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Egypt at the crossroad A new “Spring” or a deeper Fall. The Muslim Brotherhood's
challenges and transformations in Foreign Policy
Written By Valentina Cantori e Anita Nappo
May 2016
Report No
05
Copyright© 2016 by Mediterranean Affairs
This Paper must not be reproduced in any form without permission in
writing form the publisher.
Updated at May 5, 2016
All statements of fact, opinion, or analyses expressed are those of the
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Summary
Abstract ......................................................................................4
Between Repression and Violence: The Transformation of the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Future of Egypt ........8
Introduction ................................................................................8
From Palace to Prison: Old Stories and New Twists. .............10
The Dynamics of Repression and Violence ..............................21
Conclusions ..............................................................................31
Is Egypt still a necessary evil? Egyptian regional stance and
its external projection ................................................................35
Introduction ..............................................................................36
Gulf buddies and political advisors .........................................39
Money talks, EU conditionality walks .....................................47
Saudi shuffle and French connection: final remarks ...............57
References (part 1) .....................................................................60
References (part 2) .....................................................................63
About the Authors ......................................................................65
Egypt at the crossroad
4
Egypt at the crossroad
A new “Spring” or a deeper Fall. The Muslim
Brotherhood's challenges and transformations in
Foreign Policy
Abstract
Over the past two months, the major newspapers of the world have
devoted particular attention to one of the cornerstones on which
General al-Sisi’s regime in Egypt is founded: the repression of civil
society. Following Giulio Regeni’s death, denunciations have been
raised against the regime’s crackdown on human rights activists,
journalists, and civil society members who are considered a threat to
the stability of the country’s political order. Arbitrary arrests,
marginalization of the opposition, limits to personal liberties, mass
trials, unjustified imprisonments are everyday life experiences for
everyone living on the Egyptian soil. Although much international
attention is being paid to the liberal spectrum of the oppressed
Egyptian society, the Muslim Brotherhood has largely been the group
that has suffered the most from the regime’s crackdown on
oppositions after the coup of July 2013. In the present analysis, the
complex relations between regime’s repression and opposition’s
violence will be investigated, trying to shed light on both Muslim
Brotherhood’s organizational and ideological transformations, and on
the role played by institutionalized regime repression in the name of
security at domestic level and its consequences in shaping Islamist
May 2016
5
flexible ideology. Drawing from the theoretical contributions provided
by Mohammed M. Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz (2013) and
starting from the well-established assumption of the extreme flexibility
by which Islamist ideology seems to be characterized, we will argue in
favor of a psychosocial analysis of Islamist violence, focusing on the
socio-economic and political dynamics that are molding MB’s
organizational changes, providing a theoretical framework that will
enable us to make some predictions over the future developments of
Egyptian domestic policy.
This paper will be divided into two main sections. The first one will
offer an historical overview on the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly
focusing on two main issues. On the one hand, attention will be paid
to the organizational characteristics of the group in order to provide
solid bases for a full understanding of the dynamics of internal change
taking place in these days. On the other, stress will be put on the
ideology of the MB and the foundational texts, showing how
contextual factors have determined profound ideological shifts in the
organization’s political stance, thus arguing in favor of a non-
essentialist and deterministic approach to the study of Islamist
religious ideologies. The second part will thoroughly investigate the
complex dynamics between repression and violence, making reference
to Hafez and Wiktorowicz’ model on political violence as contention
in order to predict future possible developments of the organization.
In addition, following el-Sherif’s predictions on the future of the
Muslim Botherhood in Egypt in a changed “political opportunity
Egypt at the crossroad
6
structure” (2014), we will evaluate the plausibility of its predictions to
better understand the unfolding of the political scenario with dramatic
consequences within and outside the organization. The report will also
go through an analysis of Egyptian role in the region and the elements
featuring the policy-making process in foreign affairs.
The label of “necessary evil” has been stuck on Egyptian
establishment as of the wake of the second revolutionary wave which
upturned the Brotherhood regime in 2013 and led to the power
General and President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi and his entourage through
what under the political lens could be defined a coup. Many scholars
and analysts assumed that Egypt operated a comeback on the regional
stage in 2014 due to the regional constant upheaval, especially after the
critical collapse on the Country’s Eastern border. Although, its
domestic policy seems to be facing more setback, expressly in the
socio-economic sector.
According to the “doingbusiness” and economic analysis sheets of
the World Bank, besides any remark from the international institutions
and institutes working in the field, Egypt does not score high in the
indicators valuing the environment where to start business and
investments, as to make them thrive. The main claim points out the
insufficiency of the efforts taken so far by the government to put in
place the needed reforms in the deteriorating social and economic
sector.
May 2016
7
Being that said, it may be interesting to investigate the roots of the
Saudi and French interest manifestly shown in the last months in
investing in Egypt.
“Why necessary, why evil?” Aimed to answer to these questions, the
analysis will take the stock of the economic and political features of
Egyptian relations with the Gulf Countries, first. Further, the EU-
Egyptian relations will be investigated under two different lenses.
From a side the EU will be presented as a single actor endowed with
innovative instruments deployed to pursue European external action
objectives. Nevertheless, this unique EU guise will be depicted as the
complex product of the decisions taken at national level by the
member states. It will be noted how the member states increasingly
tend to take divergent decisions from the EU common policy in the
last five-year period, especially with the Egypt lead by general al-Sisi
within the post-revolutionary Middle East. This work should provide
the reader with the tools to understand how these international
economic and political relations are the key to read the liquid regional
alliance system.
Egypt at the crossroad
8
Between Repression and Violence
The Transformation of the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood and the Future of Egypt
Valentina Cantori
Introduction
Over the past two months, the major newspapers of the world have
devoted particular attention to one of the founding cornerstones of
General al-Sisi’s regime in Egypt: the repression of civil society.
Following Giulio Regeni’s death, denunciations have been raised
against the regime’s crackdown on human rights activists, journalists,
and civil society members who are considered a threat to the stability
of the country’s political order. Arbitrary arrests, marginalization of
the opposition, limits to personal liberties, mass trials, unjustified
imprisonments are everyday life experiences for everyone living on
Egyptian soil. Although much international attention is being paid to
the liberal spectrum of the oppressed Egyptian society, the Muslim
Brotherhood has largely been the group that has suffered the most
from the regime’s crackdown on oppositions after the coup of July
2013.
May 2016
9
In the present analysis, the complex relations between the regime’s
repression and the opposition’s violence will be investigated, trying to
shed light on both Muslim Brotherhood’s (MB hereafter)
organizational and ideological transformations, and the role played by
institutionalized regime repression in the name of security at domestic
level and its consequences in shaping Islamist flexible ideology.
Drawing from the theoretical contributions provided by Mohammed
M. Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz (2013) and starting from the well-
established assumption of the extreme flexibility by which Islamist
ideology seems to be characterized, we will argue in favor of a
contextual analysis of Islamist violence, focusing on the socio-
economic and political dynamics that are molding the MB’s
organizational changes, providing a theoretical framework that will
enable us to make some predictions over the future developments of
Egyptian domestic policy.
This paper will be divided into two main sections. The first one will
offer an historical overview on the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly
focusing on two main issues. On the one hand, attention will be paid
to the organizational characteristics of the group in order to provide
solid bases for a full understanding of the dynamics of internal change
taking place in these days. On the other, stress will be put on the
ideology of the MB and the foundational texts, showing how
contextual factors have determined profound ideological shifts in the
organization’s political stance, thus arguing in favor of a non-
essentialist and deterministic approach to the study of Islamist
Egypt at the crossroad
10
religious ideologies. The second part will concentrate on the analysis
of the complex intertwining of repression and violence, closely
investigating the recent generational split in the organization as a
consequence of regime’s harsh repression on the movement’s old
guard. Taking into account the “political opportunity structure” to
which the MB is exposed, we will analyze the two dimensions of the
accessibility to the institutional system and the nature of state
repression to predict the possible future role of the MB in Egyptian
domestic developments.
From Palace to Prison: Old Stories and New Twists.
The mission of the Muslim Brotherhood, as first outlined by the
founder of the group, Hasan al-Banna, in 1928, has traditionally been
centered on a gradual reformation of Egyptian society along religious
lines, which would naturally achieve the ultimate aim of creating a
“true” Islamic State. In Hasan al-Banna’s own words, the minhaj (path,
way) of the group is grounded in the idea that “Islam is an all-
embracing concept which regulates every aspect of life, adjudicating
on every one its concerns and prescribing for it a solid and rigorous
order.”1 The kind of religious ideology theorized by the father of the
most widespread Islamist organization in the Muslim world is still at
the heart of the MB’s course of action today. As a matter of fact, the
great degree of generalization of Hasan al-Banna’s statements is
1 Wendell, C. (1978), Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949). A Selection from the Majmu’at Rasa’il al-Imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna, Berkley, CA: University of California Press.
