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Showing posts with label Labor Law Case Digest. Show all postsWednesday, October 10, 2012

Abella vs. NLRC Posted by she lamsen

G.R. No. 71813July 20, 1987

FACTS: Ricardo Dionele, Sr. (private respondent) has been a regular farm worker since 1949 in Hacienda Danao-Ramona located in Ponteverde, Negros Occidential. Said farm land was leased to Rosalina Abella (petitioner) for a period of ten (10) years, renewable for another ten years.Upon the expiration of her leasehold rights, petitioner dismissed Ricardo and another co-employee. Private respondents filed a complaint against the petitioner at the Ministry of Labor and Employment for overtime pay, illegal dismissal and reinstatement with backwages. After presenting their respective evidence, the Labor Arbiter ruled that the dismissal is warranted by the cessation of business, but granted the private respondents’ separation pay.Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:Whether or not private respondents are entitled to separation pay.

HELD:The petition is devoid of merit.Article 284 of the Labor code provides that “the employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled

to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one month pay or to at least one month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closure or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one month pay or at least one-half month pay for every year of service whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six months shall be considered one whole year."The purpose of the said article is obvious: the protection of the workers whose employment is terminated because of the closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. Without said law, employees like private respondents in the case at bar will lose the benefits to which they are entitled for the number of years served. Although they were absorbed by the new management of the hacienda, in the absence of any showing that the latter has assumed the responsibilities of the former employer, they will be considered as new employees and the years of service behind them would amount to nothing. In any event, it is well-settled that in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations, the workingman’s welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration.

The instant petition is hereby dismissed and the decision of the Labor Arbiter and the Resolutionof the Ministry of Labor and Employment are hereby affirmed.No comments:Email ThisBlogThis!Share to TwitterShare to FacebookShare to Pinterest

Friday, October 5, 2012

Mercidar Fishing Corporation vs. NLRC & Fermin Agao, Jr. Posted by she lamsen

G.R. No. 1112574October 8, 1998

FACTS:This case originated from a complaint filed on September 20, 1990 by private respondent FerminAgao, Jr. against petitioner for illegal dismissal, violation of P.D. No. 851, and non-payment of five days service incentive leave for 1990. Private respondent had been employed as a "bodegero" or ship's quartermaster on February 12, 1988. He complained that he had been constructively dismissed by petitioner when the latter refused him assignments aboard its boats after he had reported to work on May 28, 1990. Private respondent alleged that he had been sick and thus allowed to go on leave without pay for one month from April 28, 1990 but that when he reported to work at the end of such period with a health clearance, he was told to come back another time as he could not be reinstated immediately. Thereafter,

petitioner refused to give him work. For this reason, private respondent asked for a certificate of employment from petitioner on September 6, 1990. However, when he came back for the certificate on September 10, petitioner refused to issue the certificate unless he submitted his resignation. Since private respondent refused to submit such letter unless he was given separation pay, petitioner prevented him from entering the premises. Petitioner, on the other hand, alleged that it was private respondent who actually abandoned his work.

ISSUE:Whether or not the fishing crew members are considered field personnel as classified in Art. 82 of the Labor Code.

HELD:Art. 82 of the Labor Code provides: “The provisions of this title [Working Conditions and Rest Periods] shall apply to employees in all establishments and undertakings whether for profit or not, but not to government employees, field personnel, members of the family of the employer who are dependent on him for support, domestic helpers, persons in the personal service of another, and workers who are paid by results as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate regulations.” "Field personnel" shall refer to non-agricultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty. In contrast, in the case at bar, during the entire course of their fishing voyage, fishermen employed by petitioner have no choice but to remain on board its vessel. Although they perform non-agricultural work away from petitioner's business offices, the fact remains that throughout the duration of their work they are under the effective control and supervision of petitioner through the vessel's patron or master.3 comments:Email ThisBlogThis!Share to TwitterShare to FacebookShare to Pinterest

Villar vs. Inciong Posted by she lamsen

L-50283-84April 20, 1983

FACTS: AEU under FUR attempted to have a certification election but due to the opposition of AEU-PAFLU, the petition was denied by the Med-Arbiter.

AEU-PAFLU then called a special meeting among members and it was there decided that an investigation of certain people would be held pursuant to the constitution and by-laws of the Federation, of all of the petitioners and one Felipe Manlapao, for

"continuously maligning, libelling and slandering not only the incumbent officers but even the union itself and the federation;" spreading 'false propaganda' that the union officers were 'merely appointees of the management', and for causing divisiveness in the union.

A Trial Committee was then formed to investigate the local union's charges against the petitioners for acts of disloyalty. AEU-PAFLU and the Company concluded a new CBA which, besides granting additional benefits to the workers, also reincorporated the same provisions of the existing CBA, including the union security clause reading, to wit:

All members of the UNION as of the signing of this Agreement shall remain members thereof in good standing. Therefore, any members who shall resign, be expelled, or shall in any manner cease to be a member of the UNION, shall be dismissed from his employment upon written request of the UNION to the Company.

