REPUBLICOF THE PHILIPPINES SAN DIGAN BAYAN...

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESSAN DIGAN BAYAN

QUEZON CITY

SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,

Criminal Cases Nos. SB-16-CRM-I061-1067For: Violation of Republic Act No.

3019, Section 3 (e) and six(6) counts of falsificationunder Article 171 (4) of theRevised Penal Code

GREGORIO MICLATCAMILING, JR., et al.,

Accused.

CABOTAJE-TANG, P.J.,Chairperson,FERNANDEZ, B., J. andFERNANDEZ, S.J., J. 1

')\J~ 10,2c),J-:t.61[------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1[

1. Accused Editha B. Santos'Reconsideration" dated October 9,2017;2 and,

2. Accused Cesar G. Santos' ((Motion forReconsideration" dated October 4,2017 '/I1 Sitting as a permanent special member of the 3'd Division pursuant to Adtb· 1st ive Order No. 316-2017

dated September 13, 2017. 1(: pp. 685-690, Vol. II, Record

pp. 707-712, Vol. II, Record

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-16-CRM-I061-1067People vs. Camiling, Jr., et ai.

ACCUSED EDITHA B. SANTOS' MOTION FORRECONSIDERATION

Accused-movant Santos reiterates the factual and legalgrounds she raised in her Motion to Quash dated June 19, 2017.In addition to these, she argues that [1] the Office of theOmbudsman failed to explain the delay in the fact-findinginvestigation of the present cases;4 [2] the intention andpurpose of the Constitution would be easily and convenientlyset aside and circumvented if the Office of the Ombudsmanwould be allowed to whimsically and capriciously refer the fact-finding to other government offices;5 [3] the Office of theOmbudsman and the Commission on Audit (COA) are bothinstrumentalities of the government; hence, there is no reasonto treat them separately for the purpose of determining whetheror not there is a violation of the accused's constitutional right tospeedy disposition of cases;6 [4] the claim of the Office of theOmbudsman that the fact-finding of the COAis separate shouldnot be entertained by the Court because to do so would inviteinefficiency and lack of accountability;7 [5] there was no logicalexplanation on the fact that she was included in the presentcases, but was not implicated in the administrative proceedingpending before the COAwhich involved the same transactionand subject matter;8 [6] the motion for early resolution filed byher did not cause any delay in the proceedings before the Officeof the Ombudsman;9 and, [7] there were unexplained additionaldelays on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman after thecompletion of the fact -fmding of the CO~

4 p. 685, Vol. II, Record5 p. 686, Vol. II, Record6 p. 687, Vol. II, Record7 p. 688, Vol. II, Record8 p. 688, Vol. II, Record9 pp. 688-689, Vol. II, Record10 p. 689, Vol. II, Record


ACCUSED CESAR G. SANTOS' MOTION FORRECONSIDERATION

Accused-movant Cesar G. Santos insists that the Officeofthe Ombudsman took cognizance of the present cases onOctober 7, 2003, or when the Memorandum dated August 20,2003, was filed before it by State Auditor Manuel Baes. Heasserts that the Court's distinction in its assailed Resolutionpromulgated on September 22, 2017, between a fact-findinginvestigation conducted by the Officeof the Ombudsman and afact-finding investigation conducted by the COAis not based onany real difference.

Relying once again on the case of People v.Sandiganbayan and Perez,ll he argues that the guarantee ofthe right to speedy disposition of cases applies to all casespending before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrativebodies; and, whether or not the fact-finding investigationconducted by the COA was separate from the preliminaryinvestigation conducted by the Officeof the Ombudsman shouldnot matter for purposes of determining if the respondents' rightto speedy disposition of cases had been violated.12

Moreover, the same accused-movant asserts that theexcuse given by the prosecution that the case had to undergomany layers of reviewand the meticulous scrutiny that it had toentail had already lost its novelty and that it was not his duty tofollowup on the prosecution of his case.13

Lastly, he reiterates that he was prejudiced by the delay inthis case because his intended witnesses may not be able torecall accurately the events that transpired in the disputedtransactions and there is a distinct possibility that importantpieces of evidence are already lOS~

11 712 seRA 2013 (2013)12 p. 708, Vol. II, Record13 p. 710, Vol. II, Record14 p. 711, Vol. II, Record

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-16-CRM-I061-1067People vs. Camiling, Jr., et aZ.

