Rereading Mao’s Military Thinking

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Rereading Maos Military ThinkingPrashant Kumar SinghPublished online: 03 Oct 2013.

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Strategic Analysis, 2013Vol. 37, No. 5, 558580, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2013.821247

Rereading Maos Military Thinking

Prashant Kumar Singh

Abstract: Although the nature of warfare has changed beyond recognition since the1920s and 1930s when Chairman Mao Zedong penned his main military writings, hismilitary thoughts are still a point of reference for any discussion on military thinking inmodern China. Developments in warfare have superseded Maos operational principlesand tactics visualised in his three-stage warfare; however, his philosophical and politi-cal understanding of war has value that transcends time and space. The present articleshows that the political and military situation in China in the 1920s and 1930s shapedMaos military thoughts, and his military ideas were an original contribution to Marxistthought. The extent to which pre-existing non-Marxist Chinese and Western scholarlytraditions of strategic thinking influenced his ideas is uncertain. Maos military ideascontinue to provide normative direction in China, with the potential of opportunisticphilosophical manipulation by the government. In addition, the righteous convictionsof his military thoughts continue to capture the imagination of anti-system dissentersworldwide.

Introduction

W ith the passage of time, Mao Zedongs military thinking has been reduced toromanticised guerrilla warfare, at least in popular parlance. This article rereadsthe larger contexts and nuances of Maos military thinking, and reminds us that guer-rilla warfare was just one aspect of his thinking and had only secondary importance inhis understanding of warfare. It should also be reiterated that Maos military thoughtswere a product of his Marxist-Leninist conviction and practical military experiencederived from Chinas civil war and the fight against Japans invasion. Tracing it toChinas ancient military thinking would be an over-extension. This article has beendeveloped on the basis of Maos seminal military writings during the 1920s and 1930sthat are available in English. Many scholars have carried out work on Maos militarythinking in the past, some of which this author has referred to. This article highlightsthe finer details of Maos reasoning on war and warfare and will perhaps also satisfythe need for a short and readable representation of Maos military thinking to enablescholars to grasp Maos military thoughts more easily.1

The historical setting of Maos military thinking

The Japanese invasion of China and the Chinese civil war between the Kuomintang(KMT or the Nationalist Party) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) made a

Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh is Associate Fellow at IDSA, New Delhi.Some portions of this article will appear in an ensuing monograph to be published later. The viewsexpressed in this article are the authors own.

2013 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

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Strategic Analysis 559

complex political and military picture in China from the late 1920s onwards, and alsoshaped Maos military thinking. Japan had long had its eyes on Chinese resources torealise its colonial ambitions. Annexing Taiwan from China in 1895 made China thefirst victim of its colonial ambitions. Japan fought a war against Russia on Chinese soilin Manchuria in 19041905. After the final collapse of the Qing dynasty in 19111912,Japan started pressing China for sovereign concessions in Manchuria and Shandong.Japan presented its 21 demands to China in 1915 in this regard. However, even adisintegrated and enfeebled Chinese state resisted such demands which had createdpopular outrage against Japan. After bullying China for years, Japan finally invadedand occupied Manchuria in 1931. After a few years of nibbling at Chinese terri-tory, the Japanese military juggernaut rolled down from Manchuria in the north intoChina proper in July 1937, and knocked out the Chinese forces, capturing Chinesecities in quick succession. By October 1938, when Wuhan (the Chinese capital sincethe fall of Nanjing in December 1937) fell, almost the whole of North and CentralChina and large swathes of South China were under loose Japanese occupation. Thismeant that the cities and the main lines of communication were firmly guarded bythe Japanese, whereas the countryside was relatively free. After the fall of Wuhan, thewar became protracted; no major operation was conducted, leaving the ground positionmore or less unchanged until the end of the war in 1945. The primary reason for thiswas Japans engagement in other war theatres during that period. In this war, Chinapaid a huge human cost. The Chinese people were subjected to inhuman atrocities,the cities were bombarded indiscriminately, around 300,000 Chinese were butcheredin Nanjing alone, and approximately 100 million Chinese were displaced. This bar-barity left the ordinary Chinese people hostile towards Japan and fuelled internationaloutrage as well, notably in the US. Incidentally, Japan during this time had fallen intothe hands of a militarist leadership, with the democratic leadership either persecuted orsidelined.

In the meantime, the emergence of the CCP with an alternative vision for Chinawas an important development. The CCP was formed in 1921. The communists joinedthe KMT on the common anti-imperialism and anti-warlordism plank in 1923. Theyparticipated in the northern campaign (19261928) to reunify China, alongside theKMT, under KMT leader Chiang Kai-sheks military leadership. However, this wasan uneasy relationship. In April 1927, on Chiang Kai-sheks orders, the nationalistarmy with the help of criminals unleashed violence on the communists, murderingthousands of communists in Shanghai in just a couple of days. This marked the endof the first united front, starting the Chinese civil war. The communists failed to inciteretaliatory revolutionary violence in urban areas and were compelled to retreat into therural hinterland and raise their own Red Army.

Between 1930 and 1934, Chiang Kai-sheks government launched five extermina-tion or encirclement and suppression campaigns against the communists. While thecommunists successfully repulsed the first four by employing guerrilla warfare, aban-doning this guerrilla warfare and opting for positional warfare almost ensured theirextermination in the fifth. The disaster of the fifth extermination campaign was thebackground of the communists flight for survival, known in history as the heroic LongMarch, in which 86,000 communists abandoned their base in Jiangxi, South China, inOctober 1934 and travelled first westward, then turning north reached the northernprovince of Shaanxi in October 1935, covering around 6,000 miles. The attacks by thenationalist and warlords militaries, and exhaustion during this long flight reduced thecommunist armys numbers to less than 10,000. After reaching Shaanxi in October

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560 Prashant Kumar Singh

1935, the communists based themselves in North China and carried out their oper-ations from there till the end of the war with Japan and finally till the breakout ofcivil-war with the KMT in 1946. Under tremendous public pressure, as well as pressurefrom within the nationalist army, Chiang Kai-shek reluctantly proposed a united frontwith the communists against the Japanese, which the communists agreed to, accept-ing his overall leadership, starting the second united front in 1937. The united frontbroke down after the New Fourth Army incident in 1941 in which the nationalist troopskilled 3,000 communist troops in Southern Anhui. After this the nationalists and thecommunists entered a sort of truce until the resumption of civil war in July 1946. Thecommunists, until the end of the war against Japan, basically carried out guerrilla activ-ities between the Japanese lines in North China. However, realising the outcome of thewar, they rushed to fill the vacuum left by the Japanese in Manchuria. In Manchuria,they got hold of the retreating Japanese troops ammunition, and more importantly theysuccessfully mobilised the countryside for their support. It was here that the civil warfinally resumed with the arrival of the nationalist troops.

In final analysis, during the entire war the Japanese always had the upper hand.Japan demonstrated superior firepower and military skills. The nationalist forces borethe brunt of the Japanese juggernaut. However, the KMT not only appeared lackingon military counts, despite Soviet and US assistance, but it appeared constrained byits support base of landlords and bourgeois class, politically vacillating too as to whowas its major enemy: Japan or the communists. On the other hand, the military roleof the communists in the war against Japan on the whole was limited to some heroic

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fights. They were never considered the main countervailing force against Japan, eitherby the Chinese public or by international powers such as the US and the USSR. Laterit was the rural masses political support for them which ultimately proved decisive inthe civil war against the KMT.

