CSIR Research Report
Research Report: The Border Intelligence
Fusion Section Perspectives on Joint Interagency Intelligence Collaboration along the U.S. Southwest Border
CAPT Rodd Ricklefs November 2015
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The Border Intelligence Fusion Section:
Perspectives on Joint Interagency Intelligence
Collaboration along the U.S. Southwest Border CAPT Rodd Ricklefs
United States Coast Guard
November 2015
Center for Strategic Intelligence Research
CAPT Ricklefs is the USCYBERCOM liaison to USSOUTHCOM. This research report is the product of
independent scholarly investigation and is not finished intelligence. The opinions expressed in this report
are solely the author’s and are not those of the National Intelligence University, Defense Intelligence
Agency, or Department of Defense. An expanded discussion of these findings is available upon request to:
[email protected]. This report has been approved for unrestricted distribution by the Office of
Corporate Communications, Defense Intelligence Agency, case #15-520.
On the cover: Border Patrol agents observe Arizona National Guard soldiers training for
Operation Copper Cactus at an undisclosed location in Arizona, Aug. 25. Operation Copper
Condor is the Arizona National Guard's contribution to the up to 1,200 National Guard troops
being deployed to support the Border Patrol and Immigration and Customs Enforcement in the
four Southwest border states. By SFC Jim Greenhill.
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Introduction. United States Southwest border (SWB) security is a subject of national prominence, resonating strongly in the public domain over the last eight years.1 To improve the
region’s security, the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, and Defense (DHS, DOJ, and
DoD) bolstered resource investments along the border, augmenting the already-considerable
state, local, and tribal law enforcement (LE) commitments.2 Numerous speeches, editorials, and
academic research projects assert collaboration between these SWB LE stakeholders is the key to
overcoming advanced transnational crime organizations (TCOs) which represent the most
consistent threat to SWB security.3 As a result, over 250 separate task forces and intelligence
fusion centers currently operate along the SWB.4 This study investigated one such collaborative
effort: the Border Intelligence Fusion Section (BIFS) at El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC). i BIFS
was a multiple-source analytic team, established in November 2010, composed of DOJ, DHS, and
DoD personnel. This team’s objective was to provide SWB stakeholders with fused intelligence
and tactical information to support LE investigations and operations. Despite possessing an
organizational description that conforms exactly to what stakeholders claim to desire in the
region, U.S. policymakers disbanded BIFS after just over three years of existence.
Based on documentation and interviews of BIFS executive agents, leaders, analysts, and
customers, this study examined those factors that motivated BIFS’s creation, influenced its
mission execution over time, and ultimately led to its demise.
TINAJAS ATLAS
MOUNTAINS, AZ.
Large steel fence
protecting the
border between
Mexico and the
United States.
I El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) was founded in 1974. Its mission is to collaboratively support U.S. law enforce-
ment and interdiction components through the timely analysis and dissemination of intelligence on illicit drug and
alien movements, and criminal organizations responsible for these illegal activities. Representatives from over 20 agen-
cies participate at EPIC in a common facility at Biggs Army Airfield, Fort Bliss, TX, with a Drug Enforcement Agen-
cy (DEA) senior official serving as Director. See http://www.dea.gov/ops/intel.shtml#EPIC.
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Resource limitations, unclear strategic plans, and uneven levels of internal, top-leadership, and political
support all affected BIFS’s final outcome. The research findings determined that the presence (or lack) of
individual champions, weariness of grand strategic initiatives that lack execution details, and the
proper management of expectations are critical considerations for future DHS, DOJ, and DoD
leaders as they continue to determine how best to accomplish intelligence collaboration among
SWB stakeholders.
Study Overview. In order to understand which factors influenced the demise of BIFS, I compiled perspectives on interagency collaboration and organizational transformation from
more than 50 published studies. Based on that review, five managerial actions stood out that
offer value during such a transformation:5
Because few details regarding BIFS’s history are available publically, the study produced a
history of BIFS based on interview data and more than 100 archived e-documents provided
from 16 BIFS executive agents, leaders, analysts, or customers. From this historical data, I
produced 24 findings that were relevant for BIFS capacity to succeed. While these findings were
the result of evaluating BIFS’s history against the five managerial actions above, the findings also
enabled the evaluation of those same five managerial actions to determine their relevance in
public organizational transformation.