In its Consolidated Opposition dated October 20, 2017,15the prosecution contends that the Officeof the Ombudsman isnot barred from referring a case to the COA;no law or rule isviolated in doing so, and it is not the first time that the Officeofthe Ombudsman sought or asked another agency to conduct afact-finding or fraud audit of transactions entered into bygovernment agencies; 16 and, the actions of the COAshould beconsidered distinct and separate from the actions of the Officeof the Ombudsman considering that they are different andindependent entities. 17

The prosecution also disputes the applicability of Torres v.Sandiganbayan,18 People v. Sandiganbayan,19 andCoscoZZuela v. Sandiganbayan20 to the present cases on theground that the factual milieus of the said cases are differentfrom the present cases.21

The Court finds the subject motions unmeritorious.

To begin with, accused-movant Editha B. Santos'contention that the Office of the Ombudsman should not beallowed to ((whimsically" and ((capriciously" refer the fact-findinginvestigation other offices is erroneous.

Administrative Order No.7, or the Rules of Procedure of theOffice of the Ombudsman, expressly provides that upon

" pp. 723-726, Vol. II, Record < /716 p. 724, Vol. II, Record / r

17 pp. 724, Vol. II, Record18 G.R. No. 221562-69, October 5, 201619 712 SCRA2013 (2013)20 701 SCRA188 (2013)21 pp. 724-725, Vol. II, Record

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-16-CRM-I061-1067People vs. Camiling, Jr., et al.

evaluation of a complaint, the investigating officer may forwardthe said complaint to the appropriate office or official for fact-finding investigation, 22 to wit:

Section 2. Evaluation - Upon evaluating thecomplaint, the investigating officer shall recommendwhether it may be:

c) indorsed to the proper government office oragencywhich has jurisdiction over the case;

d) forwarded to the appropriate office orofficial for fact-finding investigation;23

In these cases, Manuel A. Baes, State Auditor V of theCOA, issued a Memorandum dated August 20, 2003, to theCommanding General of the Philippine Army. Therein, he notedpurported irregularities which were observed by the COA on theprocurement of the Combat Clothing and Individual Equipment(CCIE) items by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),which are the subject of these cases, thus:

1. The items procured were delivered and issueddirectly to the end users without first recordingthem on the stock ledger card; hence, physicalexistence of the delivery could not be ascertained;

2. The procurement was through shopping; and,/l22 Paragraph (d), Section 2, Rule II of Administrative Order No.723 Emphasis supplied


3. The purchase orders were prepared on the samedate for the purchase of similar items; thus,indicating that there was splitting which violatedCOACircular No.76-41 dated July 30, 1976.24

On October 7, 2003, a copy of the said memorandum wasreferred to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Militaryand Other Law Enforcement Offices (OMB-MOLEO)for theconduct of a fact-finding investigation. Noting that the COAhadalready taken initial steps on investigating the transactions inissue, the OMB-MOLEOendorsed the same to the COA onFebruary 27, 2004, for the conduct of an appropriate fraudaudit. 25

The Ombudsman's request for a fraud audit on the part ofthe COA was obviously intended to have a more thoroughanalysis of the data already uncovered and possibly thegathering of additional evidence. This fraud audit involvedtechnical matters which are within the area of competence ofthe COA. The result thereof was logically expected to aid theOmbudsman in properly assessing whether or not a wrongdoinghas indeed been perpetrated and by whom. Thus, the periodduring which the COAconducted this fraud audit should not beconsidered part of the preliminary investigation conducted bythe Officeof the Ombudsman in these cases.

Notably, during the conduct of the said fraud audit, theaccused-movants and their co-accused were not the subject ofany formal complaint or investigation concerning the disputedtransactions; hence, no prejudice could have been occasionedthem.

