REVIEW OF MARKET INFORMATION TO FACILITATE EFFICIENT ELECTRICITY SPOT AND FUTURES TRADING
DECISION PAPER
22nd July 2014 ENERGY MARKET AUTHORITY
991G Alexandra Road #01-29 Singapore 238164
www.ema.gov.sg
Disclaimer: The information contained in this document is subject to change and shall not be
treated as constituting any advice to any person. It does not in any way bind the
Energy Market Authority (‘EMA’) to grant any approval or official permission for any
matter, including but not limited to the grant of any exemption nor to the terms of any
exemption. EMA reserves the right to change its policies and/or to amend any
information contained in this document without prior notice. Persons who may be in
doubt about how the information in this document may affect them or their commercial
activities are advised to seek independent legal advice or any other professional advice
as they may deem appropriate. EMA shall not be responsible or liable for any
consequences (financial or otherwise) or any damage or loss suffered, directly or
indirectly, by any person resulting or arising from the use of or reliance on any
information contained in this document.
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REVIEW OF MARKET INFORMATION TO FACILITATE EFFICIENT ELECTRICITY SPOT AND FUTURES TRADING
DECISION PAPER
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 An extensive amount of market information is currently made available by the
Energy Market Company (‘EMC’)1 and the Power System Operator (‘PSO’)2. The
information can be classified under two broad categories:
a. Market information which is made available to spot market participants and
also non-market participants who subscribes to EMC’s data subscription
services (‘data subscribers’);3 and
b. Market information which is made available only to spot market participants
or a subset of spot market participants, more specifically the commercial
generation companies (‘gencos’).
1.2 The Energy Market Authority (‘EMA’) has reviewed the existing market
information including the specification and publication timeline thereof. The objective is
to enhance data transparency which will facilitate efficient trading and risk management
for participants in our wholesale electricity market (i.e. the spot market), and also the
electricity futures market. In this regard, EMA has conducted a public consultation to
seek comments and feedback on the following two proposals:
Proposal 1: All data subscribers to be given the same market information which is currently provided to spot market participants or gencos.
Proposal 2: All data subscribers and spot market participants to be given
aggregated energy offer information.
1.3 This paper sets out EMA’s decisions on the two proposals after taking into
account the comments received (refer to Appendix 1 for the comments and EMA’s
responses).
1 EMC operates the spot electricity market under an electricity licence granted by EMA.
2 PSO, which is a division of EMA, is responsible for ensuring secure operation of the power system and
reliable supply of electricity to consumers in Singapore. In this regard, PSO directs the operation of the high-voltage transmission system, controls the dispatch of registered facilities in the spot market, co-ordinates outage of generation and transmission facilities (including the release of these facilities for maintenance, testing, commissioning and repair). 3 The various subscription service packages offered by EMC can be viewed at the following EMC
website: https://www.emcsg.com/data
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2. RECAP OF EXISTING MARKET INFORMATION
2.2 Chapter 6 of the Market Rules4 sets out the information to be published by EMC
to facilitate the physical operation of the power system and the dispatch of registered
facilities to meet electricity demand/load (refer to Table 1 for the list of such
information). Currently, all spot market participants and data subscribers have access
to such information5 which is in respect of the actual/real-time dispatch schedule
(‘RTDS’) for each half-hourly dispatch period, and the following 3 look-ahead
schedules:
a. The short-term schedule (‘STS’), at any point in time, covers twelve
consecutive dispatch periods from the end of the current dispatch period.
b. The pre-dispatch schedule (‘PDS’):
i. at any point in time before 12:00 hours in a given day, covers all dispatch periods from the end of the current dispatch period till the end of the current dispatch day; and
ii. at any point in time at or after 12:00 hours in a given day, covers all dispatch periods from the end of the current dispatch period till the end of the following day.
c. The market outlook schedule (‘MOS’), at any point in time in a given day,
covers the dispatch periods from that point in time till the end of the following 6th day.