{ 1) Build internal support. Those within the organization support the transfor-mation.
2) Develop a vision and strategy. The organization’s desired end-state follow-ing the transformation is clear and understood, and a functional plan to implement that transformation exists.
3) Ensure top-management support and commitment. Top leaders with-in the organization support the transformation long-term.
4) Build external support. The organization’s relevant political apexes and external stakeholders support the transformation.
5) Provide resources. The organization is provided adequate resources to enact the transformation.
}
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History of BIFS: Foundation, Establishment, and Ending. As drug cartel-related violence increased exponentially along the U.S.-Mexican border region in
the late 2000s, SWB security became an important political issue for U.S. policymakers at all
levels of government. Policymakers and security officials were particularly concerned about the
potential for cartel violence to de-stabilize the Mexican government—a situation that would
adversely affect U.S. security along its southern borders and beyond.6 Given these concerns, the
U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) re-prioritized its counter-TCO and counter-narcotics missions.
As part of this renewed national effort to address SWB security, the Office of National Drug
Control Policy (ONDCP) initiated a National Southwest Border Counter-Narcotics Strategy in
2007. One way that this strategy aimed to combat the increasing TCO threat was by prioritizing
intelligence and information sharing between government agencies in the SWB region. This
effort grew out of concerns by senior officials in Washington that SWB stakeholders were failing
to integrate their strategic and tactical approaches to addressing the TCO threat.
DHS and DOJ specifically prioritized interagency collaboration in formulating strategy.7 The
subject of interagency collaboration was particularly important and sensitive among EPIC
leaders and DOJ officials as a result of a DOJ Inspector General (IG) report published in
EL PASO, TX:
Skyline of down-
town El Paso with
yucca plant in the
foreground and
mountains on the
Mexican side of the
border.
By Frontpage.
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”
“ At least 13 senior officials from DoD, DOJ, and
DHS praised
the creation of
BIFS during
Congressional
testimony.
June 2010 that criticized the lack of collaborative practices at the site.8 DoD assets with SWB ties
also received pressure to broaden partnerships in May 2010, when the new NORTHCOM
commander noted that support to the government of Mexico in its conflict with TCOs was one of
three major mission areas he needed to improve during his tenure.9
The combination of political pressure and the need to fulfill departmental priorities prompted
DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) to propose establishing an inter-departmental
analytic section at EPIC that included I&A analysts. Senior leader introduced this proposal
during meeting at EPIC on June 8, 2010, attended by 13 DOJ and 10 DHS high-ranking
principals. At the meeting, the principals approved “the creation of the Border Intelligence
Fusion Section led by DHS within EPIC… [that] will address DHS needs for additional border-
centric intelligence without creating another intelligence center.”10 In addition, “the new section
would seek opportunities, means, and methods to increase the exchange of intelligence with
State/local/tribal LE agencies along the expanse of the SWB and across the country.”11
Initially, SWB senior stakeholders were, at worst, optimistic and, at best, enthusiastic with BIFS’s
potential to bolster collaboration between interagency partners. In multiple border security-
related strategic plans, documents, and speeches, BIFS was highlighted as a positive step toward
furthering regional partnerships—a glimpse at what many hoped was the model for similar
interagency endeavors. In fact, between February 2011 and April 2012, at least 13 senior officials
from DoD, DOJ, and DHS praised the creation of BIFS during Congressional testimony. Over
the next three years, BIFS would grow to a workforce of 53 individuals from 10 different
agencies, providing support to federal, state, and local SWB stakeholders. Its product line
included Area Studies, Target Packages, Person of Interest Reference Cards, Intelligence Notes,
and Post-Seizure Analysis and Story Boards on evolving events. In fiscal year 2013, EPIC’s Joint
Collection Management and Dissemination unit (JCMU), originally a sub-section of BIFS,
processed over 4,000 requests for information and supported stakeholders with intelligence
products from DoD and national collectors.12
Despite this initial cross-departmental enthusiasm from senior executives in Washington and an
intended mission designed to mitigate an intelligence gap of increasing public concern, BIFS did
not sustain itself as an organization in the manner its founders and allies hoped. Although BIFS
developed significantly as an organization in the years following its establishment, EPIC started
planning an organizational evolution in 2013 that would shift its overarching focus from
development and dissemination of actionable intelligence toward a more strategic “hemispheric
approach” that would consider “all threats, all hazards.”13 EPIC’s organizational transformation
plans reconstituted its analytic workforce into “strategic,” “operational,” and “tactical” sections.
