Risk and Resilience Assessment Niger

2016

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Annex 2: Niger Risk and Resilience Assessment

1) Background

Niger at a glance

The republic of Niger is a landlocked country located where northern and sub-Saharan Africa meet.

It is a vast territory of 1,3 million km2, with a low population density given its 19.1 million inhabitants

(2014 census). Niger has the highest demographic growth rate in the world, at 3,9 percent per year, and a

very young population, 50 percent of which is under the age of fifteen. It is home to several ethnic groups,

including the Hausa (which compose around half the population, present in the South East), Djerma (South

West), Tuareg (North), Fulani (South-West), Arab (South), and Kanuri (South East). Niger’s economy

largely depends on the agriculture and livestock sectors. Extractive industries are also a major contributor

to the economy, amounting to 10 percent of the GDP and 50 percent of exportation revenues. Niger is the

fourth-largest uranium producer in the world and could become second if the Imouraren site is finally put

in production.1 Gold mining has remained largely informal to date, but recently authorities have adopted

measures to begin formalizing the sector.

Niger is faced with a high incidence of poverty and low human development. In 2014, 44.5 percent of

the population was poor,2 and Niger ranked second to last out of 188 countries on the 2016 Human

Development Index. Although poverty dropped between 2005 and 2014, it was unable to outpace the rate

of demographic growth, which was four times higher during the same period,3 and as a result the absolute

number of poor continues to rise. Many poor are caught in a poverty trap, due to inadequate assets holding,

low nutritional and health status, and lack of education (72 percent of the population has no formal

education), maintaining them in a low productivity status. 4 Disparities between urban and rural areas are

extremely strong, with poverty at only 8.7 percent in the capital city and in other urban areas in 2014,

against 51.4 percent in rural areas during the same year.5 The lower poverty regions include the capital city

of Niamey, Agadez in the north, and Diffa in the southeast. These three regions comprise 12 percent of the

population and less than 5 percent of the poor. The high poverty regions are the remaining five regions in

the southwest of the country (Tahoua, Dosso, Maradi, Tillabdri, and Zinder).

Historic background

Niger has a long history of political instability and contained violence, punctuated by military coups,6

rebel movement uprisings and terrorist incursions. The colonial era left a deep mark on the country’s social

organization, promoting tense and violent social relations. In the 1960s, the Sawaba armed group, a political

movement composed mainly of Hausa, led the first post-independence violent movement and attempted to

assassinate President Diori. The nomadic populations of the North have also led rebellions against the

authorities, including the Tuareg rebellion in the 1990s. Since the early 2000s, Niger has also been affected

by the onset of violent extremism emanating from terrorist groups based in neighboring countries. The most

severe terrorist threat comes from Boko Haram, which began an insurgency in northeastern Nigeria in 2009,

1 Imouraren is a uranium mining site 160 km north of Agadez for which Areva obtained the exploitation permit in

2009. Activities were suspended in 2015, due to low uranium prices. 2 $1.90 a day, 2011 PPP, 2014. 3 Between 2005 and 2014, the annual population growth rate reached 3.9 percent, compared with a 1 percent poverty

reduction rate. 4 World Bank, 2016b 5 Ibid 6 The country experienced 3 coups (1974, 1996, and 2010), two coup attempts (1976 and 2015), one presidential

assignation (1999) and one solider mutiny (2002).

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and pursued its territorial expansion towards the Nigerien border. Terrorist attacks have also been

perpetrated in northwestern Niger on the border with Mali. Insurgent actors include the Islamic State in the

Greater Sahara (ISGS, the Islamic State’s local branch led by Abou Walid Al Sahraoui) and Jamaat Nosrat

al-Islam wal- Mouslimin (JNIM, a group with al-Qaeda ties).