2.3 Chapter 5 of the Market Rules requires PSO to periodically assess and report on
the adequacy and security of the power system, and also to co-ordinate and approve
the planned outage schedules of registered facilities. In this regard, PSO prepares and
issues (through EMC) the following reports to spot market participants only:
a. Adequacy and Security Assessment (‘ASA’) reports which provide PSO’s
forecast of system demand (MW), available generation capacity, overhaul
and de-rated generation capacity, available regulation capacity and available
reserve capacity in each reserve class:
4 The Market Rules are available at the following EMC website: https://www.emcsg.com/marketrules
5 All spot market participants have access to the information by logging into a secured area of EMC’s
website. Non-market participants (i.e. data subscribers) can also access the same information by subscribing to EMC’s data subscription services.
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Table 1: List of information currently available to spot market participants and EMC’s
data subscribers
S/No. Information Reference Remarks
1 Total load a. Total load, prices and system shortfalls for MOS, PDS and STS are projected information.
b. The information in respect of the MOS is published by EMC by 9:00 hours of each day.
c. The information in respect of the PDS is published by EMC not later than 15 minutes prior to the start of the first dispatch period of the PDS.
d. The information in respect of the STS is published by EMC not later than 25 minutes prior to the start of the first dispatch period of the STS.
2 Total transmission losses
3 Total reserve requirement by reserve class
4 Total regulation requirement
5 Energy price associated with each market network node at which a generation registered facility or generation settlement facility is located
6 Uniform Singapore Energy Price (‘USEP’)
7 Reserve price for each reserve class and reserve provider group
8 Regulation price
9 Any system energy shortfall
10 Any system reserve shortfall, by reserve class
11 Any system regulation shortfall
12 List of security and generation constraints applied for market-clearing
13 Advisory notices EMC will publish advisory notices as soon as practicable pertaining to the following events for any dispatch period in the current MOS, PDS and STS:
a. any surplus or shortfall in energy, regulation or reserve by reserve class;
b. any major equipment outage, load shedding or other abnormal condition in the power system that the Power System Operator (‘PSO’) considers material is occurring or is likely to occur;
c. communications warning advisory notices of difficulties which market participants are experiencing, or EMC considers a significant probability that market participants will experience, in delivering or receiving communications to or from EMC or PSO; and
d. price warning advisory notices that the prices calculated or released to market participants may be subject to revision.
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i. There are two types of ASA reports: (1) the Daily ASA report which
sets out the half-hourly forecast over a rolling 14-day period beginning
at the end of the current day; and (2) the Monthly ASA report which
sets out the daily forecast over a rolling 12-month period commencing
from the following month.
ii. PSO will prepare and issue to all spot market participants (through
EMC) the Daily ASA report by 17:00 hours on the same day, and the
Monthly ASA report by 5 business days before the end of the current
month.
iii. PSO may, at any time, issue an updated Daily ASA report or Monthly
ASA report to incorporate changes that, in the opinion of PSO, are
materially significant.
b. Annual Outage Plan which consists of the Annual Generator Outage
Programme (‘AGOP’) and the Annual Equipment Outage Programme
(‘AEOP’). The AGOP and AEOP respectively set out the planned outage
schedule in respect of all market participants’ generating units and non-
generating equipment (e.g. transmission/switch-house equipment and
designated load registered facilities):
i. PSO will issue, by 15th September of the current year, a provisional
AGOP and AEOP for consultation with the market participants. PSO,
after the consultation, will decide on the final version of the AGOP and
AEOP, and issue them (through EMC) by 15th October of the current
year.
ii. PSO will update and issue the AGOP and AEOP as and when required
taking into account ad hoc outage requests or delays in completion of
maintenance work.
