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Resource Curse?Explaining Botswana’s Democratic Success as a Rentier-State
Cade Ratclif
Abstract
Rent-seeking economies have often been shown to have considerable
diculty in producing substantive democracy within their political
regimes. An exception to this rule is Botswana, which despite having a
signicant proportion of government revenue derived from mining
resources has still been able to consistently procure substantive
elections. !hree interdependent variables that can potentially explain
this phenomenon are" #$% &thnic 'omogeneity, #(%
)orruption*+atronage, and #% Bureaucratic Autonomy. By analying
this case alongside that of another comparable rentier-state, abon,
the in/uence of these variables over a rent-seeking state0s capacity to
democratie can be evaluated.
I. Introduction
Rentier-states have consistently been aligned with a diculty to
produce substantive democracy. 1ome explanations have relied on
a correlation between tax revenues and democracy. 2hile this
explanation of the in/uence of rents on democracy has retained
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logical plausibility, certain states have deed expectation. )hie/y
among them is Botswana, which has procured regular and
substantive elections.
!he 3uestion then emerges, 4why and how56 Botswana0s success
compared to many other rent-seeking countries is clear from
several analyses. !he strength of Botswana0s electoral processes
and pluralism, as well as its propensity for civil liberties are among
the highest on the globe, and certainly the highest in Africa
#&conomist 7ntelligence 8nit, (9$:%. 7t has also been evaluated that
the +residency of Botswana, despite increased power to the
executive branch, has not exhibited abuses of such power #)enter
for 1ystematic +eace, (9$9%. !he country0s ability to exhibit an
exceptional amount of economic as well as political success has
derived from its ability to host free, fair, and regular elections
without fail, producing a consistent basis of constitutional and
civilian government #1kidmore-'ess, (99(%.
7n the range of analysis, it is tting to look at the dialogue
already expressed on the sub;ect of state building, specically state
building that creates incentives for democracy. Alongside this
dialogue, a comparison with rentier states that have lacked thus far
in generating substantive democracies is also appropriate. !ogether,
these two components may shed light on the variables that make
Botswana such a distinct case within the African continent.
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II. Review o Literature
Institutional Frameworks
<rancis <ukuyama exhibits a powerful explanatory model
regarding political development, concentrating on three primary
components" a strong centralied and ecient state, an impartial rule
of law, and prevalent democratic institutions and norms. &ach of these
components can be divided further into sub-components. !he
development of a strong and centralied state for instance, re3uires
the development of a relatively autonomous bureaucracy, shielded
from appointments and e3uipped with the proper resources. !he
state0s ability to tax, and its ability to develop e=ective and
programmatic policy, are both contingent on the centralied strength
of the state, and a merit based bureaucracy.
7n many cases, the historical development of the state
determines the ability to generate this type of bureaucracy. <ukuyama
argues that issues of patronage and clientelism emerge when
democracy is introduced prior to the development of a strong
centralied state with an autonomous bureaucracy already present.
>any positions in the bureaucracy are often used to as appointments
to reward constituents rather than serve the interest of the overall
state. 'istorical comparisons of the +russian >odel and the American
>odel of development highlight this behavior #<ukuyama, (9$?%.
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@nce democracy has been introduced however, transitions away
from this clientelistic system are not impossible, but increasingly
dicult.
emocracy can be hindered in these situations, especially where both
rent seeking and multi-ethnic populations are involved. igeria is a
case o=ered to illustrate this point. espite the introduction of formal
democratic prospects, igeria is still fueled by corruption. 1cholar
Robert Coseph explains this phenomenon as being one in which political
ties are exerted along vertical lines rather than horiontal onesD a
steady /ow of revenue from rents allow elites in the country to draw
from a pool of resources independent of the citiens and allows them
to payo= political obedience. &ven though E9F of the population lives
beneath the poverty line, the multi-ethnic distinctions in society make
collective action dicult when patronage politics produce greater
individual payo=s #Coseph, $GHE%. !hus, the persistent presence of
patronage-based bureaucracy simply exacerbates corruption, and is
maintained by rent seeking and impediments to collective action to
counter reliance on this spoils system. 7n such clientelistic political
systems, ethnicity becomes an e=ective signaling device between
patron and clients #+osner, (99:%.
