Risk of incursion
• The risk of incursion of H5N1 HPAI viruses (or other pathogens) into a farm is determined by:
- the number of ‘contacts’/links with the world outside the farm
- the probability of each of these ‘contacts’involving infected or contaminated material
Risk of virus incursion
• This depends on the level of infection in the area (hard to measure and varies over time) …
• And the measures taken to reduce the likelihood of infection on/in items that enter the farm (e.g. water treatment , change of clothes, etc)
Risk of virus incursion
• Each individual farm or flock has its own risk profile for introduction of pathogens and subsequent development of disease
• This is influenced by a number of factors, including the density of farms (density-dependent (airborne) and density-independent pathogens)
Biosecurity
• “All measures taken to prevent incursion and spread of disease/pathogens”
• “Biosecurity means taking steps to ensure good hygiene practices are in place so that the risk of a disease occurring or spreading is minimized” Defra UK
Farm biosecurity measures
• Location • Physical• Operational
• Disease can occur as a result of inattention to any of these
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• Industrial integrated system with high level biosecurity and birds/products marketed commercially (low risk, high impact)
Poultry production system 1
• Highly sophisticated biosecurity measures • Often international linkages (operating in
more than one country) • Strong political connections (trust)
• High level of inputs and outputs• Prepared to relocate to more isolated sites• High impact if outbreak occurs
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• Commercial non-integrated poultry production system; ‘moderate to high biosecurity’; birds and products marketed commercially
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• Commercial poultry production system; minimum or very low biosecurity; marketing via live bird markets
Poultry production system 3
• Minimal investment in biosecurity measures• Sometimes due to lack of capital or lack of
ownership of facilities• Some develop from smaller flock• Opportunistic• Often linked to live poultry markets • Some production methods cannot be made
biosecure without totally changing the method of production (e.g. grazing ducks)
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• Village or back yard production(scavenging) - no biosecurity, informal marketing
Poultry production system 4
• In some places limited links to formal market chain and in isolated communities very low risk (unless wild birds involved)
• Attempts to fence scavenging poultry make no sense to poultry owners
What has H5N1 HPAI taught us?
• Classifying all industrialised poultry farms together, without regard to the biosecurity measures implemented is unhelpful (provides no indication of the likelihood of disease outbreaks on individual farms)
• This simplistic approach has been adopted by many of those critical of ‘intensive production” and its purported role in H5N1 HPAI
What has H5N1 HPAI taught us?
• Most reports of H5N1 HPAI outbreaks in intensively reared poultry in Asia provide insufficient detail on the biosecurity measures practiced to assess whether disease occurred as a result of poor management or the level of infection around the farm overwhelmed otherwise ‘reasonable’ measures
What has H5N1 HPAI taught us?
• In some situations, on-farm biosecurity measures alone are not enough to prevent infection and disease (e.g. Hong Kong) –combination of improved biosecurity with vaccination
• Outbreaks may depend on a series of low probability events
What has H5N1 HPAI taught us?
• ‘Blame’ for Asian-lineage H5N1 HPAI outbreaks cannot be attributed to any one production system (but note role of domestic ducks and poorly regulated live poultry markets)
• Farms in all systems have been affected and played some role in the persistence and spread of this disease
• Although more cases of HPAI are generally found in system 3 flocks there is insufficient accurate data to allow comparisons of susceptibility of different farm types (denominator data and ascertainment bias)
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Risk analysis
• Done informally in establishing biosecurity measures
• Should be done more often for farms • Will highlight large gaps in knowledge
regarding the level of hazard to farms• Should follow standard steps • Qualitative, but can still measure certain
aspects especially the effects of interventions
Biocontainment
• Most farmers focus on preventing entry of pathogens and less about preventing onward spread
• Major issue in areas with high poultry farm density
• Role for government in regulation and enforcement
Enhancing farm biosecurity
• Market forces (& self interest)
• Regulation (and cost sharing for emergency disease)
• Communication/persuasion (get message right)
• Threat of litigation? (not yet but look at food safety in the US after E.coli O157)
• Like buying insurance
The future
• Loss of public tolerance for control through mass culling
• Pressure on areas with high concentrations of farms
• Pressure on system 3 (more contract growing?)
The future
• Greater enforcement/regulation• Use of complementary measures if
needed for ‘high risk’ production systems rather than their elimination
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