The petitioners were summoned to appear before the PAFLU Trial Committee for the aforestated investigation of the charges filed against them but they did not attend and instead requested for a "Bill of Particulars" of the charges which had been formalized by the AEU-PAFLU officers; they contend that their actions were merely exercise of the right to freedom of association.

Not recognizing PAFLU's jurisdiction over their case, petitioners again refused to participate in the investigation rescheduled and conducted. Instead, they merely appeared to file their Answer to the charges and moved for a dismissal.

Based on the findings and recommendations of the PAFLU trial committee, the PAFLU President found the petitioners guilty of the charges against them and it was requested that they be terminated in conformity with the security clause in the CBA. Meanwhile, they were placed under preventive suspension and denied access to the workplace.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Minister acted with grave abuse of discretion when he affirmed the decision of the RO4-Officer-in-Charge allowing the preventive suspension and subsequent dismissal of petitioners by reason of the exercise of their right to freedom of association.

HELD: It is true that disaffiliation from a labor union is not open to legal objection. It is implicit in the freedom of association ordained by the Constitution. However, a closed shop is a valid form of union security, and such provision in a CBA is not a restriction of the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution.

Here, the Company and the AEU-PAFLU entered into a CBA with a union security clause and the stipulation for closed-shop is clear and unequivocal and it leaves no room for doubt that the employer is bound, under the collective bargaining agreement, to dismiss the employees, herein petitioners, for non-union membership.

Petitioners became non-union members upon their expulsion from the general membership of the AEU-PAFLU pursuant to the Decision of the PAFLU national president.

PAFLU had the authority to investigate petitioners on the charges filed by their co-employees in the local union and after finding them guilty as charged, to expel them from the roll of membership under the constitution of the PAFLU to which the local union was affiliated.

According to the OIC: dtripped of non-essentials, the basic and fundamental issue in this case tapers down to the determination of WHETHER OR NOT PAFLU HAD THE AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE OPPOSITORS AND, THEREAFTER, EXPEL THEM FROM THE ROLL OF MEMBERSHIP OF THE AMIGOEMPLOYEES UNION-PAFLU.

Recognized and salutary is the principle that when a labor union affiliates with a mother union, it becomes bound by the laws and regulations of the parent organization.

When a labor union affiliates with a parent organization or mother union, or accepts a charter from a superior body, it becomes subject to the laws of the superior body under whose authority the local union functions. The constitution, by-laws and rules of the parent body, together with the charter it issues pursuant thereto to the subordinate union, constitute an enforceable contract between the parent body and the subordinate union, and between the members of the subordinate union inter se.

'Due process' simply means that the parties were given the opportunity to be heard. In the instant case, ample and unmistakable evidence exists to show that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity to present their evidence, but they themselves disdained or spurned the said opportunity given to them.

Inherent in every labor union, or any organization, is the right of self-preservation. When members of a labor union, therefore, sow the seeds of dissension and strife within the union; when they seek the disintegration and destruction of the very union to which they belong, they thereby forfeit their rights to remain as members of the union which they seek to destroy.

We, therefore, hold and rule that petitioners, although entitled to disaffiliate from their union and form a new organization of their own, must, however, suffer the

consequences of their separation from the union under the security clause of the CBA.

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General Milling Corporation vs. Torres Posted by she lamsen

196 SCRA 215 [G.R No. 9366, April 22, 1991]

FACTS:Earl Timothy Cone is a US citizen, who was hired by General Milling as a sports consultant and assistant coach. He possessed an alien employment permit which was changed to pre-arranged employee by the Board of Special Inquiry of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. GMC requested that Cone’s employment permit be changed to a full-fledged coach, which was contested by The Basketball Coaches Association of the Philippines. Alleging that GMC failed to show that there is no competent person in the Philippines to do the coaching job. Secretary of Labor cancelled Cone’s employment permit.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Secretary of Labor act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking Cone’s Alien Employment Permit?

HELD:The Secretary of Labor did not act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking Cone’s Alien Employment Permit. GMC’s claim that hiring of a foreign coach is an employer’s prerogative has no legal basis. Under Section 40 of the Labor Code, an employer seeking employment of an alien must first obtain an employment permit from the Department of labor.GMC’s right to choose whom to employ is limited by the statutory requirement of an employment permit. The Labor Code empowers the Labor Secretary to determine as to the availability of the services of a “person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the time of the application to perform the services for which an alien is desired.” DOLE is the agency vested with jurisdiction to determine the question of availability of local workers.

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Escario vs. NLRC Posted by she lamsen

G.R. No. 124055June 8, 2000

FACTS:Private respondents California Marketing Co., Inc. (CMC) is a domestic corporation principally engaged in themanufacturing of food products and distribution of such products to wholesalers and retailers. Privaterespondent Donna Louis Advertising and Marketing Associates, Inc. is a duly registered promotionalfirm.Petitioners alleged that they were employed by CMC as merchandisers. They alleged that the hiring,control and supervision of workers and the payment of the salaries were all covered by CMC throughits agent D.L Admark in order CMC to avoid its liability under the law. Petitioners filed a case againstCMC before the labor arbiter for regularization of their employment status.During the pendency of the case, D.L Admark terminated the services of the petitioners. Thecomplaint was amended to include alleged dismissal. CMC filed a motion to implead as partydefendantD.L Admark, the latter filed a motion to intervene. Both motions were granted. CMC deniedbeing petitioners employer while D.L Admark asserted it is the employer of the petitioners.The labor arbiter found petitioners as employees of CMC as they were engaged in activities that arenecessary and desirable in the usual business/trade of CMC. On appeal, the NLRC set aside the laborarbiters decision. But ordered the reinstatement of the petitioners in D.L Admark petitioners filed amotion for consideration before the NLRC which was denied for lack of merit. Hence the petition.

