MOVJNG TO THE THIRD PHASE 75

DVIC DN-ST-93-0381 9

A Marine prepares to load a box of weapons parts onto a truck filled with munitions confiscated during a patroL

Addis Ababa meetings.207

MarFor performed other important work inMogadishu, not all of it related to patrolling ormanning checkpoints. When UNITAF forces firstarrived in the city the roads were choked with alltypes of rubbish and the debris of war. Often onlya single narrow lane existed for the passage oftraffic, and that would be thronged with pedestri-ans. This was unacceptable to the military forces,which needed to be able to move quickly through-out the city and between the important facilities atthe port, airport, embassy, and elsewhere.Operation Clean Street started on 28 Decemberwith the aim of clearing the main roads and open-ing them for the fast-moving traffic of the coali-tion. Marine combat engineers and members ofthe U.S. Naval Construction Battalion, theSeabees, performed the work. The operation con-tinued until 6 January 1993 and was the first of

Another innovation used in Mogadishu was theidea of mass distribution sites. The large numbersof refugees, often scattered in settlementsthroughout the city, made it difficult for humani-tarian relief organizations to effectively distributefood to those in need. By consolidating the distri-bution specified areas throughout the city, morepeople could be reached more efficiently. Also, hyflooding the city with grain, the price of foodwould be lowered and the black market for stolenfood would he undermined. MarFor had theresponsibility of establishing the program with therelief organizations.209 The program was launchedin February in conjunction with the establishmentof the Somali auxiliary security force. On 6February, the first mass food distribution washeld. Eventually, there were 25 distribution siteslocated throughout the city with Somali auxiliarysecurity forces providing control. Security for

A good indication of progress occurred on 24 several Clean Street operations that benefitedMarch, the end of the holy month of Ramadan. UNITAF as well as the citizens of the city. AsFor the first time since the civil war the city was soon as the roadways were opened to traffic, theable to spend two days in celebration of this spe- roadside markets began to come back to life, andcial holiday. Five days later, Somalis in the city soon merchants, barbers, and tailors were operat-peacefully held a rally in support of the recent ing from small stalls.208

76 RESTORE'JG HOPE JN SOMALIA

Marine Corps Combat Art Collection 306-4-21

Combat artist Ma] Burton E Moore, a former memberof a Marine Corps scout/sniperteam, joined Jump Team1, Recon Company, 5th Marines, atop the old U.S.Embassy in Mogadishu as the team returned hostle firein 1993. Portrayed in his painting of the experience is(left) Sgt Charles A. Johnson, LtGol Edward J.Lesnowicz, CpI Patrick B. Ward and Cpl Tim Richards.

each site was the responsibility of MarFor unitsand coalition forces guarded 18 of the 25 sites.21°

The work of the coalition in Mogadishu wasreflected, on a lesser scale, in most of the otherrelief sectors. But each sector was unique, andpeople traveling outside Mogadishu saw a far dif-ferent side of Somalia than was apparent in thecapital city. This was largely because eachhumanitarian sector generally had one dominantclan, which meant factional rivalry and fightingwere not as prevalent as it was in the capital. Also,the cities and towns were not nearly so large orcrowded as Mogadishu. Still, each sector had itsown challenges. Some quickly became very qui-escent, and others continued to have troubles withfactional fighting and bandits. The establishmentof the first three humanitarian relief sectors out-side Mogadishu provided experiences and lessonsthat were used elsewhere. Bale Dogle, the impor-tant airbase; Baidoa, the "City of Death;" and

Bardera all benefited from the early attention theyreceived as centers of IJNITAF activities.

Bale Dogle

The control of the first sector, Bale Dogle,passed quickly from the Marines to the soldiers ofthe 10th Mountain Division. As these soldiersflew directly into the airbase, they soon hadresponsibility for its security and the Marineswere able to move on to other cities. The respon-sibility for this sector did not remain long with theAmerican soldiers, however. By early January1993, the soldiers of the Royal Moroccan Armybegan to arrive, and by the 12th of that month theywere placed under the operational control ofArmy Forces Somalia.2 The Moroccan forceswere composed of two infantry companies, a cav-alry company, a medical section, and other sup-port detachments of the 3d Motorized InfantryRegiment, under the overall command of ColonelMajor Omar Ess-Akalli. This force formed amobile intervention group of more than i ,000men with 200 light vehicles equipped with crew-served weapons, as well as light tanks, artillery,and antitank missiles.212

Their initial task was to ensure the security ofthe airbase. Then, as more troops arrived through-out Mogadishu, control was extended. By 28January, the Moroccans were responsible for mostof the sector. On 1 March, they were placeddirectly under UNITAF control and given respon-sibility for the security of all of sector BaleDogle.213

Their light vehicles provided the Moroccanswith flexibility and tactical mobility, which theyused to patrol the sector and escort convoys. Theheart of their tactical mission, however, remainedthe security of the important airbase.2t4 In addi-tion to being a major aerial port for the operation,Army Forces Somalia established a firing rangefor its AR-i helicopters within the sector. Therange was a key factor in maintaining the accura-cy of the weapons systems of the aircraft.215

The Moroccans had yet another mission, onegiven to them by the King of Morocco himself.The king wished to help the sick and distressedpeople of Somalia, and he extended the Moroccan

* This was a highly experienced regiment, which at that timehad just come from spending several years fighting insur-gents in the Western Sahara.

Movmic TO THE Trmw PRASE 77

humanitarian mission to include a large hospitaloperating in support of the Somali people. Thehospital staff had many specialties, to includenutritionists, obstetricians-gynecologists, podia-trists, ophthalmologists, oral surgeons, and spe-cialists in digestive disorders and bone diseases.There was also an engineering specialist for waterpurification. Somali medical specialists and socialworkers were hired to assist the Moroccan staff.The hospital quickly gained an excellent reputa-tion among the Somali people and was seeing 400to 500 people of all ages and tribes every day.There were five to six major surgical proceduresperfonned daily.2t6

The Moroccan contingent was intended to beself-sufficient, which they were with food, water,and fuel. In fact, the king ensured his men inSomalia received fresh food every day; they car-ried no prepackaged rations and cooked theirmeals daily. But the light vehicles, which provid-ed the force with its flexibility, also caused itslargest logistics problem. All maintenance andrepair on these vehicles had to be performed inMorocco.217

The Moroccan unit was one of the largest non-U.S. contingents in the coalition. With this strongand mobile force patrolling the sector, Bale Doglesoon became one of the quietest in the area ofoperations, with few incidents reported.

Baidoa

The next sector occupied, Baidoa, presented avery different aspect to the soldiers of the coali-tion, and elicited different responses. There weremore lawless elements present in this sector and,accordingly, more violent incidents. Also, thepolitical situation was more complicated. TheMarines who first occupied the sector were veryaggressive patrolling, conducting raids, and mak-ing searches where threats were assessed. Atnight, helicopters were used to extend the pres-ence of the coalition forces into outlying areas andto frighten off bandits.218

Even at this early period, Colonel Gregory S.Newbold, as the commander of the 15th MEU, theMarines who initially occupied the town, recog-nized the difficulty, if not impossibility, of creat-

DVIc DA-ST-96-01283

The centrally located K-4 traffic circle in Mogadishu was the site of several con frontations between local Somali fac-tions and coalition forces.

78 REsroffiNc HOPE IN SOMALIA

ing a secure environment in the relief sector if thebandits were allowed to carry their arms openly.He, therefore, told the local leaders his forceswould seize any weapons seen on the streets ofBaidoa. While the aggressive actions of theMarines quickly decreased hostile acts against thecoalition, the policy of no weapons openly carriedhad equally good results. As the power of the ban-dits declined, the local elders could reassert theirauthority. They did so within the first few days ofthe Marines' arrival. Several Somalis approachedthe Marines and requested assistance in establish-ing a security council.219

Under the direction of Colonel WernerHellmer, the local civil-military operations teamprovided the secure and neutral venue needed toestablish such a council. Relying heavily onhumanitarian relief organizations, the team soughtout the legitimate local leaders and elders. At thesame time, Colonel Hellmer and his small staffrecognized the importance of including represen-tatives of all major groups and clans. It was vitalto the Marine mission and its image of neutralitythat no one who should be a member would inad-vertently be left out. Representatives from theState Department and United Nations OperationSomalia (UNOSOM) were also in attendance atthe beginning of this new security council. Asthroughout the area of operations, the idea wasthat the Somalis would take care of their owninternal governance. Under the protection of theMarine policies of "no openly carried weapons,no crew-served weapons, and no technicals withgun mounts," the weakening of the bandits, andthe strengthening of the elders, conditions inBaidoa soon began to improve.220

On 27 December, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines,relieved the 15th MEU of responsibility forBaidoa. They continued their predecessors' rou-tine activities; protection of food convoys,patrolling in the sector, and mine clearing. Thecivil-military operations team remained in placeworking with the relief organizations and the localsecurity council. By early January, ColonelHellmer believed they had made good progress.People were out on the streets again, the marketsin town were open, and the local buses were run-ning. Fear no longer existed and people couldsleep safely, some getting a full night's rest for thefirst time in years. The lingering problem thatColonel Hellmer saw was what to do with thosewho previously had made their living by banditryand stealing relief supplies.22'

Another organization making life better inBaidoa was Action Internationale Contre de Faini(International Action Against Hunger). This reliefagency set up two camps, one for the most criticalrefugee cases and the other for those who wereless serious. In the first, there were four servingsper day of what was described as a very rich mix-ture of food. This was intended to get these peo-ple back up to strength and out of danger. Thosewho were in better health were placed in the othercamp, where they were fed one meal of a regularmixture per day. In addition, there was a hospitalward treating various illnesses, such as malaria,cholera, tuberculosis, and other respiratory dis-eases.222 Such work was typical of what therelief organizations were doing in all the sectors.The civil-military teams provided coordinationwith the military to ensure they received theirrelief supplies safely and answered other legiti-mate needs.