Difficulties in addressing Niger’s fragility are compounded by pronounced structural weaknesses and

strong regional and ethnic inequalities. Niger’s economy is highly vulnerable to external shocks. Climate

variability in particular is strongly correlated with economic performance, and climate shocks are the most

important contributor to adverse changes in the depth and severity of poverty. The northern regions and

populations are the most affected by droughts and food crises, while the southern regions benefit from

higher rainfall and agricultural productivity. These disparities find resonance in Niger’s history of uneven

development, as colonial and post-colonial authorities concentrated their investments in the country’s

Southwest.7 As a consequence of this legacy, at the country’s independence elites from this part of Niger,

mainly from the Djerma community, were in a privileged position to access education and civil service

positions, while other communities, such as the Tuareg and Hausa, continued to suffer from

marginalization.8

Despite Niger’s fitful political history, the country has maintained a fragile stability sustained by a

limited access order system. In this system, a political settlement is established by an elite coalition

comprising elements from various political, economic, defense and religious networks, which also reflects

regional and communitarian affiliations. The elite group is built around a consensus to share political power

and economic resources, and provides stability to the country. The army is a key actor9 and a de facto

arbitrator within this political sphere. It has played an ambiguous role, orchestrating coups which have been

motivated in part by corporatist interests, and in part by the will to restore an equilibrium when the ruling

party has become too powerful or unresponsive and unpopular. The 2010 coup, for example, followed

accusations that President Tandja was inefficiently addressing the severe consequences of that year’s

drought.

Current context

In March 2016, President Mahamadou Issoufou was re-elected by a landslide10 for a second term,

partly as a result of the opposition’s boycott of the poll’s second round. The elections took place amid a

tense context of political tensions. This includes the arrest and imprisonment in November 2015 of Hama

Amadou, a former Prime Minister and President of the National Assembly and a serious contender in the

presidential race. Dissensions had already been growing during President Issoufou’s previous mandate,

prompting the appointment of major opposition figures in a new Government in September 2013, including

civil society members and prominent businessmen. Nevertheless, this strategy is built on very fragile and

reversible alliances.

The country is facing a rapidly escalating scale and frequency of jihadist attacks on the border with

Mali since early 2017. In March 2017, the authorities declared a state of emergency in seven departments

of the regions of Tillaberi and Tahoua11. The latest attack took place on October 21, 2017, when the

7 ICG 2013. 8 Ibid. 9 The army has occupied positions in forty out of forty-nine governments between 1974 and 2002 10 President Mahamadou Issoufou won 92.4 percent of votes, while his contender Hama Amadou, who was flown to

France the week prior to the election for emergency medical treatment, took close 7.4 percent. 11 Ouallam, Ayorou, Bankilare, Abala and Banibangou in Tillaberi and Tassara and Tilia in Tahoua

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gendarmerie camp of Ayorou, 180km north of Niamey, was attacked, killing at least 13 gendarmes. This

assault comes only two weeks after the attack on a Malian refugee camp in Tazalit (Tahoua region), during

which 22 Nigerien soldiers were executed. In addition, for the first time in the region, four American forces

were killed in a jihadist ambush on October 4, alongside five Nigerien soldiers, during a mixed patrol near

Tongo Tongo in the Tillabery region (approximately 120 km north of Niamey). The number of fatalities

from attacks on civilians of the Tillabery and Tahoua regions, especially nomadic communities, could

surpass those against security forces, but often go unreported.12 A regional force aimed at tackling terrorism

and transnational crime was created by the G5 countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger)

in February 2017. However, they lack funds and resources, and their effectiveness remains to be seen as

they are faced with a huge area to place under surveillance.13

Jihadist attacks, poor health conditions and climatic shocks have led to a humanitarian crisis in

Niger. As of mid-September 2017, there were 2.2 million people in need of humanitarian assistance, an

increase by 300,000 people compared with initial estimated for 2017, due to rising insecurity, the increase

in cereal prices and a Hepatitis E epidemic in Diffa.14 20 percent of agricultural villages monitored by

OCHA have been unable to sow during the 2017 crop year, due to insecurity, lack of access to seeds and

locust. As a result, 2.7 million people risk food insecurity in the near future.15 The security crisis has

displaced 250.000 people in the Diffa region, including IDPs and Nigerian refugees, which currently rely

on foreign aid for survival. Niger accounts globally for nine percent of the people displaced by Boko Haram.

