Hydro-Political Hyperbole: ExaminingIncentives for Overemphasizing theRisks of Water Wars
•
David Katz
Introduction
Reference to linkages between natural resource scarcity and the potential for vi-olent conºict is now commonplace. Perhaps the most highlighted and moststudied such linkage is that between freshwater scarcity and conºict. Predictionsof looming water wars—such as former Egyptian Foreign Minister and laterUnited Nations Secretary-General Boutrous Boutrous Ghali’s statement that“The next war in the Middle East will be fought over water, not politics,” or for-mer World Bank Vice President Ismail Serageldin’s declaration that “the wars ofthe next century will be over water”1—have been cited extensively by a varietyof sources over the past three decades. More recently, UN Secretary-General BanKi-moon stressed reports that water scarcity has created “a high risk of violentconºict.”2 Those who make claims regarding the possibility of future water warsrange from people who present such a scenario as a possibility that can beavoided with cooperation and proper planning,3 to those who predict thatsuch wars are likely,4 to those who conªdently assert that such outcomes are“certain”5 and only a matter of time.6
While the claim that increasing water scarcity will lead to increased out-breaks of wars—often dubbed the “water war hypothesis”—is widespread inpublic discourse, a growing body of literature has challenged both the empirical
1. Cited by Barbara Crossette, “Severe Water Crisis Ahead for Poorest Nations in Next 2 Decades,”New York Times, 10 August 1995.
2. Cited by Mark Clayton, “Is Water Becoming ‘The New Oil’?” The Christian Science Monitor,29 May 2008.
3. Frey and Naff 1985; and Postel and Wolf 2001.4. Cooley 1984; Naff and Matson 1984; Starr 1991; Bulloch and Darwish 1993; De Villiers 1999;
and theoretical foundations of such a hypothesis.7 Critics note, for instance, thatproponents of the water war hypothesis often rely on a very limited number ofcase studies or statements from a handful of prominent ªgures,8 that relativelylittle systematic empirical evidence exists of past wars over water, and that thereis scant evidence that violent conºict over water is becoming more frequent.9
Despite weak supporting evidence and numerous theoretical challenges tothe water wars hypothesis, proclamations that water wars are imminent remainprevalent. Much of the academic literature on the topic has attempted to pro-mulgate, refute, or test the water war hypothesis. Little has attempted to explainwhy the predictions of water wars remain so popular despite questionable em-pirical support. This study addresses this gap. It outlines various incentives dif-ferent types of key actors have to emphasize, and even exaggerate, the likelihoodof water wars. Moreover, it demonstrates that relationships between several ofthese actors serve to mutually reinforce these incentives. This conºuence of in-centives to stress such risks is likely to have contributed to the persistence ofsuch warnings in public discourse at levels and proªles far beyond what appearsjustiªed by empirical evidence. While this article speciªcally addresses violentconºict over water, its premises and conclusions are likely relevant to much ofthe discourse in the ªeld of environmental security.
The article proceeds as follows: The next section speciªes what is meant bywater wars and violent conºict over water for the purposes of this discussion. Itthen lays out the main arguments for and against the water war hypothesis, andprovides a review of some empirical studies. The subsequent section outlinesincentives to stress the risks of war over water for ªve different actor types—political ofªcials, academics, the media, NGOs, and the private sector—and ex-plores interactions among each groups’ incentives. The ªnal section offers con-cluding thoughts and suggestions for further research.
The Water War Hypothesis: Examining the Evidence
Deªning Water-based Conºict and the Water Wars Hypothesis
Perhaps because of its alliterative character, the expression “water wars” is oftenused to describe any level of conºict between parties involving water.10 Singernotes that most studies of war fail to distinguish between war, which is uncom-mon, and conºict, which is more common.11 Wolf and colleagues cite the lackof a clear use of the term “conºict” as a contributing cause for confusion anddisagreement regarding the water wars hypothesis.12 This article focuses on the
David Katz • 13
7. Lonergan 2001; Dolatyar 2002; and Wolf 2007.8. Dinar 2002.9. Yoffe et al. 2003.
10. For example Annin 2006.11. Singer 1981.12. Wolf et al. 2003.
potential for use of armed force or armed conºict13 between politically orga-nized groups over control over or access to freshwater resources, as this is adeªnition commonly used by both proponents and detractors of the water warhypothesis.
The typical version of the water war hypothesis posits that countries willbe willing to wage war in order to secure or preserve access to scarce water re-sources. A stronger version claims that countries experiencing acute water scar-city will be compelled by a “hydrological imperative” to obtain additional watersupplies from neighboring countries, resorting to violent means if necessary.14
Other versions stress that water scarcity alone is unlikely to serve as a casus bellibetween nations, but rather, may aggravate existing international or domesticconºicts—for instance, by increasing competition over scarce arable land orcausing displacement of rural populations and the creation of environmentalrefugees.15 Kahl identiªes four hypotheses to explain how resource scarcitycould lead to violent conºict: simple scarcity, transboundary migration, depri-vation, and state failure.16 Homer-Dixon noted that resource scarcities couldresult from a decrease in supplies (e.g. drought), an increase in demand (e.g. in-creased consumption), or unequal distribution of a resource among a popula-tion.17
Support for the Water War Hypothesis
Support for the water war hypothesis rests on declarations of public ofªcials,theoretical models, and empirical evidence. In addition to the quotes alreadymentioned, other commonly cited ªgures warning of the risks of water warsinclude former heads of state such as former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat,the late King Hussein of Jordan, and former Israeli Prime Minister ArielSharon.18
Much of the empirical evidence presented in support of the water war hy-pothesis consists of anecdotal evidence and case studies. Among the most pop-ular are Israel’s bombing of Syrian attempts to divert the headwaters of the Jor-dan River, the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s attempt to blow up Israel’sNational Water Carrier,19 and India’s decision to occupy the headwaters of the
14 • Hydro-Political Hyperbole
13. For a detailed deªnition of the terms “armed force” and “armed conºict” as they are commonlyused in the environmental security literature see Uppsala Universitat: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/deªnitions/ Accessed on 12 October 2010.
