Rime of the Ancient Epistemologist

7/28/2019 Rime of the Ancient Epistemologist

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Rime of the Ancient Epistemologist

By:

Stephen Casey

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for:

TCDH 524: Philosophy of Religion

On-Campus

Professor: Mr. Skip Horton-Parker

Regent University

School of DivinitySpring 2005

2005 by Stephen Casey


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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

DISSECTION BY ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

INDECISIVELY OPTIMISTIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

IDOLATRY OF ONTOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

ERROR CARRIED FORWARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

"APOLLO 13, WE HAVE A SOLUTION" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

APPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22

2005 by Stephen Casey 2


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Rime of the Ancient Epistemologist

"God save thee, ancient Mariner!

From the fiends, that plague thee thus!

Why look'st thou so?"With my cross-bow

I shot the Albatross.Samuel Taylor Colridge,Rime of the Ancient Mariner1

Introduction

Hermeneutics is concerned with the "effectiveness of linguistic expression," the way

of properly interpreting communicative signs. 2 With such a broad definition, many human

fields of scholarship claim to own at least a "slice" of the hermeneutical "pie," such as

writing (religious, legal, and literary), verbal discourse, natural signs (interpretatio naturae),

language, and philosophy.3 The role of interpretation in each of these instances more or less

expresses the same query: How can one be sure that the message within or about each of

these disciplines will be properly "interpreted," so that it brings about the desired effect in the

receiver intended by the sender.

The above epigram was taken from Coleridge's poem "Rime of the Ancient Mariner,"

an analogue of this situation. In it, a young man is confronted by the Mariner in the street,

and, transfixed by the seaman's gaze, listens to the Mariner's tale. The Mariner had been on a

voyage to sea, one begun in a position of balance with the spiritual and natural worlds. While

in this state of balance, an albatross appeared to guide his ship. For sport, the Mariner killed

the bird. His crew, aghast at his act, forced him to wear the dead bird around his neck for as

a penance, and the spirit world punished him as well. After his penance was done and he

expressed his regret, the curse began to break, and the albatross fell from his neck. Now he,

1 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, "Rime of the Ancient Mariner,"Norton Anthology of English Literature,

M. H. Abrams, ed., vol 2, (London: W. W. Norton & Co., 2000), 425.2 Maurizio Ferraris,History of Hermeneutics, (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1988), 2.3 Ibid, 1-3.



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the Mariner, must travel around telling the tale of his tragic lesson, lest anyone else make the

same mistake.

Modern "versions" of the Rime

For this day and age, a dead albatross of hermeneutics haunts us. It hangs upon the

neck of epistemology, demonstrating our rejection of it as a guide. Attempts to remove this

bird from our neck have failed in four major ways. First, there is the "dissection by analysis"

method.4 In this approach the albatross is studied more intently, its rotting parts analyzed,

and through dissection it is taken away piece by piece. Hermeneutics becomes a forensic

science only practicable to the intellectually astute, people who glean historical and literary

clues in "sterile" academic laboratories, either oblivious to or in denial of their contaminated

methods and dirty gloves.

Closely related to this group is the "indecisively optimistic" group. They believe the

progression of society, in its ability to recognize interpretive bias (through natural or divine

empowerment) will eventually (eschatologically) bring about clarity of truth and

understanding. Yet at the same time they promote an innumerable number of hermeneutical

voices. This group tells the Mariner that the stench of the dead bird really isn't that bad, and

that by hearing all of the opinions about the albatross it will get easier to deal with;

eventually, the bird will decay away to nothing.

4 I am heavily endebted to James K. A. Smith for his categorization of hermeneutical models in his

bookThe Fall of Interpretation (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2000). I will draw on his critique in this

paper, clarifying some over-generalizations I believe he makes. Smith postulates the basic "interpretations" ofinterpretation. The first two groups, cessationist evangelicals and progressive hermeneutists, would posit that

hermeneutics resulted from the fall; they propose to overcome this post-lapsarian problem by either properhistorical-critical methodology (present immediacy) or progressive transformation of humanity (both Christian

and secular), respectively. The third group, made of secular existential philosophers, believe hermeneutics to be

part of the human condition; they claim that it will never be overcome rationally. To these Smith adds his view:

hermeneutics is a natural part of finitude and God's plurality of creation; he suggests a pneumatic (Pentecostal)

mechanism for establishing epistemic certainty for each plural voice created by individuals engaged in

hermeneutics. While his book prompted my thinking in this area, and my knowledge of philosophy pales in

comparison to his, there are fundamental flaws in his reasoning that I will address herein.



