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ROMÂNIA
MINISTERUL EDUCAŢIEI NAŢIONALE ŞI CERCETĂRII ŞTIINŢIFICE
UNIVERSITATEA “VASILE ALECSANDRI” din BACĂU
FACULTATEA de INGINERIE
Calea Mărăşeşti, Nr. 157, Bacău, 600115, Tel./Fax +40 234 580170
http://inginerie.ub.ro, [email protected]
PHD THESIS SUMMARY
RISK MANAGEMENT AND INDUSTRIAL
SAFETY FOR PREVENTION, PROTECTION
AND INTERVENTION IN THE EVENT
OF MAJOR ACCIDENTS TO AN
OBJECTIVE TYPE SEVESO
COORDINATOR,
Univ. dr. eng. Dr. h. c.
Valentin NEDEFF Doctorand,
eng. FELEGEANU DANIEL-CĂTĂLIN
BACĂU - 2016
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Thanks
With the completion of this stage of my life, I want to express words of gratitude to the most
important personalities who guided me and gave me the necessary support for development and
completion of this doctoral thesis.
First of all, I want to thank and to express my gratitude to my scientific coordinator, Univ.
Prof. Dr. eng. Dr.h.c Valentin Nedeff, for his outstanding support for ongoing guidance,
encouragement and remarkable ideas given over the period of preparation and elaborating of this
doctoral thesis. Through the professionalism of his high academic support, patience and
understanding manifested, and through the shared knowledge, permanent encouraging and guidance
during the successive stages, especially in difficult times, he had a very important contribution in
ellaborating and completion of this work.
Equally, I would like to thank to assoc. Prof. doctor engineer Mirela Panainte Lehadus who
guided and supported me constantly throughout the correction and doctoral studies for both the
thesis and for achieving the realization of the published articles. Also, I am grateful to Mrs. prof.
Dr. dr. eng. Luminiţa Bibire for the way in which she directed and supported me during this period,
for all the scientific support provided, but also for the permanent welcome, criticism, which helped
me to get out of the jams taken at certain steps.
Special thanks to Mr. assist. univ. dr. Mircea Horubeţ, from the Department of Foreign
Languages and Literatures, for the support during the thesis ellaboration.
I also want to thank to my colleague from the Inspectorate for Emergency Situations Bacau
County, Mrs. Professor Lidia Axinte and to Mrs. Professor Enache Veronica for their support
during this thesis ellaboration.
I want to thank in particular to Mr assoc. Prof. dr. eng. Emilian Mosnegutu for his support to achieve the schemes of the thesis.
I want to thank to the Company's management of Amurco LLC Bacau and particularly to the
civil protection inspector Mrs Anca Mihai for her technical support and the offered documentation,
her trust in the use of data and implementation of accident scenarios that constituted the subject of
study of this thesis.
Sincere thanks I want to bring to the doctoral fellows from the University "Vasile
Alecsandri" of Bacau, which over five years have contributed in a certain to achieve, develop and
complete in good conditions and successfully this thesis.
Particularly thanks to my former colleagues at the Regional Centre for Training of Civil
Protection Bacau for their support in 2015 to ensure the necessary time to achieve the
documentation and structure of this thesis.
Special thanks to my wife, Liliana, who has supported me unconditionally throughout the
doctoral studies, and who had the power to motivate my absences from the domestic activities,
especially during the last period. I also want to thank especially to my children Larisa -Elena and
Eduard-Constantin, to my mother, my brother and my sisters and to all our friends who have
supported me permanently, for the understanding they have shown, their moral and spiritual
encouragement, so necessary, especially during the difficult moments we went through sometimes.
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SUMMARY
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.............................................................................................. 8/8
DEFINITION OF MAIN TERMS............................................................................................. 10
CHAPTER 1. RISK AND INDUSTRIAL SECURITY............................................................ 14/11
1.1. RISK MANAGEMENT.............................................................................................. 14/11
1.1.1. RISK................................................................................................................... 15/12
1.1.2. CLASSIFICATION OF RISKS....................................................................... 15/12
1.1.3. RISK MANAGEMENT – STEPS IN THE PROCESS OF MANAGEMENT. 20
1.1.3.1. Risk identification.................................................................................. 20
1.1.3.2. Risk analyses.......................................................................................... 20
1.1.3.3. Planning.................................................................................................. 21
1.1.3.4. Monitoring.............................................................................................. 21
1.1.3.5. Control.................................................................................................... 21
1.1.3.6. Communication....................................................................................... 22
1.2. INDUSTRIAL RISK FACTORS IN DIFFERENT AREAS OF ACTIVITY........ 22/14
1.2.1. INDUSTRIAL RISK FACTORS IN MACHINERY BUILDING.................. 22
1.2.2. INDUSTRIAL RISK FACTORS IN THE FIELD OF CHEMISTRY AND
PETROCHEMISTRY.....................................................................................................
25
1.2.2.1. Accidents, damages, explosions and fires.............................................. 25
1.2.2.2. Risks arising from substances that can be used by operators................. 26
1.2.3. FIRE RISK FACTORS IN INDUSTRIAL AND CIVIL AREA.......................... 26
1.2.4. INDUSTRIAL RISK FACTORS IN NUCLEAR FIELD.................................... 30
1.2.5.INDUSTRIAL RISK FACTORS IN THE TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS
SUBSTANCES................................................................................................................
31/14
1.3. INDUSTRIAL SECURITY........................................................................................ 32/15
1.3.1. INFLUENCING FACTORS OF SECURITY IN DIFFERENT
INDUSTRIAL AREAS..................................................................................................
33/15
1.3.1.1. Influencing factors of industrial security in machinery building.............. 33
1.3.1.2. Influencing factors of industrial security in the field of chemistry
and petrochemistry................................................................................................
35/16
1.3.1.2.1. The safety report (in the context of Seveso)................................... 35/16
1.3.1.2.2. Major accidents prevention policy.................................................. 36/17
1.3.1.2.3. Internal and external emergency plan............................................. 38
1.3.1.2.4. Plans to prevent accidental pollution............................................... 38
1.3.1.2.5. Risk maps........................................................................................ 39
1.3.1.2.6. Measurements of emissions and imissions, monitoring of
technological processes in order to prevent pollution...................................
39
1.3.1.2.7. Report analyses and evaluation of environmental pollution........... 40
1.3.2. INFLUENCING FACTORS OF SECURITY AT FIRE...................................... 40
1.3.2.1. Management structure that will ensure fire safety..................................... 41
1.3.2.2. The activities to be carried in case of fire.................................................. 41
1.3.3. INFLUENCING FACTORS OF SECURITY IN TRANSPORT OF
DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES.....................................................................................
44
CHAPTER 2. MANAGEMENT OF MAJOR ACCIDENTS INVOLVING DANGEROUS
SUBSTANCES...............................................................................................................................
49/19
2.1. MAJOR ACCIDENTS THAT INVOLVED DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES....... 49/19
2.1.1. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ACCIDENT AT SEVESO ITALY......................... 50/19
2.1.2. OTHER MAJOR INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS THAT TOOK PLACE IN
THE WORLD ALONG THE TIME..............................................................................
51/21
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2.2. LEGAL ISSUES.......................................................................................................... 55/22
2.2.1. CHARACTERISTICS OF SEVESO DIRECTIVE............................................ 56
2.2.2. IMPLEMENTATION OF SEVESO DIRECTIVE II......................................... 57
2.2.3. SEVESO DIRECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION IN ROMANIA......................... 58/23
CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL SOLUTIONS REGARDING THE CONTROL OF
MAJOR ACCIDENTS RISK.......................................................................................................
60/25
3.1. INDUSTRIAL RISK EVALUATION METHODS IN WHICH ARE
INVOLVED DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES..................................................................
61/26
3.1.1. HAZOP METHOD............................................................................................. 62
3.1.1.1. Generalitie................................................................................................. 62
3.1.1.2. Details of the HAZOP methodology......................................................... 62
3.1.2. METHOD OF PROTECTION BARRIERS LOPA (LAYER OF
PROTECTION ANALYSIS).........................................................................................
64
3.1.2.1. Generalities................................................................................................. 64
3.1.3. TECHNICAL/ TECHNOLOGICAL RISK ANALYSIS METHOD –
MOSAR........................................................................................................................
67
3.1.4. ARAMIS METHOD............................................................................................ 70
3.1.4.1. Presentation ARAMIS project targets....................................................... 70
3.1.4.2. The main results of ARAMIS project....................................................... 70
3.1.4.2.1. Basic concepts.............................................................................. 70
3.1.4.3. Evolution, takeover and application of the project................................... 72
3.1.4.4. The method application............................................................................ 72
3.1.5. METHOD QRA..................................................................................................... 73
3.1.5.1. Selecting installations for QRA................................................................ 73
3.1.5.2. Defining the produced events and their frequency.................................... 74
3.1.5.3. Modelling the dangerous phenomena intensity......................................... 74
3.1.5.4. The calculation and presentation of results............................................... 74
3.1.6. OCTAVE METHOD............................................................................................. 75
3.1.7. MEHARI METHOD............................................................................................. 76
3.1.8. CHECKLIST METHOD FOR RISK ANALYSIS............................................... 77
3.1.8.1. Describing analysis stages of risk............................................................... 78
3.1.8.1.1. Identification of relevant security installation............................... 78
3.1.8.1.2. Dangers identification................................................................... 78
3.1.9. METHODS BASED ON CONSEQUENCES....................................................... 81
3.1.10. METHODS BASED ON RISK............................................................................ 81
3.1.11. THE ”DETERMINISTIC” APPROACH............................................................. 82
3.1.12. COMBINED METHODS.................................................................................... 82
3.2. ANALYSIS AND SELECTION OF STRONG POINTS IDENTIFIED AT
THE STUDIED RISK EVALUATION METHODS.........................................................
90
3.3. ANALYSIS OF WEAK POINTS IDENTIFIED AT THE STUDIED RISK
EVALUATION METHODS..............................................................................................
91
3.4. ADVANTAGES OF THE EXISTING METHODS FOR ELLABORATING
A NEW METHOD...............................................................................................................
2/34
3.5. THE PRINCIPLE OF CARMIS METHOD............................................................... 93/35
3.6. STAGES AND METHODOLOGY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE CARMIS/DS METHOD.............................................................................................
93/35
3.6.1. DESCRIPTION OF STAGES................................................................................. 95
3.6.2. SWOT ANALYSIS OF CARMIS METHOD........................................................ 101/37
CHAPTER 4. BASE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF TECHNICAL
RESEARCH ON INDUSTRIAL AND SECURITY MANAGEMENT...................................
102
4.1. GENERAL STAGES OF RISK ANALYSIS......................................................... 103
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4.2. SIMULATION PROGRAMS USED IN RISK EVALUATION AND ITS
ENVIRONMENTAL AND POPULATION IMPACT.................................................
105
4.2.1. SIMULATION PROGRAM EFFECTS 7.......................................................... 105
4.2.2. SIMULATION PROGRAM SLAB View.......................................................... 106
4.2.3. SIMULATION PROGRAM SEVEX View....................................................... 107
4.2.4. SIMULATION PROGRAM PHA Pro 7............................................................ 108
4.2.5. SIMULATION PROGRAM ISC- AERMOD.................................................... 108
4.2.6. SIMULATION PROGRAM ALOHA............................................................... 109
4.3. DATABASE OF OBJECTIVES TO BE ANALYSED REQUIRED FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF CARMIS METHOD.............................................................
111
4.4. PLANS AND SCENARIOS FOR THE EXERCISES AND
APPLICATIONS................................................................................................................
111
CHAPTER 5. SETTING RESEARCH METHODOLOGY FOR RESEARCH ,
CORRELATIONS AND MATHEMATICAL MODELS.........................................................
112/38
5.1. INFLUENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS ON MAJOR
ACCIDENTS INVOLVING DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES........................................
112
5.2. METHODOLOGY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CARMIS
METHOD BASED ON A CASE STUDY AT S.C. AMURCO S.R.L..........................
114
5.2.1. ESTABLISHMENT OF EVALUATION TEAM................................................. 114/38
5.2.2. DEFINING THE SYSTEM ANALYSIS (INSTALLATION/
TECHNOLOGY).............................................................................................................
115/39
5.2.2.1. Location of installation (location).............................................................. 115/39
5.2.2.2. General technical plan of the economic operator....................................... 116/40
5.2.2.3. Describing the system (process, chemical installation).............................. 117/41
5.2.2.4. Process or control installations................................................................... 118/42
5.2.2.5. Normative manufacturing , tehnological schemes , operating
Procedures..............................................................................................................
119/44
5.2.2.6. Quantities of dangerous substances and their characteristics..................... 121/45
5.2.2.7. Metheorological conditions of the area to place the objective................... 122/46
5.2.2.8. Seismic characteristics of the area............................................................. 123/47
5.2.3. ANALYSIS OF THE LAND AND IDENTIFICATION OF RISK
FACTORS IN THE SYSTEM.........................................................................................
123/47
5.2.3.1. Presentation of the installation, identifying of sources of danger............... 124/48
5.2.3.2. Inventory of dangerous substances............................................................. 124/48
5.2.3.3. Identifying danger, risk assessment and control......................................... 125/49
5.2.3.4. Identification the area with the highest risk............................................... 126/50
5.2.3.5. Setting targets for prevention...................................................................... 130/54
5.2.4. ESTABLISHING CHECKLISTS........................................................................... 131/55
5.2.5. DRAFTING THE TREES OF FAILURE............................................................... 133/57
5.2.6. ELABORATING THE ACCIDENT SCENARIO.................................................. 134/58
5.2.6.1. SIMULATION OF DISTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL TANK OF
AMMONIA REALIZED WITH THE SIMULATION PROGRAM LOHA.............
138/62
5.2.6.1.1. THE EVENT SCENARIO, INTRODUCTION OF DATA INTO
THE PROGRAM..............................................................................................
140/64
5.2.6.1.2. DESCRIPTION OF THE SITE........................................................ 141/65
5.2.6.1.3. THE METHEOROLOGICAL SITUATION................................... 142/66
5.2.6.1.4. ESTABLISHING THE SOURCES FOR THE SCENARIO........... 143/67
5.2.6.1.5. THE CHEMICAL DANGEROUS SUBSTANCE.......................... 143/67
5.2.6.1.6. ONE CHOOSES THE SITUATION WHEN THE SUBSTANCE
DOES NOT BURN...........................................................................................
144/67
5.2.6.1.7. MATHEMATIC MODELING AND PRINCIPLES
REGARDING THE NUMBER SIMULATION..............................................
145/69
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5.2.6.1.8. QUANTITY AND AMMONIA LEAK TIME.................................. 146/69
5.2.6.1.9. AMMONIA LEAK FREE ZONE WITHOUT FIRE....................... 149/72
5.2.6.1.10. INFLAMABIL AREA..................................................................... 150/73
5.2.6.1.11. AREA OF EXPLOSION.................................................................. 151/73
5.2.6.1.12. ESTABLISHING THE EVACUATION ZONES............................ 152/74
5.2.7. ASSESSING RISK FACTORS IDENTIFIED IN TERMS OF
SERIOUSNESS.............................................................................................................
152/74
5.2.8. EVALUATION OF INITIATING FREQUENCY EVENTS AND
CONFIDENCE LEVELS OF BARRIERS...................................................................
153/75
5.2.9. ESESTIMATING THE DIRECT IMPACT OVER THE ASSETS, THE
DATES AND INFORMATION, INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE STAFF...............
158/80
5.2.10. EVALUATION OF THE EXISTING PROTECTION FACTORS,
COMPENSATION AND REHABILITATION............................................................
158/80
5.2.11. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF SAFETY BARRIER.......................... 161/83
5.3. METHODOLOGY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE METHOD
CARMIS/DS FOR A CASE STUDY AT S.C. CHIMCOMPLEX S.A..........................
163
5.3.1. ESTABLISHMENT OF EVALUATION TEAM............................................... 163
5.3.2. DEFINING THE SYSTEM ANALYSIS (INSTALLATION/
TECHNOLOGY)..........................................................................................................
163
5.3.2.1. Location of the installation (location)..................................................... 163
5.3.2.2. Activity profile........................................................................................ 164
5.3.2.3. Process or control installations............................................................... 164
5.3.2.3.1. Chlor installation...................................................................... 164
5.3.2.4. Quantity of dangerous substances and their characteristics..................... 165
5.3.2.4.1. Chlor – Cl2............................................................................... 165
5.3.2.4.2. Ammonia - NH3...................................................................... 165
5.3.2.4.3. Monomethylamine................................................................... 166
5.3.2.5. The metheorologic situation of the area for the location of the
objective...............................................................................................................
167
5.3.3. ANALYSIS OF THE LAND AND IDENTIFICATION OF RISK FACTORS
IN THE SYSTEM.........................................................................................................
168
5.3.3.1. Identification of the dangers, risk evaluating and control....................... 168
5.3.3.1.1. Identification of the danger of substances.................................. 168
5.3.3.1.2. Risk evaluation........................................................................... 168
5.3.3.2. Identification of the the area with the highest risk.................................... 169
5.3.3.2.1. Chlor installation........................................................................ 169
5.3.3.2.2. Identification of highest risk areas............................................. 170
5.3.4. ESTABLISHMENT OF CHECKLISTS.............................................................. 170
5.3.5. DRAFTING THE TREES OF FAILURE............................................................ 171
5.3.6. ELABORATION OF THE ACCIDENT SCENARIO......................................... 171
5.3.6.1. SIMULATION OF THE CHEMICAL ACCIDENT WITH THE
CHLORINE TANK CRACKING, SIMULATION PROGRAM
COMPLETED WITH THE ALOHA.....................................................................