This is the background that resonates in Maos military writings. He led theLong March, and was chairman of the communist party during many of these years.In his writings, he comes across as a patriot revolutionary communist military com-mander, and puts forward his observations, opinions and convictions. His writings,

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originally lectures given to party cadres, were intended to dispel their doubts and striveto debunk theories expounded self-servingly or out of ignorance by non-communistcircles, especially the KMT.2

The study of war

Conceding high unpredictability on a tactical level, Mao perceived war as a methodi-cal exercise worth scientific study, as considerable predictability exists on its strategiclevel. For him, war science contained science of strategy, science of campaign and sci-ence of tactics. The recurrence of the terms strategy and strategic is noticeably highin Maos military thoughts. The terms, simply speaking, denote overall, broad, on thewhole and macro level of war. Any war-related analysis on this level is a strategic-levelanalysis, which Mao insisted must be allowed to decide the course of military cam-paigns and nature of tactics employed. Granting that sometimes one or two individualrecklessly fought wars could disturb strategic-level calculations, he emphasised indi-vidual victories or defeats as strategically inconsequential for any of the belligerents.According to Mao, having a correct strategic view of war and faithfully implementingit was the key to winning.

Strategic-level analysis consists of two parts: political and military. While politicalanalysis examines belligerents overall socio-political, economic and military strengthand the international scenario, military analysis chalks out a war strategy consistentwith political analysis. Maos strategic-level analysis encompassed:

Study of comparative strength of enemy and own in politics, economy, military and otherareas; Proper study of various campaigns or various operational stages and their relationwith the war as a whole; Identify important tactical aspects which can prove decisive; Identifyunique characteristics in the general situation; and Study how to manage the front and the rearsimultaneously.3

Nature of war

War had a central place in Maos scheme for communist revolution. He pronounced:

[t]he seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central taskand the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds gooduniversally, for China and for all other countries . . . Experience tells us that Chinas problemscannot be settled without armed force . . . Whoever wants to seize and retain state power musthave a strong army.4

For Mao, war was a political action which performed the historical function of carry-ing society forward by breaking civilisational deadlocks created by vested interests. Heaverred that in human civilisation hardly any war has happened that was not a productof politics. Here, he was endorsing the Marxist understanding that politics is all aboutclass struggle. Class struggle is a long-drawn competition among various groups ofsociety that manifests itself in various violent and non-violent ways. For Mao, war wasthe supreme manifestation of class struggle.

War is the highest form of struggle for resolving contradictions, when they have developed acertain stage, between classes, nations, states, or political groups, and it has existed ever sincethe emergence of private property and of classes.5

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Mao described the armed struggle under the CCP leadership as the only way left forsocio-economic reforms in China.

Yes, we are advocates of the omnipotence of revolutionary war; that is good, not bad, itis Marxist. The guns of the Russian Communist Party created socialism. We shall create ademocratic republic.6

War per se was not morally condemnable. He saw a distinction between just and unjustwars. Just wars were progressive and ensured advancement of society. Mao declared:We support just wars and oppose unjust wars. All counter-revolutionary wars areunjust, all revolutionary wars are just.7 He exemplified the First World War as unjustwar, which, he stated, the communists in the world opposed. The protracted war withJapan was another example of just war. He announced: The banner of mankinds justwar is the banner of mankinds salvation. The banner of Chinas just war is the ban-ner of Chinas salvation.8 He was convinced that only just war could eliminate unjustwars, and ensure peace:

War, this monster of mutual slaughter among men, will be finally eliminated by the progress ofhuman society, and in the not too distant future too. But there is only one way to eliminate it andthat is to oppose war with war, to oppose counter-revolutionary war with revolutionary war,to oppose national counter-revolutionary war with national revolutionary war, and to opposecounter-revolutionary class war with revolutionary class war.9

Upholding strategic defensive orientation for just wars, Mao rejected strategic offen-sive as an imperialist idea, which, according to him, was in pursuit of aggressivepolicies in international politics. He was essentially rejecting the cult of offenceseen in many countries in Europe in the first half of the 20th century. He did notaccept that strategic offensive was needed to boost national morale, certainly notin the Chinese context. He argued that Chinese peoples faith in the justness oftheir cause of liberation was a big morale booster. However, his vision of strategiccounter-offensive, expressed in the concept of active defence, reserved the rightof pre-emptory strikes in self-defence on campaign and tactical levels. This wasconsistent with his belief in just war.10 Mao stipulated that politics in the formof war was conducted by the armed forces, and was a different format than poli-tics in the regular sense. According to him, the military objective of every war wasself-preservation and annihilation of the enemy. Here, annihilation means destruc-tion of the enemys war machinery, not physical destruction of each and every enemysoldier.11

Some scholars such as Samuel B. Griffith and John LWashington Jr. have attemptedto underscore the influence of Sun Tzu on Mao. On the other hand, Edward L.Katzenbach and Gene Z. Hanrahan, Tang Tsou and Morton H. Halperin, and GiriDeshingkar do not see such an influence. Although Maos writings contain ancientChinese maxims, they do not constitute the core of his ideas. The real meaning of beinginfluenced by someones work is accepting his or her views as cardinal guiding princi-ples, and accordingly interpreting and constituting the reality. The trend of overlookingMaos Marxist-Leninist convictionsubiquitous in his writingsand emphasisingsporadic maxims of Sun Tzu misses the point made here. As far as Sun Tzus influ-ence on Maos guerrilla tactics is concerned, his guerrilla tactics came, more plausibly,from his own experiences of war. Besides, there are questions about his actual reading

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of Sun Tzu. Katzenbach and Hanrahan, and Deshingkar point out Maos late readingof Sun Tzus texts. Similarly, Mao read some of Clausewitz in Chinese translation, andhis ideas about war have resemblance to those of Clausewitz. However, it would beincorrect to describe him as Clausewitzian. As is clear, Maos military thoughts werebasically introducing Marxist understanding of class struggle into the military realm.Drawing insights from Stuart R. Schram, Mao was aware of his Chinese cultural her-itage, and the society he wanted to change was Chinese. However, the ideology he waspursuing for this change was Marxism-Leninism.12 Finally, Maos ideas on war andwarfare are his original and structured contribution to Marxist thought: Mao Tse-tunghas done for war what Lenin did for imperialism and Marx for capitalism: he has givenwar scientific schemata.13

The two main problems

The strategic-level problems that Mao strove to resolve in his writings were whethersheer military force could subjugate China, and whether quick victory against theenemy was achievable. While the first problem was applicable in the context of theJapanese invasion, the second problem was equally applicable to the war againstJapan as well as the civil war against the KMT. Mao resolutely opposed flightism(only retreat, never advance) as well as desperate recklessness (only advance, neverretreat). Flightists were those who advocated compromise with Japan by surrenderingsome Chinese territory, while the reckless wanted quick victory over the Japanese orthe KMT. Many of the themes under the two problems are quite entwined, but havebeen segregated in this article for better readability.