14. Stauffer 1982; Stork 1983; Cooley 1984; and Lebanese government ofªcial Fadi Comair, citedin “Analysis: Shebaa farms key to Lebanese hydro-diplomacy,” IRIN humanitarian newsand analysis, 10 September 2009. Available online at http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId�86092, accessed 20 December 2009.
15. Gleick 1991; and Homer-Dixon 1994.16. Kahl 2006.17. Homer-Dixon 1994.18. Sharon and Chanoff 1989; Starr 1991; and Amery 2002.19. Naff and Matson 1984; Starr 1991; Gleick 1993; Lowi 1993; and Ward 2002.
Indus in Kashmir.20 Some observers have also attributed more recent conºicts towater scarcity, such as those in Sri Lanka and the Darfur region of Sudan.21
Many early studies on water wars were guilty of what Singer noted as a ten-dency of many popular models to reduce war to single deterministic cause.22
Theories based on water scarcity as a single deterministic driver of conºict ig-nore other important variables such as historical relationships between parties,riparian position, military balance (or asymmetry) of power, governance, anddecision-making structures. These factors have been identiªed as critical in boththe literature on the determinants of war in general,23 and transboundary waterconºict in particular.24 More recent empirical studies have attempted to addressshortcomings of early studies by conducting large-sample statistical analysisthat includes additional explanatory variables. Several have found per-capitawater availability to be statistically correlated with the outbreak of either civil orinternational wars.25 Others have found that, holding other variables constant,neighboring countries that share a river are more likely to engage in violentconºict than those that do not.26 Still others have found correlations betweenchanges in rainfall or high levels of variability in rainfall and the likelihood ofviolent conºict.27
Critiques of the Water War Hypothesis
A number critiques have been leveled against both the theory and the empiricalevidence behind the water wars hypothesis. One critique of the environmentalsecurity literature, of which much of the published material on water wars isguilty, is that warnings and threats of future violence are often considered as evi-dence.28 Statements from the 1980s that the next war in the Middle East will beover water have already proven false. Research has shown, however, that eventhe more general predictions of imminent water wars that are based on com-ments by ofªcials may be suspect. Leng, for instance, found no correlation be-tween the frequency of threats of war and the onset of war.29 Examining conºictand cooperation over water resources, Yoffe and colleagues noted over 400 inci-dents of water-related verbal exchanges by political ªgures between 1948 and1999 that were conºictual in nature, but only 37 instances of violent conºict ofvarying levels of intensity. Thirty of these were from the Middle East, none were
David Katz • 15
20. Mirza 2008.21. Bajpaee 2006; Reddy 2006; and Ban Ki-moon, “A Climate Culprit in Darfur.” Washington Post,
16 June 2007.22. Singer 1981, 2000.23. Singer 1981; and Vasquez 2000.24. Dinar 2009.25. Hauge and Ellingsen 1998; Gleditsch et al. 2006; and Hensel et al. 2006.26. Toset et al. 2000; and Furlong et al. 2006.27. Miguel et al. 2004; Levy et al. 2005; and Hendrix and Glaser 2007.28. Gleditsch 1998, 381.29. Leng 1980.
more recent than 1970, none were all-out wars, and in none was water the cen-tral cause of conºict.30
Proponents of water war scenarios often premise their dire conclusions onthe fact that water is essential for life and non-substitutable.31 Yet water for basicneeds represents a small share of total water use, even in arid countries.32 Econo-mists and others point out that over 80 percent of world freshwater withdrawalsare for the agricultural sector, a relatively low-value use and one in which largegains in efªciency could be made by changes in irrigation techniques and choiceof crops. Thus, economic critiques of the water war hypothesis stress that thevalue of water that would be gained from military conºict is unlikely to out-weigh the economic costs of military preparation and battle, much less the lossof life.33
Some authors have even questioned the empirical basis for the conclusionthat freshwater is increasingly scarce,34 an assumption on which the water warhypothesis relies. Such a “cornucopian” view claims that people adapt to scar-city through improvements in technology, pricing, and efªciency—renderingwater less scarce, not more so.
Perhaps the strongest case against the likelihood of water wars is thelack of empirical evidence of precedents. Wolf found only one documented caseof war explicitly over water, and this took place over 4500 years ago.35 Moreover,he could document only seven cases of acute conºict over water. Yoffe andcolleagues also ªnd that armed conºict over water resources has been uncom-mon.36 They found that cooperation was much more common than conºict,both globally and in all world regions except the Middle East/North Africa. Thispattern may explain why only a limited number of case studies of water conºictare presented in the water wars literature.