ISSUE:Whether or not D.L Admark is a labor-only contractor or as independent contractor.

HELD:The Supreme Court denied the petition.There is labor-only contracting when the contractor or subcontractor merely recruits, supplies orplaces workers to perform a job, work or service for a principal. In labor only contracting, the followingelements are present:

1. the person supplying workers to an employer does not have substantial capital or investment in theform of tools, equipment, machineries, wok premise, among other tools

2. the workers recruited and placed by such person performing activities which are directly related to theprincipal business of the employer.In contract, there is permissible job contracting when a principal agrees to put out or farm out with acontractor or a subcontractor the performance/completion of a specific job, work or services within adefinite or predetermined period, regardless of whether such job/services is to be performed orcompleted within or outside the premises of the principal. In this arrangement, the followingconditions must concur.

1. The contractor carries on a distinct and independent business and undertakes the contract work on hisaccount under the responsibility according to his own manual and methods, free from the control anddirection of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of his employerwork except as to the results thereof; and

2. The contractor has substantial capital / investment which are necessary in the conduct of his business.The court reiterated that it is not enough to show substantial capitalization on investment. In additionthe following factors need be consideredwhether the contractor is carrying on an independent businessthe nature and extent of the workthe skill requiredthe term and duration of the relationshipthe right to assign the performance of specified pieces of workthe control and supervision of the workersthe power of the employer with respect to the hiring, firing and payment of workers of the contractorthe control of the premises the duty to supply premises, tools, appliances, materials and labormode, manner and terms of payment. Based on the foregoing criteria, the court found that D.L Admark is a legitimate independentcontractor. Applying the four-fold test, D.L Admark was found to be the employer of the petitioners.The Supreme Court affirmed the NLRC’s ruling.No comments:Email ThisBlogThis!Share to TwitterShare to FacebookShare to Pinterest

Sosito vs. Aguinaldo Development Corp. Posted by she lamsen

G.R. No. L-48926December 14, 1987

FACTS:Petitioner Manuel Sosito was employed in 1964 by the private respondent, a logging company, and was in charge of logging importation, with a monthly salary of P675.00, 1 when he went on indefinite leave with the consent of the company on January 16, 1976. On July 20, 1976, the private respondent, through its president, announced a retrenchment program and offered separation pay to employees in the active service as of June 30, 1976, who would tender their resignations not later than July 31, 1976. The petitioner decided to accept this offer and so submitted his resignation on July 29, 1976, "to avail himself of the gratuity benefits" promised. However, his resignation was not acted upon and he was never given the separation pay he expected. The petitioner complained to the Department of Labor,where he was sustained by the labor arbiter. The company was ordered to pay Sosito the sum of P 4,387.50, representing his salary for six and a half months. On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission, this decision was reversed and it was held that the petitioner was not covered by the retrenchment program.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is covered by the retrenchment program and thus entitled to separation benefits.

HELD:It is clear from the memorandum that the offer of separation pay was extended only to those who were in the active service of the company as of June 30, 1976. It is equally clear that the petitioner was not eligible for the promised gratuity as he was not actually working with the company as of the said date. Being on indefinite leave, he was not in the active service of the private respondent although, if one were to be technical, he was still in its employ. Even so, during the period of indefinite leave, he was not entitled to receive any salary or to enjoy any other benefits available to those in the active service. We note that under the law then in force the private respondent could have validly reduced its work force because of its financial reverses without the obligation to grant separation pay. This was permitted under the original Article 272(a), of the Labor Code, which was in force at the time. To its credit, however, the company voluntarily offered gratuities to those who would agree to be phased out pursuant to the terms and conditions of its retrenchment program, in recognition of their loyalty and to tide them over their own financial difficulties. The Court feels that such compassionate measure deserves commendation and support but at the same time rules that it should be available only to those who are qualified therefore. We hold that the petitioner is not one of them. While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also has its own rights which, as such, are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Out of its concern for those with less privileges in life, this Court has inclined more often than not toward the worker and upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer. Such favoritism, however, has not blinded us to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine.

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Wednesday, October 3, 2012

Tanduay Distillery Labor Union vs NLRC Posted by she lamsen

G.R. No. 75037April 30, 1987

FACTS: Private respondents were all employees of Tanduay Distillery, Inc., (TDI) and members of the Tanduay Distillery Labor Union (TDLU), a

duly organized and registered labor organization and the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of the petitioner company.

A Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), was executed between TDI and TDLU. The CBA was duly ratified by a majority of the workers in TDI including herein private respondents and contained a union security clause which provides that “all workers who are or may during the effectivity of the CBA, become members of the Union in accordance with its Constitution and By-Laws shall, as a condition of their continued employment, maintain membership in good standing in the Union for the duration of the agreement.”

