"Retention & Online Search: How Current Challenges for Privacy Become New Threats for Freedom of...

www.ulys.net -‐ www.droit-‐technologie.org 1

(SARAJEVO, BOSNIA-‐HERZEGOVINA, 8-‐9 JUNE 2012) INTERNEWS & ANNENBERG SCHOOL FOR COMMUNICATION

Cédric Laurant A5orney-‐at-‐Law, Cabinet Ulys (Brussels) Principal, Cedric Laurant ConsulAng

CONFERENCE ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE, POLICY & REGULATION


RETENTION AND ONLINE SEARCH: HOW CURRENT CHALLENGES FOR PRIVACY BECOME NEW THREATS FOR FREEDOM OF

EXPRESSION

ü IntroducAon: 2 illustraAons



EXPRESSION

ü 1) public authority’s surveillance by data retenAon mandates


q How threats to privacy may present a threat to free speech:

§ 1. public authority’s surveillance by data retenAon mandates

CHALLENGE TO PRIVACY – THREAT TO FREE SPEECH?


http://www.zeit.de/datenschutz/malte-spitz-data-retention

q The case of Malte Spitz

THE CASE OF MALTE SPITZ


“How much informa[on do you give online every day? And who has access to it?”

See h`p://vimeo.com/19289724




http://www.zeit.de/datenschutz/malte-spitz-data-retention

q 6 months of phone records (“traffic data”), enhanced with records of the Malte Spitz’s tweets and blog entries

q Person’s profile q Person’s rela[onships q Where he lives, works, spends [me with friends, spouse?... lovers?

q Indirectly reveals his poli[cal, philosophical, even sexual preferences.



q Ques[ons: q Does this threaten Malte Spitz’s right to associate with others? To travel? To communicate or interact with whom he wishes?

q Does data reten[on poten[ally place every ci[zen under suspicion?

q Could such surveillance end the presump[on of innocence?

q …




EXPRESSION

ü 2) private sector’s surveillance through online behavioural and targeted adverAsing techniques


q How threats to privacy may present a threat to free speech:

§ 1. public authority’s surveillance by data retenAon mandates

§ 2. private sector’s surveillance through online behavioural and targeted adver[sing techniques

CHALLENGE TO PRIVACY – THREAT TO FREE SPEECH?


“COLLUSION”


“COLLUSION”

q A Firefox add-‐on that allows you to see which sites are using third-‐party cookies to track your movements across the Web. It shows, in real [me, how that data creates a spider-‐web of interac[on between companies and other trackers.


http://blogs.wsj.com/wtk/

“WHAT THEY KNOW” (WALL STREET JOURNAL)


ü 1. How can violaAons of individuals’ privacy affect their freedom of

speech?


EXPRESSION


1. HOW CAN VIOLATIONS OF YOUR PRIVACY AFFECT YOUR FREEDOM OF SPEECH?

q Ar[cula[on between privacy and freedom of speech.

q Privacy as a core human right and a condi[on for freedom of expression. (But also freedom to travel, to associate, etc.)


ü 2. Challenges to individuals’ privacy: illustraAons of how actual or hypotheAcal infringements to individuals' privacy have led, or may lead, to a restricAon of their

freedom of expression


EXPRESSION


2.1. DATA RETENTION

q How regula[ons in Europe manda[ng the reten[on of communica[ons data -‐ e.g., online traffic and mobile communica[ons -‐ on online service providers and telecommunica[ons companies, have affected Internet users, consumers and individuals’ right to privacy and, as a result, their freedom of speech.

q Delega[on by the state of law enforcement-‐specific du[es to the private sector (Choicepoint case).


DATA RETENTION IN EUROPE

Extract from the European Privacy & Human Rights 2010 report. Map available at h5ps://www.privacyinternaAonal.org/projects/global-‐country-‐reports


Struggles against data reten[on in Central and Eastern Europe

Case study of Poland

(by Katarzyna Szymilewicz, Panoptykon)


•  Overview of data reten[on regimes (and struggles against them).

•  2011 case study of Poland contrasted against the cases of Hungary, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Czech Republic and Romania: necessity and propor[onality revisited.

•  Interpreta[ons?


Purpose limita[on for data reten[on


Poland For preven[on or detecAon of crimes, for prevenAon and detecAon of fiscal offences, for use by prosecutors and courts if relevant to the court proceedings pending, for the purpose of the Internal Security Agency, Foreign Intelligence Agency, Central AnA-‐CorrupAon Bureau, Military Counter-‐intelligence Services and Military Intelligence Services to perform their tasks.

Hungary To enable invesAgaAng bodies, the public prosecutor, the courts and na[onal security agencies to perform their du[es, and to enable police and the Na[onal Tax and Customs Office to invesAgate intenAonal crimes carrying a prison term of two or more years.