173
5.3.6.1.1. THE EVENT SCENARIO, ENTERING DATA IN THE
PROGRAM.................................................................................................
173
5.3.6.1.2. DESCRIPTION OF THE SITE........................................................ 174
5.3.6.1.3. THE METHEOROLOGICAL SITUATION................................... 174
5.3.6.1.4. SCENARIOS FOR DETERMINING THE SOURCE.................... 175
5.3.6.1.5. MATHEMATIC MODELING AND PRINCIPLES
REGARDING THE NUMBER SIMULATION.............................................
178
5.3.6.1.6. THE QUANTITY AND THE TIME FLOW CHLORINE.............. 180
5.3.7. EVALUATION OF RISK FACTORS IDENTIFIED FROM THE GRAVITY
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POINT OF VIEW........................................................................................................... 181
5.3.8.EVALUATION OF INITI ATING EVENTS AND THE CONFIDENCE
LEVELS OF BARRIERS................................................................................................
181
5.3.9. ESTIMATION OF DIRECT IMPACT ON THE GOODS, DATES,
INFORMATION, INFRASTRUCTURE, STAFF..........................................................
182
5.3.10. EVALUATION FACTORS FROM PROTECTION, COMPENSATION AND
REHABILITATION OF EXISTING...............................................................................
183
5.3.11. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF SAFETY BARRIERS............................ 184
CHAPTER 6. OBTAINED EXPERIMENTAL REZULTS..................................................... 186/85
6.1. OBTAINED EXPERIMENTAL REZULTS AND THEIR
INTERPRETATION.........................................................................................................
186/85
6.2. DRAFTING SECURITY REPORT, THE MAIN DOCUMENT OF THE
MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY SYSTEM.................................................................
188/87
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS...................................................................................................... 190/89
BIBLIOGRAPHY.......................................................................................................................... 197/96
APPENDIX NO. 1 – Economic operators from Bacau county ranked in terms of
SEVESO III. Directive
APPENDIX NO. 2 – Situation of objectives at risk -chemical accident from Bacau
County.
APPENDIX NO.3 – Fire situation on settlement and causes in 2014 .
APPENDIX NO. 4 – Security report at S.C. AMURCO S.R.L. BACĂU.
APPENDIX NO. 5 – Security report at S.C. CHIMCOMPLEX S.A. ONEŞTI.
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GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
The existence of the sources of risk and the production of natural and technological disasters
are increasingly more in the attention of scientists and specialists from institutions with
responsabilities in this area. The phenomena and disaster risk sources , the causes and the
consequences of events are analysed more thoroughly by the specialists within the studies at work ,
research in the field, symposia, scientific communications and other forms. The first necessary
condition for economic growth and for the protection of the employees is the security of the
economic operators that use dangerous substances in the manufacturing process and its
implementation can be done by developing a new concept of security in the chemical industry. This
concept must follow the approach of technological and ecological problems of the economic
operator , the security aspects of the environment and protect the site in terms of physical security
from fire and natural disasters as well as the limitation of the consequences of producing the events
which still occur and the complete restoring of the production capacity [63].
Risks are present in all the economic and industrial activities that are marked both by
economic loss from damage occuring at the installations or machinery, as well as by producing
minor or major accidents with particularly serious consequences resulting in deaths and injuries or
the pollution of the environment. [64].
The evaluation of risk levels stimulates the economic operators to improve their working
conditions and the environment respectively to take measures for passing from higher levels of risks
to lower, acceptable levels. The application and the generalization of such methods allows the
establishment of social security allowances which can vary according to the level of risk/security of
the economic operators including the criteria of safety in their wages and the criteria of productivity
and complexity of work. [12].
The activity of risk management developed both from a conceptual and practical point of
view , became an industry in the countries with functioning financial markets, but in Romania few
organizations have developed their own mechanisms for measurement and covering the risks, but
others do not even know the benefits they would get by applying the procedures already established
[13].
The active participants in the process of harmonizing risk evaluation methods recommend a
quantitative estimation method for major accident risk. According to the possible consequences of
the accident, major security systems installation and protection of the employees and the people of
the incidence are established. An accurate estimation of the risk of a major accident offers the
possibility of providing better protection for potential receptors. The factors necessary for changing
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legislation regarding the prevention of major accidents in Europe were not enough deepen and
modelled up to present and the relationship between a major accident and changing legislation is
still unclear [111].
Globally, the chemical industry has held a series of major accidents. In Europe, the accident
in Seveso-Italy in 1976 led to the adoption of legislation to prevent and control such accidents. In
1982 the European Council adopted Directive no. 501/EC of 24 June 1982 on the major accident
hazards of certain industrial activities - Seveso I Directive replaced by the Seveso II Directive -
Council Directive 96/82/EC from 9 December 1996 regarding the control of major accident hazards
involving dangerous substances, subsequently amended and repealed by the Seveso III Directive
2012/18/EU of the EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT and of the COUNCIL from 4 July 2012 on the
control of major accident hazards involving dangerous substances [12, 63].
Industrial accidents involving dangerous substances, often have very serious consequences.
Some serious accidents, well known as those from Seveso, Bhopal, Schweizerhalle, Enschede,
Toulouse and Buncefield have caused significant loss of life and/or environmental destruction as
also costs of billions of euros. After these accidents, the political awareness level regarding risk
recognition and initiation of appropriate precautions to protect citizens and communities has
increased significantly [104].
Seveso II Directive, which covers approximately 10,000 entities in the European Union, had
an essential role in reducing the probability of producing chemical accidents and their consequences
.However, it is necessary at all times to ensure the maintenance of high levels of existing protection
and, if possible, such protection to be further improved. Major accidents produced in Toulouse -
France Enschede - Netherlands, Bhopal - India, Baia Mare - Romania have been studied in depth by
specialists of the European Union, resulting in the need to change legislation in this area with
immediate effects on the activities of economic operators who use dangerous substances in the
production process or transport of dangerous substances [6, 34].
Seveso II Directive was transposed into Romanian legislation by H. G. no. 95 of 2003 on
"control of the activities of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances", replaced in
2007 by H.G. no. 804. Accidents produced in recent years and the development of science and
technology have demonstrated the limits and difficulties of the existing methods of risk evaluation
[7].
Seveso II Directive requirements need to achieve the required development of new methods
of risk evaluation, demonstrating authorities with responsabilities in the area and citizens that:
• the economic operator concerned has taken all the necessary measures to analyze the
risks covering ;
• allows communicating the results of the risk assessment to all the persons likely to be
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affected by a major accident.
Risk identification is the most difficult because of the multitude and diversity of events.
Possibilities of occurrence of events can be estimated by statistical studies. Chances of getting
reliable results through the strict application of theoretical relationships are very limited. Risk
analysis is a matter of great complexity and difficulty [64].
Establishing limits of acceptability of the consequences and the use of methods, means and
procedures of prevention of major accidents, limiting and removing their consequences are
determined by the environmental assessor’s average experience [125].
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CHAPTER 1 . RISK AND INDUSTRIAL SECURITY
1.1. RISKS MANAGEMENT
Risk management is a systematic and rigorous process of identification, analysis, planning,
control and risk communication. Each identified risk passes sequentially through the other
functions, continuously and concurrently. Risks are usually pursued in parallel with the
identification and analysis of new ones and the plans of attenuation for risk can produce other risks
[13].
Risk management is conducted in any decision-making process and, in order to be effective, it
is necessary to reconsider the current rocesses of analysis and decision taking. An effective risk
management process also represents a set of specific, continue and systematic activities of exchange
of relevant information in an open environment. Risk management provides a rigorous and active
environmental decision-making for [10]:
• continuously assessing what could have unwanted consequences;
• determination of significant risks, to be studied;
• implementation of strategies for managing these risks;
• ensuring the effectiveness of the implemented strategies.
Implementing the processes for identification, analysis, planning, control and risk
communication of any kind shall, at any level, ensure a number of advantages, including [13]:
• avoiding surprise: continuous evaluation of what can end badly anticipate events and
their consequences;
• increasing the likelihood that events occur as expected: the results of the decisions
may be influenced by weighing the potential impacts andthe associated probabilities;
the understanding of risk enables better decision making;
• changing the emphasis from treatment of a crisis on its prevention: management of
risks can identify and then prevent the potential problems when it is easier and
cheaper to do, before conversion to real problems and then the crisis (the prevention factor
is more pronounced);
• focusing on the main objectives and detecting the events that may affect the
achievement of these objectives;
Identifying in time the potential problems (the practical approach ) as a possible
support in decisions making in resource allocation.
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1.1.1. RISK
In broad, RISK can be defined as a potential event that, if produced, causes loss, damages,
distructions, sufferings etc. According to the domain they can occur or depending to their nature,
one can talk about a great diversity of risks [17, 64].
One can give as a characteristic of risk the existence exposure to negative consequences of
population, material goodss, heritage or environment. Another criterion one can operate with in
identifying and arranging specific risks represents the vulnerability of the elements exposed to risk
[30, 47]. This fact highlights how much a person and his goods are exposed to various hazards,
indicating the likely level of damages that can be produced by a certain phenomenon.
The negative effect taken into consideration when defining specific risks is usually the level
of losing human lives, of the injujured number, of damages produced on properties and economic
activities by a certain phenomenon or a group of phenomena in a certain place and at a certain
period of time. As a consequence, risk is the probability to human and goods exposure to a
particular hazard of a certain size and can be expressed mathematically as the product of hazard,
risk and vulnerability of the elements exposed [133]:
R = f(H x E x V/C) (1.1)
unde:
R represents - risk ;
H – hazard;
E – elements exposed to risk (persons, goods);
V – vulnerability;
C – capability (capacity to adapt / the answer of the comunity).
It follows that the risk exists depending on the size of danger, of all groups of people and
material goods endangered and their vulnerability and can be defined as a predictive mathematical
loss of life, injuries, property damage and damage to economic activity over a period of
reference in a given region, for a specific hazard [7].
1.1.2. CLASSIFICATION OF RISKS
Depending on the area of production risks can be divided into : cross-national, regional,
county and local risks [148].
Cross-national risks are risks that according to their manifestation, affect a part of the area of
a country or many countries. [19, 28].
National risks are risks that, according to their way of manifestation, affect more than half of
a country. Regional risks are the ones that, according to their way of manifestation, affect a part of a
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13
county or more surrounding counties. County risks are risks that, according to their manifestation,
affect only localities from the same county.
Depending on the way of production and the consequences generating events, risks can be:
natural risks;
technological risks;
biological risks;
fire risk.
Fire risk is a risk that occurs with greater frequency and with consequences more or less
increased in comparison with other risks for which will be treated separately.
In figure 1.1 one can see the events generating situations of emergency produced by
technological risks:
EVENTS
GENERATING
EMERGENCY
SITUATIONS
FALLING
OF COSMIC
OBJECTS FROM
THE ATMOSPHEREDISCOVERED
AMMUNITION
REMAINED
UNEXPLODED
DURING MILITARY
CONFLICTS
DETECTION OF
PUBLIC UTILITIES
AND PRODUCTION
OF MAJOR
DAMAGES
THE COLLAPSE OF
SOME BUILDINGS
OR
INSTALLATIONS
NUCLEAR
ACCIDENTS
ACCIDENTS
PRODUCED DURING
TRANSPORT
MAJOR ACCIDENTS
IN THE CHEMICAL
INDUSTRY
Figure 1.1 Events generating situations of emergency
1.2. INDUSTRIAL RISK FACTORS IN DIFFERENT AREAS OF
ACTIVITY
1.2.5. INDUSTRIAL RISK FACTORS IN THE TRANSPORT OF
DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES
Dangerous substances are present in all areas of industry and industries where the risk
associated with the specific sites known but for which no action is taken to minimize or eliminate
them [9, 86].
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14
Accidents during transport represent a particular risk, particularly for urban or rural areas
that do not have industrial activity which could cause accidents involving dangerous substances, the
local population is not ready for self-protection in case of such an event [121].
In figure 1.2. one can see the transport ways where can be produced accidents involving
dangerous substances.
RAILROADS
30%
ROADS
50%MARITIME AND
WATER WAYS
20%
Figura 1.2. The transport ways where can be produced accidents involving dangerous
substances.
Dangerous substances are transported in tank wagons, tankers, containers or special
packaging, able to [121]:
gas at normal pressure;
compressed gas;
liquefied gas;
liquid;
solid (compact, cristals, dust).
About 15% from all the transported staff along a year period is represented by the staff
containing dangerous substances. Given the fact that the circumstances in which accidents may
occur namely: the quantities of dangerous substances released into the atmosphere and on the
ground after the accident, can not feasibly be provided and can not be taken any preventive
measures. Because of this aspect, the population in areas of communication lines can not be
forewarned and protected from any consequences of such an accident. After an accident involving
dangerous substances there can be caused an explosion followed by fire, direct in the means of
transport or due to the release of dangerous substance on the ground, thus there exists the risk of the
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15
threat of human and animal health, risk of environmental contamination, risk of partial or total
damage to buildings, damage to material goods that produce major effects of short or long on
holding community activities [103].
1.3. INDUSTRIAL SECURITY
For the productivity growth for operators using dangerous substances in the production
process, it is necessary to identify a security concept to be linked to aspects of quality,
environmental and technological and security issues in the business environment. Mitigation of
unwanted accidents consequences and short while restoring production capacity is a prerequisite of
the security concept [67].
1.3.1. INFLUENCING FACTORS OF SECURITY IN DIFFERENT
INDUSTRIAL AREAS
1.3.1.2. Influencing factors of industrial security in he field of chemistry and
petrochemistry
Natural and technological risks affect the economic and social development of the regions
exposed. They have destructive effects on both the environment and on the economy and life safety.
It is generally impossible to prevent, and in recent years the frequency of their manifestation has
significantly increased [48].
Even if now most resources are focused on response actions and recovery following a
disaster to most communities, prevention and mitigation of the consequences is much more
important [58].
The complexity of industrial sites, the variety of materials used and technological processes
determine the need for using more methods and techniques for identifying and assessing hazards
and risks [84].
Such risk evaluation is a complex study, which is based on a series of qualitative and
quantitative analysis methods, which estimates the probability and severity of technological
accidents and sets measures to limit or eliminate the consequences of accidents [85].
Evaluation studies of natural and technological risks affecting the population becomes a
necessity and serve to identify those critical points for achieving effective solutions to reduce the
risks where necessary and promote the growth of industrial safety by applying field factors
influence of industrial safety [56, 110].
In the chemical and petrochemical domain, the determinant factors of industrial safety are
[111]:
the security reports;
the policy of preventing major accidents;
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16
internal and external emergency plans ;
plans for preventing accidental pollution;
maps of technological risk;
emission and immission measurements and monitoring of processes in terms of
pollution prevention;
reports of analyzing and evaluation of medium pollution.
1.3.1.2.1. The security report (in the context of SEVESO DIRECTIVES)
The security report is made according to article 10 of SEVESO Directive III which specifies
obligation operator with high risk to develop a safety report which is documentation drawn up by
natural or legal persons certified under the legal provisions necessary for targets where dangerous
substances are present [103, 106].
By means of the safety report one demonstrates that [107]:
• "There are efforts to implement the policy to prevent major industrial accidents and the
system of technological safety management;
• All major hazards have been identified and have measures in place to prevent accidents
and also to limit the possible effects;
• ensure a high level of safety and security during design, operation, construction, etc .;
• emergency internal and external plans are prepared, which represents all measures to be
taken within the objective to limit and remove the consequences of any situation which lead to
uncontrolled developments during the operation of industrial facilities that can endanger the health
of staff and/or more dangerous substances in relation to the target;
• There is basic information on territorial planning decisions ".
1.3.1.2.2. Major accidents prevention policy
The general policy for preventing, preparing and responsibility in case of industrial
accidents is based on the following principles [125]:
prevention, which assumes operation in such a way as to prevent uncontrolled
development of the abnormal operations, the consequences of any accidents to be
minimum and in accordance with the best available security techniques;
identification and evaluation of major risks through systematic studies of hazard and
operability and detailed security analysis for each identified individual cases;
evaluation of security necessities prioritized according to the "nature and extent of danger
expected" based on the quantities of dangerous substances and industrial activities and
relevant susceptible to accidents.
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17
The policy of preventing major accidents in case of economic operators constitute an
assurance and continuous engagement to safety in the operation of facilities and equipment in all
places of employment, to reduce risk of incidents and accidents arising from the storage and
handling of dangerous products on their location [ 87, 133].
In the case of the economic operator will be applied specific measures for maintaining safety
in operation, that will help to achieve the following objectives [125]:
reducing to minimum the potential medium risks through an accurate evaluation of
security necessities ranked according to the "nature and extent of danger expected";
ensuring compliance with legal rules and regulations;
training the whole staff in order to know the risks and medium problems that their work
involves;
evaluation of risks associated to the activities whenever changes occur in processes,
practices or resources;
providing staff schooling required in operating practices and use of equipment and devices
safety;
carrying out of emergency planning, performance monitoring and review;
continuous improving of health and safe conditions at work by drawing up plans to
prevent potential risks and to minimize the consequences of possible accidents;
constant communication with all the stakeholders to ensure transparency regarding the
possiblenegative consequences of their activity in the external environment.
The management program will ensure the necessary resources to adopt safety measures and
investment in equipment, monitoring by periodic environmental audits performances [88].
Management objective is to obtain economic and financial performance in terms of
environmental protection and optimum safety and health for the employees, which set out the
measures to prevent and reduce risks of injury and illness of staff.