While the CBA was in effect and within the contract bar period the private respondents joined another union, the Kaisahan Ng Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMPIL) and organized its local chapter in TDI. KAMPIL filed a petition for certification election to determine union representation in TDI, which development compelled TDI to file a grievance with TDLU.TDLU created a committee to investigate its erring members in accordance with its by-laws which are not disputed by the private respondents. Thereafter, TDLU, through the Investigating Committee and approved by TDLU's Board of Directors, expelled the private respondents from TDLU for disloyalty to the Union. By letter, TDLU notified TDI that private respondents had been expelled from TDLU and demanded that TDI terminate the employment of private, respondents because they had lost their membership with TDLU.The private respondents were later on terminated. In their petition, private respondents contend that their act of organizing a local chapter of KAMPIL and eventual filing of a petition for certification election was pursuant to their constitutional right to self-organization.

ISSUES: a) whether or not TDI was justified in terminating private respondents' employment in the company on the basis of TDLU's demand for the enforcement of the Union Security Clause of the CBA between TDI and TDLU; and b) whether or not TDI is guilty of unfair labor practice in complying with TDLU's demand for the dismissal of private respondents.

HELD: The dismissal of an employee pursuant to a demand of the majority union in accordance with a union security agreement following the

loss of seniority rights is valid and privileged and does not constitute an unfair labor practice.

Article 249 (e) of the Labor Code as amended specifically recognizes the closed shop arrangement as a form of union security. The closed shop, the union shop, the maintenance of membership shop, the preferential shop, the maintenance of treasury shop, and check-off provisions are valid forms of union security and strength. They do not constitute unfair labor practice nor are they violations of the freedom of association clause of the Constitution. There is no showing in these petitions of any arbitrariness or a violation of the safeguards enunciated in the decisions of this Court interpreting union security arrangements brought to us for review.93 comments:Email ThisBlogThis!Share to TwitterShare to FacebookShare to Pinterest

Wednesday, September 26, 2012

Jose Rizal College vs. NLRC Posted by she lamsen

FACTS:The National Alliance of Teachers sued Jose Rizal College for alleged nonpayment of unworked holidays from 1975 to 1977. The members of the Alliance concerned are faculty members who are paid on the basis of student contract hour.

ISSUE:Whether or not the school faculty are entitled to unworked holiday pay.

HELD:As far as unworked regular holidays are concerned, the teachers are not entitled to holiday pay. Regular holidays specified as such by law are known to both school and faculty members as no class days;” certainly the latter do not expect payment for said unworked days, and this was clearly in their minds when they entered into the teaching contracts.On the other hand, the teachers are entitled to be paid for unworked special holidays. Otherwise stated, the faculty member, although forced to take a rest, does not earn what he should earn on that day. Be it noted that when a special public holiday is declared, the faculty member paid by the hour is deprived of expected income, and it does not matter that the school calendar is extended in view of the days or hours lost, for their income that could be earned from

other sources is lost during the extended days. Similarly, when classes are called off or shortened on account of typhoons, floods, rallies, and the like, these faculty members must likewise be paid, whether or not extensions are ordered.No comments:Email ThisBlogThis!Share to TwitterShare to FacebookShare to Pinterest

Jahara, et.al. vs. The Mindanao Lumber Company Posted by she lamsen

G.R. No. L-36830February 16, 1933

FACTS:This is an action commenced in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga by the plaintiffs for the recovery of compensation from the defendant company for the death of the workman, Moro Sapturani, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3482, otherwise as the "Workmen's Compensation Act."

The late Moro Kingan was engaged in the business of cutting timber within the defendant's concession, employing laborers for that purpose, among them Sapturani. Kingan paid his cutter's wages and delivered the timber and firewood to the defendant company which paid him the corresponding value thereof. On the morning of February 12, 1930, between 6 and 6.30 o'clock, Sapturani, who was about to go to the place where he was engaged in cutting timber, by means of the defendant's train operating in the place, was run over by the last car of the train as it was moving backwards, and died almost instantly as a result of injuries received on different parts of his body.

Mora Jahara, the divorced wife of the deceased, his daughters, Albaya and Mandasiang, and their respective husbands, Ladaya and Bachaja, are the plaintiffs and appellants in this case.

ISSUE:1.     The court a quo erred in holding that the accident causing the

death of Moro Sapturani was due to his negligence in trying to embark on the rear platform of the train of the defendant corporation at the Chinkang Sawmill, Naga-Naga, which was moving backwards at the time of the accident, and not holding that Moro Sapturani was overrun and killed by the train of the defendant

corporation thru the negligence and carelessness of the employees of the latter.

2.     The trial court erred in holding that the preponderance of the weight of evidence is in favor of the defendant and against that of the plaintiffs.

3.     The trial court erred in holding that in view of the negligence of Moro Sapturani, the defendant cannot be made liable for the payment of compensation to the plaintiffs under the Worksmen's Compensation Act No. 3428 as amended by Act No. 3812, and in not holding that even admitting the facts stated in the decision, the paupers- appellants are still entitled to their claim under the law.

