Date post: | 12-Aug-2019 |
Category: |
Documents |
Upload: | vuongkhanh |
View: | 212 times |
Download: | 0 times |
1
Respect for Civil Liberties during the Third Wave:
Levels and Sequences
Jørgen Møller
Associate professor, PhD
Department of Political Science, Aarhus University
Bartholins Allé 7
8000 Aarhus C, Denmark
E-mail: [email protected]
&
Svend-Erik Skaaning
Associate professor, PhD
Department of Political Science, Aarhus University
Bartholins Allé 7
8000 Aarhus C, Denmark
E-mail: [email protected]
Paper prepared for presentation at the Danish Political Science Association’s annual meeting, Vejle,
October 25-26.
2
Respect for Civil Liberties during the Third Wave:
Levels and Sequences
Abstract
The literature on state repression has been preoccupied with electoral rights and personal integrity
rights whereas the repression of civil liberties has received much less attention. In this paper, we
present a new dataset on respect for civil liberties, which includes indicators on freedom of
expression, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of religion, and freedom of movement
for 198 countries in the period 1976-2010. Interrogating this dataset, we identify a hierarchical
pattern between the four civil liberties: freedom of expression is generally repressed at least as
much as freedom of association and assembly, which is generally repressed at least much as
freedom of movement, while freedom of religion is only rarely repressed more than any of the other
liberties. Moreover, we find convergence in the respect for the different kinds of civil liberties after
the Cold War as the global averages for the freedom of expression and the freedom of association
and assembly have increased more than those for the freedom of movement and the freedom of
religion. However, on both accounts this increase has been surpassed by that for electoral rights,
meaning that the democratization which has occurred since 1989-91 suffers from a liberal deficit.
Keywords:
Civil liberties, dataset, developmental trends, hierarchical patterns, Mokken scale analysis
3
Introduction
The widespread violations of civil liberties, the consistency with which they have been championed
by social movements in modern times, and their prominent position in liberal political theory,
international human rights conventions, and most national constitutions (Berlin 2002; Ishay 2004;
Keith 2002; Landman 2006) all speak in favour of systematically analysing patterns in their
repression. The near-absence of large-N comparative studies of First Amendment-type civil liberties
is therefore paradoxical (cf. Davenport 2007: 1), especially considering the explosive increase in
empirical studies of neighbouring freedoms such as electoral rights and physical integrity rights
(Berg-Schlosser 2007; Munck 2009; Davenport 2007; Landman 2006). Accordingly, we know little
about the general development in the relative repression of these liberties on the one hand and vis-à-
vis electoral rights and physical integrity rights on the other hand, and we do not know whether
strong patterns exist in the sequencing of civil liberties.
Arguably, this lack of attention to civil liberties is, at least partly, a consequence of the
absence of disaggregated, cross-temporal data. Extant measures of civil liberties are characterized
by a very limited coverage of countries, years, and/or rights, and they do not offer fine-grained,
disaggregated data (Skaaning 2010). In this paper, we introduce a new dataset on government
respect for civil liberties (the Civil Liberty Dataset), which covers four First Amendment-type
rights, i.e., freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of religion, and
freedom of movement. The scope of the dataset is virtually all independent countries (198) in the
period 1976-2010.
Interrogating the Civil Liberty Dataset, we demonstrate that the more political civil
liberties of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association are generally repressed
more than the more private civil liberties of freedom of religion and freedom of movement.
Furthermore, a sequencing analysis strongly indicates the existence of a more fine-grained, four-
4
step hierarchy across the civil liberties. Next, interesting temporal dynamics occur. The
developments in global repression levels of the four civil liberties show a partial convergence over
time, especially because respect for the freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and
association increase remarkably at the end of the Cold War. However, for all four kinds of civil
liberties the post-1989 increase is smaller than that for electoral rights, lending support to the notion
of a liberal deficit of recent democratization processes.