By the middle of January 1993, the Marineswere ready to hand over responsibility for the sec-tor. At 2359 on the 16th, Baidoa was transferred toArmy Forces Somalia, with the remainingMarines placed under its control.223 However, thissituation was only intended to be temporary.

During this same period, the Australian contin-gent arrived by ship and airplane. By 8 January, aportion of the advance party had already come toBaidoa to assess the quality of the water anddetermine if it could be purified. Company A,which had left on the Royal Australian Navy'sHMAS Jervis Bay (UT 203) on 24 December,made port at Mogadishu on 12 January. By the17th, the main body, composed of Company B,half of Company C, and most of the battalionheadquarters, flew straight to Baidoa on board aQuantas Airlines 747 passenger aircraft. Theremainder of the Australian forces arrived the nextday. Company A, mounted in trucks off the ship,motor marched to the town.224

The Australian force would soon be one of thelargest national contingents. It includedCompanies A, B, C, and D of the 1st Battalion, 1stRoyal Australian Regiment, with their normal bat-talion headquarters, plus support and administra-tion companies. Attached to this battalion groupwere Squadron B, 3d Battalion, 4th Cavalry

* Such diseases were rampant in the refugee camps through.out the area of operations and were the result of poor sanila-don, crowded conditions, and unclean water.

MOVING TO THE THIRD Pltt.sE 79

Photo courtesy of the Australian Department of Defense

Australian soldiers move by convoy from the port of Mogadishu to Baidoa where they would relieve elements of the15th Marine Expeditionaty Unit.

Regiment, mounted in armored personnel can-i-ers; the battery commander's party, Headquarters,6th Field Battery, 4th Field Regiment; and 17thTroop, 18th Field Squadron, 3d Combat EngineerRegiment. All were supported by a detachment ofthe 103d Signals Squadron and the 1st BattalionSupport Group.225

The Australian force was intended to be as self-sufficient as possible. Therefore, when theydeployed, they tasked their support group for 30days of supply and ammunition. The greatest con-cern was for water. The advance party found thatthe local water could be purified. Also, HMASTobruk, which was also supporting the operation,could pump water into tankers that could thenmake the overland journey to the relief sector. Thesupport group was a very capable organization,which contained fuel tankers and 8-ton cargotrucks. It also had a medical section capable offorming a regimental aid post. The maintenancedetachment included a field workshop for electri-cal and general engineering maintenance, as wellas for vehicle and communications repair.226

For requirements above the capabilities of thesupport group, the Australian forces could useUNITAF's logistics assets for water, fuel, rations,

and other common consumables. These arrange-ments were set under cross servicing agreementssigned between the United States and Australiangovernments. Anything required that was notavailable from UNITAF was either purchased inKenya, or flown in from Australia by the RoyalAustralian Air Force on regularly scheduled C-130 Hercules flights.227

The handoff of responsibility for the sector wascompleted on 19 January. At a simple ceremony,the flags of both nations were lowered and raisedin reversed positions on the flagpole. At the sametime, appropriate music was played on a harmon-ica. "Waltzing Matilda," the Australian battalion'squick march and the national song, is also thedivision march of the 1st Marine Division, so itwas chosen and matched with "The Star SpangledBanner." For the previous two days, Company Aof the Royal Australian Regiment had been under

* In the author's interview with Major John Caligari, RoyalAustralian Army, "Waltzing Matilda" was identified as theregimental march of the 9th Marines, and it is so identified inthe notes of the interview. Calls to the division actually identified it as the division's own march, adopted during WorldWar II.

80 RESTORING HOPE IN SCIMALLA

the tactical control of 3d Battalion, 9th Marines.Now the situation reversed itself as Company L,3d Battalion, 9th Marines, was placed under thetactical control of the Australian forces. TheMarines would retain this command relationshipuntil they departed Baidoa.228

By 23 January, all of the Australian force waspresent in Baidoa; 888 soldiers armed with 36M113 annored personnel carriers and eight 81mmmortars. The Australians quickly settled into theirmission, which, as elsewhere in the area of opera-tions, was to control the sector and provide secu-rity for the relief operations and the supply con-voys. The work was divided into three parts androtated among the companies. One companyguarded the airfield, while another patrolled intown. The third company patrolled in depth,throughout the sector, to establish presence, col-lect intelligence, and respond to any incidents.229

About 80 kilometers from Baidoa on the mainroad to Mogadishu was the town of Buurhakaba,the second largest in the sector. A huge rock mas-

sif that rose from the plain to a height of a fewhundred feet dominated the town. This area hadbeen the site of much bandit activity and wasnoted for the presence of several technicals. Toend these depredations, the Australians estab-lished a permanent outpost at the town. This wasoccupied in company strength, with patrolsextending out to other towns in the sector. Theother companies could be called for support ifthere were a need.23°

There were two intelligence gathering organi-zations operating in the Baidoa sector. One was athree-man combat intelligence detachment of theAustralian force. These soldiers were responsiblefor collecting human intelligence, checking thepopulace, fmding out who was in the area, and theidentification of the local clans and subgroups.231There also was a team of American Special Forcesin the sector. This team was "used to conduct areaassessments throughout the [humanitarian reliefsector], especially in those areas where conven-tional forces or relief agencies had not yet

Photo courtesy of the Australian Department of Defense

LtGen Robert B. Johnston talks with an Australian soldier while visiting the Australian headquarters in Baidoa.Behind LtGen Johnston is Col William J Me/br, commander of the Australian army contingent.

Movmc TO THE THIRD PHASE 81

Marine Corps Combat Art Collection 119.9-51

During a 1993 deployment to Somalia, combat artist Go! Donna J. Nean depicted this familiar scene of the inter-national relief effort. In this piece, an Australian soldier is shown escorting a refugee convoy. After relieving the 3dBattalion, 9th Marines, in Baidoa, "Diggers," the nickname adopted by Australian soldiers, took over relief escortduties in that area.

arrived." The local commander used these assess-ments to plan operations in support of the human-itarian relief organizations that were providingrelief to these outlying areas. In addition, theSpecial Forces team also provided intelligenceabout criminal activities and sources of bandit-ry.232 With one of the companies always operatingin the sector in a random pattern of patrolling, theAustralians were able to respond whenever andwherever intelligence indicated that somethingwas afoot. The company could quickly move intothe target area and remain for a few days.233

Baidoa was not terribly plagued by the pres-ence of waning factions during this period.' There

* There was some factional activity in the sector, but it wasrelatively minor. For instance, during the visit of the authorto the Baidoa humanitarian relief sector in late January, arepresentative of the Somali Liberation Army had justappeared in town to recruit. The Australian's quick reactionforce planned to "pay him a visit" at his quarters to search forarms and explain the weapons policy. He was not very suc-cessful in his recruiting efforts.

were some instances of armed troops passingthrough the sector, but these were generally smallgroups that were monitored closely as they movedalong. Lawlessness was another matter. By theend of January, the Australians had established thepattern by which they would operate for the nextfew months. Finding the towns that were the cen-ters of criminal activity, they used a series of cor-don and search or airmobile operations to find andconfiscate weapons and make their presence felt.The Australian forces soon were stamping out thebanditry that had been so rife in the sector. Whenthey discovered that the bandits had adopted thetactic of attacking civilian traffic along the roadsat night, the Australians became equally resource-ful. After dark, Australian vehicles with theirlights off would follow the civilian trucks andbuses. The drivers would use night vision gogglesto operate, and the troops would also use nightvision devices to scan the roadsides ahead to spotany ambushes. These ambush-busting operationswere a very successful deterrent to the banditactivity.234

82 RESToRING HOPE IN SOMALIA

The Australians were constantly busy duringtheir four months as a part of UNITAF. The paceof operations was described as grueling. While thework was hard, harsh, and unrelenting, it did helpto keep the sector more quiet and secure thansome others. The success of the Australians' oper-ations can be measured by the fact that banditsonly engaged them on four occasions. They sus-tained no casualties while confiscating anddestroying almost 1,000 weapons and a vast quan-tity of ammunition and explosives.235

Bardera

The Bardera relief sector differed from Baidoain several critical ways. First, it was a smaller sec-tor. While the town of Bardera had been ravagedduring the civil war, one clan, whose faction, theUnited Somali Party, was led by General AbdiDahir Warsame, inhabited it. Therefore, there waslittle of the factional fighting that had been sotroublesome elsewhere, and it was far simpler tostabilize the sector once UNITAF troops arrived.Ironically, the presence of a single faction in thetown actually increased the effects of the famine.Most of the starving people in the sector had comefrom its outlying areas, and the inhabitants of thetown felt no obligation to assist those to whomthey were not related. Those living in the townwere relatively well-off in comparison to the

refugees, who were crowded into an area calledthe "Italian Village" to the south of the town. Herethey were subject to starvation from the lack ofrelief supplies, from disease due to crowded andunsanitary conditions, and from the depredationsof armed bandits. When the Marines arrived, asmany as 300 refugees were dying each day. Withthe safe delivery of food and medicines to therelief organizations and the presence of theMarines, the death toll soon dropped to less than10 percent of what it had been.236

After the success in Baidoa, Colonel Helimermoved quickly to Bardera, arriving in lateDecember. With Colonel Emil R. Bedard, thecommanding officer of the 7th Marines, he set upanother civil-military operations center. ColonelHellmer's team soon was assisting the legitimateelders of Bardera to establish a security counciland reassert their own authority. Again, theMarines were there to provide security, not togovern. The elders took advantage of the opportu-nity to reestablish an effective local government,enforcing laws, trying criminals, and meting outjustice to those convicted of crimes. By 7February, an auxiliary police force was broughtback into existence, and the police were soon join-ing the Marines at checkpoints. As a result ofthese efforts, the influence of local bandits waned.Bardera was noted for being a quiet sector for thenext four months.237

Photo courtesy of the Australian Department of Defense

An Australian soldier uses a mine detector to search for hidden arms in the effort to stamp out banditry in the Baidoahumanitarian relief sector.