HELD:The trial court declared that the deceased was notoriously negligent in connection with the accident, because the evidence shows that he tried to board the rear platform of the car as it was moving backwards; that he succeeded in getting a foothold but failing to obtain a hold of the car, he fell to the ground and was run over by the train.

The Court reviewed all the evidence presented and find that the conclusions reached by the trial court are supported by preponderance thereof. It noted that the plaintiffs' witnesses gave a different version of the accident. It also agree with the lower court that Sapturani acted with notorious negligence in attempting to board the train in the manner in which he did and, consequently, the action cannot be maintained in accordance with subdivision 3 of section 4 of Act No. 3428 which provides that no action for the recovery of compensation shall prosper when the accident upon which it is based is due to the notorious negligence of the workman.No comments:Email ThisBlogThis!Share to TwitterShare to FacebookShare to Pinterest

Ysmael Maritime Corporation vs. Avelino Posted by she lamsen

151 SCRA 333

FACTS;On December 22, 1971, Rolando Lim, a licensed second mate, died when the vessel he was on board ran a ground and sank near Sabtan, Batanes. The vessel was owned by petitioner Ysmael Maritime Corporation. The parents of the deceased claiming that the untimely death of their son was due to the negligence of the

petitioner sued the petitioner in the CFI for damages. By way of affirmative defense, petitioner claimed that the private respondents had already been compensated by the Workman’s Compensation Commission (WCC) for the same incident, for which reason they are now precluded from seeking other remedies against the same employer under the Civil Code.

ISSUE:  Whether the compensation remedy under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (WCA), and now under the Labor Code, for work-connected death or injuries sustained by an employee ,is exclusive of the other remedies under the Civil Code.

HELD:In the recent case of Floresca v. Philex Mining Company, the Court was confronted with three divergent opinions on the exclusivity rule.   One view is that the injured employee or his heirs, in case of death, may initiate an action to recover damages (not compensation under the Workman’s Compensation Act) with the regular courts on the basis of negligence of the employer pursuant to the Civil Code. Another view is that the remedy of an employee for work-connected injury or accident is exclusive in accordance with Section 5 of WCA. The third view is that the action is selective and the employee or his heirs have a choice of availing themselves of the benefits under the WCA or of suing in the regular courts under the Code for higher damages from the employer by reason of his negligence. But once the election has been exercised, the employee or his heirs are no longer free to opt for the other remedy. The Court rejected the doctrine of exclusivity of the rights and remedies granted by the WCA. As thus applied to the case at bar, respondent Lim spouses cannot be allowed to maintain their present action to recover additional damages against petitioner under the Civil Code. In open court, respondent admitted that they had previously filed a claim for death benefits with the WCC and had received the compensation payable to them under the WCA. It is therefore clear that the respondents had not only opted to recover under the Act but they had also been duly paid. At the very least, a sense of fair play would demand that if a person entitled to a choice of remedies made a first election and accepted the benefits thereof; he should no longer be allowed to exercise the second option. Having staked his fortunes on a particular remedy, he is precluded from pursuing the alternate course, at least until the prior claim is rejected by the Compensation Commission.No comments:Email ThisBlogThis!Share to TwitterShare to FacebookShare to Pinterest

Tuesday, September 25, 2012

Alano vs. Employee' Compensation Commission Posted by she lamsen

158 SCRA 669

FACTS:Dedicacion De Vera worked as principal of Salinap Community School in san Carlos City, Pangasinan. Her usual tour of duty was from 7:30 am to 5:30 pm. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00AM while she was waiting for a ride at Plaza Jaycee in San Carlos City on her way to school, she was bumped and ran over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which resulted to her instantaneous death. Her brother GenerosoAlano filed the instant claim for income benefit with the GSIS for and in behalf of the decedent’s children. The claim was denied by GSIS on the ground that the injury upon which compensation is being claimed is not an employment accident satisfying all the conditions prescribed by law. The ECC affirmed the denial by GSIS. It claimed that the deceased’s accident did not meet the conditions under the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation. First, the accident occurred at about 7:00 am or thirty minutes before the deceased’s working hours. Second, it happened not at her workplace but at the plaza where she usually waits for a ride to her work. Third, she was not then performing her official functions as school principal nor was she on a special errand for the school.

ISSUE:Whether or not the injury sustained by the deceased Dedicacion de Vera resulting in her death is compensable under the law as an employment accident.

HELD:YES. The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place at work, while he is going to and from his work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment. In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal about the school principal’s being at the place of the accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there.1 comment:

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Iloilo Doc & Engineering Co. V. Workmen’s Compensation CommissionPosted by she lamsen

27 SCRA 103

FACTS:Teodoro Pablo and Rodolfo Galopez, had just finished overtime work at 5:00 pm and was going home. At around 5:02 pm, while Pablo and Galopez were walking along the IDECO road, about20 meters from the IDECO main gate, Pablo was shot by Martin Cordero. The motive for the crime was and still unknown since Martin Cordero was himself killed before he could be tried for Pablo’s death.