At least 450 civilians have been killed, wounded or kidnapped between February 2015 and August 2017,

including the kidnapping of 33 children and 6 women in the Ngalewa village (Bosso) in July of this year.

408.000 people, i.e. 50 percent of the Diffa population, require at least one form of humanitarian assistance

as a result of insecurity and the loss of livelihoods.16 In addition, Niger has been affected by heavy rainfall

and floods, impacting 194,000 people and claiming 54 lives throughout the territory, with 80 percent of

displaced people living in the regions of Dosso, Niamey, Maradi and Agadez. Habitations have been

destroyed, cattle have perished and thousands of hectares of crop have been devastated.

2) Drivers of fragility, conflict and violence

While the past several years saw Niger remaining generally stable despite various stresses, three structural

drivers of fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV) explain its persistent fragility: (1) climate vulnerability

and environmental degradation, (2) territorial imbalances and uneven share of mining revenues and benefit;

and (3) a growing regional security threats. Youth exclusion and increasing demographic pressure are

transversal FCV drivers, compounding the risks caused by each structural driver.

i. Climate vulnerability and environmental degradation

Vulnerability to climatic hazards is a consistent driver of fragility in Niger. Between 1980 and 2012,

10 major episodes of drought were recorded in Niger, of which 5 led to widespread famine resulting from

diminished crops and herds, price peaks and population displacements. Climate vulnerability is worsened

by water resource scarcity and growing desertification, impacting agriculture and livestock, as well as

generating health risks. Because the agricultural sector (including livestock) represents 39 percent of

Niger’s GDP and employs 82 percent of its workforce,17 adverse climate shocks have disastrous

12 ICG, 2017a 13 ICG, 2017b 14 OCHA, 2017a 15 Ibid 16 Ibid 17 FAOSTAT 2011.

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consequences for the population and the economy. The 2011 food crisis affected more than 7 million people,

or almost half of the country’s total population at that time, and each drought since 1960 has caused a

negative GDP growth (see figure 1 below). Droughts and desertification affect predominantly the northern

populations, and have been correlated to coups and rebellions. They exacerbate territorial imbalances and

tensions, and loss of livelihoods and grievances have partly driven political actors and communities, such

as the Tuareg in northern Niger, to lead uprising against the government. In addition, Niger’s vulnerability

to severe climatic shocks, combined with the country’s rapid demographic growth, increase the risks of

local conflicts, as an increasing number of people compete for diminishing resources, including fertile land

and water. Pastoralists in particular clash with sedentary farmers in their pursuit of grazing areas. The

complex land ownership framework further impedes conflict resolution.

Capacity to adapt to climatic shocks is reduced by extensive environmental degradation, which is

destroying livelihoods and increasing risks of intercommunal tensions. Overexploitation of the soil has

caused a decline in agricultural productivity, and deforestation is generating extensive soil erosion, thereby

depleting the land from its nutrients. The situation is particularly worrisome because Niger’s forest base is

very small and has modest capacity for regeneration. In addition, the economy is highly dependent on wood

energy, which accounted for 85 percent of the national energy consumption and 98.8 percent of household

energy consumption in 2010.18 The situation is compounded by demographic pressure as the demand for

wood energy and fertile land increases, forcing agriculture to extend into areas that were previously

dedicated to pastoralism. While there are more land disputes among farmers,19 the conflicts between farmers

and herders and among herders are more likely to lead to violence. Yet there is a total absence of arbitration,

18 World Bank 2014. 19 See, for instance, Salissou 2014.

-20.0

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Figure 1: Annual rainfall (mm), GDP % growth, coups and severe droughts in Niger, 1961-2015

(source: WB Climate Knowledge Portal and WB data)

Annual Rainfall (mm) GDP growth (BW data)

1974 1996coup

2000 coup

'73-'74 drought

2010drought

'82-'84 drought

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given the dysfunctionality of the local land commissions (commissions foncières, or COFOs), the

chefferies’ loss of legitimacy, and the lack of presence and efficiency of the formal justice system.