Analysts have criticized environmental security arguments that are basedon case studies because such works tend to have no variation in the dependentvariable.37 Many large sample statistical studies have attempted to address suchshortcomings, however, in several cases these studies too have come under ªre.For instance, a number of large-sample statistical studies ªnd correlations be-tween water-related variables and conºict, however, few, if any, provide convinc-ing support for causal relationships. Moreover, several studies found that wateravailability had no impact on the likelihood of either domestic or internationalconºict,38 including at least one study that attempted to replicate earlier studies
16 • Hydro-Political Hyperbole
30. Yoffe et al. 2003.31. For example Elhance 1999.32. Gleick 1996.33. Deudney 1999; Allan 2002; and Fisher and Huber-Lee 2005.34. For example Lomborg 2001.35. Wolf 1999.36. Yoffe et al. 2003.37. Levy 1995; and Gleditsch 1998.38. Esty et al. 1999; Levy et al. 2005; and Stalley 2003.
that claimed to have found such correlations.39 Moreover, the results of severalstudies that do ªnd correlations between water and conºict are either not robustor are contrasted by other ªndings. For instance, Raleigh and Urdal ªnd that thestatistical signiªcance of water scarcity variables is highly dependent on one ortwo observations, leading them to conclude that actual effects of water scarcity“are weak, negligible or insigniªcant.”40 Jensen and Gleditsch ªnd that the re-sults of Miguel and colleagues are less robust when using a recoding of the origi-nal dataset.41 Gleditsch and colleagues found that shared basins do predict anincreased propensity for conºict, but found no correlation between conºict anddrought, the number of river crossings, or the share of the basin upstream, lead-ing them to state that “support for a scarcity theory of water conºict is some-what ambiguous.”42
Evidence and Perception
In sum, despite some instances of violent conºict over water, there is little sys-tematic evidence of war over water resources. Evidence for a deterministic rela-tionship between water scarcity and the outbreak of armed conºict is particu-larly weak. Less ambitious claims that water shortages will contribute toinsecurity, which can, in turn, lead to violent conºict, have more empirical sup-port. Even here, however, the importance of water as a causal variable is ques-tionable. Several studies have found that variables such as regime type and insti-tutional capacity are much more important indicators of conºict potential,43
and may have mitigating effects on any water-conºict link.As a consequence of accumulated research, many scholars have concluded
that risks of water wars are low,44 and others have toned down or qualiªed theirstatements about the likelihood of future water wars.45 Some governmental re-ports have limited their contentions to highlighting that water scarcity canaggravate conºicts and increase insecurity,46 and many studies now emphasizewater as a tool for cooperation.47 Warnings and predictions of imminent water
David Katz • 17
39. Theisen 2008.40. Raleigh and Urdal 2007, 674.41. Jensen and Gleditsch 2009.42. Gleditsch et al. 2006, 361.43. Wolf et al. 2003; and Raleigh and Urdal 2009.44. Beaumont 1994; and Dolatyar 2002.45. Compare, for example, Homer-Dixon’s declaration that “the renewable resource most likely to
stimulate interstate resource war is river water” (Homer-Dixon 1994, 19), with his later state-ment that “wars over river water between upstream and downstream neighbors are likely onlyin a narrow set of circumstances . . . [and] there are, in fact, very few river basins around theworld where all these conditions hold.” (Thomas Homer-Dixon, “The Myth of Global WaterWars,” Toronto Globe and Mail, 9 November 1995; and Homer-Dixon 1999, 208).
46. UNDP 2006; and UN 2009.47. Wolf 1998; Haddadin 2002; Asmal 2001; Sadoff and Grey 2002; Yoffe et al. 2003; Conca et al.
2005; Brochman and Hensel 2009; UN 2006a; and Wolf 2007.
wars continue to be commonplace, however. In a review of published academicliterature, Gupta and van der Zaag ªnd that articles on water conºict outnumberthose on cooperation by nearly three to one, and are ªve times more likely to becited.48
This article will now turn to offering possible explanations for the persis-tence and popularity of such declarations despite the bulk of expert opiniondownplaying the risks of water wars.
Incentives to Stress a Water War Scenario
Incentives Presented in Existing Literature
Observers have noted that various actors may have incentives to stress or evenexaggerate the risks of water wars. Lonergan notes, for instance, that in “manycases, the comments are little more than media hype; in others, statements havebeen made for political reasons.”49 Beyond mere acknowledgement of the possi-bility of such incentives, however, little research has attempted to understandwhat these incentives are and how they may differ between actors. An under-standing of the different motivations of various groups of actors to stress thepossibility of imminent water wars can help explain the continued seeminglydisproportionate popularity of such messages and help to evaluate such warn-ings more critically.
Mueller offers a general explanation for a focus on violence in public dis-course by postulating that, following the end of the Cold War, policy-makers,the press, and various analysts seek to ªll a “catastrophe quota.”50 According tothis theory, various actors seek out new areas of potential violence to justifyfears that had become commonplace during the Cold War period.
Simon, while not speciªcally addressing environmental conºict, suggestsfour possible reasons for academic researchers to offer what he claimed wereoverly gloomy scenarios resulting from resource scarcity.51 The ªrst reason is thatinternational funding organizations are eager to fund research dealing with cri-ses, but not work that produces good news. The second is that bad news sellsmore newspapers and books. The third is a psychological predisposition to fo-cus on bad news or worst-case scenarios. The fourth is a belief that soundingalarm bells can mobilize action to improve environmental issues.
