Journal of Psycli(ilii((y and Cliri.siianily

2OO'l, Vol. 2.̂ , No, 2. 110-12(1

2004 Cliriitiun .A,';soriarinn for Psychological Studies

I.SSN 0753-1273

Resonance: A Model for RelatingScience, Psych^^logy, and Faith

VCarren S. Brou-nGraduate Sch<X)l of PsychologyFuller 7heolo,^ical Seminary

It Ls otten difficuli to be clear alunil i.-ithi.T ihf prcxesses lo engage in, or the final oiikomes to be txpecl-ed. when altemptlng to rehile science and religion, or psychology and faith. Ttiis anicle presents tlie Resonance Modei as a metaphnric way to think about the processes and ouicumes o( these dialogues. TheResonance MtxJel has the advantage of: (a) specifying a larger number uf domains of relevant informationthat intist tx; lakcn into account; (b) suggesting what son of interrelationships can be expected; and (c) pro-viding a formulation that is dynamic and suggestive of how to prcKeed. One example of a search tor reso-nance is described—an attempt to relate a Christian anthropology to a neuroscientific view of human nature.

The problem of relating psychology andChristian faith is a broader and deeper problem(han much of the discourse in this area supp<xs-es. This is because there is much more to con-sider than the iwo domains of modernpsychological research and practice and thetenet.s of historic Christian faith. There are alsovarious cultural traditions (societal and religiotis)that must be considered, as well as the subjec-tive experiences of persons. In addition, thedomain of infortnation that is currently mostdetnantling of attention in our culture is science,and particularly cognitive neuroscience. Basedon neuroscience research, mucb is being pro-posed about the nature of persons that alsoneeds to he brought into dialog with Christiantheology. This article presents a model (or moreaccurately, a metaphor) for understanding whatis nece,s.sary in relatirig science, psycln>logy, andChristian faith.

What are we trying to accomplish?Some o!" the confusion and lack of apparent

progress in relating psychology (particularlyneuroscience) and Christian faith is, I believe,related to a lack of clarity regarding both tbeprocess and llie ultimate goal of this dialogue.With respect to process, when we are facedwith relevant information from a number ofcotnpeting sources, how can the authority ofthese sources and the implications of their par-ticular conclusions be appropriately recognized

Correspondence regarding this article should beaddressed to Warren S. Brown, Ph.D., Professor ofPsychology, Graduate School of Psychology, FullerTheological Seminary, 135 N. Oakland Avc, Pasade-na,, CA 911H2,

and reconciled? What is the best process forweighing the claims made by various fields, dis-ciplines, and sources of authority?

And what should the final outcome of thesedialogues look likei" Shoiik! there be a set ofpropositioas on which all .sources of authorityagree? Should Christian theology adopt withoutmodification all the implications of current psy-chological or scientific theories, or should sci-ence and psychology accommodate withoutfLirther comment some version of Christian theol-ogy? In these conceptual card games, who getsto trump whom? If there is to be some blending,what sort of a blend, integration, or correlationshould we expect to achieve?

This article comes out of my own need todevelop a perspective from which to work and amodel lo gtiide me in making various conceptualand theoretical moves. I occupy an unusual aca-demic position, and an appreciation of this posi-tion can help the reader understand themotivation behind the model I develop in thisarticle. First, I atn a research neuropsychologistwith an active laboratory. My students and I.study the cognitive and psychosodal outcomesof a cotigenital brain abnormality called agenesisof the corpus callosum. Second, I am a professorin a doctoral program in Clinical Psychology. Allof my students are training to be clinicians andtherapists. Third, I am a professor in a theologi-cal seminaiy. Both my re,search and my teachingoccur within the life and academic programs ofFuller Theological Seminary. Finally, my theolog-ical and ecclesiastical roots are within the Wes-ieyan tradition. All of these ideas and influencesimpinge on my thinking.

As neiiro,science comes tnore and more to theforefront in both psychology and popular cul-

110

WARKEN S. BRCJWN 111

tiire, it i.s not po.s.sible fur me to hide away in mylab and work at doing good and importantresearch with my graduate students. I find myselfcalled to consider more deeply the relationshipbetween my field of human cognitive neuro-science, wider domains of p.sycholog>', and iheWesleyan nature of my Christian faith.

What follows is my understanding of what ispossible and necessar>' in relating psychology,neuro.science, and Christian faith. I present theResonance Model as iny way of understandingwhat must be accomplished and how to goabout relating these various domains of knowl-edge and information. As a case study. I willbriefly outline the work I have done in findingre.sonance between neuroscience and a Christianview of human nature.