ISSUES:1.     Whether or not Pablo’s death occurred in the course of

employment and arising out of the employment.2.     Whether the PROXIMITY RULE should apply in this case.3.     Whether the death of Pablo was an accident within the purview of

the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

HELD:1.     YES. Workmen’s compensation is granted if the injuries result

from an accident which arises out of and in the course of employment. Both the “arising” factor and the “course” factor must be present. If one factor is weak and the other is strong, the injury is compensable but not where both factors are weak. Ultimately, the question is whether the accident is work connected. The words “arising out of” refer to the origin or cause of the accident and are descriptive of its character, while the words “in the course” refer to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident takes place. The presumption that the injury arises out of and in the course of employment prevails where the injury occurs on the employer’s premises. While the IDECO does not own the private road, it cannot be denied that it was using the same as the principal means of ingress and egress. The private road leads directly to its main gate. Its right to use the road must then perforce proceed from either an easement of right of way or a lease. Its right therefore is either a legal one or a contractual one. In either case the IDECO should logically and properly be charged with security control of the road.

2.     YES. The general rule in workmen’s compensation law known as going and coming rule provides that in the absence of special circumstances, an employee injured in going to, or coming from his place of work is excluded from the benefits of workmen’s compensation acts. The following are the exceptions: a. Where the employee is proceeding to or from his work on the premises of his employer b. Where the employee is about to enter or about to leave the premises of his employer by way of exclusive or customary means of ingress and egress. Where the employee is charged while on his way to or from his place of employment or at his home or during his employment, with some duty or special errand connected with his employment. Where the employer, as an incident of the employment provides the means of transportation to and from the place of employment. The second exception is known as the “proximity rule.” The place where the employee was injured being immediately proximate to his place of work, the accident in question must be deemed to have occurred within the zone of his employment and therefore arose out of or in the course thereof.

3.     YES. An “assault” although resulting from a deliberate act of the slayer, is considered an “accident” within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Act since the word accident is intended to indicate that the act causing the injury shall be casual or unforeseen, an act for which the injured party is not legally responsible.3 comments:Email ThisBlogThis!Share to TwitterShare to FacebookShare to Pinterest

Mafinco Trading Corp. vs. Ople Posted by she lamsen

GR No. L-37790March 25, 1976

FACTS:Cosmos Aerated Water Factory, a firm based at Malabon, Rizal, appointed petitioner Mafinco as its sole distributor of Cosmos soft drinks in Manila. Rodrigo Repomanta and Mafinco executed a peddling contract whereby Repomanta agreed to buy and sell Cosmos soft drinks. Rey Moralde entered into a similar contract. Months later, Mafinco terminated the peddling contract with Repomanta and Moralde. Consequently, Repomanta and Moralde, through their union, filed a complaint with the NLRC, charging the general manager of Mafinco for illegally dismissing them.4.Mafinco

filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the NLRC had no jurisdiction because Repomanta and Moralde were not its employees but were independent contractors. It stressed that there was termination of the contract not a dismissal of an employee.

ISSUE:Whether or not there exist an employer-employee relationship between petitioner Mafinco and private respondents Repomanta and Moralde.

HELD:  The Supreme Court held that under the peddling contracts, Repomanta and Moralde were not employees of Mafinco but were independent contractors as found by the NLC and its fact finder and by the committee appointed by the Secretary of Labor to look into the status of Cosmos and Mafinco peddlers. A contract whereby one engages to purchase and sell soft drinks on trucks supplied by the manufacturer but providing that the other party (peddler) shall have the right to employ his own workers, shall post a bond to protect the manufacturer against losses, shall be responsible for damages caused to third persons, shall obtain the necessary licenses and permits and bear the expenses incurred in the sale of the soft drinks is not a contract of employment.No comments:Email ThisBlogThis!Share to TwitterShare to FacebookShare to Pinterest

Pan American World Airways System vs. Pan American Employees AssociationPosted by she lamsen

1 SCRA 527

FACTS:Petitioner herein claims that the one hour meal period should not be considered as overtime work, because the evidence showed that complainants could rest completely, and were not in any manner under the control of the company during that period. The court below found, on the contrary, that during the so-called meal period, the mechanics were required to stand by for emergency work; that if they happened not to be available when called, they were reprimanded by the lead man; that as in fact it happened on many occasions, the mechanics had been called from their meals or told to hurry up eating to perform work during this period.

ISSUE:Whether or not the 1 hour meal period of the mechanics is considered working time.

HELD: Yes. The Industrial Court’s order for permanent adoption of a straight 8-hour shift including the meal period was but a consequence of its finding that the meal hour was not one of complete rest but was actually a work hour, since for its duration, the laborers had to be on ready call.No comments:Email ThisBlogThis!Share to TwitterShare to FacebookShare to Pinterest

Monday, September 24, 2012

Progressive Worker's Union vs. Aguas Posted by she lamsen

G.R. No. L-59711-12May 29, 1987

FACTS:Petitioner Progressive Workers' Union is the local chapter of the Federation of Free Workers [FFW] in respondent company, Solid Mills, Inc. In the collective bargaining agreement [CBA] entered into by and between Solid Mills, Inc. and the FFW as the certified bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees, respondent company agreed to grant across-the-board wage increases to covered bargaining unit employees.