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Third, there is the "idolatry of ontology." Hermeneutic models, in their opinion, are

always destructive to the interpretation of the self and we should accept that fact, living out

our own interpretations. Though most conservative scholarship would ignore this group of

radical existentialists, they are perhaps the most honest about the real human predicament.

They believe that it was okay to shoot the albatross, because the perspective of the Mariner

(annoyance at the bird's presence) is just as valid as Nature's perspective (the bird was a

symbol of divine blessing); forcing the Mariner to wear the bird, much less punish him in

other ways, is wrong since self-actualization of his own being is his own right and reality. If

he allows himself to submit, it is his fault for not being a true existentialist.

I would classify the fourth and last group as an "error carried forward."5 Believing

that hermeneutics is coincident with human finitude, the group would cheer the spiritual

thrust of Coleridge's Romanticism. They would offering the corrective that, according to

Radical Orthodoxy, the Holy Spirit addresses everyone at all times, prompting ontological

honesty.

The Mariner, accordingly, should have known better. He had to have faced the

Ultimate Other prior to shooting the albatross, and the consequences are a result of his lack

of ethic in the face of divine address, not due to finitude. In fact, since hermeneutics is a

positive mark of finitude, everyone will always have a different story to tell people, one that

is as serious and transfixing as the Mariner's. This multiplicity of stories is a part of God's

diverse creation. We will one day rejoice by the diversity of these voices in eternity.

Their solution, a recognition of the transcendental pneumatic check on hermeneutics,

is profound; indeed, their diagnosis of the Mariner's problem (failure to acknowledge divine

5 Within mathematics, often a professor will deduct a reduced amount of points from a person's

arithmetic if they used proper methodology later on in a problem despite an earlier flaw in the solution. This

process of grading is called "error carried forward," for while it affected the outcome of their solution they had

nearly sound methodology.



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spiritual address prior to shooting the albatross) has a pneumatic quality, and adds an

ingredient that the other methods either do not acknowledge or are unwilling to allow.

However, it has apresuppositionalproblem which taints the conclusions of their syllogism,

and that is why I consider their argument, while insightful, to be as erroneous as the other

ones.

It is thus my intention in this paper to briefly examine each of the previously

categorized models, identifying weaknesses within their methods and those implications

upon faith and practice. Next, I will argue for a pneumatic method of hermeneutics based on

a Christological understanding of pre-lapsarian learning. Proceeding from this foundation,

the reasons behind and meaning of the fall as it affects understanding will be explained.

Then, implications of this view upon contemporary faith and practice will be addressed, as

well as eschatology.

"Dissection by Analysis"

Perhaps the most damaging form of hermeneutical praxis in the church today,

specifically related to textual hermeneutics, are those who believe that by further scientific

investigation the albatross will go away. Smith identifies this group as the old Princeton

theologians, such as B. B. Warfield, A. A. Hodge, who find their roots in a classical

Reformed theological tradition.6 Modern theologians he finds following this tack are

Koivisto and Lints. As I have said earlier, his analysis is penetrating. I do believe, however,

that it could be refined.

Classical Reformed theologians are committed to Luther's Sola Scriptura mode of

revelational authority. Consider A. A. Hodge's Outlines of Theology. In chapter five Hodge

calls the Bible the "all-sufficient and only rule of faith and practice, and judge of

6 Smith, 189 n.1.



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controversies."7 God has given His divinely-inspired Scriptures to mankind, and our job is to

perfect our faith and practice by examination of them upon the table of academic autopsy.

This school has several flaws. First, they ignore the wisdom of Prv 26:4-5 in

attempting to answer the foolishness of post-Kantian thought by reducing the fullness of

God's revelation, placing His authority upon the limited playing of field of Biblical

empiricism.8 Can the Spirit be looked at in a microscope? The challenge and wisdom of Prv

26:4-5 is what Jesus did: when doubters attempt to question one's faith, the response is not to

submit oneself to their mode of thinking, but to challenge their presuppositions. 9

There is an element of thepneuma within this method, but it goes relatively

unacknowledged. Richard Lints would call this "insight" that comes from reading

Scripture.10 This view completely ignores the capacity of the Holy Spirit for revelation and

limits its function within study of Scriptures to a "holy cross-reference system," linking

together verses and thoughts.