In the near future, a severe climatic shock and associated food crisis, as well as increased competition for

resources including fertile land, could lead to social unrest and fuel intercommunal tensions.

ii. Popular dissatisfaction with state institutions over the management and distribution of services

and mining revenues

Offering quality and legitimate services to Nigeriens is a major challenge Although public spending on

education represents 23 percent of the total public expenditure, Nigeriens’ level of education is among the

lowest in the world, with 1.4 years of education on average. In addition, the quality of the education system

is very poor.20 According to the “Rapport d’Etat du système éducatif nigérien,”21 only seven out of ten

children who enter primary school end up completing it. The 2014 Programme for the Analysis of Education

Systems (PASE) survey found that only 8.5 percent of students receive passing scores in French, and only

7.7 pass math.22. Seventy-two percent of children and 46 percent of pregnant women are anemic. Budget

execution remains very weak. According to the 2016 PEFA report, structural problems of budgeting, cash

management, and weak revenue mobilization undermine budgetary discipline.

Investments and basic service delivery are concentrated in Niamey. Population density is extremely

low in other areas of the country (the Agadez and Diffa regions, for example, represent 80 percent of the

territory but just 3 percent of the population). Low population density renders service delivery and

infrastructure investments extremely costly, stretching the state’s already weak resources and further

reducing its capacity to provide basic needs in these areas, thereby increasing marginalization.23 Urban

centers, particularly Niamey, exhibit the best human development outcomes. For instance, in Tahoua, 82

percent of the population lacks education; compared with 34 percent in Niamey.24 While Niamey represents

only 8 percent of the national population, it houses approximately 50 percent of its health staff, including

one-third of its doctors. The density of doctors in Niamey is 17 times greater than in Tillaberi and 13 times

greater than in Dosso. Poor road infrastructure in rural areas further impedes access to medical services.

Access to improved water is nearly universal in urban areas, while in rural areas where less than half of the

population has an improved access.25

Distribution of mining revenues and benefits, which would support greater regional development,

also suffers from territorial imbalances. Northern and eastern Niger boast extensive mining areas,

including exploitations of uranium (Akouta and Arlit mines), coal, gold, and modest amounts of oil since

2011 (Agadem). The current legal framework26 includes provisions for the retrocession of 15 percent of

mineral revenues to municipalities of mining regions (which must be allocated to the agriculture, health,

and education sectors). However, this share of revenues has not been regularly paid. For instance, Agadez

received only approximately 25 percent of its allocated share in 2012 and 2013, while Diffa received its

share just once, and only 50 percent of it. In addition, the preferential recruitment of staff from the capital

in these regions has caused tensions. In Diffa, the issue resulted in violent social unrest led by youth

20 World Bank 2016b. 21 Ministère de l’Education Nationale 2010. 22 World Bank 2016b. 23 IEDAS 2014. 24 World Bank 2016b 25 Forty-nine percent in 2015, according to the WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Program: www.wssinfo.org. 26 Especially the Mining Code of 2006. A 2007 decree and the 2010 Constitution have more precisely framed the

allocation of this retrocession.

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protesting against the oil companies’ extensive recruitment of Niamey rather than local personnel. Lastly,

there is a risk that the impending transition from artisanal to industrial gold mining in the Agadez region

will create perceptions of spoliation. While artisanal mining has successfully uncovered superficial gold

deposits to date, deeper deposits require the removal of large sand quantities and the introduction of external

companies with mechanical digging capacities. This will lead to a loss of livelihoods for artisanal miners,

as well as many former rebel leaders, which are directly or indirectly involved in the gold mining sector.