Respondent company implemented the CBA stipulation by giving the union members a retroactive pay for the first year wage increase, without further including wage increase into the basic wage rate of the rank-and-file employees. Contending that the wage increase for a particular period should be included in the basic wage rate, the individual petitioners, presented a grievance to respondent company demanding strict and faithful compliance with said CBA provision. Grievance meetings thereafter held between the representatives of the Union and the respondent company proved to be unavailing. Hence, the Union filed with the Conciliation Division, Bureau of Labor Relations, Ministry of Labor & Employment [MOLE], Manila, a notice of strike for unfair labor practice, violation of CBA, violation of SS law, job evaluation and failure to restate work week.

The union went on strike and on the same day, respondent company filed with the NLRC, MOLE, petitions praying in the main that the strike staged by the union be declared illegal and the participating officers and members thereof be declared to have lost their employment status. Respondent company likewise prayed for a preliminary injunction/restraining order commanding the union, its members, agents, representatives and sympathizers to lift their picket lines and allow free and unobstructed ingress to and egress from the company and to refrain from committing coercion, threats and other illegal acts.

The union filed a motion to dismiss the complaints on the ground that under B.P. 130, the labor arbiter has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaints or the nature of the actions.

ISSUES:WON the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition and complaint or the nature of action or suit filed by the petitioners.

HELD:The Labor Arbiter have jurisdiction over the case. Declaring a strike or lockout to be illegal requires the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial authority, which in this instance is located in the National Labor Relations Commission. Under Article 217 of the labor Code, as amended, Labor Arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction over, among other disputes, "all other claims arising from employer- employee relations," and the Commission has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters. This statement of jurisdiction is intended to cover all disputes between employers and employees arising from their relationship as such, including those involving the legality of concerted actions.No comments:Email ThisBlogThis!Share to TwitterShare to FacebookShare to Pinterest

Tuesday, September 18, 2012

Philippine Commercial International Bank vs. Anastacio D. Abad Posted by she lamsen

G.R. No. 158045February 28, 2005

FACTS: Anastacio D. Abad was the senior Assistant Manager (Sales Head) of petitioner Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCI Bank now Equitable PCI Bank)], when he was dismissed from his work. Abad received a Memorandum from petitioner Bank concerning the irregular clearing of PNB-Naval Check of Sixtu Chu, the Bank’s valued client. Abad submitted his Answer, categorically denying that he instructed his subordinates to validate the out-of-town checks of Sixtu Chu presented for deposit or encashment as local clearing checks. During the actual investigation conducted by petitioner Bank, several transactions violative of the Bank’s Policies and Rules and Regulations were uncovered by the Fact-Finding Committee. Consequently, the Fact-Finding Officer of petitioner Bank issued another Memorandum to Abad asking the latter to explain the newly discovered irregularities. Not satisfied with the explanations of Abad, petitioner Bank served another Memorandum, terminating his

employment effective immediately upon receipt of the same. Thus, Abad instituted a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal.

ISSUE: Whether or not awarding of separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) month’s pay for every year of service to respondent is gross, the same being contrary to law and jurisprudence.

HELD:The award of separation pay is required for dismissals due to causes specified under Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code, as well as for illegal dismissals in which reinstatement is no longer feasible. On the other hand, an employee dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code is not, as a rule, entitled to separation pay.

As an exception, allowing the grant of separation pay or some other financial assistance to an employee dismissed for just causes is based on equity. The Court has granted separation pay as a measure of social justice even when an employee has been validly dismissed, as long as the dismissal was not due to serious misconduct or reflective of personal integrity or morality.

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Royal Crowne International vs. NLRC Posted by she lamsen

G.R. No. 78085October 16, 1989

FACTS: Petitioner, a duly licensed private employment agency, recruited and deployed private respondent Virgilio for employment with ZAMEL as an architectural draftsman in Saudi Arabia. Service agreement was executed by private respondent and ZAMEL whereby the former was to receive per month a salary of US$500.00 plus US$100.00 as allowance for a period of one year commencing from the date of his arrival in Saudi Arabia. However, ZAMEL terminated the employment of private respondent on the ground that his performance was below par. For three successive days thereafter, he was detained at his quarters and was not allowed to report to work until his exit papers were ready. On February 16, 1984, he was made to board a plane bound for the Philippines. Private respondent then filed a complaint for illegal termination

against Petitioner Royal Crown Internationale and ZAMEL with the POEA. 

Petitioner contends that there is no provision in the Labor Code, or the omnibus rules implementing the same, which either provides for the "third-party liability" of an employment agency or recruiting entity for violations of an employment agreement performed abroad, or designates it as the agent of the foreign-based employer for purposes of enforcing against the latter claims arising out of anemployment agreement. Therefore, petitioner concludes, it cannot be held jointly and severally liable with ZAMEL for violations, if any, of private respondent's service agreement. 

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner as a private employment agencymay be held jointly and severally liable with the foreign-based employer for any claim which may arise in connection with the implementation of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and deployed abroad. 