Smith's critique of this view also points out one of this school's fundamental flaws:

human beings are always preconditioned in their understanding. While practitioners of this

hermeneutic would consider themselves to be objective, he points out, quoting Abraham

Kuyper, that interpretive glasses are "cemented to our face."11 We cannot avoid our own

"interpretive horizon" anymore than a rocket with a velocity less than the force of gravity

7 A. A. Hodge, Outlines of Theology, n.p., Online: http://homepage.mac.com/shanerosenthal/

reformationink/aahsolascrp.htm [April 26 2005].8 Kant formed a watershed in philosophy with his division of the phenomenal world (as it appears to

us) and the noumenal (as it is) in Critique of Pure Reason. He separated the spiritual from the physical.9 Jesus did this frequently when his opponents tried to catch him in their rhetoric. Matthew 22 is

replete with examples of this tactic.10 Richard Lints, "Two theologies or one: Warfield and Vos on the nature of theology," Westminster

Theological Journal54, no 2 (Fall 1992): 245.11 Smith, 43.



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will leave planet Earth. These "dirty" forensic gloves, used to dissect the albatross, are what

they deny.

While the implications coming from these deficiencies are numerous, one is

particularly devastating. Scriptural study becomes the specialization of those few who have

the natural inclination for historical and grammatical study. This exclusivity of biblical

studies combines with the anti-intellectualism of this present era to make our bible studies

and Sunday School classes no more than academic exercises where biblical fish (facts) are

tossed by the more learned and scholarly (teachers) to the hungry seals (parishioners) who

never learn to feed themselves.

In addition, the Bible, while it is the Book of books, becomes deified. People interact

less with the Holy Spirit and more with empirical methods of literary analysis. A potential

corrective to this, which will be examined later, includes inductive Bible study.

"Indecisively Optimistic"

This faction within the eternal counsel on hermeneutical methodology hopes to build

ties between the "dissolution" group's epistemic self-deception and the "idolatry" group's

apathy. For example, Hans-Georg Gadamer, a student of the hermeneutist Martin Heidegger,

is often interpreted as one who "builds a bridge" between his mentor's isolated "gorge" and

the rest of the world, in the way that Marx made Hegel's dialecticism practicable.12 Smith

finds within Gadamer's methodology this attempt as well. If all faults on every side, both of

sender and receiver, of subject and object, are acknowledged, we will gradually, towards

eternity, be able to compensate for all the plurality of interpretations.13

12 Ferraris, 171. Edmund Husserl, the teacher of Martin Heidegger, would fit in this group as well.13 Smith, 79.



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Brice Wachterhauser sees this in Gadamer's assertion concerning the

Geisteswissenschaffen (human sciences). The human sciences afford us the opportunity for

self-understanding, for "the exploration, analysis, and further development of the meaning

inherent in the different languages of self."14 We then have meaning encapsulated where our

own past horizon, through much introspection, crosses the horizon of the sender of

information, be it an ancient text or another person, in a "fusion of horizons."15

Within the Christian sphere, Wolfhart Pannenberg promotes this method for a more

genuine interpretation of Scripture. Concerning this "fusion" in biblical studies, he says, "we

can justify in a general way our assertion that the event sought for in inquiring behind the

texts reveals its true visage only within universal continuities of events and of meaning."16

Thus, there is a destination, and through the clarification and examination of various horizons

meaning can be determined, thereby touching transcendental truth.

There is a certain amount "tension" within this approach, for the attempt to move

towards any type of meaning while still wading through the myriad factors affecting

interpretation. The idea of theological "tension" is very prominent in today's religious

culture; a search on the ATLA database under the keyword "tension" yielded 826 articles

concerning some theological topic analyzed under this paradigm.

However vogue the nature of this approach, it problematically offers no normative

solutions in a search for Reality. In trying to please everyone, it does justice to no one. Who

becomes the arbiter of what is or is not a significant enough influence upon the horizon of

14 Brice R. Wachterhauser, "Must We Be What We Say? Gadamer on Truth in the Human Sciences,"

Hermeneutics and Modern Philosophy, Brice R. Wachterhauser, ed., (Albany: SUNY Press, 1986), 225-227.15 B. E. Benson, "Postmodernism,"Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Walter A. Elwell, ed., (Grand

Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001), 942.16 Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Hermeneutics and Universal History,"Hermeneutics and Modern

Philosophy, 113.