2.4 In addition to the above market information provided under the Market Rules,
PSO will prepare and issue directly to gencos only, a Projected Gas Curtailment
Schedule (‘PGCS’) to facilitate their operational responses (e.g. adjusting the
maintenance schedule of their generation facilities, preparing to run-up their steam
power plants, etc). The PGCS sets out aggregated gas curtailment information in terms
of the percentage reduction in total piped natural gas (‘PNG’) supply to Singapore in
bands of 5% (from 0% to 100%) on an hourly basis and up to the end of the following
year:
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i. To prepare the PGCS for next year, each PNG importer is required to
submit to PSO, by 15th August of the current year, the planned
upstream maintenance schedule affecting gas supply to Singapore
during the next year. PSO will de-conflict over-lapping upstream
maintenance before issuing the PGCS by 15th October of the current
year.
ii. As and when a PNG importer receives any official notice from its
upstream gas seller conveying any information or updates on any
incident, event or activity (planned or unplanned) affecting the quantity
of PNG available for supply to Singapore, the PNG importer is required
to inform PSO:
(1) within 2 hours following receipt of the official notice if the gas
supply to Singapore over the next 48 hours is affected; and
(2) no later than 17:00 hours in the next business day following
receipt of the official notice, or at least 48 hours before the
associated change in gas supply to Singapore, whichever is
earlier, if the gas supply to Singapore beyond the next 48 hours is
affected.
iii. If there is any change to the PGCS based on the update from any PNG
importer, PSO will issue (via email) to the gencos the updated PGCS:
(1) within 2 hours following receipt of the PNG importer’s update if the
gas supply to Singapore over the next 48 hours is affected; and
(2) no later than 17:00 hours in the next business day following
receipt of the PNG importer’s update, or at least 48 hours before
the associated change in gas supply to Singapore, whichever is
earlier, if the gas supply to Singapore beyond the next 48 hours is
affected.
3. EMA’S DECISION ON PROPOSAL 1
3.1 Any person can choose to become a data subscriber of EMC to access the
market information as set out in Table 1. Access to other market information such as
the ASA reports, AGOP and AEOP is currently restricted to spot market participants,
and the PCGS to gencos only.
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3.2 There is no commercial sensitivity or adverse impact on market competition or
national security if access to the ASA reports, AGOP, AEOP and PGCS is extended to
any data subscriber or non-genco market participant. Furthermore, disclosure of such
information will help to eliminate the significant information asymmetry that currently
exists and may also provide pro-competitive benefits to futures market participants.
3.3 Hence, EMA has decided that all data subscribers and spot market
participants shall be given access to the ASA reports, AGOP, AEOP and PGCS
through EMC. The coverage of the AGOP and AEOP will also be extended to
look-ahead 3 years (instead of 1 year currently) with effect from 2015.6
4. EMA’S DECISION ON PROPOSAL 2
4.1 Currently, spot market participants’ price-quantity energy offers are not
disclosed. The disclosure of such information could facilitate efficient trading in the spot
and futures market, but could also increase the likelihood of exercise of market power
or concerted activities among spot market participants to elevate pool price.
4.2 Table 2 summarises the offer information disclosure practices in various
competitive electricity markets with electricity futures trading in the US and Asia Pacific.
While offer information is generally released, the details and time lag varies across
different markets. Most competitive electricity markets in the US release unit-specific
energy offer data with a 3-month time lag and units’ identify masked. In comparison,
Australia and New Zealand currently release offer data by units (including identity) on a
short time-lag of 2 days and 2 weeks respectively. There is no clear pattern to disclose
more offer information as the electricity markets become more mature.7
4.3 The key concern with releasing energy offer information is that it could lead to
strategic bidding behaviours, especially during tight supply situations. This can be
mitigated by aggregating the energy offer information and delaying data release which
may in turn trigger dynamic responses among the spot market participants, making it
more difficult for spot traders to characterise and understand the dynamic response
effect for strategic bidding.