Authorities and formal operators will need to tread carefully to avoid an explosive situation.27

Territorial imbalances with regards to access to basic services and development outcomes, compounded

by the lack of decentralized mining revenues and benefits from associated activities in northern and eastern

Niger could cause growing tensions and resentments against the state. These grievances could be exploited

by radical groups to enlist marginalized population.

iii. Growing regional security threat

As a landlocked country surrounded by turbulent neighbors, Niger faces various security and

instability threats on all sides. The first impact of the Libyan civil war was that among the 260,000

migrants who left Libya for Niger, a significant number were Nigerien and Tuareg (namely Ishumar),28

which raised the risk of trouble and instability in the North. Thanks to the good relations between former

rebels and the authorities, and to the deterrent presence of Nigerien security forces, this massive return went

well. Moreover, the conflict in Libya has also led to a fall in remittances, which accounted for 80 percent

of household income in the Tchintabaraden district.29 In October 2011 the regime created the HACP to

manage the resettlement of the returning populations and the economic consequences of the Libyan conflict.

Niger is particularly weakened by terrorist activism in Mali and exposed to various threats (from terrorist

attack to kidnapping), while violent extremist groups increasingly build on Niger domestic community

conflicts to recruit and operate on the Niger soil. The fact that a Nigerien army battalion participates in the

MINUSMA30 operations in Mali further exposes the country to conflict and violence. Another worrying

situation is the one along the Niger-Nigeria border in the Diffa region. The humanitarian impact has been

enormous (see context section); it has threatened the economy in Niger’s south and deprived thousands of

Kanuri and Hausa traders of their activities, especially the youth.

The spread of insurgency is exacerbating local tensions. In Diffa, economic restrictions on the trade of

vegetables and fish have been imposed to starve Boko Haram’s of resources, but have also led to the loss

of local livelihoods and increased the risk of food insecurity.31 In addition, reprisals by Boko Haram against

civilians that collaborate with the army and the establishment of local vigilante committees have created a

deleterious atmosphere of collective fear and score-settling. The resulting escalation in tensions has led to

the formation of ethnic-based self-defense militias that, under the pretext of fighting Boko Haram, have

been involved in deadly intercommunal clashes. A similar dynamic is operating on the border with Mali,

where Fulani communities in particular are suspected of having ties with jihadist groups. In turn, Tuareg

27 Claims of mining spoliation was one of the core drivers of the Touareg MNJ’s (Mouvement des Nigériens pour la

justice) last rebellion in Niger. 28 Term derived from chômeur, the French name for the unemployed to designate the Tuareg population that left

Niger in favor of Libya in 1970 to flee from drought. 29 Shepherd and Melly 2016. 30 United Nations peacekeeping mission in Mali (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission

in Mali). 31 OCHA 2016.

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and Doosaak armed groups have reportedly used the pretext of countering jihadist groups to attack Fulani

communities. Militias of rival Fulani, Tuareg and Doosaak ethnic groups regularly accuse each other of

killing civilians as part of anti-terrorism operations.

Grievances over the lack of security and loss of revenue could further push the recruitment of youth into

the ranks of violent extremist groups. Furthermore, the armament of local self-defence groups to protect

their community and goods from terrorist organizations and their allies could further raise intercommunal

tensions and heighten the risk of local conflicts.

iv. Transversal FCV drivers

Youth exclusion. Youth in Niger evolve in a context of low education levels, very limited economic

opportunity, and difficulty acceding to land. As a result of the weak quality of the education system, youth

remain largely unskilled and basic jobs in electricity, repairs, plumbing, or services are often left to better-

educated foreigners. Insecurity has magnified their precarious economic and social situation. The state of

emergency in Diffa, in particular, has forced thousands of young Nigeriens to suspend their activities as

taxi-moto drivers, pepper producers, or fishermen. In addition, youth are generally excluded from the elite

coalition and any other circles of power. Because of their economic and political marginalization, youth are

even more vulnerable to the drivers of FCV described above, reinforcing their grievances and the risks of

mobilization and exploitation by radical groups or actors.