Moreover, accused-movant Editha B. Santos' alleged non-implication in the administrative proceeding pending before theCOA,which purportedly involves the same transactions in thesecases, is not controlling in the filing of criminal charges against24 /)

pp. 8-9, Vol. I, Record / ./25 p. 9, Vol. I, Record


her. In Aguinaldo v. Sandiganbayan,26 the Supreme Courtruled that the findings of the COA only relates to theadministrative matter of the case and does not foreclose theOffice of the Ombudsman's authority to investigate anddetermine whether there is a crime to be prosecuted for whichthe accused is answerable, thus:

Indeed, while the COA may regard petitioner tohave substantially complied with its accounting rules,this fact is not sufficient to dismiss the criminal cases.Beyond compliance with COArules and regulations, thequestion is whether there was a misappropriation ofpublic funds by petitioner. This is a question of fact tobe established by evidence. All that petitioner's failure tosubmit the documents required in the COA circulars inquestion means is that there is a presumption ofmalversation sufficient to justify the filing of a case incourt. As Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

The failure of a public officer to have dulyforthcoming any public funds or property withwhich he is chargeable, upon demand by anyduly authorized officer, shall be primafacie evidence that he has put such missingfunds or property to personal use.

Petitioner may still prove his innocence. Until hedoes this, however, the presumption that public fundswere put to personal use stands.

In the same vein, the dismissal of an administrative casedoes not bar the filing of a subsequent criminal action arisingfrom the same acts which were likewise the subject of theadministrative complaint. Thus, in Paredes, Jr., v.Sandiganbayan,27 the Supreme Court ruled, to /726265 seRA 121 (1996)27252 seRA 641 (1996)


Petitioners call attention to the fact that theadministrative complaint against petitioner Honradawas dismissed. They invoke our ruling in Maceda v.Vasquez28 that only this Court has the power to overseecourt personnel's compliance with laws and take theappropriate administrative action against them for theirfailure to do so and that no other branch of thegovernment may exercise this power without runnIngafoul of the principle of separation of powers.

But one thing is administrative liability. Quiteanother thing is criminal liability for the same act. Ourdetermination of administrative liability for falsificationof public documents is in no way conclusive of his lackof criminal liability. As we held in Tan v. Comelec,29 thedismissal of an administrative case does not necessarilybar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same orsimilar acts which were the subject of theadministrative complaint.

Petitioner's assertion that private respondentAlterado has resorted to forum-shopping isunacceptable. The investigation then being conductedby the Ombudsman on the criminal case for falsificationand violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt PracticesAct, on one hand, and the inquiry into theadministrative charges by the COMELEC,on the otherhand, are entirely independent proceedings. Neitherwould the results in one conclude the other. Thus anabsolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to anadministrative prosecution (Office of the CourtAdministrator v. Enriquez, 218 SCRA 1)or vice versa. 30

Furthermore, the Court finds accused-movant Cesar G.Santos' reliance on the case of People v. Sandiganbayan31

misplaced./7E Footnote om;"ed ~29 Footnote omitted30 pp. 657-658,252 SCRA 641 (1996); Italics s p31 712 SCRA2013 (2013)

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-16-CRM-I061-1067People vs. Camiling, Jr., et at.

In People, the Supreme Court held that the fact-findinginvestigation should not be deemed separate from thepreliminary investigation conducted by the Office of theOmbudsman !f the aggregate time spent for both constitutesinordinate and oppressive delay.32The Supreme Court includedthe duration of the fact-finding investigation in thedetermination of the existence of inordinate delay in theproceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman because theState miserably failed to demonstrate that the delay in the fact-finding investigation and the preliminary investigation wasreasonable.33 This is not so in these cases.

In its assailed Resolution promulgated on September 22,2017, the Court found the explanation of the prosecutionregarding the delay in these cases to be satisfactory, thus:

Here, the prosecution explained that it took morethan 3 years to complete the preliminary investigationbecause the different stages of the case, i.e., fact-finding, review, filing of the Informations, wereconducted by separate offices within the Office of theOmbudsman.

In Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan,34 theSupreme Court took judicial notice of the fact that thereis a steady stream of cases being filed with the Officeofthe Ombudsman. Towit:

x x x. The Court takes judicial notice of thefact that the nature of the Office of theOmbudsman encourages individuals who clamorfor efficient government service to lodge freelytheir complaints against alleged wrongdoing ofgovernment personnel. A steady stream of casesreaching the Ombudsman inevitably results.Naturally, disposition of those cases would take

______ so_m_e_t_im_e_.Moreover, petitioner herself h~

32 p. 364, People v. Sandiganbayan, 712 SeRA 2013 (2013); Emphasis supplied"pp. 415-416, People v. Sondioonboyon, 712 SCRA2013 (2013) H rvI~ Footnote om;"ed / • U ..-b'

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-16-CRM-I061-1067People vs. Camiling, Jr., et aI.

contributed to the alleged delay when she askedfor extension of time to file her counter-affidavit.

This holds true even in the present. Because theOffice of the Ombudsman must devote time to review allcomplaints filed before it, the resolution of cases willnecessarily take some time.

As with the other cases pending before the Officeof the Ombudsman, the present cases involvevoluminous documents. This was acknowledged byaccused Dosado, Cabreros and Editha Santos in theirMotion for Extension dated January 19, 2012,35requesting the Office of the Ombudsman to grant themadditional time for the filing of their respective counter-affidavits. 36

Indeed, the period during which records of these caseswere examined and reviewed, the motions for extension filed bythe accused-movants, the time poured into the research ofpertinent laws and jurisprudence, the levels of review that thecase had to go through and the exercise of legal judgment anddiscretion should also be taken into consideration indetermining the existence of inordinate delay.

The Court notes that the other grounds relied upon by theaccused-movants in their present motion had been squarelypassed upon by the Court in its assailed Resolutionpromulgated on September 22, 2017, to wit:

In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan,37 the SupremeCourt explained that this right was designed to preventoppression by holding criminal prosecution suspendedover the citizen for an indefinite time. Moreover, spe~

35 Footnote omitted36 pp. 24-25, Resolution; pp. 637-638, Vol. II, Record37 Footnote omitted


trial is a relative term, and necessarily a flexibleconcept. The right thereto is violated only when theproceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious andoppressive delays. Viz.:

The right of the accused to a speedy trialand to a speedy disposition of case against him .was designed to prevent the oppression of thecitizen by holding criminal prosecutionsuspended over him for an indefinite time, andto prevent delays in the administration of justiceby mandating the courts to proceed withreasonable dispatch in the trial of criminalcases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedydisposition of a case is violated only when theproceeding is attended by vexatious, capriciousand oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whetheror not an accused has been denied such right isnot susceptible by precise qualification. The. concept of a speedy disposition is a relative termand must necessarily be a flexible concept.

While justice is administered withdispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly,expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot bedefinitely said how long is too long in a systemwhere justice is supposed to be swift, butdeliberate. It is consistent with delays anddepends upon circumstances. It secures rightsto the accused, but it does not preclude therights of public justice. Also, it must be borne inmind that the rights given to the accused by theConstitution and the Rules of Court are shields,not weapons; hence, courts are to give meaningto that intent.

In determining whether the accused has beendeprived of the right to speedy disposition of cases, fourfactors must be considered. These are: (a) length ofdelay; (b) reason for the delay; (e) the defend~


assertion of such right; and (d) prejudice to thedefendant. 38

It appears that the subject transactions took placesometime in February 2003. On October 7, 2003, theMemorandum dated August 20, 2003 of State AuditorManual Baes was referred to the Office of the DeputyOmbudsman for the Military and Other LawEnforcement Offices (OMB-MOLEO) for fact-findinginvestigation. The same was subsequently endorsed tothe Commission on Audit (COA)for the conduct of fraudaudit on February 27, 2004. The COA submitted theresults of the fraud audit and investigation to OMB-MOLEOon September 14,2010.