The Civil Liberty Dataset
The Civil Liberty Dataset (henceforth CLD) includes measures of civil liberties “understood as
certain freedoms to perform actions that individuals might wish to perform, which (it is thought) the
state should not restrict” (Waldron 2003: 195). These freedoms are also known as First
Amendment-type rights (Goldstein 1978: xxx-xxxi; Davenport 2007: 2). In the creation of the CLD,
only the actual practices of states and their agents have been taken into account in the assignment of
scores, which means that neither merely formal-legal guarantees nor citizens’ missing abilities to
make use of the freedoms due to lack of initiative, commitment, financial means, etc. have
influenced the coding of the following civil liberties:
Freedom of expression: To what extent do citizens, groups, and the press have the right
to hold views freely and to seek, obtain, and pass on information on political issues
broadly understood without being subject to actual limitations or restrictions?
Freedom of assembly and association: To what extent do citizens have the right to
gather freely and carry out peaceful demonstrations as well as to join, form, and
participate with other persons in political parties, cultural organizations, trade unions, or
the like of their choice without being subject to actual limitations or restrictions?
5
Freedom of religion: To what extent do citizens have the right to have and change
religion or belief of own choice and alone or in community manifest their religion or
belief in practice, worship, observance, and teaching in private or public as well as
proselytize peacefully without being subject to actual limitations or restrictions?
Freedom of movement and residence: To what extent do citizens have the right to settle
and travel within their country as well as to leave and return to their country of own
choice without being subject to actual limitations or restrictions?
The source for the coding has been the US State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices, a set of annual country reports that provide systematized information on violations of
civil liberties and other human rights over several decades. After the first reports, issued in the mid-
1970s, were met by severe criticism, the scope, quality, and independence of the information
improved significantly (McNitt 1988: 97-98; Innes 1992), and the “results of careful, critical
examinations over the years … tend to agree that the annual State Department Reports are an
invaluable source accurately reporting on the conditions of most of the countries most of the time”
(Poe et al. 2001: 651).
The four indicators have been coded based on a four-point scale.1 The points denote
situations where the respective civil liberties are severely restricted (1), fairly restricted (2),
1 In transforming the information into the scores constituting the dataset, at least two independent coders (trained
graduate students well-versed in comparative politics and, regarding the (post-)communist and Latin American
countries for the period 1977-2003, also AUTHOR) assigned scores to all the country-years. In case of the Latin
American and (post-)communist countries 1979-2003, disagreements were settled by discussions among the coders, and
for the remaining disagreements a third coder was authorized with the final judgment. For a more detailed set of coding
standards we refer to the codebook: www.xxx.xx. Regarding inter-coder reliability tests, these have been run for all four
freedoms for all years. The percent agreement ranges from .70 (freedom of movement) to .77 (freedom of expression).
Cohen’s kappa is 0.61 for the freedom of religion scores, .64 for the freedom of movement scores, .64 for the freedom
6
modestly restricted (3), and not restricted (4). The four points are anchored in an overall distinction
between ideal typical characteristics of liberal, semi-liberal, illiberal, and anti-liberal regimes,
where the two intermediate categories are inserted symmetrically between the endpoints (cf. Munck
2006).
The four-point scale thus parallels the often employed division of political regimes
into democratic, semi-democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian types (cf. Merkel 1999; Linz 2000).
Noting that many contemporary countries fit poorly into the end points of democracy and
totalitarianism, the need for intermediate categories between democracies and authoritarian regimes
has long been recognized by scholars studying regime change (Diamond 2002; Merkel 2004;
Zakaria 1997). A similar reasoning can be extended to civil liberties. Indeed, many of the adjectives
attached to the democracy concept, such as ‘illiberal’ and ‘delegative’, denote combinations where
electoral competition occur in the absence of adequate protection of one or more civil liberties (cf.
Collier & Levitsky 1997: 438-441). Hence, it seems reasonable to include the semi-liberal score
into the scale. The term anti-liberal makes up a negative end-point of the scale which takes into
account the existence of extremely repressive (i.e., totalitarian) regimes.