6 PSO will adopt the same process and timeline to prepare and issue, by 15
th October of the current
year, the final AGOP/AEOP for next year and a provisional AGOP/AEOP covering the following two years. E.g. by 15
th October 2014, PSO will issue the final AGOP/AEOP for 2015 and provisional
AGOP/AEOP for 2016 and 2017. 7 In several competitive electricity markets in the US, the delay in the release of offer data was shorten
from 6 months to 3 months in 2008/2009 and the 3-month delay practice has been maintained since then. In the Alberta Electricity Market, the Market Surveillance Administrator is reviewing to release less granular offer information to prevent collusive behaviour.
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Table 2: Offer data disclosure practices in competitive electricity market with futures trading 8
Posting Time Lag
Form of Disclosure
Unit-specific offers with IDs
Unit-specific offers with masked IDs
Offers aggregated by zone
At end of each trading hour
AESO block-wise energy
offer data NYISO day-ahead energy offer data
1-day lag Australian NEM energy offer
2-day lag
ERCOT energy supply and demand curve
2-week lag New Zealand energy offer
2-month lag AESO energy market merit order
3-month lag MISO day-ahead and real-time cleared energy offer
and bid data
ISO-NE energy offer data
NYISO energy offer data
CAISO energy offer data
4-month lag PJM daily energy bid data
4.4 On balance, EMA has decided to make available aggregated energy offer
information to all data subscribers and spot market participants through EMC
with a 4-week time-lag. The aggregated energy offer information (also referred to as
the “energy offer stack”) will show, for each half-hour period and based on all offers
considered for the RTDS, each distinct offer price (in $/MWh) and the total offer
capacity (in MW) at that price. With this information, external futures traders would be
able to carry out fundamental modeling and value-at-risk assessments in order to enter
and trade in our futures market, making it more liquid and efficient. The 4-week delay
would be adequate for short-term tight market conditions to normalise and mitigate
informational feedback for strategic bidding in our spot market.
4.5 EMA will continue to monitor all gencos’ bids closely and will not hesitate to take
swift enforcement actions against any genco exhibiting anti-competitive behaviours.
8 Acronyms: Alberta Electric System Operator (‘AESO’); California Independent System Operator
(‘CAISO’); Electric Reliability Council of Texas (‘ERCOT’); ISO New England (‘ISO-NE’); Midwest ISO (‘MISO’); New York ISO (‘NYISO’); Pennsylvania, Jersey, Maryland Power Pool (‘PJM’).
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5. IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE
5.1 EMC will implement the abovementioned decisions of EMA by end September
2014. The templates of the ASA reports, AGOP, AEOP, PGCS and aggregated energy
offer information to be made available by EMC to all data subscribers and spot market
participants are as shown in Appendix 2.
* * *
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APPENDIX 1
No. Respondent Feedback EMA’s Response
1(a) YTL
PowerSeraya
We suggest that EMA look into the provision of
indicative information on gas, transmission, load and
generation facilities outages for time periods beyond
that covered by the AGOP, AEOP and PGCS so as to cover
the time periods for which electricity futures apply. We
understand that such information so far forward is only
indicative and subject to further confirmation by the
information providers.
The coverage of the AGOP and AEOP will be extended to look-
ahead 3 years instead of 1 year currently. PSO will adopt the
same process and timeline to prepare and issue, by 15th
October of the current year, the final AGOP/AEOP for the next
year and a provisional AGOP/AEOP covering the following two
years. The provisional AGOP and AEOP will be based on
updates as provided by the relevant parties and hence only
indicative.
1(b) YTL
PowerSeraya
With respect to insider trading, would gencos be allowed
to buy electricity futures for the purpose of hedging of
their planned/unplanned generation capacity outages
before information on those planned/unplanned
generation capacity outages is disseminated to the
market?
Prior knowledge of upstream fuel disruptions before
such information is disseminated to the market would
allow holders of such prior knowledge to buy electricity
futures before such information is disseminated,
knowing that the electricity futures prices would be
higher after such information is disseminated to the
market, thereby affording them the opportunity to then
sell the electricity futures and close out the position at a
profit. What measures will be used to detect and prevent
such cases of insider trading, including by proxies?