In figure 1.4. lines of action are presented in health and safety at work, in which the
management of the objective must undertake [13]:
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18
REDUCING OR REMOVAL
OF INJURY RISK
PERIODIC REVIEW
OF THE ACTIVITY
OF WORK HEALTH
AND SECURITY
CURRENT LOW
COMPLIANCE WITH
HEALTH END SAFETY AT WORK
IMPROVING THE SECURITY
PERFORMANCE
THE TRAINING
OF THE STAFF
FOR TECHNICAL
COMPLIANCE MEASURES
Figure 1.4. Lines of action in safety and health at work
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19
CHAPTER 2. MANAGEMENT OF MAJOR ACCIDENTS
INVOLVING DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES
The major accident caused by dangerous substances "is an event (emission of dangerous
substances, fire, explosion) occurred in uncontrolled developments during the operation of an
objective, which leads to immediate or delayed aparition of some serious dangers to human health
and/ or environment, inside or outside the objective and involving one or more dangerous
substances "[12, 29, 89].
The general policy for prevention, preparing and responsibility to industrial accidents is
based on the following principles [111]:
- prevention which involves the operation so as to prevent the uncontrolled development of
abnormal operations, the consequences of possible accidents to be minimal and in line with the
best security techniques available;
- Identify and evaluate the major risks through systematic studies of danger and operability
and detailed security analysis for each identified individual cases;
- Evaluating the security needs prioritized according to the "nature and extent of danger
expected" based on the quantities of dangerous substances and industrial activities and relevant
susceptible to accidents.
Policy to prevent major accidents to operators constitute a continuous assurance engagement
to safety in the operation of installations and equipment in all places of employment, to reduce
risks of incidents and accidents arising from the storage and handling of dangerous products on
their location [95 ].
2.1. MAJOR ACCIDENTS THAT INVOLVED DANGEROUS
ACCIDENTS
Major accidents produced in Toulouse - France Enschede - Netherlands, Bhopal - India,
Baia Mare - Romania have been studied in depth by specialists of the European Union, resulting in
the need to change legislation in this area with immediate effects on the activities of economic
operators who use the dangerous substances in the production or transport of dangerous substances
[5, 103, 104].
2.1.1. SHORT HISTORY OF THE ACCIDENT FROM SEVESO ITALY
Seveso is the name of a city in Italy, north of Milan where, on July 10, 1976, there was an
accident at the chemical pesticide factory ICMESA. At the production of trichlorophenol, by
Page 20
20
overheating, there was eliminated in the atmosphere a form of highly poisonous
tetrachlorodibenzodioxines and since then, this chemical compound is called Seveso poison and
dioxin and polychlorinated represent symbolically highly toxic materials. In Fig. 2.1. A and B are
shown the pictures of the accident at Seveso Italy [24].
After the accident there occurred approximately 6 tons of toxic substances into the
atmosphere, resulting in the occurrence of a condition of chloracne (a dermatitis caused by exposure
to chlorine and its derivatives) among the population living in the impact zone and exposing a large
number of over 35,000 people, more than 700 citizens affected resettled in an area of 110 ha (the
oak forest today at Seveso); there were sacrificed 80,000 animals in order to prevent contamination
through the food chain affected and more than 4% of the animals at farms in the vicinity died.
Figure 2.1. A Figure 2.1. B
Figure 2.1 Images from the SEVESO accident, Italy [24].
This accident was a warning which prompted the European Community to take steps to
prevent similar situations.
After the accident at Seveso, the European Community has defined the concept of 'major
accident' (high risk) as an event (an emission of substances, fire or explosion) in relation to the
uncontrolled development of technological activities that generate a serious danger inside or outside
the enterprise by releasing one or more toxic substances.
Directive "SEVESO I – European Council Directive no. 82/501/EC on major accident risks
of certain industrial activities "was adopted on 24 June 1982 and includes a set of bonds, aimed at
employees of industrial factories and national authorities. According to this directive, the European
Commission is aimed at identifying and controlling the risk of major accidents from industrial
installations [78, 135].
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21
2.1.2. OTHER MAJOR INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS THAT TOOK PLACE IN
THE WORLD ALONG THE TIME
The major industrial accidents that occurred in the world over the past 77 years highlight the
potential effects of accidents that originate from dangerous substances.
In table 2.1. major industrial accidents that occurred in the world over the last 77 years are
presented [46].
Table 2.1. Major industrial accidents that occurred in the world over the last 77 years [46].
Year Country Type of accident Substace Deads
Number of
intoxicated
persons
Number of
evacuated
persons
1939 Romania
(Zărneşti) Explosion of a tank Chlor - 600 -
1976 Italy
(SEVESO) Accident at a reactor Erbicides - 500 730
1979 Canada Transport accident
( railroad )
Propan,
chlor - - 250.000
1979 Romania
(Bucharest) Accident at a tank Ammonia 27 175 -
1984 India
(Bhopal)
Accident at a pesticides
factory
Methyl
isocyanate 3.598 100.000 200.000
1984
Mexic
(Ciudad de
Mexico)
Explosion of a tank Benzine 452 4.248 31.000
1985 India Major toxic leaks Sulfur
trioxide 1 350 100.000
1987 China Accident due to
a human error
Methylated
alchool 55 3.600 -
1988 China Contamination of water Ammonia
bicarbonate - 15.400 -
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22
Continuare Tabel 2.1.
Year Country Type of accident Substace Dea
ds
Number of
intoxicated
persons
Number of
evacuated
persons
1988 Romania
(Fălticeni)
Accident due to
a human error
Acetone
cyanohydrin,
sulfuric acid
- - 400
1989 USA Fire at a chemical factory Sulfuric acid - - 16.000
1992 Haiti Explosion at a chemical
factory
Mixtures of
toxic
substances
10 154 -
1992 Senegal Explosion of a tank Ammonia 100 400 -
1994 South
Africa
Accident at a golden
mine
Cyanide and
hydrogen
cyanide
77 450 -
2001 Romania
(Fălticeni)
Accident due to
a human error
Acetone
cyanohydrin,
sulfuric acid
- 150 -
2001 France
(Toulouse) Explosion at a deposit
Ammonium
nitrate 25 2.442 -
2.2. LEGISLATIVE ASPECTS
The necessary factors for changing legislation to prevent major accidents in Europe were not
enough to understand and shape the present relationship of a major accident and changing
legislation is still unclear [67, 71].
In Europe, the accident in Seveso - Italy in 1976 led to the adoption of legislation to prevent
and control such accidents. In 1982 the European Council adopted Directive no. 501/EC of 24 June
1982 on the major-accident risks of certain industrial activities - Seveso I was replaced by Seveso II
Directive - Council Directive 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major accident risks
involving dangerous substances, subsequently amended and repealed by the Seveso III Directive
2012/18/EU oF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT and of the COUNCIL of 4 July 2012 on the
control of major accident risks involving dangerous substances.
This applies to sites which "mean the whole area under the control of an operator where one
or more installations, including infrastructures or common activities or related substances are
hazardous establishments are either lower-tier or upper-tier "[9, 13].
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23
The new Seveso III Directive aims "to establish rules to prevent major accidents involving
dangerous substances and limit their consequences on human health and the environment, to ensure
a high level of protection throughout the Union in a consistent and effective manner "[104].
The SEVESO Directive grants more rights to population regarding both the access to
information and to consultation. Both public authorities and operators have clear obligations to
inform the public. It's about the passive information, which consists of continuous access to
information, but also the active one. The operators and competent authorities should actively
participate by distributing leaflets and brochures, for example, informing the public about the
behaviour in case of an accident [63, 111].
However, the competent authorities are required to organize an inspection system that
ensures systematic evaluation of the operators or at least one inspection a year at each level [111].
2.2.3. TRANSPOSITION OF THE SEVESO DIRECTIVE IN ROMANIA
In Romania, the Seveso II Directive has been transposed by Government Decision no. 804/2007
on the control of major accident risks involving dangerous substances, amended by Government
Decision no. 79 from 11 February 2009, which amends art. 10 paragraph (5) a) art. 17 paragraph (1)
and (2) and repealed art. 22 paragraph (2)from the Government Decision no. 804/2007. The
SEVESO Directive II establishes two classes of risk (major and minor) for the industrial
establishments that use or store dangerous substances. The Directive 96/82/1996 was amended and
subsequently repealed by Seveso III Directive 2012/18/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
AND OF THE COUNCIL of 4 July 2012 regarding the control of major accident hazards involving
dangerous substances.
In Romania there are 333 industrial objectives that fall under this directive (245 in the category
of high risk and 88 with minor risk). The highest density of operators is recorded in the North - East
(including the counties of Bacau, Iasi, Neamt and Suceava), where there are inventoried 22
objectives and in the Central Region - with 21 operators. In figure 2.4. the industrial units with
technological risks from Romania are presented [63].
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24
Figure 2.4. Industrial units with technological risks [63].
Romania joined the international law in the field of technological hazards elaborating an
inventory of industrial units falling under the Directive 2012/18 / EU SEVESO III, most of them
related to chemical and petrochemical industry (144 units with high risk and 55 with minor risk)
[104].
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25
CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL SOLUTIONS REGARDING THE
CONTROL OF MAJOR ACCIDENTS
Major accidents that may occur on an industrial site represent the result of a natural disaster
or technological event giving rise to the additional effects such as explosions, fire and the release
of dangerous toxic substances. The consequences of such accidents are often very serious, even
catastrophic, these consequences being materialized in loss of lives and material goods and the
environmental damage [1,4].
Limiting and even eliminating the risk of a major accident involving dangerous substances
is achieved through a coherent and efficient prevention and protection overall measures aimed at
limiting the probability of a major accident production and the severity of the consequences on the
site and the environment. SEVESO III Directive states explicitly the obligation that the operators
should identify and quantify the risks of a major accident and the necessity to take into account the
environment likely to be affected by the consequences of such an accident and oblige the economic
operator to draw up a security report in order to provide the competent authorities to carry out work
on site [3, 66].
In Romania the authorities responsible for applying the SEVESO III Directive have
not identified so far a method to national risk evaluation on the sites of premises under the
incidence of this Directive. The methods of analysis and risk evaluation allow a site for the
identification and quantification of risks, mandatory steps in the development of the safety
report. Depending on the type of industrial installation and the dangerous substances existing
in the world there is a great variety of methods of analysis and risk evaluation. The assembly
is characterized by a variety of methods, both from the point of view of the general approach,
and the field of applicability [9].
Taking into account the above mentioned things and the fact that there is a likelihood of a
major accident on a site that uses in the production process the dangerous substances with a
destructive effect and besides it is necessary to develop a combined and complex method capable to
consider measures/actions protection / intervention in order to limit and remove the consequences
of a possible major accident.
In order to elaborate this method, it is necessary to conduct a thorough study of the
components of methods of analysis and risk evaluation existing at the moment globally, method
that can be applicable on the industrial sites type SEVESO, that use the production process for
dangerous substances, establishing the weak points of the methods studied to be removed from the
new method, the strength points to be taken in the new combined method, and supplementing it
with new elements that will support the competent authorities and the economic operators.
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26
Worldwide there are several methods of risk evaluation that can be used by the specialists
for the analysis and evaluation such as: the Hazop Method, the Hazan Method, the Lopa Method,
the Mosar Method , the Aramis Method, the Checklist Method, the QRA Method, the Octave
Method, the Mehari Method etc.
3.1. INDUSTRIAL RISK EVALUATION METHODS IN WHICH
ARE INVOLVED DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES
There are two kinds of analysis, of identification and of characterization of risk [75]:
Qualitative analysis (Hazard Operability Study);
Quantitative analysis (CPQRA - Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis).
The decision on the choice of the analysis and the degree of depth of the work are linked to
the probabilistic risk tolerance scale.
The risk identification techniques used to discover them presented in the process and the
techniques for their evaluation - to decide how to act on them in order to eliminate or reduce them
to protect the population and the environment are often confused. Summing these two categories of
techniques are distinguished following general components [2, 8]:
To identify risk: their intrinsic presence, the observation of what happens, the
checklist - HAZOP (Hazard & Operability Analysis) is a method for identifying
operational problems associated with the design, maintenance or operation of a
system safety. It is an objective process to evaluate the various parts of a given
system, which provides a systematic and well documented evaluation of potential
dangers;
Risk Evaluation: their intrinsic presence, previous experience, codes of practice -
HAZAN (Hazard Analysis) an estimation method used to evaluate hazards in order
to decide how to act to eliminate or reduce the risk.
Page 27
27
Tabelul 3.5. Analiza SWOT a metodelor de evaluare a riscurilor industriale studiate.
NO. TYPE OF
METHOD
GOAL/OBJECTIVES
OF THE METHOD STRONG POINTS WEAK POINTS OPPORTUNITIES
THREATE
NINGS
1.
THE
HAZOP
METHOD
- it is a qualitative method;
- it analyses the safety of an
installation/place and it
discoveres the vulnerable
points(technically,
organizing, operationally),
ellaborates a plan in order to
rectify/ improve them.
- for each deviation,
the relevant cauded are
analysed, theoretical
consequences and the
existent protections;
- all the claaaical
deviations are covered
in the analysis;
- it is realised by a
team.
- the use of non-classical deviations is
recommended only if these were not
covered inside the analysis based on
a checklist.
- the dangerous identified scenaries
are are further analyzed by
quantitative risk analysis;
- it does not establish the
measures/actions of protection/
intervention necessary to limit and
remove the consequences of a
possible major accident.
- general components for risk
identification:
-their intrinsic presence;
- observation of everything
that happens;
-checklist.
- imposes the
covering of
deviations and
dangers through
the checklist;
- it is dependent
on LOPA
methodology;
- the probability
of producing a
major accident
with loss of lives
and material
goods.
2.
THE
HAZAN
METHOD
- it is a quqntitative method;
- it realizes a
probabilistic risk
evaluation.
-it is realised by one or two experts;
-it does not establish the
measures/actions of protection/
intervention necessary to limit and
remove the consequences of a
possible major accident.
- general components for risk
identification:
-their intrinsic presence;
- earlier experience;
- practical codes;
- analyse and risk evaluation.
- the probability
of producing a
major accident
with loss of lives
and material
goods.
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28
Continuation Table 3.5.
NO. TYPE OF
METHOD
GOAL/OBJECTIVES
OF THE METHOD STRONG POINTS WEAK POINTS OPPORTUNITIES
THREATE
NINGS
3. THE LOPA
METHOD
- a quantitative method that
evaluates the necessary
barriers to prevent major
accidents and to reduce
risks in installations up to
acceptable level.
- the probability for an event
to produce and develop to a
scenary with the worst
credible consequences is
closely linked to individual
scenario risks;
- it is applied to any identified
dangerous scenario, generated
by the risks associated to the
process, respectively the
scenarios dedicated to process
deviations that can be
provided.
- it requires the use of a
previous analysis results of
risks of process, identified
through checklistor the
HAZOP Method, so it is not a
methodology of independent
risk evaluation;
-according to the severity of
the worst credible
consequences, a certain
number and/ or a certain
quality of the barriers, it is
necessary in order to have a
tolerable/acceptable risk in the
end for every individual
analysed scenario;
-it does not establish the
measures/ the actions of
protection/ intervention
necessary to limit and remove
the consequences of a possible
major risk.
- the analysis of the
protection barriers;
- prevention of dangerous
events;
- reducing risks;
- it will be written in the
security report or as a
support document of the
system of security
management.
- It is dependent on
the previous
results of other
evaluation
methods and it
requires bigger
costs;
- the probability
of producing a
major accident
with loss of lives
and material
goods.
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29
Continuation Table 3.5.
NO. TYPE OF
METHOD
GOAL/OBJECTIV
ES OF THE
METHOD
STRONG POINTS WEAK POINTS OPPORTUNITIES THREATE
NINGS
4.
THE
MOSAR
METHOD
-it is an integrated
method which allows
a stepwise analysis of
an industrial objective
specific risks.
- it places special emphasis on the link
between risk processes and systems
components of an installation being
specially adapted for studying the effects
of accidents or "domino" chain.
- it represents a symbiosis between
analytical and systemic approaches of
technological risks, being based on
identifying the interactions between the
investigated system components - seen
as sub-components with structures,
functions and own ends - on the one
hand and between the system and the
environment on the other hand;
-it is a method of structured analysis in
modules and stages;
-it is a participatory approach of the
technological risk problem and it creates
the premises of team work.
It does not establish the
measures/ the actions of
protection/ intervention
necessary to limit and
remove the consequences
of a possible major risk.
- Identifying risks of
malfunction;
- The risk assessment
through trees failures;
- Negotiation of a precise
objective of prevention;
- Improvement of prevention;
- Risk management.
- the probability
of producing a
major accident
with loss of lives
and material
goods.
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30
Continuation Table 3.5.
NO. TYPE OF
METHOD
GOAL/OBJECT
IVES OF THE
METHOD
STRONG POINTS WEAK POINTS OPPORTUNITIES THREATE
NINGS
5.
THE
ARAMIS
METHOD
- this method is
an alternative
solution to the
strictly
deterministic or
probabilistic
approaches to
risk assessment
strictly.
- identification and
setting of equipments
according to the
quantities of substances
they use;
- Elaboration of accident
scenarios by identifying
the undesirable events;
- realization of accident
scenarios based on a
butterfly knot
corresponding to the
equipment used in the
chemical industry;
- this method allows the
definition of a list of
hazardous events.
- it adopts with difficulty public
decisions based on risk assessment
using worst case scenarios;
- by addressing a purely
probabilistic estimation result,
communicating with difficulty
because it is difficult to be
understood by the population;
-the social risk based on statistical
data does not reflect local reality or
the efforts to control the risk done
by the operator;
- the absence of decision criteria
that allow the use of graphic
representation of gravity and
vulnerability.
- the easy identification of
functions and security barriers;
- the omplete assessment of
performance of the security
barriers;
- estimating the probability of the
scenario based on accident
frequency initiating events and
confidence levels of barriers,
barrier characteristic approach;
- assessment and safety
management of influence of the
system on the level of trust
barriers;
- the establishment of reference
scenarios to be modeled to
determine the severity index.