Haas offers two reasons why “exaggerated beliefs about resource scarcityand their possible threats to environmental security persist.” The ªrst is “the ab-sence of any consensual mechanism for reconciling inter-discourse (or inter-paradigm) disputes.” This, Haas argues, allows for ideological disputes to con-
18 • Hydro-Political Hyperbole
48. Gupta and van der Zaag 2009.49. Lonergan 2001.50. Mueller 1994.51. Simon 1980, 1431.
tinue unresolved. “The second reason is the elective afªnity between environ-mental and security discourses on the one hand, and other dominant discoursesin social discussions . . . on the other hand. Consequently self-interested politi-cal actors can borrow from discourses that are similar in their ontology andstructure and that justify pre-existing political ambitions.”52 Trottier, addressingthe risks of water wars speciªcally, suggests that certain private-sector actors inthe water industry may stress the risks of water wars in order to promote water-related infrastructure.53
Mueller’s catastrophe quota does not distinguish among different types ofactors, nor does it explain why speciªcally water-related or environmental criseswould be the natural successor to Cold War worries. Straightforward explana-tions such as Simon’s claim that “blood sells” and Trottier’s economic argumentmay have some merit, but ultimately are unsatisfying; they are not relevant forseveral actors and they oversimplify a multifaceted picture by ignoring otherpossible motives. Such explanations also may give a mistaken impression thatthose offering such statements intentionally distort or mislead the public.Haas’s explanations, too, fail to distinguish between differing incentives for dif-ferent actors. In sum, even taken collectively, these explanations provide only apartial picture of existing incentives. The following sections outline a range ofincentives facing multiple stakeholders.
Multiple Incentives for Multiple Actors
This study analyzes incentives of ªve different types of actors, each of whom hasplayed a role in the promotion of the water war hypothesis. These include polit-ical leaders and policy-makers, academic scholars, the media, NGOs, and theprivate sector. Possible incentives to stress water war scenarios are offered foreach type of actor. These are summarized in Table 1 below. Several incentivesthat are shared by more than one actor type are discussed ªrst, followed by adiscussion of those incentives unique to a single type. While it is not possible inmany cases to verify that these incentives have indeed played a role in the deci-sion of a particular actor, several examples are given in which such a scenarioseems credible.
Shared Incentives
Call Attention to Genuinely Felt Risk: Given past instances of conºict as well asdeclarations by policy-makers, many who stress the potential for war over waterno doubt do so out of a belief that such risks are genuine. Such genuine warn-ings appear to be the case, for instance, for statements in the 1950s and 1960s
David Katz • 19
52. Haas 2002, 2.53. Trottier 2003.
by Israeli leaders that they would take military action against Arab forces shouldthey interfere with Israeli water development projects, a threat upon which theylater acted. Each actor, however, may have several other less straightforward in-centives to stress the water war hypothesis.
20 • Hydro-Political Hyperbole
Table 1Incentives to Stress or Exaggerate Risk of Violent Conºict
Actor
IncentivePoliticians &Policymakers Academics Media NGOs
Privatesector
Call attention to a genuinelyfelt risk
X X X X X
Raise the proªle of develop-ment or environmental needs
X X X X X
Raise the proªle of the authoror organization
X X
Expand pools of availablefunding
X X X
Cite signiªcant statements byprimary deªners
X X
Signal co-riparians that water ishigh-level politics
X
Signal domestic population thatwater is a priority issue
X
Signal to third party a desire forintervention
X
Serve as negotiating tactic X
Provide a gripping headline X
Shorten analysis into sound-bite or article-length piece
X
Give equal weight to opposingviews
X
Focus on aspect of most interestto target audience
X
Serve as a null hypothesis inresearch
X
Raise the Proªle of Water-related Development or Environmental Needs: Several ob-servers have noted that the process of securitization of issues is a strategic prac-tice done in a conscious way to achieve speciªc goals, which need not be secu-rity-related.54 Grifªths noted that “the rhetoric of security is used to attractattention to new concerns.”55 A desire to bring attention to aspects of watermanagement that may otherwise be deemed as less deserving of attention orfunding is an incentive common to all actors examined in this study. Raising thespecter of war can draw attention to issues such as inequitable allocation, sani-tation, pollution, or other environmental or development concerns that maynot otherwise be on many people’s political agendas. By tying their primarycause to conºict over water, actors increase their visibility and offer those whosympathize with their mission an additional reason to offer support or take ac-tion.
Of the actors discussed herein, NGOs, which often have public educationand awareness-raising as goals, face perhaps the strongest incentive to empha-size the risks of water wars in order to raise the proªle of water-related develop-ment or environmental goals they are championing. On the ªrst page of a re-port on improving access to water in poor communities, for instance, the NGOCARE, an organization dedicated to “ªghting global poverty,”56 states in boldletters that “conºicts over water are predicted to contribute to most wars in thefuture.”57 The British-based NGO World Development Movement provocativelynamed its water campaign “Stop Water Wars,” though the primary goals of thecampaign are advocacy in support of provision of basic water and sanitation ser-vices to the poor and opposition to privatization of the water industry.58
Other actors also may highlight the risks of water wars in order to bring at-tention to other environmental goals. Several books and articles have the phrase“water war” in the title, although actual discussion of violent conºict over waterrepresents a relatively minor focus of the texts, with the bulk being dedicated tovarious water management issues.59 The intent of such works appears to be aneffort to raise attention to some aspect of water management. Risk of violentconºict is used as a motivational device to highlight the potential dangers offailing to take action.