The virtues of our dataset come into relief when comparing it with the civil liberties
rating included in the Freedom in the World survey provided by Freedom House (2011) and the
indicators for First Amendment-type rights included in the CIRI Human Rights Database (see
Cingranelli & Richards 2010), respectively. The widely employed civil liberties index by Freedom
House suffers from a number of shortcomings2 (Munck 2009; Coppedge & Gerring et al. 2011),
of assembly/association scores, and .67 for the freedom of expression scores. In all cases, this is within the range of
what Landis & Koch (1977) regard as good (substantial) agreement.
2 For example, the underlying coding scheme is merely a checklist that has undergone several changes over the years
and it does not specify the meaning of the different scores. Furthermore, the measure is rather incoherent – besides civil
liberties and personal integrity rights it also covers aspects such as personal social freedoms, absence of economic
7
most notably a blatant lack of disaggregate scores for the years 1972-2004. This problem does not
affect the impressive CIRI Human Rights Dataset, which includes scores for no less than seventeen
different human rights in the period 1981-2010. Among these are indicators for a number of First-
Amendment type rights: freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of
foreign movement, freedom of domestic movement, and freedom of religion. But even the CIRI
data has certain limitations compared to our dataset. First, in the case of freedom of speech and
freedom of assembly and association, scores for 33 small countries are only available for the years
after 2000. Second, inter-coder reliability tests have just been performed on the coding of one year
(2004). Third, the CIRI indicators are only measured on three-point scales.
To elaborate the third point, CIRI (Cingranelli & Richards 2008) score what they term
the freedom of speech by determining whether “Government censorship and/or ownership of the
media (including radio, TV, Internet, and/or domestic news agencies)” is (0) Complete, (1) Some,
or (2) None. One might make the critical observation that censorship and ownership of the press is
at most a subset of the freedom of speech. Moreover, the jump from ‘some’ censorship to
‘complete’ censorship is relatively big, meaning that the CIRI coding rules are unable to tease out
relevant differences among countries with low levels of the freedom of speech. Similar problems
affect the coding rules for “Citizens’ rights to freedom of assembly and association”. The three-
point scale here distinguishes between (0) Severely restricted or denied completely to all citizens,
(1) Limited for all citizens or severely restricted or denied for select groups, and (2) Virtually
unrestricted and freely enjoyed by practically all citizens. The code of 0 once again collapses
important differences, such as whether the freedom of assembly and association is very or next to
completely restricted.
exploitation, the right to own property and establish private business, gender equality, and freedom from war and
insurgencies.
8
Furthermore, the distinctions between no censorship, some censorship, and complete
censorship and between restricted, limited, or virtually unrestricted freedom of association and
assembly do not seem to be anchored in more general theoretical distinctions. Rather, they tend to
be of a more pragmatic nature, which is also reflected in the fact that the concepts linked to the
different levels differ between the coding of these rights, which makes it difficult to carry out
meaningful comparisons of absolute repression levels across the different liberties.
Considering these differences between the CIRI dataset and the CLD, it is not overly
surprising that the respective scores for the four civil liberties only correlate (Kendall’s Tau-b) in
the range of .544 -.727, even though they are based on the same source. Especially the pairwise
correlations between the two measures for freedom of expression/speech (.544) and the freedom of
assembly and association (.605), respectively, are rather low whereas the highest correlation (.727)
is found between the freedom of religion indicators. These correlations are of course not low in an
absolute sense, but compared to pairwise correlations between many measures of democracy (cf.
Casper & Tufis 2003), they are relatively low. This indicates that the two datasets capture different
aspect of the empirical variation in civil liberties and that the addition of the CLD is therefore not
superfluous.
In Table 1, we report the bivariate correlations between our civil liberties measures
and between these and the Freedom House (2011) civil liberties rating and the Political Terror Scale
(PTS) (see Wood & Gibney 2010; Gibney et al. 2011). The results show that the four civil liberty
indicators are highly correlated – especially freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and
association – but clearly not on a level where it makes no analytical sense to distinguish between
them.