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interpretation? In fact, doesn't the new buzzword "tolerance" suggest that all opinions have

some validity? Then, the number of voices affecting each horizon is virtually endless.

While hermeneutic praxis must acknowledge the thin elements of truth within the

relatively new voices of feminist, black, and liberation theology, who is going to be bold

enough to determine that Mediterranean underwater basket-weavers do not have a voice?

There must be a dividing line, but no one within this school is bold enough and assume that

they have enough of the truth to tell the Mariner what he must do to rid himself of the

albatross; they only keep hoping that one day the bird will decay enough to fall off by itself.

"Idolatry of Ontology"

As mentioned above, this third group is perhaps the most honest in their diagnosis of

the human condition, and therefore the most insightful about the epistemic shift of the Fall.17

As their classification betrays, they have made their goal not to outline a plan of attack or

method to appropriate Truth; even if it is out there, they tell everyone why it really doesn't

matter. Martin Heidegger, Michel Foucault, and Gianni Vattimo all argue for this

methodology.

The existential position of these philosophers is, without apology, ontologically self-

centered. Yet Vattimo would object with this term, for it to argue for humanism presupposes

that there is another possible center. Instead, he prefers to speak of the "development of the

self within an ontological horizon" (emphasis mine).18

This self-centeredness is inescapable from Heidegger's perspective. The first

question is the interpretation of the self, "the self-understanding of the subject as Dasein." 19

17 I will my explanation of this "shift" until after evaluating each system in order to avoid "tipping my

hand."18 Gianni Vattimo, The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Postmodern Culture,

(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1988), 33.19 Ferraris, 156.



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In other words, what does one believe, through a self-hermeneutic, what one is? Important to

this view is the liberation which accompanies recognizing that one's own ontological

discovery determines one's destiny. "Ontology is no longer the only guide for the

phenomenological constitution.... Rather, phenomenology is the method, and ontology the

content for the same task."20

How is this view idolatrous? What is its effect? A brief illustration will help

demonstrate. Anyone who has studied how a ship anchors itself at sea is initially startled to

find that the real source of stability to an anchored ship at sea is the weight of the anchor

chain, and not the ability of the anchor to embed itself into the ocean floor. Ideally, a ship's

captain would like to have the ship tied up to a pier, for it is objectively rooted and can be

trusted not to move. In contrast, anchors and their chains can be affected by both sea

currents and their subsequent effects upon the sea floor. Nevertheless, at times a captain may

decide to drop the anchor and orient the ship away from the pier.

For Heidegger and Vattimo, there is no pier (transcendence) and even if there was, we

wouldn't know it. The anchor drops whenever and wherever one pleases. What gives them

their strength or meaning for life is their belief that they have dropped anchor, in a pure act of

spontaneous self-actualization, when and where they want to and were not told to by anyone.

No manner of hermeneutics is better or worse so much as it is an authentic method (as

determined by how much anchor chain is holding it down) thought up by oneself instead of

imposed by das man, the ubiquitous "they" who threaten to limit ones ability to "be." Human

agency, the most coveted possession, finds its greatest value in "being." Their method, the

20 Otto Pggeler, "Sein als Ereignis,"Zeitschrift fr philosophische Forschung13 (1959): 611; quoted

in Ferraris, 153.



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huge anchor chain of existentialism, is their idol; yet, in an odd paradox they worship the idol

which they themselves control.

The resulting affect on those around this sect is purposely disastrous. It truly leads, as

Vattimo argues, and, if its adherents are intellectually honest, towards nihilism, which he

argues for, despite Heidegger's rejection of "-isms".21 The albatross' death, then, was

valueless for the bird and of the greatest value for the Mariner, who was writing his own

values in light of his own ontological speculation. The spirits are wrong for punishing him,

as are his crewmates who force him to wear the bird, which is indicative of their ignorance or

weak self-subjection to another system of values.

"Error Carried Forward"

There is a great deal of potential embedded within this approach. James K. A. Smith

has gone a significant distance in providing the groundwork for providing a template of

"heuristic devices" by which to categorize the previous types of interpretation. However, his

premises concerning hermeneutics and its relationship to human finitude are problematic.