MOVING TO THE TFmD PHASE 83

Still, there were some problems that beset therelief efforts. The most notable of these was thepresence of mines along the main roads. Nearlyevery Toad ifl the sector was mined, making it dif-ficult to open the main supply routes into the inte-rior. Even though few mines were encountered,the clearance operations had to progress slowlyand thoroughly along every mile before they weresafe for the passage of convoys. Even then, theroads needed repair. As engineers worked on theroads, the helicopters of Marine Aircraft Group 16lifted food and relief supplies to the humanitarianrelief organizations in outlying villages that other-wise could not have been reached.238

Toward the end of January, the restructuring offorces in the theater allowed Major GeneralWilhelm to rearrange the Marine forces in a man-ner he considered more in keeping with local con-ditions. The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, which hadoriginally occupied the Bardera sector, wasrecalled to Mogadishu, where its riflemen wereadvantageously used in the urban environment. Itsplace was taken by a new organization, TaskForce Bardera, formed around the 3d AmphibiousAssault Battalion. This unit, with its greatermobility, was better suited to the open terrain inthe sector. On 24 January, the task force officiallybegan its duties in Bardera.239

While the sector was fairly quiet, there was stillthe need for vigilance. This was especially true inlate February when serious fighting eruptedamong the factions in Kismayo, the humanitariansector bordering Bardera to the south. To ensurethat Bardera was not affected by the fighting, andespecially to ensure that Colonel Jess' SomaliPatriotic Movement forces did not enter theBardera sector, Task Force Bardera maintainedreconnaissance elements north and south of thetown. At the beginning of March, squad-sizedpatrols were sent along the Jubba River valley asfar south as the town of Saacow. These patrols andscreens had the desired effect, and no disturbancesor significant presence of Jess' forces were notedin the sector.24°

By the end of April, the Marines were able toturn over responsibility for a sector that wasreturning to peace and normalcy. As UNTTAFprepared to hand off operations to the UnitedNations, Task Force Bardera was brought back to

* Lawrence N. Freedman was killed when his vehicle strucka mine in this sector.

Mogadishu to prepare for redeployment. On 18April, the Botswana Defense Force contingentrelieved the Marines of responsibility forBardera.241

Oddur

As the French soldiers moved into the townsfrom which they would operate in Oddur, theybrought with them great experience in operatingin this part of the world. Many of these Frenchsoldiers and Marines had served in the neighbor-ing state of Djibouti, formerly known as FrenchSomaliland. They came, therefore, with knowl-edge of the importance of clan and tribal alle-giance in Somalia, and they tried to work withinthat context in this sector.242 In addition, theFrench forces in Djibouti had witnessed the civilwar that began there in 1991 between the SomaliIssas and the Ethiopian Afars.

By 28 December, the last elements of theFrench forces arrived from France and Djibouti,and moved to Oddur through Mogadishu. By thistime, the French forces consisted of a commandelement, which included a special operationscompany, a logistics support battalion, a militaryintelligence detachment, and detachments ofsecurity forces, military police, and communica-tions. The ground forces were composed of onebattalion from the 5th Combined Arms OverseasRegiment, one battalion from the 13th ForeignLegion Demi-Brigade, and the 3d Company of the2d Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment. The 3dand 4th companies of the 2d Marine InfantryRegiment strengthened the other battalions withorganic armored personnel carriers. These forceswere supported by an aviation detachment fromthe 5th Attack Helicopter Regiment, and the 3dCompany of the 6th Foreign Legion EngineerRegiment. All told, there were about 2,200 Frenchsoldiers, Marines, and Legionnaires in the Oddursector.243

As in Bardera, the natives of Oddur were main-ly from one dominant clan, the Rahanweyne.However, that does not mean there was unitythroughout the sector. The Rahanweyne clan wasdescribed as "divided into a multitude of sub-clans opposed to each other and characterized byopportunism and fragile alliances." Also, the peo-ple living in the north and near the criticalEthiopian border were members of the rivalOgaden clan. As in Bardera, the townspeople feltlittle sympathy toward the refugees from the out-

84 RESTORTNC HOPE IN SOMALIA

Photo courtesy ot the author

French Foreign Legionnaires made their headquarters in an old Italian fort at El Berde, from which platoons andsquads were sent to villages and hamlets throughout the Oddur sector.

lying districts who were not related to them. Thelocal leaders looked out for their own clan, but notthe others. The French would thus have to drawon all, their experience and skills in dealing withthe native Somalis throughout this sector.244

The French forces were deployed in their tradi-tional "oil spot" manner. The sector was first bro-ken down into three sub-sectors centered on majorcities or towns, which in this case were Oddur andthe Ethiopian border, Wajid, and Tiyegloo. Onebattalion occupied each of these sub-sectors.From these, 10 towns or hamlets were occupiedby company-sized forces, which then sent pla-toons to other locations, for a total of 20 occupiedsites. The French then were able to operate fromthese strongpoints, spread throughout the sector,show their presence, maintain a strong posture,and conduct reconnaissance. In Oddur itself, amobile reaction force supported by helicopterswas kept ready to intervene in any situation.245

In the city of Oddur, the work of these coalitionforces was very similar to what was going on inthe other sectors. The Somalis soon established

local committees for security, food distribution,school operations, and so forth. As was the caseelsewhere, the French recognized they had to getthe Somalis to take responsibility for their ownwelfare and governance. The French also estab-lished their own team to work with the relieforganizations in town, notably Medecines SansFrontieres (Doctors Without Borders) andConcern. These organizations ran a hospital andfeeding stations. The effectiveness of the organi-zations' work was significantly increased by thearrival of the French Army, which controlled thesafe shipment and distribution of food and sup-plies while leaving the humanitarian agencies tocarry on with their own duties.246

By 30 December, just days after their arrival inthe sector, the French special operations forcespushed out along the axis Oddur-Ted-El Berde.The purpose of this initial operation was threefold: first, it provided a surveillance line towardthe Ethiopian border; next, it opened the sector tothese areas for the local humanitarian organiza-tions; and finally, the French presence there would

MOVING TO THE THIRD PI-rASE 85

help to stop the heavy flow of refugees cominginto Oddur and other cities from the northerntowns which were hit hard by war and drought.247

This area was very important to the entire oper-ation because its northern limit stretched along theSomali-Ethiopian border. The flow of refugeesacross the ill-defmed frontier brought with it thepossibility of armed forces from either nationcrossing into the other's territory. This, in turn,might cause an incident that could be difficult tocontain. As early as 31 December, during a heli-copter reconnaissance in the vicinity of the townof Yet, French troops came across four armed menin civilian clothing who were acting suspiciously.The men were picked up, interrogated, and foundto be members of the Ethiopian Army. They werequickly turned over to their own authorities.248

The presence of the Ogaden clan also served toincrease the volatility of this section of the border.The town of El Berde, located just a few kilome-ters south of the border, was a case in point. Priorto the civil war, a ntodus vivendi was in placehere, as elsewhere in Somalia where a smallerclan or sub-clan had to coexist in an area domi-nated by a larger, stronger one. An effective policeforce was active in the area and there were region-al and district committees, on which the localchiefs served. In this way, good relations weremaintained with the various national ministriesand the governor at Oddur. With the coming of thewar, however, clan was pitted against clan. Thepopulace of the region around El Berde, about8,000 people, crossed into Ethiopia.* By early1993, they were returning to fmd their homes andvillages destroyed or damaged. They needed food,medicine, and humanitarian assistance. To com-pound the situation here, the returning chief of ElBerde did not recognize the legitimacy of the newgovernor of Oddur. Despite the internal strife, theFrench were respected and were working withboth sides to effect reconciliation and an agree-ment to bring back normal relations.249

The French tactic of spreading across the sectorinto hamlets and villages in platoon and squadformations allowed them to cover maximum terri-tory. With so many soldiers in the sector, they alsorelied upon the mobility of their armored person-nel carriers and helicopters to move rapidly and

* The French estimated about 113 villages and hamlets in thesector had been abandoned and roughly 40 percent of thelocal population (118,000 people) had become refugees.

establish control of the zone. By late January,their presence had created a reassuring effect onthe relief organizations, which were able to moveabout with greater security. The people also beganto respond by gaining confidence, providing intel-ligence, and returning to their villages.250

The first contacts between the French and thenative Somalis were described as excellent, andthe local elders and chiefs were satisfied with theFrench presence. By the beginning of February,mine clearing operations had effectively beencompleted throughout the sector. A police force,armed only with batons, was established, and aweapons registration program was in place. Thisprogram allowed the French to confiscate unreg-istered firearms and to arrest any armed individu-als.25' The French soldiers, Marines, andLegionnaires settled into a daily routine of patrols,reconnaissance, ambushes, checkpoints, search-ing for arms caches, and seizing unauthorizedweapons.