HELD: Yes, Petitioner conveniently overlooks the fact that it had voluntarily assumed solidary liability under the various contractual undertakings it submitted to the Bureau of Employment Services. In applying for its license to operate a private employment agency for overseas recruitment and placement, petitioner was required to submit, among others, a document or verified undertaking whereby it assumed all responsibilities for the proper use of its license and the implementation of the contracts of employment with the workers it recruited and deployed for overseas employment. It was also required to file with the Bureau a formal appointment or agency contract executed by the foreign-based employer in its favor to recruit and hire personnel for the former, which contained a provisionempowering it to sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with the foreign principal for any of the violations of the recruitment agreement and the contracts of employment. Petitioner was required as well to post such cash and surety bonds as determined by the Secretary of Labor to guarantee compliance with prescribed recruitment procedures, rules and regulations, and terms and conditions of employment as appropriate. 

These contractual undertakings constitute the legal basis for holding petitioner, and other private employment or recruitment agencies, liable jointly and severally with its principal, the foreign-based employer, for all claims filed by recruited workers which may arise in

connection with the implementation of the service agreements or employment contracts. 1 comment:Email ThisBlogThis!Share to TwitterShare to FacebookShare to Pinterest

People vs. Jamilosa Posted by she lamsen

GR No. 169076 

January 23, 2007 

FACTS:

Sometime in the months of January to February, 1996, representing to have the capacity, authority or license to contract, enlist and deploy or transport workers for overseas employment, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally recruit, contract and promise to deploy, for a fee the herein complainants, namely, Imelda D. Bamba, Geraldine M. Lagman and Alma E. Singh, for work or employment in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. in Nursing Home and Care Center.

Prosecution presented three witnesses, namely Imelda Bamba, Geraldine Lagman and Alma Singh.

According to Bamba, she met the appellant on a bus. She was on her way to SM North Edsa where she was a company nurse. Appellant introduced himself as a recruiter of workers for employment abroad. Appellant told her he could help her get employed as nurse. Appellant gave his pager number and instructed her to contact him is she’s interested. Sometime in January 1996, appellant fetched her at her office, went to her house and gave him the necessary documents and handed to appellant the amount of US$300.00 and the latter showed her a photocopy of her supposed US visa. However, the appellant did not issue a receipt for the said money. Thereafter, appellant told her to resign from her work because she was booked with Northwest Airlines and to leave for USA on Feb, 1996. On the scheduled departure, appellant failed to show up. Instead, called and informed her that he failed to give the passport and US visa because she had to go to province because his wife died. Trying to contact him to the supposed residence and hotel where he temporarily resided, but to no avail.

Winess Lagman testified that she is a registered nurse. In January 1996, she went to SM North Edsa to visit her cousin Bamba. At that time Bamba informed her that she was going to meet to appellant. Bamba invited Lagman to go with her. The appellant convinced them of his ability to send them abroad. On their next meeting,

Lagman handed to the latter the necessary documents and an amount of US$300.00 and 2 bottles of black label without any receipt issued by the appellant. Four days after their meeting, a telephone company called her because her number was appearing in appellants cell phone documents. The caller is trying to locate him as he was a swindler. She became suspicious and told Bamba about the matter. One week before her scheduled flight, appellant told her he could not meet them because his mother passed away.

Lastly, Alma Singh, who is also a registered nurse, declared that she first met the appellant at SM North Edsa when Imelda Bamba introduced the latter to her. Appellant told her that he is an undercover agent of FBI and he could fix her US visa. On their next meeting, she gave all the pertinent documents. Thereafter, she gave P10,000 to the appellant covering half price of her plane ticket. They paged the appellant through his beeper to set up another appointment but the appellant avoided them as he had many things to do.

The accused Jamilosa testified on direct examination that he never told Bamba that he could get her a job in USA, the truth being that she wanted to leave SM as company nurse because she was having a problem thereat. Bamba called him several times, seeking advices from him. He started courting Bamba and went out dating until latter became his girlfriend. He met Lagman and Singh thru Bamba. As complainants seeking advice on how to apply for jobs abroad, lest he be charged as a recruiter, he made Bamba, Lagman and Singh sign separate certifications, all to effect that he never recruited them and no money was involved. Bamba filed an illegal recruitment case against him because they quarreled and separated.

RTC rendered judgment finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment in large scale.

ISSUE:

W/N the trial court erred in convicting accused appellant of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale

HELD: “Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

Illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority. Provided, That any such non- licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged.

To prove illegal recruitment in large scale, the prosecution is burdened to prove three (3) essential elements, to wit: (1) the person charged undertook a recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) accused committed the same against three or more persons individually or as a group. As gleaned from the collective testimonies of the complaining witnesses which the trial court and the appellate court found to be credible and deserving of full probative weight, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged. Indeed, the findings of the trial court, affirmed on appeal by the CA, are conclusive on this Court absent evidence that the tribunals ignored, misunderstood, or misapplied substantial fact or other circumstance.

The failure of the prosecution to adduce in evidence any receipt or document signed by appellant where he acknowledged to have received money and liquor does not free him from criminal liability. Even in the absence of money or other valuables given as consideration for the "services" of appellant, the latter is considered as being engaged in recruitment activities. It can be gleaned from the language of Article 13(b) of the Labor Code that the act of recruitment may be for profit or not. It is sufficient that the accused promises or offers for a fee employment to warrant conviction for illegal recruitment.

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