Consider his statement on human finitude:

To be human is to interpret to negotiate understanding between two or more finite

entities. Interpretation, then, is called for by a "state of affairs" in which we findfinite orsituated beings in relation. These two elements finitude and intersubjectivity are the

conditions for hermeneutics; but as will be noted, they are at the same time conditions

that are part and parcel of being human and living in the world. Hermeneutics the need

for negotiation of understanding between finite entities is therefore an inescapableaspect of being human and not an accidental or fallen way of being.22

His argument for hermeneutics is that humanness is coincident with finitude. The

syllogism is set up as follows:

21 Vattimo, 19-29.22 Smith, The Fall, 149-150.



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(1) To be human is to interpret

(2) To interpret is to use hermeneutics

(3) To be human is to use hermeneutics

Premise (2) is understandable and by definition is correct. However, what about premise (1).

It is itself a conclusion from the following syllogism:

(1a) To be human is to understand

(1b) To understanding is always interpretive

(1) To be human is always interpretive

Now the "man behind the curtain" is exposed, so to speak. Smith views understanding of

another (intersubjectivity) as always interpretive (1b). This false assumption will be

addressed in the next section.

This hermeneutical model begins with a multiplicity of interpretations from the

coincidental fact of finitude. Once we accept that finitude necessitates interpretation, we are

able to dispense with dogmatic arguments that result from challenges to multiple

interpretations. Are all interpretations then right? Smith proposes an ethics of interpretation,

in which the Holy Spirit, through charismatic influence, divinely "trumps" interpretations

that do injustice to the transcendental Truth that "resists manipulation or distortion."23

In response I ask (tongue in cheek), "Well, why didn't you say this sooner. Is that it?"

Isn't this, according to His argument for a radical orthodoxy, a tautology?24 This argument

for a restoration of the idea of transcendence that modernity denied would assert that we

could never escape the Spirit's accountability even if we tried. It is as if he is going to

introduce a proper hermeneutic to Christians just by saying, "God will get you if you don't do

23 Smith, 176.24 James K. A. Smith,Introducing Radical Orthodoxy, (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004), 70-85.



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it right," and to secularists (who either deny the transcendental or our ability to know it) by

asking, "That's not what you really believe, is it?" Is this any different than telling the

Mariner, "You really shouldn't have shot that bird, for you knew better."?

"'Apollo 13, We Have a Solution'"

These words were spoken from Mission Control, Houston, Texas, to the Apollo 13

astronauts during their fateful mission to the moon on 13 April, 1970. In fact, numerous

problems were fixed thanks to the resourceful team of engineers who could see not only what

the astronauts could, but had access to materials that the astronauts had left behind.25

Investigations after the accident would ultimately show that the fault which the astronauts

had carried with them into space, the problem which caused the disaster, was a defect that

had occurred years before, and they did not even recognize the problem existed.

This is analogous to the issue of hermeneutics. We have previously seen satirical

categorizations of different hermeneutical models based on Coleridge's "Rime of the Ancient

Mariner." Yet, to answer questions concerning hermeneutics, one must move beyond satire

and analyze where hermeneutics began, in Eden. What happened there? One must

speculatively peer in on Eden, the place of creation and the Fall.

Before the Fall

God told Adam and Eve that they could not eat from the tree that bore the fruit of the

knowledge of good and evil (Gen 2:16-17). We falsely assume that this meant they had no

idea what it meant to sin before this incident. Culpability presupposes knowledge, does it

not? Romans 1:21 says this explicitly.

25 Stephen Cass, "Apollo 13, We Have a Solution," n.p., 13 April 2005. Online:

http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/WEBONLY/wonews/apr05//0405napolc.html [25 April 2005]. This account of

the mission, both from space, and from the ground, is detailed and thorough, and at the same time extremely

interesting. Tom Hanks, Bill Paxton, and Kevin Bacon popularized the story in the movieApollo 13, directed

by Ron Howard, and based on the bookLost Moon,by ex-astronaut James Lovell.