During February, the French already realizedthey could decrease and realign their forces with-out losing control of the sector, and the firstFrench units began to rotate out of theater. Thebattalion of the 5th Combined Arms OverseasRegiment left, along with the engineers and onecompany of Marine armored personnel carriers.Helicopter support also was decreased. To accom-modate fewer troops, the number of towns andhamlets occupied was reduced to 12, but theamount of patrols was increased. By March, theFrench government decided that 1,100 men wouldtake part in UNOSOM II. During the remainder ofMarch and April, the French forces continued torealign themselves, rotating out some of the orig-inal units while bringing in new ones to supportthe United Nations mission.252

Gialalassi

As the Italian forces settled in aroundGialalassi, their responsibilities were soonextended beyond that sector. Having reclaimedtheir embassy in Mogadishu early in the opera-tion, the Italians kept a strong force in the neigh-borhood for its protection. It also made sense tothe Italian commanders that they should be givenresponsibility for some part of the city that includ-ed the area where they were located. Of course,political and practical considerations wereinvolved in determining how the Italian forceswould be employed in the city.

86 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

Italian soldiers on patrol in the Gialalassi humanitarianem half of Mogadishu.

First, there was the question of how theSomalis would accept the Italians, with their his-tory as a colonial power. The issue was a delicateone, for the Italians were a strong presence whobrought distinct benefits to the coalition. Yet,General Johnston did not want them to be placedin a situation or position in which they would becounterproductive if Somali anti-Italian reactionwas strong. He saw the older Somalis, who hadlived in the period of Italian presence, would beamenable to their return as a part of UNITAF. Hewas more worried about the younger Somalis,who might make an issue of colonialism. GeneralJohnston therefore followed a policy of gradual-ism by which the Italian forces were slowlyplaced in the city and countryside and the reac-

Photo courtesy of the Italian Armed Forces

relief sector, which as later expanded to include the north-

tions of the Somalis were assessed. After the suc-cesses of the Merka and Gialalassi operations, hedecided the problem might have been overstated.Johnston soon decided to give the Italians respon-sibility for a portion of the city.253

Other political considerations had to be takeninto account. MarFor and other coalition forceshad occupied areas that were mostly in the south-western portion of the city, which was territory ofGeneral Aideed. The Italian Embassy was in thenortheast part of the city, in an area claimed by theforces of Ali Mahdi. While this could be a coun-terbalance, it was recognized that it was impera-tive no favoritism be shown to either factionleader by the coalition forces in the area. Since theItalian Embassy was nearly adjacent to the head-

MOVING TO THE THIIO PHASE 87

quarters of Mi Mahdi, General Johnston deter-mined the Italian forces headquarters should notbe established in that area. Instead, the Italianswere given responsibility for the northeast portionof Mogadishu, with their sector extending intoGialalassi. Their headquarters was then estab-lished in the town of Balcad, several kilometersout of Mogadishu along the main route headingnorth. The gradual manner in which this wasaccomplished, along with the professionalism ofthe Italian soldiers, allayed any suspicions by theSomalis of either neocolonialism or favoritism.254

The italian soldiers were soon conductingpatrols, arms sweeps, and other civil actions with-in the city of Mogadishu. The situation thererequired close cooperation between all parties."As activity in Mogadishu picked up, MarFor andItalian units began running into each other onpatrols and during operations, creating confusionand potentially dangerous situations."255 Althoughthe creation of distinct areas of responsibility wasa major step toward solving the problem, directliaison between the coalition members was anecessity. For example, early in January, Italiansoldiers had been fired at by a sniper along a routein a section of the city called the Villagio Scibis.To show their resolve, the Italian commandplanned a major sweep through this area usingabout 540 men. The operation was to start at 0430on 12 January. But when the liaison officerbrought this to the attention of the UNITAF staff,it was noted the MarFor also was planning to con-duct an operation in a neighboring area at thesame time. UNITAF postponed the Italian opera-tion for 24 hours, when it was successfully com-pleted without incident.256 Major GeneralWilhelm, the commanding general of MarFor, andMajor General Gianpietro Rossi, the Italian com-mander, also agreed on the conduct of joint oper-ations in the city, beginning on 19 January. Thecooperation between the two coalition partnersresulted in the creation of Task Force Columbus,composed of forces from the San MarcoBattalion, and the 571st Military Police Company,a United States Army unit under the operationalcontrol of MarFor. The task force conductedpatrols and provided security for humanitarianrelief warehouses in the area of the KaraanMarket.257

With such a wide and diffuse area of responsi-bility, the Italians had to align their units some-what differently than those in other sectors. Theymaintained a large force in their sector of

Mogadishu, around the Italian Embassy. Theyalso placed garrisons in the towns of Balcad,Jawhar, and Gialalassi. These four strongpointscontrolled the main population centers in the sec-tor and provided security along the main supplyroute that ran from Mogadishu to Bulo Burti.Three task forces (Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie)were assigned to cover these bases. Alpha, thesmallest force with 413 soldiers, was responsiblefor Mogadishu. Charlie, the next largest taskforce, split its deployment between Jawhar, with180 soldiers, and Gialalassi, with 550 soldiers.Task Force Bravo, the largest with 1,116 soldiers,was at the so-called transitory base in Balcad,from which it could deploy north or south as thesituation required.

The threat to coalition forces differed in each ofthese places. As might be expected, Mogadishu,with the presence of armed memhers of the twomain Somali factions, had the highest number ofincidents. Members of Mi Mahdi's Abgal clan fre-quently clashed with those of the rival Habr Gedrclan of General Aideed on the streets of the capi-tal. These fighters also fired occasionally at theItalian soldiers, or boldly threatened the local pop-ulace, just as they did with American servicemenand Somali civilians elsewhere in the city. Banditspresented the main problem in outlying towns.

The Italians quickly demonstrated their pres-ence and strength throughout the sector with rou-tine patrolling and checkpoints. From theirstrongpoints, reconnaissance patrols protected themain supply route, weapons caches and marketswere raided, arms were confiscated, and mineswere cleared. More importantly, the Italiansdevised a series of operations that would takeplace throughout the sector. The size of the forceused for each of these operations depended on theobjective. Those at the highest levels were named"canguro" (kangaroo). They were planned anddirected by the Folgore Brigade headquarters andexecuted by its subordinate units. The next level,named "mangusto" (mongoose) comprised opera-tions undertaken by the 186th and 187thParachute Regiments of the brigade. The lowest

* As with regiments in many other modem armies, theseunits were not formed in the manner familiar to Americans.Each was composed basically of one battalion, with a sepa-rate company-sized headquarters element through which sheregimental commander provided command and control,administralion, and logistics support.

88 RESTORING HOPE TN SoL1A

DVIC DD-SD-0O-00861

U.S. Marines in a light armored vehicle from the 3d Light Armored Infantry Battalion join Italian soldiers in a FiatOTO Melara 6614 armored vehicle at an intersection along the Green Line in Mogadishu.

level operations, meant for rapid reaction toevents or intelligence, were named "hilaac"(Somali for lightning). These were executed bythe brigade's special forces and were generallyconducted in Mogadishu.258

A fourth type of operation was named "tam-buro" (drum) and took advantage of the Italianforce's large component of armored personnelcarriers and helicopters. The mobility and rapidmovement provided by these vehicles made themespecially valuable in emergency situations, theprimary goal of tamburo operations. These opera-tions also enabled the Italians to react to situationsfar from the city strongpoints, effectively control-ling the entire relief sector.259

The Italian soldiers were busy with civil activ-ities as well. In the Gialalassi sector, as elsewherein the coalition's area of operations, the overallsuccess of the mission depended on the perceptionby the population that the coalition was there toassisi: the Somali recovery and to provide generalsecurity. The brigade engineer company clearedmines from roads and villages, and detachmentsof soldiers provided security for relief convoysmoving throughout the sector. Relief organizationwarehouses and distribution points were keptunder surveillance to prevent attack or theft. The

Italians also provided direct medical aid to theSomali people. An ambulance service carriedwounded or seriously ill civilians to the Italianmedical facilities. There they were treated incooperation with Somali health and medical per-sonnel. By the end of January alone, these med-ical visits numbered more than 4,000.260

The Italian command worked with Somali eld-ers and leaders to establish local committees soorder could be maintained and local governancebegun. They also were very actively involved inthe establishment of the auxiliary security force inMogadishu and throughout the Gialalassi sector.These forces worked in the main population cen-ters of Mogadishu, Gialalassi, Balcad, andJawhar. The auxiliaries were soon accompanyingthe Italian soldiers on patrols and at checkpoints.Weapons control within the sector was accom-plished through a series of actions. First, the car-rying of arms in the sector was prohibited; citi-zens were requested to voluntarily turn inweapons. Next, arms were confiscated during

* The Italian forces established one military hospital and onesurgical ward. Six infirmaries in the four strongpoint citiesbacked these up. They were staffed by 39 medical officers,12 hospital corpsmen, and 170 troops.