[Table 1 about here]
9
Moreover, the results demonstrate that our civil liberties measures are consistently higher correlated
with Freedom House’s measure than with the (combined3) PTS. This finding is as expected
considering that our indicators should obviously tap into a more general measure of civil liberties to
a higher extent than they co-vary with violations of physical integrity rights.
Global trends, 1979-2010
One thing is co-variation; another is the absolute levels of repression across the four civil liberties.
As mentioned in the introduction, the four civil liberties included in our new dataset can be divided
into two sub-species based on the distinction between the more political civil liberties of freedom of
expression and freedom of assembly and association and the more private civil liberties of freedom
of movement and (especially) freedom of religion. Generally speaking, one would expect the
political liberties to be repressed more than the private liberties because the former are likely to
threaten the political power holders the most (cf. Davenport 2007). Indeed, the political liberties are
often treated as defining attributes of democracy (Dahl 1989; Merkel 2004; O’Donnell 2007), which
underlines that governments normally have a more direct interest in curtailing these compared with
less political liberties. Finally, among the political liberties, freedom of expression is likely to be
repressed more than freedom of assembly and association. Power holders have always fought open
criticism of their rule and according to Gearon (2006: 129): “If truth is the first casualty of war,
freedom of expression is the first target of the totalitarian”.
3 I.e., the average of the version based on Amnesty International’s Annual Report and the version based on Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices.
10
To what extent are the actual repression levels in line with these expectations?4 Figure
1, which depicts the global average scores rescaled to range from 0 (low respect) to 10 (high
respect), shows that freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association have indeed
been violated more than freedom of religion and freedom of movement over the entire period.
Moreover, as one would expect due to the boost of a liberal-democratic Zeitgeist (Fukuyama 1993;
Linz & Stepan 1996) and the emergence of a Western liberal hegemony in international affairs
(Levitsky & Way 2010), there was a sudden increase in respect for, first and foremost, the political
liberties at the end of the Cold War. This trend has clearly narrowed the gap between the two sets of
rights. Nonetheless, the absolute differences have remained clear-cut throughout the post-Cold War
era, which has generally been characterized by stagnation after the spike around 1989-91.
[Figure 1 about here]
But how do tendencies compare to the developments in respect for electoral rights. To
investigate this issue, we employ a recoded version of POLITY IV, which we have weighted and
aggregated in a way that secures a higher degree of concept-measure consistency than the standard
democracy-autocracy scale.5 Figure 1 shows that the 1989-91 juncture produced an abrupt increase
in the respect for electoral rights, which was followed by more gradual improvements. Hence,
electoral rights have experienced a much higher relative jump than the civil liberties. This
4 We only use the data from 1979 onwards due to the alleged biases and selective country coverage in the very first
years covered by the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.
5 Based on the POLITY IV dataset, we have used the scores assigned to three indicators, viz. competitiveness of
participation, competitiveness of executive recruitment, and openness of executive recruitment, weighted as suggested
by Goertz (2005: 97). The scores are then aggregated by taking the maximum value of the two latter (highly
overlapping) indicators in a single competition dimension (ass also suggested by Goertz) which is then multiplied with
the score of the first indicator as recommended by Munck (2009).
11
observation lends support to scholars (e.g., Diamond 2002; O’Donnell 2007; Zakaria 1997) who
have emphasized that the latest wave of democratization has been characterized by a remarkable a
liberal deficit.
We have also included the average (combined) PTS scores in the overview. It
demonstrates that the violation of physical integrity on average seem to have been relatively
resistant to the changes in 1989-91; actually the global mean scores during and after the Cold War
are not significantly different. This interesting finding indicates that the increased electoral
competition can have had cross-cutting (liberal vs. illiberal) effects (cf. Bueno de Mesquita et al.
2005; Cederman et al. 2010; Davenport 2004; Hegre et al. 2003).