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Not only does Paul argue for this fact, but Jesus demonstrates how they could have a

concept of sin without actualization. We are falsely and without knowing it stuck on a

paradigm of learning that involves failure. We learn by making mistakes and through

successes. These mistakes are sin. Jesus was sinless (1 Jn 3:5); yet, he learned as well (Luke

2:40,52). If Jesus is the new Adam, the one who shows us what it truly means to be human,

One who could learn and yet remain sinless, is it too hard to believe that in Eden there was

learning, as well as consciousness of the concept of sin, but yet no sin?

How then, did they learn? I submit it was through communication, via language, with

God. Must we believe, as Smith affirms, that all language and understanding is

interpretive?26 Why? We were created to understand, and if God created language and gave

it to us, and if it was good (bw{T) as everything was (i.e., functioning according to design),

would we not be able to fully comprehend language, even while we were learning? Werner

Gitt addresses this in his seminal book,In the Beginning was Information. His breakdown of

language and its functions when set in the perfection of Eden demonstrates that God's

creation and use of language is incomplete and meaningless unless it has an "apobetic"

quality, one that accomplishes the goal for which it was sent.27

Our minds lacked any noetic effects of sin, and therefore we understood perfectly,

just as Jesus did throughout his years of learning. Even the slightest misunderstanding would

be sin, or missing the mark (at*j*). This challenges Smith's stipulation that a plurality of

interpretations were present from the start. Remember, hermeneutics is about the

effectiveness of the apobetics of communication.28 A perfect language perfectly sent and

perfectly understood does not need hermeneutics, for it is one-hundred-percent efficient.

26 Smith, The Fall, 149-151.27 Werner Gitt,In the Beginning was Information, (Bielefeld, Germany: Christliche Literature-

Verbreitung e. V., 1997), 134-157, 206-222.28 See definition of hermeneutics in "Introduction."



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The Fall

Hermeneutics

When Adam and Eve, who had free agency to choose their source of knowledge,

decided to eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, they removed themselves

from God as the source of knowledge and decided that, true to Satan's nefarious deception,

they wanted the prerogative to decide for themselves what was right and wrong instead of

letting God tell them what was right and wrong. When the curse was issued, all of creation

fell, including language and understanding. We were unsure of God's communication to us,

and unsure of our communication to each other. Misunderstandings arose. Adam became

afraid (Gen 3:10) since his knowledge of God was now reduced. Apobetic efficiency went to

less than one-hundred percent. Therefore, the need for hermeneutics arose.

Epistemology

In addition, our removal from the immediate revelatory presence of God led to the

more serious issue: epistemological uncertainty. This is very pneumatic, and involves the

cutting, decisively honest evaluations by existentialists such as Heidegger and Derrida.29 The

Holy Spirit, as Smith suggests, constantly confronts us.30 Was this not so in Eden? It was, as

D. Lyle Dabney relates.31

Dabney suggests that the relationship presupposed by communication was initiated,

and I would suggest constantly confirmed, by the Holy Spirit prior to the Fall. The Spirit

mediated epistemic confidence to mankind, so that we could recognize truth when we came

in contact with it. It bridged the intersubjective gap between God and man by giving us an

internal confirmation of God's Truth. The Spirit served as our transcendental "6th" sense,

29 See my earlier comments that this group of hermeneutists is the most honest about our situation.30 Smith, The Fall, 176-177.31 D. Lyle Dabney, "Otherwise Engaged in the Spirit: A First Theology for a Twenty-first Century," in

Future of Theology, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 159.



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revealing truth to us. Eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil rejected the

Spirit's revelation, much like plugging one's ears, shifting our epistemic center towards

ourselves and removing the Spirit's rightful place. It made us the final arbiters of our own

transcendental truth; unfortunately, without any epistemic confidence (assurance by the Holy

Spirit) we groped about like blind men.

Consider Jacques Derrida's focus on the a priori conditions of understanding.32 What

he called the "blindness" that precedes understanding is the lack of epistemic confidence

resulting from the Fall. Blindness presupposes that there was at one time "sight." The Spirit

had at one time guided us, assuring us of what we experienced. It would no longer. Our

existence without the Holy Spirit's guidance was fraught with epistemic drift. We then, in

almost comical fashion (if not so eternally tragic), were left to evaluate things based on all

we could muster, our own experience. The result, says Heidegger, is that we "uncover"

reality based on experience, and evaluate it by our own knowledge. Asserting the truth of

what we find then "allows the entity to be seen in its uncoveredness." 33

It is this self-centered epistemic methodology that existentialism, as asserted

previously, is so deadly honest about. Ever since Eden, the Holy Spirit "haunts our dreams

and disturbs our sloth, the source of our every broken intimation of an o/Other as it

constantly drives us out of our self-centered [existentialist] existence, and [it is] the object

against which we struggle as we lean into the wind, holding our breath, 'grieving the