May 2016
11
responsible for both the peculiar
ideological flexibility that seems to
characterize the movement and for its
long-lasting history, which is in itself a
consequence of its extreme ideological
adaptability.
As Wickham pointed out in her
recent work (2013),2 Islamist
organizations in general, and the MB
in particular, should not be analytically
considered as unitary actors, uniform in their ideological stance, but,
rather, as made up of different and diverging factions among which
only one has the upper hand at different historical moments. As
asserted by Ibrahim al-Hudaiby (2013), ideological differences have
always been present among MB’s cadres; on the one hand, Qutbists,
even if following a demilitarized approach, focused on the need to
empower the organization and create a vanguard that could bring
about revolutionary change. On the other hand, a more Salafi trend
developed, focusing on social issues rather that political ones, whose
name (Salafi) derived from the tendency of traditional Salafism to
refrain from taking active part in the country’s political life. Anyway, it
is hard to build analytically sound and close-bounded definitions in
which to classify the various ideological views inside the MB,
especially as a consequence the proliferation of ideological differences
Hasan Al-Banna
Source: wikipedia
Egypt at the crossroad
12
after the 2011 revolution. Hence, rather than investigating the group
in essentialist terms, it is fundamental to look at it as a living organism
perpetually adapting to the political opportunity structure and to the
macro-historical frame in which it is required to act. These analytical
premises are crucial in investigating both MB’s history and in
forecasting their future role in the Egyptian domestic environment.
Starting from these assumptions, it is easy, then, to understand why
MB has been portrayed sometimes as a moderate and nonviolent
group while other times as a violent non-jihadi actor, in opposition to
violent jihadi organizations like Jihadi Salafism (Awad and Hashem,
2015). In the present analysis, we will avoid using misleading
categorizations that do not pay tribute to the complexity of the
movement itself, which, furthermore, is currently undergoing major
transformations due to an organizational and generational
restructuring whose causes will be deeply analyzed in the second
section hereafter. Looking at the MB as a dynamic and internally
differentiated movement, whose boundaries with other Islamist
groups are not as clear cut as is usually thought, helps us trace its
historical development from a highly structured movement in which
daily control on individual members’ life was exerted, to one where
the rigid hierarchical structure, much praised by al-Banna himself for
whom deep faith, precise organization and uninterrupted work were
the core elements of MB’s mission (Wendell, 1978: 33), is being
eroded by both endogenous and exogenous factors that will ultimately
May 2016
13
be decisive in determining the future of the organization itself in
Egypt.
In addition, it is worth noticing that it is not the first time in history
that the MB experiences a radical ideological shift which is a
consequence of the changed institutional environment in which they
are to operate, proving the fact that often ideological declarations are
more the effect of exogenous situation than the predictor of individual
or group behavior. As Mona El-Ghobashi asserted (2005), a huge
organizational transformation already involved the group starting from
the 1980s. In those years, the MB embraced electoral politicking, at
least initially ideologically so, even if not through the direct
establishment of an autonomous political party, given the law
preventing the formation of political parties based on religion. As
Caryle Murphy wrote, “The Egyptian government sent a message to
its moderate Islamist opposition: The ballot box is a narrow gate
though which you will not pass as long as we are in charge” (2002:
150). Indeed, the first appearance of MB-affiliated candidates was in
1984, when the group negotiated an alliance with al-Wafd party,
winning seats in parliament, even if the collaboration was later
thwarted by the restrictive nature of parliamentary rules. Nevertheless,
the 1984 elections “established the Ikhwan as a leading political
contestant, striking electoral alliances in both Parliament and the
professional unions and joining the opposition in extraparliamentary
coalitions for reform” (El-Ghobashi, 2005: 378).
Egypt at the crossroad
14
The issue of participation in democratic elections has been highly
debated by scholars in the field due to both the seemingly radical
ideological shift from past positions and to the hoped benefits of
participation when “victory is not an option” in semi-authoritarian
states (to quote Nathan Brown’s famous book title). The kind of
society that al-Banna founded and that later thinkers helped (re-
)shaping, like Sayyid Qutb and Salman al-Farag, is a religious-based
organization that traditionally refused the implementation of a
coercive decision-making process as a viable path to the resurrection
of the umma, the righteous Muslim society of good believers, whose
establishment was deemed to be the conditio sine qua non for the
creation of an Islamic State following the Prophet’s model. This is the
reason why, since the beginning, Muslim Brothers focused on
reaching out directly to people, in the street, in the neighborhood, at
work, creating strong grassroots networks, first in the countryside and
then in urban areas, but not directly taking part in political life,
something that, in al-Banna’s view, should be postponed for when
society would have been re-Islamized (Kandil, 2015). Of a different
opinion were Saiyyd Qutb and Salman al-Farag who called for a kind
of revolutionary Islam directly challenging the institutional
organization of the (apostate) Egyptian state. Useless to say, they
belonged to a different generation from that of al-Banna and to a
different historical period during which the MB was being heavily
persecuted by Nasser’s regime (the former) and Anwar al-Sadat (the
latter), leading up to the key question of the relationship between
institutionalized repression and levels of organization’s violence.
May 2016
15
Without delving too much into the manifold and complex historical
developments of the MB as an organization, an important
consideration is worth citing here before approaching more recent
times that will be the main focus of our analysis. As we have seen,
exogenous factors play a pivotal role in determining Muslim Brothers’
either legal, political behavior, or absence thereof, or recourse, instead,
to various forms of violence (either jihadi or non-jihadi oriented). This
was the case, for example, in determining the radical shift in (a sector
of) the MB after the harsh repression of the 1960s or when younger
generations of Muslim Brothers turned to electoral politics as a means
to achieve their organizational goals, becoming “irrevocably
transformed into a flexible political party that is highly responsive to
the unforgiving calculus of electoral politics” (El-Ghobashi, 2005:
390). Without taking side on the much-debated and still unresolved
question concerning the extent to which ideology affects behavior or
behavior affects ideology, but arguing in favor of a comprehensive
Source: Ikhwanweb.com
Egypt at the crossroad
16
approach that could grasp the dialogical nature of the relationship
between the two, an analysis of the political opportunity structure will
shed lights on the violent turn of MB’s cadres after the July 2013 coup
by the Egyptian army, after a two-year period in which violence had
been almost completely abandoned in favor of political participation
in a pseudo-democratic system in which they conquered parliamentary
majority in the first democratic election in the country.
Indeed, after Egypt’s 2011 Revolution and with the coming to
power of the newly formed Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), there
have been “numerous splits and internal conflicts within the group”
(El-Houdaiby, 2013: 1). This appeared to be an inevitable occurrence
due to the fact that the organization moved from the periphery to the
center of power and was no more able to postpone fundamental
intellectual discussions. Previously, thanks to its role as an opposition
movement with no possibility to participate in a truly democratic
environment that could grant alternation to power, the MB leadership
managed to hide internal differentiation by turning to the concept of
dharura, “necessity” (El-Houdaiby, 2013), in the name of
organizational unity. Its coming to power, instead, brought to the
surface the many souls of the MB, which the old guard of the
movement could not control or tap anymore due to the radical
restructuring of the MB’s political positioning. Even tough the old
guard, the official face of the organization, tried to keep on playing the
card of identity politics in order to maintain organizational unity which
was deemed to be the crucial issue to be addressed, the new fervent
May 2016
17
political environment in which it was acting pushed for intellectual and
pragmatic issues to be dealt with, instead.
Interestingly enough, already during the first days of the 2011
Revolution the different souls of the MB and the generational divide
within it were both clearly visible to a careful observer. As reported by
Charles Sennot (2011), the divide between an old guard detached from
the rank-and-files of the movement and a younger generation
physically present in the squares and streets of Cairo became apparent.
Specifically, the main divergent issue was the attitude towards the
protests, fully embraced by the youth wing of the movement since the
very beginning, but only gradually acknowledged through a series of
subsequent communiqués by an old guard (El-Houdaiby, 2013)
initially prone to accept a dialogue with Mubarak’s regime. The 2011
Egyptian revolution has been the revolution of the youth under many
aspects, yet, the highly hierarchical and pyramidal organization
structure of the MB, which the old guard has been careful to preserve
and protect, brought to power exponents of a generation that grew up
to maturity in a historical period that saw the increasing participation
of the MB into a legal, democratic framework which, nevertheless, did
not grant them the possibility to win, thus leaving them anchored to
issues of identity politics rather than actual policy matters. That
historical period was characterized by the gradual shift in MB’s
ideology from a complete refusal of democracy as an alien and
imported Western system, unsuitable to thrive in Islamic societies, to
one not only perfectly in tune with Islamic principles, but prescribed
Egypt at the crossroad
18
and sanctioned by Islam itself (Wickham, 2013: 10), an idea fully
promoted in Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s theological position (Euben and
Zaman, 2009). The old guard, thus, conceived of their seizing of
power in much more gradual terms than the young cadres of the
group, which embraced more revolutionary ideas and, additionally,
were “better connected to the broader opposition movement and less
tied to identity politics” (El-Houdaiby, 2013: 5), as is clear from
Muhammad Abbas’ collaboration with the April 6th secular movement
in the organization of the January 25th revolt (Sennot, 2011).