7n/uence over state institutions is not entirely endogenous
however. @utside forces, especially in the case of colonialism, can
in/uence institutional development #<ukuyama, (9$?%. Regarding both
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<rench and British colonial models, the post-colonial in/uence of both
is enough to highlight stark di=erences in the e=ectiveness of the
conglomerate of di=erent states in Africa. By accepting clientelistic
behavior as a necessary evil and part of the process of democratic
development #<ukuyama, (9$?%, but still developing institutional
connements to incentivie more programmatic policy development,
some states have fared o= better democratically than others in Africa.
Ethnic Heteroeneit!
As a cluster of developing countries, African states are prone not
only to rent seeking and institutional in/uence from post-imperialism,
but also succumb to the in/uence of ethnic tension and thus
internal*external con/ict. As a part of Besley and +ersson0s >odel of
1tate evelopment, +olitical Iiolence, along with <iscal and Jegal
)apacity, are also important components to consider. +olitical
heterogeneity exacerbates instability when states lack centraliation
#Besley K +ersson, (9$$%.
!ying this to <ukuyama0s analysis, ethnic homogeneity can
reduce internal political violence and allow the population to overcome
the corruption tied with rent seeking*clientelism in the government. <or
example, in igeria, the prevalence of multi-ethnic groups is a likely
impediment to overcoming corruption. 7n a state such as Botswana
however, nearly H9F of the population is of the !swana ethnic ma;ority.
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!his distinction may play a ma;or factor in the propensity of Botswana
to overcome corruption.
Rents and "atronae
!he analysis of compatibility between democracy and resource
exports is a sub topic of )ollier0s work on the challenges facing
developing countries. 1imilarly in line with the analysis o=ered
previously, )ollier illustrates the way in which resource rents
undermine electoral competition by making patronage politics more
cost-ecient than provisions for public service.
7n many cases, the cost of large-scale patronage is unfeasible if
the institutions for democratic electoral processes already exist. 2hen
resources are introduced, the cost is lowered and it becomes more
ecient for parties to draw from public funds. 7n certain situations,
autocracy is even shown to be more e=ective at economic growth than
democracy, but primarily relies on the presence of resources that can
contribute to rent seeking #)ollier, (99E%.
!he introduction of certain restraints, through a series of checks
and balances, can reduce the cost eciency of patronage politics in
these types of economies, and protect such democracies from
faltering. <urthermore, such restraints would contribute to increased
economic growth by channeling accumulated rents to public services
rather than private interest #)ollier, (99E%.
#tate $wned Enter%rises
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7ntegrating a perspective on development within resource rich
countries in Africa also re3uires reviewing di=erences of behavior
within the public sector. !he case to be made for the e=ectiveness of
autonomous authority can be drawn out of structures surrounding
state owned enterprises in the ulf Region. 7n many gulf countries,
state owned enterprises are mostly shielded from royal and
bureaucratic forces playing an in/uence over prot ob;ectives, due in
large part to the fact that these 1@&0s en;oy relative managerial
autonomy #'ertog, (9$9%. !hus, )&@0s in these 1@&0s do not have to
be concerned with appealing to public demands and can operate
e=ectively to produce purely rational decisions on policy within the
enterprise. 2elfare employment is not a concern, and insulation from
patronage politics is key #'ertog, (9$9%.
Indicators o &ureaucratic Autonom!
A consistent issue within the social sciences has been the ability
to properly measure characteristics of behavior #especially those
regarding society%, and to know the proper indicators for such
measurements. Bureaucratic Autonomy is no exception, and is a prime
example of this issue in terms of today. o resources exist currently to
measure a total amount of bureaucratic autonomy, but research has
nonetheless been conducted in an attempt to distinguish possible
indicators that could be searched for as a means of measurement.