Those plans called for BIFS analysts’ reallocation to the new Strategic Analysis Section (SAS)—a
move that effectively terminated BIFS by February 2014.14
Specific details regarding the motivation behind EPIC’s organizational transformation were
difficult to obtain because of limited access to EPIC/DEA senior management during the study.
Interviewees offered mixed opinions of experiences with SAS compared to those with BIFS.
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With SAS, overall production (i.e. product output) has increased dramatically and incorporates
more strategic-level assessments. However, the same customers and partners admitted the loss of
the agility and capabilities BIFS provided prior to EPIC’s reorganization.16
Research Findings. The following represents the aforementioned 24 findings determined to concretely demonstrate some measure of impact on BIFS’s capacity to succeed,
either positively or negatively (or both depending on perspective). They are sub-divided into
four categories: organizational, cultural, political, and resource-related. These findings represent
the basis for the study’s subsequent analysis of the five proposed managerial actions and final
perspectives.
It was not clear to all stake-holders if BIFS’s primary mis-sion was strategic, operational,
and/or tactical support.
BIFS was not constructed to be driven programmatically by
customer requirements.
There was no consensus among BIFS’s partners for
performance measures.
Support from the BIFS director
was consistent and ardent.
Joint Task Force-North (JTF-N) support significantly impacted
BIFS’s development.
JTF-North’s relationship with EPIC/BIFS had limitations, which affected its support to
BIFS.
BIFS’s desired mission impact was not rationally scoped
based on resources provided.
BIFS’s mission required exten-sive negotiation through legal
and policy challenges.
BIFS’s intended intelligence analysis approach significantly clashed with EPIC’s criminal
investigative approach.
Personnel assigned to BIFS from LE agencies demonstrat-
ed resistance to sharing data.
Personnel assigned to BIFS from EPIC initially demonstrat-ed considerably more loyalty to their agency than to BIFS’s
mission or leadership.
An acceptable “credit for re-sults” culture among inter-agency partners was not estab-
lished within BIFS.
BIFS was a DHS I&A-generated
initiative.
There was debate as to wheth-er EPIC should have direct
oversight of BIFS.
There was debate whether BIFS should have an operational
tasking component.
DEA senior leadership did not
support BIFS concept.
Support to BIFS from EPIC Directors was uneven and in-
consistent.
Perceptions existed that BIFS was threatening to “over-
shadow” EPIC itself.
EPIC leadership’s frustration with its Liaison Officers at the time likely affected considera-
tions made regarding BIFS.
EPIC personnel assigned to BIFS did not possess the ana-lytic tradecraft to carry out
BIFS’s intended mission.
BIFS’s level of investment to-ward one particular mission affected its organizational
development.
BIFS struggled to develop and implement a cloud-based,
data-sharing e-architecture.
Some partners’ support to BIFS waned over time after
failing to see near-term value.
Ultimately, DHS did not demonstrate appropriate long-
term commitment to BIFS.