Methods of Relating Psychology and FaithThere are a number of diflereni nKjdels or

approaches to relaiing psychology and faith.One approach (or non-approach) is what Don-ald Mackay (1979, p. 29) has called "conceptualapartheid"—keeping views from differentdomains in watertight compartments so thatthey can never interact. When functioning inthis way. we do uur best to ignore the contra-dictor\' naiLire of informaticjn and implicationsthat exist within varicjus domains of knowledgeand theory, (^ne version of conceptual apartheidwould he a complete disintegration where onebelieves something in one context with theimplication "A." and believes something else inanother context with the implication "not-A,"without noting or being ccjncerned about thisproblem. Some postmodernist thinking appearslo endorse this sort of conceptual apartheid byprestiming that we simply have two differingnarratives, neither of which has any obligationto take account of the other. The idea that reli-gion and .science are "non-overlapping magiste-ria" (Gould, 1999) is another version ofconceptual apartheid. Some versions of concep-tual apartheid might be better repre.sented bythe metaphor of an "intellectual gated communi-ty," with walls, gates, and locks defending onedomain from the cognitive dissonance of havingto bother with information from anothertiomain. It is clear that other information exists,bill one has constructed a defended positionthat shields one from confronting potentiallydiscordant information from another domain.

The intellectual gated community overlapswith another method for dealing with potentially

conflicting sources^ the choice of a faroriteindispiilahle anthonty. Whatever source is cho-sen is presumed tt) iruinp any differing conceptsor ideas from other domains of information.Influences between domains can only go in onedirection. The favored authority is not open topressure for reinterpretation from any othersource. Of course, this makes discus.sion quitedifficult between inclividtials who have adopteddifferent authority rankings. The heated andseemingly Linresolvable debate between cre-ationism and evolutionary science can be viewedas occurring between groups who have adopteddifferent indisputable and unassailable authori-ties, Certainly, examples of individuals who haveadopted indisputable authorities can be foundwithin both science (e.g., Richard Dawkins) andpsychology (e.g., h'reud). In the dialoguebetween psychology and Christian faith, BiblicalCounseling (Powlison. 2000) and Christian Psy-chology (Roberts, 2000) would also fall withinthe orbit of this position, as does the position ofCollins (despite his use of the term "integration")(Collins, 2(K)0). While on the surface the.se posi-tions on psychology and Christianity may seemto have merit as "defenders of ihe faith," theyimplicitly assume that the Bible can be directlyand indisputably interpreted with respect to itsimplications for psychology, the relevance of sci-ence, the nature of persons, the events of cre-ation, etc. However, if some form ofinterpretation ot the Bible is, in fact, necessary toanswer such questions, who.se interpretations areto be accepted as the trump card in this game?And might not harmony with other domains ofInformation help one choose between potentialinterpretations of relevant Biblical material?

Particulady within di.scussions about psychologyand tlieology, lots of people talk al:K)ut integra-tion. This term does not have a precise definitionand means lots of different things to differentwriters. Nevertheless, most of these meaningsrefer (at least implicitly) to an attempt to makeconcepts from the two fields explicitly compara-ble and, where possible, to combine (and. thus,to integrate) theories. Carter and Narramore(1979) describe integration as follows: "Genuineintegration involves the discovery- of and articula-tion of the fomnion tinderlying principles of bothpsychology and the Scriptures. It is this di,scoveryof the one overarching configuration or set ofprinciples that constitutes the deepest level ofintegration, not sitnply lining up of parallel con-cepts from two di.stinct disciplines" (p. 92).

112 Kl-SONANCK: A MODEL FOR

However, there are a number of problemswith this form of integrative a[iproach. As thequotation from Carter and Narramore (above)indicates, the term "integration" connotes anattempt to force (sometime.s through interpretivelegerdemain) the discrepant sources to sayexactly the same thing so that they can beshown not to be incotnpatible. However, thereare major differences between ttomains in theirpresuppositions, epistemologies, and sources (JIrelevant data. Thus, attempts at integration ainthe danger of doing some degree of violence tothe epistemological integrity of various fields ofenquiry and scholarship.

Yet another way of understanding the relation-ship between fields like psychology and theolo-gy is the idea of "levels of explanation" (Mackay.1979. 1991; Myers, 2000; Myers ^Jeeves, 1987)-^a view sometimes labeled perspectivalism.Here it is believed that physiological science,psychology, sociology, philosophy, theology,scripture, personal faith, etc., all provide descrip-tions of human nature from differing points ofview. One way perspectives can differ is wiihrespect to the closeness or distance <;)f view,varying from the more microscopic (e.g.. cellularphysiology) to the more macroscopic (e.g.. ,soci-ology or theology). Another way informationabout human nature can vary is with respect toexternal observations versus internal subjectexperience. Mackay (1979, 1991) calls these twoperspectives the O story" (observer perspective)and the "I story" (subjective experiences of per-sons). Mackay believes these points of view-should correlate, but one should never attemptto integrate them or to substitute one for theother. Thus, within perspectivalism, differentfields are presumed to provide diflcrent views olexactly the same phenomena. While ihereshould be some correspondence or correlationbetween the views, the views should never beconfused or substituted one for another.