China cannot be subjugated

Maos answer to whether China could be subjugated demonstrated his patriotismas well as his grip over domestic and international political-economy and warfare.His answers to the question basically took on a defeatist psychology, expressed instatements like China is inferior in arms and is bound to lose in a war; If Chinaoffers armed resistance, she is sure to become another Abyssinia; and the continu-ance of the war spells subjugation. For Mao, such statements were subjugationism,not a concern about subjugation. Subjugationists had neither hope nor interest in theresistance against Japan.14 In view of the common Chinese peoples anger towardsJapan because of its barbarity, and international opinion against it, Mao believed thatsubjugationists did not pose a serious challenge. Nevertheless, they required rebuttal atevery level, and in every form, due to the fear of the existence of defeatist impulses insociety.15

Mao underscored that the Japanese invasions barbarity flowed from the military-feudal character of Japanese imperialism, pursuing a basically unchangeable materialand cultural agenda in China:

At the very beginning of the War of Resistance, we estimated that the time would come whenan atmosphere conducive to compromise would arise, in other words, that after occupyingnorthern China, Kiangsu and Chekiang, Japan would probably resort to the scheme of inducingChina to capitulate. True enough, she did resort to the scheme, but the crisis soon passed,one reason being that the enemy everywhere pursued a barbarous policy and practiced naked

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plunder . . . In the main the enemy is transplanting into the interior of China the same oldmeasures he adopted in the three northeastern provinces. Materially, he is robbing the commonpeople . . . Spiritually, he is working to destroy the national consciousness of the Chinesepeople . . . This barbarous enemy policy will be carried deeper into the interior of China.16

Mao argued that only the progressive overthrow of the Japanese ruling class by Japansprogressive sections could stop Japanese aggression towards China. Otherwise, thisaggression would stop with the Japanese ruling class committing suicide in pursuit ofthe subjugation of China. There was no third way out. For Mao, the second scenariowas the only plausible possibility.17

Mao was convinced that Japanese imperialism would not be able to carry on itsinitial success in the long run due to deficient manpower and overstretched resources.Besides, as he argued, the Japanese invasion coincided with the eve of the worldwidecollapse of imperialism and fascism. Japans imperialist strength itself had declinedfrom what it used to be before the First World War. Furthermore, Mao reasoned, Japanwas underestimating the rising tide of Chinese nationalism. Despite being a compara-tively weak semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, China had considerable presenceof capitalism and had a bourgeoisie national leadership (basically the KMT and othernationalist groups), with considerable military wherewithal. He also reiterated the pres-ence of the CCP and its Red Army as a committed force against the aggressors.Furthermore, Mao was confident of eventually gaining full international support forChina against Japan. He spoke highly of the geographically proximate USSR. Thus,Japan was indulging in adventurism to maintain its pre-eminence.18

Answering an important question posed to him about whether a small but strongcountry could conquer a big but weak country in modern times, he emphasised thatit was possible only in distant history when wars were local incidents without signifi-cant international repercussions. Furthermore, he argued that citing Britains conquestof India was incorrect, as it would amount to forgetting that Japanese capitalism inthe 1930s was in decline, while British capitalism in the 18th century was on a risingtrajectory. He also argued that Italys conquest of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935 wasalso an incorrect example as Abyssinia was still passing from the slave to the serfsystem, and was too small and weak in every regard of national capabilities to becompared with China. The Italian conquest of Abyssinia was an internationally iso-lated event even in modern times, whereas war on such a scale as the Japaneseinvasion of China could not have been without international repercussions.19 Thus,Mao forcefully argued that subjugation of China through sheer military force wasimpossible:

Even if Japan should succeed in occupying a section of China with as many as 100 to 200 mil-lion people, we would still be far from defeated . . . when it is dark in the east, it is light in thewest; when things are dark in the south, there is still light in the north . . . Even if Japan block-ades the Chinese coastline, it is impossible for her to blockade Chinas Northwest, Southwestand West.20

Quick victory is not possible

Mao dismissed the Left adventurism of demanding quick victory against the KMT andthe Japanese. He straightforwardly stated that the adventurists assessments were unre-alistic and quick victory was a delusion.21 Victory required comprehensive political

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work and continuously pushing back the enemy by a series of small tactical vic-tories. Mao asked to take full advantage of Chinas geography and population, andopposed putting all the stakes in one or two odd battles, as without a favourable strate-gic balance of power, fighting strategically decisive battles could have been disastrous.Chinas large territory provided an extended battlefront for manoeuvre, and its hugepopulation a large recruitment base: an ideal situation for protracted war. He arguedthat the duration of the war against Japan would mainly depend on the rise of theanti-imperialism revolutionary movement within Japan, formation of an internationalunited front against Japan and most importantly the building of a united national frontin China. Incidentally, Maos emphasis on the international scenario was perhaps morerelevant in the war against Japan than in the civil war.22

In the context of the civil war, Mao considered the KMTs encirclement and sup-pression campaigns, and the Red Armys counter-campaigns, as the main pattern. Theentire civil war would protractedly rotate between the KMTs offensive and the RedArmys defensive, and the Red Armys counter-offensive and the KMTs defensive.For the communists, the loss of territory, cadres and party membership would alwaysbe recoverable. Only complete destruction would be their defeat. According to Mao,the KMT would not be able to sustain this mode of warfare in the long run for wantof the public support protracted warfare required. Besides, it had a palpable state todefend.23

Nevertheless, Mao knew that the Red Armys internal and external adversaries wereformidable, and had strategic advantage. While the Japanese were waging war in theChinese territory maintaining a strategic offensive and operating on exterior lines, theKMT government, recognised by major countries, controlled almost all of China andhad massive military power. On the contrary, the communist partys political powerwas in flux and without external recognition and its Red Armys fighting capabilitieswere very limited. Broadly speaking, in the civil war the KMT forces were encirclingthe communists, and later the Japanese forces were encircling the Chinese, commu-nists included. However, as Mao stated, the communist party was pinning its hopeson political divisions in the KMT which were adversely affecting the KMT forcesmorale, and also on the most potent weapon of the politically surcharged peasantryssupport against the foreign invaders and the local KMT. He underlined that the invad-ing Japanese army or the reactionary KMT forces were moving amidst a large andhostile population.24 Thus, with the peasantry and Chinas large territory in the back-drop, Mao supported the idea of three-stage warfare to fight superior enemies from aninferior position.

Three-stage warfare

Maos three-stage warfare strategy was basically a strategy of mobile warfare assistedby guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare was secondary in his overall scheme despitetaking the lead from time to time. Mobile warfare was high-mobility war on exten-sive battlefields, making swift advances and withdrawals, swift concentrations anddispersals. Its essence was fight when you can win, move away when you cantwin, keeping war fronts fluid. In mobile warfare, regular armies wage quick-decisionoffensive campaigns and battles on exterior lines along extensive fronts and overbig areas of operation. He argued that [a]ll our moving is for the purpose of

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fighting.25 One can argue that the same applies to guerrilla warfare too. But as itemerges in Maos writings, guerrillas were local peasants loosely directed but stronglyinspired by the communist party, and active only in their local pockets, whereas regu-lar communist armies, despite the fluidity of war, were under a political and militarycommand with a high degree of centralisation, and their scale of operation was muchlarger.

The three-stage mobile warfare strategy proposed strategic retreat against thestrategy of engaging the enemy outside the gates. Mao argued that engaging theenemy outside the gates was erroneous, and meant:

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Pit one against ten, pit ten against a hundred; Attack on all fronts; Seize keycities; Strike with two fists in two directions at the same time and Dont let ourpots and pans be smashed.26

The communists needed a calculated strategic retreat to acquire strength to defeattheir more powerful enemies. Mao argued that the communist partys 16-characterformulathe enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemytires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursuewas the gist of strategic retreat-basedanti-encirclement and suppression counter-campaigns against the KMT,27 equallyapplicable to the war against Japan too.