The sequencing of civil liberties
Whereas differences in repression levels across different rights were clearly identifiable from the
graphs in Figure 1, we need further scrutiny of the data to see if they also lend support to the
existence of a more particular sequencing in the respect for civil liberties. In Table 2, we report the
means for each of the four measures over the entire period of 1976-2010. A mean score of 1 would
indicate that the civil liberty in question was severely violated everywhere in all years. Conversely,
a mean score of 4 would indicate that the civil liberty in question was not restricted at all across
space and time. In the table, the indicators have been ordered according to their mean value from
low to high.
[Table 2 about here]
The ordering suggests that for a particular country-year, a high score on any indicator
is matched by at least the same score on the indicators listed below this indicator in the table.
12
Hence, the numbers suggest that, in most cases, governments respect the freedom of religion and
the freedom of movement at least as much as the freedom of assembly and association, which they
respect at least as much as the freedom of expression. In addition, the differences in the average and
standard deviation (i.e., the frequency distribution) of the indicators indicate that if the indicators
are unidimensional, one needs to apply a method that is able to capture systematic differences in
‘difficulty’.
Mokken Scaling Analysis is of way of testing the presence of a systematic hierarchy
(Mokken 1971; Schuur 2011) as it “is a nonparametric probabilistic version of Guttman scaling”
(Schuur 2003: 139), i.e., a probabilistic cumulative scale. The scaling analysis tests whether
countries do indeed cross thresholds on our four civil liberties in an ordered/cumulative way,
meaning that we should only rarely find instances of other sequences. It does so, in the first
instance, by producing an H coefficient which indicates the homogeneity/scalability of such a
cumulative scale. This figure is achieved by comparing the number of deviations from a Guttman
scale with the expected number of deviations (based on a random distribution), given the hierarchy
between indicators indicated by the mean values. Running the scaling analysis, we also obtain H
coefficients for each of the scale items (the four civil liberties), which show the homogeneity of
each item with the rest of the items in the scale.
Mokken’s (1971) rule of thumb says that H>.5 indicates a strong scale. In their
attempt to scale physical integrity rights (i.e., disappearances, political killings, torture, and political
imprisonment), Cingranelli & Richards (1999) find a total H value of 0.59 and H coefficients for the
individual items between .55 and .64. The H coefficients for our scale and the individual
coefficients of the four indicators are reported in Table 2 above. The total scale coefficient is very
high (.767), with the coefficient for the four scale items ranging from a low of .694 (freedom of
religion) to a high of .818 (freedom of expression). Based on the H coefficients, the cumulative
13
scale is strongly one-dimensional and – allowing for its probabilistic nature – characterized by a
unique way to reach any combination of attributes if these are awarded a particular score. In other
words, such a unidimensional scale contains information about both the level and sequence of
government respect for civil liberties.
The scale runs from a low of 4 (all civil liberties severely restricted) to a high of 16
(no restrictions on any of the four civil liberties). As already indicated, these aggregate scores tell us
much more than that, say, Chile in 1990 (with a score of 13) ranks higher than, say, Burma in 2010
(with a score of 6). From the overall scale scores (the level of respect for civil liberties in general),
we can (probabilistically) infer the particular level of respect of each of the four civil liberties. To
exemplify, an aggregate score of 13 means that the country in question scores 4 on freedom of
religion and 3 on the other civil liberties.
In spite of the very high H coefficients, the established scale does not take the form of
a perfect hierarchy, however. In Table 3, we report the actual sequence of government respect for
the different civil liberties that finds most support in the data.
[Table 3 about here]
The pattern indicates that for all values of the scale, none of the private liberties are repressed more
than any of the political liberties, and – consistently across the scale – freedom of religion is not
repressed more than freedom of movement. However, freedom of assembly and association changes
from severely restricted to fairly restricted subsequent to freedom of expression. Table 3 also
reveals some additional exceptions to the stepwise hierarchical pattern as freedom of religion is
predicted to be unrestricted when freedom of expression is still fairly restricted, and freedom of
assembly and association only changes from severely restricted to fairly restricted at the scale value
14
of 10, although this, according to the logic of the proposed simple order scale, should already
happen with a combined score of 7. Taken together, the results thus indicate some noteworthy
violations of a stepwise difficulty (double monotonicity) in the fulfillment across the full spectrum
of civil liberties.