I find perspectivalism more satisfactory thanothers as a method for understanding the rela-tionships between psychology, neuroscience,and Christian theology. For one thing, there areobviously more than two domains or perspec-tives that need attt.'ntion and consideration. Inaddition, within perspectivalism one can respectdifferences between domains in methodologyand sources of data. However. I also feel per-spectivalism has some significant limitations.First, the idea of levels-of-explanation. with itsimplications of hierarchy, has the potential for

trumping out-of-hand theories and ideas from a"lower" level because they are not consistentwith a higher level explanation, or (in the caseof reductionism) presuming to give a betteraccount of theories and ideas from higher levelsby showing the micro-level "determinants." Sec-ond, it is difficult to know what one can accom-plish u'ithin perspectivalism that goes beyond(he form of conceptual apartheid found in "non-overlapping magisteria" or the differing narra-lives of postmodernism. We need a richer viewregarding how to establish correspondencebetween what is learned iilxjul human naiure atdifferent levels or Iroin ditfcrcnl j:)erspectives.We alst) need a model tliat signals the dynamicsot process in addition to ihc hoped-(<.)r outcome.

Tfje Wesle}'€in QuadrilateralIn the 18''' Century. John Wesley was faced

with is,sues of competing authorities in trying torevitalize personal Chri.stian faith within theAnglican church of his day. He wrestled withreconciling the competing authorities of scrip-lurc, Anglican theological tradition, his own per-sonal spiritual experiences, and the dictates ofrational thought. He was also well aware ofdevelopments within the rapidly atKancing sci-ence of ihe Enlightenment. The solution for Wes-ley was an implicit method thai allowed forsome arbitration and interaction between author-ities. Wesley s apparent methodology has beenformalized and made explicit by Outler (Outler,1985) in the form of the Wesleyan Quadrilateral.From his various writings and sermons, it is clearthat Wesley presumed that four sources ofauthority (Scripture. Experience, Rationality, andTradition) must be taken into account in orderbest to understand truth about God, humannature, the physical workl, redemptitm. holiness,elc. For a further expianaiion see Maddox. 1994.

A geometric arrangement in \hv form of aquadrilateral (sec Figure 1 for my representationof the Quadrilateral) is mt̂ ant to emphasize Wes-ley's recognition that there are different domainsof authority; that each domain has a valid voicethat must be heard and considered: and thattruth (such as it can be known) is revealedsomewhere at the intersection of these domains.These concepts derived from Wesley seem toprovitie a feiiile starting point for thinking aboiilthe relationship between psychology, neuro-science, and Christian faith, particularly in ourattempt to understand the nature of persons.

WARREN S. BROWN 113

The Wesieyan Quadrilateral

Four Sources of Authority

Scripture

TRUTH

Experience

Figure 1. The Wesieyan Quadrilateral, the four sources of authority: Scripaire, Rationality,Experience, Tradition.

Given that Jolm Wesley was an Anglican priestand situated professionally within the religiousworld of his day. what is to be particularlyappreciated in his implicit model is that there isno attempt to disregard the importance of cjthevdomains of knowledge, nor to ignore the poten-tial for apparent discrepancy between the impli-cations of information from the differentdutnains. This way of thinking avoids proposinga single, absolute authority that trumps all otherson every question (as in sola Sciiptura). but itallows each domain to stand ba,sed on its ownintegrity. This quadrilateral tiiodel, derived fromWesley's writings, would be less likely to violatethe epistetnological integrity of the differentdomains by forcing them to come io exactly thesame conclusions. Rather, the Quadrilateral sug-gests respect for what each dotnain can knowtnost a.ssuredly given its methods and focus.

However, the Wesieyan Quadrilateral as amodel for relating neuroscience, psychology,and Christian theology is incomplete withrespect to two i.ssues. The first issue is thedomains thai need to be recognized—-within thecurrent dialogue between science and religion, itis better to recognize five primary dotiiains,rather than four. Although Wesley would haveconsidered science a.s v\ithin the domain ofrational discourse. T believe it is more informa-

tive in the current age to differentiate betweenscience and rationality. Second, the model doesnot specify how the domains interrelate. (Ofcourse, the Quadrilateral is derivative from Wes-ley's writings and, thus, one would not expect tofind tuuch specificity attached to it.) As a tnodel,the Quadrilateral does not give us any guidanceas to how conflicts are arbitrated or how consen-sus might be reached, particularly since themethodologies and sources of information withineach domain are so vastly different. Nor does theQuadrilateral hint at what a coherent resolution(.)f information from various domains might belike. Here I propose the metaphor of resonance,and the following model.

