP Shri Chakravarthi for some time and if he had any
45
suggestion for controlling the communal riots, then he should bring the same to the
notice of the DGP and the Home Minister. Accordingly he had attended the office of
DGP for about 2 to 3 hours. He denied that he had given any instruction to any police
officer. He stated that he had a talk with DGP and had informed the DGP that he was
in his office for the purpose of co-ordination and if anything was required to be co-
ordinated, then the DGP should inform him. The DGP had not brought any such thing
to his notice. During his stay in the office of Shri Chakravarthi for about 2 to 3 hours,
he had sat in the office of DGP for about 15 minutes. Thereafter, he had gone to the
adjoining vacant office and had sat there. During that time, he did not have any
discussion with any officer nor he had given any instruction to them. While he was in
the office of DGP, nothing was brought to his notice about the incidents which had
happened in Ahmedabad city and in other parts of the State. He has also stated that it
was the desire of the Government to see that the incidents of riots did not increase and
if there was any communication gap, then he should bring that to the notice of the
Home Minister. During his presence for about 2 to 3 hours in the office of DGP, he
had felt that DGP and staff were busy with their work and therefore he did not wait
there for the whole day and returned within 2 to 3 hours. He also stated that except
informing the DGP as to why he had gone there, he had no other talk with him. In
reply to the question put to him by the advocate of JSM, he stated that he was told to
go to the office of the DGP in the morning but he was not sure about the time. When
asked whether he had a talk with Shri Gordhan Zadafia, he stated that he had such a
talk with him and that was in the Ministers campus. When asked whether on 28.2.2002
there was a sitting of the assembly, he said no but when asked whether on that day if
any resolution regarding the persons who died in the Godhra incident was passed, he
stated that such a resolution was passed and he was present in the assembly but he was
not sure whether it was on 28th
. He also stated that it was not possible to say the exact
time when he met Shri Gordhan Zadafia on 28.2.2002. In reply to the question
whether instructions were given to him by Shri Gordhan Zadafia, he said that Shri
Zadafia had not given any instruction to him. He had asked Shri Zadafia whether he
could be useful in any way and he had suggested that he should go to DGP‟s office
and if there is any communication gap, then he should draw his attention. As regards
what he meant by communication gap, he stated that if any message was received by
him but had not reached DGP or if any message was received by DGP but had not
46
reached Shri Gordhan Zadafia, then to avoid such a gap he had gone to that office. He
had reached there between 11.00 a.m. and 12.00 noon. He also stated that he was not
given any instruction by the Chief Minister before he had gone to the office of DGP.
He had not met the Chief Minister in connection with the riots that were going on. He
has stated that he had not received any definite information regarding the incidents
which had happened in Ahmedabad by the time he had gone to DGP‟s office. He had
come to know only that which was reported by the media. He denied that he had any
knowledge about Home Minister‟s visit to Godhra on 27th
. He also did not know about
his programme on 27th
or 28th
. In reply to the question whether he had any telephonic
talk with the Home Minister on 28th
, he stated that he does not remember about it now.
He was asked if he had gone to Ahmedabad on 28th
, he said that he does not remember
it now. In reply to the question that according to the telephonic record, a call was
made from his phone No. 9825000618 between 4.00 p.m. and 5.30 p.m. from
Ahmedabad he stated that during those days, it used to happen that even if the call was
made from Gandhinagar, it was recorded as a call made from Ahmedabad. He was
asked whether he was present in Ahmedabad on 28th
at 4.30 p.m. when the Chief
Minister had called a press conference in the circuit house, he stated that he being the
spokes person it is possible that he was present if it was a press conference called by
the Government. He denied that he was spokes person of BJP. He was asked whether
any information was received in the office of DGP by 2.00 p.m. regarding the incident
of Gulberg Society, he stated that no such information had come to his notice. He
stated that he was not a member of VHP in 2002. When asked if he was aware of the
fact that BJP had supported the „bandh‟ call given by VHP, he stated that he was not
aware of the same. He denied that he had given any instruction to Gandhinagar police
control regarding the incidents of Ahmedabad. He also denied that he had any talk
with the Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad or with the Joint Commissioner of
Police Shri Tandon. When asked that it was not likely that Gordhan Zadafia who was
only a Minister of State would give any instruction to him, he stated that at the time of
natural disaster or unusual circumstances the Ministers work as a team and not like a
senior Minister or a junior Minister. When asked whether he knew about the meeting
of top Police Officers called by the Chief Minister on 27.2.2002, he said that he did
not know about it then.
47
33 Shri Gordhan Zadafia (W. 1032) was the Minister of State (Home) in the year 2002.
He was therefore summoned by the Commission for eliciting information on aspects
relevant for the purpose of the inquiry. He was first examined on 19.11.2010 and then
on 27.12.2011. He was examined again on 13.1.2012 so as to enable the advocates
appearing for JSM, Congress Party and others to put questions to him. Shri. Gordhan
Zadafia in his evidence has stated that he was earlier a Swayamsevak of RSS and had
then joined VHP. In the year 1990 he joined BJP and became a Minister of State in
charge of the Home Department. In the year 2001 he had an independent charge of
Police Housing and Border Security. Rest of the activities of Home Department were
looked after by the Home Minister who was also the Chief Minister. He stated that on
27.2.2002 he left Gandhinagar some time between 1.30 pm. and 2.00 p.m. for going to
Godhra by road. He had reached there at about 4.30 to 5.00 p.m. He had gone to the
civil hospital and met the injured persons who were under treatment there. Thereafter,
he had gone to the office of the Collector where a discussion had taken place regarding
the steps to be taken in view of the Godhra incident. He stated that he had seen Shri
Jaideep Patel and Ashwin Patel at Godhra but he had no talk with them. On 27th
night
he had a talk with Shri Jaideep Patel on telephone as regards some relative of Shri
Jiadeep Patel. On that day he had no other talk with Shri Ashwin Patel, except the talk
which he had with him in the morning at about 7.30 a.m. He had stayed at the circuit
house of Godhra on that night and left Godhra at about 3.00 a.m. He had reached
Ahmedabad by road at about 5.30 a.m. After waiting for about half an hour at his
house, he had left for Gandhinagar. In view of the Godhra incident and the „bandh‟
call for 28th
given by VHP, he had given instructions to the police for taking
appropriate steps and to see that the Godhra incident did not have much reaction. He
also stated that he had instructed DG, Police Commissioner and other police officers
to take strict action against persons induldging in rioting and if some one says that the
Government had instructed the police not to take action against the riotors for 24 hours
then that is wrong. He stated that on 28.2.2002 he had not come to Ahmedabad and
between 1.3.2002 and 4.3.2002 he had visited Ahmedabad only once and that was
probably on 3rd
or 4th
when Shri Gujaral had visited Ahmedabad. Between 28.2.2002
and 4.3.2002 he had talked to various police officers over telephone as he was the
Minister of State (Home Department) and it is quite possible that he had also talked
with political leaders as he used to receive many telephone calls from outside and he
48
might have replied to them after making inquiries. He also stated that from time to
time, police was given instructions to take strict action against persons induldging in
rioting. He was present in the meeting of 27th
which was held at Godhra in the
Collector‟s office but he was not present when the decision was taken to send dead
bodies to places to which those persons belonged. He stated that it was his belief that
the said decision was taken by two senior Ministers i.e. Chief Minister and Shri Ashok
Bhatt and the concerned officers together. The dead bodies which were brought to
Ahmedabad were of the persons who belonged to Ahmedabad and near about places.
He was not aware on that day how and when the dead bodies were sent to Ahmedabad.
He had come to know about those things later. He stated that it was his belief that dead
bodies were taken to Sola Civil Hospital as that was considered more convenient for
the relatives of those persons to collect dead bodies, that place being outside
Ahmedabad. He also stated that he does not believe that the incidents which happened
in Ahmedabad had happened because the dead bodies were brought to Ahmedabad
and they were handed over to their relatives. According to him, only in one case, some
incident had happened in Amraiwadi following the funeral procession of one person
who had died in the Godhra incident. He also stated that whenever he used to go out of
Gandhinagar in a Government vehicle, entries used to be made in the relevant registers
and also in the control room. He has stated that it is false to say that he had talked to
someone on his mobile phone on 28.2.2002 either in the afternoon or in the evening
from Ahmedabad. If the call details prepared by Shri Rahul Sharma show that, then
those details are not true, because on that day he was not present in Ahmedabad. He
also stated that neither on 27th
nor on any day thereafter, he had a talk with Babu
Bajrangi, either from Ahmedabad or from any other place. He had talked to Smt.