It is pertinent to note that if we had only used three-level scales – such as those
constructed by CIRI – we would have missed the surprising findings about exceptions to the
stepwise hierarchical pattern at high levels violations of civil liberties. This clearly comes out when
we rerun our Mokken scaling analysis using the CIRI indicators mentioned above.6 Such an
analysis furthermore shows that the extent to which the CIRI measures conform to a sequencing
hierarchy are much lower. The H coefficient for the four scale items ranges from a low of .58 to a
high of .69, meaning that the highest scale item coefficients using the CIRI data are lower than the
lowest coefficient using the CLD. Thus, while we do find the general hierarchy between the
political liberties and the more private liberties when using the CIRI data, we do not find nearly as
systematical a stepwise hierarchy across the board. We take this to show not only that the two
datasets are not identical but also as an indication of the higher validity of our data considering the
theoretical expectations about the existence of such a hierarchy.
Returning to the general patterns in the CLD data, in spite of the misfits discussed
above, the very high coefficients of homogeneity (H) lend strong support to the scalability of the
indicators. Based on the empirical patterns, it is thus possible to aggregate the civil liberties scores
into a unidimensional scale, running from 4 to 16. This can be done because Mokkan scaling uses
the proper aggregation rule given the hierarchical nature of the data, as opposed to using
aggregation procedures that assume similarity in means and standard deviations. Notice, however,
that the combined measure is by definition an ordinal scale. Creating an interval scale would entail
6 In our analysis, we have used CIRI’s ‘freedom of domestic movement’ measure to replace our more composite
‘freedom of movement’ measure.
15
assigning weights to the attributes. The advantage of a Mokken (as of a Guttmann) scale is exactly
that the weights are irrelevant “as long as the countries’ ratings match the perfect scale types”
(Coppedge & Reinicke 1990: 56).
Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a new, global dataset on civil liberties, the CLD. We have used it
to reveal some strong patterns in the repression of civil liberties. Our data show that political
liberties have generally been repressed more than private liberties in all years between 1979 and
2010. Moreover, based on a Mokken scale analysis, we have identified a stepwise hierarchical
pattern across the four civil liberties: in general, freedom of expression is repressed at least as much
as freedom of association and assembly, which is repressed at least much as freedom of movement,
while freedom of religion is not repressed more than any of the other liberties. Despite some
interesting exceptions to this pattern, the result demonstrates that the civil liberties tap into a
common, underlying dimension, which lends support to the construction of a cumulative ordinal
scale.
We urge scholars to use this composite scale or the disaggregated scores to shed more
light on the violation of civil liberties since the third wave of democratization took off in the late
1970s. A first attempt to pursue some prominent issues has been carried out in this paper as we have
used the CLD to show that the end of the Cold War produced a spike in both electoral rights and
civil liberties. But though a rising tide lifts all boats, this abrupt increase has been asymmetrical in
that the average respect for electoral rights increased much more than the average respect for civil
liberties, and among the civil liberties, improvement in respect for political liberties were higher
than for the more private liberties. These findings go to show that a disaggregated, comparative
16
approach to regime change is necessary to understand important dynamics when it comes to
governments’ repression of fundamental rights.
17
References
Berg-Schlosser, Dirk (ed.) (2007). Democratization: The State of the Art. Opladen: Barbera Budrich
Publishers.
Berlin, Isaiah (2002). Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bueno de Mesquita, B.; G. Downs; A. Smith & F. Cherif (2005).”Thinking Inside the Box: A
Closer Look at Democracy and Human Rights.” International Studies Quarterly 49(3):
439-457.
Casper, Gretchen & Claudiu Tufis (2003). “Correlation Versus Interchangeability: The Limited
Robustness of Empirical Findings on Democracy Using Highly Correlated Data Sets.”
Political Analysis 11: 196-203.