The Resonance ModelI believe that a helpful way of thinking about

what we need to be doing in the dialogueberween theology, neuroscience, and psycholo-gy is best represented by an auditory/acousticmetaphor involving the property of resonance.In this tnodel, resonance refers to the amplifica-tion or enrichment of sound when two or moreauditory signals vibrate together synchronouslyor hannonically. The opposite would be disso-nance, which is the datiipening or discordancecaused from the combination of two or moreinharmonious sources.

114 RKSONANCF,: A MODEL FOR RKLAHNG

Brown's Resonance Model

••̂ ,̂ '••>;-. Experience//// ,

/•-TRirthctfadition

Rationality Scripture

Figure 2. Brown's Resonance Model: Experience, Tradition, Scripture, Rationality, Science.

Resonance is meant primarily to be under-stood as a rich metaphor. However, to givegreater meaning to the term "resonance." I offerthe ftillowing more explicit definition: A state-ment from psychology and a statement of Chris-tian theology (for example) would beconsidered resonant if one is directly pre-dictable from the other, or if one is reasonablyprobable given the other. Similarly, two suchstatements would not be considered dissonant ifthey are not directly contradictory, or if theirinescapable deductions or implications are notcontradictory; or if the implications of one doesnot make the other significantly improbable.

In this model, arbitration of differences betweendomains is conceived of as a prixre.ss of findingmaximal resonance between [he information ema-nating from various sources. To seek resonance isnot to look for different domains to say the .samething, nor is it allowing one field to taimp anoth-er. Rather, it is presumed that if a conclusion istrue within one domain, it should have someform of resonance with other domains.

Figure 2 is a visual representation of the Re.so-nance Model. Five domains of information areconceived of as old fashioned radios. In the Res-onance ModeL each radio is understood to be

giving off an auditory signal (i.e., informationfrom that domain). All of these auditory signals(indicated by the radiating dashed lines repre-senting .sound waves) have some implication forunderstanding what is likely to be true. Howev-er, in this model, information from a singlesource is not always synonymous with truth.Truth, such as it can be known and understood,is found in the inter-domain resonant field.

Thus, somewhere in the middle of the 5 radios(or information .sources), where the sound wavesmeet and overlap, truth is best understood. Theword "Truth" in Figure 2 should be depicted insotne fuzzy and indistinct graphical form, repre-senting the idea that we oniy know "as througha darkened glass." Our comprehension is alwayspartial and incomplete. Nevertheless, eachsource is hopefully telling us something aboutwhat is tRie. Thus, the most reliable knowledgeand understanding is to lie found .s<.)mewhere inthe re.sonant field where information from differ-ent domains intersect.

Kach radio is labeled to indicate one domainof information. As indicated above, I have splitthe Wesleyan idea of "Rationality" into "Science"and "Rationality" in order to recognize differ-ences in epistemology. "Science" is meant to

WARREN S. BROWN 115

denote information based on sy.stematic andrepeatable tili.servations of the natural world(physical, biological, and social). While .scienceuses rational tools, the final arbiter of truth in.science is whether findings are empirically repli-cabte. ralher than logically consistent. Logicalinconsistency is tolerated in science at leastwhile waiting for clarification from further obser-vations and experiments. In this model, psychol-ogy as a summary of obser\ations of humanbehavior would be primarily within "Science."

"Rationality" is then allowed to uniquely repre-sent the outcome of the application of the rules,melhods, and arguments within areas like mathe-matics, philosophy, logic, elc. "Rationality"" refersnot only to the outcome of the lawful processesof information manipulation specified withinihese intellectual disciplines, but also the naturalkinds of logical arguments that are advanced indiscussions and debates. In their theoretical mani-festations, btrth neuroscience and psychology aremost clearly nitional, as is systematic theology.

"Kxperience" is meant to include our personalreligious experiences, our subjective experienceof l:)eing a person, the experiences of being inrelationship to other persons, and the sharedexperiences of local communities. Personalepisodic memories are a core aspect of thisdomain of information. "Experience" as a sourceof knowledge would also encompass proceduralknowledge and emotional learning, which aremajor contributors to "tacit knowledge" asdescribed by Michael Polanyi (19S8). Explicationof the nature of subjective experience is a criticalcomponent in psychology, particularly withinmany theories of psychopathology and psy-chotherapy. The fact that neuroscience is begin-ning t<i sketch out brain systems involved invarious forms of subjective experience shouldnot confuse us into thinking that science can inany way completely override (or "taimp") thetruth contained in our subjective experiences.However, the rapidly accumulating neuroscienceof subjective experiences provides one of manychallenges in finding resonance.