Based on the results of the fraud audit, the OMB-MOLEO, through its Fact-Finding Investigation Bureau(FFIB), filed the Affidavit-Complaint dated October 19,2011. From January 30, 2012 to March 16, 2012, therespondents (accused herein) filed their respectivecounter-affidavits. Thereafter, Ombudsman ConchitaCarpio-Morales approved the Joint Resolution datedJanuary 8, 2014 on March 19, 2015. The separateMotions for Reconsideration of the respondents weredenied in the Joint Order dated October 30, 2015 andthe Informations dated August 15, 2016 were filed withthis Court on October 28,2016.

From the referral of the matter to the OMB-MOLEOon October 7, 2003 to the filing of the Information in thepresent cases before this Court on October 28, 2016,there was a lapse of around thirteen (13) years. Thepreliminary investigation, which commenced upon thefiling of the Affidavit-Complaint dated October 19,2011,and which was terminated upon the approval of theJoint Resolution on March 19, 2015, took more thanthree (3)years to complete.

The prosecution now contends that the time it tookthe COA to complete the fact-finding investigatiOn

38 Footnote omitted /


should not be taken into consideration in determining ifthere was a violation of the accused' right to speedydisposition of cases.

The Court agrees with the prosecution that thefraud audit conducted by the COA- which took morethan 5 years to complete - should not be included in thecounting to determine if there was inordinate delay. InTilendo v. Ombudsman,39 the Supreme Court ruledthat the fact-finding investigation conducted by theNational Bureau of Investigation is not part of thepreliminary investigation. The pertinent portion of theSupreme Court's Decision reads:

In this case, there was no unreasonabledelay to speak of because the preliminaryinvestigation stage officiallybegan when the NBIfiled before the Office of the Ombudsman acomplaint against Tilendo for violation of therelevant provisions of RA 3019 and the RPC.Contrary to Tilendo's view, the preliminaryinvestigation did not automatically commenceupon the filing of the anonymous letters in theOmbudsman.

Significantly, the Court held in Raro v.Sandiganbayan, that by referring the complaintto the NBI, the Ombudsman did not therebydelegate the conduct of the preliminaryinvestigation of the case to the NBI. What wasdelegated was only the fact-finding function,preparatory to the preliminary investigation stillto be conducted by the Ombudsman.

Verily, in the more recent case of Torres v.Sandiganbayan,40 it was held that the stages prior tothe preliminary investigation, including the fact-finding

~ Footnote om;tted ??'" Footnote om;tted p/;

)(


investigation, are considered In determining if therewas inordinate delay. Towit:

We find it necessary to emphasize that thespeedy disposition of cases covers not only theperiod within which the preliminaryinvestigation was conducted, but also all stagesto which the accused is subjected, evenincluding fact-finding investigations conductedprior to the preliminary investigation proper. xxx

But it must be stressed that the fact-findinginvestigation being referred to in Torres is the fact-finding investigation conducted by the Office of theOmbudsman.

Here, after the Memorandum was referred to theOMB-MOLEO in October 2003, the matter wassubsequently endorsed to the COA, which submittedthe results of its fraud audit in September 2010. Thepreliminary investigation proper commenced upon thefiling of the Affidavit-Complaintdated October 19, 2011.

Nonetheless, even if the Court starts counting onlyfrom the commencement of the preliminaryinvestigation, the fact remains that it took more thanthree (3) years to terminate the preliminaryinvestigation. Such period of more than three (3)years4Ito complete the preliminary investigation may beconsidered unreasonable if the prosecution fails to offera valid justification for the same. In Corpuz, theSupreme Court explained that different weights shouldbe assigned to different reasons invoked by the State forthe delay. Towit:

Closely related to the length of delay is thereason or justification of the State for suchdelay. Different weights should be assigned todifferent reasons or justification invoked by //

41 Footnote omitted


State. For instance a deliberate attempt to delaythe trial in order to hamper or prejudice thedefense should be weighed heavily against theState. Also, it is improper for the prosecutor tointentionally delay to gain some tacticaldisadvantage over the defendant or to harass orprejudice him. On the other hand, the heavycase load of the prosecution or a missing witnessshould be weighed less heavily against the State.