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURAL POLIITICAL RESOURCE-RELATED
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Conclusions for Better Understanding Public Organization
Transformation. Analysis of the history and research findings suggested the five proposed managerial actions need further refinement. Based on these research assessments, the
study offered a revised set of five managerial actions which are presented in order of priority
and relevance:
1) Secure external support for the vision. “Build External Support” was the most relevant managerial action, so it was given top priority. “Secure” was substituted for “build” to
denote the importance of obtaining support from the political apex of relevant supporting
organizations from the outset of an initiative, not in the middle of it. Though development of a
“macro vision” was not found to be specifically relevant, having an initial vision to advocate is
an inherent necessity.
2) Scope the mission based on anticipated resources; identify/satisfy
lynchpin requirements. “Provide resources” was almost too inherent a managerial action and, thus, was of limited value as a strategic learning point. The findings from this study
offered some potential enhancements to this managerial action, including the notion of refining
the original vision appropriately based on resources provided and ensuring sustainment of any
specific resource requirements deemed absolutely critical to a vision’s long-term success.
3) Develop a comprehensive execution plan based on vision. This managerial action replaced “develop a vision and strategy,” which this study found to have
limited relevance in public organizational transformation. What this study did indicate,
however, was although formation of a vision may be an important first step in the transfor-
mation process, the detailed plan to execute that vision is much more relevant to the
transformation’s success.
4) Ensure top-management support and commitment. This managerial action was particularly relevant, and was, therefore, included unchanged. An executive
unwilling to support an organization’s transformation may have the ability to single-handedly
disrupt or discontinue it, either directly or indirectly. New initiatives need well-placed
champions to survive.
5) Build internal support. The study determined this managerial action was relevant, but of lower priority than the others. Unlike many modern business transformations, the
impetus for public organization transformation is not often led from within, but rather from
senior levels in the hierarchal bureaucracy.17 Given this dynamic, resistance to change is
common, and internal support for transformation is generally soft in the beginning.18 Because of
deeply engrained cultures common within interagency collaborative efforts, incremental
improvements of internal support are all one should really expect. Building gradual internal
support over time is an acceptable practice.19
FIVE
TRANSFORMATION
MANAGERIAL ACTIONS FOR PUBLIC ORGANIZATION
}
}
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Final Perspectives. Champions can make a huge difference. Academic literature specifically notes the importance individual leaders play in during public organizational change, perhaps
even more critical than for change in private business.20 As new initiatives for SWB collaboration
emerge, strong leaders must be chosen to direct them and advocate their causes in the face of
political and cultural pressures.
Be wary of “good idea” initiatives that lack an adequate execution plan. It is not unusual to see new fusion
centers, collaborative teams, task forces, and working groups “pop-up” in the SWB region
without necessarily a good plan for how their mission can be effectively integrated into the
community’s holistic intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination strata. Haste to
implement organizational structures prior to defining their scope of mission and securing
adequate resources to accomplish it can prove detrimental to such initiatives.
There are no quick solutions. Government organizations are generally only capable of incremental changes,
even when leadership desires more dramatic transformation;21 and it is not unusual for it to take
four to six years for interagency partnerships to fully mature and achieve a sustainable level of
collective trust.22 Stakeholders and customers that expect organizations like BIFS to mature and
achieve efficient operations after just one, two, or even three years, are likely being too ambitious.
Interagency collaboration will always encounter friction. Opposing agendas, clashes of culture, and
divergent personal and political motivations will never cease to exist and will always represent a
source of conflict. What is detrimental to a collaborative organization is when, over time, those
conflicts result in frustrations that significantly hamper future interactions. If these inherent
challenges are understood and accepted, progress can be made. Collaboration at 70 percent
optimal efficiency is still a better option than when stakeholders choose not to collaborate at
all. ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// //
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Notes.