Spirit.'"34

The Holy Spirit makes Jesus' Heideggerian, "uncovering" assertion, "I am the way,

and the truth, and the life," vitalto us (John 14:6). This is why Jesus says to Peter, following

32 Ferraris, 181.33 Arne Naess,Four Modern Philosophers, (Chicago: University Press, 1965), 230.34 Dabney, 160.



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his famous confession, that "because flesh and blood did not reveal this to you" (Matt 16:17).

Again, it is why Jesus asks Pilate an open-ended question, "Are you saying this [that I am the

King of the Jews] on your own initiative [that is, from the Holy Spirit], or did others tell you

about Me" (John 18:34)?

The reason why the "hard-core" secular existentialists are unwilling to add the

spiritual dimension of God to their worldview is their refusal to give this epistemic

prerogative back to the Holy Spirit, a refusal of the divine address. For Heidegger, the Holy

Spirit was also das man, an outside entity that would structure or anchor the world ofDasein.

Every attempt of God to reach Heidegger would be confused as an encroachment upon his

ability to Be. For Nietzsche, the voice of the Holy Spirit was the masses trying to prevent the

"overman" from exercising his "will to power."

Applications

Contemporary Faith and Practice

Several aspects of this reality merge when we practice hermeneutics in our daily

lives, whether philosophical or textual. First, we face daily the challenge to live by faith

(Hab 2:4). This confrontation with radical existential denies any possibility of reaching

transcendence, or of its existence. We can affirm a portion of this assertion. We cannot

reach out and grasp God in an authoritative way, singing in a Sinatra-like voice, "I did it

myyyyy way!" We are dependent upon revelation breaking through to us. We need the Light

from heaven, Who dwelt among us (John 1:9).

However, we can tell existentialists that they are living a philosophically incoherent

pattern, one irrelevant to human need, denying the necessity of relationship.35 As Dabney

35 Howard M. Ervin,"Hermeneutics: A Pentecostal Option,"Pneuma: The Journal of the Society for

Pentecostal Studies 3, no 2 (Fall 1981):16.



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says, communication presupposes relationship.36 This is what we once had, in Eden, and

what we intuitively reach for. We would have never grasped at a purpose if one had not been

there to begin with. One does not reach unless there is something to be grasped, a kind of

presensingthat comes before the blindness of Derrida. But unlike Derrida, who would

postulate that blindness comes first, we would support Augustine, who argued that evil was a

privation of good; therefore, epistemic blindness is a "privation," a secondary state,

confirming that there once was epistemic confidence via a transcendent relationship.

Next, we are challenged by textual criticism to atomize Scripture through a scientific

Cuisinart of doubt, examining the transcendent Word of God on a mocker's playing field of

empiricism (Prv 26:4-5). This challenge has two aspects. First, we can rely, with great

humility, on our reasoning capacity for historical-literary analysis, for the creation (our mind)

is good and we therefore have a capacity for reason.37 However, without an acknowledgment

of the Holy Spirit's role in this process, guiding our reason, criticism is as dead as the

Mariner's albatross. Smith appropriately calls the role of the Spirit a hermeneutic of "trust,"

and it can be described in no truer terms.38

Second, we need to actively promote the study of Scripture as a group activity. For

far too long the empirical study of Scripture has relegated knowledge of the word to the

"enlightened" few who have the opportunity, privilege, or inclination to pour over critical

resources. The Holy Spirit is active, enabling us to glean truth no matter what our level of

theological education. Instead, we have limited the Spirit in its fullness of revelation, hearing

from only the bookish few. We need the full counsel of God, and the Spirit has many things

to communicate to us through many people.