-it is not possible to
determine the most
lifelike scenarios and
the public decisions
are taken very hard;
- the risk can not be
evaluated with
precision and it can
be transmitted
incorrectly to the
public;
- the possibility that
people might not
understand the result
of the estimation;
- the probability of
producing a major
accident with loss of
lives and material
goods.
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31
Continuation Table 3.5.
NO. TYPE OF
METHOD
GOAL/OBJECTIVES OF
THE METHOD STRONG POINTS WEAK POINTS OPPORTUNITIES
THREATE
NINGS
6. THE QRA
METHOD
- method of evaluation the
likelihood of damage from a
potential accident.
- it presents a ot of
similiarities with the
ARAMIS and LOPA
methods.
- It is less adapted for iaking
onto consideration the site-
specific security barriers
studied;
- Only the security barriers
that allow the limitation or
reduction of loss of
containment can be explicitly
taken into account in
calculating the final
probability of damage;
-it does not establish the
measures/ the actions of
protection/ intervention
necessary to limit and remove
the consequences of a possible
major risk.
- selecting installations;
- Definition of unwanted
central associated events and
frequencies;
- Modeling the intensity of
the dangerous phenomenon;
- Exposure modeling and
consequences.
- it considers
nothing but
lethal effects on
people;
- It does not
provide for
consideration of
barriers of
specific
prevention
designed to
reduce the
likelihood of loss
of containment;
- the probability
of producing a
major accident
with loss of lives
and material
goods.
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32
Continuation Table 3.5.
NO. TYPE OF
METHOD
GOAL/OBJECTIVES
OF THE METHOD STRONG POINTS WEAK POINTS OPPORTUNITIES
THREATE
NINGS
7.
THE
CHECK
LIST
METHOD
- It examines the safety
of an installation / site
and discovers the
vulnerabilities
(technical,
organizational,
operational), and
develops a plan to
rectify / improvements.
- All the individual issues on the checklist
are covered in the analysis;
- Hazard identification process related to
corresponding installations are performed
using the checklist. One danger arises from
an event which incidentally can be
approached in an installation or sccording
to their importance.
-it does not establish
the measures/ the
actions of protection/
intervention necessary
to limit and remove
the consequences of a
possible major risk.
- the safety report or the
document of security
management system will
include the checklists in full;
- The documents or the
necessary actions
(regulations, instructions,
safety systems, procedures,
test reports, minutes of
control, shift report etc.) are
used for protective measures
presented in the analysis.
- the probability
of producing a
major accident
with loss of lives
and material
goods.
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33
Continuation Table 3.5.
N
O.
TYPE OF
METHOD
GOAL/OBJECTIVES OF
THE METHOD STRONG POINTS WEAK POINTS OPPORTUNITIES
THREATE
NINGS
8.
THE
OCTAVE
METHOD
-It defines the risk
evaluation and the
technical planning with the
purpose of achieving the
objective of security
protection.
- identification and anakyss of risks;
- modernization of plans of reducing
risks and the measures of security of
the objective;
- a team of 3-5 experts is working for
achieving the objectives, who collects
data and analyzes the information
obtained, elaborates security measures
and plans to reduce and eliminate the
risks identified;
-it does not establish
the measures/ the
actions of protection/
intervention
necessary to limit
and remove the
consequences of a
possible major risk.
- Hazard profiling based on existing
values in goal;
-Identifying the infrastructure
vulnerabilities.
- the probability
of producing a
major accident
with loss of lives
and material
goods.
9.
THE
MEHARI
METHOD
-addresses to both
analysis and risk
management and
evaluates the quantitative
and qualitative risk
factors.
- it enables calculations, simulations
and optimizations;
- it uses a complete set of
questionnaires serving on audit and
detailed list of scenarios;
- It makes an evaluation as safe
impact over the values of the
objective.
-it does not establish
the measures/ the
actions of protection/
intervention
necessary to limit
and remove the
consequences of a
possible major risk.
- natural exposure assessment;
- Evaluation of deterrence and
prevention (building components,
equipment, procedures, specialized
personnel);
- Evaluation of the impact of direct
property data and information,
infrastructure, personnel;
- Evaluating the protective factors,
compensation and recovery.
- the probability
of producing a
major accident
with loss of lives
and material
goods.
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34
3.4. ADVANTAGES OF THE EXISTING METHODS FOR
ELLABORATING A NEW METHOD
This work aims to develop a method for risk evaluation involving dangerous substances,
the implementation of which will be taken into consideration and will use the advantages offered
by the methods for the existing risks evaluation and set out in subchapter 3.1.
In table 3.6. one can see the advantages of the methods studied and selected in order to be
used by the new resulting method.
Table 3.6. Advantages offered by the existing methods for the elaboration of a new mehod.
NR.
CRT.
TIPUL
METODEI AVANTAJE
1.
THE
MOSAR
METHOD
- It allows identifying the risks of malfunction;
- It performs risk assessment through trees failures;
- It requires improved means of prevention.
2.
THE
ARAMIS
METHOD
- It allows evaluating the results of safety barriers;
- It realizes the likelihood of an accident scenario depending on the frequency of
the initiating events and confidence levels of barriers;
- It allows assessment of the safety management system and its influence on the
level of trust barriers;
- It allows the selection of reference scenarios, that is the scenarios to be
modeled to determine the severity index.
3.
THE
CHECK LIST
METHOD
- It prepares the checklists present in the safety report or in the document support
to management system of security;
-It uses the existence of some documents of the economic operator (regulations,
instructions, operator action, safety systems, procedures, cause-effect diagram, test
reports, inspection reports, report lap etc.).
4.
THE
OCTAVE
METHOD
- it allows a threat profile building based on the existing values in the objective.
5.
THE
MEHARI
METHOD
- it realizes the evaluation of the safety factors and prevention;
- It allows the direct impact evaluation over the property, data and information,
infrastructure, personnel;
- It carries out an evaluation of protection factors, compensation and recovery.
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35
By combining the strong points of the five methods studied and selected, a new method of
evaluating risks, called THE CARMIS METHOD (Combined Analysis and Assessment Method
of Risks and Industrial Safety).
3.5. THE PRINCIPLE OF CARMIS METHOD
The elaborated method resulting from the combination of strong points of the five methods
selected from the studied methods, called the CARMIS METHOD, has as aim the quantitative and
qualitative determination of the risk/security level for the installations/technologies of the economic
operators that use dangerous substances in the production process and can produce major accidents
with serious implications for people, property and the environment.
The new elaborated method implies:
identification of all risk factors from the analysed system;
the elaboration of the accident scenario according to the frequency of the initiating
events and confidence levels of the security barriers (to prevent major accidents and
to reduce risks in installations or on site up to the acceptable levels);
assessing the direct impact on staff, goods, data and information, infrastructure,
assessing protective factors, compensation, rehabilitation and establishment of
measures/actions of protection/intervention to limit and remove the consequences of
a possible major accident (using checklists);
drafting the safety report, the main document of the security management system.
3.6. STAGES AND METHODOLOGY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE CARMIS METHOD
The method comprises these compulsory steps:
a) Establishing the evaluating team;
b) Definition of the anlyzed system (installation/ technology);
c) The analysis in the field and identifying the risk factors in the system;
d) Making and consulting the checklists;
e) Preparing the trees failure;
f) Evaluating the risk factors identified from gravity point of view;
g) Evaluating the frequency of the initiating events and the confidence levels of
security barriers;
h) Elaborating the accident scenary ( by simulation with the Aloha program);
i) Estimating the direct impact over the goods, dates and information, infastructure,
staff;
j) Evaluating the protection, compensation and existing rehabilitation factors;
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36
k) Evaluating the performances of the existing security barriers;
l) Drawing up the safety report as supporting document of the security management
system.
According to the security report drawn up after completing all the compulsory steps, there
will be carried out by the economic operator or will be outsourced following activities:
Establishing the measures/protection/intervention actions for limiting and removing
the consequences of a possible major accident- procedures;
Implementing the measures plan for improving the performances of the security
barriers;
Monitoring the application of the security report and the efficiency of the established
measures (Feed-back of the implementation).
In figure 3.13. one can see the drawing of the general principle of the method CARMIS
CARMIS
METHOD
Evaluation of the initial events
frequency and safety barriers
reliability levels
Evaluation of the
protection, compensation
and recovery factors
Development of the accident
scenario
Evaluation of the existing
safety barriers performance
Assessment of the direct impact
of the accident on man
Assessment of the risk factors
seriousness
1. Know in details the assessment method, the instruments and procedures to
be used
2. Have information in advance on the workplaces and technological
processes they are going to analyse/assess
Assessment team formation
Defyning the system
(/installation(s)/technology)
Examination of the
establishment and identification
of the risk factors
Checklists elaboration
Accident scenario
representation using the
butterfly node ELABORATION
OF THE
SAFETY REPORT
1. Installation location
2. Sytem description (process, chemical installation etc.)
3. Operator’s general layout
4.Process/control diagram
5. Manufacturing instructions, technological schemes, processing procedures
6.Quantities of dangerous substances and their characteristics
7. Regional meteorological characteristics
8. Regional seismic characteristics
1. Presentation of the installation and identification of the hazard sources
2. Hazard identification and accident scenarios development
3. Risk evaluation
4. Establishing prevention objectives
5. Defyning safety barriers
Through Aloha Programme simulation
1. Specific to the establishment/process
2. Based on incidental events
3.External
Figure 3.13. Drawing of the general principle of the method CARMIS
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37
3.6.2. SWOT ANALYSIS OF THE CARMIS METHOD
Advantages and disadvantages of the CARMIS METHOD are presented in table 3.7.
Table 3.7. SWOT analysis of the CARMIS METHOD.
NO. TYPE OF
METHOD
AIM/ OBJECTIVES
OF THE METHOD STRONG POINTS
WEAK
POINTS OPPORTUNITIES THREATENINGS
CARMIS
METHOD
- makes a full risk
assessment;
-makes quantitative and
qualitative
determination of the
level of risk / security
for the installations
/technologies of the
economic operators
who use dangerous
substances in the
production process and
can cause major
accidents with serious
implications for people,
property and the
environment.
- identification of all risk
factors from the analyzed
system;
-evaluation of the factors of
protection, compensation,
rehabilitation;
-setting measures / actions of
protection/ necessary
intervention to limit and
remove the consequences of a
possible major accident.
- realised by 4-5
experts;
- high costs.
-drafting the current
protection strategy;
- The choice of concepts
for risk reduction;
- Develop risk reducing
plans;
- Identify changes in
protection strategy.
schiţarea strategiei curente
de protecţie;
- increasing costs for the
assessment to the
complexity of the site and
existing installations .
Page 38
CHAPTER 5. SETTING RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
FOR RESEARCH, CORRELATIONS AND MATHEMATICAL
MODELS
To establish the research methodology, the correlations and the mathematical models, I
checked the efficiency of the method that I realized by combining the strong points, the
covering of the weak points and the thretenings, the so-called CARMIS method, that I applied
to an economic operator who deposits and uses dangerous substances in the production process,
respectively ammonia, in an accident scenario based on a case study at S.C. AMURCO S.R.L.
Bacău, following and completing all the steps of the established method in subchapter 3.6.
5.2. METHODOLOGY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CARMIS
METHOD BASED ON A CASE STUDY AT S.C. AMURCO S.R.L.
The economic operator must establish, implement and maintain a procedure (procedures)
for the continuous identification of the dangers, the risk evaluation and the establishment of the
necessary controls which must consider all the identified dangers, generated both inside the
emplacement that can affect staff”s health and security as well as the dangers outside the
emplacement created by activities related to the technological process of the operator,
infrastructure, equipments and the materials used at work.
5.2.1. ESTABLISHMENT OF EVALUATION TEAM
According to the methodology presented in subchapter 3.6.1. point a), the evaluation team
will be constituted of: a specialist of activities with dangerous substances, a specialist who
develops activities in safety and security of work and environment, a specialist in civil protection,
a physician within the medical system and an appropriate internal specialist at Private Service for
Emergency Situations.
The members of the team must know the technological installations to be analyzed, the
characteristics and the behavior of dangerous substances.
Before beginning the activities, the members of the team must:
know the evaluation method in detail, the instruments used and the concrete
work procedures;
have a minimum prior documentation on jobs and processes to be analyzed
and evaluated;
after setting up the team for analysis and evaluation, that is after acquiring the
method, one can proceed to completing the steps themselves.
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39
5.2.2. DEFINING THE ANALYSED SYSTEM
(INSTALLATION/TECHNOLOGY)
From the documents provided by the economic operator regarding the system analyzed,
there were collected information on the location of the installation (location), describing the
system (process, chemical installation), the general plan of the economic operator, the diagram of
process or control, manufacturing normatives, technological schemes, operating procedures,
weather conditions of the area to place the objective, characteristics of the seismic area, so [141]:
5.2.2.1. Location of the installation (location) [132]
Amurco Bacău is a chemical factory in Bacau owned by the group Interagro since 1997
and it was founded in 2005 by taking over part of the actions of the chemical factory Sofert
Bacau, which resulted from the conversion of full Chemical Fertilizer Bacau (CIC Bacau)
established in 1974. Through the GD 1200/1990 Bacau Sofert company was set up under Law
15/1990.
AMURCO chemical platform is a complex facility located in the industrial area south of
Bacau, at a distance of about 3 km from the city of Bacau, which covers an area of approximately
78,000 sqm and it is located in the built-up area.
In the period under review the area was affected by the presence of several industrial
facilities including: CET Bacau - South S.C. Bistrita S.A., SC CONBAC S.A., household waste
dump in Bacau, Bacau LETEA etc. In table 5.1. the places and the economic operators from
neighborhood of S.C. Amurco LLC Bacau that may be affected in the event of a major accident.
By developing Bacau city, the residential area is continuously expanding all around Bacau
and the unincorporated areas considered in the past are now in the immediate vicinity of the
industrial objectives.
The chemical company's platform is located on the contour line of 150 m to 140 m on the
right bank of the river Bistrita. The local topography in the form of a bump of land at the
confluence of the river Bistrita with Siret river and a wide terrace step. In the immediate
proximity of the chemical platform there are are not habitats or protected species.
The ammonia tank is located in the south of the site society. On the outside it is fitted with
flooding devices in the event of accidental drains.
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40
Table 5.1. Localities and economic operators from the neighbourhood S.C. AMURCO S.R.L.
Bacău [132].
Located in the area of 500 m Located in the area of external
emergency planning
The economic operator Distance(
km)
Number
of
employees
Locality Distance
(km)
Population
(loc.)
BACĂU CITY 3 35.000 LUIZI CĂLUGĂRA 8 6.283
S.C. I.L.S. S.R.L Bacău 0,2 40 MĂGURA 10 3.947
S.C. CONBAC S.A 0,2 60 MĂRGINENI 8 7.985
S.C.SSAB AG S.R.L 0,3 85 LETEA-VECHE 5 4.813
S.C. BAC DELPHI S.R.L 0,2 40 BUHOCI 7 5.039
S.C. CONBAC S.A 0,3 40 TAMAŞI 6 6.059
C.E.T BACĂU 0,5 150 NICOLAE BĂLCESCU 4 10.949
S.C. GLOBALSERV SRL 0,1 10 MUN. BACĂU 3 140.261
SC CARPAT BETON SRL 0,5 4 SAUCEŞTI 15 3.775
S.C. SELENA Pista Kart 0,5 40 BEREŞTI BISTRIŢA 20 3.195
SC INTERSERV SRL 0,2 17 NEGRI 36 3.529
SC INTER BRANDS 0,5 150 TRAIAN 24 5.830
SC REGAL GLASS 0,4 8 SECUIENI 31 4.344
SC MELINDA IMPEX STEEL 0,4 10 RĂCĂCIUNI 20 6.763
SC.WATCH & CATCH 0,1 38 CLEJA 15 6.718
SC AVEGO NEGRESTI 0,1 15 FARAOANI 12 5.884
SC FIBROMAR SRL 0,2 10 SĂNDULENI 30 4.272
SC BETON DENIS SRL 0,2 7 SCORŢENI 34 3.328
5.2.2.2. The general technical plan of the economic operator
a) General data:
Capacity charging/recharging ammonia:
At charging: 40t/h, max.320 t/ day( for 2 changes);
At discharging: approx. 50 t/h (capacity of discharging through the ramp storage
tank is limited because the ammonia deposit is not equipped with cooling system- it has only
temperature maintaining installation) [137].
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41
b) The compnents:
the ramp itself, with 4 holes loading, pipework and fittings flexible;
ammonia water tank, V= 90 000 L;
two pumps for loading/ unloading ammonia and ammonia water.
c) Connections external to the ramp:
the main route to store ammonia for receiving ammonia for loading in tanks and
delivery;
connecting pipes with the ammonia manufacture installation;
hot ammonia gas pipeline for discharging tanks;
pipe nitrogen gas pressurization and inerting tanks of ammonia.
In figure 5.1. one can see the technical plan of the economic operator [137].
NH3
EMISSIONS
HEAT EXCHANGER
AMMONIA FROM THE TANK
AMMONIA FROM THE CISTERN AZOTE GAS
Figure 5.1. The general technical plan of the economic operator [137].
5.2.2.3. Describing the system (process, chemical installation)
The ammonia reservoir ( given in use in August 1978) is a cylindrical shaped ground
construction, made of carbon steel lined with isolating material provided anti-thermal (provides a
temperature of - 40°C), placed in a vat of concrete retention. It has a metal supporting structure,
the parts of the structure are represented in elevation of a wall made of steel with a thickness of 25
mm at the bottom, up to 10 mm from the top [132].