Bulgaria For ‘discovering and inves[ga[ng severe crimes and crimes under ArAcle 319a-‐319f of the Penal Code and for searching persons’.

Lithuania For the inves[ga[on, detec[on and prosecu[on of serious and very serious crimes, as defined by the Lithuanian Criminal Code.

Romania & Czech Rep.

Not transposed.


Access to retained data


Poland Police, border guards, tax inspectors, Internal Security Agency, Foreign Intelligence Agency, Central AnA-‐CorrupAon Bureau, military counter-‐intelligence services, military intelligence services, th.e courts and the public prosecutor. Requests must be in wri[ng and in case of police, border guards, tax inspectors, authorised by the senior official in the organisaAon.

Hungary Police, NaAonal Tax and Customs Office, naAonal security services, public prosecutor, courts. Police and the NaAonal Tax and Customs Office require prosecutor’s authorisaAon. Prosecutor and naAonal security agencies may access such data without a court order.

Bulgaria Specific directorates and departments of the State Agency for NaAonal Security, the Ministry of the Interior, Military InformaAon Service, Military Police Service, Minister of Defence, NaAonal InvesAgaAon Agency; the court and pre-‐trial authoriAes under the condiAons. Access only possible on the order of the Chairperson of a Regional Court.

Lithuania Pre-‐trial invesAgaAon bodies, the prosecutor, the court (judges) and intelligence officers. Authorised public authoriAes must request retained data in wri[ng. For access for pre-‐trial invesAgaAons a judicial warrant is necessary.


Not transposed.


Reten[on periods


Poland

2 years.

Hungary

6 months for unsuccessful calls and 1 year for all other

data.

Bulgaria

1 year Data which has been accessed may be retained for a

further 6 months on request.

Lithuania

6 months.


Not transposed.


Number of requests for retained data in 2009


Poland

1 048 318.

Hungary

None provided.

Bulgaria

None provided.

Lithuania

72 473.

Romania

None provided.

Czech Republic

280 271.


( POLAND

number of requests for retained data:

2009 – 1 048 318 (total for the EU: 2 051 082) 2010 – 1 382 521


Courts, Prosecu[on and Police

56%

Military police 0%

Fiscal Intelligence

1%

Border Guard 15%

Military Intelligence

11%

Central An[-‐corrup[on Bureau 4%

Internal Security Agency 13%

POLAND data checks performed in 2009


Subscriber data 54%

Other 3%

Geoloca[on 9%

Billing data 34%

Types of data checks performed by 6 agencies between

Jan 2009 and Oct 2010


RECENT DEVELOPMENTS SHOWING CHALLENGES TO LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY OF DATA RETENTION LAWS IMPLEMENTED IN EASTERN EUROPEAN MEMBER STATES

q  Romania: ConsAtuAonal Court: blanket data retenAon unconsAtuAonal per se (2009); new drag data retenAon bill introduced in Parliament (2011), but rejected by Senate (end 2011).

q  Czech Republic: ConsAtuAonal Court: naAonal provisions implemenAng the DirecAve recognised not proporAonate (2011); Chamber of DepuAes’ current a5empts to reintroduce data retenAon (2012).

q  Bulgaria: Supreme AdministraAve Court revised and amended naAonal law on data retenAon on the basis of unconsAtuAonality with Bulgarian ConsAtuAon and ECHR (2008).

q  Hungary & Poland – pending cases.


RECENT DEVELOPMENTS SHOWING CHALLENGES TO LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY OF DATA RETENTION LAWS IMPLEMENTED IN EASTERN EUROPEAN MEMBER STATES

q European Court of Jus[ce: decision expected soon that will assess compaAbility of data retenAon mandate of Data RetenAon DirecAve with respect to the fundamental right to privacy.

q European Commission: suing Germany for failing to implement the Data RetenAon DirecAve (May 2012)

q Other EU Member States: q Germany: ConsAtuAonal Court declared unconsAtuAonal the naAonal data

retenAon law (March 2010). §  Court ordered deleAon of collected data. §  Court stated: data retenAon could “cause a diffusely threatening feeling of being

under observa@on that can diminish an unprejudiced percep@on of one's basic rights in many areas.”

q Ireland: Court referred to European Court of JusAce a case challenging legality of Data RetenAon DirecAve (thanks to an Irish NGO) (May 2010).

q Cyprus: Supreme Court: parts of data retenAon law are unconsAtuAonal (Feb. 2011).


INTERPRETATIONS?



q Used in Mexico by the police… and the mafia (!);

q Contains name, tel.no. and ID no. (Clave Única de Registro de Población);

q Useful to locate someone.