The generational divide widening in the revolutionary days
remained problematic during the two years of presidency of
Muhammad Morsi, triggering a further diversion of attention to
identity politics by the part of the old leadership to preserve group
unity, instead of addressing fundamental political issues mainly
concerning the relationship between religion and state, the dialectic
2011 Revolution
Source: CNN
May 2016
19
between authenticity and modernity, and foreign policy matters (El-
Hudaiby, 2013), all issues the young cadres wanted to put under
intellectual scrutiny. Trying to figure out the possible future scenarios
of the MB’s government and the plausible organizational
transformations once the movement moved “from prison to palace” is
by now only a theoretical exercise, since the military coup of July 2013
that ousted president Muhammad Morsi forced the Muslim Brothers
again “from palace to prison.” In fact, it further exacerbated the
organization’s internal disputes, especially with regard to the most
suitable ways to counter the subsequent regime’s repression on
Islamist opponents promoted by General Abd al-Fattah Al-Sisi on the
wake of the military’s seizure of power. One episode in particular,
among the many, seems to have triggered the violent turn of the rank-
and-files of the organization, namely the Raba’a Massacre of August
2013. On that occasion, numerous opponents to the recent coup by
the military decided to occupy Midan Raba’a al-Adawiyya, in Eastern
Cairo, in sign of protest against what they perceived as an unlawful
action by the SCAF (Supreme Council of the Armed Forces) (The
Washington Post, August 2015), which considers itself as “a guardian of
the nation”3 entitled to get rid of alleged illegitimate rulers or
government figures. In Midan Raba’a an imprecise number of people
were killed, with estimates ranging from 600 to 1,000 or even to 2,500
according to MB’s sources (al-Jazeera, Aug. 2015), fomenting hatred
for the newly established and repressive military order. And Raba’a
3 Brown, N., El-Shimy, Y. (Jan. 25, 2016), Did Sisi save Egypt. The Arab Spring at Five. Foreign Affairs, Retrievable from: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/egypt/2016-01-25/did-sisi-save-egypt
Egypt at the crossroad
20
signaled just the beginning of a harsh crackdown on all oppositions,
and specifically MB’s members, that is becoming increasingly thorny
for Western countries allied with Egypt.
The Raba’a Massacre has
become a powerful symbol
of the regime’s misdeeds
and violent actions, and,
recalling Midan Raba’a,
violent actions carried out
by the MB are justified in
the light of a lawful
response to regime’s repression (El-Sherif, 2014). Even if a parallel
with Mubarak’s regime is easy to make, scholars and analysts have
underlined the far greater repressive system that General al-Sisi has
established, cracking down both Islamist and secular opposition in the
country at a level Mubarak never reached, “the repression is even
worse now, say many” (The Economist, May 2015).4 The repression is so
harsh that Nathan Brown and Yasser El-Shimy, in a recent article
(Foreign Affairs, Jan. 2016), compared al-Sisi’s regime with the Nasserist
period, characterized by a one-political-party system, the will to
complete annihilate the MB, the intolerance for any form of dissent,
and the establishment of a police state. It is, thus, legitimate to analyze
how the Muslim Brothers are responding and would respond to this
unprecedented wave of political repression and to investigate the
4 “Repression in Egypt. Worse than Mubarak”. (May 2, 2015), The Economist. Retrieved from http://www.economist.com/node/21650160/print
Maidan Raba’a
Source: al-Jazeera
May 2016
21
degree to which regime’s repression can actually affect future internal
development of the organization, specifically in terms of increasing
the levels of violence from the group’s youngest cadres, as well as its
future domestic political role.
The Dynamics of Repression and Violence
Since the Midan Raba’a’s episode, a (prevalently) young sector
inside the MB started a low-profile insurgency against the repressive
regime of General al-Sisi, in an attempt to topple it and restore the
legitimacy of the MB’s government, advocating for the use of
revolutionary – and violent – tactics to achieve its political aims. As
Awad and Hashem report, “At least initially, most Islamist youth who
embraced violence did so as a means of exacting revenge against the
state for the deaths of Islamist protesters in Rabaa Square” (2015: 8).
One of the latest examples is the attack at the Bella Vista Hotel in
Hurgada in Januray 2016, when two young Cairene tried to spread
panic among the presents by threatening tourists with knifes and fake
suicide belts (Foreign Affairs, Feb. 2016). This episode constitutes just
one instance among the many currently taking place in Egypt, a signal
of the popping up of new strains of Islamist violence not linked to
Jihadi Salafism. Furthermore, in order to provide a religious
justification to this new wave of violence embraced by exponents of
the MB, the young wing of the group commissioned a 93-page book
titled The Jurisprudence of Popular Resistance to the Coup, in which the
ideology of the MB is adapted to the new needs of the post-Morsi
Egypt at the crossroad
22
period, providing religious legitimacy and drawing an ideological
boundary with the more radical Salafi Jihadism trend. (Foreign Affairs,
Feb. 2016).
This violent turn of the young wing inside the MB is escalating the
Islamist insurgency in the country, especially after the MB’s internal
elections in February 2015 that were won by the revolutionary wing
inside the organization (Foreign Affairs, May 2015), with 90 percent of
the new elected leaders coming from the younger generation. The
present escalation of violence in Egypt paves the way for important
issues to be addressed. First of all, the question of authority and the
thin line between legitimate violence and terrorism, which, then,
trigger the fundamental analysis of the role of religion in the
legitimization process and the importance of the widening
generational gap within the MB. Second, the long-lasting problem in
the social sciences concerning the dialectic relationship between
repression and violence: why are Islamist youth recurring to violent
strategies to face the regime’s threat? Is there any relationship between
their violent turn and the degree of indiscriminate oppression of the
military government? In order to answer these questions, we will make
reference to the theoretical framework elaborated by Hafez and
Wiktorowicz (2013), critically applying it to the present political
dynamics in Egypt and using it to forecast the possible future
scenarios that might develop from the current increasing circles of
Islamist violence.
May 2016
23
As for the first point at stake, the Brotherhood’s youth leadership,
which is gaining momentum in the aftermath of July 2013 coup,
considers the use of violence against the regime as a legitimate
strategy, given the unlawful seizure of power by the military (Foreign
Affairs, May 2015). On the same note, General al-Sisi’s regime justifies
its crackdown on civil society as a reactive strategy to counter the
Islamists that were destroying the state apparatus while in power.
While young Muslim Brothers see themselves as legitimate
revolutionaries morally forced to perform their duty as “true”
believers acting in the name of the common good (maslaha), Sisi looks
at them as terrorists, exploiting religion for their own aims and
threatening domestic stability, while portraying himself, at the same
time, as the true keeper of Islam in order to bolster his own authority
(The New York Times, Jan. 2016).
Both these views, useless to say, are dictated by some sort of bias
and tarnish the complexity of the interplay between legitimization,
religion, and authority. In fact, the blurring boundary between
revolutionaries and terrorists ultimately rests on the capacity to define
owned by the ones in power at a particular historical moment and on
the legal framework of authority inside which these definitions are
elaborated. Moreover, religion, far from being the cause in itself of
violent acts (Sharma, 2016), is still instrumentally used to provide a
legitimate framework for the exercise of violence and, in addition, it
cannot be considered as the cause of Islamists’ violence given the
impossibility of explaining variation through a constant. Religion is,
Egypt at the crossroad
24
thus, instrumentally used by MB’s young cadres to justify their
recourse to violence, but it does not constitute the cause of their
violent turn. As Hafez and Wiktorowicz noted (2013), Islamic
movements are “not ‘born’ violent” (63), and, as we have already
pointed out in the previous section, it is logically not sound to
consider ideology as a determinant of behavior, being it itself subject
to a dialogical restructuring in which behavior and ideology are
mutually affecting each other.
As a consequence, a second set of questions must be taken into
account: why do certain Islamist groups turn to violence? And why,
specifically, the MB’s young cadres are making recourse to violent
strategies to challenge the regime? And which is the relation between
repression and violence? As outlined above, regime repression plays a
crucial role in determining the political opportunity structure in which
the group is to operate, thus creating incentives and conditions where
recourse to violence may be preferred as a strategy by Islamist actors
over other alternative,
nonviolent paths. As
Awad and Hashem
point out, “The
Brotherhood and the
Egyptian government
have both adopted a
zero-sum approach,
offering no realistic
MB young cadres’ protest
Source: Reuters
May 2016
25
political way to end the impasse” (2015: 3), giving origin to
unprecedented levels of violence that are starting to catch the
attention of Western state actors with vested interests in the stability
of the country.