1uch research has yielded two facets of autonomy" independent goal
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formation and the capacity to achieve desired outcomes #)aughey,
)hateld, K )ohon, (99G%
2ithin the context of a rentier-state, and the corruption that
tends to emerge from utiliing public resources for private political
gain, a key characteristic for measurement would be 4Jegal >andates6,
which is an indicator that falls under the facet of independent goal
formation #)aughey, )hateld, K )ohon, (99G%. !he reasons for this
being a sucient indicator are both its ability to clarify the extent to
which bureaucratic positions in an agency can be used for
appointment, and also the extent to which an agency can develop its
structural norms and expectations internally rather than from external
forces. !he ability to develop policy preferences based o= agency
research rather than outside demands, and to promote individuals
based o= recognition of merit internal to the agency.
#ummar! o Literature
!hus, in analying these components of research, state development
with regard to resource rich economies #t for rent seeking policies%
create di=erent political outcomes. !hese outcomes are contingent on
the institutional framework of the state, in large part from inherited
institutions in cases of colonialism. Another component is the
propensity for ethnic homogeneity. Above all however, is the ability for
the state to produce relatively autonomous bureaucratic positions,
sheltered from patronage and clientelistic behavior. !his may help
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explain a large part of the reason why Botswana has succeeded so
well. >any of its policies could be labeled as 4programmatic6, allowing
a balance of power between ruling elites within the country, cattle
farmers #a dominant group%, ethnic chieftains #via the tlo ya ikgosi%,
and peasants #&riksen, (9$$%. +olicies of this sort are tied to
autonomous bureaucratic frameworks #<ukuyama, (9$?%.
III. 'odel o Anal!sis
Based o= the previous body of literature, three principal
variables stand as being indicative of the likelihood of democratic
development in a rentier state. !he three variables are also
interwoven, and cannot be considered outside the context of each
other. !hey are as follows, with their own denitions"
$. &thnic 'omogeneity M !he scale of a society0s diversity of ethnic
groupsD maximied when either the number of ethnic identities
are $ or less #where ethnic identity is not the scope of group
identity and the scope of group identity is instead focused on
national identity #)ottam, iet-8hler, >astors, K +reston, (9$9%.(. +atronage M !he propensity of politicians or public oce holders
to trade votes and support for oce with favors of appointment
or legislation* funding toward the specic interest of those who
were their supporters or will remain their supporters.
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. Bureaucratic Autonomy M !he capacity of bureaucratic bodies to
engage in both the development of goals independent of
external preferences and to achieve said goals #)aughey,
)hateld, K )ohon, (99G%.
!he interaction of these variables is an interwoven and mutually
dependent structure, the explanation of which relies primarily on the
thoughts and arguments expressed by <rancis <ukuyama. &thnic
homogeneity is the rst variable of consideration, along with its ties to
patronage. !he argument regarding their connection was expressed
above on page , when Richard Coseph explained the way in which
&thnic iversity produces what is often called a 4)ollective Action
+roblem6. 7n a highly heterogeneous state of ethnic diversity,
individuals face a highly complex prisoners0 dilemma that largely
eliminates the ability of each group to unify in a common interest.
!hus, the only means of political #and in turn economic% mobility is to
support those with the greatest collection of power within the state,
namely the politician. !hus, political participation and the preferences
emerging from society are based more-so on a vertical relationship,
based o= status of power, rather than a horiontal relationship of group
unity to generate power through vote.
!he tie between patronage and bureaucratic autonomy is directly
related to the preferences that emerge from ethnic homogeneity. 2hen
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ethnic homogeneity is low, it is more dicult for the public to demand
transparency and collectively accepted programs. !hus, these groups
prefer special advantages that best serve their individual group
associations. 2hen this type of power is a=orded to those within power
#especially so within rent-seeking states%, they will be given an
incentive to procure both personal prot from public resources as well
as to retain power over policies regarding the use of such public
resources and the public programs that might emerge from such public
policies. 'owever, when the ability of politicians to exert their
preferences over the preferences of bureaucratic bodies is constrained,
the bureaucracies are better able to freely develop policy preferences
that are more ob;ectively goal oriented and produce benets for
society as a whole. !his in turn can reduce the public0s reliance on
patronage, since now their interest as a state entity is being addressed
rather than in terms of individual ethnic groups. !his e=ect in turn can
allow these ethnic groups to vote for politicians based less on returns
through patronage, and instead on views of the needs of the overall
state.