Demographic pressure. Niger has the highest population growth rate in the world, and is experiencing a

slow demographic transition. The fertility rate remains unchanged, with 7.6 children born per woman, and

child mortality is slowly declining. Based on this trend, Niger’s population will reach 34.5 million in 2030

and 69 million in 2050.32 The high fertility rate heralds a high dependency ratio and consequently limits

human capital accumulation, which is a core component of economic growth. Demographic growth

compounds fragility drivers by reinforcing land pressure and competition over resources, while weakening

the state’s ability to resist shocks (especially climate-related shocks) and to provide basic services, thereby

reinforcing the risks of FCV.

3) Factors of resilience

Niger benefits from several factors of resilience that help generate institutional arrangements that allow

various groups to coexist and manage violent contests.

A succession of coups d’état occurred without any state collapse and with limited incidences of

political violence. Even if institutions are impacted by successive coups d’état, they constitute a factor of

resilience in the sense that they never collapse, even in spite of the recurrent political instability. The

succeeding civilian and military authorities are attentive to their minimal functioning and stability. The

HACP is probably the best illustration of this institutional continuity.

Social cohesion has prevailed over sporadic tensions. This is partly due to the historic and regular

migrations (for commercial and economic reasons) between regions, which has led populations to mix. For

instance, the majority of Agadez’s population is Hausa; on the other side, Tuareg from Agadez are deeply

connected to Niamey through many social and economic networks. The ruling authorities since Kountché

have also promoted this social mixing by appointing civil servants independent of their ethnicity. Such

mixing tends to reduce the communal identities in favor of social and national cohesion. Subregional

migrations have also constituted a valve and contributed to the absorption of economic and climatic shocks.

32 UN 2013.

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In addition, various nongovernmental actors are dedicated to leading public awareness campaigns and

promoting dialogue, both to prevent conflicts and to solve them.

Civil society organizations play an active role in contributing to country’s resilience. They launch

awareness-building activities on various topics dedicated to reducing fragility or implementing projects

funded by international aid. For instance, a coalition of civil society organizations was formed in 2014 to

support adaptation to climate change. Farmers’ organizations such as the Nigerien Platform of Farmers

(PFPN) are also crucial actors in attempts to improve agricultural conditions. Agriculture and climate

change are priority topics for Niger’s resilience, but civil society is also mobilized on other issues, like the

democratic consolidation.

Some official institutions also play a stabilizing role and act as a counterpower. The HACP may

represent a factor of resilience regarding the situation in northern Niger. It was created in 2011 to replace

the High Authority for the National Reconciliation and the Democracy Consolidation (HARNCD) created

in 2010 on the ashes of the High Commissariat for Peace Restoration (HCRP) launched in 1994. From the

first rebellion until now, peace has been considered a continual process with a strong political backing. As

a key partner of the UNDP and other international donors, the HACP assures the coordination of

international aid dedicated to the North (and also the East, where the HACP is more and more active). It is

a useful tool for anticipating and mitigating social, religious, and community tensions.

International support represents a deterrent for any disturbing force that would try to contest the

sociopolitical order. Various interviews conducted over many years with young Tuareg and army officers

allow us to assume that international political and military support acts as a deterrent for the military, the

political opposition, or another actor that might be tempted to act disruptively and to threaten the political

order. The presence of international forces also helps limit extremist groups’ capacity to establish

themselves in the Aïr mountains, in the Ténéré and on the Nigerien shores of the Lake Chad.

4) Recommendations

Based on this analysis of risks and resilience factors, and drawing on experiences from both Niger and other

fragile contexts, the following recommendations can be taken into consideration by the government, the

WBG, and other donors.