[IMAGE 5: MB Young Protesters]
One of the possible reasons that have been addressed to justify this
violent turn is the MB old leadership’s loss of control over the
revolutionary young wing, a loss of control further exacerbated by the
arrest of main senior leaders. The group had, then, to restructure in
order to face the heavy crackdown by decentralizing a usually highly
centralized decision-making process, thus opening up the possibility
for young members to have a voice in the organization’s political
strategy (Awad and Hashem, 2015: 7). Hence, regime repression can
be held accountable for the internal organizational restructuring of the
MB, which paved the way for the implementation of more violent
strategies in the attempt to destabilize the government. This divide is
made even more perspicuous by the creation of two different websites
now associated with the group. The youth maintained control over the
old website (ikhwanonline.com), whereas the old leadership had to
create a new one (ikhwan.site) (Foreign Affairs, Jan. 2016).
However, the complex dynamic between repression and violence
does not end here. Indeed, according to Hafez and Wiktorowicz’
model, even though we cannot suppose a direct relationship between
oppression and violent resistance since empirical historical analyses
have falsified this argument long ago (Scott, 1976), we cannot get rid
Egypt at the crossroad
26
of the assumption that regime’s repression, as an exogenous factor,
does have consequences on the rational choices of Islamist groups. In
order to shed light on this topic, the model Hafez and Wiktorowicz
offer is based on the analysis of two variables, namely: a) the access to
institutionalized politics; and b) the nature of state repression. None
of the two is deterministic in predicting the turn to violence, but they
seem to be good probabilistic indicators of it.
As for the first variable, the access to alternative legal paths to have
a say in the system seems to diminish the probability of recourse to
violence, whereas inaccessibility to the formal institution of the state is
likely to increase it. In the case at stake, the harsh crackdown
following the coup, not only on MB’s members but on all oppositions
more in general, prevents opposition actors to exert formal influence
on the decision-making process at state level, thus increasing the
probability to rationally choose violent paths in the pursuit of the
group’s objectives. Nonetheless, system inaccessibility appears to be a
necessary but not sufficient trigger of violent reactions. Even though
Muslim Brothers have been prevented from participating in the legal
political framework, this has always been true, at different levels, until
the 2011 revolution when they were eventually allowed to form a
political party.
As a consequence, the second variable must also be taken into
consideration, i.e. the nature of state repression. Far from constituting
a constant, state repression changes over time along two different
continuums. On the one hand, state repression may be either
May 2016
27
preemptive or reactive (“timing” variable); on the other, it can be
either selective or indiscriminate (“targeting” variable) (Hafez and
Wiktorowicz, 2015: 67-68). Inaccessibility to the formal institutional
system and a form of reactive and indiscriminate state repression are
considered to be sufficient causes for a violent turn, in probabilistic
terms. Closely investigating the situation of MB’s youth on the
ground, it becomes apparent how General al-Sisi’s repression is
reactive, in the sense that it is a consequence of the two-year power by
the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, and it is indiscriminate insofar as a
mere suspicion of links and ties to the group may lead to
incarceration, torture, or, even more dramatically, death.
In addition to structural considerations that might have ignited a
violent Muslim Brothers’ reaction, Ashraf El-Sherif (2014) reported
how, in the group’s own vision, de-escalation was considered to be
counterproductive given the historical precedent of the “Abdel-Qader
Ouda complex,” during which the deputy supreme guide Abdel-Qader
Ouda opted for stopping the protests against Nasser’s government in
1954, a decision that was soon followed by one of the bloodiest
crackdowns on the MB since their foundation. Learning, then, from
this historical episode, the general assumption is that the only choice
left in order not to be erased is escalation of the opposition,
fomenting, thus, the inner circle of mutual violence.
Egypt at the crossroad
28
At this point of the analysis, it is worth addressing the significant
question concerning the possible future of the Muslim Brothers in
Egypt. The unprecedented intensity of the confrontation between
regime’s forces and MB’s cadres is unlikely to abate any time soon.
However, external factors and external actors are coming into play and
may prove to be decisive in changing the course of events in the near
future. In particular, the death of the Italian researcher Giulio Regeni,
allegedly killed by the Egyptian Mukhabarat (intelligence forces) after
his disappearance on January 25th, 2016, has given rise to a wave of
international protests, bringing to light the misdeeds of General al-
Sisi’s regime (Vice, Feb. 2016). One possible scenario, then, is that
international pressure on the Egyptian regime may reduce the level of
repression on Islamists and civil society, possibly widening the
accessibility to the institutional frame and, consequently, causing a
May 2016
29
reduction in the level of violent insurgency carried out by the MB’s
young cadres. Nonetheless, this prediction presents two main
problems. First, doubts persist relating to the real commitment of
Western powers to put pressure on a regime that remains an
important player in the Middle Eastern region (al-Jazeera, April 2016),
as has been demonstrated by the silence on Giulio Regeni’s case and
the softening of previous accusations for the negligence in respecting
human rights during the visit of U.S. Secretary of State, John Jerry, in
Egypt on April 19th, 2016 (CNN, April 2016). Second, a decrease in
regime’s oppression may not result in a concomitant opening up of
the institutional system to oppositions, thus not providing incentives
to stop the escalation of violence on the part of Muslim Brothers.
In a detailed analysis on the future of political Islam in Egypt,
Ashraf el-Sherif (2014) tried to delineate five possible scenarios for the
future of the Muslim Brothers in the post-Morsi period: a) total
eradication; b) triumphant comeback; c) reconciliation with the
regime; d) fragmentation into various factions; e) reinvention of the
movement. The recent developments previously investigated seem to
point to the unlikeliness of both the total eradication of the movement
(a), given the high degree of adaptability to exogenous situations and
the resilience the group has historically demonstrated (al-Anani, 2013),
and of a triumphant comeback (b), since certain strata of Egyptian
society might withdraw their support to the Brothers as a consequence
of their recent turn to violent tactics that may further destabilize the
political and economic situation in the country.
Egypt at the crossroad
30
As for the third hypothesis (c), namely a reconciliation with the
regime that would create a situation similar to that under Mubarak,
when the MB was guaranteed a limited and de facto political inclusion
in the semi-authoritarian system, el-Sherif presents it as a possible
development since “the current war of attrition between the regime
and the Brotherhood is unsustainable” (15), although not likely in the
short-run, given the mutual demonization efforts carried out by both
part. And, indeed, after one year and a half from the writing of El-
Sherif’s analysis, his predictions find confirmation since reconciliation
seems possible but still a remote prospect. Furthermore, any attempt
of possible reconciliation will be threatened by the widening
factionalism inside the organization of the Brothers itself. Indeed, with
the difficulties the Brothers are facing in maintain unity, a possible
reconciliation may interest just a sector or wing of the MB, without
engaging also the violent grassroots that are gaining the upper hand in
the leadership.
This observation leads us to the fourth hypothesis (d), the
fragmentation of the group into various factions and, consequently,
the integration of the moderates in the system with the exclusion of
the hardliners. A moderate line already exists inside the MB, namely a
wing of the group that recognizes the impossibility to restore Morsi’s
to presidency through the use of violence and is keener on
undertaking political rather than violent paths. Exponents of this
position are the leaders of the old guard, the Supreme Guide
Mahmoud Ezzat, the Deputy Supreme Guide Ibrahim Munir,
May 2016
31
currently in exile in London, and Secretary General Mahmoud
Hussein (Foreign Affairs, Feb. 2016), who, nonetheless, are being
increasingly ostracized by the decision-making process by the young
revolutionary wing. In addition to this, hardliners seem to have already
achieved hegemony inside the group, notwithstanding the generational
divide, but counting supporters across the age groups.
As for the last hypothesis (e), a reinvention on the part of the group
is desirable but not so likely in the short run, especially looking at the
empirical analysis of the group’s dynamics at the moment. A
reinvention might entail a retreat of the group from politics in order to
concentrate on more ideological issues that will foster ijtihad
(interpretative effort) and a reconsideration of the positioning of the
group in the new Islamist scenario that is unfolding at regional level.
But the political stakes are high and since now we do not have any
signal that the group is willing to stop the political struggle in order to
favor educational, social, and cultural reconsiderations (el-Sherif,
2014).
Conclusions
The Muslim Brothers have proved to be particularly resilient during
their long history, both in Egypt and elsewhere. They adapted to the
political opportunity structure, reframing their goals and ideological
positions according to contextual needs. This inherent characteristic of
the group has guaranteed the Brothers to survive to the rapid political
Egypt at the crossroad
32
changes in the country, cautiously intertwining pragmatism and
ideology in a continuous dialectical relation that makes it hard for
political analysts to determine the process of causality between the
two. Nonetheless, the harsh regime repression of the post-Morsi
period, which is heavily cracking down on all oppositions and on the
Brothers in particular, is further challenging the future of the
organization and, even more importantly, its internal cohesion and
structure. The appeal to the concept of dharoura (“necessity”) to
maintain organizational unity is breaking down following the
decentralization process that both the renewed illegal status of the
group and the imprisonment of the old leadership are imposing. An
additional consequence of the decentralization process is the
proliferation of non-jihadi violent wings within the MB, comprised of
mainly young members, even though the violent discourse is
increasingly transcending age group barriers.