Mayaben Kodnani on telephone between 27.2.2002 and 4.3.2002 but it was not
possible for him now to say what was that talk. He stated that call details pertaining to
him produced by Shri. Rahul Sharma are not true. He might have talked to Smt.
Mayaben as she was MLA of their party. He knew Shri Bipin Panchal as a social
worker and he might have talked to him as his shop for selling vehicles was burnt in
one of the incidents. He stated that he knows Jaideep Patel as he is a worker of a
political party and he might have talked to him on 27.2.2002 in connection with
relatives of the persons who had died in the Godhra incident. He also stated that he
might have talked to various police officers between 28.2.2002 and 4.3.2002 as he was
49
the Minister in charge of Home Department. He had come to know at about 3.00 p.m.
that one person was crushed under a truck in Naroda area. That was the only
information which he had got by that time. He had come to know about the Gulberg
society incident only after it had happened. In reply to the question put to him by the
advocate of JSM, he stated that it was through oversight that he had mentioned before
the SIT that he had left Godhra on 28th
some time between 7.00 a.m. and 8.00 a.m. He
had later clarified about it in his statement in his statement before SIT. He might have
reached the Assembly at about 8.30 a.m. and had remained there till it was over. He
denied that he had told Shri I.K.Jadeja to go to the office of DGP. He did not know
who had instructed Shri Jadeja to go there. He did not know about the movements of
the Karsevaks as he was not having the charge of internal security. He was told about
the Godhra incident by Shri Ashwin Patel at about 7.30 a.m. He was told by the Chief
Minister to go to Godhra. He had not gone to Godhra with Shri Ashok Bhatt. It was
not his decision to get post mortem done of the dead bodies done at the railway yard.
He was not aware of any report given by P.I. Barot that because the dead bodies were
brought to Ahmedabad, the communal violence had started. According to his
information, no major incident had taken place at Ahmedabad as a result of bringing
dead bodies to Ahmedabad. He was not asked to remain present in the meeting of 27th
called by the Chief Minister. He had come to know about it on the next day when a
written report was sent to him by his department. He stated that he was not aware of
any allegation made by Shri Haren Pandya before some Tribunal that the Government
had given instructions that no action should be taken for about 24 hours against
Hindus indulging in rioting. He further stated that he did not remember if he had
attended any meeting called by the Chief Minister on 28th
or that he had contacted
somebody in the office of VHP at about 8.00 pm. on 27th
. He also did not remember if
there was any phone call for him from RSS office. He stated that he was informed
about the Naroda Patia and Gulberg society incidents by Shri Savani. He had come to
know about those incidents later on and therefore there was no question of his giving
any instruction to any police officer with respect to those incidents. He stated that he
had not received any fax message stated to have been sent by Shri Sanjeev Bhatt on
27th
or 28th
to the effect that a mob has surrounded Ehsan Jafari and his family in
Gulberg Society and that it was necessary to take immediate steps. He stated that if he
had a talk with Shri Bipin Panchal who became an accused later on in Naroda Patia
50
case then it must have been in connection with his shop which was burnt in one of the
incidents. If he had a talk with Shri Jaideep Patel who also became an accused in the
Naroda Patia case, then it must have been in connection with maintenance of law and
order. He does not know Babu Bajrangi and he does not remember to have met him
any time before 27.2.2002. He stated that it is false to say that he had told Babu
Bajrangi to go out of Gujarat and take shelter there. In reply to a question put by the
advocate of the Gujarat Congress Party, he stated that he was not responsible for the
transfers of police officers as the said decision was taken by the concerned officers. He
also stated that he had not visited places of the Gulberg Society incident or the Naroda
Patia incident or the Naroda Gam incident wherein many persons were killed. He had
not visited Shah Alam relief camp or any other camp.
34 As the Commission had come to know that Shri Sanjeev Bhatt, who was at the
relevant time working in the office of I.B. as Deputy Commissioner Intelligence, had
filed an affidavit in some proceeding before the Supreme Court and it contained some
statements relevant for the purpose of this inquiry, he was summoned for being
questioned by the Commission regarding those statements. He was first examined on
16.5.2011. On that day he gave one application and alongwith it a copy of his said
affidavit. He stated that he was aware of the notifications issued by this Commission
but did not file any affidavit before the Commission. He had not received any order
from DGP or any other Superior Officer to file any affidavit before this Commission.
(Shri Bhatt had filed his affidavit in his capacity as Head of the SIB under the
directions from the Government.) As an Intelligence Officer, he was expected to
maintain confidentiality and therefore could not have disclosed information of
sensitive nature unless called upon to do so under a legal obligation. [With respect to
the questions put regarding his eagerness to tell certain facts to Special Investigation
Team appointed by the Supreme Court of India to look into a complaint made by Mrs.
Zakiya Ehsan Jafri and his allegations against the SIT, he stated that he was neither
eager as alleged nor he had made any complaint against SIT. He also stated that as his
evidence was under consideration pending judicial proceeding, it would not be proper
on his part to make any further comments.] While questioned as to why he had
produced floppy/disc containing the entire cell phone/cell site records of Godhra town
for 26th
and 27th
February, 2002, even when he was not called upon to do so, he
51
merely stated that in his statement before the SIT, he has clarified the position and
requested the Commission to call for that statement.
35 He stated that in the year 2002, the State Intelligence Bureau consisted of one Addl.
DGP rank officer assisted by officers of the rank of IG/DIG/SP. He was at the relevant
time S.P. and was holding the post of Dy. Commissioner of Intelligence (DCI). There
were 3 Dy. Commissioners of Intelligence. One DCI was looking after political
matters, one DCI was looking after the communal affairs and one DCI was in charge
of internal security and administration and that covered all matters pertaining to the
internal security of Gujarat including the matters pertaining to border security of
Gujarat, coastal security, security of vital installations, counter intelligence and VVIP
security including Chief Ministers security. The scope of duties of Dy. Commissioner
Internal Security overlapped the securities of other branches of the SIB. To support
this point, he relied upon some fax messages sent by the I.B. which were signed by
him. He has stated that during times of crisis or emergent situations, as arose in
February, 2002, SIB used to work as one monolithic unit and all the officers
subordinate to ADGP functioned as staff officers irrespective of work allotment. He
stated that a floppy based report was obtained by him but refused to disclose the
reason behind obtaining the same on the ground that “the said issue is at present under
consideration by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India.”
36 He has further stated that on 27.2.2002 he was contacted by the State Control Room
some time between 9.30 and 9.45 p.m. when he was at his residence at Ahmedabad.
He was told to accompany the DGP and IGP Shri Chakravarthy for attending a
meeting at the residence of the Chief Minister. He had reached Police Bhavan at
Gandhinagar at about 10.15 p.m. In the foyer of the Police Bhavan, DGP
Chakravarthy‟s car was already parked. Shri Chakravarthy was descending the steps
leading to the said foyer. He reported to Shri Chakravarthy. He was told to accompany
him in his car. Accordingly he went to the residence of the Chief Minister in the car of
Shri Chakravarthy. He had attended the meeting alongwith Shri Chakravarthy and he
was present when instructions were given by the Chief Minister in that meeting.