Movmic TO THE Tr-ujw PHASE 89

DVIC DD-SD-OO-00864

An Italian soldier holding a 9mm Beretta 12S sub-machineLine, which separated the warring factions in Mogadishu.

sweep operations in areas known or suspected tocontain weapons caches or havens for armed per-sons. These actions had results similar to thosetaken throughout UNITAF's area of operations.Thousands of weapons and several tons of ammu-nition were confiscated and destroyed.26

In addition to the work of the medical staff, theItalians assisted the local population in severaldirect ways. Wells damaged during the civil warwere cleared and repaired. Main roads were putback into good order. Schools were reopened, andlocal businesses were encouraged and given sup-port to help restart the local economy. A postalservice between Somalia and Italy was estab-lished.262

The supply of this large force (about 3,200 sol-diers) was an important issue for the Italian com-mand. This was the Italian armed forces' firstmajor deployment since World War II. TheFolgore Brigade had a related unit, the 46thAviation Brigade, which supported the operation

gun patrols a heavily pockmarked section of the Green

with three Aeritalia G222 utility transport air-craft.263 These airplanes, along with 12 helicoptersassigned to a composite helicopter regiment, pro-vided ample intra-theater transportation for per-sonnel and supplies. The Italian forces were alsofortunate in Somalia's location within easy airresupply distance of Italy itself. The Italian offi-cers' mess at Balcad was soon renowned for thequality of its fare; fresh pastas, meats and fish,fruits and vegetables, and wine were all preparedand served daily.' Potable water for drinking andwashing was a problem, as it was everywhereelse. This burden was relieved in large part by dig-ging two wells, one in Mogadishu and the other inGialalassi. The combined capacity of the wells

* General Order Number 1 prohibited the consumption ofalcohol. However, this applied only to American forces.Americans traveling in the theater were offered wine inOddur and Gialalassi and beer in Belet Weyne, which theyhad to respectfully, and usually reluctantly, decline.

90 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

DVIC DD-SD-OO-00849

A sampling of the small arms and crew-served weapons confiscated by the 2d Battalion, 87th lnfantiy, at checkpointCondor south of Merka.

was 14,000 liters of water per day, which could beused for washing.264 This represented a tremen-dous boon because more of the water that washauled into the relief sector every day could beused just for drinking and cooking.

Through March and April, the Italians contin-ued to suppress bandits and assist the local popu-lace. By the end of the latter month, as some of theIJNITA.F coalition partners prepared to depart, theItalians were tasked to remain as a part of UNO-SOM II. Their new area of responsibility wouldcontinue to include Gialalassi, with an expansionto the north to incorporate the neighboring reliefsector of Belet Weyne.

Merka

The Italian forces also had been instrumental inestablishing the Merka relief sector, but once theport and airfield had been secured and roadsopened into the interior, Army Forces Somaliawas given responsibility for that sector. The unitthat was left for this mission, 2d Battalion, 87thInfantry, was a part of the 2d (Commando)

Brigade, 10th Mountain Division.265 Although asmaller sector than most of the others, Merka hadits share of challenges for the American soldiers.

Patrols uncovered some large arms caches dur-ing January. The first of these discoveries came on14 January when elements of Task Force 2-87seized 500,000 rounds of small arms ammunitionhidden at an airfield near the town of Afgooye.Ten days later, Task Force 3-17, the 10thMountain Division cavalry squadron, uncovered alarge arms cache kept in eight half-buried conexboxes. In both instances, the arms and ammuni-tion were quickly destroyed. Task Force 2-87 con-tinued cordon and search operations throughoutthe sector, especially near large towns such asKurtunwaarey, Baraawe, and Qoryooley.266 On 29January, these operations uncovered two morecaches.267

Although it was originally outside the Merkarelief sector, the town of Afgooye was a concernfor the soldiers in this sector. Afgooye was locat-ed within the Bale Dogle sector, which also wasunder the control of the Army Forces Somaliaduring January and February, and American sol-

MOVING TO THE THIRD PIiAsE 91

sector. The 984th Military Police Companyremained in place. On 9 April, the 1st (Warrior)Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, relieved the 2dBrigade at Merka. On 28 April, the Merka reliefsector was tumed over to the Pakistani 6th PunjabRegiment, which had arrived as part of UNOSOM11 forces.7°

Belet Weyne

Photo courtesy of the Italian Armed Forces

Italian soldiers exhibit some of the arms confiscatedduring sweep operations in areas known to harborarmed insurgents and contain weapons caches.

diers could therefore be transferred between sec-tors as needed. The problems in Afgooye centeredon banditry. The town was at a key location on amain road to Mogadishu, and was therefore amagnet for bandits and lawless elements wantingto extort payments from travelers going to or fromthe capital city.

On 31 January, Commando Brigade conducteda large cordon and search operation at Afgooye.Task Force 2-87 conducted an air assault, whileTask Force 3-17 and the 984th Military PoliceCompany held sectors in and around the town.The operation continued for severa.l days. At itsconclusion, the 984th Military Police Companywas left in the town to provide a presence andconduct stabilization operations. The operationsuccessfully curtailed violence and banditry inthis area, which allowed the people to reclaimtheir town.26tThese operations continued in theMerka sector, which had become relatively quietthrough February. A 60-man police force wasreestablished in the town and worked closely withArmy Forces Somalia by the end of January.269 On1 March, as the Moroccans assumed control of theBale Dogle relief sector, Afgooye was removedfrom that sector and incorporated into the Merka

The Canadian presence grew quickly in theBelet Weyne sector after it was secured on 28December. The entire Canadian AirborneRegiment Battle Group had flown in by the firstdays of January 1993. Commanded by ColonelSerge Labbe, the battle group strength was 1,359soldiers at its height. The group was composed ofthree commandos, with a service commando anda reconnaissance platoon in support. The RoyalCanadian Dragoons' A Squadron also wasassigned for the mission, as were an engineertroop and a signal troop.271 *

The Canadian forces were supported byGrizzly, Cougar, and Bison armored vehicles,which arrived by ship and were then driven over-land. Such vehicles were not normally part ofthe regimental equipment. Due to the long dis-tances and the need for convoy protection, how-ever, they were borrowed from other units specif-ically for this operation.272 The Canadians con-ducted dismounted patrols until these vehiclesbegan arriving in the sector on 15 January. Byearly March, the Canadian 93 Rotary WingAircraft Flight had provided six CH- 135 helicop-ters, which increased the force's mobility andoperational reach.273

* In the Canadian forces, the term battle group is analogousto task force. In this instance, it represents the fonnation of abattalion-sized unit specifically reinforced and formed forthis particular mission. The commandos that make up thebattle group are company-sized airborne infantry formations.The term does not imply special operations capabilities.

** These are Canadian-made all-wheeled armored personnelcarriers. The Grizzly has eight wheels and mounted a12.7mm machine gun and a 7.62mm machine gun. TheCougar is a six-wheeled fire support vehicle armed with a76mm gun and a 7.62mm machine gun mounted coaxiallywith the main gun. The Bison is an eight-wheeled armoredpersonnel carrier mounting a 7.62mm machine gun.

Until this time, traffic moving between Belet Weyne andthe port of Mogadishu took five days for a round trip; twodays each way and one day with overnight at the port.

92 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

The Canadians divided their sector into foursecurity zones, each of which was assigned to asub-unit of the battle group. They quickly beganaggressive patrolling throughout the sector, bothdismounted and in the armored vehicles. Towardthe end of January, the Canadian command hadalready assessed most of the humanitarian sectorsas generally quiet, making the patrolling of thelarge security zones safer for the soldiers. It wasonly to the north and east that friction was causingconcern.274

There, close to the Ethiopian border and thetown of Matabaan, the political situation wascomplicated. Most of the population within thesector was of the Hawadle clan, and the UnitedSomali Congress faction had a strong presencethere. Some of these faction members were sup-porters of General Aideed. Colonel "John"Hussein was one of Aideed's division command-ers. Aideed's first cousin, Colonel Omar Jaua, wasthe chief of staff of Aideed's 1st Division, whichoperated in the vicinity of Galcaio (outside ofUINITAF's area of operations). A local governornamed Harlane, in the town of Dharsamenbo,reported directly to General Aideed. However,there also was a United Somali Congress factionthat declared itself independent of both Aideedand Ali Mahdi. The Somali National Front and theSomali Salvation Democratic Front also hadstrong factions in the area, and a faction of theSomali National Movement was situated alongthe Ethiopian border.275

From the start Canadian forces and U.S.Special Operations Forces in the area began tomake contact with these groups. From these initialtalks, the coalition soldiers received informationabout camps and the locations of cantonmentareas, of which there were a large number in thesector, each guarded by 60 to 70 men. The coali-tion troops inspected and inventoried these campsand cantonments. Just as important, this aggres-sive activity showed a strong coalition presencethroughout the sector and acted as a bufferbetween the factions.

Of equal importance was the need to keep thefactions from causing trouble across the interna-tional boundary with Ethiopia or beyond the lim-its of UNITAF's area of operations in Somalia.The Belet Weyne sector adjoined both of thesecritical areas. Coalition patrols along these areaswas enhanced by the personal contacts ofCanadian and American soldiers with Ethiopianand Somali leaders. In late December and early

January, the most volatile area was at the town ofFer Fer, which lay directly astride the Ethiopian-Somali border. The Somali National Movementhad a strong presence there, and the EthiopianArmy had moved more than 500 men to the area.The Ethiopians disarmed any Somali who crossedthe border, but were refraining from attacking theSomalis.276 UNITAF Special Operations Forceshad made contact with the Ethiopian commanderat Fer Fer by 5 January, and kept regular contactwith him.