Policy-makers, too, may attempt to “securitize” water in order to bring at-tention to water management issues. For instance, former US Senator Paul Si-mon warns of water wars in a book on water policy.60 British diplomat John
David Katz • 21
54. Balzacq 2005.55. Grifªths 1997, 19.56. CARE, “About CARE,” available at http://www.care.org/about/index.asp, accessed 10 January
2010.57. CARE 2006.58. The web site http://www.wdm.org.uk/stopwaterwars/ was closed following the completion of
the campaign in 2008.59. For example de Villiers 1999; Ward 2002; and Brahma Chellaney, “Averting Water Wars in Asia,”
New York Times, 26 June 2007.60. Simon 1998.
Ashton, the United Kingdom’s “Climate Ambassador,” reportedly said thatglobal warming should be recast as a security issue to help mobilize support forcuts in global greenhouse gas emissions.61 While the previous comment ad-dressed climate change in general rather than water shortages speciªcally, such arationale seems reasonable in explaining declarations concerning water warsmade by other ofªcials in government and at bodies such as UNDP andUNESCO, which are formally charged with development and educational is-sues, not conºict resolution, and which make such declarations in reports thatprimarily focus on other aspects of water or environmental management.62
Raise the Proªle of the Author or Organization: Similar to the desire to draw at-tention to a cause, framing water issues in a security context can be a means ofraising the proªle of an organization or author. Again, this incentive is probablymost dramatic for NGOs. Many observers have noted that NGOs and other“non-elites” can face serious challenges in attracting attention. Some have re-sorted to “exceptionally strange or violent acts as a substitute for their lack ofstatus or resources” in order to attract the media’s eye.63 However, as some havenoted, while “the beneªt of outlandish behavior is media attention, the price isthat you get stuck in this role or caricaturization.”64 In order for their organiza-tion and message to be taken more seriously, many environmental organiza-tions have moved away from such tactics.65 Increasing the severity of their mes-sage is one tactic to attract attention while toning down behavior.
In the case of academics, connecting water to security also offers research-ers a way to raise the proªle of their work, given the salience of security issues inhigh-level policy circles and with the general public. Doing so increases the po-tential to gain access to policy-makers and the media. There is some evidencethat water research stressing conºict potential may be more likely to be pub-lished.66 Furthermore, combining environmental and security issues expandsthe number and types of journals in which academics can publish. Moreover, bygaining exposure to audiences outside their particular ªeld of expertise, re-searchers also expand possibilities for further research collaboration.
Expand Pools of Available Funding: Several actors face ªnancial incentives to ref-erence the possibilities for water wars. Conºict can affect terms and levels of in-vestment. There is some evidence to support Trottier’s claim that certain privateindustry actors may stress the risks of war in order to encourage policy-makersto invest in water infrastructure.67 A representative of a desalination facility un-
22 • Hydro-Political Hyperbole
61. Alister Doyle, “Climate Change Called Security Issue Like Cold War,” Reuters News Service, 22August 2007.
62. For example UN 2006b; and UNDP 2006.63. Anderson 2003, 37.64. Anderson 2003.65. Cottle 2003, 37.66. Gupta and van der Zaag 2009.67. Trottier 2003.
der construction in Israel commented, for instance, that “unfortunately water isone of the reasons that create war. If you compare the cost of one F-16, it ismore or less the cost of this desalination plant. I believe at the end of the day itwill be much cheaper to solve conºict based on this type of plant than throughbuying new F-16s.”68 The website of a developer of large bags that can be ªlledwith water and towed quotes World Bank Vice President Ismail Serageldin’sstatement that the next century’s wars will be over water and then claims that“Waterbag technology will have a direct impact on the Peace Process in the Mid-dle East.”69
Other types of actors also face ªnancial incentives to stress risks of waterwars. Many NGOs are engaged in a constant search for funding, as are many ac-ademics. Both NGOs and academics with a focus on environmental, develop-ment, or security stand to beneªt by expanding their focus to include some as-pect of environmental security, as adding additional ªelds increases the pools offunding available. This is especially true for those adding the security element totheir core focus, given the large pools of funding frequently available for secu-rity issues. In addition, many NGOs use press coverage as evidence of their effec-tiveness in awareness-raising vis-à-vis current and future sources of funding. Asalready mentioned, stressing war can increase the likelihood of media exposure.
Cite Signiªcant Statements by ‘Primary Deªners’: The media and academic re-searchers may cite statements of policy-makers, regardless of their own personalbeliefs as to the veracity of the claims, simply because they view statements bypublic ofªcials as legitimate subjects of study. Elites, including political elites,are considered inherently worthy of media coverage.70 Davis states that journal-ists are drawn to government and institutional sources in positions of power.71
Also, the media rely on these policy-makers to provide expert knowledge. Thus,Davis concludes that the media grant ofªcials “primary deªner” status.72
The prospect of imminent water wars was ªrst presented by authoritieswith such “primary deªner” status. Once the notion was established, it has re-mained a popular theme in the press, despite subsequent empirical studies. Fur-thermore, if political leaders continue to make reference to the possibilities ofwater wars, the media can be expected to continue to report such comments, re-gardless of the state of research supporting or refuting such claims.
Academic researchers, too, may choose to focus on statements of leadingªgures. Furthermore, because of the multitude of possible methodological ap-proaches, the topic of water-based conºict invites numerous research studies.
David Katz • 23
68. “Water Factory’ Aims to Filter Tensions,” BBC News, 7 September, 2004. Available online athttp://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/3631964.stm, accessed 8 October 2007.