52
37 On being questioned by JSM, he stated that ADGP, Intelligence Shri Raigar was on
leave on that day. The next person in hierarchy was Shri O.P.Mathur. As the direction
to attend the meeting at the Chief Minister‟s residence was conveyed to him by the
superior formation, it was not necessary for him to inform his immediate superior Shri
O.P.Mathur about it. He has stated that in the said meeting in- charge Chief Secretary
Smt. Swarnakanta Verma, Addl. Chief Secretary Home, Shri Ashok Narayan,
Commisserioner of Police, Ahmedabad city Shri P.C.Pande, Secretary Home Shri
Nityanand, and Secretary to Chief Minister Shri P.K.Mishra were present. They were
there when he reached there alongwith Shri Chakravarthy. He stated that the statement
made by the Chief Minister has been reproduced by him in para 13 of his affidavit and
that the said statement was made towards the conclusion of the meeting. He also stated
that Shri P.C.Pande and Shri Chakravarthy had tried to impress upon the Chief
Minister that it was not a good idea for the BJP as a party to support the Bandh call
given by VHP. He also tried to impress upon the Chief Minister that for the BJP and
Sangh Parivar cadre members, the distinction between BJP as a party in power
meaning the Government of Gujarat would get blurred and that could result into a
serious misconception and break down of law and order. It was tried to be impressed
upon the Chief Minister that it was not a good idea to transport dead bodies of the
Karsevaks from Godhra to Ahmedabad as it would inflame communal passions. Shri
P.C.Pande had said that taking out funeral procession in Ahmedabad city would turn it
into a virtual “tinder box”, Shri P.C.Pande and Shri Chakravarthy also told the Chief
Minister that they were extremely short of man power resources in order to meet with
the situation that was likely to arise during the Bandh call. He had also informed the
Chief Minister that there was large scale mobilization of the Sangh Parivar cadres not
only in the major cities of Gujarat but also in the rural areas of Gujarat and in case of
wide spread communal violence on the next day, the State Police resources would be
stretched to an extent where they would become absolutely ineffective. When asked
what follow up action was taken by the DGP and Police Commissioner after the
statement referred to him by the Chief Minister, he stated that he did not know what
was done. He also stated that while going from Police Bhavan to the Chief Minister‟s
residence, his car had followed and that the Movement Diary maintained by him
would contain details about his exact movements on that day. He further stated that
there were 2 meetings held by the Chief Minister on 28th
February, 2002. First meeting
53
was in the forenoon and the second meeting was in the afternoon and that he had
attended both the meetings alongwith Shri Chakravarthy. In reply to the question put
by JSM, he also stated that by afternoon he had the information that the Ex. MP was in
a serious difficulty in Gulbarg Society and that he had personally informed the Chief
Minister about developing emergent situation at Gulbarg Society. H also stated that
there were reports about complete police inaction all across Ahmedabad and
specifically at Gulbarg Society. This was also conveyed to the Chief Minister. He has
also stated that the Chief Minister did not give any instruction to the DGP or police for
taking measures to protect the people residing at Gulbarg Society. However, SIB had
alerted the Commissioner of Police by repeatedly informing him about the developing
situation at Gulbarg Society and requested him to take all necessary measures to
prevent the imminent untoward incident. In reply to the question put by JSM, he also
stated that Shri Amarsinh Chaudhari was not present in that meeting but while he was
leaving after the meeting, he had met Shri Amarsinh Chaudhari and Shri Naresh
Raval. Shri Chaudhari had requested him to take appropriate measures to assist Shri
Ehsan Jafri and he had informed Shri Chaudhari that he had briefed the Chief Minister
on that aspect. He also stated that he had briefed ADGP Shri Raigar about the meeting
of 27th
February, 2002.
38 In reply to the question put to him by Central Relief Committee, he stated that he was
not able to remember all the information pertaining to the developing situations
between 27.2.2002 and 3.3.2002. He stated that he had general as well as specific
information that the police action and response at some places was inadequate.
However, he was not in a position to opine as to whether inaction on the part of the
police was intentional or otherwise. When asked to explain the statement made by him
in para 4 of his affidavit, he stated that since his affidavit was under judicial
consideration by the Supreme Court, it would not be appropriate for him to disclose
any details. In reply to a further question regarding the messages that there were acts
of omission and commission of the State Functionaries, he stated that he had full
recollection regarding such acts but it would be inappropriate on his part to give any
further information till his affidavit is considered by the Supreme Court. He also stated
in reply to a question put to him by the Central Relief Committee that Minister of
Home Shri Amit Shah had approached him but he would not disclose the exact nature
54
of the briefing given by him and the persons involved in the said briefing. The State
Home Minister had tried to influence him in not speaking the truth but he was not
threatened. He stated that he was present on 1.3.2002 when Shri Chaudhari had met
the Chief Minister. Shri Chaudhari and Shri Vaghela had been to the house of Chief
Minister for sitting in „dharna‟ there. At that time, the Chief Minister had taken Shri
Amarsinh Chaudhari aside and told him “VDZl;\CEF. VtIFZ[ H[ DFCF[, K[ T[DF\ H[ D];,DFGF[ ;FY[
Y. ZñF]\ K[ T[ TDFZL VG[ DFZL ;FY[ 56 Y. XS[.” [Amarsinhbhai in the prevailing atmosphere,
what is being done to the Muslims can happen with you and with me also.] He had
assured Shri Chaudhari that Government was taking all necessary steps to bring about
the cessation of on-going riots. When asked about the petition filed by Mallika
Sarabhai in Supreme Court, he stated that the Chief Minister of Gujarat Shri
Narendrabhai Modi was trying to undermine the proceedings but refused to elaborate
by saying that it would be unable for him at this stage to give further details as his
affidavit is before the Supreme Court.
39 While replying to the question put to him on behalf of the Government, he stated that
in the meeting of 27.2.2002, no other police officer of his rank was present. He stated
that he was required to attend the said meeting by virtue of the position held by him in
the SIB and not by virtue of his rank. He stated that he had left the said meeting alone
at around 10.45 p.m. and had returned to Police Bhavan in his official car.
40 Questions were put to him as regards his involvement in Criminal Case filed in Jam
Jodhpur Police Station for causing death of Prabhudas Madhavji. He admitted that
such a complaint has been filed against him. He further stated that he was not aware
whether SIB maintains Movement Diaries of senior officers but he used to follow that
practice. He also stated that the incoming and outgoing registers maintained by SIB,
the vehicle log books and movement diaries do not contain any privileged,
confidential or sensitive intelligence or information. When asked about the registration
number of the vehicle in which he had traveled from his residence to police Bhavan at
Gandhinagar on the night of 27th
and back from Chief Minister‟s Bunglow, he stated
that he did not recollect the same. He also stated that as per the prevailing practice,
entries were made in the log book by the driver and he was counter signing the same.
When asked whether information and documentary evidence shared with SIT formed
55
part of the record of IB, he stated that the said investigation was still in progress and
therefore, it would not be proper for him to disclose anything further in that behalf.
When asked whether the floppy discs, print outs and call records were the records of
IB and that he had moved those records from IB when he left the IB, he gave the same
reply. He stated that on 27.2.2002, Shri Mathur was present in the office. He also
stated that by stating privileged information and communication what he meant was
information and communication regarding which he could claim privilege. He was
bound by the conduct rules prescribed for IPS Officers by the Government of Gujarat.
What he has stated in the affidavit filed before the Supreme Court does not disclose
any secret information and therefore, it was not necessary for him to refer to oath of
secrecy which the IPS Officer is administered at the time of inductment into service.
When asked by the advocate for the Government about the time when he and Shri
Chakravarthy had gone to Chief Minister‟s residence, he stated that he had provided
details to the SIT and therefore, he would not like to disclose any further details. When
asked whether he had stated that he had left the meeting midway, he stated that he had
excused himself from the meeting after deliberations were concluded and instructions
were given by the Chief Minister. He had remained in the Chief Minister‟s residence
from around 10.20 p.m. to 10.40 p.m.
41 Shri Khursheed Ahmed, Dy. Police Commissioner, Surat City has filed an affidavit
dated 9.1.2004. Therein, he has stated that from 8.3.3001 to 26.4.2003 he was the
Commandant of SRPF Group-2, Saijpur Bogha, Ahmedabad. The said group was
located in the area falling within the jurisdiction of Naroda Police Station. On
28.2.2002 number of persons residing in the Naroda Patia area had taken shelter inside
the campus of SRPF Group. Considering the situation which had developed, he had
ordered that those persons should be granted shelter inside the campus. A total number
of 764 persons were given shelter. He has annexed alongwith his affidavit a statement
containing details about the quarters and blocks where those persons were kept. He
has further stated that as he was concerned with the safety of those sheltered families
and also the families of SRPF personnel and the armoury, he had deployed the
available group man-power consisting of only one platoon of D Company to secure
the periphery of the campus. At that time, sprawling campus of the group did not have
a compound wall. Yet, he was able to keep the campus free from the rampaging mobs.
56
He has also stated that the allegation made by some persons that the SRPF men had
refused shelter to them by stating that there were such orders from the top is not
correct and no such complaint was ever made to him by anyone before that allegation
was made.
42 In his further statement on 25.3.2010 before the SIT, he has given more details about
what happened on 28.2.2002. He has stated that the SRPF men of his group were
deployed somewhere else for bandobast duty and in the campus only one platoon and
some persons doing administrative work were present. Right from 7.00 a.m. of
28.2.2002 he had given orders to his persons to take care of the safety of the campus.