I(. 'ethod o Research
!esting the explanatory strength of this previous analysis re3uires both
a comparative case as well as viable indicators. <or indicators of the
previously given variables, the following are used"
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• Ethnic Homogeneity: +ercentage of population concentrated
within the largest ethnic group, as provided by the )7A 2orld <act
Book and the )line )enter for emocracy.
• Patronage" >easurements of )orruption as given by
!ransparency 7nternational• Bureaucratic Autonomy: Analysis of external in/uence upon
the public sector by outside actors and the e=ectiveness of the
public sector to generate programmatic policy through the use of
extractive resource revenues, as provided by Agence <ranNaise
de Oveloppement.
Regarding comparison, necessary variables to control for
constituted" +opulation 1ie, overnment Revenues rawn from an
&xtracted Resources, + per )apita, Regional 1imilarity, Rentier-
1tatism, and emocratic <ramework. !o properly understand the
anomalous behavior exhibited by Botswana, the interaction of
population and economic demands needed to be relatively similar.
Regional similarity was also important due to the fact that a stark
di=erence in climate or overall geopolitical associations would change
expectations concerning technology, external sources of in/uence and
con/ict and regional norms in a signicant way. >ost important, the
concentration of revenue ac3uired from extracted resources needed to
by similar. 7n this way, the potential for the use of revenues to either
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procure clientelistic or programmatic policy decisions would be largely
e3uivalent.
7n this case, the closest comparable state was that of abon. !he
two absolute factors both countries shared was their regional and
economic similarity as both are considered rentier-states and also
belong within 1ub-1aharan Africa. 7n addition, both states exhibited
similar details to make them appropriate comparisons for the purpose
of this research #As shown in <ig.$%.
FI). *
&otswana )abon
"o%ulation*+ (,$H(,EHG $,E9:, L)," %er Ca%ita-+ P$L,999 P((,G99#tate Revenuebased of etractedresource-+
?9F from >ining
Rents
?(F from @il Rents
(. Findins
!he ndings of the research were shown to be consistent with
the expectations of the hypothesis laid out within previously written
$ ata from )7A 2orld <actBook( ata from 2orld Bank #!he 2orld Bank%
$
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literature on the sub;ect. onetheless, there is room for interpretation
regarding the actual causal links that lead to the ndings listed below.
&thnic 'omogeneity
!he density of &thnic 'omogeneity was clearly in Botswana0s favor
#see <ig (, below%. 2ith nearly H of every $9 individuals within
Botswana being part of the dominant !swana ethnicity, the aptitude for
collective demands over public policy decisions to be programmatic is
predictably stronger. 7n abon however, the presence of a diverse
range of ethnic backgrounds would be predicted to generate a higher
propensity for political tensions that concentrate on favoritism for a
selective apportionment of the population0s welfare. ue to this, it
would be predictable that corruption within abon would be more likely
than in Botswana.
FI). -
&otswana )abon/
'a0or Ethnic)rou%s 1"ercentaeo "o%ulation2
!swana #EGF%Qalanga #$$F%Basarwa #F%@ther #EF%
?9 &thnic roups"<ang #(F%>pongwe #((F%Bapounou #$$F%
+atronage
As predicted previously, corruption was more prevalent in abon than
in Botswana #1ee <ig .% 7n the )orruption +erceptions 7ndex, scores
ata from population estimates calculated by the )line )enter foremocracy
$?
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ranged from 9 #high corruption% to $99 #low corruption%. 7n the )ontrol
of )orruption indicator, scores ranged from -(.: to (.:, with higher
scores indicating better governance outcomes #!ransparency
7nternational, (9$:%.