The Special Operations Forces performed otherimportant functions in the sector as well. Theytraveled to all the major villages to assess the atti-tudes of the local populations. They also notedwhich clans people belonged to, the extent of ban-dit activities, sources of water, main crops grown,and other information about daily life and politics.This information was passed to the coalition com-mander in Belet Weyne, Colonel Labbe. It wasthen passed to UNITAF, where, combined withsimilar information from the other sectors, it wasprocessed as intelligence about the entire area ofoperations.277

The Canadian forces soon established goodrelations with the local populace and conductedaggressive patrolling throughout the sector. Theyalso provided security for the convoys of reliefsupplies coming into the sector, notably those ofthe Red Cross and Save the Children. These relieforganizations took care of up to 45,000 people aday just in the maln city of Belet Weyne. Fromthat center, additional supplies were distributed tooutlying areas. DependabLe stocks of food andregular feeding at the refugee centers brought thefamine under control. Toward the end of January,starving refugees were so far removed from dan-ger they only required one feeding per day. Yet,even with food stocks available elsewhere, largenumbers of refugees stayed in the city because ofthe lack of water. Many wells had been destroyedor contaminated during the civil war. With thesecurity provided by the Canadian soldiers, twohumanitarian relief organizations, Save theChildren and Oxfam Quebec, worked on restoringwells and provided veterinary assistance.278 Suchmeasures allowed the people to return to their vil-lages.

The Canadian command encouraged Somaliself-reliance through a series of councils. Therewere separate ones established for local security,relief, reconstruction, and political concerns.Colonel Labbe, as the commander, met only with

MOVING TO TI-fE THIRD Pw&sE 93

OVIC DD-SD-OO-00904

A soldier from the 10th Mountain Division points an M16 rifle into an enclosure while checking for weapons duringa sweep of the small village of Afgooye. The village was a haven for weapons and bandits.

the councils, not with individuals. This discour-aged any charges of Canadian favoritism. All fac-tions and clans needed representation on thesecouncils and at major meetings to ensure theirrespective interests were heard and protected.279

The Canadians also reached out to the Somalipeople in more direct ways. As was happening inother sectors, they helped reestablish a policeforce. These local policemen did not carryweapons, but they were soon accompanying theCanadian soldiers on patrols. The Canadianstrained these officers in first aid and riot controlprocedures and even procured uniforms for them.The education of Somali children also receivedattention. In the population centers of BeletWeyne and Matabaan, several schools wererepaired and reopened with the help of theCanadian soldiers. School supplies were procuredthrough the United Nations Children's Fund anddistributed to these institutions. Teachers wererecruited, tested, and given vocational trainingand returned to their duties. The Canadians alsoestablished a fund totaling $75,000 to pay forlocal laborers working on repair projects, such asroads. These workers were employed and man-

aged through the local rehabilitation committee,but the funds were controlled and disbursed by theCanadians.28° As elsewhere in Somalia, militaryengineers undertook the hazardous duty of clear-ing mines from roads and other areas.

Aside from the threat posed by potentiallyvolatile confrontations of the numerous armedfactions, the major problem in the sector was sim-ple banditry. This usually took the forms of loot-ing, sniping, and setting up roadblocks for thepurpose of robbery and extortion. The Canadianssought to control these activities through the pres-ence of their patrols. They also issued a strictweapons control policy. All weapons in the sectorhad to be registered, and none could be carriedopenly.' Non-registered weapons were seized. Inthis manner, small arms in the sector became lessof a problem. Then, by working closely with thevarious factions, the Canadians got the Sornalis toagree to place their heavy weapons in canton-ments. By 27 March 1993, the entire sector wasrated secure.281

* This allowed humanitarian relief organizations that hadlegitimate security needs to maintain their protection.

94 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

In April, the Canadians prepared for the arrivalof UNOSOM II forces. Under the transition plan,the Belet Weyne sector was to be handed over tothe control of soldiers from India. But the Indianswould not arrive on time, and the Italians had totemporarily extend their control into this sector.

Lieutenant Colonel Carol J. Mathieu, com-manding officer of the batfie group, recognizedthe sensitive position of his sector, which bor-dered on both Ethiopia and the portion of Somaliathat was not within the UNTTAF area of responsi-bility. He foresaw that difficulties could arisefrom the presence of factional forces aroundGalcaio and he recommended the extension of hissector, something that was eventuaily done underUNOSOM IJ.282 Fortunately, the Canadiansbrought Belet Weyne quickly and skillfully undercontrol, and the possibility for violence neverbecame reality. The humanitarian sector on theother flank of the coalition's area of operations,however, would pose serious problems forUNITAF.

Kismayo

After Mogadishu, Kismayo was the relief sec-tor that had the greatest number of incidents. Thatcity also caused the greatest concern because ofthe potential for inter-faction fighting. As in thecapital, these armed factions were ultimately tiedby alliance to either Aideed or Ali Mahdi. Bothgroups wanted to control this important city,which had been the scene of heavy fighting untilthe arrival of UNITAF. To further exacerbate theproblem, the leader of the group loyal to Aideed,Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess, was suspected of hav-ing perpetrated a massacre among the followers ofGeneral Said Hirsi "Morgan" just before coalitionforces landed. Tensions were high in the city andits environs, and the need to keep the two factionsapart was critical. Morgan's Somali NationalAlliance faction of the Somali PatrioticMovement numbered only about 1,000 men, butmany of them were well-disciplined veterans ofthe old national army. Jess' Somali PatrioticMovement faction was about four or five timeslarger, but was not nearly as well organized. Priorto the arrival of UNITAF troops, Morgan hadmoved his followers far up the Jubba River valley,

* This is a conservative estimate of Morgan's strength.Various sources put his numbers at two or three times this.

near the Kenyan border. He began to move southagain in January.

Just as MarFor had responsibility for stabiliz-ing the capital, so Kismayo was the responsibilityof the Army Forces Somalia. Major GeneralSteven L. Arnold decided on 17 December todeploy his 10th Mountain Division artillery tacti-cal operations center staff to the city, under thecommand of Colonel Evan R. Gaddis, USA. Theadvance party of six officers and enlisted soldiersarrived at Mogadishu on 12 December and werequickly informed about the situation, given theirmission, and told what was expected of them.They traveled to Kismayo by humvee and linkedup with the Belgian and U.S. Marine units thathad just secured the port and airfield.283 TaskForce Kismayo was created from the U.S. Army's3d Battalion, 14th Infantry, and the Belgian 1stParachute Battalion. The task force headquarterswas formed from the 10th Mountain Divisionartillery staff, reinforced by other division assetsincluding an aviation detachment, a boat compa-ny, a communications platoon, a psychologicaloperations team, a civil affairs team, and a supportelement.284 Brigadier General W. LawsonMagruder ifi, USA, the assistant division com-mander for operations, was selected to be the taskforce commanding general.

General Magruder moved quickly to impressupon the faction leaders in the sector the powerand determination of UNITAF. He also wanted toensure they understood the coalition was neutraland was there only to assist the Somali people.The task force began its security operations on 28December. The very next day, General Magruderhosted a meeting with Colonel Jess, local elders,clan members, and former police officers to forman interim security council for the sector. Shortlyafter this first meeting took place, two otherimportant steps were taken. First, the local Somalipolice began to form as an auxiliary securityforce. Soon they manned roadblocks with coali-tion forces. The second step was to issue a "noweapons policy" on 1 January.285 This was a com-prehensive policy that stated: "no one may carry apistol, rifle, automatic weapon or transport acrew-served weapon within the city limits ofKismayo." It also banned pedestal mounts forweapons on vehicles. The only exceptions werefor legitimate bodyguards, and even they had tobe in possession of an authorized permit, and inthe presence of their employer. Their weapons hadto be carried openly (in a holster or slung over the

MOVING TO THE TWR0 PHASE 95

Photo courtesy of the author

Canadian soldiers mounted in a Bison light armored vehicle patrol the Belet Weyne sector to create and maintain asecure environment in which to carry out their humanitarian work.

shoulder with the muzzle pointed down.) Thispolicy took effect on 9 January, and was enforcedthrough a system of routine patrols, searches ofvehicles and individuals, roadblocks, and mobilecheckpoints. Coalition forces and auxiliary secu-rity forces worked together to enforce the ban.286

The coalition forces in Kismayo would soon beat the forefront of one of UNITAF's major chal-lenges. The ceasefire agreement on IS Januaryrequired all factional forces to remain where theywere on that date. Barely a week after the signingof the initial Addis Ababa accords, GeneralMorgan began moving his forces south from theKenyan border toward Kismayo. There was nodoubt that General Morgan wanted a confronta-tion with his rival Colonel Jess for control of thecity. General Magruder moved quickly and direct-ly to end the possibility of fighting between thefactions and to warn General Morgan of the con-sequences of his actions. On 23 January, GeneralMagruder met personally with General Morgan atthe town of QoQaani. General Magruderexplained tiNITAF's position on the cantonment

of large weapons and technicals and told Morganthat any such weapons found outside the canton-ment areas could be destroyed. General Morgandisclosed the locations of his forces at four townsin the sector. General Magruder replied that foursites were too many. Morgan stated he had alreadytold his forces not to engage coalition forces, andthat he would avoid having his men on roads usedfor relief convoys if he was forewarned aboutthem. He also agreed, "not to initiate attacksagainst other factions." Finally, he stated he couldbe contacted on 26 January to arrange anothermeeting.287 In the end, however, this proposedmeeting was overtaken by other events.