Thus, three-stage warfare was strategically defensive. Its first two stages generallywitnessed strategic retreat, whereas the third stage was strategic counter-offensive. Maowarned that three-stage warfare would be a long-drawn process, always with new cam-paigns and new battles under new circumstances.28 Incidentally, this article strives toprovide a context-neutral interpretation of three-stage warfare, or read the two contextsalongside each other. However, since three-stage warfare got full treatment in the con-text of the Japanese invasion, it is this context that is relatively more pronounced in thefollowing sub-sections.

1. The first stage

At the time Mao was writing his essays On Protracted War and Problems of Strategyin Guerrilla War against Japan, the war of resistance was in the first phase. Japanwas on the strategic offensive making advances into China, and the Chinese forceswere on the strategic defensive. Despite Chinas putting a united national front againstJapan, the Japanese were prevailing in the war with all their potential disadvantages.Their inadequacy in numbers of men and material was yet to show any effects. Japanwas yet not fully isolated by the international community, and was receiving foreignarms. Although sympathetic to China, advanced capitalist countries were hesitant tojoin hands with the USSR against Japan. Therefore, despite China gaining some polit-ical and military strength since the invasion began, the idea of a quick victory wasnot workable. Strategic retreat was the only choice.29 Earlier against the KMT, too,Mao had rhetorically described the temporary loss of territory as give in order totake:

It often happens that only by loss can loss be avoided . . . If you refuse to let the pots and pansof some households be smashed over a short period of time, you will cause the smashing ofthe pots and pans of all the people to go on over a long period of time.30

Primarily mobile warfare, supplemented by guerrilla and positional warfare wasthe preferred mode of war in strategic retreat. During this period, explaining therationale of strategic retreat as the beginning of a counter-offensive to the sym-pathetic masses, on whose support the success of this strategy depended, wasvery important. The retreat had tactical value too: to force the enemy to makemistakes.31

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2. The second stage

The shortage of troops and the stiff resistance put up by the Chinese would bringJapans strategic advance to a halt which will mark the end of the first stage. In thesecond stage, marked by a strategic stalemate, the enemy would consolidate its powerand revolutionary forces would prepare for the counter-offensive. In this stage, theenemy would defend his rear and its occupied territory operating from terminal points(centralised locations). The guerrillas would fight intensely on exterior lines. Takingadvantage of the enemys neglect of his rear during his relentless strategic advancein the first stage, they had immediately set up their bases around the occupied areas.Thus, the main feature of the fight would now be guerrilla warfare, with mobile warfare

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becoming secondary. The bulk of the Chinese forces would be dispersed to the enemysrear in coordination with local guerrillas. Their coordinated guerrilla warfare wouldcompel the enemy to come out from his stronghold areas only to be annihilated inmobile warfare.32 Nevertheless, despite the enemy adopting the strategic defensive,the overall balance of power would still favour the enemy.

The second stage would be relatively longer and more painful, and would witnessunprecedented bloodshed, foreign occupation, puppet governments, rapine and plun-der, and cultural humiliation. However, this phase would also witness unprecedentedmass mobilisation and national unity, primarily seen in the public support for the guer-rillas. International support, crucial to determine the duration of this stage, would buildup for China tangibly. With the enemy fully overstretched, the strategic balance wouldfinally begin to tilt in Chinas favour by the end of this phase. Political and diplomaticwork would begin to bear fruit.33

2.1. Quick decision battles

Although Mao did not very clearly ascribe quick decision battles to any particularstage, most quick decision battles were likely to have taken place in the second stage.Although fighting potentially strategically decisive individual battles with uncertainoutcomes was unacceptable, when victory was sure, dragging the enemy into deci-sive engagements in major or minor campaigns or battles was necessary. Incidentally,there is difficulty of approximation of Chinese use of the words operation and cam-paign with the Western or Indian terminology. Nevertheless, in the light of Maoswritings, it appears that these quick decision battles are operation-level battles. Onlya series of such decisive battles would deplete the enemy forces and transform theChinese forces from weak to strong. The thrust was to annihilate the enemy in smallnumbers. Thus, Mao endorsed an operational principle of quick-decision offensivewarfare on exterior lines for campaigns and battles under an overarching strategic prin-ciple of protracted defensive warfare on interior lines. This operational principle wasmeant to push the enemy on the defensive on exterior lines, compel him to divest histroops from the interior lines, and gradually achieve the strategic objective of seekingthe enemys strategic-level attrition. Quick decision battles should have quick victo-ries which depended on the offensive employment of overwhelming numbers.34 Maoemphasised that the victory or defeat in the first battle in any campaign may prove adecisive influence on the troops morale. Therefore, it should be part of the larger cam-paign plan, and should be carefully planned keeping the next strategic stage in mind.For battles, he produced certain guidelines:

It is inadvisable to fight when the force confronting us is too large; it is sometimes inadvisableto fight when the force confronting us, though not so large, is very close to other enemy forces;it is generally inadvisable to fight an enemy force that is not isolated and is strongly entrenched;and it is inadvisable to continue an engagement in which there is no prospect of victory.35

Mao warned that sometimes the enemy too would like to prolong operation/campaign-level battles in order to avoid annihilation. However, inadequate reinforcement wouldnot allow him to do so. Thus, the enemys weakness in numbers and its strategicmismanagement should be continuously exploited. In addition, although the enemy

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may like to prolong some battles when in a disadvantageous position, its overall strat-egy would still be to impose a war of quick decision on China, which China mustavoid and instead persist with a protracted war strategy to keep the situation under itscontrol.36

3. The third stage

Intense political and diplomatic work done during the second stage brings aboutthe third stage, in which relatively strengthened Chinese forces would finally launcha strategic counter-offensive and the exhausted enemy would beat a strategic-level

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retreat. Mobile warfare would subsume guerrilla warfare. For the first time, the Chineseforces would fight a war on exterior lines on a strategic level to recover national ter-ritory. China would be liberated by dint of its political and military perseverance, andwith international support. It would also contribute to the international fight againstfascism. What a prophetic word in 1938, when the Second World War in Europe wasyet to start, and Japans defeat would take a full seven years more. The details of theactual course of Chinas war of resistance against Japan may vary. However, what isbeyond doubt is that Mao correctly perceived the direction of the general drift of thepolitical course.37

Four main relations in three-stage warfare

Maos three-stage warfare contained four main relations or themes: interior andexterior lines, possession and non-possession of a rear area, encirclement and counter-encirclement, and big areas and little areas. On the whole, the retreating regular forceswould operate on interior lines, while the guerrilla forces would advance on exteriorlines. The guerrilla forces too would have their own interior and exterior lines open-ing multiple fronts of war, and presenting an imagery of simultaneous retreat andadvance. The regular forces would fight from the depth (rear area) of the country,whereas the guerrillas would be located in the enemy rear, maintaining their own smallrear area, trapping the enemy in a multi-layered encirclement and making the battle-front unsustainably extended for the enemy. The Chinese forces were first encircled bythe invading Japanese army when they were retreating on interior line. However, theretreating Chinese forces too, at times, tactically encircled isolated enemy troops onexterior lines, which formed the first counter-encirclement of the enemy. The enemysattempt to encircle individual guerilla bases located in its rear area was the secondform of encirclement by it; however, in its attempt to encircle individual guerilla basesthe enemy itself stood encircled by the guerilla network on the whole, which was thesecond form of counter-encirclement of the enemy. Despite occupying Chinese terri-tory, the enemy would practically occupy some big cities and protect its main lines ofcommunication only. China at large, particularly its rural side, would remain free, andeven occupied areas had guerrilla bases.38