The Monetary Authority of Singapore (‘MAS’) is the regulator
in respect of the trading of financial derivative products
including electricity futures. MAS has affirmed that there is no
need to prohibit or regulate insider trading of all commodity-
based derivative products including electricity futures, in line
with international practices by regulators in major overseas
futures markets.
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2(a) Senoko Energy The proposal increases the disclosure of NEMS
information to non-NEMS participants to help “eliminate
the significant information asymmetry that currently
exists and may provide pro-competitive benefits to
futures market participants”. The Consultation Paper
does not explicitly consider or address the information
advantages that non-NEMS participants may hold over
others that participate in the futures market. For
example, gas-market players (both upstream and
midstream) hold price sensitive information that could
be traded-on prior to it being known by NEMS
participants. Senoko believes that it would be inherently
unbalanced for NEMS information to have a high degree
of transparency while other important information is not
required to be disclosed. This issue raises the question
of how “insider-trading” would be regulated (if at all) in
the futures market. We request regulatory guidance on
this matter prior to the commencement of the electricity
futures market.
The Monetary Authority of Singapore (‘MAS’) is the regulator
in respect of the trading of financial derivative products
including electricity futures. MAS has affirmed that there is no
need to prohibit or regulate insider trading of all commodity-
based derivative products including electricity futures, in line
with international practices by regulators in major overseas
futures markets.
2(b) Senoko Energy At a more technical level, the proposal entails gencos
providing provisional AGOPs so that the AGOP horizon
covers 3-years in total. While Senoko can provide
provisional plans for the 2 additional “out-years” we will
not be able to do so with the same level of accuracy as
the “next year” AGOP (due to difficulties in estimating
equivalent operating hours and scheduling contractors).
Therefore, we request that gencos be able to amend
their out-year plans without requiring prior PSO approval
(i.e., only notification is required).
Provisional AGOPs will be based on updates as provided by the
relevant parties and hence only indicative.
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2(c) Senoko Energy One of the arguments supporting the disclosure of offer
information is that it would enable interested parties to
conduct fundamental market modelling. Typically,
modelling relies on use of historic data sets, so we
suggest that EMA/EMC release a number of years of
historic offer data at the commencement of the trial
period. More fundamentally, to enable non-NEMS
participants to deeply understand the electricity price
formation process Senoko believes that it will be
necessary to make additional information available
regarding electricity and gas network capacities and
dynamics (with the necessary “anonymisations” for
physical security requirements).
The aggregated energy offer information to be made available
by EMC will cover 16 consecutive months of historical data.
3(a) SembCorp
Cogen
EMA has stated in Paragraph 1 of the Consultation Paper
that the objectives of the review on disclosure of market
information is to facilitate the efficient trading and risk
management for market participants :
(i) in the Singapore wholesale electricity market (i.e.
spot market); and
(ii) the electricity futures market.
The objective of the current review is not intended to
release additional information to the public.
The current disclosure of the ASA reports, AGOP, AEOP
and PGCS to only spot market participants is align with
the EMA’s first objective stated above.
The objective of EMA’s review is to enhance data transparency
which will in turn facilitate efficient trading and risk
management for participants in our electricity spot and futures
market. There is no commercial sensitivity or adverse impact
on market competition or national security if access to the ASA
reports, AGOP, AEOP and PGCS is extended to any person.
There is no reason to delay access by the person until he
becomes a spot or futures market participant as suggested by
Sembcorp Cogen. On the contrary, the person would require
such information to decide whether to participate in our spot
or futures market.
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We do not agree with the disclosure of the ASA reports,
AGOP, AEOP and PGCS to all data subscribers. To meet
the second objective of the EMA as stated in Paragraph 1
of the paper, the disclosure of the ASA reports, AGOP,
AEOP and shall be limited to only data subscribers who
are market participants in the Electricity Futures Market.