General Morgan was one of the more interest-ing characters in the Somali political landscape. Aformer Minister of Defense, he was a son-in-lawof Siad Bare. He also had attended the UnitedStates Army Command and Staff College at FortLeavenworth, Kansas. As U.S. AmbassadorRobert B. Oakley said, this meant Morgan under-stood how we think, "but we don't have the fog-giest idea of how he thinks." Ambassador Oakley

96 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

did describe him as "very cunning and totallyuntrustworthy."288 As if to prove the ambassador'sassessment, General Morgan's agreement not toattack his rivals did not last 24 hours.

Some of Colonel Jess' soldiers were in a can-tonment at the town of Bir Xaani, located about35 kilometers from Kismayo. Security was lax,perhaps in part because these men thoughtUNITAF would protect them from attack.289 On24 January, General Morgan's fighters attackedthe outpost as part of an attempt to move againstthe port city. In response, Colonel Maulin, one ofJess' subordinates, made an unauthorized moveagainst Morgan's forces. UNTTAF respondedquickly with two radioed warnings to GeneralMorgan to desist in his aggression and to pullback. When he paid no attention and continuedwith his intentions of reducing the Jess canton-ment, Task Force Kismayo was ordered to stophim by force.

The task force planned a combined operation,with the 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry, providing airassault elements and attack helicopters and theBelgian 1st Parachute Battalion forming theground assault element. An aerial reconnaissanceof Bir Xaani located General Morgan's forces andwarning shots were fired. After these wereignored, Cobra attack helicopters fired cannonsand antitank rockets at the Somali technicals andmilitary equipment. The fife was described as"accurate and deadly." Belgian soldiers, soon onthe scene, captured several technicals, artillery,and armored vehicles.299 This preventive opera-tion was successful; although Morgan's soldiersdid return fire, they also pulled back quickly. Thesmall, sharp engagement was important for tworeasons. It was the first time preemptive force hadbeen used against one of the Somali factions toenforce the Addis Ababa accords, signed only 10days before. Second, as Ambassador Oakley saidin an interview, the attack was necessary to "teachMorgan a lesson. ... Cobra gunships went in andtook care of Morgan for not respecting the cease-fire, continuing to move south after we told him tostop, and for general misbehavior."291 GeneralMorgan had to withdraw his remaining vehicles35 kilometers from Bir Xaani, and his troopsseven kilometers from the town.

* Colonel Jess had gone to attend the talks in Addis Ababaand had not returned. In fact, with the notoriety of theDecember massacre in Kismayo, there was speculation hemight never return.

The forceful reaction of UNITAF forces pro-duced an immediate effect. Fighting ceased, andthe opposing factions pulled away from eachother. The Kismayo relief sector entered a periodof uneasy peace. Over the next few days, theBelgian paratroopers aggressively sought out andconfiscated weapons, and American attack heli-copters destroyed technicals found outside thecompounds.292 General Morgan and his men,some of whom claimed a right to return to homesin Kismayo, remained a threat in the area. ColonelJess' followers also caused troubles in the townand lower Jubba valley. There were several inci-dents of sniping and of grenade attacks againstcoalition soldiers, particularly the Belgians. Theseincreased in intensity through the middle ofFebruary. By that time, General Morgan andColonel Maulin were probing each other. In themidst of this turmoil, Colonel Jess retumed toKismayo. UNTITAF had placed a lid on the situa-tion on the southern flank, but it continued tosimmer.

In late February, General Morgan was preparedto move against Colonel Jess' forces in Kismayoonce again. Taking advantage of the better disci-pline of his men, he infiltrated small groups intothe city on 22 February. Again, Jess' men werecaught napping. In a short but intense action, sev-eral of Jess' fighters, as well as some civilians,were killed and Jess and his followers fled thecity. This clash was to have serious consequencesfor IJINIITAF.

Such a daring chaUenge could not go unan-swered. Both General Johnston and AmbassadorOaldey immediately issued a strongly wordedultimatum to General Morgan. "There can be noexcuse or pardon for the deliberate, well-plannedactions of your forces and senior commanders inattacking Kismayo on 22 February 1993.UNITAF condemns and holds you responsible forkilling innocent civilians and terrorizing the entirepopulation, threatening to destroy all the progresstoward [prosperity] and peace which has beenmade in the region." UNIITAF commanders thentold General Morgan, "as a result of these inex-cusable, criminal actions and the breaking of theceasefire, all your forces and weapons must bemoved out [of] the lower Jubba valley to locationsnorth of [Dhoble] no later than midnight 25February. You must designate these locations toUNITAF by 25 February. If any of your forces arefound outside of these locations on 26 February or

MOVING TO THE ThIRD PHASE 97

thereafter, they will be engaged. Any weaponslocated will be destroyed."293

To give teeth to the ultimatum, Army ForcesSomalia's quick reaction force was ordered toKismayo. Other Army units were shuffled in thetheater to keep all humanitarian sectors secured.Even as Morgan withdrew to the Dhoble area,Colonel Jess' forces were ordered to move out ofthe city, to the area of Jilib. These measures weretimely, effective, and balanced, but the damagehad been done.

hi Mogadishu, General Aideed claimed thatMorgan could not have succeeded at enteringKismayo unless he had the cooperation ofUNITAF. He also told his followers that all ofUNITAF's actions were directed against his ally,Colonel Jess, conveniently ignoring what thecoalition was doing to chastise GeneralMorgan.294 Aideed's efforts at disseminating prop-aganda succeeded in bringing his followers outonto the streets of Mogadishu for three days ofdisturbances.

In Kismayo, as the situation quieted downagain, the Army handed over responsibility for thesector to the Belgians on 5 March. About 150Americans remained out of the original 1,000-

man contingent. Their main mission was to workwith the humanitarian agencies.

But General Morgan was not done makingtrouble. With the start of the next round of peacetalks scheduled to begin shortly in Addis Ababa,there was concern violence might again erupt. On9 March, Colonel Frederick C. Peck, the publicaffairs officer, expressed UINTTAF's views in apress statement: "We're going on intuition andtrack record. We are concerned that someonemight try to derail things or make a point or get alittle bit better situation."295 After only two weeksof relative quiet, Morgan's forces again attackedJess' fouowers on 16 March and tried to take overthe city. Jess' supporters fled to the north, andUNITAF recalled its quick reaction force to thecity. This 500-man unit, under Brigadier GeneralGreg L. Gile, USA, was backed with 13 attackhelicopters. The belligerents were quickly pushedout of the city. To further emphasize UNITAFresolve to keep the factions from confronting eachother, the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp(LHD 1) and three other ships carrying the 24thMarine Expeditionary Unit were stationed off thecity's coast on 25 March. The MEU landed thenext day and conducted patrols to the west of the

ovic DD-SD-OO-00798

A Canadian soldier manning a machine gun in a bunker guards the entrance of Belet Wayne airfield as a U.S.Marine KC-130 lands on the dirt airstrip.

98 REsToRING HOPE IN Sov1.AuA

port city. At the same time, 200 American soldiersand the Belgians pushed to the north, placing astrong cordon between the forces of Morgan andJess.

The Addis Ababa talks, which had begun on 15Marclh, continued through this period. With newsof General Morgan's latest actions, Aideed threat-ened to leave the talks, again charging IJNITAFwith complicity. Colonel Peter A. Dotto,UNITAF's future plans officer, was also the coali-tion representative to the conference. He warnedAideed that Leaving the conference would only"play into the hands of his enemies."296 Aideedrefused to listen and left. But this time he hadoverextended himself. His people in Mogadishudid not come into the streets as they had before.Also, several of his lieutenants disagreed with hisstubbornness and formed their own contingent tocontinue representation at the conference. Facedwith this unacceptable loss of support and prestigefrom his own faction, Aideed decided his interestswere best served by returning to the negotiatingtable. While Aideed's resentment undoubtedlycontinued, Kismayo settled into a period of quietfor the remainder of UNITAF's time in Somalia.