Positional warfare and guerrilla warfare

Mobile defence, positional attack and positional defence had only a secondary role inmobile warfare. Both offensive and defensive positional warfare was generally defunctin the extremely fluid second phase. However, semi-positional warfarewas more usefulin obstructing the enemys advance.39 In Maos thinking, guerrilla warfare due to itssheer scale was much more important, and had its own autonomous strategic context.It would assume relatively more importance in the second phase; otherwise, its primaryfunction was assisting mobile warfare, and it would be subsumed into mobile warfarein the third phase. Mao did not appear to hold a romantic view of guerrilla warfare.In fact, while discussing guerrilla-ism, Mao argued that guerrilla-ism in the sense ofmobility was essential as a primary mode of warfare, but in the sense of irregularity,decentralisation, lack of uniformity, absence of strict discipline and rudimentary func-tioning, he would have to go with the Red Army becoming a more sophisticated andmodern army.40

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Political work

Mao emphasised that victory in war depended on political progress. For him, politicalwork deserved more attention than weapons and finance. It involved shaping publicopinion, mass mobilisation for war, raising a politically committed army, establish-ing the communist partys leadership over the army and building broad political unityand international opinion against the enemy.41 The article has already mentioned cre-ating a broad-based unity without compromising the communist partys long-termgoal and the importance of international diplomatic work as important componentsof Maos political work. The role of the masses in war and the concern about establish-ing leadership of the communist party over the Red Army stands out in Maos politicalwork.

Maos dubbing of subjugationist and quick victory ideas as subjective did not meanopposing mans conscious dynamic role, but only meant opposing unsubstantiatedideas.42 He welcomed conscious individual efforts in war. In fact, without ensuringpeoples whole-hearted participation, aspiring to victory was to go south by drivingthe chariot north. A comprehensive mass politicisation was meant to explain the aimof the war to the masses, convince them about its justness and tell them the daily lifeimplications of defeat. Political work was basically propaganda carried out throughvarious educational and cultural activities. Such politicisation would ensure an abun-dance of voluntary reinforcement producing a spirited peoples army whose moralewould be far superior to that of the invaders. Thus, people were more decisive thanweapons.

Political progress at home and perseverance in the War of Resistance are inseparable. Thegreater the political progress, the more we can persevere in the war, and the more we perseverein the war, the greater the political progress.43

Mao declared:

Communists do not fight for personal military power, but they must fight for military powerfor the Party, for military power for the people . . . Political power grows out of the barrel of agun. Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed tocommand the Party.44

Mao condemned the roving rebel band political ideology and the purely military view-point which showed little interest in ground-level political work as running counter tothe communist partys leadership and its revolutionary goals. He attributed the rovingrebel band tendency to the lumpen proletariat section, which constituted a consider-ably large proportion of the Red Army, and wanted to increase the partys politicalinfluence only by mercenary methods like monetary incentives and accepting desert-ers and mutineers. Besides, a purely military viewpoint saw division between politicaland military tasks of the party, and treated military tasks as superior. Mao warned thata purely military viewpoint would eventually mean, If you are good militarily, natu-rally you are good politically; if you are not good militarily, you cannot be any goodpolitically. He warned that the military bereft of revolutionary commitments wouldalienate the masses, threaten proletarian leadership and take the course of warlordism.In order to tackle these problems, he recommended correct ideological education forthe army, more recruitment from politicised workers and peasants, the partys activeparticipation in military affairs and constructive criticism of the army at every level

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of the party, with clear instruction for the army for grassroots-level political and mil-itary work and a clear definition of its relationship with the party and the masses.The aim was to make the army realise that it was fighting its own war, not somebodyelses.45

Finally, the unity between officers and men, the unity between army and people,a united front policy, mass mobilisation and an international alliance including pro-gressive Japanese, constituted the full spectrum of political work that was to start atthe officer-soldier level. Once the political work was completed:

[t]he Japanese aggressor, like a mad bull crashing into a ring of flames, will be surrounded byhundreds of millions of our people standing upright, the mere sound of their voices will striketerror into him, and he will be burned to death.46

For a summary of Maos strategic and operational precepts see Appendix 1.

The legacy and relevance of Maos military thinking

Maos military thoughts, summarised as the Peoples War, provided the intellec-tual conditioning of the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) for decades. Theybecame an important instrument in larger political machinations in the 1960s, par-ticularly during the Cultural Revolution. Even after the reversal of Maoist politics,and eventually Maos death, the wholesale abandoning of Maos military thoughtswas never possible.47 The deterrence value of Maos Peoples War, national mobil-isation and all-out war-like formulations, although polemical, has been underscored.The examples of Vietnam and Afghanistan are also cited to prove that the nationalmobilisation that Mao visualised has never been an outdated phenomenon.48 Militarypower continues to be a vital component in the Chinese conception of comprehen-sive national power. Dennis J. Blasco points out that all the Chinese defence WhitePapers since 1998 have adhered to the Peoples War concept and active defence strat-egy, indicating a strong textual as well as normative continuity. David Lai illustrateshow the CCP and the PLA treats Peoples War as a magic weapon. Maos successorDeng Xiaoping, upholding Maos thoughts, insisted on implementing it under modernconditions. Jiang Zemin, who underscored the role of technology in military affairs,also described Peoples War as the key to defeating enemies. Lai also mentionsHu Jintaos highlighting of the importance of Peoples War. He appears to suggestthat there is pressure from the top Chinese leadership to continuously redefine MaosPeoples War doctrine.49

The idea of strategic defence still has strong ideological support. Hypotheticallyspeaking, if China were to build an expeditionary military force on the Americanmodel, it would entail adjustment in overall national ideological orientation and ensurea lot of homework for the ruling communist party. Analysing Peng and Yaos editedvolume, The Science of Military Strategy, Blasco states that peoples war is not astatic or dead theory. It is redefining itself, as the PLA is modernising. Blasco aswell as Alexander Huang points out that the salience of this theory does not lie intechnology, but in its connection with politics and people. As China continues to be aparty-state, the importance of correct handling of partypublic, partyarmy and armypublic relations is as relevant as it was in the 1920s and 1930s. Blasco mentions thatpeoples mobilisation is still an important feature in Chinas military planning. TheNational Defence Mobilisation Law (2010) and Chinas emphasis on civilmilitary

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integration in logistic building are instructive in this regard, although criticism persistsover how reliable and sustainable civilian support is in the context of high-technologywars. Information warfare too is interpreted as a form of Peoples War, although theinformation warfare-specific contours of Peoples War require a clearer enunciation ofthe idea, whether it is interpreted as a form of Peoples War in terms of civilmilitaryintegration of the information technology resources, the mass use of private hackers orsurprise and deception akin to guerrilla tactics.50