"Tradition" means not only religious tradition,but also the wisdom of the cultural traditions offamilies, local communities, elhnic/nationalgroups, professions, etc. Community narrativesand stories form a critical ma.ss of .such traditions.Since all knowledge .starts with "pre-knowledge"in the form of presuppositions that are stampedon us by our families and cultures, the impact ofTradition" in this model cannot be minimized.

The postmodern critique of .science and rationali-ty suggests that the traditions of local cultures(including scientific cultures) have an influenceon theories, formulations, choice of questions,what is accepted as valid information, etc.

Finally, "Scripture" refers to the Bible (orother writings viewed as sacred and authorita-tive by adherents of various other religions)."Scripture," in this model, is placed as one ofseveral pointers to truth, rather than truth itself,in that there is always a hermeneutical andinterpretive task when attempting to figure outwhat scripture means, both in its original con-text and with respect to a particular psychologi-cal, scientific, or even theological question.Thus, one implication of this model is thatother domains are seen as aids to scripturalinterpretation by creating re.sonance or disso-nance with our attempts to understand themeaning of the Bible.

The knob.s on each radio suggest the dynamicprocess implied by this model (i.e., the possibili-ty of Inning the information coming from eachof the sources). Tuning refers to a process offinding, within the range of interpretations thatare permissible within a particular domain, theone that is most resonant with information andtheories from other domains. Thus, to extendour resonance metaphor, as the radios are tuned(i.e., the information changes in pitch or loud-ness) the outputs sometimes resonate at thept)int of intersection in a way that makes truthclearer. But sometimes the settings result in dis-sonance, causing the signals to cancel or distort,such that truth becomes less clear. When disso-nance occurs, the task of knowing and under-standing is to go to each of the sources and tryadjusting the knobs (within the range of reason-al)le interpretations for that particular domain) inorder to find settings that result in greater reso-nance. While truth is to be found in resonance,dissonance indicates that some form of misinfor-mation or misinterpretation is being broadcastfrom one or several sources. The static nature ofa diagram such as seen in Figure 2 cannot cap-ture the dynamic that is intended in this model-The reader needs to imagine the knobs turning,and sound waves pulsing at various frequenciesand intensities, and the word "Truth" variouslycoming more or less into focus with the chang-ing signals emanating from the S radios.

Finally, it must l>e emphasized that the searchfor re.sonance is a community endeavor. No sin-gle person can know enough about all of the

11(1 RESONA^^CE: A M O D E L KOR REIATING

various domains. We must have conversati<insbetween persons, each of whom has knowledgefrom at least one of these domains. Of course.the hazard is that experts easily adopt an altitudeof academic imperialism, where the dynamic andrange of possibiliiies within their own field isnever subjected to the test of resonance withother domains.

Further Implications of the Resonance ModelOne of the issues in the development of the

Resonance Model was what word to put in ihcmiddle—the point of intersection of informationbetween domains. The reader may be imcom-fortable with the word "truth." The commitmentin this model to the position that a reality existsthat is knowable in some manner, is an idea thatrings of a modernism which is currently in disre-pute among most philosophers. However, thismodel attempts to capture some ot the spirit andconcerns of postmodernism in that it proposesthat our understanding of what is true is dynam-ic. Important truths seldom appear absolutelyclearly, or are independently validated, withinany one domain. What is more, this model rec-ognizes that any understanding of what might betrue is always influenced by lx)th tradition andpersonal experience. Neither science nor ratio-nality, nor a combination of these, .stand alone asarbiters of truth.

The challenge for this model is to indicate insome way that an understanding of tnith at anyone time or by any one person or group isalways somewhat partial and indistinct. One po.s-sibility would be tt) replace "Truth" with "Theory-"or "Hypothesis." However, this move would havethe problem that the outcome of the modelwould be something upon which one cannol actwith confidence. We do not wish to make criticaldecisions for ourselves or our communities basedon theories or hypotheses. In fact, we would bebetter to use the words "theory" and "hypothesis"for the information coming from each domain.What can be known from the resonance ot infor-mation is something more reliable.

Reasonable alternatives might be "Knowledge"or "Understanding" as codes for "bcsl under-standing of truth under the circumstances." How-ever, I have chosen to keep "truth" as the centralidea to reinforce my presumption that propertiesof the world and of human nature are largelyconstant and at least partially knowahle, and thaithese properties can be reflected in some veridi-cal manner is the resonance of information com-

ing from different domains. Thus, this model isnot entirely modern (it gives an equal place topersonal experience and cultural traditions), isnot entirely postmodern (it escapes objection-able forms of cultural relativism by granting thatimportant information about truth comes fromscience and rationality), and is not secular (itgives a critical voice to the authority of scripture,as well as to the wisdom of religious traditions).