A market participant in the Electricity Futures Market
can be identified by demonstrating that it has a “live”
Trading Account with any of the Clearing Members of
SGX and with Initial Margin provided for the purpose of
trading the Electricity Futures product.
3(b) SembCorp
Cogen
There is insufficient evidence (i.e. it appears that we are
only relying on a feedback from SGX stated in Paragraph
12) in the consultation paper to show that the availability
of energy offer information will attract more players to
enter and create liquidity in the futures market.
In Paragraph 13, EMA has clearly stated that the
quantification of incremental benefits and costs of
releasing more data is still controversial in many
matured electricity market.
In the absence of any concrete evidence that availability
of energy offer will definitely create liquidity in the
futures market and no cost and benefit analysis to
support the release of more information, we propose to
remain status quo.
The aggregated energy offer information that EMC will make
available with a time-lag will enable external futures traders to
carry out fundamental modeling and value-at-risk assessments
in order to enter and trade in our futures market, making it
more liquid and efficient. The 4-week delay would be
adequate for short-term tight market conditions to normalise
and mitigate informational feedback for strategic bidding in
our spot market.
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With the non-availability of such information to
everyone in the wholesale and futures market, we
believe that level playing field is preserved.
3(c) SembCorp
Cogen
We would appreciate if the EMA could provide an
illustration of what will be provided. It is not clear from
Paragraph 16 how the information will be presented.
Refer to Appendix 2 for the template of the aggregated energy
offer information to be made available by EMC.
4(a) Keppel
Merlimau
Cogen
The consultation paper proposed that the availability of
information to enhance data transparency will facilitate
efficient trading and risk management for market
participants in the Singapore electricity wholesale and
futures market. Keppel seeks to clarify how an efficient
trading market will benefit the industry as a whole.
Firstly, depending on the characteristic of the derivative
product, the traded market may not provide the best risk
management tool for the market participant.
Furthermore, unlike the bigger and more mature
markets in the United States or Australia, the Singapore
market has limited market participants and consists of
mainly of gas fired power plants. The lack of participants
and alternatives makes the Singapore market susceptible
to the exercise of market power by bigger or more
privilege players.
Secondly, an efficient trading market does not necessary
benefit Singapore market participants, given the physical
constraint of the electricity network and limited
infrastructure interconnectivity of the gas network.
An electricity futures market will provide more options for
spot market participants and contestable consumers to
manage pool price risk. This would enhance competition in
both wholesale and retail electricity markets, especially if
independent electricity retailers can secure hedges in the
futures market to compete against incumbent retailers with
affiliated generation assets. The issues highlighted by Keppel
such as market power and physical network constraints, if they
exist, will be addressed specifically e.g. by increasing the
vesting contract level if there is market power concerns, and
building new network capacity to alleviate transmission
constraints. Such issues are not relevant to the introduction of
the electricity futures market to bring forth the above
mentioned benefits.
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Instead, it may give rise to speculation and market
volatility, caused by speculators who exploit the
inefficiency of the physical network. Hence, it is in the
industry’s interest to resolve the physical limitations of
the market before attempting to pursue trading
efficiency.
Lastly, it is in Keppel’s opinion that efficient trading
cannot occur given the constraints in the Singapore
electricity grid which enable certain market participants
to be entrenched in more favorable position to response
to price signal as compared those constrained by their
electricity dispatch.
The proposal to make available information to all data
subscribers is under the assumption that greater
information transparency would attract more players
hence creating liquidity in the electricity market. We
seek the EMA to provide further justification that the
provision of such information would indeed attract more
players to enter and create the necessarily liquidity,
bearing in mind that physical infrastructure inefficiency
will restrict the effectiveness of the trading market as a
risk management tool.
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4(b) Keppel
Merlimau
Cogen
Keppel disagrees with the disclosure of the same market
information, which is currently being provided to spot
market participants or Gencos only, to any data
subscriber. Keppel is concerned that the release of the
sensitive information such as system availability and gas
availability to the public may compromise system
security and have a negative effect on the market.