On a different note, the old Maoist tendency of interpreting the world in confronta-tional ideological terms persists, in which the US and the West are still consideredhegemonic powers. Other countries are evaluated on the basis of their relationswith the hegemonic powers. Japan continues to be a reference point for Chinesenationalism. Seeing Chinas recent assertions in the territorial disputes in the EastChina Sea and the South China Sea, one could argue that China is transiting froma strategic defensive ideology to a strategic offensive ideology. In this context, anopportunistic philosophical and political revival of Maos military thought is not animpossibility as terms like self-defence, active defence and just cause are all aboutsubjective interpretation. Maos principle of strategic defence with permission forpre-emptive initiative on the campaign level has the capacity to accommodate thisopportunism.51

Maos Peoples War has a role-model value. It still inspires armed insurgenciesacross countries; recent examples include Indian and Nepalese Maoist insurgencies.The internet has the potential to bring Peoples War to urban areas. Facebook mobil-isations brought down Hosni Mubaraks government in Egypt in 2011 and played aninstrumental role in the civil society-led anti-corruption movement in 20112012 inIndia and unprecedented public demonstrations in the wake of the death of a gang-rape victim in India in December 2012 and January 2013. In China, too, the internetplays an important role in mass incidents. All this is protracted war in its own rightwaged by civil society. In the 1930s, the Japanese or the local bourgeois reactionaryKMT forces were moving amidst a hostile population. Now, and in recent times, theCCP is moving amidst a growing number of dissenters. Although terrorist and sepa-ratist violence figures as a prominent security concern for China, as seen in the PLAsPeace Mission exercises with Russia and its other military drills, whether the Chinesegovernment officially recognises the threat of any form of Peoples War or protractedwar against it, and whether it has any comprehensive counter-strategypolitical andmilitaryis a matter of separate research.

Conclusion

Although Maos three-stage Peoples War was the product of a specific time and space,as an analytical category that changed the notion of time, space (territory), loss anddefeat, it reains relevant. Various military leaders like Simon Bolivar in Venezuela inthe 19th century may have implemented the kind of three-stage war in the past that Maovisualised in the 1930s. In fact, even the nationalist army basically followed protractedwar against Japan after the fall of Wuhan in 1938. Nevertheless, it is Mao who madeit an analytical category. His understanding that war is politics, and people at large arean integral part of this politics, is hard to challenge. Maos views of political workare not very compatible with the liberal democratic setting of civilmilitary relations.Nevertheless, the role of righteous conviction in boosting the militarys morale andthe militarys organic link with the masses and the political class in national defence

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transcends boundaries. Finally, a fair understanding of Maos military thoughts is stillvital in order to understand the Peoples Republic of Chinas continuous rhetoric onpeace, just wars and strategic defence.52

Notes1. Mao Zedong, The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains (1928), On Correcting Mistaken

Ideas in the Party (1929), Problems of Strategy in Chinas Revolutionary War (1936),Guerilla Warfare (1937), Basic Tactics (1937), On Protracted War (1938), Problems ofStrategy in Guerrilla War against Japan (1938) and Problems of War and Strategy (1938),all in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, at http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/ and http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/military-writings (both accessed 17 February 2013). The Marxists Internet Archive (http://www.marxists.org/) houses standard translations of Maos work in circulation. Since the writingsare in html format rather than PDF, they do not show page numbers. Therefore, to make ref-erences easily accessible, the author has put sections in inverted commas followed by chapterswith chapter numbers, wherever a book is available in chapters, and then the name of the bookin italics. On Protracted War is available in sections and paragraph numbers, not in chapters.Therefore, references to this book include paragraph numbers.

2. This summary narration of the historical setting in China from the late 1920s onwards drawson Stephen R. MacKinnon, The Sino-Japanese Conflict, 19311945, in David A. Graff andRobin Higham (eds.), A Military History of China, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 2002,pp. 211227; William Wei, Political Power Grows Out of the Barrel of a Gun: Mao and theRed Army, in David A. Graff and Robin Higham (eds.), ibid., pp. 229248; Edgar Obalance,The Red Army of China, Faber and Faber, London, 1962. See also Mao Zedong, The ChineseCommunist Party and Chinas Revolutionary War and The Laws of War are Developmental,Problems of Strategy in Chinas Revolutionary War, no. 1.

3. Mao Zedong, Strategy is the Study of the Laws of a War Situation as a Whole, in Howto Study War (Chapter I), Problems of Strategy in Chinas Revolutionary War, no. 1; MaoZedong, Initiative, Flexibility and Planning (Paragraph 88), On Protracted War, no. 1.

4. Mao Zedong, Chinas Characteristics and Revolutionary War, Problems of War and Strategy,no. 1.

5. Mao Zedong, The Laws of War Are Developmental, in How to Study War (Chapter I),Problems of Strategy in Chinas Revolutionary War, no. 1.

6. Mao Zedong, The War History of the Kuomintang, Problems of War and Strategy, no. 1.7. Mao Zedong, The Aim of War is to Eliminate War, in How to Study War (Chapter I),

Problems of Strategy in Chinas Revolutionary War, no. 1.8. Ibid.9. Ibid.; Mao Zedong, The Object of War and Fighting for Perpetual Peace

(Paragraphs 5758), On Protracted War, no. 1.10. Mao Zedong, Active and Passive Defence, in The Strategic Defensive (Chapter V),

Problems of Strategy in Chinas Revolutionary War, no. 1.11. Mao Zedong, War of Annihilation, in The Strategic Defensive (Chapter V), Problems

of Strategy in Chinas Revolutionary War, no. 1; Mao Zedong, The Object of War(Paragraph 68), On Protracted War, no. 1.

12. Stuart R. Schram, Chinese and Leninist Components in the Personality of Mao Tse-Tung,Asian Survey, 12(6), June 1963, pp. 259273.

13. For this quotation, see Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr. and Gene Z. Hanrahan, The RevolutionaryStrategy of Mao Tse-Tung, Political Science Quarterly, 70(3), September 1955, p. 322.Samuel B. Griffith is probably the earliest writer who attempted to draw a parallel between SunTzu and Mao. He translated Sun Tzus Art of War and some of Maos works, and gave themintroductory notes. His translation of Sun Tzu (Sun Tzu: The Art of War, translated and withan introduction by Samuel B. Griffith, with a foreword by B.H. Liddell Hart, Clarendon Press,Oxford, 1963) is perhaps the first known standard translation. Griffith asserts: The influence ofthe ancient military philosopher Sun Tzu on Maos military thought will be apparent to thosewho have read The Book of War. Sun Tzu wrote that speed, surprise, and deception were theprimary essentials of the attack and his succinct advice, Sheng Tung, Chi His (Uproar [in