The reservoir of ammonia ensures the safe ammonia storage having the following
features:
volume: V =12.000.000 m3;
exterior diameter of the mantal = 27,6 m;
height : H thermo-isolated = 20,5 m;
TANK OF AMMONIA
CISTERN NH3
RAMP AMMONIA
VESSEL
AMMONIA
WATER
pp.
pp
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42
refill degree: maximum 80%;
capacity to deposit : maximum 15.000 t (minimum 700 t).
In figure 5.2. the ammonia reservoir is presented, this image being resulted from its
characteristics introduced in the simulation program ALOHA.
Figure 5.2. The ammonia reservoir.
5.2.2.4. Instalations of process or control.
a) The installation of ammonia KELLOGG.
General data [132]:
Year of commissioning:1979;
Projected capacity: 300.000 t/an.
Technology: licence KELLOGG – technology U.S.A., modernized in 1990, degree
of automation 98%.
Phases of the technological process [132]:
Preparation of synthesis gas:
- Compress and natural gas desulphurization;
- Reforming the primary natural gas, medium pressure;
- Catalitic Reforming of natural gas secondary air technology;
- Catalitic conversion of carbon monoxyde in two temperature stages.
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43
Purification of yhe synthesis gas [132]:
Purification for removing CO2, by chemical absorbtion in the soil. K2CO3
activated with cu diethanolamine – system Carsol;
Methanisation: catalytic reaction of transforming carbon oxydes to methan.
Synthesis and ammonia refrigeration [132]:
Synthesis gas compression;
Pressure ammonia synthesis with separation of ammonia by refrigeration;
Refrigeration and ammonia storage.
b) Auxiliary installation, component parts of the ammonia factory [137]:
Facility for generation, distribution and recovery of the steam;
Degassing facility condensation process;
Facility for storage and distribution of liquid ammonia.
105 bar steam generation system is integrated, with use at high energy recovery level,
the steam generated being used for a technological purpose and turbines driving compressors
and main pumps from the installation. It uses natural gas as fuel.
c) Finished products[137]:
Liquid ammonia – main product , 99,8% NH3, used as raw material in the
manufacture of urea;
carbon dioxide– secondary product.
d) Evaluation BAT (Best Availablle Techniques – The best technologies
available) [137]:
BAT is defined as being the current stage of development of processes, facilities or
methods of operation which indicates how appropriate is basically a measure for limiting
discharges. To determine whether a series of processes, facilities or methods of operation
represents the best technology available for general or individual cases, a particular attention
should be paid to the following aspects [132]:
the process of manufacturing ammonia applied in S.C. Amurco S.R.L. Bacău
installation: it falls into the category of conventional reforming, this being considered
a production process BAT;
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44
the installation of ammonia KELLOGG exploited by S.C. Amurco S.R.L. Bacău: it
belongs to the second technological generation, having the proper moral and
physical wear;
facility operation in recent years was made at a level of 20-70 % of its capacity, the
recorded exceeding BAT levels;
the installation was modernized in the 1994 – 1996 period.
5.2.2.5. Normative manufacturing, technological schemes, operation procedures
The process of manufacturing ammonia applied in SC Amurco SRL Bacau installation
falls into the category of conventional steam reforming of natural gas. In figure 5.3. one can see
the technological flux scheem at the ammonia installation [137].
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45
Figure 5.3. Yje technological scheme of btaining ammonia [137].
5.2.2.6. Quantities os dangerous substances and their characteristics
SC AMURCO SRL Bacău has as main activity [132]:
production of urea, nitrogen fertlizer, used in agriculture and marketed internally and
internationally;
producing ammonia, this being an intermediate product mainly used in the urea
production platform – the liquid ammonia as well as its aqueous solution is
commerciallized for different industrial uses;
producing and commercializing the alimentary ammonium bicarbonate.
CO2 la
consumatori
STORAGE
AMMONIA
SYNTHESIS AMMONIA
AMMONIA
FINITE
PRODUCT
RECOVERY
HYDROGEN
Ammonia water
at deposit
CONVERSION CO
AT HIGH
TEMPERATURE
CONVERSION CO
AT LOW
TEMPERATURE
WASHING CO 2
METHANISATION
COMPRESSION
synthesis gas Spent
catalists
PRIMARY
REFORMING
SECONDARY
REFORMING
Technological
air
COMPRESSION
Technological air
COMPRESSION
Natural gas
HEATING
DESULPHURISATION
Natural Gas
RESIDUAL
GAS
Solution K2CO3
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46
In table 5.2. one can see the main finite products obtained in the production process
[132].
Table 5.2.
No. Product
name
Installation
of
production
Capacity of
production
(t/year)
Way to store and
delivery Destination
1. Ammonia Ammonia
installation 300.000
Liquid ammonia, NH3
99.8%, delivered in the form
of liquid ammonia
1. Run as feedstock
in the process of
manufacturing urea on
the same site;
2. delivered to third
parties in tanks C.F. or
automobiles
2.
Ammonia
water
sollution
25%
The
ammonia
installation
Depending
on market
demand
Ammonia water tank with
V = 90,000 liter
delivered to third
parties in tanks C.F. or
automobiles
3. Urea Urea
installation 420.000
Urea pearl humidity 0,35 -
0,5% urea stored in bulk
storage, capacity 30,000 t;
Delivery: bulk or in double
bags of polypropylene and
polyethylene
Various beneficiaries
of chemical fertilizers
or technical urea
4. Azote
Installation
for
separation of
air (nitrogen)
nitrogen gas
600 m³ / h
Liquid
nitrogen
60 L / h
Nitrogen gas concentration
of 99%.
Liquid nitrogen:
- Cryogenic storage tank
with V = 5000 liters
Delivery in special
containers
Internal consumers
Various beneficiaries
5. Oxygen
Air
separation
installation
oxygen gas
80 m³ / h,
p = 150 atm
Bottled oxygen in the
installation of bottling , in
special containers ,
Storage bottles - in specially
designed storage.
Various beneficiaries
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47
5.2.2.7. The metheorological situation of the area to place the objective
The altitudinal layout step with wide opening to the east has conditioned, in a
great measure, the characteristics of Bacău climates. The continental influences are
modeled by the air masses from the western and northwestern Europe which arrive in
Bacau through saddles of the Carpathian and increase the rainfall [30].
The annual medium average wind speed frequency shows its predominance from
north, northwest and from the south and southeast.
Weather phenomena that are of special interest are the fog and the frost. The fog
occurs frequently during winter time and the transition of hot weather to cold or cold to
hot, with a maximum frequency in December and January. In the autumn months fog is
a common phenomenon on the river valleys, too, reducing the brightness [133].
The climatic conditions for Bacău city are:
• 42.2% of the time in the city of Bacau is represented by weather condition favorable
for the spread of toxic fumes;
12,6 % of the time in the city of Bacau is represented by weather conditions very
unfavourable for dispersion of toxic fumes;
45,2 % of the time in the city of Bacau is represented by weather conditions
unfavourable for dispersion of toxic fumes.
5.2.2.8. The seismic characteristics of the area
In order to study the impact of an earthquake occurrence in the reservoir area, there
were used studies of Iaşi branch INCERC vibration measurements, which aimed (INCERC,
2002) [136]:
for the reservoir, determining its own oscillation frequency domain, identifying the
areas on which there might appear significant amplifications of a dynamic disturbing
external action (conducted at microseismic agitation and low-intensity shocks
applied to the dome);
For site, the identification of dominant dscilation frequency ( made only for the
microseisms).
Modeling of seismic wave action was realised using the program with a finite
element type SELL (plate and membrane) SAP 2000.
The lowest natural frequency of oscillation determined by the modeling exercise was
33.7 Hz. The results of numerical simulations presented in the report, concluding that the cover
insulation and aluminum protection mantala are resistant to severe seismic actions up to 7.4 on
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48
the Richter scale. Such the seismic hypothesis of the waves action is not supported by the
container especially since the area at the time of the incident were not recorded significant
earthquakes ( according to data obtained from the website of the National Institute for Earth
Physics - real-time archive) [101].
5.2.3. ANALYSIS OF THE LAND AND IDENTIFICATION OF RISK
FACTORS IN THE SYSTEM
Identification of the risk factors is is based on detailed risk analysis of the evaluated site
and requires an initial analysis of risks. The identified risk factors are written in an " Evaluation
system sheet ” [12, 68].
Identification of RISC factors through ,,Macroscopical analysis”, comprises the
following stages [68]:
Presenting the installation , identification of the sources of danger;
Inventary of dangerous substances;
Identification of danger, evaluation and control of risk;
Identification of the area with the biggest risk;
Setting targets for prevention.
5.2.3.1. Presentation of the installation, identifying of sources of danger
Ammonia warehouse and loading ramp - unloading ammonia, for depositing liquid
ammonia and delivery to internal and external consumers and are located in the south part of
S.C. Amurco LLC BACĂU.
The description of the installation was presented in subchapter 5.2.2.3.
Identification of the sources of danger is realised according to the checklists
presented in subchapter 3.1.8. respectively:
Specific dangers of the site/process;
Dangers based on the incidental events;
External general dangers.
5.2.3.2. Inventary of the dangerous substances.
In table 5.3. are presented dangerous substances used in the production process, the
degree of danger and the relevant quantities[137].
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49
Table 5.3. Dangerous substances used, degree of danger and the relevant quantitaties [137].
The chemical
substance Danger
Risk
phases
Maximum
capacity of
storage
Maximum used
quantity/ produced
anually
Natural gas Inflamable F+; R12 It is not stored 535000 mc/a year
Anhidrous
ammonia
Toxic,corosive ,
dangerous
for the environment
R10
T; R23
C; R34
N; R50
15000 t 300.000 t/ a year
Ammonia water At a concentration >25%
it is toxic, dangerous for
the environment
C; R34
N; R50
80 t
According to orders
Formaldehyde
solution 25% toxic
Catalytic
cracking
3T;R23/24/
25–34-40-
43
100 t 6300 t
Hydrogen Inflamable F+; R12 It is not stored
Oxygen Oxidant O; R8 - According to orders
Sulfuric acid
Concentration
98%
Toxic, corosive R23 R35 3000 t 3000 t
Hydrochloric
acid
solution 36%
Toxic, corosive R23 R35 30 t 550 t
The effects of ammonia over tge employees and population health:
Ammonia is an extremely irritating gas for mucous and its its aqueous solutions are
caustic. A part of the inhalated ammonia is neutralized by the carbon dioxide at the level of
alveoli, the rest coming in circulation, then being eliminated through urine and sweat.
Acute intoxication with ammonia is manifested by feelings of suffocation strong access
of coughing, agitation, delirium, uncertainty in walking, blood flow disorders.
Death can occur in heart failure and pulmonary edema.
Concentrations of 0,25% - 0,45% ammonia in the air, that is 1897-3415 mg NH3/m3 air
can cause the apparition of an acute form of intoxication. An exposure of about 5 minutes in a
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medium having concentration of 0,5 % – 1 % ammonia in the air, that is 7589 mg NH3/m3 air
can cause death.
Accidental ingestion of ammonia solutions is accompanied by phenomena of gastric
intolerance, erythema, global edema. Ammonia affects the conjunctiva and cornea, causing the
appearance of conjunctivitis, palperal spasm and in severe cases, corneal clouding or
perforation [137].
In table 5.4. are presented the maximum admitted values for the ammonia concentration
at work places and in habitable zones.
Table 5.4. The maximum admitted values for the ammonia concentration at work
places and in habitable zones.
Reglementari in vigoare U.M. Valoare limita termen
scurt Valoare limita
Law no. 319/2006 regarding
security and health at work
(at work places)
mg/m3 air 36 (15 min.) 14 (8 hours)
MMPS 2002 STAS 12574/78 (for
the habitable zones) mg/m3 air 0,3 (30 min.) 1(24 hours)
Under the legislation presented in Table 5.4., the maximum permissible concentration
of ammonia in the working environment is 36 mg / m3 air and in protected areas 0.3 mg / m3
air.
5.2.3.3. Identification of danger, evaluation and risk control.
Determination and evaluation of risks of major accidents at Amurco society
establishes the process of identifying all dangers, risk evaluation on the chemical
platform for compliance with legislative requirements regarding occupational health and
safety arising from [132]:
activities conducted currently on the platform;
new or modified activities;
curent operation of installations and procedures a instalaţiilor şi procedurile
issued for cases of normal / abnormal operation, occasional pr periodical
procedures;
controlling of an operation which has potential in initiating risks;
using products and services provided by third parties.
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To achieve the identification process of major dangers resulting from normal and
abnormal operation, as well as the evaluation of their likelihood and severity, one has resorted
to systematic identification to adopt and implement the most appropriate procedures.
For the efficiency of the realised study, there were considered data about toxicity,
degree of ignition, poyential of explosion and reactions in chain in the following situations
[132]:
starting;
normal operation;
normal stop;
crashes;
maintenance.
For identification, analysis and risk evaluation at the chemical platform Amurco, we
took into account the history of the spent events over 30 years of activity in the production of
chemical fertilizers.
According to data from the Environmental Balance after 1997, after taking over the
company by SC INTERAGRO S.A. no major incidents were reported during the finctioning of
the installation at Amurco, following hich to have killed at least one employee, or might have
led to serious intoxication of a number of people both in and outside its amplansament [137].
5.2.3.4. Identifying the area with the highest risk.
In order to determine the highest risk installations, the company has been divided
into individual areas, on each area we conducted a thorough analysis pursuing the
following factors:
probability of producing an accident;
consequences in case of producing this accident;
hystory of each installation.
After an analysis on the platform of AMURCO, the following installations are
highlighted, each of them having a different potential when producing a major accident[132]:
ammonia synthesis installation;
urea synthesis installation;
ammonia storage reservoir;
ammonia loading ramp.
A relevant accident is linked to the loss of ammonia at one of the four installations
presented and for this reason each facility has an associated risk and a degree of danger which
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52
characterise it.
The probability of appearing an emergency situation is reduced by [137]:
equipping with safety elements and systems;
automation and control of risk parameters;
qualification of the staff in operating and mintenance of the facilities;
training and education for staff intervention;
alternative ources of power supply;
alternative sources of water supply.
The potential danger that the chemical platform AMURCO represents for both the
location and population (situated in Bacău and the neighboring localities), is determined by the
coexistece and the possibility of manifestation of multiple risk factors:
Dangerous properties of ammonia;
Occurence of troubled in the installations of the society.
Risks that can be produced on the emplacement of S.C. AMURCO l.L.C. Bacău :
1. natural risks [132]:
Earthquake and landslides (p);
Falling of cosmic objects (s);
2. technological risks [132]:
terrorist attak with heavy weapons; (s);
chemical accidents (p);
rail transport accidents (p);
explosions (p);
fires (p).
where :
(p) = main risk , (s) = secondary risk.
The natural risks, once manifested may trigger, in turn, additional specific effects on the
platform AMURCO like the technological risks mentioned above.
The emergency situations are treated according to the type of risk that manifests or tha
combination of their consequences in direct correlation with the quantities of dangerous
substances and their concentration.
For the AMURCO platform, the types of potential risks to be considered are [132]:
massive releases of dangerous sucstances in the air (chemical accident);
fires;
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explosions;
combinations of dangers determined by the damage character.
The main factors that lead to the chemical risk outbreak ( generally ) are:
technical errors;
uncontrolled chemical reactions determined by errors in projection;
the improper maintenance of facilities;
lack of control or procedural errors;
the human factor.
The typology of the possible emergencies on Amurco internal chemical platform, based
on the history of events leading to accidental crash and knowing the risks associated with the
installations as well as the properties of their substances danger is presented in the table 5.5.
[137].
Table 5.5. Types of emergency situations possible to be produced in S.C.AMURCO L.L.C. [137]
Type of event Where?
Pollution Fire Explosion Toxic
cloud air soil water
Massive ammonia emissions x x x
Gas flammable substance leak
(gas, synthesis gas, hydrogen) x x x
Flammable liquid spill x x x x x
Corrosive liquid spills x x x x
Technological damage at the
ammonia installation x x x x x x x
Technological damage at the
urea installation x x x x x x x
Technological damage at the
Ammonia tank installation
and loading ramp
x X x x x x x
Technological damage at
CET installation x x
Technological damage at
section electro SRA x
Technological damage at
nitrogen installation x
Technological damage at
oxygen installation x
Damage to storage of
flammable liquids - fuels x x
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Continuation Table 5.5.
Type of event Where?
Pollution Fire Explosion Toxic
cloud air soil water
Damage to deposits of
finished product- urea x
Failures, derailments during:
loading, manipuating and /
or transportation of dangerous
substances on the factory
railways
x x x x x x x
The types of emergencies outlined in Table 5.5. will be managed by S.C. Amurco LLC
while applying procedures specified in the content of plans of intervention and the operating
instructions of the departments.
The most toxic substance potential from the platform that presents a potential risk
triggering a major accident is ammonia. For leakage of ammonia from the installations that
produce, use and manipulate ammonia, the accidents can occur due to dispersion of toxic fumes
[137].
In the installations for the production of ammonia and urea it is supposed to be unlikely
to produce a major accident which will endanger health and civil community life. The existing
safety equipments in these installations, the degree of technology, the existence of clear
operating instructions within each section, enable stopping the source of the event through
technological intervention [132].
The deposit of ammonia is classified as being a strategic objective for the population
due to its vulnerability to external, violent, mechanical action. The existing ammonia depozit in
Amurco is a goal achieved by respecting storage technologies for the properties of the stored
substances. These technologies ensure minimum accepted risks regard ting the protection and
safety in exploitation [132].