1 United States Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, “Fiscal Years 2014–2018, Strategic
Plan,” 28; The White House, "White House Drug Czar Releases Southwest Border Counternarcotics
Strategy," ONDCP Press Release, October 2, 2007. 2 Jerome P Bjelopera and Kristin Finklea, “Domestic Federal Law Enforcement Coordination: Through the
Lens of the Southwest Border,” paper written for Congressional Research Service, June 3, 2014, 10;
Southwest Border Protection Act of 2014, H.R. 4882, 113th Congress, 2nd Session, 2014. 3 Stephen G. Lauer (principal author, project group of 10), “Southwest Border Support Strategy,” School
of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, academic
research paper submitted to Honorable Paul N. Stockton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, 2011, 5; CAPT Bob Allen, CAPT Mary Jackson, COL Janice
King, and CAPT Jorge Palacios, “Aligning for Hemispheric Defense: Synchronizing NORTHCOM and
SOUTHCOM Efforts to Combat Transnational Criminal Organizations,” thesis for Joint Forces Staff
College, Class 12-2, June 5, 2012, 3; Executive Office of the President of the United States, Office of
National Drug Control Policy, “National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy,” 2011, 9; United
States Department of Homeland Security, “Fiscal Years 2014–2018 Strategic Plan,” Annex B, 56-59. 4 Bjelopera & Finklea, 10. 5 Though multiple works contributed, the following article was the most relevant to the development of the
five managerial conditions: Walter J. M. Kickert, “Specificity of Change Management in Public
Organizations: Conditions for Successful Organizational Change in Dutch Ministerial Departments,” The
American Review of Public Administration 44, no. 6 (2014): 693-717, originally published online April 23,
2013. 6 Interviewee #10, interviewed by author, Washington, DC, April 24, 2015. 7 United States Department of Homeland Security, “Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A
Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland,” February 2010, 36; United States Department of Justice,
Bureau of Justice Assistance, “Justice Information Sharing: A 2010–2012 Strategic Action Plan,
Accomplishments and Status Report,” updated November 2012, 30. 8 United States Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Evaluation and Inspections
Division, “Review of Drug Enforcement Administration’s El Paso Intelligence Center,” I-2010-005, June
2010, 27–29. 9 U.S. Northern Command, Office of History, “A Short History of United States Northern Command (as of
December 31, 2013),” 10; Interviewee #9, interviewed by author, Washington, DC, April 14. 2015. 10 “DOJ-DHS Leadership Meeting El Paso Intelligence Center,” June 8, 2010, document received via e-
mail from Department of Homeland Security official on April 7, 2015. 11 “DOJ-DHS Leadership Meeting El Paso Intelligence Center,” 3–4. 12 Data obtained from “Trans-border IPC EPIC Discussion,” October 1, 2013, document received via e-
mail from Department of Homeland Security official on April 7, 2015, 3. 13 Interviewee #4, interviewed by author, via phone, on April 23, 2015; Interviewees #12 and #13,
interviewed by author, El Paso, TX, April 27, 2015; Interviewee #16, interviewed by author, El Paso, TX,
April 28, 2015. 14 El Paso Intelligence Center, The EPIC Observer 2, no. 2 (February 2014): 2. 15 Interviewee #11, interviewed by author, El Paso, TX, April 27, 2015. 16 Interviewee #16. 17 Kickert, 699–701, 713.
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18 Tom Karp and Thomas I. T. Helgo, “From Change Management to Change Leadership: Embracing
Chaotic Change in Public Service Organizations,” Journal of Change Management 8, no. 1 (March 2008):
85–96. 19 Patricia Klarner, Gilbert Probst, and Richard Soparnot, “Organizational Change Capacity in Public
Services: The Case of the World Health Organization,” Journal of Change Management 8, no. 1 (March
2008): 57–72, 69; Kickert, 713. 20 Ben S. Kuipers, Malcolm Higgs, Walter Kickert, Lars Tummers, Jolien Grandia, and Joris van der Voet.
“The Management of Change in Public Organizations: A Literature Review.” Public Administration (Vol.
92, No. 1, 2014): 1-20, 11. 21 Kickert, 713. 22 William D. Leach, Neil W. Pelkey, and Paul A. Sabatier, "Stakeholder Partnerships as Collaborative
Policymaking: Evaluation Criteria Applied to Watershed Management in California and Washington,"
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 21, no. 4 (Fall 2002): 645–70, 666.
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