36 Dabney, 158.37 Augustine, Confessions 13.238 Smith, The Fall, 163.



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A third challenge is faced in philology. Wittgenstein's "language games" necessitate

doubt of any intrinsic transcendental meaning outside the relative and arbitrary rules created

by different interest groups. There is an element of truth here, but only an element; we must

not subordinate the Scriptures to this completely. We have a "'pneumatic' continuity", for the

same Holy Spirit which superintended its transmission is also empowering the believer to

understand it over and above any transmission difficulty [caused by a language game that]

we may encounter.39 God created language, and He gave it meaning, based on truth. He

alone "judges all humangnosis, ., in fact, there is no hermeneutic unless and until the

divine hermeneutes (the Holy Spirit) and mediates an understanding"

40

Conclusion

I conclude with a look towards the day when we will be past the interpretive nature of

understanding, the day of our eschatological hope. What do I mean? Smith's multivalent

chorus of praise to God, while sounding very grand, does no good if immediacy is just a

dream.41My version of God, that which I apprehend, is not what I long for. We are

promised the knowing of God just as (kaqwV") we are fully known (1 Cor 13:12). This

does no good if we all have a different idea of what God is due to a hermeneutic tied to

finitude. For if heaven is immediacy, if faith and hope and the diversity of spiritual gifts will

pass away (1 Cor 13:8-13), then the knowledge of God will be immediate and uninterpreted.

When this happens, revelation will be mediated through the Holy Spirit, giving us full

epistemic confidence. Sin will no longer effect our understanding. Mankind's attempt for

self-mediated knowledge will be no more, and our penance for shooting the albatross will be

complete.

39 Ervin, 22.40 Ervin, 18.41 Smith, The Fall, 184.



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Do I think that we will forget then the days of hermeneutics? No, I do not think we

will. We will remember our previous sad state, and be spurned to praise God even more.

When Jesus came, Truth was revealed. Just like in the Mariner's tale, the albatross

fell away and the spell was "snapt."42 At Pentecost, the effects of the spell began to die away

as the Holy Spirit was poured out, calling us towards epistemic stability. When the Lord

returns, we will be ushered into an atmosphere of immediacy, free of hermeneutics, anchored

firmly by the Holy Spirit in epistemic confidence, where He will "wash away The Albatross's

blood."43

42 Coleridge, 434.43 Coleridge, 436.



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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Augustine. Confessions

Benson, B. E. "Postmodernism."Evangelical Dictionary of Theology. Edited by Walter A.

Elwell. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001.

Cass, Stephen. "Apollo 13, We Have a Solution." 13 April 2005. Online:

http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/WEBONLY/wonews/apr05//0405napolc.html [25April 2005].

Coleridge, Samuel Taylor. "Rime of the Ancient Mariner."Norton Anthology of English

Literature. Edited by M. H. Abrams. Vol 2. London: W. W. Norton & Co., 2000.

Dabney, D. Lyle. "Otherwise Engaged in the Spirit: A First Theology for a Twenty-first

Century."Future of Theology. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996.

Ervin, Howard M. "Hermeneutics: A Pentecostal Option,"Pneuma: The Journal of the

Society for Pentecostal Studies 3 no 2 (Fall 1981): 11-25.

Ferraris, Maurizio. History of Hermeneutics. New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1988.

Gitt, Werner. In the Beginning was Information. Bielefeld, Germany: Christliche Literature-

Verbreitung e. V., 1997.

Hodge, A. A. Outlines of Theology. Online: http://homepage.mac.com/shanerosenthal/reformationink/aahsolascrp.htm [April 26 2005].

Lints, Richard. "Two theologies or one: Warfield and Vos on the nature of theology."Westminster Theological Journal54 no 2 (Fall 1992): 235-253.

Naess, Arne. Four Modern Philosophers. Chicago: University Press, 1965.

Pannenberg, "Hermeneutics and Universal History,"Hermeneutics and Modern Philosophy.

Edited by Brice R. Wachterhauser. Albany: SUNY Press, 1986.

Pggeler, Otto. "Sein als Ereignis."Zeitschrift fr philosophische Forschung13 (1959): 611;

quoted in Maurizio Ferraris. History of Hermeneutics. New Jersey: Humanities Press,

1988.

Smith, James K. A. The Fall of Interpretation. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2000.

________. Introducing Radical Orthodoxy. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004.



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Vattimo, Gianni. The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Postmodern Culture.

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1988.

Wachterhauser, Brice R. "Must We Be What We Say? Gadamer on Truth in the HumanSciences."Hermeneutics and Modern Philosophy. Edited by Brice R.

Wachterhauser. Albany: SUNY Press, 1986.

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Rime of the Ancient Epistemologist

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