FCV environment

It will be pivotal to establish a risk monitoring framework in the coming months, with the objective

of informing policy dialogue and helping design and adapt WBG interventions. The system would

bring together qualitative analyses33 and data feeds, that would lead to a discussion within the CMU and

with relevant global practices. It could build on the existing Global RiskScan that was set up in 2012 by the

FCV cross- cutting solution area, and be based on a number of desk- or field-based indicators and reports

that could be easily monitored to assess context dynamics and adjust strategy and programs accordingly.

Doing so would support a stronger focus on FCV prevention in WBG strategy and operations, which need

to avoid a “business as usual” approach and should be smartly designed, coordinated, and aligned. As a

result, well-adapted development aid and stabilization support, together with sound technical advice, can

incentivize leaders, elites, and their constituencies and supporters to refrain from embracing conflict-prone

decisions or behaviors.

33 Including those pertaining to political developments and evolution of the elite system; the developments of the

security situation, including regional security trends, state presence, legitimacy, and capacity; and the evolution of

the socioeconomic situation and the public’s perceptions.

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The WBG should apply a fragility lens to every project, ensure it addresses the population’s needs

while supporting a stronger social contract between the state and the population. Any intervention

should help address geographic imbalances and the exclusion of lagging regions or borderland areas. This

involves ensuring that WBG interventions are evenly distributed between institutional support and direct

support to people across the entire territory. Communities should be involved in program design and

implementation (including community oversight and feedback mechanisms, or specific M&E indicators on

vulnerability or fragility)34 and by reinforcing non-state actors such as producers’ organizations, producers’

networks, and cooperatives. Interventions should also strengthen the confidence pact between the

government, the regional authorities, and the population, in order to contribute to greater stability.

The WBG should ensure it adopts good practices for insecure and fragile environments when

engaging, in particular: (1) paying attention to the simplicity of design and focusing on immediate causes

of fragility with fewer components; (2) investing in preparation so that projects are ready to be rapidly

implemented; (3) when designing a response, task teams and donors should consult as widely as possible

with local people and communities of the affected areas; (4) making sure the existing procurement plan

guides implementation and is updated accordingly as activities become clearer and situations of insecurity

become better known; (5) determining security costs associated with operating in insecure areas; and (6)

making sure task teams avoid designing project objectives that are focused on addressing the security

situation, because this is not within the realm of what the WBG does best. As such, the project development

objective needs to be very narrow.35

Governance issues

The WBG can support public institutional reforms to increase accountability and responsiveness.

Effective reforms aimed at improving the administration’s efficiency must be rooted in the national context

and take into account local practical norms. Any attempt to reform public institutions would need to take

into account the findings of the 2014 and 2015 LASDEL studies on bureaucratic culture and practical norms

in the Nigerien administration.36 Reforms need to be collectively designed and supported in the long term.

Reforms will have a much better chance of succeeding if they rely on innovating and reforming personalities

and coalitions inside each administration, even if their impact is primarily limited to the local level.

Any support to governance and the preparation of WBG programs should be guided by the principle

of promoting transparency, information, and oversight. Participation mechanisms need to be

improved—directly or through civil society organizations—and assessed for effectiveness; there should be

a connection to formal authorities and a role for customary and religious authorities. As per WBG program

rules, all projects should produce documents in local languages and integrate outreach programs to explain

policies, legal matters, and institutional changes to the population. All programs must support

anticorruption and transparency. Doing so will involve institutional and public finance management

reforms, transparency, parliamentary and judiciary control, and also CSO oversight. Only strong and

effective external oversight will be able to make a difference.

Climate vulnerability and environmental degradation

Activities supporting the agricultural sector should take into account the need to ensure the fair

cohabitation of different soil uses given the scarcity of natural resources, including the cohabitation of

farmers and herders. This involves paying attention to land policy at the national and local levels and

34 Such as perception of insecurity, confidence in local authorities. 35 These general recommendations are taken from World Bank 2015. 36 De Sardan, O., 2014, 2015a.