In this analysis we argued that the complex dynamics of repression
and violence are pivotal in determining the future of the Muslim
Brothers in Egypt, whose fate will highly affect the domestic policy of
the country as a whole. Applying Hafez and Wiktorowicz’ model, we
noticed how the indiscriminate and reactive use of violence carried out
by al-Sisi’s regime, together with the complete closure of alternative
institutional paths for expression of dissent, resulting in a high degree
of inaccessibility to the formal legal system, is likely to further ignite
the circle of violence, even though these elements do not seem
(empirically) to be the deterministic variables at play in causing the
May 2016
33
passage from ordinary forms of everyday resistance, to unordinary
forms of violence (namely, armed insurgency). Still, they can well
predict variation in the circle of violence once it has started.
The violent turn of the young cadres of the Brothers have many
underlying causes and among them, exogenous and structural factors
play a significant role. Both the imprisonment of the old leadership by
the new regime and the presence of different ideological positions
towards the use of violence to achieve political aims were determinant
in leading to a violent insurgency against al-Sisi’s rule. The logic of
violence is contextual in the sense that it cannot be investigated only
from the ideological point of view but needs be studied as framed in a
specific political context that transcends national boundaries. As a
consequence, the possible future developments of the role of the
organization in Egypt depend on a conspicuous number of factors.
Nevertheless, we argue, the attitude of the regime as far as repression
is concerned may be a key element to analyze the ideological
restructuring of the MB. What is sure is that the Muslim Brothers are
undergoing a crucial historical moment that may even lead to a
definitive split inside the organization with possible dire consequences
for the stability of the country, since the violent non-jihadi branch of
the group is gaining the upper-hand and this course of event is
unlikely to be counteracted in the short term, given the zero-sum
approach fostered by both parties. Only a reduction in the degree of
oppression perpetrated by the regime, thus, is likely to (possibly) allow
for a decrease in the levels of Islamist violence in the country, paving
Egypt at the crossroad
34
the way for a repositioning of the Brothers in the domestic political
scenario. The alternatives delineated by El-Sherif concerning the
annihilation of one of the two actors, either al-Sisi’s regime or the MB,
is almost impossible to occur for a number of reasons. On the one
hand, the MB’s resilience and adaptability to new environments, as
well as their widespread support at grassroots level among the
population, especially at universities. On the other, as recent
international events have demonstrated, Egypt remains an important
player in the current geopolitical scenario and, consequently, Western
powers are unwilling to allow for a return of Islamists at government
level. In the meantime, the country is experiencing one of the most
dramatic waves of violence of the last decades, and journalists and
scholars have already started to talk about a possible return of the
Spring.
May 2016
35
Is Egypt still a necessary evil? Egyptian
regional stance and its external projection
Anita Nappo
The label of “necessary evil” has been stuck on Egyptian establishment as of
the wake of the second revolutionary wave which upturned the Brotherhood regime
in 2013 and led to the power General and President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi and
his entourage through what under the political lens could be defined a coup. Many
scholars and analysts assumed that Egypt operated a comeback on the regional
stage in 2014 due to the regional constant upheaval, especially after the critical
collapse on the Country’s Eastern border. Although, its domestic policy seems to be
facing more setback, expressly in the socio-economic sector.
According to the “doingbusiness” and economic analysis sheets of the World
Bank, besides any remark from the international institutions and institutes
working in the field, Egypt does not score high in the indicators valuing the
environment where to start business and investments, as to make them thrive. The
main claim points out the insufficiency of the efforts taken so far by the government
to put in place the needed reforms in the deteriorating social and economic sector.
Being that sketched, it may be interesting to investigate the roots of the Saudi
and French interest manifestly shown in the last months in investing in Egypt.
Why necessary, why evil? These may be the main points to be developed as the
words pop up violently at the first sight under the readers’ eyes. Although the focus
of this section is set on taking the stock of the economic and political features of
Egypt at the crossroad
36
Egyptian relations with the brand-new actors of the Arab speaking region, the
Gulf Countries, both with the European Union, as a single actor as well as a
group of Countries taking divergent decisions even more often in the last five-year
period. This focus should provide the reader with the tools to understand how these
economic and political relations are the key to read the regional alliance system and
perspective “equilibrium”.
Introduction
Before the neat demonstration of its illiberal features which only
lately have gained the headers of international sheets, the definition of
the nature of the Egyptian government was an open secret. It was
unlike to hear the words compound “military regime” spoken out loud
in high-level meetings or official statements when it came to better
shape the essence of Egyptian government. Hardly possible to find an
outlet or a voice out of the choir, begging to differ and stating out that
the international community attitude was wrong. Closing an eye on the
illiberal restrictions imposed by the Egyptian military regime was
justified by the tall story told depicting al-Sisi government as the last
bastion, a fundamental ally in the as broad as vague European strategy
in the post-revolutionary Middle East. Nonetheless, its military nature
is manifest now as it has always been.
Briefly, its autocratic features perfectly fit the common definition
used in Political Science to categorize regimes and political formations.
This political outline usually thrives from a coup d’état and it is
May 2016
37
characterized by the lack of a grand ideology supporting the work of
the government. Although, on the other hand regimes’ actions are
highly drenched in dogmas and supported by rhetorical catchphrases
focusing on typical political themes likewise the national security,
order and prosperity. Personification of the power also generally
features this type of regimes with the instauration of an intimal
interconnection between the person and the role, so far that military
regimes may also assume the guise of kleptocracy. As pointed out by
Geddes [1999], a significant indicator may be the influence of military
hierarchies and officers on policy making structures. In a nutshell, this
influence may scale from a role of guardians the status quo to the role
of controlling the administration and the state structures by the
military officers. This latter is considered to be the apex of the shapes
a military regime may adopt [Nordlinger, 1979] under which no
opposition or dissent is allowed. This looks a lot like the situation
ruling out the existence of hostile movements in Egypt, or chiefly the
main idea driving the chase of the Muslim Brotherhood in the
aftermath of the al-Sisi presidency kickoff. Being that said, apparently
one day the world woke up and found out that the government sitting
in Cairo was rather neglecting the respect of human rights and
somewhat steering in a dangerous direction grasping to control with
its authoritarian punch on the Country. That day was last February,
when the body of the Italian researcher Regeni was found at the verge
of the dusty Desert road connecting Cairo with Alexandria, the
motorway which is one of the jewels of the crown of General al-Sisi’s
government in the field of infrastructures. Many may argue that this is
Egypt at the crossroad
38
not the first either the last undemocratic regime taking up the power
in the region as well as in the world, according to the Western-
European features of the ideal-typical notion of democracy. This is
not the first either the last government of this kind which the
European Countries and the European Union itself entertains
relations with, despite of evident breach in the respect of human
rights chiefly. Apart from the requests connected to the case of the
death of the young Italian researcher and besides the demands on the
destiny of thousands and thousands of Egyptian nationals who
disappeared in mysterious situations in the last 3 years leaving in
despair their families, many readers may argue why Egypt is still so
important not to leave it go. What does it takes to get over relations
with Egypt after that the influent European public opinion, or at least
a part of it, has asked for accountability and transparence from Cairo.
But their governments are quite reluctant to find a way to give answers
to their people while not letting go the Egyptian government.
Geopolitics and economics are intimately intertwined in this affair
more than any other scenario at present. For those persuaded that
different politic domains can be secluded in watertight sealed
containers, they may be here reached by bad news discarding this
persuasion. Egypt’s domestic and foreign politics are becoming more
and more entangled as for the time from the establishment of the
General’s government has taken up. This may be the case ruling over
the extreme makeover of Egyptian political alliances and economic
ententes since 2013. As this paper will try to enlighten in the next
May 2016
39
paragraphs, Egyptian
foreign affairs have
been molded
according to its
domestic dimension
and so were its
relations with Gulf
Countries, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates in pole position, as
well as with the European Union and its Members States. As
indicators will be used the treatment of political dissent as the
readiness to inject cash flows to revive the shattered Egyptian treasury.
The paper further will explain why despite of all these main fault lines,
everyone counts on Egypt both in a regional perspective seeking after
stabilization both in a countering angle against Iran and its comeback
on the world stage.
Gulf buddies and political advisors
At a glance, connections between Gulf Countries and lower middle
income countries5, as Egypt, may be simplistically labeled as mere
economic relations formed by the duo wealthy sheikhdom donor –
poor X country recipient. Yet, Egyptian relations mainly with the Saud
family as well as the UAE are rooted in last century history and outdo
5 The Arab Republic of Egypt is categorized by the World Bank as “Lower middle income” under the WB world development indicators and more than 5000 indicators from other collections such as Gender Statistics, African Development Indicators, and Education Statistics. Retrieved from: http://goo.gl/G6jHXC.