69. See the website of the company Waterbag, http://www.waterbag.com/,accessed 14 June 2008.70. Cottle 2003; and Becker 1967.71. Davis 2003.72. Herman and Chomsky (1988) go even further, asserting that relations of economic dependency
ensure that political leaders are given preferential access to and coverage by the media.
Even if such studies do not promote the water war hypothesis, they keep the is-sue alive in public affairs and academic circles.
Incentives to Political Leaders and Policy-makers
Political leaders and policy-makers have several other, unique, reasons to voicewater war risks. Indeed, given that research has shown that public threats aremore often met with deªance rather than compliance,73 other reasons may infact be primary ones.
Signal Co-riparians that Water is Considered High-level Politics: Actors may usethe language of securitization in order to elevate an issue from low to high poli-tics.74 Issues of water management are often considered technical or bureau-cratic matters far from the realm of high politics, which traditionally has fo-cused on security and economic development. Warning of risks of war overwater can be a signal to a co-riparian country that their actions are being takenseriously. This may be done, for instance, to convince a country to refrain from aplanned action or to induce it to engage in negotiations. While Fearon showsthat offering non-credible threats is a dominated strategy, he also notes that inreality, such policies are often pursued.75 For example, saber-rattling by Syriaand Iraq towards militarily superior Turkey, including threats of war and mobi-lization of troops, were (unsuccessful) attempts to dissuade Turkey from devel-oping dams upstream. Güner presents the use of threats of war over water as asignaling tactic by Turkey and Syria in a game-theoretic model.76 Such use ofthreats of war may be an important signaling device even if parties recognize thelikelihood of the threat being realized as minor.
Signal Domestic Population: Political leaders may wish to signal not only to ri-val governments but to domestic constituencies as well. Putnam and othershave noted that national political leaders are often engaged in two-level deci-sion-making in which they must simultaneously attempt to balance domesticand international demands.77 Fearon notes that signaling threats of war is oftendone with both domestic and international audiences in mind, and that thismay be responsible for “half-hearted” signals that are less likely to be actedupon.78 A public statement of willingness to ªght for water rights is likely tosend a signal to domestic constituencies that water rights are being taken seri-ously by the national government, or it may be issued with the intent of per-
suading a domestic audience to favor or oppose a particular political party orpolicy.
In analyzing the “bellicose statements, even at the highest levels” of the In-dian and Pakistani governments in the 1950s and 1960s, Alam suggests that
. . . though the statements made by key decisionmakers in public may sug-gest a move towards war, the statements are used to generate domestic sup-port for a political position. As seen in the Indus basin the political rhetoricdid not match the governments’ actions which sought to resolve an interna-tional water dispute through cooperation . . . The experience from the Indusbasin, therefore, throws into question whether public statements made for adomestic audience are truly indicative of a country’s intent to go to war overshared waters.79
Many experts agree that accords over shared water resources between Israeland its neighbors are possible and need not be an obstacle to larger peace agree-ments.80 Political ofªcials and other parties opposed to territorial concessions,however, have often raised the risks of water wars among their reasons to main-tain control of territory.81 Often this belligerent rhetoric is directed towards in-ternal audiences. In so doing, policy-makers can develop a constituency blockto make concessions more difªcult.
Signal Third Party: Third parties often play a role both in mediating interna-tional disputes and in ªnancing water development projects. Hensel and col-leagues found that water scarcity was positively correlated with third-party assis-tance.82 Warnings of war may be meant to inºuence these third parties. Iraqithreats against Syria in the 1970s spurred intervention by the Soviet Union andSaudi Arabia, who helped negotiate a settlement. At the time that Israeli PrimeMinister Ariel Sharon issued warnings that continued diversions of waters of theWazzani stream could spur military conºict with Lebanon, the diversions pre-sented a very minor threat to the Israeli economy.83 While Sharon may havebeen attempting to send a signal to Lebanese leadership, he may also have beenattempting to engage a third party to mediate between Israel and Lebanon, withwhom Israel has no direct diplomatic relations. Soon after the statements weremade, US ofªcials became involved in the matter. They reportedly requestedfrom the Israelis that messages should be transmitted through them and notthrough threats of military reprisals84 and proceeded to negotiate an agreementbetween the sides.
Threats of war are also likely to undermine possible credit options for na-
David Katz • 25
79. Alam 2002, 349.80. Asmal 2001; Allan 2002; and Haddadin 2002.81. Sherman 2002.82. Hensel et al. 2006.83. Amery 2002.84. “US Offers to Mediate Hasbani Problem,” Walla! Online News Service. Available online at
http://news.walla.co.il/?w�//281451, accessed 18 September 2002 (in Hebrew).
tions seeking to ªnance large-scale water projects. Thus, leaders may issue themin order to deter institutions from offering project ªnance or to inºuence theterms of projects being considered. Threats of violence were important in moti-vating World Bank efforts to help negotiate an agreement between India and Pa-kistan on the Indus River in the 1960s.85 Reputedly, the Bank not only refused tofund projects while the river was being disputed, but also convinced India notto take on projects unilaterally until an agreement was negotiated.86
Iraqi threats of military action against Turkey may have been intended notonly to send a signal to Turkey, but also to the World Bank, which was contem-plating funding of Turkish dams.87 Risks of regional instability also may havebeen a factor dissuading international agencies and governments from ªnanc-ing dams in Ethiopia.88
Serve as Negotiating Tactic: Threats of war can be useful in extracting informa-tion that helps a state gauge the importance of an issue to a potential adversaryor negotiating partner.89 Policy linkage is common in water negotiations,90 andthreats of war may signiªcantly up the ante in terms of expected concessions onnon-water-related issues. Güner explained how threats of military acts betweenSyria and Turkey, while ostensibly over shared water resources, were likely an at-tempt to inºuence issues such as territorial disputes and separatist move-ments.91 In 1993, Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Çiller sent a message to SyrianPresident Hafez al-Assad stating that there would be no solution to water dis-putes between the nations unless Syria prevented the Kurdish separatists fromacting within its territory. Thus, despite the rhetoric, threats over water were anoutcome of conºict over other issues, and likely used as an attempt to extractconcessions on these other issues.