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focusing on the need to create secured transhumance corridors in agreement with concerned communities

and herders. It also involves improving local conflict management mechanisms in light of the weakness of

the formal justice system. The resilience of farmers and herders should be strengthened, notably through

better access to rural finance, the development of local transforming industries and irrigated agriculture,

and the introduction of technology or improved seeds. Activities should also attempt to curb the

overexploitation of forests due to increasing demands for energy, and as a direct consequence, the

desertification of the country, which first and foremost affects the agriculture sector.

Tensions over the share of mining revenues

Support should be provided to the inclusive management of extractives. Efforts should be deployed to

ensure the enforcement of the 2006 mining code in an effective and inclusive way, and in particular the

decentralization of 15 percent of mining revenues to mining regions. Support should be provided to the

development and implementation of a local content policy aimed at generating sustained and inclusive

growth in the mining regions through economic diversification and employment opportunities. Moreover,

assistance should be provided to the authorities in their attempts to formalize gold mining in northern Niger,

which will have consequences on the existing value chain and on people involved in it, and could therefore

risk destabilizing the region.

Growing insecurity

Any WBG communication, outreach, or visibility activity should clearly emphasize the WBG’s twin

goals and the improvement of Nigeriens’ living conditions. This will help avoid linking security and

development interventions too closely, which could lead the population to misperceive WBG intentions

and objectives.

The WB should consider supporting alternative economic opportunities for the youth of Diffa who

are deprived of their jobs due to the state of emergency, as well as displaced populations and host

communities. Beyond the creation of labor-intensive works (haute intensité de main d’oeuvre, HIMO) and

income-generating activities, the region needs to develop durable new economic activities that are not

dependent on the situation in Nigeria, by diversifying agricultural production and creating new sources of

supply within Niger’s territory. To ensure that humanitarian or development assistance does not raise

tensions between communities, aid must be carefully distributed and benefit local populations that have not

directly suffered from the Boko Haram crisis. Some tensions between native and nonnative populations

have recently surfaced in Diffa because of this issue.

Support should be provided to the establishment and implementation of a new strategy to manage

areas affected by jihadist groups and rebellions. This should include a security strategy aimed at

strengthening the internal security forces (police, gendarmerie) while abstaining from relying on local

militias for counter-insurgency efforts, and reducing stigmatization of entire communities on the grounds

that they are "collectively" favorable to the jihadist project (such as the Fulani and the Buduma). Former

combatants should be demobilized and reintegrated, especially those who have not been involved in serious

crimes, while consulting victims and their representatives to avoid a cycle of score-settling (ICG, 2017b).

The establishment of formal and informal dispute resolution mechanisms should also be supported.

Youth exclusion

Youth exclusion should be addressed by reforming the education sector and improving vocational

training. A better control of madrasas and Koranic schools should be pursued by instituting some rigorous

inspection missions, and build bridges between formal and religious education providers. From this

perspective, the work achieved by the NGO Eirene in Maradi and Diffa may be a source of inspiration. The

11

NGO successfully introduced French language learning and vocational training in Koranic schools. The

introduction of incentives to employ youth in the formal sector should also be considered.

Demographic growth

Niger’s demographic growth could become an opportunity if the state can successfully collect taxes

and increase professional opportunities for those entering the job market. Despite a recent increase,

Niger has a very low tax collection rate compared to the UEMOA’s objectives, because of a very limited

fiscal base due to an improper VAT system (with a high rate of exoneration), the predominance of an

informal economy, and the absence of tax for agriculture production.37 Job creation will probably continue

to lag behind population growth over the coming decade. The reservoir of unemployed youth continues to

expand, especially in urban areas (especially in the burgeoning cities), where the population’s growth rate

is the highest, at 5 percent per year.38

37 Moumi, 2012. 38 USAID, 2013.

12

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