Source: Stratfor
Egypt at the crossroad
40
the plain definition of financial exchange. It does not need to
throwback the memory till the dawn of history to track the ratio of
the current triangular relation. Besides, it gives ground to the claim
that Egyptian external relations are molded accordingly the internal
political and economic state of the play. In the aftermath of the
historical changes undergoing in Egypt during the 1950s many
members of the Muslim Brotherhood fled away to find shelter in the
Arab Gulf Countries from the political persecution they would have
encountered by staying in their homeland. In the direct upshot of the
Free Officials revolution, relations between the Brotherhood and the
junta were initially friendly although they quickly escalated as result of
Nasser’s choices to ban political parties and then to limit
organizations’ freedom of action, aiming to diminish as well any anti-
secular influence on the nation-building process. Consequently, the
member or supporters of the Brotherhood found a safe harbor in the
Gulf Countries societies where they were often employed as teachers
and treated with consideration as being educated individuals. Albeit,
even here the history tells of a short lived honey mood. In Saudi
Arabia as in the Emirates the connections between these Egyptian
nationals and the politics started being way too far intertwined and
thus no longer tolerated. Clearly, at stake were the political stability
and the permanence of the monarchies at the guide of the two Gulf
Countries. Then as now, Muslim Brothers’ increasingly political
behavior is seen as suspicious henceforth governments tend to
prohibit their activities being deemed to potentially incite those parts
of the population that had been influenced by ideology to rise up
May 2016
41
against the monarchies. Hereinafter, the hostile treatment of the
group may be a good indicator to understand the initial alignment in
foreign policy of al-Sisi-led Egypt and the two Gulf Countries in
object. After the ousting from the power of Mohammed Morsi in July
2013, Egyptian politics showed in a wider perspective a whole new
ballgame to the entire wobbling Middle East.
A completely renewing balance was required to settle the case
between so-called secularist forces heading towards the stabilization
of the country establishing a strong tie with the armed forces and
religious feelings. Nothing happening in Middle East stays in within its
own national borders but it tends to overwhelm them as to stress out
that borders are sometimes only a fictional imposition, a transplanted
organ which the body continuously rejects in countless expressions.
And sometimes it takes a bit for those externally sitting and watching
Middle-Eastern events to understand or at least try to.
In Middle East more than everywhere else the alliances takes and
changes in the twinkling of an eye, and sometimes countries find
themselves to fight against a faction supported by a state which stays
on the same side of the barricade in another war-torn scenario within
the region. This may be the case of Saudi Arabia and Egypt related to
the Syrian war, or Saudi Arabia and Qatar in Yemen, and so on. This
should help understand that there is no full reshuffle on the stage in
Middle East, no complete change of course after the new king Salman
took the power in Riyadh, but rather a symptomatic readjustment of
alliances in accordance with the events. It has been observed that
Egypt at the crossroad
42
lurking in the background is a broader strategy employed by the Gulf
nations to shuffle regional power in the Middle East. As matter of
fact, Saudi Arabia is currently engaged in a regional competition
aiming for the hegemony against Iran, and they are both deploying all
the possible means to wage proxy wars, as in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.
Although influence may be grown up even through means other than
military interactions and this perfectly matches Egyptian needs.
President-General al-Sisi is endeavoring to find a way to keep the
Egyptian economy afloat and as well needs military aid after the
partial withdraw of the European counterpart due to his regime’s poor
human rights record. What Egypt needs, and apparently started to
Source: Stratfor
May 2016
43
obtain as of the beginning of the al-Sisi government was the
recognition of the Egyptian role in the shaking and shaken Middle
East, sustain and recognition under any circumstances.
Main economic issues in the post-2013 Egypt are chiefly the
increasing dependence on external energy suppliers, an unstable public
finances sector and a profile which turns out being almost unattractive
for external financer. If in the first period, Saudi Arabia and the UAE
were more than eager to supply Egypt with discounted fuel and to
represent the dominant sources of external financial support, a certain
degree of dissatisfaction and frustration has started emerging in the
last year. The lack of transparency from the Egyptian side on
accountability towards the Gulf donors on how the money generously
pledged in the Cairo treasury were spent caused the first wave of
dissatisfaction from Abu Dhabi and even more strongly from Riyadh.
In the sole first period, Saudi Arabia and allies Kuwait and the United
Arab Emirates pledged around $30 billion to bankroll the coup and to
shore up the first step of the baby born military govern in Cairo. The
cash flow from the Gulf to Cairo continued despite the realignment
of alliances tying up the three main centres of this political triangle,
namely the disaccording choices in the Syrian affair and the Yemeni
scenario separating the views of the Egyptian leader and his royal
counterpart, the Saudi King Salman. A clear example may be
embodied by the positions taken regarding Russian involvement in the
Syrian war. While Egyptian Foreign Affairs minister Shoukry has
welcomed it as a decisive step towards the fight against the terrorism,
Egypt at the crossroad
44
the Saudi King defined the Russian air strikes as a crucial asset to
support Asad, who is considered by Riyadh as the longa manu of the
Shi’te Iran in the Arab-speaking Middle East.
It may be interesting to note that in this situation, the Emirati
position was ambiguous and less definite than the Saudi one, standing
the UAE opposition to the resurgent Iran. War-scarred Yemen may
serve as another example helping to outline the evolving, and maybe
worsening, relation between the two Gulf States and Egypt. The
puzzle of the alliances becomes way more intricate and the Saudi
position turns more subtle as in Yemen Riyadh supports the Islah
group, an affiliated group of the Muslim Brotherhood, which battles
against the Houti, allegedly Iranian proxies in Sanaa. At stake in
Yemen is, not only the regional predominance that Riyadh is
struggling to maintain after the return on the stage of Iran. Yemen is
strategically important for Egypt both for the Gulf monarchies as it
sits on the Bab al-Mandab strait connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf
of Aden, which sees the majority of the world's oil shipments
passages. Obviously, Egypt and Saudi Arabia fear that the
appropriation of the power by Houti group would threaten oil
shipment passage through the strait. But the Saudi Kingdom decided
that the minor evil in this scenario was to support the Islah, despite
being backed by the Muslim Brotherhood and Qatar in order to
contrast Iran, falling in a discordant military position with the
Egyptian counterpart. With the change at the head of the Kingdom
occurred in January 2015, after that King Abdallah passed away, the
May 2016
45
Egyptian-Saudi relations started worsening, especially apropos of
which role, treatment and future should be envisaged for the Muslim
Brotherhood.
Despite these incongruences Saudi and Emirate will not stop
completely their support to Cairo as the side-effect of a cash-flow cut
may be the upheaval of Egypt besides it would call into question Gulf
countries influence there. On the other hand, despite of the
announcement of the support package signed under the Cairo
Declaration6 in 2015, it is expected a reduction of the financial
support especially from the oil-dependent Saudi Arabia as a result of
the low prices momentum. To the point, Riyadh has planned an
investment and loans plan covering the next three years and
discounted fuel provision for the forthcoming five, but no new
donations will be pledged. Also UAE treasury has lately decided to
downsize the tenor of the material support towards Egypt as a move
to display Abu Dhabi dissatisfaction with the steps undertook so far
by Cairo in implementing reforms in the socio-economic sector and in
the minor effects following Cairo’s effort to fight terrorism. While
Gulf Countries are struggling with differentiating their economies
from the highly dependence on the energy raw materials, Egypt strives
to discern extremists from non-violent rivals in domestic politics
domain which inevitably involves foreign affairs’ choices. Being that
6 Early 2015, Egypt and Saudi Arabia announced their intention to set a joint military force mainly financed by Riyadh and with the highest contribution in terms of human forces from Egypt. This intention may be read as part of a broader intention leading towards cooperation wrapped in the Cairo Declaration. Singed in August 2015, the document encompasses a range of areas of cooperation over common regional challenges.
Egypt at the crossroad
46
one of the main reason why it is unlikely and ingenuous as well to
expect that the Gulf Countries may good counselors for Egypt in the
path towards socio-economic normalization and implementation of
the rule of law. Relations with Egypt cannot be simply neglected as
this may become source of a greater regional instability though the
role of the Gulf countries should become more concrete in their
political leadership. Saudi and Emirates economic and political
support to Egypt may help to restore investors’ confidence in the
country and to encourage the return in Egypt of the economic actors
and so ensure a macro-stability at least on the short term. These latter
conditions are lacking in Egypt since the revolution of January 2011
that took to end the long-lasting autocratic Mubarak regime.
Additionally, a series of terrorism-connected events as well as internal
instability discouraged tourists to visit Egypt, which turned out being a
mortal setback to al-Sisi’s attempts to independently keep Egyptian
economy afloat. The diminishing expenditure from the Gulf may
anyway be perceived as a new opportunity for Europe. As it will be
further discussed in the next section, Egypt will face a new
circumstance tied with the decreasing cash-flow from the Gulf
notwithstanding its engagement in the fight against terrorism, here
included those opponent groups which are perceived as terrorist
under the Egyptian establishment’s eyes. Looking for substitute or
complementary sources of liquidity to cover its expenditure after the
Gulf partial withdrawn, Cairo will potentially knock at the EU’s doors.