“RENAUT” DATABASE DATABASE (REGISTRO NACIONAL DE USUARIOS DE TELEFONÍA MÓVIL)

OTHER EXAMPLES OF HOW ACTUAL INFRINGEMENTS TO INDIVIDUALS' PRIVACY HAVE LED TO A RESTRICTION OF THEIR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION



EXPRESSION

ü 2.2. How making an online search can reduce freedom of speech?


2.2. HOW MAKING AN ONLINE SEARCH CAN REDUCE FREEDOM OF SPEECH?

q  Profiling by online marke[ng industry, data aggregators and other online adver[sing companies: characterisa[on of Internet user as a type of consumer fiwng into marke[ng and data mining categories, which in turn may affect their choices online as a consumer, computer user, individual or ci[zen.

q  “Dynamic” pricing: discriminatory aspects. q  Google’s new merged privacy policy and consequences (example of search in Google

and YouTube while logged on through gmail account). q  Facebook’s subject access request (Max Schrems’ case: h`p://europe-‐v-‐facebook.org). q  Rapleaf case: tying of an e-‐mail address to a profile. q  “SSN” case: individual’s date + place of birth (zip code) sufficient to guess his/her

Social Security No. q  Facebook “Apps”:

h`p://online.wsj.com/ar[cle/SB10001424052702303302504577327744009046230.html#ar[cleTabs%3Dinterac[ve


http://s.wsj.net/public/resources/documents/st_RAPLEAF_20101018.html

RAPLEAF CASE


OUTLINE (1/2)

q Introduc[on: 2 illustra[ons showing extent of the: q a) Challenges to privacy, and q b) How they may present a threat to free speech:

§  1) public authority’s surveillance (data retenAon): Malte Spitz’s case §  2) private sector surveillance (WSJ “What They Know” example of 3rd party

tracking through online behavioural adverAsing).

q 1. How viola[ons of your privacy can affect your freedom of speech: q 1.1. ArAculaAon between privacy and freedom of speech. But also freedom to travel, to associate, etc.

q 1.2. Privacy as a core human right and a condiAon for freedom of expression.


OUTLINE (2/2)

q 2. Challenges to individuals’ privacy: illustra[ons of how actual or hypothe[cal infringements to individuals' privacy has led, or may lead, to a restric[on of their freedom of expression q 2.1. Data retenAon: how regulaAons in Europe mandaAng the retenAon of communicaAons data affect users and consumers' right to privacy and, as a result, their freedom of speech.

q 2.2. How making an online search can reduce freedom of speech?

q  3. Take-‐aways


3. TAKE-‐AWAYS

q What solu[ons? q EU legal framework (ECHR, EU Chart FR, DP Dir., DP Reg.). q Integra[on/adapta[on of Bosniak legal framework within the EU framework.

q Civic engagement and public opposi[on in Eastern European countries (cfr Eastern European cons[tu[onal courts’ decisions on data reten[on).

q Impact of Civil Society & NGOs. q Ci[zens’ public trust in their government and public ins[tu[ons (cfr data reten[on slides).

q Risks of discrimina[on.


ü New Technologies, Privacy & ICT ü Intellectual Property ü Cinema, Media & Entertainment ü E-‐Payment, E-‐Finance & Internet Banking ü Sport & Gaming ü Commercial Law

ULYS BELG

IUM

224 avenue

de la Cour

onne

1050 Bruxe

lles

Tel : +32 (0)

2 340 88 10

Fax : +32 (0

)2 345 35 80

ULYS FRAN

CE

33 rue Gali

lée

75116 Paris

Tel : +33 (0)

1 40 70 90 1

1

Fax : +33 (0

)1 40 70 01

38

ULYS ISRA

EL

Vered Towe

r, Derech H

ashalom, 53

Givatayim

Tel : +972 (0

)3 770 70 20

Fax : +972

(0)3 770 70

19

ULYS, a Moder- and Human Law Fir5, Dedicated to Innovation ! THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION !

AREA

S OF EXPERT

ISE

Cédric Laurant A5orney-‐at-‐Law, Cabinet Ulys (Brussels)

(Member of the Brussels and District of Columbia Bars)

Principal, Cedric Laurant ConsulAng [cedric.laurant [at] ulys [dot] net] [c [at] cedriclaurant [dot] com]

CONFERENCE ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE, POLICY & REGULATION (SARAJEVO 8-‐9 JUNE 2012)


PresentaAon available at:

h5p://blog.cedriclaurant.org

Date post:	15-Jun-2015
Category:	News & Politics
Upload:	cedric-laurant
View:	247 times
Download:	0 times

"Retention & Online Search: How Current Challenges for Privacy Become New Threats for Freedom of...

News & Politics