The Court notes that accused Editha Santos filedwith the OMB-MOLEO her Motion for Early Resolutionwith Motion to Dismiss42 on June 10, 2013, therebyasserting her right to speedy disposition of cases. Butwhat accused Editha Santos filed was not a meremotion asking the Office of the Ombudsman to actpromptly on her case. It bears stressing that included inher Motion for Early Resolution was a Motion toDismiss, which the Office of the Ombudsmannecessarily had to pass upon, respecting accusedEditha Santos' right to due process.

Finally, accused Dosado, Cesar Santos and EdithaSantos claim that the delay in the termination of thepreliminary investigation caused prejudice. Because ofthe delay, documents and witnesses have becomeunavailable, thus impairing their defense. AccusedSantos further claim that her career in the governmentservice has been placed in uncertainty, and herreputation tarnished by reason of the inordinate delayin resolving the case filed with the Office of theOmbudsman.

Accused Editha Santos' claim that her career wasadversely affected by the delay in unsubstantiated. Andindeed, the Supreme Court, in Corpuz, recogrlized/7

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-l6-CRM-I061-1067People vs. Camiling, Jr., et ai.

fact that inordinate delay may cause the impairment ofthe accused' defense. Towit:

x x x. Prejudice should be assessed in thelight of the interest of the defendant that thespeedy trial was designed to protect, namely: toprevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; tominimize anxiety and concerns of the accused totrial; and to limit the possibility that his defensewill be impaired. Of these, the most serious isthe last, because the inability of a defendant toadequately prepare his case skews the fairnessof the entire system. There is also prejudice ifthe defense witnesses are unable to recallaccurately the events of the distant past. Even ifthe accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he isstill disadvantaged by restraints on his libertyand by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicionand often, hostility. His financial resources maybe drained, his association is curtailed, and heis subjected to public obloquy.

It must, however, be emphasized that theimpairment of the accused' defense may also be a resultof the mere passage of time. To reiterate, the right tospeedy disposition of cases is violated only when thedelay is unjustifiable. In determining if the delay isunjustifiable, the Court must consider several factors,and not solely the length of delay. If the delay is notunjustifiable, or if the complaint against the accusedwas filed towards the end of the prescription period forthe respective crimes allegedly committed, impairmentof the accused' defense may also result, but it cannot besaid that the right to speedy disposition of cases wasviolated.

Considering the foregoing, the Court finds thatthere was no violation of accused Dosado, Cesar Santosand Editha Santos' right to speedy disposition ofcases.43

~ pp. 21-26, ResoluNon; pp. 634-639, Vol. II, R co,d ;t


Finally, the accused-movants' reliance on the cases ofCoscolluela, Torres and People cannot be applied to thepresent cases because of the differences in their factual milieus.

In the very recent case of Remulla v. Sandiganbagan,44the Supreme Court emphasized the need for the courts to weighthe different facts and circumstances surrounding each case inorder to determine whether an accused's right to speedydisposition of cases had been violated. According to the HighTribunal, as early as 1983, the Supreme Court, in the case ofMartin v. Ver,45had already adopted the ((balancing test" laiddown by the United States Supreme Court in the case ofBarker v. Wingo.46 This test compels the courts to approachsuch cases on an ad hoc basis.47 This is precisely the approachadopted by the Court in these cases. The Court applied the((balancing test" and did not find the delay in these cases to bevexatious, capricious and oppressive.

In sum, the Court does not find any new and compellingargument raised by the accused-movants that would warrantthe grant of their present motions.

WHEREFORE, accused Editha B. Santos' "Motion forReconsideration" dated October 9, 2017, and accused Cesar G.Santos' ((Motion for Reconsideration" dated October 4, 2017, areDENIED for lack of merit and/ or being pro forma.

Set the arraignment of accused Gregorio M. Camiling,Severino P. Estrella, Barmel B. Zumel, George P. Cabreros,Editha B. Santos and Cesar G. Santos and the pre-trial onDecember1, 2017, at 1:30 in the afterno/7

44 G.R. No. 218040, April 17, 201745208 Phil. 658 (1983)46407 US 514 (1972)47 p. 6, Remulla v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 218040, April 17, 2017


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