Even as the city and the area of operationsbegan to calm down near the end of March theevents in Kismayo and their spillover inMogadishu had two serious consequences. ForGeneral Aideed, loss of credibility would causehim to seek some method to regain his staturewith his followers. For UNITAF, the Kismayotroubles caused a reevaluation of the transition toI.JNOSOM H and a rearrangement of the rede-ployinent schedule.297

Morale and Restraint

During the third phase of the operation, thework in Somalia could be rewarding for the sol-diers and Marines of the coalition. They could seethe results of their efforts, whether they wereengineers building a bridge, infantrymen onpatrol, officers assigned to the civil-military oper-ations teams, or air traffic controllers bringing inaircraft filled with supplies or troops. Each person

* Kismayo continued to be a source of tension and conflict.On 6 and 7 May 1993, just two days after the departure ofUNITAF and the turn over of the operation to the UnitedNations, Colonel Jess attacked General Morgan's forces in abid to retake the city. Belgian forces, then under the com-mand of UNOSOM II, repelled the attack.

contributed to a situation that was noticeablyimproving for the vast majority of Somalis. Therewas a tedious sameness to the daily round ofwork, however, and shifts were long and oftenmonotonous with no days off. There also was anedge to life in the area of operations from theoccasional attacks or sniping incidents. Within amonth of the start of the operation, tension wasmounting for those who patrolled the streets of thecities or the roads of the countryside, or who wereriding in convoys. An official document stated thecase clearly: "the strain of operating in an envi-ronment where a Marine on patrol might be metby a waving, smiling crowd on one corner andgunfire on the next began to tell on the individu-als in MarFot Many Marines began to growincreasingly impatient with the naturally curiousSomalis, particularly when Somalis crowdedthem."298

This attitude was not peculiar to Americans orMarines. In Baidoa, the Australians also noted:

The soldiers observed acts of corruption andexploitation among Somalis and SomaliNon-Government Organization staff. Theybecame disillusioned. In many cases theirmorale plummeted as they asked themselveswhy they were risking their lives in aremote, hot and dangerous country, hell benton its own destruction. It was an immensechallenge for the commanders within the 1RAR Group to maintain morale, and preventsoldiers from allowing their disillusionmentand anger to lead to overly-aggressive prac-tices. All of those who served in Baidoa hadto dig deep to remain in touch with valuesand attitudes developed at home inAustralia, while working under pressure in abrutalized society, stricken with corruptionand violence.299

Such frustration was familiar to those seniorcommanders and noncommissioned officers whohad served in Vietnam. There the enemy often hidwithin, and was supported by, the civilian popula-tion. In Somalia, there was no enemy in the tradi-tional sense, but it was just as difficult to discernthe intentions of a mob of people, or to spot with-in a crowd the person who might pose a realthreat. Strong leadership at all levels was requiredto keep soldiers and Marines focused on their mis-ston.

Major General Wilhelm recognized the creep-ing tiredness and frustration of his Marines bymid-January, and he issued MarFor a "Thirty-Day

MovtNc TO THE THIRD PHASE 99

Photo courtesy of the author

Belgian paratroopers stand guard at the port ofKismayo.

Attitude Adjustment Message." In addition tocalling for a brief stand down of operations toallow his Marines to gain some respite, hereminded them that they needed to maintain goodrelations "with the 90 [percent] of the populationwho welcomed the American presence." As henoted, no matter how frustrating the situationmight become, the Marines "had to avoid alienat-ing the citizens of Mogadishu."30° In Baidoa,Lieutenant Colonel David W. Hurley adopted themotto of "firm, fair, and friendly" as the guide forthe Australian soldiers. He also made it clear thatunnecessary violence would not be tolerated, andthat all actions must be within the rules of engage-ment.30'

The professionalism and discipline of coalitionsoldiers were essential in keeping down the num-ber of unfortunate incidents. Occasionally, somesoldier or Marine would be confronted with a sit-uation that called for a quick decision to use dead-ly force, although these were rare. At such times,the rules of engagement provided both a basis foraction and protection for the soldiers involved if

there was an obvious threat. An investigation washeld for any incident in which a member of thecoalition shot a Somali. The individuals involvedwould either be upheld in their decision or recom-mended for a court-martial. On 4 February, ayoung Somali was shot and killed by a Marinesergeant as he rushed toward the back of an openvehicle while carrying a closed box. The boxturned out to hold nothing dangerous. This was avery sorrowful event, causing grief to the boy'sfamily and deep remorse to the Marine involved.But since the contents of the box were not known,and since the boy's actions were deemed to pose apossible threat, the sergeant was determined tohave acted in accordance with the rules ofengagement and did not face a court-martial.

But there were also some who did let their frns-tration and anger get out of hand, with drasticresults. On 2 February, Gunnery Sergeant HarryConde, shot and wounded a Somali youth whohad approached his vehicle and stolen his sun-glasses. Gunnery Sergeant Conde shot the boy ashe was fleeing from the vehicle. The gunfire alsowounded another Somali. Since the boy did notpresent any threat to the gunnery sergeant, he wasdeemed to have used excessive force and wastried by court-martial. He was found guilty of twocounts of assault with a firearm with intent toinflict grievous bodily harm, was fined, and wasreduced in grade to staff sergeant.

* Riding in a convoy in the city of Mogadishu or in Kismayowas always a tense time. Roads between major points werekept clear by the Clean Street operations to allow for fastmovement, and routes were occasionally varied, but therewas always the chance of random sniping or a grenadeattack. Also, Somali pedestrians frequently stepped in frontof vehicles to purposely separate them from their convoy andslow them down or stop them. Then the vehicle could bemobbed as crowds of young men and boys rushed in to grabwhatever they could get. Passengers in the vehicles were lit-erally sitting targets if anyone wished to take advantage ofthe situation. There was a need for constant vigilance in suchsituations, and coalition soldiers had to be able to protectthemselves and their property. On leaving a compound, amagazine was inserted into one's personal weapon and around chambered with the safety on. Many also carried sticksor the end poles from cots to rap the knuckles of those whomight attempt to steal. At one point it was noted that somesoldiers, such as the Tunisians, were traveling with bayonetsfixed to deter thieves, but this practice was stopped. It wasdetermined the very act of fixing bayonets provided a clearmessage of the intent of the soldiers involved and could actas a deterrent that would not be possible if the bayonets werealready on the rifles.

100 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

DVIC DD-SD-OO-00788

BGen Lawson W. Magruder Ill, USA, the 10th Mountain Division's assistance division commander and Task ForceKismayo's commander, meets with Col Ahmed Omar Jess, the Somali faction leader in Kismayo.

The most serious set of incidents occurred inBelet Weyne. The Canadians had problems withSomali men and youths sneaking into their lines atnight and stealing whatever they could. The theftswere bad enough, but no one could determine theintentions of these intruders, and for that reasonthey posed a threat to the soldiers and a danger tothemselves. Frustration and resentment mountedagainst these thieves. Unfortunately, some juniorleaders took matters into their own hands in amanner that was unjustifiable and deadly. On 4March, soldiers of the Reconnaissance Platoonwere ordered to augment security at the engi-neers' camp at Belet Weyne. That evening the pla-toon's commander, Captain Michael Rainville, setin motion a plan to capture infiltrators by placingrations and equipment in a position that could beseen by Somalis coming close to the compound.Eventually, two unarmed Somali men wereobserved entering the compound. They were chal-lenged by members of the platoon and attemptedto flee. Warning shots were fired, but they contin-ued to run. One of the Somalis was shot and cap-tured. The other continued to run inside the com-

pound until he, too, was struck by rifle fire,knocking him to the ground. As he tried to get up,he was shot twice again at close range and killed.

Just a few days later, Major Anthony Seward,the commanding officer of 2 Commando, passedon to his platoon commanders that any intruderscaptured in Canadian lines were to be abused. Theintention of this poorly worded direction was thatany Somali thieves should be taught a lesson thatwould deter them, or others who might be con-templating such actions, from stealing from theCanadians. Some officers passed this word on totheir men. Unfortunately, some soldiers took it asa license to do what they could to anyone unfor-tunate enough to fall into their hands. On the nightof 16 March, a Somali teenager, Shidane Arone,was caught in the Canadian base at Belet Weyne.He was bound and taken to a bunker that had beenused to hold such prisoners until they could beturned over to proper authorities. There he wastortured and beaten to death by at least two sol-diers, Master Corporal Clayton Matchee andPrivate Kyle Brown. Several noncommissionedofficers had knowledge of the beating, although

MovING TO mrs THIRD PHASE 101

DVIC DiD-SO-OO-00946

Two Belgian militaiy police officers go through the possessions of a Somali taxi dilver at a checkpoint at theentrance into the compound at the port of Kismayo.

they may not have known of its severity until toolate.302

Canadian authorities investigated both inci-dents. The result tarnished the reputation of a finemilitary establishment, which had received praisefrom General Johnston for "the humanitarianfocus of the Canadian troops. It has earned themenormous good will and they have properly por-frayed themselves as having come to Somalia for[a] noble purpose."303 The careers of many sol-diers in the Airborne Regiment and in theCanadian Ministry of National Defense wereruined.

The initial investigations began with a com-manding officer's investigation immediately afterthe 4 March shooting, but this was not received atNational Defense headquarters until 23 March.However, an investigation by Canadian militarypolice began in late April, just days before theredeployment of the UNITAF headquarters. TheCanadian forces began redeploying in May andcontinued to arrive back in Canada through June.

As word of the incidents began to emerge, alongwith allegations of withheld or altered informa-tion, they developed into a national scandal,reaching into the highest levels of the CanadianMinistry of National Defense. A specialCommission of Inquiry was established inCanada, which worked on questioning all officersand soldiers connected in any way with eitherincident. As a result of the investigation and thescandal, the Canadian Airborne Regiment wasdisbanded. Lieutenant Colonel Mathieu was courtmartialed; although acquitted he retired from theservice. Several other officers and noncommis-sioned officers were also court martialed. Amongthe most significant was Major Seward, who wasfound guilty of negligent performance of duty andreceived a severe reprimand, three months inprison, and dismissal. Captain Rainville was courtmartialed and found not guilty. Master CorporalMatchee attempted to commit suicide while incustody in Somalia, resulting in permanent braindamage that rendered him incompetent to standtrial. Private Brown was court martialed, found

102 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

guilty of manslaughter and torture, and sentencedto five years imprisonment and dismissal with dis-grace.

A