Between 10.00 a.m. and 12.00 noon, large number of persons belonging to minority
community had taken shelter in their camp. Even after 12‟o clock, some persons alone
or accompanied by others were coming to the camp for shelter and they were given
shelter. He and his Dy. Commandant, Shri Akbarmiya Pirumiya Kureshi and Shri
J.B.Dantaniya had supervised the bandobast. In the afternoon, some violent mobs had
tried to enter into the camp and they were prevented by his men from entering into the
camp as many persons were taking shelter within the camp and there were families of
the SRP personnel and also arms and ammunitions in the camp. For their protection,
such mobs were not allowed to enter the camp. He has also stated that in the camp 700
to 800 persons belonging to minority community were given shelter. He has reiterated
that only the mischievous persons/elements were not permitted to enter the camp. He
has also stated that the allegations made against his men are totally false and baseless.
43 Mallika Sarabhai, by her letter dated 25.5.2011, requested this Commission to re-
examine Shri Sanjeev Bhatt and Shri R.B.Srikumar, ex DGP. In that letter she stated
that on reading newspaper reports about the testimony given by Shri Sanjeev Bhatt
before this Commission, she came to know that there was direct involvement of Shri
Narendra Modi in undermining the court process in the writ petition filed by her and 2
others in the Supreme Court regarding the 2002 Gujarat communal riots. On 1.6.2011,
she again wrote to the Commission that she has come to know that Shri Sanjeev Bhatt
has already told the Commission everything that he knew about Mr. Modi‟s
involvement in tampering with her writ petition and that Shri R.B.Srikumar can throw
more light on that point. She therefore requested the Commission to cross examine
57
Shri R.B.Srikumar. The said letter was treated as an application made by her and it
was fixed for hearing on 8.6.2011. At her request, the hearing was adjourned to
13.7.2011. On that day she delivered one letter to the Commission stating therein that
her request for re-examination of Shri Sanjeev Bhatt and further examination of Shri
R.B.Srikumar was justified for the reasons stated therein. Meanwhile, on 2.7.2011 she
had written a letter to Shri R.B.Srikumar requesting him to file an affidavit before the
Commission clarifying all the aspects in respect of this matter. By an order dated
18.7.2011, Commission rejected her request. Shri Sanjeev Bhatt while he was
examined by this Commission, was asked to elaborate why and to what extent
according to him, Shri Modi had tried to undermine the proceeding of Ms Mallika‟s
writ petition in the Supreme Court, he stated that the said issue being a part of his
affidavit was before the Supreme Court and therefore it would not be appropriate for
him at that stage to give any further details. The Commission therefore held that no
useful purpose would be served by summoning Shri Sanjeev Bhatt again and for that
reason Ms Mallika‟s request for summoning Shri Bhatt was rejected. After Shri
Srikumar filed one more affidavit on 15.9.2011, Mallika again wrote to the
Commission requesting for a certified copy of the said application and for an
opportunity to cross examine Shri Srikumar. As the said affidavit was marked as
confidential and secret by Shri Srikumar, her request for copy thereof was rejected.
Thereafter, on 22.9.2011, she again made a request for an opportunity to cross
examine Shri Bhatt and Shri Srikumar. Her said request was rejected by an order dated
23.9.2011 by pointing out that her request was already rejected earlier and that there
was no good reason to change that order.
44 Thereafter, on 25.10.2011 she informed the Commission that she has learnt the
contents of the affidavit filed by Shri Srikumar on 16.9.2011 and therefore it was
absolutely necessary to question Shri Bhatt about the details regarding the action taken
by the Chief Minister and the Government of Gujarat to derail her said Writ Petition
No. 221/2002. That letter was treated as an application and kept for hearing on
24.11.2011. On that day she appeared before the Commission and gave her written
arguments in support of that what Shri Bhatt and Shri R.B.Srikumar have stated with
respect to the said Writ Petitioin and the alleged efforts made by Shri Modi and the
State Government to derail the said petition do not fall within the perview of the scope
58
of inquiry of this Commission. It was also made clear by the said order that it was
open to Shri Srikumar and Shri Bhatt to file additional affidavits if they have some
more details about the same.
45 Thus Mallika Sarabhai has merely relied upon what Shri Sanjeev Bhatt has already
stated before the Commission and has not produced any new material which can be of
any use to the Commission in making the inquiry.
46 Shri Mahendra Nalvaya who was at the relevant time working as Taluka Mamlatdar
and Executive Magistrate at Godhra, has in his affidavit dated 3.6.2002 stated that he
had arranged for sending some dead bodies to Ahmedabad on 27.2.2002. The papers
sent by him alongwith his affidavit show that the dead bodies were sent by him some
time after 10.30 p.m. under police escort in 5 vehicles. He also filed one affidavit on
5.9.2009 stating that he had sent the dead bodies on oral instructions given by District
Magistrate and the Addl. District Magistrate. For the purpose of carrying those dead
bodies to Ahmedabad he had entrusted them to Shri Jaideep Patel who was the leader
of VHP and another leader of VHP Shri Hasmukh Patel had signed the receipts.
47 Shri Rahul Sharma who was the DSP of Bhavnagar from 16.2.2002 to 26.3.2002 has
apart from mentioning the steps taken by him for maintaining law and order in the
district stated in his affidavit dated 1.7.2002, that on 1.3.2002 Sandesh newspaper had
published one writing. Therein it was stated that whereas in other cities including
Ahmedabad, Vadodara and Rajkot the timid leaders of Bhavnagar under the excuse of
„Ahinsa‟ (non violence) are concealing their faces. Alongwith his affidavit he has
produced a cutting of the said newspaper. He has also stated in his affidavit that he had
contacted the local editor of that newspaper and told him not to publish such
inflammatory news. The editor had assured him not to publish such news again.
48 While giving evidence before the Commission, on 30.10.2004 he stated that
Bhavnagar had remained quiet on 27th
and 28th
and he had not received any report
regarding any inflammatory up surge in the city of Bhavnagar as a reaction of Godhra
incident. According to him what triggered riots in Bhavnagar where 3 factors namely
(1) Sandesh newspaper report of 1.3.2002, (2) rally taken out by Sadhu Samaj in
59
Bhavnagar on 1.3.2002 and (3) some inflammatory speeches made by some persons
who had gathered outside the Collector‟s office. He has stated that Kishor Bhatt, who
was President of Bhavnagar Branch of Shivsena, was one of the persons who gave
such an inflammatory speech. He was therefore arrested by him on that day.
49 He has further stated in his affidavit that “in my efforts to control the riots, I did not
encounter any political interference. I had received one telephone call from Mr.
Rajendrasinh Rana, the President of the Gujarat BJP that I should save the children of
Madresa and shift them to safe place within the city. I received that message from him
sometime in the evening. I do not know how Mr. Rajendrasinh Rana got the
information regarding the attack on the Madresa. As I remember I had not tried to
contact Home Secretary. The Chief Minister had not contacted me during that period.
One Minister of State Shri Gordhan Zadfiya had contacted me. That was on 4th
evening. That was in connection with visit of Mr. L.K.Advani. He had again contacted
me on 16.3.2002 at about 1-.10 a.m. He had told me that while I had done a good job
at Bhavnagar, the ratio of deaths as a result of police firing was not proper. What I
understood thereby was that he was complaining about more number of deaths of
Hindus compared to Muslims as a result of police firing in Bhavnagar city. I had told
him that that would depend upon the situation of the mobs at which firing was resorted
to”. He has further stated that with respect to the incident which happened on 23rd
that
though he had come to know that local leaders were behind that incident, he had not
identified those local leaders. After that incident was over, political leaders of BJP had
come to him and told him that he had done a good thing by not succumbing to the
pressure of local leaders.
50 He has also stated while answering questions asked by JSM that when he was working
as DCP Control Room at Ahmedabad, he was asked to assist Mr. Surolia in the
investigation of Naroda Patia case and Gulberg Society case to find out who were
really involved or who were falsely involved, he had thought it fit to collect data from
AT & T and Cell Force i.e. details of calls received or sent by all persons holding
mobile phones within the city. From the original CDs containing such information he
had prepared one CD. While the original CDs were returned to Mr. Pande for keeping
them with the case file. He had retained one copy of those CDs with him. He produced
60
2 copies of the CDs prepared by him from the CD which he had on a request made by
the advocate for JSM.