From a side, Cairo could afford not to abide to EU’s conditionality
May 2016
47
parameters as it had other cash income sources which paid without
setting any political either governance-related condition.
Ideally, it is shaping out a new condition bringing about the
opportunity for the EU to influence and use its conditional aid system
to prevent Egyptian internal situation to further deteriorate , which as
outlined above risks to jeopardize the already unstable region.
Although, EU funds will not leave al-Sisi’s free to move forward
keeping up with its internal reforms and stabilizing his rule as it is,
mainly because the two parts of this equation do not match.
Money talks, EU conditionality walks
The outlook from the North shore of the Mediterranean does not
appear less entangled. In an already knotted series of entities
interacting and throwing in turmoil the Middle East and its actors, it
must be noted the impact of the peculiar nature of the EU. Assuming
that foreign affairs are the series of activities undertaken by state both
non-state actors in the international arena, or better said the world
politics domain, aimed at the achievement of objectives, the EU still
lack to define these latter with the result of an hesitating and pale
performance on the international scenes. In 2014 the Commission
lead by Jean-Claude Juncker took office and following its appointment
the Italian double-hatted Vice-President and High Representative of
the European Union for Foreign Affairs Federica Mogherini took on
her first official visit abroad, in occupied Gaza. This was way far more
Egypt at the crossroad
48
than symbolic and the analyst embarked on pleasing comments on her
choice as they foresaw a renewed energy and spirit flowing into the
veins of the EU external action body toward the Middle East. A more
comprehensive approach to build a unique external projection of the
EU was also pleaded by foreign affairs operators and commentators.
The post-
revolutionary Middle
Eastern scenario
seemed to be the
right test-bed to
benchmark new
external policies
trends in the area and
to surpass the idea
that the EU is not able to speak just with one voice. Unfortunately
though, the evergreen sentence allegedly spoken out by Kissinger
stands still and the world leaders still lack of a number to call when in
need to speak to the EU as a whole. Without broadening the scope of
the debate excessively, it may be useful to point out some of the
features characterizing the external action of the EU in order to take
the pulse of the current status of its relations, with Egypt specifically
for the purpose of this analysis. Bearing in mind that the EU is an in-
between actor and its construction is still ongoing, its international
legal status waves from supranational organization to group of States
acting under the purpose of saving their national interests using the
Source: European Commision
May 2016
49
EU as loudhailer, there again, the broader the group, the bigger the
clout. Reporting Wojciechowski’s scheme [2015], EU foreign policy
can be analyzed by discerning three different aspects featuring
individual national interests, environmental at EU level and systemic
factors, which involves the different activities carried out by the EU in
the area of foreign affairs. Especially true for the first two level of
analysis, the interests may be referred as identical, contradictory or
mutually complementary. From this kind of analysis it may result that
decision makers’ initiatives give prominence to national interests and
sometimes do not correspond to the principles and the guide-lines of
the EU as a whole. Hence, while trying to harmonically sum up the
components of external affairs interactions (goals, values, challenges,
strategies, instruments) the member states also try to abide to national
interests and security purposes. The EU at the moment is perceived
and tends to present itself as a brand-new actor of the post-nations
global arena, thus it is required to act accordingly with the states asked
to operate in a coordinated way.
This latter does not seem to be applicable to the current political
tendency towards Egypt within the European Continent, especially in
the wake of the tragic assassination and the connected answerless
issues recalled in the introductory session of this work. The EU,
especially through the Parliament, has raised some points against the
military regime in office in Egypt and asked for more accountability
and respect of the human rights as condition to continue the long-
established relation between the continental organization and the Arab
Egypt at the crossroad
50
Republic of Egypt. While on the institutional level resolutions and
initiatives have been promulgated, some among the single member
states have shown a disinterested attitude towards the guidelines and
conditions marked by the EU and kept on carrying on a business as
usual attitude. The French particular case will be further investigated.
The text of the resolution7 adopted in Strasbourg on March 10th
2016 by the plenary assembly of the European Parliament uses strong
words of condemn. It underlines with concern that the murder and
torture and disappearances are not isolated cases and treated with
impunity in Egypt and calls upon serious measures to be realistically
applied by the EU. In this context, clause 118 of the abovementioned
resolution reads “[The European Parliament] Underlines the
importance that the European Union attaches to cooperation with
Egypt as an important neighbor and partner, and Egypt’s role in
ensuring stability in the region; shares the concerns of the Egyptian
people about the economic, political and security challenges facing
their country and the region; condemns the terrorists’ attacks on
Egyptian civilians and military”. These quoted lines confirm that
Egypt is and remain a partner of the EU, too important to let it go.
According to supporting evidences, Egypt is largest country as regards
population covered by the European Neighborhood Policy under the
legal foundation of cooperation stipulated in 2004. Not only mere
7 European Union Parliament resolution, text adopted on Thursday 10th March 2016 on Egypt, notably the case of Giulio Regeni. Series P8_TA(2016)0084. Retrieved from: http://goo.gl/1eeDuq.
8 ibidem.
May 2016
51
digits on the constantly growing Egyptian population, Egypt is
fundamental for European strategy in the neighborhood under its
geopolitical endowment at the crossroads of two crucial regions,
North Africa and the Middle East. To better understand the
proclaimed importance of the EU-Egypt relation it is suitable to
quote the formula offered by the official website of the EEAS
delegation to Egypt:
“The EU stands by the Egyptian people in their ongoing search for
democracy, respect for human rights, dignity, social justice, and
security. The EU has supported the country's roadmap to democracy.
After the endorsement of a new Constitution in January 2014,
presidential elections in May 2014 and parliamentary elections
concluded in December 2015, the convening of the Egyptian
Parliament in January 2016 was an important step in the country's
political transition. Temporarily on hold in the wake of the January
2011 revolution, the institutional dialogue meetings foreseen by the
Association Agreement have resumed. Already in 2001 and in order to
put their relationship on a firm legal footing, the EU and Egypt
concluded negotiations on an Association Agreement. Since its entry
into force in 2004, it has provided the framework for regular political
dialogue between the two partners and enhanced cooperation in a
number of key sectors, ranging from trade and investment to energy
Egypt at the crossroad
52
and education, and also for sustained and substantial EU assistance to
Egypt's reform efforts”9.
Since 2004, Egypt is beneficiary of aids and grants funneled by the
EU through the ENP framework, it is accounted that in the period
2007-2013 after the first revision of the ENP instrument, the EU has
channeled around € 1bln in the quasi totality accounted for budgetary
help to Egyptian government. Lately, in compliance with the new
policies and trends seeking after an answer to the Arab Springs, the
ENP itself and any other EU external policy instrument have
undergone a revision, as the remolding of the conditionality
parameter. It may be useful to briefly remind what EU conditionality
refers to. Chiefly the parameter refers to a composite set of actions
enabling the EU to bridge political demands to economic incentives to
third parts. This instruments need to be implemented co-coordinately
wise by the EU and its member states in order to establish credible
relations and to make the make conditionality work. The more for
more approach largely exemplifies the conditionality instrument and
the EU tendency to reshape its relations rather than rethinking the
nature of the relations between the two shores [Balfour, 2012].
Conflicts and persistence of authoritarianism have spoilt the EU
relations with the Countries of the southern-Mediterranean flank as
through the conditionality and leading values of the institution it was
not possible to neither act nor cooperate with these actors. Conversely,
9 Official European External Action Service website related to the European Mission to Egypt. Retrieved from: http://goo.gl/hspqrN.
May 2016
53
the EU Lisbon treaty and its articles ruling on the external action
created a complex legal environment which allows the single member
states to anyway carry out actions in the field of trade or international
cooperation whatever the respect of the conditionality parameters in
the third country is. This is the core of the issue on the existence of
divergent objectives pursued by member states which limits the
credibility as the role of the EU if compared to other actors such as
the US, the single EU member states, and additionally the non-
Western actors
lately stepping up
at international
level – namely, the
geographically
dwarf Countries of
the Gulf, the
People’s Republic
of China, Russian
Federation. Being
the conditionality a leverage of the EU, this would be useful as tool
serving to rethink interdependence and relations as a whole between
the EU and the Middle-Eastern region, by identifying common
interests and mutual areas of cooperation to work together in future.
EU policies in the post-revolutionary Middle East have suffered of a
failing approach catalyzing the attention on a given territory only when
it faces a serious crisis and outlining the same standard solution for all
the third-part partners – the so-called “from one crisis to another”
Saudi King Salman and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi.
Bilateral agreements in Cairo
Source: Wall Street Journal
Egypt at the crossroad
54
approach. As of now, this results being a well-done diplomatic
exercise on the paper though it does not exceed its paper-based stance.