In conclusion:
major events such as the catastrophic cracking of the tank of ammonia do not occur as a
consequence of technological process, human error, attack with light weapons or
unfavorable meteorological conditions (lightning, hail, strong wind), but only by violent
action of an external agent (meteorite, heavy weapons);
as a measure of safety , the storage reservoir is not filled at its designed capacity,
(maximum load capacity is 80% of the designed capacity);
in the technological process, the human factor is insignificant, as the pressure and
temperature regulation in ammonia storage is automatic;
the cryogenic cover was fully restored in 2001-2002.
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The storage tank of ammonia as a whole was designed and built to resist to an
earthquake of up 8˚ on the Richter scale according to the code for seismic design P100/1992
[136].
5.2.3.5. Setting targets for prevention
The potential for major danger in producing accidents, representing the Amurco site
justifies the need of establishing: the safety report, internal emergency plan and a policy of
prevention, for the following reasons [137]:
the existence of some technologies and installations which produce, use, manipulate,
deposit dangerous substances;
the existence, at a certain moment, of large stocks of dangerous substances;
the existence of a large number of persons who work on the platform and the possibility
of a human error in operation;
the possibility of involvement in events with serious consequences in neighborhood in
case of massive emissions of dangerous substances;
the possibility of surface water pollution.
This potential danger is determined by the co-existence and manifestation of several
risk factors that can cause and trigger at one time a certain type of risk (eg earthquakes or
landslides with complementary effect, terrorist attacks or falls of cosmic objects ). The
worsening consequences of an accident involving dangerous substances is influenced by the
location and technological specific which may favor simultaneous expression of multiple risk
factors with possibility of involvement in the "domino effect" of several installations.
5.2.4. ESTABLISHING CHECKLISTS.
General dangers checklists are used to identify relevant dangers specific to the
installations/sites. General external dangers are treated at the level of the entire site. In tables
5.6., 5.7. and 5.8. the checklists are presented for ammonia tank.
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Table 5.6. Checklists for dangers specific to the site/ process.
Nr. General dangers YES NO
1. Wrong design X
2. Incorrect manufacture and assembly X
3. Operating pressure over the permissible limit X
4. Temperatura de funcţionare necorespunzătoare X
5. Malfumctions due to corrosion, aging, normal wear or process X
6. Failures due to vibrations / fatigue X
7. Failure of components: flanges, joints, valves, gaskets,fittings,
pipes, hoses, etc. X
8. The bearings jam X
9. Moving permanent component failure X
10. The occurrence of unexpected chemical reactions X
11. Nonfeeding with substances for operation
12. Failure of the control device X
13. Nonfeeding with electricity, cooling water, steam, nitrogen,
etc.) X
14. Failures arising during normal operation X
15. Failures occurred during startup and shutdown X
16. Failures occurred during carrying out maintenance / repair X
17. Failures occurred during transportation of dangerous substances X
18. Appearance of flammable / explosive substances due to
failure X
19. Creating occurrence of explosion due to uncontrolled leakage
of substances X
20. Creating occurrence of explosion due to human error X
21. Creating occurrence of explosion due to malfunction of the
control system parameters X
22. Creating local occurrence of unexpected explosions X
23. Creating occurrence of explosion due to loss of energizing
substance X
24. The production of mechanical sparks due to friction X
25. The emergence of flame and hot gases X
26. The occurrence of undesirable chemicals, materials igniting
easily (eg FeS) X
27. Electrostatic Discharge current production and equalization X
28. Electrical sparks X
29. Uncontrolled emergence of electromagnetic waves X
30. Overheating surfaces due to friction and mechanical sparks
appearance X
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Table 5.7. Checklists for dangers based on incidental events.
Nr. General dangers YES NO
1. Unfulfilment of all necessary prevention and fire protection X
2. Failure to ensure the required dimensions of the vessel or the
retention tank X
3. Insufficient release of the substance in the plant X
4. The equipment failure or the insufficient measures to limit and
control the spread of the released substances X
5. No emergency exits are provided for personnel at the job X
6. The minimum distances between installations are not
respected X
7. The installations are not equipped with defense systems
8. The fire alarm and the fire detection system do not work X
9. The installation is not equipped with fire extinguishing agents X
10. The etinguishing fire means are not checked and do not
work X
11. There is not enough room for intervention X
12. No organization is made for intervention in emergencies X
13. The injury of the intervention personal due to the effects of
physical / chemical properties of the event X
14. The personnel at the job is not ready for intervention X
15. The detection systems do not work X
16. Failure to comply timely measures to limit the substances
released X
17. Failure to comply distances X
18. Limiting means of explosions are not made according to the
technical rules X
19. Failure to comply the detection of Gas devices / dangerous
pollutant substances X
20. Leaks of dangerous substances are not detected X
21. Leakage of the dangerous substances into sewer system/
wastewater without being detected X
22. The increasing uncontrolled concentration of dangerous
substances X
23. The released toxic substances are not separated sufficiently X
24. The substances which are dissolved in water from the solids
ones in the flue gas can not be separated X
25. The toxic clouds expansion due to the application of measures
of dispersion (ex: the curtain of water) X
26. The dangerous substances are not retained enough X
27. The dangerous substances are not neutralized X
28. The flare for thermal elimination of the substance does not
work X
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Table 5.8. The checklists for the external general dangers.
Nr. General dangers YES NO
1. Failure in taking flood protection measures
2. Failure in implementation of measures to protect against
earthquakes X
3. Failure in making safeguards against dangerous weather
phenomena X
4. Failure in making fire safety measures outside X
5. Failure in making lightning conductors or dangers caused
by the presence of high voltage line X
6.
The pipelines crossing the installation and containing
dangerous substances are not protected against producing an
unforeseen accident
X
7. Failure in taking protection measures against the impact of
transport or nearby objects X
8. Failure in implementation of measures to protect against
explosions from the outside (shell effect) X
9. Failure in implementation of measures to protect against
unauthorized access X
10. Failure in making protection measures and intervention
systems to unauthorized access X
11. Services performed through contract by other companies on
site are faulty X
12. The intervention vehicles have not accesses to the
installation X
13. The intervention equipment, protection and means of
extinguishing / neutralization are uninsured or out of order X
14. There are no plans for cooperation with forces outside the
establishment X
15. Failure in making training intervention forces during
emergency situations X
16. Making faults in evaluation and eliminating dangers X
17. The entire staff can not be alarmed in case of an accident X
5.2.5. DRAFTING THE TREES OF FAILURE
The identification of deviations from normal system operation and all the possible risks
are made on direct observation and logical deduction based on the simulation of the system
operation [25].
The identification of accident scenarios is based on the use of butterfly node comprising
trees of failure and trees of events [27].
This step allows the defining of a list of critical events for each couple consisting of one
device and the substance which it contains. For each critical event there is associated a tree of
failure that can be changed to match the features of the studied system. In the same way,
starting from a critical event and the dangerous substance involved, this stage allows the
construction of a tree of events, which combined with the tree of failure forms the butterfly
node characteristic for more accident scenarios [25,27].
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In figure 5.4. one can see the scheem of trees of failure, realised for an ammonia tank,
but which can be used for other dangerous substances, too.
FUNCTIONAL
STABILITY
TAMPER
PROTECTION
CONTINUOUS
FUNCTIONING
STOP
WITHOUT
MISTAKES
CONTINUOUS
SUPPLY EARTHQUAKE
PROTECTION
FIRE
PROTECTION
AC
CE
SS
CO
NT
RO
L
RE
LIA
BL
E
EQ
UIP
ME
NT
SA
FET
Y
INFO
RM
AT
ION
PE
RM
AN
EN
T
SU
PE
RV
ISIO
N
MA
INT
EN
AN
CE
PR
OF
ES
SIO
NA
LIS
M
TA
NK
3
TA
NK
2
EV
AC
UA
TIO
N
PO
MP
S
WA
TE
RP
RO
OF
CO
NS
TR
UC
TIO
N
ME
AN
S O
F
ES
CA
PE
ME
AN
S O
F
PR
EV
EN
TIO
N
RE
SP
ON
SA
BIL
ITIE
S
TA
NK
1
PE
NA
LT
IES
Figure 5.4. Scheme of trees of failure.
5.2.6. ELABORATING THE ACCIDENT SCENARIO
a) Building an accident scenario
For major accident scenario development there were taken into account the following
elements [132]:
the conditions of AMURCO objective conditions takin into account the position of the
urban and rural settlements in the area;
the danger presented for the staff of the AMURCO society;
the quantity of dangerous substsnces ( ammonia) present installations and stored when the
accident occurs;
the characteristics of the involved substances that can occur during failures and can
increase the accident consequences;
modeling regarding emissions propagation according to studies, as well as producing fires
after explosions;
the way of propagation and dispersion of the dangerous substance in the air , water or soil
where there would be an escape followed by explosion and fire;
the security management established by the AMURCO society manager, the capacity to
answer in situations of emergency to limit and remove the consequences of a major
accident on the site and outside;
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knowing the behaviour in time of the maximum concentrations for evacuation or protection
measures.
In order to establish the emergency planning zones there will be considered scenarios
with the highest range.
At the implementation of he scenario, there will not be taken into account scenarios that
may be excluded and are "still hypothetical accidents that may occur." The accidents that might
occur and that had not an immediately planned response from the operator, are not taken into
account because they deviate from the purpose of the scenario (eg "terrorist attack with heavy
guns/bombs/high power explosive ", "fall of a sizeable meteorite over the ammonia tank fully
loaded "or" collapse of an aircraft over the tank of ammonia. "These accidents require the
establishment of special security measures, the operative plans of intervention, involving the
intervention of institutions responsible for security (The Gendarmerie, The County Inspectorate
for Emergency Situations, The County Police Department/The Municipal Hall Police, air
Forces, The ambulance, etc. SRI) [132].
The result of the established scenario must update the evolution of the dangerous effects
in time and space that determines the maximum degree of danger and protective and
intervention measures needed to be taken to limit and remove the consequences.
In order to write a realistic scenario in which the probability of occurrence is high, one
should consider [137]:
analysing and evaluating the effect of the produced event;
the characteristics of the neighboring buildings: vulnerabilities, the domino
effect, the produced meteorological conditions;
the specific data of the installations that use dangerous substances in the
manufacturing process which represent a major danger;
the quantity of the existant substance in the installation and the flow released
during the event;
the quantity of the dangerous substance released by producing a technological
malfunction;
the level of training of the staff participating at the production process;
the special training of the staff who works at the classified installations
with major risk for the intervention and conducting simulation interventions for
maintaining workplace skills;
establishing and displaying the work instructions for each installtion for normal
work conditions but also for accidentally appeared defects;
special equipments for protection and intervention;
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protection systems and safety installations;
optical and acoustic notification-allarm systems;
organizing, equipment and preparing the Private Service for Emergency
Situations of S.C. AMURCO L.L.C. Bacău in relation to the existing risks of the site and
the competence approved by the I.S.U.J. and with the performance criteria established by
the elaborated by the General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations.
For the evaluation efficiency one must take into account data about the toxicity, degree
of ignition, exploison potential and reactions in chain in the following situations: starting,
normal operation, normal stop, temporary emergency stop, maintainance, starting from the
question “ what happens if …..”, taking into account potential ways of failure for every
component, the cause of failure and the potential consequences[132].
For the events where fire and explosions are the causes of producing major accidents,
leading to the release of a mixture of more dangerous substances, defining the scenario of an
accident is done for the more dangerous substance, also considered the guiding substance,
namely the ammonia.
In figure 5.5. one can see the scheme of the accident effects for the ones that may
however be produced [102]. The notices represent:
STV = efficiency domain of accident prevention measures;
STB = efficiency domain of measures of limiting the effects of accidents;
Indices: I = Inventary; CMI = the biggest quantity implied; K = critical; SA =
security analysis.
Distance Critical points of reference
( Residential area
VALUE
Acid evaluation
De ex.AEGL-2
STV STB
INSTALLATION SURROUNDINGS
DOMAIN ACCIDENTS THAT
STILL CAN BE
PRODUCED
M i
M CMI
M K
M SA
QR CMI
QR K
MASS FLOW PROPAGATION
RATE PERCENTAGE EMISSIONS
QR SA
QT CMI
QT K
QT SA
Figure 5.5. Scheme of the effects of accidents for the accidents that may however be
produced [102].
From figure 5.5. there follow two deliitation criteria for the accidents that may however
be produced, so[102]:
Criterion 1 ( inferior limit): The possible courses of incidents from an installation
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with leaking of dangerous substances, fire or explosion, the failure of measures to
prevent accidents, these being classified as accidents that still can be produced, if
the CMI of a dangerous toxic substance, inflamable or explosive from the
installation exceeds a critical quantity MK, (that quantity whose leak, fire or
explosion reaches the relevant value of evaluation of accident just at the critical
point of reference);
Criterion 2 ( superior limit): There will be taken into consideration the bigget
possible accidents that may still occur in an installation, those running incidents
with dangerous substance leak, fire or explosion.
The installations with major risk in causing accidents involving dangerous substances
are [132]:
ammonia synthesis installation ;
urea synthesis installation;
ammonia storage tank;
ammonia loading ramp.
According to the established scenario, the probability of producing a major accident at
S.C. AMURCO L.L.C.Bacău was reduced as frequency but can cause very serious
consequences, that is the event was not expected to be produced in the lifetime of the operator,
but it can be produced once in the lifetime of the operators of the type.
b) Producing the event
The event was produced on the tenth of July 2015 around two o’clock p.m .
Due to vibrations caused by an earthquake with a magnitude of 8,2º Richter Scale,
there occured a major rift to four meters of tank base, which led to the release of a large
quantity of ammonia in the atmosphere. The tank was loaded at 80%of its maximum
capacity.
c) Descrbig the event
When the event was produced there was heard a very loud noise that initiated the
destruction of the sheath of alluminium sheet, the mineral wool insulation and FOAMGLAS
isolation. The objective resonated and the vibrations led to the failure of thermoisolation, this
process continuing until the distruction of cryogenic cover up to 90 %, the building becoming
unusable for the purpose for which it was created, namely the maintenance of the ammonia in
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liquid estate in conditions of security (temperature of -40˚C). The produced event affected the
backbone of the tank causing a rift with a diameter of 3 m, which led to the release of large
ammounts of ammonia in the atmosphere and, due to the high concentration, 25 employees
died and over 40 citizens from the population were in lethal zone of the dangerous substance
and it also affected the environment[138].
5.2.6.1. SIMULATION OF DISTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL TANK OF
AMMONIA REALIZED WITH THE SIMULATION PROGRAM ALOHA
ALOHA software program is a free program developed and used by the USEPA
(United States Environmental Protection Agency). With this program one can forecast air
concentrations of gas discharges from damaged tanks [130].
The mathematical model as a base of the program works well with certain limitations
(low wind speeds - which has no interaction phenomena, very stable atmospheric conditions,
slow changes of the wind direction, slow variations of concentrations) [130].
The program objective is to support the decision-makers responsible for the chemical
releases into the atmosphere to deal with emergency situations and training activities to
establish protective measures and intervention in such situations.
The main stages of the ALOHA program are: input, running and retrieving the results,
their representation and interpretation.
It is used a GIS program for taking an aerial zone picture ongoing process and a
program of photographic processing, able to overlap on scale the graphic result of the program
over the aerial image captured with the software GIS transparency necessary to the recognition
of the main reference objects of the graphic image [130].
The results of the program are presented under different forms:
numeric listing;
graphically, the plan distribution of the concentration of polluant at the desired hight;
graphically, the concentration variation in time in a point from the chosen space;
variation in time of the flow source.
The interpretation of the obtained results: the plan distribution of the ammonia
concentration at different heights, allow the demarcation of areas according to their dangerous
toxicity levels at various time intervals, less than 60 minutes, because there are certain rules
that, due to the atmospheric instability prohibit forecast programs on longer timeframes[130].
Knowing the most exposed areas to the effects of the pollutant, allow taking preventive
measures (equipment of population, isolation, discharge, etc.). Determination pollutant
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substances and the level of danger in a certain point at a certain distance from the source, it can
be done using graphics of temporary variation of concentration [130].
With the help of ALOHA program 5.4 there will be calculated the consequences of an
accident at the ammonia tank from SC Amurco LLC Bacau, taking into account the following
inputs: the description of the location, the weather conditions (the air temperature, the
atmospheric stratification, the wind speed), the place of the crack, the ammonia storage tank
characteristics, the physico-chimcal properties of the ammonia.
5.2.6.1.1. THE EVENT SCENARIO, INTRODUCTION OF DATA INTO THE
PROGRAM
The scenario of the considered event is a crack in the ammonia storage tank of 15,000
tons ( built capacity of the tank).
a) Details of the scenario:
the place of the crack: at a height of 3m from the base of the tank;
crack as a circle, having a diameter of 3 m;
the quantity of ammonia stored in the tank is 12,000 t, corresponding to a degree of
filling of approx. 80 %.
b) The climate data considered while producing the chemical accident are:
Tge air temperature: 15 °C;
The atmospheric stratification: neutral;
The wind speed: 3 m/s.
The necessary data to fix the problem of dispersion of the dangerous substance in the
atmosphere are:
c) The characteristics of the ammonia storage tank [132]
Net volume capacity: 22,000 m3
The tank capacity: 15,000 t
Storafe parameters: t = - 34 °C, atmspheric pressure =748
The tank height: 20.0 m
diameter: 27.6 m.
d) Physico-chemical properties of the ammonia [132]
Molecular weight: 17.03 kg/kmol
Physical state: colourless gas with a characteristic odor
Density at 0C: 0.771 g/L
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Density in liquid estate (at - 79 C ): 0.817 g/L
Melting temperature: - 77,7 C
Boiling temperature: - 33,35 C
solubility: soluble in water, partial soluble in water, parţial
soluble in ether
density of vapors in report to the air: 0,589 g/ m3
flash temperature: - 2 C
temperature of ignition: 651 C
chemical reactivity: in contact with Cl, I, Br, HF lights or even explodes
calorical power: 4450 kcal/kg
limits of exploison:
inferior: 16 % /113,34 g/m3
superior: 79 % /178,34 g/m3
maximum pressure of explosion: 0,588 N/mm2
toxicity: substance with medium toxicity, action according to concentration
and time of exposure;
group of explosion: II A.