Cederman, Lars-Henrik; Simon Hug & Lutz F. Krebs (2010). “Democratization and Civil War:
Empirical Evidence.” Journal of Peace Research 47(4): 377-394.
Cingranelli, David L. & David L. Richards (1999). “Measuring the Level, Pattern, and Sequence of
Government Respect for Physical Integrity Rights.” International Studies Quarterly 43(2):
407-417.
Cingranelli David & David Richards (2008). The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data
Project Coding Manual. http://ciri.binghamton.edu/documentation.asp
Cingranelli, David & David Richards (2010). “The Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human Rights
Data Project.” Human Rights Quarterly 32(2): 401-424.
Collier, David & Steven Levitsky (1997). “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in
Comparative Research.” World Politics 49(3): 430-451.
Coppedge, Michael & Wolfgang Reinicke (1990). “Measuring Polyarchy.” Studies in Comparative
International Development 25(1): 51-72.
18
Coppedge, Michael & John Gerring, with David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Steven Fish, Allen
Hicken, Matthew Kroenig, Staffan I. Lindberg, Kelly McMann, Pamela Paxton, Holli A.
Semetko, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton & Jan Teorell (2011). “Conceptualizing and
Measuring Democracy: A New Approach.” Perspectives on Politics 9(2): 247-67.
Dahl, Robert A. (1989). Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Davenport, Christian (2004). “The Promise of Democratic Pacification: An Empirical Assessment.”
International Studies Quarterly 48(3): 539-560.
Davenport, Christian (2007). “State Repression and the Tyrannical Peace.” Journal of Peace
Research 44(4): 485-504.
Diamond, Larry (2002): “Elections without Democracy: Thinking about Hybrid Regimes.” Journal
of Democracy 13(2): 21-34.
Freedom House (2011). Freedom in the World. www.freedomhouse.org.
Gearon, Liam (2006). Freedom of Expression and Human Rights. Brighton: Sussex Academic
Press.
Gibney, Marc; Linda Cornett & Reed wood (2011). Political Terror Scale.
www.politicalterrorscale.org.
Goertz, Gary (2005). Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Goldstein, Robert J. (1978). Political Repression in Modern America: From 1870 to the Present.
Cambridge, MA: Schenkman.
Hegre, Håvard; Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates & Nils Petter Gleditsch (2001). “Toward a democratic
civil peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992.” American Political
Science Review 95(1): 33–48.
19
Innes, Judith E. (1992). “Human Rights Reporting as a Policy Tool: An Examination of the State
Department Country Reports.” Pp. 235-257 in Thomas B. Jabine & Richard P. Claude (eds.).
Human Rights and Statistics: Getting the Record Straight. Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press.
Ishay, Micheline (2004). The History of Human Rights. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Keith, Linda (2002). “Constitutional Provisions for Individual Human Rights (1976-1996): Are
They More than Mere Window Dressing?” Political Research Quarterly 55(1): 111-143.
Landis, J.R. & Koch, G.G. (1977). “The Measurement of Observer Agreement for Categorical
Data.” Biometrics 33(1): 159-174.
Landman, Todd (2006). Studying Human Rights. London: Routledge.
Levitsky, Steven & Lucan A. Way (2010). Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the
Cold War. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Linz, Juan J. (2000). Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Linz, Juan J. & Alfred Stepan (1996). Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation:
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Societies. Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press.
McNitt, Andrew D. (1988). ”Some Thoughts on the Systematic Measurement of the Abuse of
Human Rights.” Pp. 89-103 in David L. Cingranelli (ed.), Human Rights: Theory and
Measurement. Houndmills: Macmillan.
Merkel, Wolfgang (1999). Systemtransformation. Opladen: Leske & Budrich.
Merkel, Wolfgang (2004). “Embedded and Defective Democracies.” Democratization 11(1): 33-58.
Mokken, Robert (1971). A Theory and Procedure of Scale Analysis. The Hauge: Mouton.
20
Munck, Gerardo (2006). “Drawing Boundaries: How to Craft Intermediate Regime Categories.” Pp.