Release of commercially sensitive information i.e.
upstream seller’s gas curtailment information, would
subject the affected buyers to pay higher prices for
alternatives because the seller is aware of the buyer’s
shortage and will exploit this vulnerability.
This exploitation is exacerbated by the lack of gas
infrastructure which restricts the number of viable
alternative available to the affected party. The lack of
interconnection of the gas network isolates gas buyers
from potential gas seller who are located in separate
networks. The lack of interconnection in the Singapore
gas network creates an unequal access among the gas
buyers. Buyers with less access are subjected to greater
exploitation by sellers as compared to buyers with
greater accessibility. Unless there is an efficient
infrastructure to support physical trade enabling gas-on-
gas competition, critical information such as shortage of
gas will be always remain commercially-sensitive to all
gas buyers and sellers. Release of commercially sensitive
information would cause duress to affected parties, who
are not able to mitigate it through physical mean and
EMA does not think there is commercial sensitivity or adverse
impact on market competition or national security to publish
the ASA reports, AGOP, AEOP and PGCS.
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cause more harm to the market.
Keppel would like EMA to share with us its assessment
that there would be no commercial sensitivity, adverse
impact on market or national security if the suggested
information is extended to any data subscriber. Keppel
wishes to reiterate the confidentiality and commercially
sensitive nature of the information on individual
upstream gas seller’s curtailment, which EMA had
committed to keep confidential in the PGSC’s request.
Keppel would like to point out that the provision of the
upstream gas seller’s curtailment information for the
purpose of PGSC was intended for updating Gencos on
the overall gas supply situation so that they can step-up
their operational response. The respective gas importers
should be consulted and consent be given before such
information be utilizes for other purposes other than the
original intent.
4(c) Keppel
Merlimau
Cogen
Keppel does not agree with the publishing of aggregate
energy offer information.
We would like to point out that given the relative small
market and limited participants in the Singapore market,
aggregation of data does not necessary protect or ensure
confidentiality of the individual commercially sensitive
information. Keppel would like to point out that energy
offer information specific to each generating unit is the
operational intellectual property of the respective
The energy offer information to be made available by EMC is
aggregated i.e. it will not divulge the offers of individual
generating units. Furthermore, delaying the release by 4 weeks
would be adequate for short-term tight market conditions to
normalise and mitigate informational feedback for strategic
bidding in our spot market.
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Gencos, and should remain undisclosed to the other
participants.
The proposed 4-week time-lag data, though delayed, can
nevertheless be interpreted to gather the bidding
strategy of the individual players. Keppel would like to
seek greater clarity on the format of the aggregated
energy offer information before further commenting the
proposal.
Likewise to the point of lack of participants and
alternatives, Keppel is concerned that the release of
bidding information may also encourage the exercise of
market power in both the electricity spot market and the
futures market. Unless there are clearly defined rules on
anti-competitive behaviour, it is difficult for EMA to
ascertain whether certain bidding behaviour is anti-
competitive or due to operational needs.