Toxic cloud dispersion modeling in case of an accident at the ammonia tank allows
emphasizing the impact area and its magnitude.
5.2.6.1.2. DESCRIPTION OF THE SITE
S.C. Amurco LLC Bacau is located in the southern part of Bacau county at 46 degrees
and 31 minutes north latitude and 26 degrees and 56 minutes east longitude.
In figure 5.6. is presented the location description, these location data of latitude and
longitude respectively being manually introduced. The location of the geographical area in
which the phenomenon can spend can also be given through geographical coordinates of one or
more reference points so there can be identified any desired object.
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Figure 5.6. Description of the location.
5.2.6.1.3. METHEOROLOGICAL SITUATION
Metheorological information that are required by the program are entered manually and
are given by an environmental monitoring station. In this scenario we took data from Bacau
Metrology Station as shown in Fig. 5.7. and 5.8 .:
atmospheric stratification: neutral;
wind speed: 3 m/s.
air temperature: - 9 °C;
medium humidity 50%.
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Figure 5.7. Metheorological situation.
Figure 5.8. Temperature and humidity.
5.2.6.1.4. SCENARIOS FOR DETERMINING THE SOURCE
The ammonia reservoir characteristics determined by this scenario are:
the tank capacity: 15.000 t
storing parameters: t = - 34 °C
height of the tank: 20,0 m
diameter: 27,6 m
volume: 12.000.000 l.
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5.2.6.1.5. THE CHEMICAL DANGEROUS SUBSTANCE
a) The substance that presents a possible risk in triggering a major accident is the ammonia
- a colorless gas with a pungent odor and strong choking.
b) Physical properties [132]:
The molecular mass: 17.03 kg/kmol
Density to air: 0.597 g/ m3
Point of melting: -77.7 ºC
Point of boiling: -33.4 ºC
The critical temperature:132.4 ºC
The critical pressure: 112.5 atm.
Factors of cunvertion: 1ppm= 0.71 mg/m³, 1 mg/m³= 1.41 ppm
In the presence of the flame, the ammonia burns into the air according to this
reaction:
4NH3 + 3 O2 → 2 N2 + 6 H2O + 300.6 Kcal.
The acute intoxication is manifested by feelings of suffocation, strong bouts of
coughing, agitation, delirium, uncertainty in walking, blood flow disorders. Death occurs in
heart failure and pulmonary edema [132].
Concentrations of 0.25% - 0.45% ammonia in air may cause the acute intoxication. An
exposure of about 5 minutes in an environment having a concentration of 0.5% - 1% ammonia
in the air can cause death.
5.2.6.1.6. ONE CHOOSES THE SITUATION WHEN THE SUBSTANCE DOES NOT
BURN
In figure 5.9. is presented the chosing of a situation when the substance does not burn to
verify its maximum concentration at different times and distances from the source.
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Figure 5.9. Chosing the situation when the substance does not burn.
ONE CHOOSES THE FORM AND THE DIAMETER OF THE HOLE THROUGH
WHICH THE AMMONIA DRAINS (figure no. 5.10.):
The place of the crack: at a height of 4 m from the base of the tank;
Crack under the form of a circle, having a diameter of 3 m;
Figure 5.10. Choosing the form and the diameter of the hole through which
the ammonia drains
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5.2.6.1.7. MATHEMATICAL MODELING AND PRINCIPLES FOR DIGITAL
SIMULATION
After analyzing data from the scenario, three toxic threatening areas resulted [16]:
letal – red colour;
of intoxication - orange colour;
of pollution - yellow colour.
Depending on the speed and the direction of the wind one can establish the measures of
intervention, warning and alarming of workers and population about the occurence or
imminence of a danger in order to pass in a short time to the application of measures of
protection and intervention.
5.2.6.1.8. THE QUANTITY AND TIME OF AMMONIA FLOW
In figure 5.11. is presented the graphic for the quantity and time of the ammonia flow.
Figure 5.11. The quantity and time of the ammonia flow.
From the resulted graphic, one can observe the fact that, in the first minute and a half
after breaking the tank, approx. 9,000 t of ammonia leaked, the other 3,000 t being leaked in the
other minute and a half.
In figure 5.12. is presented the mark of the concentrations of ammonia for different
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values.
Figura 5.12. The print of ammonia concentration for different values.
From the graphic one can observe the fact that the dispersing of dangerous substance
increases with the decrease of the ammonia concentration due to the wind speed and the
leakage, the area affected by the cloud of ammonia is 11,000 m², with different concentrations
depending on the distance.
In figure 5.13. is presented the graph of ammonia concentration variation at a distance of
500m.
.
Figura 5.13. Concentration of ammonia at a distance of 500 m.
From the resulting graph one can see that the concentration value increases in the first
three minutes up to the maximum value of 5000 ppm and then gradually decreases for one hour
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up to a value of 3000 ppm because of the wind speed which disperses the ammonia in an area
increasingly larger with decreasing concentration.
In figure 5.14. is presented the graph of the variation of the concentration of ammonia in
the distance of 1000m.
Figure 5.14. The variation of ammonia concentration at a distance of 1000 m.
From the resulting graph one can see that in the first 5 minutes the concentration
decreased from a maximum of 1500 ppm to 1000 ppm., while during 55 min with a tendency to
decrease according to the distance and due to the wind speed that disperses the ammonia in an
area increasingly larger with decreasing concentration.
In figure 5.15. is presented the variation of ammonia concentration at a distance of 3000 m.
Figure 5.15. The variation of ammonia concentration at a distance of 3000 m.
From the resulting graph one can see that, in the first 30 minutes, the concentration
decreased from a maximum of 220 ppm to 150 ppm, with a tendency to decrease according to
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the distance and speed of the wind which disperses the ammonia in an area increasingly larger
with decreasing concentration.
5.2.6.1.9. AMMONIA LEAKING FREE ZONE WITHOUT FIRE
In figure 5.16. is presented the graph with ammonia leaking free zone without fire.
Figure 5.16. Graph with ammonia leaking area without fire.
In figure 5.17. is given a first result of simulation, that is the spatial distribution (two-
dimensional) of the cloud of ammonia in the maximum phase of development, weather
conditions and data flow.
Figure 5.17. Escape zoning map.
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If one superimposes the graph in Figure 5.16 over GIS map of Bacau county, figure 5.17.
there can be seen that the gas cloud reaches 10,000 m of tank of ammonia in the South - North to
Bacau, whose suburbs in the South area re already affected by the cloud of ammonia and there
may be established the evacuation zones of the population. Even the city center is very close to
the border gas cloud.
5.2.6.1.10. THE FLAMMABLE AREA
In figura 5.18. is presented the graph with the flammable area.
Figure 5.18. The graph with the flammable area.
From the resulting graph one can see that the flammable area is in the vicinity of the tank
over an area of about 2500 m2, and where the ammonia is on fire, the fire produced can be
followed by a burst of high proportions as shown in Figure 5.20 .
5.2.6.1.11. AREA OF EXPLOSION
In figure 5.19. is presented the graph with the area of explosion.
Figure 5.19. Graph with the area of explosion.
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From the resulting graph one can see that, following an explosion, it would cause the
destruction of the existing buildings over an area of about 2,500 m², perhaps serious harm on an
area of about 4,000 m² and the breaking glass panes at the existing buildings on an area of
approximately 10,000 m² which could produce victims of of population in the explosion area.
5.2.6.1.12. DETERMINATION OF EVACUATION ZONES
In figure 5.20. is presented the map with the setting of the escaping areas .
Figure 5.20. The map with the setting of the escaping areas.
Depending on the chart with the leaking of ammonia without it catching fire (Figure
5.16.) and depending on the wind direction and speed, one can determine the evacuation of
population , animals and material goods areas, (figure 5.20.) that is the area from the ammonia
tank of approximately 11,000 m² to the northern part of Bacau, in a sufficient period of time to
save the life of the people being in the fatal poisoning and pollution zone.
5.2.7. EVALUATION OF THE RISK FACTORS IDENTIFIED IN TERMS
OF SERIOUSNESS
The severity class establishment is done with the tool "Scale for measuring severity and
probability of risk factors on the consequences of the action system" [13].
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" The Scale for measuring severity and probability of risk factors on the consequences
of the action system" is a rubric for grading the severity of consequences classes and classes of
probability of their occurrence [12].
Table 5.9. shows the Scala for the listing of the consequences of action severity and
probability of risk factors on system [12].
Table 5.9. The Scale for measuring the severity and probability of risk factors on the
consequences of the action system [12].
SEVERITY CLASSES SEVERITY OF CONSEQUENCES
CONSEQUENCES
1. NEGLIGIBLE Minor reversible consequences without damaging the
environment or employees.
2. SMALL Reversible consequences affecting the environment.
3. MEDIUM
Reversible consequences with environmental damage and
registration of victims among employees - at least one
employee.
4. BIG
Irreversible consequences affecting the environment and
record of casualties among employees - up to five
employees.
5. GRAVE
Irreversible consequences affecting the environment and the
record of casualties among employees - more than five
employees.
6. VERY SERIOUS Irreversible consequences affecting the environment and the
record of victims among the employees and the public.
5.2.8. EVALUATION AND FREQUENCY OF THE INITIATING EVENTS
AND THE CONFIDENCE LEVELS OF BARRIERS
Once one has established on a statistical basis, the intervals at which the events may
occur, the framing is done in classes of probability.
In terms of probability classes, one must be taken into account the following classes
[12]:
class 1 – the frequency of producinf the event : once at over 10 years;
class 2 – the frequency of producing the event: once at 5 - 10 years;
class 3 – the frequency of producing the event: once at 2 - 5 years;
class 4 – the frequency of producing the event: once at 1 – 2 years;
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class 5 – the frequency of producing the event: once at 1 year - 1 month;
class 6 – the frequency of producing the event: once at least one month.
In table 5.10. is presented the grid of risk evaluation based on probability and gravity
[12].
Table 5.10.
CLASSES OF PROBABILITY
1 2 3 4 5 6
EX
TR
EM
LY
RA
RE
VE
RY
RA
RE
RA
RE
A
LIT
TL
E
FR
EQ
UE
NT
FR
EQ
UE
NT
VE
RY
FR
EQ
UE
NT
CL
AS
SE
S O
F
GR
AV
ITY
CONSEQUENCES
P>
10
yea
rs
5 y
ears<
P<
10 y
ears
2 a
ni<
P<
5 a
ni
1 y
ear<
P<
2 y
ears
1 m
on
th<
P<
1 y
ear
P<
1 m
on
th
6 VERY
SERIOUS
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE AND
REGISTRATION OF EMPLOYEES
AND POPULATION VICTIMS
(6,1) (6,2) (6,3) (6,4) (6,5) (6,6)
5 SERIOUS
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE AND
REGISTRATION OF VICTIMS
AMONG EMPLOYEES OF UP TO 10
EMPLOYEES
(5,1) (5,2) (5,3) (5,4) (5,5) (5,6)
4 BIG
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE AND
REGISTRATION OF VICTIMS
AMONG EMPLOYEES OF UP TO
FIVE EMPLOYEES
(4,1) (4,2) (4,3) (4,4) (4,5) (4,6)
3 MEDIUM DAMAGE TO THE ENVIRONMENT
AND UP TO TWO EMPLOYEES (3,1) (3,2) (3,3) (3,4) (3,5) (3,6)
2 SMALL ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE (2,1) (2,2) (2,3) (2,4) (2,5) (2,6)
1 NEGLIGIBLE (1,1) (1,2) (1,3) (1,4) (1,5) (1,6)
Depending on the risk that may occur, severity class and class probability (likelihood
couple - gravity) and under the scenario of the presented accident, one identifies the risk level
in the table 5.10. [12].
Being given the frequency with which there can be produced an earthquake in Romania
according to the seismic characteristics of the area shown in section 5.2.2.8. ie over 10 years –
it is EXTREMELY RARE, according to the Grid risk evaluation presented in Table 5.10. and it
is 1.
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In table 5.11. is presented the Scale to classify the level of risk/security depending on
probability - severity scale built on risk evaluation [12] With the help of the scale to classify
the levels of risk/security levels there are determined the levels for each risk factor individually.
Table 5.11.
LEVEL F RISK PROBABILITY – SEVERITY COUPLE LEVEL OF
SECURITY
1 - MINIMUM (1,1) (1,2) (1,3) (1,4) (1,5) (1,6) (2,1) 7 - MAXIMUM
2 – VERY SMALL (2,2) (2,3) (2,4) (3,1) (3,2) 6 – VERY BIG
3 - SMALL (2,5) (2,6) (3,3) (3,4) (4,2) (5,1) (6,1) 5 - BIG
4 - MEDIUM (3,5) (3,6) (4,3) (4,4) (5,2) (5,3) (6,2) 4 - MEDIUM
5 – BIG (4,5) (4,6) (5,4) (5,5) (6,3) 3 – SMALL
6 – VERY BIG (5,6) (6,4) (6,5) 2 – VERY SMALL
7 - MAXIMUM (6,6) 1 - MINIMUM
Given the risks that may occur at the site S.C. Amurco LLC Bacau identified in subchapter
5.2.3.4., points 1 and 2 may do the evaluation of the frequency initiating events like this:
In table 5.12. there is presented the risk evaluation sheet identified in SC Amurco
LLC Bacău, depending on the grade of severity presented in Table 5.9. and class probability
table shown in table 5.10 [12].
Tabelul 5.12.
RISK
CLASS
OF
GRAVITY
CLASS OF
PROBABILITY
LEVEL
OF RISK LEVEL OF
SECURITY
NATURAL RISKS
Earthquake and
landslides: 6 1 3 5
Risk Factors:
F1 – Chemical accidents 1 3 1 7
F2 – Railway accidents 3 4 3 5
F3 - Explosions 4 2 3 5
F4 - Fires 1 4 1 7
Risc Factors:
Falling of cosmic objects 5 1 3 5
F5 – Chemical accidents 1 3 1 7
F6 - Railway accidents 3 4 3 5
F7 - Explosions 4 2 3 5
F8 - Fires 1 3 1 7
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Continuation Table 5.12.
TECHNOLOGICAL
RISKS 2 5 3 5
Factors of risk:
F9 - Terrorist attack with
heavy weapons 6 1 3 5
F10 – Chemical accidents 1 3 1 7
F11 - Railway accidents 3 4 3 5
F12 - Explosions 4 2 3 5
F13 - Fires 1 3 1 7
According to the scenario of the accident produced at the ammonia tank established in
subchapter 5.2.6. namely the death of 25 employees and over 40 people as well as the damage
to the environment in case of an earthquake greater than 8º on the Richter scale for which was
calculated and constructed the tank, it may crack and even destroy, leading to dispersal of a
large quantity of ammonia in the atmosphere, and "irreversible consequences are affecting the
environment and record casualties among employees and the public," gravity is 6 class with
VERY SERIOUS consequences as shown in table 5.9
If the earthquake is less than 8 º on the Richter scale, as shown in table 5.9 in case of an
ammonia tank there are "negligible consequences" severity class is 1.
Given the frequency with which there can be produced an earthquake in Romania
according to the seismic characteristics of the area shown in section 5.2.2.8. ie annually -
frequently, according to the Grid risk evaluation, the class probability presented in Table 5.10.
is five.
In the presented case in the scenario accident, the producing of an earthquake of 8,2º on
Richter Scale, where the severity class is 6 and the class probability is 1 in table 5.12. the
resulting risk level 3 – SMALL and the security level is 5- BIG. The same is for each risk
factor individually.
Figure 5.21. presents the variation of partial risk and safety levels, depending on the risk
factors [12]
RISK
CLASS OF
GRAVITY
CLASS OF
PROBABILI
TY
LEVEL OF
RISK LEVEL OF
SECURITY
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0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
PA
RT
IAL
LE
VE
LS
OF
RIS
K
AN
D S
EC
UR
ITY
F1 F3 F5 F7 F9 F11 F13
RISK FACTORS
Fig. 5.21. Variation of partial risk and safety levels, depending on risk factors [12].
Where:
Represents the partial risk level
Represents the security level
F1 – Chemical accidents;
F2 – Railway accidents;
F3 -Explosions;
F4 - Fires;
produced after an earthquake > 8º Richter scale.
F5 – Chemical accidents;
F6 - Railway accidents;
F7 -Explosions;
F8 - Fires;
produced as a result of falling of cosmic objects.
F9 – Terrorist attack with heavy weapons;
F10 – Chemical accidents;
F11 - Railway accidents;
F12 -Explosions;
F13 - Fires;
produced by technological risks.
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As can be seen both in Table 5.12. and in the graph from figure 5.21. the level of risk
and the security level are the same for risk factors complementary respectively, chemical
accidents and fires and also are the same for accidents on communication routes and explosions
in the classes of severity and probability differ in some risk factors but fall in the same scale
according to the table 5.11.
5.2.9. ESESTIMATING THE DIRECT IMPACT OVER THE ASSETS ,
THE DATES AND INFORMATION, INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE
STAFF
While elaborating the accident scenario, there is estimates a direct impact over [132]:
goods and values;
data and information;
infrastructure (telecommunication and systems);
general infrastructure;
the staff availability;
compliance with the laws and procedures in the field.