The limit of the external dimension of the EU is now as it has always
been the persistence of national interests not toeing the collective
European line. Moreover, in the specific case of Egypt, the
conditionality after the coup d’état has not had a huge impact on the
military establishment, not only for the continuous support provided
by the single European states, Italy and France foremost.
From the Egyptian perspective, the mentioned in the previous
section, the oil-rich Gulf economies have pledged generously grants
and assured investments during all the period following the January
revolution in 2015. Recalling this latter period and the exogenous
elements connected, both Egypt and the EU find themselves in a
situation that requires reshuffling cards on the table, to inject a breath
of fresh air in their deteriorating relation. For the EU, it is vital to call
to order its member states and to bid them to stay in line with the EU
decisions, if the final aim of stabilize the region is truly a shared
objective. Not only the EU credibility is at stake, but also the national
sovereign security so jealously cuddled and protected by each single
member state and which is hindering the EU institution process as of
now. Identically, Egypt finds itself a bit neglected by its generous Arab
brothers after the worsening of the situation in Libya, Syria and
Yemen and the remake of the Saudi countering strategy against Iran.
Provided with this new situation, the EU may find in the Egypt and in
May 2016
55
the other non-war-torn countries of the region a good opportunity to
operate an evaluation and review of its external action tools.
The EU conditional stances may serve to better governance in
Egypt, to upgrade the status of the respect of human rights and to
lead to a greater inclusion of oppressed internal opposition forces, not
automatically connected to the transnational terrorism. Nevertheless
this risks to be the umpteenth lost momentum of the EU failing to
impose itself as a credible international relations actor. The visit of
President Hollande to Cairo in April is symptomatic of this
foreseeably failure. Soon after the retreat of the Italian ambassador
from Cairo, recalled to Rome for further researches and mainly in
protest at the lack of progress in the investigation by Egyptian
authorities on the “Regeni affairs”, many other EU members have
shown their disapproval to Egypt impudent disregard of political
liberties and civil rights as well as the failure of the democratic process
embedment. While publically deploring the barbaric act of torture and
the discouraging poor record concerning the respect of human rights
in Egypt, France has continued its relations with Cairo as normal, as
nothing had changed. As mentioned above, on April 2016 President
Holland has been received by its Egyptian counterpart in grand style
in the Downtown area fully decorated with huge pictures of the
French president shaking vigorously the hand of al-Sisi and contoured
by waving French and Egyptian flags. Too much fanfare in Cairo to
enfold the umpteenth arm deal between regardless of EU prohibition
to trade weaponries with third-parts targeted by such bans due to the
Egypt at the crossroad
56
lack of respect of democratic criteria or in case of civil unrest.
Especially true for Egypt, where “a couple of dozen Rafales are
unlikely to make much of a difference in the campaigns Egypt is
fighting against land-based insurgencies at home and in Libya”10. Al-
jazeera reported that as part of its deal with France, Egypt will receive
fighter aircraft and navy vessels in line with Egyptian military
shopping spree which lead the government spending billions of
dollars on French weapons and other hardware. The visit was meant
as the seal on a renewed partnership between Paris and Cairo which
aims to boost ties in every field, from the political to the economic,
from the cultural to the touristic. Nevertheless this common entente
was sealed under a weapon deal which apparently has nothing to do
with the listed domains of cooperation.
Already in 2015
Egypt has signed a
$5.9 billion arms deal
that finalizes the
purchase of Rafale
fighter jets. An as
though as
straightforward
reminder sent by
Cairo to both the US and the EU showing that Egypt can acquire
10 Brophy Zak, (Feb. 16, 2016). Needed quote of Zak Brophy article “Egypt deal shores up French arms industry”. The New Arab. Retrieved from: http://goo.gl/sLTu7b.
Francois Hollande and Abdel Fattah al-Sisi
Source: Reuters
May 2016
57
elsewhere its military hardware, that also served to keep the Rafale
production alive.
Saudi shuffle and French connection: final remarks
The analysis tried to provide the reader with the elements to
understand the current situation connecting the mayor centres of
power and Egypt in the post-coup d’état that lead to power the
military junta headed by al-Sisi in 2013. As suggested by the title,
Egypt has been considered a necessary evil as everyone is aware of its
illiberal nature though it serves as a standing point in the transforming
Middle Eastern environment. The risk of a war-torn Egypt cannot be
computed by the EU as well as the Gulf Countries. The analysis
focused on some features of Egyptian internal politic to explain the
undergoing Saudi shuffle, followed in a minor tone by the UAE,
towards Cairo. For al-Sisi and his entourage, the worst evil is
embodied by the Muslim Brotherhood which is compared to the
terroristic groups threatening the world stability. Saudi Arabia used to
share this view and consequently, pledged billions of dollars of aids in
the almost-empty Egyptian reserves. So did the UAE in the direct
aftermath of the removal from power of the Muslim Brotherhood
affiliated government in Cairo in 2013. As reflex of the liquid alliances
system, much more volatile in Middle East than elsewhere, the
triangular relation binding Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE together
changed accordingly to the worsening of the Yemeni crisis, the
Russian military involvement in the Syrian civil war and the partial
Egypt at the crossroad
58
resurgence of Iran. Especially true for the Yemeni scenario, Saudi
Arabia has powerfully steered away from the Egyptian views as Riyadh
started supporting the Islah group, which is connected with the
Brotherhood. This was a reflection of the new foreign strategy of
Riyadh which needs to counter the Iranian influence in the area more
than fighting the Muslim Brotherhood, whose dangerousness has been
recently downgraded by the Saudi. This discrepancy of views has
partially enfeebled Egyptian relations with the Gulf allies which were
already showing signs of frustration towards the poor records of
economic performances in Egypt after the humongous flow of
capitals poured into Egyptian assets in the last 3 years. Under a precise
analysis provided by the World Bank, Egyptian economy is on the
brink of collapse and it cannot afford to see the aids and investment
cut from day to another. On the other side of the Mediterranean sea,
the Brussels-based institutions are monitoring with concern the
evolution of the Egyptian socio-economic situation peered by the
strengthen of the grip of the military junta at the power in Cairo. The
EU finds itself in a bad situation as it is persuaded that Egypt is too
important in its grand regional neighborhood policy to let it go.
Although the EU-Egyptian relations need to be rethought and
updated, to get over the conditionality parameter. This is the first time
since the instauration of the al-Sisi government that the EU holds the
whip hand. Despite of all the regional upheaval and the threats to
national security, not to mention the migratory crisis, the EU has a
unique opportunity to normalize its relations with e Arab Country
while backing the path towards the desirable establishment of
May 2016
59
democratic institutions in Cairo. Until 2015, al-Sisi could afford to
keep Egyptian afloat without the EU conditional support, oo
demanding in terms of political concessions under the Egyptian eyes.
It was possible indeed because, as above mentioned, the Gulf States
were eager to donate cash intakes without posing any conditions.
However, their generosity has now decreased, even due to the crush
of the oil price on the financial markets. This new situation put the
EU in the profitable position to stimulate Egypt’s development using
conditional aid, the first time since al-Sisi took office that the EU has
the chance to push for a change in Egypt.
Egypt still remains central for both European and Gulf Countries’
strategies in the region, as from one side, the regional polarization and
volatile alliance structure have hindered any attempt to resolve crisis
and establish reliable governments in the post-revolutionary Middle-
East. On the other hand, the EU still struggles to establish itself as a
credible brand-new actor able to offer innovative governance solution
mainly because of its ongoing institutional construction process and
the selfish member states’ attitude to jealously preserve their national
sovereignty. Certainly, the rough attitude from Cairo does not help
Brussels to reformulate a new pact towards the Mediterranean and the
South neighborhood; although al-Sisi has skillfully played his aces as
he is still at the lead of his Country despite of all the dissent and
opponent forces.
Egypt at the crossroad
60
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About the Authors
Valentina Cantori
Graduated with honors in the MA Culture and Languages for
Communication and International Cooperation at the University of
Milan in 2014, where she obtained also her BA degree in Linguistic
and Cultural Mediation, with a specialization in Arabic and Islamic
Studies. After a working period spent in Egypt, she is now Teaching
Assistant at Scripps College in Claremont, CA, a member of The
Claremont Colleges Consortium. She is currently researching at Pitzer
College on Religion and Conflict-related issues in Syria and Iraq.
Anita Nappo
Anita graduated in International Studies with honors at the
University l'Orientale in Naples focusing her work on the European
Union external relations with the broader Middle East, in particular
towards the Gulf Countries. After spending a period in Egypt as
freelance researcher and Arabic language student in 2015 she is
currently working in Brussels as junior consultant for EU affairs and
MENA region.
Egypt at the crossroad
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Ed. Mediterranean Affairs©
www.mediterraneanaffairs.com
Cover image source: Egypt State Information Service
May 2016
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