51 Shri K.Kailashnathan, Principal Secretary to the Chief Minister was examined by this
Commission (W.No. 1033) to know the functioning of the Home Department at the
Home Minister‟s level and functioning of the CMO, particularly when the Chief
Minister is also the Home Minister. He has stated that if there is a full fledged Home
Minister then he has his own P.S., P.A. and some clerical staff. As far as Home
Department is concerned, there will be one Secretary in charge of the department who
is ordinarily of the rank of Additional Chief Secretary. There may be two other
Secretaries, one from IPS and one from IAS. The Secretaries will have those powers
which are delegated to them by the Minister. Most of the policy decisions are taken at
the level of Home Minister. Day to day routine matters are normally dealt with by the
Department. He has further stated that ordinarily if a telephone call is received in the
office of the Home Minister, then it is taken by the P.A. and if it is received in the
department, P.A. of the Secretary would receive that phone. If the phone call is in
respect of a serious and urgent matter which deserves attention of the Minister or the
secretary then the phone call would be passed on to the Minister or the Secretary. If
the information received is not serious then the message received is passed on to the
concerned officer dealing with such matter. If Minister or Secretary is not available at
the time when an important message is received then the P.A. would prepare a short
note and hand it over to the Minister or the Secretary when he becomes available. If
the message received requires urgent attention, then the P.A. would try to pass on that
information immediately to the Minister or the Secretary without waiting for them to
come back to their office.
52 As regards functioning of the control room in the Home Department, he stated that
there was a Control Room in the Home Department since 1993. It used to get
messages from the State Police Control Room and also from the Field Officers. The
messages so received by the Home Department used to be sent to the concerned
branches. About 3 years back, the practice of having a Control Room in the Home
Department has been stopped because there is a full fledged Police Control Room in
the DGP‟s office. In the year 2002 there was no Control Room in the office of the
61
Home Minister or Minister of State (Home) and messages were received by the Home
Department as such and not by the personal staff in the Home Minister‟s office. In
case of emergency special officers were posted in the Control Room and they
coordinated the action required to be taken pursuant to the messages received. If the
Home Department sends any message through the Control Room, then there would be
a record of it in the Home Department‟s office. Such messages are sent when the
Secretary finds it necessary to do so. If the message is with regard to operational
details concerning supervision of the police force such a message would normally be
sent through DGP‟s office; but, if the Secretary so feels he can also send the message
directly to the field officer concerned through the Control Room. If a message is sent
directly by the Home Department, then a copy thereof would the sent to the DGP‟s
office and if any important message is sent by the DGP‟s office then a copy thereof
would be sent to the Home Department. In respect of routine matters DGP‟s office
does not send copies of such messages to the Home Department.
53 As regards the procedure that is followed when the Home Minister calls a meeting of
high Government officials in respect of important matters, he has stated that in cases
of emergency like communal riots, Home Minister would call a meeting of high
Government officials for reviewing the situation. In emergency situation ordinarily
persons concerned are contacted on telephone and there may not be any written
communication for calling a meeting. Ordinarily, in such meetings Home Minister,
Chief Secretary, Home Secretary, Secretary dealing with law and order and one or two
Joint Secretaries or Deputy Secretaries would remain present. From the DGP office
ordinarily DGP would remain present. If the DGP so feels he may keep an IG level
officer present. If the DGP feels like keeping any officer present from the IB‟s office
then ordinarily he would be the highest officer of that bureau or a person of the rank of
ADGP or IG. In such important meetings only officers of senior level like IG or
ADGP would remain present. Ordinarily in matters of law and order situation arising
out of an emergency, where the law and order situation is to be reviewed, instructions
are given immediately to the subordinates by Home Department or DGP‟s office and a
record thereof may not be kept except that the instructions given would be the record
so far as that meeting is concerned. So far as law and order is concerned, ordinarily it
is the police department which deals with the same and therefore, minutes may not be
62
kept in respect of all the meetings which are held for the purpose of reviewing
emergency law and order situations.
54 He has also stated, while explaining how the Home Minister is kept informed about
the incidents in the circumstances like communal riots, that if the incident is very
serious and which deserves the attention of the Home Minister immediately then that
information may be passed on to him but ordinarily the Home Minister is briefed
generally about all the incidents which have taken place and the actions taken by the
administration in respect of those incidents. This is done at the time of review
meetings which are held some times twice or three times in a day depending upon the
requirement of the situation. When incidents are wide spread and they happen almost
simultaneously at different places then in such cases information with respect to each
particular incident may not be passed on to the Home Minister immediately. The
Home Department would collect all the information about steps taken by the
concerned officers and appraise the Home Minister during review meeting. Any
intelligence received by the IB which deserves attention of the Home Department
would be passed on by the ADGP in charge of IB to the DGP and the Home
Department. Though the message from IB‟s office is signed by a subordinate officer,
such officer would not on his own send the message but he would do so only after
approval of the ADGP. The officer concerned would first place the message before the
ADGP and only after his approval and instructions he would send the message to the
office of the DGP or the Home Department. DGP would be in a better position to
elaborate on this procedure. Messages received from IB‟s office by the Home
Department are entered in a Register but I cannot say now how long such registers are
maintained.
55 As regards the set up of the CMO and its working, he has stated that there are 3 senior
Secretary level officers. Below them there are some Deputy Secretaries, Under
Secretaries and subordinate staff. Apart from this set up, CM‟s office has one OSD
who looks after appointments and there are 2 to 3 Personal Assistants. There are no
clear cut rules in this behalf. Under delegation of powers, there are certain files which
are placed before the CM by the Home Department and in doing this work he is
assisted by one Secretary level officer. Ordinarily the decisions are taken on files in
63
the department by the concerned officer. If the matter is important then it goes before
the Secretary in CMO who deals with the same. If he thinks that the said matter should
be brought to the notice of the CM also then it is brought to his notice. Ordinarily if
any serious riot or an incident takes place then it may be brought to the notice of the
CM that such an incident has happened and after the situation is brought under control
again he is informed about it. There is a State Integrated Communication Network
(SICN) which works automatically. Calls are received by the Operator working in the
office of CMO. Whenever any call is received from the public then it is connected
with the officer dealing with that subject. For example, if somebody telephones the
CMO and seeks an appointment then that call will be diverted to the OSD who looks
after such work. If there is any grievance made by a member of public then that call
would be directed to Jan Sampark Shakha. If there is any important call then it would
be connected with any of the three Secretaries. Ordinarily CM does not take any call
while he is in the office because either he would be busy in a meeting or meeting the
visitors. Only when there is a very important call or a call from high dignitary like
Central Minister or a top Party Leader, the call would be diverted to him and that too it
would be through the Operator, CM Desk. As stated earlier normally all calls are
diverted to the concerned officer dealing with the subject matter. Very rarely message
is received by the CMO from the State Control Room. Whenever such a message is
received, it comes by way of information only and that too it will be for the Secretary
dealing with the Home portfolio in the CM‟s office. IB would send daily report to the
CMO and that will go to the Secretary in charge. Very rarely IB would send a message
directly to the CMO and even if it is sent that would be by way of information only. If
the message is sent by IB through the State Control then a copy thereof would go to
ACS, Home and only if it is marked to CMO then it will go to CMO but the receipt of
such message would be reflected in the Register at the CMO and also in the record
maintained by the ACS and the State Control Room.
56 While explaining what procedure is followed when the Chief Minister wants to call a
meeting of high Governments officers for discussing an urgent important matter, he
has stated that the CM may instruct his office on telephone to call the concerned
officers and keep them present in the CMO. There is no fixed procedure in this behalf
in respect of emergency situation. Mostly the officers present would be of senior
Secretary level and senior Police officers like DGP and Additional DGP or Police
64
Commissioners. Normally Chief Minister‟s programme is prepared for the day and if
the meeting is called according to that programme then the record thereof also would
be maintained but if there is an emergency meeting or a non-structured meeting then
there would not be any record in respect of such a meeting and no record of such
meeting is maintained. If emergency meeting is called in connection with serious riot
or a situation of serious communal disturbance then it would be really a meeting for
the purpose of reviewing the situation and not for taking any decision or giving
direction and therefore, no minutes thereof are maintained. But if there are certain
directions to be given to various departments for taking action like rehabilitation or in
the matter of natural disasters involving many other departments then minutes in that
behalf may be recorded. Ordinarily, in the matter of law and order situation, it is for
the high level authorities, who have been empowered by the government and by the
provisions of law, to take action and decide what is to be done about it and the CM
would only review the situation and the action taken. As the power to deal with law
and order situation is vested in the District Magistrate and the police authorities under
various provisions of law, the CM does not give any direction in that behalf to the
police administration. He would only review the situation to keep himself informed
and express his anxiety to see that normalcy is restored at the earliest. He would not
give any direction to take or not to take any particular action. He may take other
measures or other steps like meeting community leaders, issuing press statements and
giving interviews to the media and television, etc. for seeing that the normalcy is
restored at the earliest.