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APPENDIX 2
Monthly ASA Report
Prepared on [date] at [time] 12 MONTHS ADEQUACY AND SECURITY ASSESSMENT REPORT
Page [no.] of 12
DATE
DEMAND FORECAST (MW) AVAILABLE
CAPACITY
(MW)
BASED ON FORECAST AVAILABLE CAPACITY OVERHAUL
CAPACITY
(MW) SYSTEM NORTHEAST NORTHWEST SOUTHEAST SOUTHWEST
PRIMARY
RESERVE
(MW)
SECONDARY
RESERVE
(MW)
CONTINGENCY
RESERVE
(MW)
REGULATION
(MW)
Month M+1 to M+12
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Daily ASA Report
Prepared on [date] at [time] 14 DAYS ADEQUACY AND SECURITY ASSESSMENT REPORT
Page [no.] of 14
DATE PERIOD
DEMAND FORECAST (MW) AVAILABLE
CAPACITY
(MW)
BASED ON FORECAST AVAILABLE CAPACITY OVERHAUL
CAPACITY
(MW) SYSTEM NORTHEAST NORTHWEST SOUTHEAST SOUTHWEST
PRIMARY
RESERVE
(MW)
SECONDARY
RESERVE
(MW)
CONTINGENCY
RESERVE
(MW)
REGULATION
(MW)
Day D+1 to D+14
TOTAL DAILY ENERGY FORECAST: [ ] MWh
12 | P a g e
AGOP
[APPROVED / PROVISIONAL] ANNUAL OVERHAUL PROGRAM OF GENERATING UNITS FOR YEAR [Y / Y+1 / Y+2 / Y+3]
YEAR Y
GENERATING UNIT JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC GENERATING COMPANY 1
UNIT 1A
UNIT 1B
UNIT 1C
UNIT 1D
UNIT 1E
UNIT 1F
GENERATING COMPANY 2
UNIT 2A
UNIT 2B
UNIT 2C
UNIT 2D
P..
13 | P a g e
AEOP
[FINAL / PROVISIONAL] ANNUAL EQUIPMENT OUTAGE PLAN FOR YEAR [Y / Y+1 / Y+2 / Y+3]
400KV CIRCUITS
S/No CIRCUITS OUTAGE PERIOD
COMPANY REMARKS FROM END
1 2 P
230KV CIRCUITS
S/No CIRCUITS OUTAGE PERIOD
COMPANY REMARKS FROM END
1
2
P
66KV CIRCUITS
S/No CIRCUITS OUTAGE PERIOD
COMPANY REMARKS FROM END
1
2
P
14 | P a g e
400/230KV TRANSFORMER & 400KV SHUNT REACTORS
S/No TF & SR OUTAGE PERIOD
COMPANY REMARKS FROM END
1 P
230/66KV TRANSFORMER & 230KV SHUNT REACTORS
S/No TF & SR OUTAGE PERIOD
COMPANY REMARKS FROM END
1
2
P
66/22KV TRANSFORMER
S/No TF & SR OUTAGE PERIOD
COMPANY REMARKS FROM END
1 P
Page 2 of 9
15 | P a g e
400KV SWITCHGEAR
S/No TF & SR OUTAGE PERIOD
COMPANY REMARKS FROM END
1 P
230KV SWITCHGEAR
S/No TF & SR OUTAGE PERIOD
COMPANY REMARKS FROM END
1 P
66KV SWITCHGEAR
S/No TF & SR OUTAGE PERIOD
COMPANY REMARKS FROM END
1
2
P
16 | P a g e
PGCS
PROJECTED GAS CURTAILMENT SCHEDULE (1 JAN YYYY – 31 DEC YYYY) Updated on: dd/mm/yyyy hh:mm hrs
From To Total Amount of Upstream Gas Curtailment (i.e. Total Reduction in
Supply) [date] [time] [date] [time] [0-5% / 6-10% / 11-15% / P.]
P
While PSO/EMA has made every reasonable effort to reflect the most current and accurate information in the Projected Gas Curtailment Schedule at the time of publication, no guarantees
for the currency or accuracy of information are made. It should be noted that system conditions are dynamic and the information may change with little or no notice after the time of
publication. PSO/EMA shall not be liable for any claims or losses suffered as a result of the use of or reliance on the information given in the Projected Gas Curtailment Schedule.
17 | P a g e
ENERGY OFFER STACK
TOTAL ENERGY OFFER CAPACITY FOR [Date D]
Date Period Lowest to Highest
Offer Price ($/MWh)
Total Offer Capacity At Specified Offer Price (MW)
D 1 D 1 D P D 1 D 1 D P D 2 D 2 D 2 D P D P D P D P D P D P D P D P D P D P D P D P D P D 48 D P D P