Incentives to the Media and Popular Press
Provide Gripping Headlines: Simon’s claim that “bad news sells” more thangood news92 seems to have ample empirical support. Cottle provides numerousexamples in which the press focuses on exceptional or violent behavior,93 andNew York Times reporter Max Frankel stated that among the news media “conºictis our favorite kind of news.”94
Disagreements over water allocations may be considered mundane, and
26 • Hydro-Political Hyperbole
85. Ward 2002.86. Mirza 2008.87. Kibaroglu and Ünver 2000.88. Ward 2002, 185–186.89. Fearon 1994.90. Fischhendler et al. 2004.91. Güner 1998.92. Simon 1980.93. Cottle 2003.94. Frankel, Max, “I Am Not a Camera,” New York Times, 16 October 1994.
thus not newsworthy, while violence over such allocations is. The need for grip-ping headlines ensures that the media is predisposed to favor presenting thepossibility of water wars over more moderate, less dramatic positions. For exam-ple, an article in the San Francisco Chronicle was titled “Future of War Will Gowith the Flow” with the subtitle “Water Promises to be Flash Point;” this, de-spite the fact that experts quoted in the article actually stated that they felt waterwas unlikely to lead to violence and that such prognostications were “mediahype.”95 Watkins and Berntell, development and water experts respectively,wrote an article provocatively headlined “A Global Problem: How to Avoid WarOver Water.” However, while the article warned that water shortages can lead toconºict, the authors themselves surmised that “cooperation tends to attract lessnews than violent conºict. Perhaps that is why ‘water wars’ get such exaggeratedcoverage.”96
Shorten Analysis into Sound-bite or Article-length Segment: Because the media areincreasingly structured around presenting brief sound-bites or catchy head-lines,97 they frequently reduce complex issues into memorable catchphrases andsimplistic storylines, at the expense of nuanced explanation and accuracy. Fur-thermore, Bird and Dardenne contend that the media often present what theyfeel the story should be, rather than what the facts actually depict.98 Aubin de-tails how pressures to provide pithy coverage of complex security issues have re-sulted in inaccurate media coverage and how, once established, this misinfor-mation has managed to persist in subsequent coverage.99 The connectionbetween water and conºict is complex and context-dependent, with several in-tervening and mitigating variables. An explanation of this complex relationship,however, is not amenable to short press articles or brief news segments.
Give Equal Coverage to Opposing Views: The quest for “balanced coverage” itselfmay contribute to the amount of media exposure granted to the risk of waterwars. When confronted with differing expert opinions regarding highly special-ized or technical issues, the merits of which the press is not competent to evalu-ate, journalists often attempt to provide equal coverage, regardless of how theweight of expert opinion is distributed.100 Dunwoody and Peters refer to such astrategy of balance as “a surrogate for validity checks.”101 This provision of equalcoverage, ostensibly done in the spirit of fairness and balance, can result in dis-proportionate representation of minority viewpoints. One survey of scientists
David Katz • 27
95. Freid, Stephanie L. “Future of War Will Go with the Flow,” San Francisco Chronicle, 10 June2007.
96. Watkins, Kevin and Anders Berntell, “A Global Problem: How to Avoid War Over Water,” Inter-national Herald Tribune, 23 August 2006.
97. Davis 2003.98. Bird and Dardenne 1988, 337.99. Aubin 1998.
100. Dearing 1995.101. Dunwoody and Peters 1992, 210.
found that 76 percent felt that news reports fail to distinguish between ªndingsthat are well-founded and those that are not.102 Press coverage of climate changeis a well-documented example, in which the minority viewpoint among climatescientists that climate change is not occurring has been given disproportionatelyprominent media coverage.103 While no extensive content analysis of media cov-erage of conºict over war was undertaken for this study, numerous examples ex-ist of articles that either present the potential for conºict or cooperation overwater on equal footing or simply quote experts with a range of opinions.104
Focus on the Aspect of a Story of Greatest Interest to Target Audience: Not all badnews is the same in terms of newsworthiness. Singer and Endreny found a “lackof congruence between the size of the risk and the amount of media coverage itreceives.”105 Combs and Slovic found that relative to actual objective risks, “dis-ease appeared to be greatly underreported while violent, often catastrophicevents . . . stood out as being overreported.”106 Moeller noted that “crises thatthreaten or even kill many but are not intrinsically horriªc . . . do not make thenewsroom cut.”107
Water-related illnesses kill several times the combined number of casual-ties from all the wars in the world each year, but they generally afºict the poorerclasses in developing countries, not the media’s more afºuent target audiences.Thus, they are less likely to get prominent news coverage. In attempts to capturemarket share, major media outlets attempt to target their features to the pre-sumed tastes of their intended audiences.108 Wars over water, even if in develop-ing countries, may have spillover effects that impact or interest the typical con-sumer of Western media in ways that more chronic humanitarian issues do not.