57 As regards the policy and procedure followed by the Government for effecting
transfers of Police Officers in charge of administration of the districts, he stated that
for transfers of senior Police Officers of the rank of Dy.S.P. onwards a note is
prepared by the Home Department. In routine course such a note would be prepared
once or twice in a year for major transfers. Such notes are prepared in advance and the
same then goes to G.A.D. and then to the Chief Secretary and then MOH and then it is
lastly placed before the Chief Minister. The Transfers also become necessary because
of promotions, vacancies and return of officers from their training or deputation.
65
58 As regards the Government‟s response to a „bandh‟ call given by a political party, he
stated that if the „bandh‟ call is likely to have effect of disturbing law and order
situation, then ordinarily the high ranking Police Officer would make an appeal for
keeping peace and in a grave situation even the Chief Minister himself would make
such an appeal. As per his knowledge DGP had made an appeal on 27th night through
TV to the public to maintain peace. Usually a discussion for dealing with the „bandh‟
and the situation arising therefrom takes place among the highest Police Officers as
these matters are ordinarily dealt with by the Police Authorities independently as they
are in charge of maintaining law and order. In districts, the District Magistrate would
also be involved in maintaining law and order during such occasions.
59 Shri K.Kailashnathan produced original register containing the messages received by
CMO on 28.2.2002 in respect of the incidents which happened in the city of
Ahmedabad on that day. He also produced a xerox copy of the entries made on
28.2.2002 in that register and one typed copy of the extract of the register of
28.2.2002. After referring to the register, he stated that only two messages were
received from Additional DGP on that day. They were possibly from IB. One message
was in respect of the activities concerning Dalits and another was a report relating to
Vadodara. No other message was received on that day from Addl. DGP IB or his
office. Apart from fax messages there was no other mode of receiving messages in the
office of the CM except through the post and by telephone.
60 As regards Communal Riot Scheme, he stated that there is no scheme prepared by the
State Government for the whole State for dealing with communal riots. However, the
State Government has given directions from time to time through Government
Resolutions as regards how to deal with communal riots. Pursuant to those directions
comprehensive plans called Communal Riots Scheme is prepared by Police
Commissionerates and Districts. Broadly speaking they contain instructions regarding
what should be done when a situation like communal riot develops within their
districts. They also contain instruction to maintain information about sensitive areas in
the district, information about anti social and communal minded persons in areas of
each Police Station, information about availability of police personnel and information
about members of peace committees. No instructions are required to be given by the
State Government for implementing the communal riot scheme which is some times
66
also described as „Bandobast Scheme‟ and the District Authorities have to use their
own discretion for implementing the scheme. He further stated that even though it was
not necessary to give instructions to the concerned authorities, considering the
situation, the Chief Secretary had on 1.3.2002 by a letter to all Commissioners of
Police and District Superintendents of Police and District Magistrates directed them to
take effective action including putting into action the communal riot schemes. Another
fax message was sent to all concerned by the Home Department for maintenance of
public order, peace and tranquility. In that message it was specifically stated that
communal riot scheme should be implemented immediately by the respective Districts
and Police Commissionerates.
61 While explaining the procedure which is generally followed for calling Army and
Central Para Military forces, he stated that only when the State finds that the local
police and Central Reserved Police and BSF are not adequate to deal with the
situation, a decision is taken to call the Army. For that purpose the State Government
has to make a request to the Central Government (Ministry of Defence and Ministry of
Home Affairs). If the time is very short then the District Magistrate can also in certain
circumstances requisition the help of Army. Before the Army can be deployed at
different locations they are required to be provided with logistic support like help of
District Magistrates, vehicles, maps etc. Thereafter in consultation with the local
police heads the army is deployed at the required places. He then stated that inquiries
were made regarding availability of Army at Ahmedabad and Gandhingar on 27th late
evening and 28th morning. The State Government was informed that the Army was
not available at the Head Quarter as it was deployed in the forward/border areas. A
formal request for making the Army available was made to the Central Government on
28th after-noon. The Chief Minister had spoken to the Union Home Minister for
making the Army available as the decision was required to be taken at the highest
level for withdrawing the Army from the Boarder area. A formal request was also
made by the Chief Secretary to the Defence Secretary. For bringing the Army to
Ahmedabad 40 Aircrafts were put into service and the Army had started arriving from
the midnight of 28th
. The last Aircraft had arrived at Ahmedabad on 1.3.2002 by about
11.00 hours. As the Army was airlifted in this manner, they did not have sufficient
vehicles of their own. Therefore, the District Administration had to requisition 131
67
vehicles for their use. He also stated that the deployment of Army commenced in the
morning and by 11.00 hours on 1.3.2002 Army started reaching some of the affected
areas in the city. After referring to the details of deployment of Army given in the
affidavit of Shri Chittaranjan, DG & IGP, he stated that at the peak of deployment,
there were 26 Army columns in the State.
62 Shri P. K. Parmar, Revenue Secretary has in his statement given details regarding the
financial assistance given to the persons who had suffered during the riots. Shri Harish
Muliyana, Shri Chandana, Shri Harisinh Gohil and Shri P. P. Pandey have filed
affidavits regarding the CDs which were obtained by Shri Rahul Sharma while he was
in Crime Branch of Ahmedabad City and the CDs which were produced by him before
the Commission. What they have stated is fully dealt with in Volume 9 while
recording a finding in that behalf. The Other Material consists of about 9000 pages
which were received from the SIT. They are the statements recorded by SIT during
investigation of the Gulbarg Society case, Naroda Patiya case and Naroda Gam case.
More than 45000 affidavits/statements were filed pursuant to the notification issued by
this Commission. Their details are not mentioned as most of them are stereotype
affidavits/statements and what they contain is already stated in earlier Volumes while
dealing with incidents districtwise.
Sr.
No
.C
ity/D
istr
ict
Dt.
01
/03
/02
Dt.
02
/03
/02
Dt.
03
/03
/02
Dt.
04
/03
/02
Dt.
05
/03
/02
Dt.
06
/03
/02
Dt.
07
/03
/02
Dt.
08
/03
/02
Dt.
09
/03
/02
Dt.
10
/03
/02
1A
hm
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21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
2
2V
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dar
a C
ity
33
33
33
33
33
3S
ura
t3
33
33
33
3
4R
ajko
t2
22
22
22
22
5G
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44
44
44
44
44
6B
hav
nag
ar2
22
22
22
2
7V
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l
To
tal:
-1
92
12
62
62
62
62
62
62
62
6
Cit
y/D
istr
ict
Dt.
11
/03
/02
Dt.
12
/03
/02
Dt.
13
/03
/02
Dt.
14
/03
/02
Dt.
15
/03
/02
Dt.
16
/03
/02
Dt.
17
/03
/02
Dt.
18
/03
/02
Dt.
19
/03
/02
Dt.
20
/03
/02
1A
hm
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2V
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dar
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ity
3S
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5G
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55
55
55
55
55
6B
hav
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ar
7V
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l 1
11
11
1
To
tal:
-5
55
56
66
66
6
Cit
y/D
istr
ict
Dt.
21
/03
/02
Dt.
22
/03
/02
Dt.
23
/03
/02
Dt.
24
/03
/02
Dt.
25
/03
/02
Dt.
26
/03
/02
Dt.
27
/03
/02
Dt.
28
/03
/02
Dt.
29
/03
/02
Dt.
30
/03
/02
1A
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2V
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a C
ity
3S
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t
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55
55
55
55
55
6B
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7V
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11
11
11
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1
To
tal:
-6
66
66
66
66
6
Annex
ure
- 1
Sta
tem
ent
Show
ing A
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Dep
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ent
69
Cit
y/D
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/03
/02
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11
To
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-6
66
70
Annexure – 2
The following are some of the instances in brief wherein Police have intervened and
rescued people:
1. On 28-2-2002 in the Meghaninagar area of Ahmedabad town, 150 to 180 Muslims
were rescued by effective Police action in the face of violent mob of 2000 people.