FI). /
&otswana )abon
Corru%tion"erce%tions Inde+
Rank" $*$E:1core" L*$99
Rank" G?*$E:1core"E*$99
Control o
Corru%tion+
+ercentile Rank" H9F1core" 9.GE:
+ercentile Rank" (?F1core" - 9.EL
Bureaucratic Autonomy
>easurements for bureaucratic autonomy were di=erent than
those within &thnic 'omogeneity or )orruption. 7ndicators for such
measurements are still not clear within political or economic elds of
study. 7nstead, information regarding components that likely related to
the autonomy of bureaucracies within the public sector was drawn
from the 7nstitutional +role atabase compiled by the Agence
<ranNaise de Oveloppement #A<%. !he database is based o= data
collected in a survey by private professionals and experts located
$:
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within the countries in 3uestion and then compiled by A<. Below in
gure ?, are six factors drawn from the database that attempt to
illustrate autonomy. !hey way that the factors are measured and
presented are based o= a scale, ranging from 9 to ?. !he higher the
score was given, the greater the measurement of the listed indicator.
!he rst two indicators are expected to be negative in correlation with
bureaucratic autonomy, while the last four are expected to be positive.
!he rst two indicators show the amount of political capture by elites
and their in/uence on both public policy and the use of public funds
and revenues. !he last four indicators show the level of
nonpartisanship that drives the public policy making process, and the
extent to which public interest versus private interest plays a role in
the overall 3uality and development of public policy. <ollowing this
assertion, Botswana illustrates a much higher propensity for both
autonomy and e=ectiveness from its public sector than abon.
FI) . 3
&otswana )abon
In4uence oEconomic#takeholders on"ublic "olic!
$.LE .
"riorit! o the Elitein relation todevelo%ment and
(.99 (.:9
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rowth
5ualit! o the"ublic "olic!'akin "rocess
$.H9 9.?9
#u%%ort oremerin d!namicsectors
(.99 9.99
Consideration o%ublic interest inrelationshi%sbetween state andbusiness
(.:9 (.99
)overnance o6atural Resources
.99 (.
(I. Conclusion
!here are several considerations worth mentioning after
reviewing the research of this paper. 2hile the data above appears to
fall in line with the predictions previously listed, it also leaves plenty of
room for interpretation. <irst and foremost, the causal linkages
between each of the variables listed above cannot be established with
certainty by the data alone. +erhaps the data above o=ers strength to
the hypothetical framework it is was derived from, but the proof of
causality is still lacking.
@ne example is that the data above could possibly be explained
in a very di=erent way. &xplaining Botswana0s success in developing
greater programmatic policies may have very little to do with a lack of
$E
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corruption or bureaucratic autonomy. 7nstead, the high concentration
of !swana within the population may force public policy decisions to
still follow a behavior that appears ob;ectively programmatic, but is still
based largely o= patronage to ethnic loyalties. As it is illustrated
above, corruption is still considerably present within Botswana by
global standards, even if it is relatively well o= within Africa.
Another issue present within this research is the di=erence
between the resources extracted within Botswana and abon. 2hile
Botswana0s public sector derives a large sum of its revenue from the
>ining sector, abon draws its revenues from oil. !he di=erence in
volatility between these two markets may be considerable, and
deserves further research for clarication.
Jastly, there turned out to be signicant diculty in locating
data or research on the sub;ect of bureaucratic autonomy. 2hile
research into proper indicators for measurements of bureaucratic
autonomy was available, actual data directly listing a ranking of public
sectors within di=erent states was not to be found. 1uch a resource
deserves to be further investigated and collected for public and
academic use. 8ntil it is, a ma;or component of public policy analysis
and comparative political analysis may be missing from the greater
dialogue of political economics.
After evaluating the ndings of this research, a commitment to
the strength of the hypothesis formed out of the previous literature on
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this sub;ect is arguably ;ustied. !he data given above was predictable,
even despite its inability to show direct causal links. <urther research
into this framework, given enough time, may motivate a change in
tone within political economics over the idea of the resource curse and
its e=ects on democracy.
$G
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