One can easily imagine thai not ever\" sourcewill have relevant information bearing on all lop-ics. With respect to topics about which only onedomain has any relevant information, we wouldgrant that a single source might have soleauthority. For example, information from the sci-ence of neurophysiology would have soleauthority with respect to knowledge of thenujlecular structure and function of the mem-brane of a neuron. Other domains have nothingparticular to say about ihis topic. However, assoon as generalizations about human nature (forexample) are made from the implications of suchneurophysiologica! data, c>ther sources will alsohave information to contribute, and the reso-nance or dissonance between other sources andthis generalization from neuroscience must betaken intt) account.

The exact number and designation of criticaldomains is, to .some degree, a matter of choice.Those I have designated I would consider to bethe primary voices in our understanding ofhuman nature. With respect to other conversa-tions, one might want to break 'Tradition" into"Culture" and "Religious Tradition." Or, for otherpurposes, one might want to differentiate "Phys-ical Science" and "Social Science." I would con-sider such aliernatives to be entirely within thespirit of this model. What is important is to com-prehend the metaphors of resonance betweenmultiple .sources and the possibility of tuningsignals from every source in the attempt to findresonance.

An Example of the Resonance Modelin Operation

Finding le.sonance between Christian theologyand modern neuroscience is challengiTig, particu-larly with respect to views of human naaire. It isincreasingly difficult to hold a traditional Chris-tian view of persons in a w'orld of modern neuro-biology, cognitive science, and neuropsychology.As an example of the usefulness of the Reso-nance Model, I will review what I have writtenelsewhere regarding areas of dissonance antl the

WARREN S. BROWN 117

p()lfnii;il for resonance between a Christian(specifically Westeyan) view of human natureund the view emanating from cognitive neuro-science (Brown. 199Ha, 1998b. 2002, 200.̂ . 2004;Brown & Jeeves, 1999).

The critical issue creating dissonance betweentheological and scientific views of the nature ofpersons lies in a fundamental difference in abasic assumption lield by neuroscience andwitliin most Christian theology. To put the prob-lem formally, we are faced with two opposingviews of human nature represented by the fol-lowing ccsntradictory propositions (Brown &Jeeves, 1999).

Proposition 1: Humans are physicalbeings who also have non-maierial.souls. It is through our souls that weexperience and relate to God. Arelated proposition would be thatour souls are the source of oi[r freewill and moral agency.Proposition 2: Humans are neurobi-ological beings whose minds (alsosouls. religioLLS experience, etc.) aredetermined by, and can (at least intheory) be exhaustively explainedby neurobiology. neurochemistry,and ultimately by physics.

Proposition 2 expresses a view called reduc-tive (or eliminative) materialism that is character-istic of the pliilosophic view of many (certainlynot all) scientisis, but that is denied by a Chris-tian understanding of human nature. While vari-ations on Proposition 2 exist, it is difficult tt)hold this position without mental and spirituallife being presumed to be epiphenomenal—thatIS, all ihe causes of hiuiian experience andhuman behavior emanate from the lower levelsof neurophyslology and neurochemistry. Thus,one easily arrives at conckisitjns that spiritualexperiences are merely halhicinations. free willdoes not exist, sin and personal responsibililyare a myth, and human behavior is entirelydetermined by biological and physical laws.

Proposition 1 is a statement of body/soul (orbody/mind) dualism that has been the predomi-nant Christian view for much of the last millen-nium. Dualism has its primary rotns in llieteachings of Plato, St. Augustine, and Descartes.Here soul (or mind) is presumed to be a non-material entity with a realm of activity and agen-cy separate from, but interacting with, thephysical body. However, such body-soul dual-

ism is also faced with critical problems. First, thenature of the interaction between a non-materialsoul and a physical body and brain has neverbeen specilied in a convincing way (althoughsome have tried). Second (and more important-ly), there is a decreasing residue of leftoverhigher human mental functions and even reli-gious experiences that have not yet been shownto have neurocognitive correlates. Tliere is nottiiuch left unexamined by neuroscience thatmight constitute evidence for a non-materialscjul that has some notable form of agency with-in htiman behavior To have a separate entitysuch as a soul in a manner that is more thantrivial, the soul must have some realm (orrealms) of independent causal power withinhuman mental and physical activity. The soulmust do something that the brain does not do,or that cannot be affected by damage to thebrain. Othei'wise. the concept of a soul is with-out compelling meaning.