2. On 28-2-2002, at Naroda a part of Ahmedabad town, Police was able to save 5000
persons who were attacked by violent mob of 15000 people.
3. On 1-3-2002 in the incident of village Sardarpur in Mehsana district, the Police was
able to rescue 40 Muslims from burning houses and remove 200 threatened Muslims
to safer places.
4. On 2-3-2002 in Por Village of Gandhinagar district, 350 Muslims were saved and they
were removed in vehicles to a safe place in Adalaj village.
5. On 3-3-2002, in village Ramesara of Panchmahals district, 34 Andhra Muslims were
rescued and dispatched to Hyderabad.
6. On 3-3-2002, in Vadodara town, a bomb was thrown near a Mosque which was
removed in time and the Mosque was saved.
7. On 3-3-2002, in Mora village of Panchmahals district, 365 Muslims were saved by
timely action.
8. On 3-3-2002, in Arol village of Panchmahals district, about 60 to 70 Muslims were
rescued and removed to safe places.
9. On 4-3-2002, in 28 villages of Dahod district, around 2000 Muslims were rescued and
they were brought to Dahod. When there was fresh action and threat at Dahod, they
were shifted to Banswara and Dimgarwada in Rajasthan.
10. On 3-3-2002, in Vadodara town, 1500 Muslims were rescued and shifted to Banswara
district of Rajasthan.
11. On 3-3-2002, in Dahod 20 Hindus were rescued from Randikpur village and sent to
safe places in Limkheda.
12. On getting message from ex-Chief Minister of Bihar, one Muslim family was shifted
from Dahod to a safe place.
13. In Asoj village, of Baroda district, 40 Muslims including 22 children were saved and
rescued to Baroda town.
14. On 3-3-2002, in Mehmdabad town, 7 Muslims were saved and shifted to safer place.
15. On 2-3-2002 in Sasan village of Banaskantha district, 305 Muslims were saved and
shifted to safer places and given police protection.
16. On 3-3-2002, a Mosque was saved in Baroda town which would have exploded on
account of a bomb planted there which was detected by an alert constable.
17. On 2-3-2002 a violent mob tried to damage a Madarsa known as Darul Ulun in
Bhavnagar by act of arson. The Police did timely firing and dispersed the mob and the
mosque was saved.
18. On 4-3-2002, in Valia village of Panchmahals district, 13 persons of minority
community who were trapped were shifted to Godhra at a safe place.
71
19. On 4-3-2002 in Ladpur village of Panchmahals district, 12 Muslims were trapped but
were rescued by timely action of Police and shifted to a safer place in Devgadh
Bariya.
20. On 4-3-2002 in Ojadwa village of Panchmahals district, persons of minority
community were rescued and were shifted to Godhra in a vehicle.
21. On 4-3-2002 in Rameshwar village of Panchmahals district, Muslims belonging to
Hyderabad were trapped but were rescued by timely action of Police and sent to
Hyderabad by plane.
22. On 3-3-2002 in Iral village, 70 persons of the minority community were saved and
shifted to a safe place.
23. On 3-3-2002, in Santalwada village, persons of the minority community were saved
gheroed by a violent mob, but due to timely Police and Army action, the mob was
dispersed and the trapped persons shifted to safe place.
24. On the night of 3-3-2002, 1500 Muslims were saved and rescued and sent to
Banswara in Rajasthan.
25. In Oganwa village of Panchmahals, 109 Muslims were shifted to Godhra to a safe
place.
26. In Mavasa village in Panchmahals district, 65 threatened Muslims were saved and sent
to safe place.
27. In village Shivajipura of Halol Taluka, 14 persons were saved and shifted to safe
place by swift Police and Army action.
72
ANNEXURE-3
CRASH WIRELESS MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
TO :- ALL COMMISSIONERS OF POLICE.
ALL RANGE IGPS. ALL DISTRATES.
ALL DISPOLS, WESTPOL, BARODA.
INFO. :- DG & IGP, GANDHINAGAR. (GBHD)
DGP (INT), GANDHINAGAR. (GBHD)
FROM :- HOMESEC, GANDHINAGAR.
NO. :- SB.I/LAO/102002/361 Date :- 27 / 2 / 2002
It is learnt that Vishva Hindu Parishad has given a call for “Gujarat Bandh” on 28.2.2002 in
protest against the incident of attacking on/ burning the train “Sabarmati Express” today in the
morning near Godhra Railway Station resulting into death of passengers(.) In view of the
fragile Communal situation it is requested that strict vigil should be maintained especially in
communally sensitive areas as well as the places which have witnessed communal violence (.)
All precautionary measures including adequate police bandobast and preventing measures
including issuance of prohibitory orders depending upon local situation should also be
taken(.) Anti-socials and hardcore communal elements bent upon to jeopardize communal
harmony must be belt with firmly (.) When the dead bodies of the passengers arrive at the
native places, it is likely that communal tension may perhaps arise (.) Therefore, enhanced
bandobast should be arranged including during funeral ceremonies of deceased (.) Peace and
communal harmony should be maintained at any cost (.) All C.Ps/DMs/S.Ps should remain
present in headquarter and closely monitor the situation (.) Adverse development, if any, must
be reported to Homesec/Addl. Secretary (L&O) on telephone followed on factual report on
FAX (.)
(P.S. SHAH)
Addl. Secretary To Government,
Home Department (Spl.)
73
ANNEXURE-3(A)
CRASH WIRELESS MESSAGE
TO :- ALL C.PS, ALL D.MS.
ALL S.PS, (INCLUDING S.P. WESTERN RLY.,
VADODARA).
INFO. :- POLICE, GANDHINAGAR.
ADDL.D.G. (INT), GANDHINAGAR.
ALL RANGE IGPs,
FROM :- HOMESEC, GANDHINAGAR.
NO. :- SBII/COM/102002/496 DATE : 28.2.2002
IN VIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT ON ACCOUNT OF TODAY‟S GUJARAT BANDH,
YOU ARE DIRECTED TO ROUND UP ANTI SOCIAL AND KNOWN COMMUNAL
ELEMENTS UNDER THE PREVENTIVE LAWS (.) MOBILE PATROLLING SHOULD
BE INTENSIFIED AND ADEQUATE BANDOBAST MUST BE ARRANGED AT
SENSITIVE AREAS AND PLACES WHICH HAVE WITNESSED VIOLENCE (.)
ADEQUATE PROTECTION SHOULD ALSO BE PROVIDED TO PLACES OF WORSHIP
(.) EFFECTIVE ACTION SHOULD PROMPTLY BE TAKEN TO DISPERSE UNRULY
MOBS /UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLIES (.) ELEMENTS INDULGING IN VIOLENCE AND
BENT UPON TO JEOPARDIZE COMMUNAL HARMANY MUST BE DEALT WITH
FIRMLY (.) NO STONE SHOULD REMAIN UNTURNED FOR MAINTENANCE OF
PEACE AND TRANQUILITY (.)
(P.S. SHAH)
ADDL. SECRETARY TO
GOVERNMENT,
HOME DEPARTMENT (SPL.)
74
ANNEXURE-3(B)
FAX MESSAGE
TO :- Addl. D.G. INT, Gandhinagar
INFO. :- Police GANDHINAGAR
FROM :- HOMESEC, Gandhinagar.
NO. :- SB II/ COM/ 102002/ 496 Date 28 / 02 / 2002
Now the Haji Pilgrims of the State will be returning to the state. In the present scenario, you
are requested to get the details of their arrivals from the entry point i.e. Airport and instruct
the concern officer for the security to avoid any untoward incident.
Section Officer ( Spl.)
Home Department
75
ANNEXURE-3(C)
WIRELESS MESSAGE
FROM :- CHIEF SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF GUJARAT.
TO :- POLICE COMMISSIONERS
DISTRICT MAGISTRATES
INFO. :- S.Ps including WESTPOL VADODARA.
POLICE GANDHINAGAR.
ADDL. DG. (INT.) GANDHINAGAR/ ALL RANGE IGPs.
NO. :- SBII/COM/102002/496 DATED 1.3.2002.
Home Department has already issued Crash Message including the last message No.