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the] East, Strike [in the] West), is no less valid today than it was when he wrote it 2,400 yearsago. The tactics of Sun Tzu are in large measure the tactics of Chinas guerrillas today.Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare, translated by Samuel B. Griffith, US Marine CorpsPublication, 1940, p. 37, at http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/FMFRP%2012-18%20%20Mao%20Tse-tung%20on%20Guerrilla%20Warfare.pdf (Accessed 10 March2013). Many online resources such as Online Information for the Defense Community(http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA168430)include A Study of a Classical Leader: Sun Tzu and His Influence on Mao Tse-Tung (John L.Washington, Jr., Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base,Alabama, 1986) as an important book about Sun Tzus influence on Mao. Unfortunately,however, the copy of this work is not accessible. Griffith cites a number of quotations fromSun Tzu in Maos works. However, the mere presence of these quotations does not prove SunTzus decisive influence on Mao. Recently, Mark McNeilly has also attempted to providean interpretation of Sun Tzu relevant to contemporary times: Mark McNeilly, Sun Tzu andthe Art of Modern Warfare, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003; Mark McNeilly,Sun Tzu and the Art of Business: Six Strategic Principles for Managers, Oxford UniversityPress, New York, 2003. On the basis of his own reading of Maos military writings, thisauthor endorses the view upheld by Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr. and Gene Z. Hanrahan, TheRevolutionary Strategy of Mao Tse-Tung, Political Science Quarterly, 70(3), September1955; Tang Tsou and Morton H. Halperin, Mao Tse-Tungs Revolutionary Strategy andPekings International Behavior, The American Political Science Review, 59(1), March 1965,pp. 8099; Giri Deshingkar, Mao Zedongs Military Thought: A Perspective, China Report,31(101), February 1995, pp. 101107. Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr. and Gene Z. Hanrahan,and Giri Deshingkar question whether Sun Tzu really had any decisive influence on Mao.They highlight the Marxist-Leninist character of Maos military thinking, and argue thatalthough Maos ideas may overlap with those of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, his ideas areindependent of them. Incidentally, Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr. and Gene Z. Hanrahan appear tosuggest an interesting argument that although Maos military thoughts are a contribution tocommunists worldwide, his use of Marxist-Leninist quotations themselves is just by way ofexamples, like quotations from Sun Tzus works. What he means is that Maos contributionof military thoughts to the Marxist communists was independent of Marx and Lenin. Theywere essentially his own (see pp. 322324). Giri Deshingkar points out the limitation interms of Maos access to Western literature, and Maos own confession that he read Sun Tzuconsiderably late (see p. 102). Tang Tsou and Morton H. Halperins article is an extremelyvaluable contribution on Maos military thoughts. They study Maos military thoughts interms of revolutionary strategy only, and analyse the relationship between Maos revolutionarystrategy and the Leninist framework. They argue that Mao went beyond Lenin in his emphasison the importance of military power (p. 81). Carnes Lord states: There is little evidencethat Mao Tse-tungs military thought and practice was affected significantly by Sun Tzu.The emphasis in The Art of War on subduing the enemy without fighting was long regardedin the Peoples Republic as an idealist element in the work that rendered it suspect fromthe Marxist-Leninist perspective. Since the mid- to late 1980s, however, Chinese analystshave come to see in this aspect of The Art of War the basis for a theory of deterrence withChinese characteristics, and the study of Sun Tzu in Chinese military circles has becomeincreasingly de rigueur. Carnes Lord, A Note on Sun Tzu, Comparative Strategy, 19(4),OctoberDecember 2000, p. 305.

14. Mao Zedong, Statement of the Problem (Paragraph 3) and The Theory of NationalSubjugation is Wrong and the Theory of Quick Victory is Likewise Wrong (Paragraph 28),On Protracted War, no. 1. Mao identified two different strands of subjugationism: social andpolitical. Social subjugationism reflected general pessimism and a limited world-view, whereaspolitical subjugationism self-servingly believed in Japans limited objectives in North andNortheastern China. At another level, Mao differentiated that political subjugationism wasfundamental while social subjugationism was just temporary. Mao Zedong, Statement ofthe Problem (Paragraph 8), On Protracted War, no. 1.

15. Compromise or Resistance? Corruption or Progress (Paragraph 24), On Protracted War,no. 1.

16. Ibid. (Paragraphs 21 and 24).

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17. Mao Zedong, The Army and the People are the Foundation of Victory (Paragraph 111), OnProtracted War, no. 1.

18. Mao Zedong, The Basis of the Problem (Paragraphs 911) and Refutation of the Theory ofNational Subjugation (Paragraphs 1516), On Protracted War, no. 1.

19. Mao Zedong, Refutation of the Theory of National Subjugation (Paragraphs 1318), OnProtracted War, no. 1.

20. Mao Zedong, Statement of the Problem (Paragraph 6), On Protracted War, no. 1.21. Mao Zedong, The Theory of National Subjugation is Wrong and the Theory of Quick Victory

is Likewise Wrong (Paragraphs 27, 29 and 119), On Protracted War, no. 1.22. Mao Zedong, Statement of the Problem (Paragraph 6), On Protracted War, no. 1.23. Mao Zedong, Preparations for Combating Encirclement and Suppression Campaigns,

Strategic Retreat, Strategic Counter-Offensive, in The Strategic Defensive (Chapter V),Problems of Strategy in Chinas Revolutionary War, no. 1.

24. Statement of the Problem (Paragraph 6), On Protracted War, no. 1. The support of peasantsand the rural masses for the Red Army against the KMT and later against the Japanese invadingforces is a recurring theme of Maos writings, and a basic proposition in his strategy againstthem.

25. Mao Zedong, Mobile Warfare, in The Strategic Defensive (Chapter V), Problems ofStrategy in Chinas Revolutionary War, no. 1; Mao Zedong, Statement of the Problem(Paragraph 6) and Mobile Warfare, Guerrilla Warfare and Positional Warfare (Paragraph 91),On Protracted War, no. 1.

26. Mao Zedong, Strategic Retreat, Problems of Strategy in Chinas Revolutionary War, no. 1.27. Ibid.28. Mao Zedong, Encirclement and Suppression and Counter-Campaigns against ItThe Main

Pattern of Chinas Civil War (Chapter IV), Problems of Strategy in Chinas RevolutionaryWar, no. 1.

29. Mao Zedong, The Three Stages of the Protracted War (Paragraphs 36 and 42), On ProtractedWar, no. 1.

30. Mao Zedong, Strategic Retreat, in The Strategic Defensive (Chapter V), Problems ofStrategy in Chinas Revolutionary War, no. 1.

31. Ibid.32. Mao Zedong, The Three Stages of the Protracted War (Paragraph 35), On Protracted War,

no. 1.33. Ibid. (Paragraphs 41 and 43).34. Mao Zedong, Offence within Defence, Quick Decisions within a Protracted War, Exterior

Lines within Interior Lines (Paragraphs 7277), On Protracted War, no. 1; Mao Zedong,Mobile Warfare and War of Quick Decision, in The Strategic Defensive (Chapter V),Problems of Strategy in Chinas Revolutionary War, no. 1.

35. Mao Zedong, Offence within Defence, Quick Decisions within a Protracted War ExteriorLines within Interior Lines (Paragraphs 7277), On Protracted War, no. 1; Mao Zedong,Starting Counter-Offensive, War of Quick Decision, Mobile Warfare, in The StrategicDefensive (Chapter V), Problems of Strategy in Chinas Revolutionary War, no. 1.

36. Mao Zedong, Offence within Defence, Quick Decisions within a Protracted War, ExteriorLines within Interior Lines (Paragraphs 74, 76), On Protracted War, no. 1: Mao Zedong, Warof Quick Decision, in The Strategic Defensive (Chapter V), Problems of Strategy in ChinasRevolutionary War, no. 1.

37. Mao Zedong, The Three Stages of the Protracted War (Paragraph 38), On Protracted War,no. 1.

38. Mao Zedong, A War of Jig-Saw Pattern (Paragraphs 5156), On Protracted War, no. 1.39. Mao Zedong, Mobile Warfare, Guerrilla Warfare and Positional Warfare (Paragraphs 7277),

On Protracted War, no. 1; Mao Zedong, MobileWarfare and War of Quick Decision, in TheStrategic Defensive (Chapter V), Problems of Strategy in Chinas Revolutionary War, no. 1.For strategic context of guerrilla warfare, see Mao Zedong, Problems of Strategy in GuerrillaWar against Japan, no. 1.