Although the research in most cases is incom-plete (and thus leaves the question open), thestrttng influence of neurobiological processes onour personal, social, and even spiritual lives, atthe very least, creates dissonance with dualismand forces us to consider the physical eml>odi-ment of soulish human functioning. For exam-pie: What is Ihe meaning of experiences ofnearness to God and intensely personal spiritualmoments when these can be elicited by tempo-ral lobe seizures (Ramachandran, 1997;Ramachandran ik Blakesjee, 1998) or magneticstimulation of this brain area (Cook & Persinger,1997)? And what is to he made of the failure ofmoral restraint in some patients with frontal lobebrain damage (Damasio, 199'*). or Ehe dramaticinfringement of Alzheitner's dementia on thespiritual and religious lives of some patients(Weaver, 20(N)? Thus, a neuroscience perspec-tive strongly questions the existence of a sepa-rate, non-material realm of the soul by whichcertain domains of human behavior and experi-ence can retnain unaffected by changes in brainfunction. At the veiy least, we should be uncom-fortable with simple answers regarding thenature of the hutnan .souL Here is a form of dis-sonance calling for tuning of some kind,

Nonreductive PhysicaUstnI h e alternative to dualism is whoHsm (or

monism), a view that considers humans to be asingle entity. One version of monism is called"nonreductive physicalism," "Physicalism" refers

118 RESONANCE: A MODEL FOR REI_ATING

to the assumption that it is not necessary to pos-tulate the existence of a second nonphysicalentity, the soul or mind, to account for humancapacities and distinctiveness. Soul (or mind) isphysiologically embodied. A "nonreductive" ver-sion of physicalism presumes that, despite thephysical nature of humankind, human behaviorcannot be exhaustively explained by analysis atlower levels (neurobiology). Our lower-levelneurobiological functioning is influenced (in atop-down manner) by the more global humanproces.ses of thinking, rea.soning, and deciding.Thus, there are causal properties of mintl thatemerge from the complexities of brain function-ing that cannot be reduced to the activity ofbrain modules or groups of neurons. Thinkingand willing have a real determinative influenceon behavior.

Thus, statements about the physical nature ofhuman beings made from the perspective ofbiology or neuroscience are about exactly thesame entity as statements made about the soulishor spiritual nature of persons from the point ofview of theology or religious traditions. Whenwe talk of "".souls" we are talking about wholepersons. One might say, ""We are .souls; we don'thave souls."

But is there any resonance to be foundbetween a nonreductive physicalist account ofhuman nature and a Biblical understanding ofpersons? Biblical scholars have dealt in-depthwith the issues and problems of a Biblical viewof human nature. There are tho.se who believedualism is the predominant view, and those whofavor moni5m. Among the latter is New Testa-ment .scholar Joel Green (Green, 1998, 2000,2002), who suggests that the Bible devotes little,if any, attention to theoretical or speculativeanalysis of such issues as monism vs. dualism.However, according to Green, the dominantview in Scripture is a monistic account of thehuman person that places a premium on humanrelatedness to God, to other humans, and to allof creation (Green, 2000).

This reference by Green to the critical role ofrelatedness in a Biblical definition of humannature is consistent with a position 1 have devel-oped in previous papers (Brown, 1998a, 2002,2003, 2004). I have argued that the qualities ofhuman nature that have been traditionallyattached to the concept of a soul can beaccounted for (within a monist Christian anthro-pology) by recognition of the exponentialincrease in the capacities for relatedness in

human beings compared to animals, includingother primates. The enhanced capacities ftjrrelatedness are manifest in our relationships withother persons, our relationship with ourselves(our inner life), and our relationship to God. Ihave proposed that "soul" is an aspect of humannature (more clearly designated as ".soulishness")not a distinct part of a person, and that thisaspect is commensurate with our unusual capaci-ties lor relatedness.

Finding Resonance between NonreductivePhysicalism ami Wesleyan Theology

Finally, since this issue is about Wesleyan the-ology, I will .speculate on the following ques-tions: Does a non-dualist portrait of humannature (specifically nonreductive physicalism)find any resonance with Wesleyan theology? Isthe theology of Wesley more or less hospitableto an account of human nature in which soulish-ness is understood as an embodied quality ofpersonal relatedness?

Remember that the primary goal of the Reso-nance Mt>del is not to have the various domainssay exactly the same thing. In this sense, they donot have to integrate. What is necessary is thatthere is perceived resonance and coherencebetween the perspectives. However, achievingresonance may require some amount of adjust-ment of the interpretive "dials" and tuning of the"signal" (within the acceptable ranges of inter-pretatitjn of the authoritative data within the par-ticular domain) such that greater resonance canbe perceived.