SBII/COM/102002 dated 1.3.2002, directing you to control the situation very effectively and
to take all steps including the implementation of Communal Riot Scheme. As you know, in a
communal outbreak, the District administration and the Police have to act in a decisive,
prompt and effective manner to bring the situation under control. Do not, repeat do not,
hesitate to use whatever force necessary for bringing the situation under control. When lives
and properties are threatened in a communal situation, necessary force including firing have
to be resorted to for bringing the situation under control. If the situation deteriorates beyond a
point, besides imposing curfew, you should also issue „shoot at sight‟ orders and prevent
collection of unlawful mobs in public places.
Kindly acknowledge receipt of this communication and make sure that no major
incidents take place within your jurisdiction.
(G. SUBBA RAO)
Chief Secretary.
76
ANNEXURE-3(D)
CRASH WIRELESS FAX MESSAGE
CONFIDENTIAL
TO :- ALL COMMISSIONERS OF POLICE.
ALL RANGE IGPS.
ALL DISTRATES.
ALL DISPOLS
WESTPOL, BARODA.
INFO. :- DG & IGP, GANDHINAGAR. (GBHD)
ADDL. DGP (INT), GANDHINAGAR. (GBHD)
FROM :- HOMESEC, GANDHINAGAR.
NO. :- SB.II/ COM/ 102002/ , Date :- 1 / 3 / 2002.
In view of prevalent surcharged and tense atmosphere, direction given by the Home
Department time and again for maintenance of public order peace and frequently should be
implemented (.) Following salient features should be kept in mind and put in to action
immediately (.)
1. Communal riots schemes for the respected districts/cities must be implemented (.)
2. Revised guidelines given by Government of India to promote communal harmony which
was circulated under Home Department letter No. SBII/COM/1097/GOI/295 dated
30.10.1998 must be implemented strictly and effectively (.)
3. Close vigil must be kept on the activities of anti social and communal minded elements
and they should be rounded up under preventive laws (.)
4. Prompt and effective action must be taken against hard core communal elements bent
upon to jeopardize communal harmony (.)
5. Special attention must be paid to communal sensitive areas especially the places which
have witnessed communal violence (.)
6. Bandobast should be tightened and mobile as well as foot patrolling should be intensified
especially in affected areas (.)
7. Any attempt to jeopardize tranquility peace and public order must be nipped in bud (.)
77
ANNEXURE-3(E)
8. All necessary precautionary as well as preventive measure must be taken depending upon
local situation (.)
9. Effective action should be taken to disperse unruly mobs and unlawful assemblies (.)
10. Meetings of peace committee/Ekkta committee and Mohlla committee should also be held
(.)
11. Tense situation, if any must be defuse by taking appropriate measures and involving
prominent members of both community as well as social leaders (.)
12. Last but note the least, curfew imposed in the cities/towns concerned should be strictly
implemented (.)
( J. R. Rajput )
UNDER SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,
HOME DEPARTMENT (SPL)
78
ANNEXURE-3(F)
CRASH WIRELESS MESSAGE
TO :- ALL POLICE COMMISSIONERS.
ALL DISTRICT MAGISTRATES.
ALL S.P.s including WESTPOL VADODARA
.
INFO. :- POLICE GANDHINAGAR.
ADDL. DG (INT), GANDHINAGAR/ ALL RANGE IGPs.
FROM :- HOMESEC, GANDHINAGAR.
NO. :- SBII/COM/102002/496 DATED 2.3.2002
Since the morning of 2nd
March, 2002, some instances of attack on life and property in
villages have been reported (.) It is therefore necessary that sufficient police patrolling is
organized to cover villages where particular community may be in small number and isolated
(.) Steps to prevent entry of antisocial elements from outside the state or from large cities into
rural areas must be taken in the form of Nakabandhi (.) Peace Committee meetings should be
held at Taluka level also to ensure that social leaders in rural areas are also sensitized for the
need to keep peace (.) Telephonic contact should be maintained with villagers by the Police
Station in rural areas to obtain information quickly and act accordingly (.) Available forces
should be deployed suitably to meet developing situation (.) Sufficient mobility should be
maintained by local officers as well as forces placed at your disposal (.)
(P.S. SHAH)
Addl. Secretary (Law & Order)
Home Department.
79
ANNEXURE- 3(G)
CRASH WIRELESS MESSAGE
FROM :- HOMSEC, GANDHINAGAR.
TO :- POLICE COMMISSIONERS.
DISTRICT MAGISTRATES.
S.P.s including WESTPOL VADODARA
.
INFO. :- POLICE GANDHINAGAR.
ADDL. DG (INT), GANDHINAGAR/ ALL RANGE IGPs.
NO. :- SBII/COM/102002/496 DATED 2.3.2002
Prevalent surcharged communal atmosphere in parts of Gujarat has been largely
contained and normalcy is now being restored gradually (.) Along with the duties of
maintenance of law and order, the process of healing, building confidence amongst the
people, defusing tension and promoting communal harmony, requires to be geared up
immediately by the district administration (.) For achieving this purpose, the District/ City
Ekta Committee, Peace Committees and Mohalla Committees should be activated and
arrangements for holding their meetings should immediately be made (.) Prominent members
of all communities, social leaders and NGOs should also be involved in the process (.) Report
compliance by 4th
March, 2002 (.)
(J. R.Rajput)
Under Secretary (Special)
Home Department.
80
ANNEXURE-3(H)
CRASH WIRELESS MESSAGE
TO :- ALL DISTRATES, ALL CPS
FROM :- HOMESEC
INFO. :- DG&IGP, DG (INT), ALL SPS, ALL DDOS
NO. :- SBII/COM/102002/496 DATE : 04/03/2002.
THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED
FORTHWITH (.) RUMOUR MONGERING SHOULD BE DEALT WITH STRICTLY AND
IN AN EXEMPLARY MANNER (.) DISTRICT/ CITY PEACE COMMITTEES BE
ACTIVATED TO ASSIST IN RESTORING PEACE (.) PEACE COMMITTEES AT
TALUKA LEVELS AND IN ALL VILLAGES SHOULD ALSO BE HELD (.) HON.CM
HAS INSTRUCTED THAT „SHANTHI KOOCH” SHOULD BE HELD IN VILLAGES (.)
SUCH PEACE MARCH CAN BE ARRANGED LOOKING TO THE LOCAL SITUATION
(.) ARRANGEMENTS FOR OBTAINING INFORMATION FROM VILLAGES SHOULD
BE OUT INTO PLACE (,) ALL CLASS I AND II OFFICERS OF REVENUE AND
PANCHAYAT SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO VISIT THE VILLAGES AT LEAST
TWICE A WEEK AND ENSURE PRESENCE OF ALL VILLAGE LEVEL OFFICIALS (.)
LIST OF TELEPHONE NUMBERS IN VILLAGES SHOULD BE OBTAINED AND USED
(.) TALATIS AND PRIMARY SCHOOL TEACHERS SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO
STAY IN THEIR RESPECTIVE PLACES OF DUTY AND KEEP IN TOUCH WITH
VILLAGE LEADERS AND SENSITIVE THEM FOR THE NEED TO KEEP PEACE IN
THEIR VILLAGE (.) END OF MESSAGE (.)
(Ashok Narayan)
Addl. Chief Secretary
Home Department
81
ANNEXURE-3(I)
CRASH WIRELESS MESSAGE
TO :- ALL DISTRATES
ALL COMMISSIONERS OF POLICE
ALL SUPERINTENDENTS OF POLICE
FROM :- HOMESEC, GANDHINAGAR.
NO. :- SB.II/COM/102002/584 Date :- 04 / 03 / 2002.
The State Government in Home Department has already issued instructions vide a
Crash Message dated 02.03.2002 regarding convening meeting of Peace Committees at
District/Taluka/Village levels in respect to the current disturbed situation prevailing in the
State. Additional instruction in this regard are as follows :
1. To convene the meetings of Peace Committees immediately.
2. To ensure participation of individuals from every community in these meetings
especially at village level to enable themselves to express unity and solidarity for
the safety of everybody.
3. To hold “Peace March” in all the villages after viewing the local situation.
You are, further requested to make efforts together with the active involvement of
Revenue / Development machinery and ensure that the steps taken, as per the above
instructions and as per the instructions issued in the Crash Message dated 02.03.2002, are
documented with the help of either Videography or Photography and send the same to this
department, in due course.
You are further requested to adhere to the instruction and ensure their implementation.
(PRAKASH SHAH)
Additional Secretary to
Government,
Home Department (L&O).
82