Academic Scholars
Serve as Null Hypothesis of Research into Water and Conºict: Studies that addressthe water war hypothesis, even if they do so in a critical light or present war as aworst-case scenario, still serve to keep the issue alive in the public consciousnessand in political and academic debates. Moreover, these studies (including thisone) implicitly give the water wars hypothesis some credibility by deeming itworthy of study and/or useful as a working hypothesis in empirical studies. Be-cause empirical studies in this ªeld are still few, and theories remain speculative,
28 • Hydro-Political Hyperbole
102. The Pew Research Center 2009.103. Boykoff and Boykoff 2004.104. For example “Streams of Blood or Streams of Peace,” The Economist, 1 May 2008; and Stepha-
nie L. Freid, “Future of War will Go with the Flow,” San Francisco Chronicle, 10 June 2007.105. Singer and Endreny 1987.106. Combs and Slovic 1979, 841.107. Moeller 1999, 317.108. Bae 2000.
publications both supporting and refuting the risks of conºict invite furtherwork, keeping the subject in public debate.
Interaction among Incentives
Several of the incentives discussed above may be mutually reinforcing. For in-stance, statements by policy-makers are not only covered by the media and aca-demics; policy-makers also react to these actors’ reports and use them as sourcesof information.109 Similarly, NGOs and academics may covet media coverage inorder to publicize their ªndings or may seek to inºuence policy-makers directlyor via the media, and they, themselves, may be sought out by the media andpolicy-makers as credible sources of information. Statements by policy-makersdirected at domestic populations may appear via the press and result in NGOstaking action on the issue. This mutually reinforcing web of interactions be-tween actors may well be serving to maintain or even elevate the issue of waterwars in public discourse.
Conclusion
It is not the aim of this article to claim, as others have, that the prospect of warover water is without merit.110 Water has been and continues to be a source ofpolitical conºict, at times even violent conºict, a prospect which may worsen aspopulations grow, economies develop, and climatic conditions change. More-over, there are many possible rebuttals to critiques of the water war hypothesis:the dearth of historical precedent may not be indicative of future trends; conºictand cooperation over water are not mutually exclusive outcomes;111 althoughwars over water may make little economic sense, many economically irrationalwars occur nevertheless;112 and the absence of past conºict over water may be ex-plained by variables such as power asymmetries113 which, should they change,could allow water issues to come to a boil. Still, the frequency with which waterwars are mentioned and the credibility given to that prospect do seem to bemarkedly overrepresented in public discourse.
The efªcacy of such rhetorical strategies remains unclear. Overstating risksof water wars or oversimplifying causal links may be detrimental to intendedobjectives. For instance, raising the specter of war to raise attention to, or mobi-lize action on, related environmental or development issues may ultimately re-sult in redirecting resources away from development and towards conºict pre-
David Katz • 29
109. For example Simon 1998.110. Beaumont 1994; and Dolatyar 2002.111. Zeitoun 2007.112. Fearon (1995) discusses reasons for the outbreak of wars that are poorly explained by a ratio-
nal actor model. The Economist expressed the counter-argument more succinctly, stating “warsare usually fought for much stupider reasons than water.” See “As Thick as Blood: Water Sup-ply in the Middle East,” The Economist 337 (7946): 53–56, 1995.
113. Zeitoun and Warner 2006.
vention. Moreover, there is a risk that policy-makers and other decision-makersmay feel that as long as violent conºict is avoided, they have been successful. Al-ternatively, by focusing on water as a cause of violent conºict, attention may bedrawn away from more important or proximate causes of such conºict.
It is not the intent of this study to imply that actors acting on these variousincentives intend to mislead or manipulate public opinion. It is legitimate tohighlight worst-case scenarios and to promote measures to avoid them. Rather,this study suggests that numerous and varied incentives facing several actors tostress or even exaggerate the possibility of such conºict may help to explain thesigniªcant exposure and tractability that such threats and warnings have re-ceived to date.
This study was meant to be suggestive rather than conclusive. It did not at-tempt to estimate the actual inºuence of the various incentives laid out above inmotivating the behavior of the set of actors discussed. Nor did it suggest meth-ods for identifying when such incentives are in fact responsible for actions by agiven party. Some of the incentives, such as raising the exposure of other envi-ronmental issues, use of signaling by politicians, and need for catchy headlines,appear to have much empirical support, while others have less.
Because this analysis relies on plausible hypotheses backed up with anec-dotal evidence, it is subject to many of the same critiques leveled against muchof the early environmental security literature. Veriªcation of the relative impor-tance of the various incentives laid out in this study is left to future research. Fu-ture research may also evaluate possible incentives actors may face to underesti-mate such risks—for instance, in order to encourage investment or inºuencenegotiations. Such incentives no doubt exist, but were not addressed herein.Such limitations noted, this study does provide analysts with a framework withwhich to start evaluating various claims regarding the prospects of violentconºict over water and other natural resources.
Analysts have long acknowledged “that one cannot dismiss the politicalmotives of those who wished to elevate—or prevent the elevation—of environ-mental concerns to the same status as military ones.”114 The intent of this studywas to provide a clearer picture of these motives, with the hope that this will as-sist analysts in evaluating the credibility of the many diverse pronouncementson this subject. While the speciªc topic of this study was conºict over water,much of the analysis is relevant to discussions of conºict over other natural re-sources and to broader discussions of environmental security.
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