It is fairly clear from his writings that Wesleywas not a physicalist, but rather a dualist. Hemost often expressed his theology in dualist cat-egories. For example, in one of his sermonsWesley states:

For no bcxly, or matter of any kind,can be sinful: Spirits alone are capa-ble of sin. Pray in what part of thebody should sin lodge? It cannotkxlge in the skin, nor in the muscles,or nerves, or veins, or arteries; it can-not be in the bones, any more thanin the hair or nails. Only the soul canbe the .seat of .sin. (We.sley, lH72a)

However, de.spite a fairly clear commitment todualism, Wesley believed in a ver}' close interde-pendent relationship between body and soul. Infact, passages like the following suggest thatWesley was .somewhat uncertain, and at timesinconsi,stent, regarding the body/soul issue. In

WARREN S. BROWN 119

his sermon "Wbal is Man?" he specuhilfs aboiilthe location of the "thinking principle":

... it seems to be situated in somepart of the head; but whether in thepineal gland, or in any part of thebrain, I am not able to determine.But further; This inward principle,wherever it i.s lodged, is capable, notonly of thinking, but likewise oflove, haired, joy, sorrow, desire,fear, hope, and a whole train ofother inward emotions, which arecommonly called passions or affec-tions. They are styled, by a generalappellation, the will; and are mixedand diversified in a thou>sand ways.And they seem to be the only springof action in that inward principle Icall the soul. (Wesley, 1872b)

Here ihe bead (we presume the brain) is seento be the location for all the functions of the soulthat Wesley can imagine. In fact, the last sen-tence of this quote suggests that "the soul" andthis embodied "inward principle" are equivalent.Wesley continues later In [he sermon:

... I cannol but believe, this self-moving, thinking principle, witb allits passions and affections, will con-tinue to exist, although the body bemouldered into dust. Indeed at pre-seni this body is so intimately con-nected with the soul that I seem loconsist of both. In my pre.sent stateof existence. I undoubtedly consistof both soul and body: And so 1.shall again, after the resurrection, toall eternity. (Wesley, 1872b)

Here Wesley seems to vacillate between .sou! asan embodied inward principal, and a substantial-ly separate and distinct soul. Thus, while wehear in Wesley clear dualist categories, he holdsbody and soul as an intimate and almost indistin-guishable unity. In this sermon, Wesley readslike a nonreductive physicalist unable to sbedbis habitual dualist language.

Wesley's anthropology puts great emphasis onthe idea tbat the capacity for relationships consti-tutes the image of God in bumankind. Thecapacity for relatedness rested for Wesley onthree critical faculties: understanding, will, andliberty (Maddox, 1994, pp. 68-69). I have previ-t)usly argued ibat the unusual capacity of human

beings for relatedness rests on the enhancementand complex interactions of critical cognitivecapacities: language, a theory of mind, episodicmemory, conscious top-down executive func-tions, and a future orientation. Similarly, Wesiey'sconcepts of tempers can be understood as reso-nant with modern concepts from cognitive neu-roscience of procedure knowledge, automaticity,affect memories, and somatic markers (Strawn &Brown, 2004). For maximal resonance, a nonre-ductive neuroscience would need to demon-strate that tbese buman functions and propertiesare tbe products of our physical selves, but are,nevertheless, emergent properties that arecausally efficacious in a manner not reducible to"nothing but" ibeir underlying biology. Tbis mes-sage seems to be increasingly what is beingbroadcast from the most recent research regard-ing the cognitive neuroscience of higher humancapacities.

In summary, this foray into dualism, nonreduc-tive physicalism, and Wesleyan anthropology.suggests the value of the Resonance Model. Wes-ley's dualism makes it difficult to integrate histheology witb the pbysicalist understanding ofpersons that emanates from cognitive neuro-science. Nevertheless, we can find a great dealof resonance between a nonreductive form ofpbysicalism that places emphasis on the relation-al capacities of human beings and tbe wbole ofWesleyan tbougbt, Tbe Resonance Model, aderivative of tbe Wesleyan Quadrilateral, makesit possible botb to recognize the autbority ofsucb different domains as neuroscience andWesleyan theology, and to tune tbe signals fromeach domain in our effort to find greater reso-nance without violating their integrity.

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Author

Warren S. Broivn is Pr(fessor of Psychology at theGraduate School of Psychology- at Fuller TheologicalSeminary, where he is Director of the Lee TravisResearch Institute. He is also a member of the VCLABrain Research Institute. Specializations include e.xper-imental neuropsychological research, particularly thecorfius callosum. He is co-erfiVor o/"Whatever Happenedto tlie Soul: Scientific and Theological Portraits ofHuman Nature, and Understanding Wisdom; Sources,Science, and ScK'iety.