27-40 in Andreas Schedler (ed.), Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree
Competition. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Munck, Gerardo (2009). Measuring Democracy: A Bridge between Scholarship and Politics.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
O’Donnell, Guillermo (2007). Dissonances: Democratic Critiques of Democracy. Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press.
Poe, Steven, Sabine Carey & Tanya Vazquez (2001). “How are These Pictures Different? A
Quantitative Comparison of the US State Department and Amnesty International Human
Rights Reports, 1976-1995.” Human Rights Quarterly 23(3): 650-677.
Schuur, Wijbrandt H. van (2003). “Mokken Scale Analysis: Between the Guttman Scale and
Parametric Item Response Theory.” Political Analysis 11(2): 139-163
Schuur, Wijbrandt H. van (2011). Ordinal Item Response Theory: Mokken Scale Analysis.
Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Skaaning, Svend-Erik (2010). “Measuring Civil Liberty: An Assessment of Standards-Based Data
Sets." Revista de Ciencia Política 29(3): 721-740.
Waldron, Jeremy (2003). “Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance.” Journal of Political
Philosophy 11(2): 191-210.
Wood, Reed & Mark Gibney (2010). “The Political Terror Scale: A Re-introduction and
Comparison to CIRI.” Human Rights Quarterly 32(2): 367-400.
Zakaria, Fareed (1997). “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy.” Foreign Affairs 76(6): 22-43.
21
Table 1: Correlation between civil liberty indicators, 1976-2010
Freedom of
Expression
Freedom of
Assembly and
Association
Freedom of
Religion
Freedom of
Movement
Civil
Liberties
(FH)
PTS
(combined)
Freedom of
Expression
1.00
(5999)
.771
(5999)
.551
(5999)
.634
(5999)
-.751
(5815)
.438
(5399)
Freedom of
Assembly and
Association
1.00
(5999)
.535
(5999)
.621
(5999)
-.762
(5815)
.391
(5399)
Freedom of
Religion
1.00
(5999)
.535
(5999)
-.501
(5815)
.334
(5399)
Freedom of
Movement
1.00
(5999)
-.615
(5815)
.477
(5399)
Civil Liberties
(FH)
1.00
(6710)
-.476
(5403)
Note: Entries are correlations coefficients (Kendall’s tau-b), number of country-years in parentheses.
22
Table 2
Mean, standard variation, and H coefficients for the civil liberties, 1976-2010
Mean Standard deviation H coefficient (Loevinger)
Freedom of Expression 2.52 .963 .818
Freedom of Assembly and
Association
2.67 1.126 .796
Freedom of Movement 3.23 .810 .744
Freedom of Religion 3.38 .783 .694
Note: H scale 0.767, N=5999
23
Table 3
Sequencing of respect for civil liberties: Mokken scale predictions of patterns
Freedom of Expression Freedom of Assembly and
Association
Freedom of Movement Freedom of Religion
4 Severely restricted Severely restricted Severely restricted Severely restricted
5 Severely restricted Severely restricted Severely restricted Fairly restricted
6 Severely restricted Severely restricted Fairly restricted Fairly restricted
7 Fairly restricted Severely restricted Fairly restricted Fairly restricted
8 Fairly restricted Severely restricted Fairly restricted Modestly restricted
9 Fairly restricted Severely restricted Modestly restricted Modestly restricted
10 Fairly restricted Fairly restricted Modestly restricted Modestly restricted
11 Fairly restricted Modestly restricted Modestly restricted Modestly restricted
12 Fairly restricted Modestly restricted Modestly restricted Unrestricted
13 Modestly restricted Modestly restricted Modestly restricted Unrestricted
14 Modestly restricted Modestly restricted Unrestricted Unrestricted
15 Modestly restricted Unrestricted Unrestricted Unrestricted
16 Unrestricted Unrestricted Unrestricted Unrestricted
24
Figure 1
Development in average respect for civil liberties, political terror, and democracy, 1979-2010
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
Fredom of religion Freedom of movement
Freedom of assembly/association Freedom of expression
Political terror (PTS) Democracy (Polity)