40. Mao Zedong, Mobile Warfare and War of Quick Decision, in The Strategic Defensive(Chapter V), Problems of Strategy in Chinas Revolutionary War, no. 1.

41. Mao Zedong, Political Mobilization for the War of Resistance (Paragraphs 66 and 67), OnProtracted War, no. 1.

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42. Mao Zedong, Mans Dynamic Role in War (Paragraphs 6061) and Political Mobilizationfor the War of Resistance (Paragraphs 6667), On Protracted War, no. 1. Mao has dealt withthe issue of subjectivism in the chapter On Subjectivism in On Correcting Mistaken Ideas inthe Party, no. 1. Here, he is more concerned about subjectivism within the communist party. Hedescribes subjectivism or subjective criticism as loose and groundless talk or suspiciousnesscausing unprincipled disputes and undermin[ing] the Party organization and great harm tothe analysis of the political situation and the guidance of the work finally resulting either inopportunism or in putschism. To correct this problem, he suggests: (1) Teach Party membersto apply the Marxist-Leninist method in analysing a political situation; (2) Direct the atten-tion of Party members to social and economic investigation and study, and help comrades tounderstand that without investigation of actual conditions they will fall into the pit of fantasyand putschism; (3) In inner-Party criticism, guard against subjectivism, arbitrariness and thevulgarization of criticism; statements should be based on facts and criticism should centre onpolitics.

43. Mao Zedong, Compromise or Resistance? Corruption or Progress (Paragraph 25), OnProtracted War, no. 1.

44. Mao Zedong, The War History of the Kuomintang, Problems of War and Strategy, no. 1.45. Mao Zedong, On the Ideology of Roving Rebel Bands and On the Purely Military

Viewpoint, On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party, no. 1; Mao Zedong, MilitaryQuestions, The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains, no. 1. Cliquism (the rejection of theidea of arming local masses), opportunism (the tendency to avoid action under the pretext ofconserving strength) and the malady of revolutionary impetuosity, also described as putschism(wanting only to do big things, and showing contempt for small work such as political workamong the masses), were facets of a purely military view.

46. Mao Zedong, The Army and the People Are the Foundation of Victory (Paragraph 114), OnProtracted War, no. 1.

47. See John Gittings, The Learn from the Army Campaign, The China Quarterly, 18, AprilJune 1964, pp. 153159; Ellis Joffe, The Chinese Army after the Cultural Revolution: TheEffects of Intervention, The China Quarterly, 55, JulySeptember 1973, pp. 450477; RalphL. Powell, The Increasing Power of Lin Piao and the Party-Soldiers 19591966, The ChinaQuarterly, 34, AprilJune 1968, pp. 3865; Richard D. Nethercut, Deng and the Gun: PartyMilitary Relations in the Peoples Republic of China, Asian Survey, 22(8), August 1982,pp. 691704.

48. You Ji, The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Evolution of Chinas Strategic Thinking,Contemporary Southeast Asia, 21(3), 1999, pp. 344364. The references to Peoples War incontemporary China, the example of the US defeat in Vietnam and the Soviet humiliation inAfghanistan are available on pp. 346347.

49. David Lai, The Agony of Learning: The PLAs Transformation in Military Affairs, in RoyKamphausen, David Lai and Travis Tanner (eds.), Learning by Doing: The PLA Trains at Homeand Abroad, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 2012, pp. 366367.

50. This paragraph draws on Alexander Huang, Transformation and Refinement of ChineseMilitary Doctrine: Reflection and Critique on the PLAs View, in James C. Mulvenonand Andrew N.D. Yang (eds.), Seeking Truth from Facts: A Retrospective on ChineseMilitary Studies in the Post-Mao Era, Rand Cooperation, 2001, at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/2007/CF160.pdf (Accessed 4 March 2013);and Dennis J. Blasco, Chinese Strategic Thinking: Peoples War in the 21st Century,China Brief , 10(6), The Jamestown Foundation, at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36166&tx_ttnews[backPid]=13&cHash=56137daa72(Accessed 18 March 2013). For information warfare-centric contemporary references, andinterpretation of Peoples War, see James Mulvenon, The PLA and Information Warfare,in James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang (eds.), The Peoples Liberation Army in theInformation Age, Rand Corporation, 1999, p. 183, at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF145/CF145.chap9.pdf (Accessed 4 March 2013); WangPufeng, The Challenge of Information Warfare, at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/china/docs/iw_mg_wang.htm (Accessed 18 March 2013); Wei Jincheng, Information War: A New Formof Peoples War, at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/china/docs/iw_wei.htm (Accessed 18 March2013). Wang Pufengs and Wei Jinchengs writings are part of Michael Pillsburys edited

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collection, Chinese Views of Future Warfare published by the Institute for National StrategicStudies, National Defense University Press, Washington DC, 1998.

51. The point conveyed in this paragraph draws on David Lai, no. 49, pp. 361367.52. Please see the following monograph for some of the outstanding theoretical formulations in

Chinese strategic culture: Andrew Scobell, China and Strategic Culture, Strategic StudiesInstitute (US Army War College), 2002, at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub60.pdf (Accessed 3 March 2013).

Appendix 1

Strategic and operational principles prescribed by Mao suitable for Chinas revolutionary war

Oppose adventurism when on the offensive,oppose conservatism when on the defensive,and oppose flightism when shifting from oneplace to another

Determine strategic orientation

Oppose guerrilla-ism in the Red Army Uphold the guerrilla character of the RedArmy operation

Oppose protracted campaigns and a strategyof quick decision

Uphold the strategy of protracted war andcampaigns of quick decision

Oppose fixed battle lines and positionalwarfare

Uphold fluid battle lines and mobile warfare

Oppose fighting merely to rout the enemy Uphold fighting to annihilate the enemyOppose the strategy of striking with two fistsin two directions at the same time

Uphold the strategy of striking with one fistin one direction at one time

Oppose the principle of maintaining one largerear area

Uphold the principle of small rear areas

Oppose an absolutely centralised command Uphold a relatively centralised commandOppose the purely military viewpoint and theways of roving rebels

Uphold the Red Armys propagandist andorganiser role in the Chinese Revolution

Oppose bandit ways Uphold strict political disciplineOppose warlord ways Uphold both democracy within proper limits,

and an authoritative discipline in the armyOppose an incorrect, sectarian policy oncadres

Uphold the correct policy on cadres

Oppose the policy of isolation Uphold the policy of winning over all possibleallies

Oppose keeping the Red Army at its old stage Uphold developing the Red Army into a newstage

Mao Zedong, Our Strategy and Tactics Ensuing from These Characteristics, in Characteristics of ChinasRevolutionary War (Chapter III), Problems of Strategy in Chinas Revolutionary War, no. 1.D

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AbstractIntroductionThe historical setting of Mao's military thinkingThe study of warNature of warThe two main problemsChina cannot be subjugatedQuick victory is not possibleThree-stage warfare

Four main `relations' in three-stage warfare

Positional warfare and guerrilla warfarePolitical work

The legacy and relevance of Mao's military thinkingConclusionNotesAppendix 1

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