According to the variation of the released ammonia flow, measures of decreasing the
impact over the own staff, the population from the impact area, the material goods and the
infrastructure:
evacuating the staff and the material goods;
alerting/alarming the subunits of intervention;
implementation of intervention plans;
specialized medical assistance;
conducting actions of intervention by the specialized forces.
5.2.10. EVALUATION OF THE EXISTING PROTECTION FACTORS ,
COMPENSATION AND REHABILITATION
In order to establish the risk reducing factors, one evaluates 5 categories of
measures, respectively [132]:
discouraging measures through the actions done by the specialized staff to
inform their own staff and the population from the area about the danger
of the used hazardous substances;
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prevention measures: through the activities developed by S.P.S.U. and the
specialized staff regarding the control of respecting the installation exploit
conditions and the safety at work;
measures of protection: by using the imposed systems by technical
standards and the special equiping within special installations as well as
the population that could be affected;
compensatory measures;
recovery measures.
Prevention and protective measures that can be applied to reduce the risk are: collective
protection, personal protection, employee training and preparation for emergency interventions,
training and other personnel-alarm notification system.
a) The collective protection is achieved by equipping the technological installation with
installations, facilities and equipment of labor protection so [137]:
pipes through which flow pressurized fluids or which may cause burnings (acids,
bases) are provided with protected guard flanged joints;
pipes through which flow hot fluids are insulated;
pipes through which flow flammable fluids have flanged joints equipotential
bridges;
electrically operated machines are touched to the ground;
all the moving parts of the machines are provided with protective guard;
pomps with wich the flammable liquids flow, have an antiexplosive construction
and the ones for corosive liquids are made of specific anticorosive materials;
machines, devices and installations are equipped with measuring and control
aparatus that are supposed to periodic metheorological check;
on the AMURCO site smoking and open fire are forbidden. Smoking is allowed
only in places specially designed and marked in this sense;
for mechanical works with open fire are drawn specific work licences for every
job and work place;
the installations where accidental releases of polluants ( gases, vapors or dust) are
possible, are equipped with ventilation systems;
for all workplaces are drawn and displayed work instructions which show the way
of correct and not dangerous for the execution of each operation, manipulation,
control, risk factors and measures of prevention etc. so as to eliminate as much as
possible the accidents at work and/or professional illnesses.
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b) The individual protection – is realised by using the individual protection equipment
which means all the individual ways of protection that the worker wears during the working
hours for[137]:
the current operations the equipment iconsists of: helmet, glasses for protection,
overalls, gloves, boots, gas mask with filter cartridge against the corresponding
toxic substance;
the interventions in case of breakdowns at the society , there are autonomous
insulating devices ( with compressed air), masks with adduction hose and
isolalating.
c) The training for the employees and the preparation in case of emergrncy
intervention.
The company management allows the access to training and ensures the raising of the
level of training for the whole staff in different domains of activity through participation at
different specialised courses.
The practical training of the staff of each department will be simulated through possible
accidents involving dangerous substances. At these simulations all the company employees
with responsibilities in the field of emergency management will participate, namely: the
members of emergency cell, the medical personnel from the dispensary unit, the staff of civil
protection, the private service for emergencies of the society provided with logisticsand
dispatcher [132].
The simulations are based on scenarios of possible accidents that may occur because of
their current activities that have the potential to manifest themselves outside the establishment.
These exercises are performed in collaboration with security forces and supporting intervention
from outside, if the response capacity of the company is exceeded.
Preparing for emergencies is executed in accordance with the following documents: the
preparation and main activities for the current year approved by I.S.U.J. the Order of the
county prefect, the internal emergency Plan, the external emergency Plan drawn up by I.S.U.J.
for Amurco site, the fire intervention Plan.
d) The training of other staff: new employees, visitors, delegates, teams of workers of
the companies that have contracts for temporary work in unity, it is made permanently for
each field of training (safety of work , emergency situations) recorded in Registries for
preparation and are materialized through individual evaluation tests [137].
e) The notification and alarming system is organized as to allow the reception and
transmission of the notification and alarming civil protection, warning the population in case of
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a major accident involving dangerous substances, or, in case of disasters and exchange of
information, necessary knowledge about the reality on the ground, analysis of situations that
may occur, decisions to manage and coordinate the response actions [132].
The alarm system provides a coverage of ~ 80% of the perimeter of S.C. AMURCO
LLC and it is composed of a siren of 5.5 kW connected to the centralized system of Bacău, 3
sirens of 3 kW, two sirens of 75W, one horn steam.
The audibility of the siren installed at 5.5 kW reaches 800m to the central station
platform outside, inside it is vitiated by: the noise, density and height of installations.
5.2.11. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF SAFETY BARRIERS
After identifying the potential accident scenarios, there must be identified major
security barriers that allow the reducing of the severity of the potential accident [133].
Reducing the probability of a major accident requires the adoption and implementation
of procedures and instructions for the safe operation of installations, processes, equipment, as
well as maintenance activity and temporary stop [132].
All the facilities are provided with equipment for monitoring technological parameters,
automatic alarm systems in case of emergencies and safety systems, these systems being
specified for each installation site in the site Report [132].
In order to prevent the technological accidents, the ensurance of the security operation
of machinery, equipment, devices, systems, there must be carried out, systematically,
preventive control of the technical conditions of machinery, installations, equipments [137].
The preventive monitoring of the technical condition of machinery, facilities and
equipments is carried out only by authorized personnel and at the terms established and
imposed by the specific norms.
Periodically there must be controlled the technical condition of the installations and
must be checked the dynamic equipment, the technical condition of equipment and electrical
installations and the automation for pouring ammonia tank in cisterns.
One must be periodically tested the technical condition of the equipments, appliances,
power installations and automation operating in potentially explosive environment and the
existence of the checking bulletins.
One must be checked [137]:
the existence and the status of the first intervention means against fire;
the existence and the technical status of the protection equipments against
atmospheric electrical discharges;
the instrumental air quality (dewpoint, mechanical impurities), in order to
prevent the shutdown of the measure and control aparatus;
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the way of respecting the instructions regarding the activity of lubricating
the dynamic machinery;
periodically, the equipment and machinery functioning is checked by making
measurements of vibrations and the diagnosis of the dynamic machinery as
well as the dynamic local balancing of the moving elements and the dynamic
machinery.
The purpose of these checks is for [137]:
the functioning in safety conditions;
detection of discontinuities, the unadmitted malfunctions at the elements and
welds of machinery;
anticipating the machinery reparation;
prevention for the accidental stops opririlor accidentale, damages and
serious accidents;
prolonging the life of the equipment;
functioning of the machinery in safety conditions.
Every accidental stop of the dynamic machinery, the energetic and automation
equipments is analysed.
The purpose of these controls is to discover in time the damages, before affecting the
safety of machinery installations and equipments functioning and to take decisions regarding
the repairs or replacement of machinery or faulty equipment.
After the step by step implementing of the sequencing method CARMIS / DS, there was
drafted the Safety Report for S.C. Amurco LLC BACĂU which is the last step of the method
and its result is presented in electronic format in Appendix 4.
CHAPTER 6. EXPERIMENTAL OBTAINED RESULTS
6.1. EXPERIMENTAL OBTAINED RESULTS AND THEIR
INTERPRETATION
The scenarios considered in the two case studies draw a combined emission of ammonia
and chlorine in liquid and gas. Both liquid ammonia and chlorine in a first phase flow in the vat
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of the tank, some of them even turning into gas during the discharge, with the following
effects.
6.1.1. For the ammonia
The ambient air is rapidly entrained in the evaporation of liquid ammonia, leading to a
significant cooling of the gas-air mixture and the formation of a dense cloud.
The appearance of this event leads to the following possibilities:
once with the increasing distance from the ammonia tank, the concentration of the
ammonia decreases both in atmosphere and in that space, figures 5.13. 5.15., at
2000 m, after 45 minutes, the maximum concentration being 220 ppm, in air outdoor,
figure 5.15.;
the variation of the printing of some areas of concentrations of the ammonia
depending on the distance from the tank, is presented in figures 5.13. 5.15.;
the concentration of 750 ppm, at which, for a short exposure, death occurs rapidly,
reaching approx. 1800 m away from the source after about 1.5 min. from the
accident, figure 5.13. şi 5.14.
According to the presented accident scenario, after identifying the risk level, in table
5.12. where the consequences are ireversible, affecting the environment and implying victims
among the employees and population, this simulation shows the fact that the risk level is 3 –
MIC, and thne level of security is 5- BIG and at a distance of 11000 m. from the ammonia
deposit there may occur:
significant polution of the atmosphere with ammonia, both inside the platform
and in its impact area;
risk over the health of its own employees and the staff from the impact
area;
risk of fatalities over an area of 1530 m² around the reservoir;
risk of the possibility of functioning of the neighboring installations.
6.1.2. For the chlorine
The air is mixed with the chlorine gas, the system is cooling being based on energy
consumption for the evaporation of the chlorine, thus forming a cloud of chlorine which is
much heavier than the surrounding air, tending to remain at the ground level.
The aparition of this event leads to the following possibilities:
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the mark of dispersing chlorine increases with the decreasing concentration due
to the wind speed and the phenomenon of dispersion, the affected area by the
chlorine being 10,000 m², with different concentrations according to the
distance, figure 5.28.;
one can find the values of chlorine concentration at a certain point, figures: 5.29.
şi 5.30;
in the first five minutes the value of concentration increases up to the maximum
value of 3,5 ppm and then it gradually decreases for one hour up to a value of
1 ppm, thanked to the wind speed which disperses the chlorine over a distance
of 3 Km from the place where the accident is produced, figure 5.30.
According to the scenario of the presented accident, after identifying the risk level in
table 5.12. the consequences are irreversible for the environmental damage and registration
of victims not only among the employees, but also among population where the risk event
resulting 3 - MIC, and the security level is 5 MARE, and at a distance of 200 m from the
reservoir, there could be produced:
significant polution of the atmosphere with chlorine vapors not only inside the
platform, but also in its impact area;
risk regarding the health of the population and its own employees;
risk of fatalities on a distance of 200 m² around the reservoir;
If, however, an accident would occur on the studied sites, different procedures are
implemented drawn up by the economic operator and established through CARMIS method
(listed in section 3.6.1.) with minimum work required to be carried on the site and outside it
for the management, limitation and removing of the consequences of the accident, the
evacuation of the people, saving lives and material goods.
After implementing step by step the stages of method CARMIS, the economic operator
will be able to draw, by specialized persons, the Safety Report that represents precisely the
proposed and obtained result.
6.2. DRAFTING SECURITY REPORT- THE MAIN DOCUMENT
OF THE MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY SYSTEM
The final result of the implementation of the method CARMIS is represented by the
preparation of the Security Report.
According to H. G. 804/2007 as amended and supplemented, on the control of major
accident hazards involving dangerous substances, the Security Report will be prepared for S.C.
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Amurco LLC Bacau, respectively S.C. CHIMCOMPLEX S.A. ONEŞTI by the economic
operators classified Seveso who "produce, handle, use, store substances: toxic, dangerous,
explosive, flammable, which, by their nature, in abnormal operation of installations, generates
situations of serious risk with serious effects on employees, population and the environment".
It will be prepared in accordance with GD 804/2007 "on the control of major accident
hazards involving dangerous substances" and constantly updated according to changes in the
economic operator.
The Activity Report sets out measures to control the activities presenting major-
accident hazards involving dangerous substances, to prevent and limit the consequences for the
safety and health of population and on the quality of the environment.
The safety report specifically treats the events resulting from the uncontrolled
developments during exploitation, events that lead to serious danger of immediate or delayed
establishment or outside it because of their activity profile, the occurrence of natural disasters
(earthquake, landslides ) the occurrence of terrorist attacks and/or cosmic objects falling from
the atmosphere.
The Safety Report is a reference document for organizing, training, equipping and
intervention in situations of serious risk, considered emergencies that require activities of
noyification-alarm and specific intervention.
The Safety Report will be drawn for the specific of organizing economic operator and
has the following features:
it is applied on the whole area of the chemical platform;
it is applied to the societies that develop their activity on the
emplacement;
the foreknoledgements are mandatory for all the staff on the platform,
considered an area of emergency planning including all the operators
outside the society who develop work under contracts on the site.
In the case of a major accident, which can not be limited at the site, some
specific foreknoledgements of the safety report are applied to the economic operators in
the neighborhood and nearby communities that may be affected.
For the immediate settlements, in the event that an alarm disaster is produced, due to a
chemical accident at an economic operator from the zone of responsibility, the administrative
staff management with roles and responsibilities in emergency situations (mayor, deputy
secretary of the village) will act according to the plan analysis and will cover the risks for each
locality.
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The major accidents potential danger that is present in both locations, justifies the need
for drawing up the safety report, the internal emergency plan and a policy of prevention, for the
following reasons:
the existence of some technologies and installations which produce, use,
manipulate and deposit dangerous substances;
the existence of some large quantities of dangerous substances at a given
moment;
the affecting of neighborhood with serious consequences when there are massive
emissions of dangerous substances;
the pollution of surface waters;
The location and technological specific may favor simultaneous expression of multiple
risk factors that can facilitate training in "domino effect" of more installations causing
worsening consequences of an accident involving dangerous substances.
The requirements set out in the document regarding major accident prevention policies
are changed or updated and supplemented by major-accident dangers presented by each
economic operator and they contain the following elements:
1. major accident prevention policy – document including the economic operator’s
objectives and the action principles with respect to major accident dangers;
2. security management - comprising organization, responsabilities, procedures,
processes and ressources for determining and applying the prevention policy of major
accidents, namely:
a) organization and staff;
b) identification and evaluation of major dangers;
c) operational control;
d) management for mordenisation;
e) plans for mergency situations;
f) monitoryng the performance, checking and eview.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
This paper contributes to the ellaboration of a method of analysis and evaluation of risks
that may be produced at the economic operators that use in the production process dangerous
substances, reffered to as SEVESO operators and has a great advantage regarding the existent
methods, namely at international level, it covers the weakpoints and their threatenings and
allows the economic operator to establish the safety report after the implementation of the
method.
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Regarding the opportunity of the thesis
1. In many European countries there exist well established methodologies for risk
evaluation when producing major accidents involving dangerous substances. In Romania, after
joining the European Union, there does not exist a unique methodology yet to be accepted by
the evaluators of risk on sites where there is the possibility of producing a major accident, as
well as the danger to amplify it by the "Domino" effect, because the location conditions and
the existence nearby of some installations or economic operators.
2. Based on the study of the existing documents in the international literature about the
existence of methods of risk analysis and industrial safety within an operator who uses in the
production process dangerous substances and given the fact that in Romania there is no such
method, it is necessary to investigate the status of existing risks, the accidents and their
consequences at the objectives SEVESO in ourcountry, the security measures implemented and
to identify new solutions for the prevention of major accidents involving dangerous substances
and to increase the existing security level.
3. From the experience of the disasters in our country, the specialists in the field have
determined that natural disasters are unpredictable and almost impossible to avoid, while
technological disasters can be avoided to produce systematically. For each type of risk that
may trigger a disaster, there must be realized management systems to prevent or minimize
negative impacts and the damages of any kind.
4. The system of security management in all areas must identify all the important
functions at all levels of the organization, to define clearly and explicitly the roles, tasks,
responsibilities, authorities and resource availability in order to prevent and limit the impact of
possible emergencies in the area of competence.
5. After the implementation in our country of European legislation, harmonized and
transposed into Romanian legislation in Bacau County in 2015 there were identified five
economic operators classified SEVESO high risk, and six minor risk, the sites being located
near areas with high vulnerability for the population or the environment. In these locations the
development of risk studies is to prevent technological accidents (which were produced in
some locations) and emergency planning. Based on these studies, the population can be
informed, trained and prepared regarding the behavior during accidents, which can lead to
saving many lives.
These issues led to the decision to study some of the methods of risk evaluation and
security of existing industrial at an international level, to identify a new method to answer to
the needs of covering the existing risks within the territory of economic operators from
Romania who use dangerous substances in the production process.
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Regarding the theoretical substantiation of the ellaborated CARMIS method
1. The new method of risk evaluation and industrial safety identified and named METHOD
CARMIS (Combined Analysis and Assessment Method of Risks and Industrial Safety -
Method Combined of Analysis and Risk Evaluation and Security Industrial) resulted from
combining the strengths of the studied methods, the coverage of weaknesses and threats and it
is aimed at qualitative and quantitative determination of the level of risk/security for the
installations/technologies of the economic operators who use in the production process
dangerous substances and can cause major accidents with serious implications on population,
material goods and the environment.
2. The defining characteristic of the studied risk evaluation methods is represented by their
high degree of complexity.
3. The representation of accident scenarios using the butterfly node which associates a
tree of failures with a tree of events through ARAMIS method, should be taken in
regulations governing the drafting of safety reports.
4. The methods studied and presented being methods of analysis and evaluation do not
establish measures/intervention actions necessary to limit and remove the consequences of a
possible major accident.
5. From the point of view of security objectives SEVESO, the studied analysis methods of
risk evaluation is necessary both in terms of the way of identification of stages in risk evaluation
and the establishment of prevention, protection and intervention measures on a given site, in one
combined method.
6. The use of the studied risk evaluation methods presents some drawbacks, which, due to
their complexity, are difficult to apply in practice, are expensive, require a large volume of work
and involves a particular specialization and competence of analysts who realise the risk
evaluation.
Regarding the implementation of the method CARMIS
1. The new method developed by combining strengths and weaknesses and threats coverage
of the studied integrated and selected methods, called CARMIS realizes a full risk evaluation and
has the following main benefits:
a. it derermines both qualitatively and quantitatively the level of risk/security
for the installations/technologies of the economic operators who use
dangerous substances in the production peocess and can produce major
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accidents with serious implications on population, material goods and the
environment;
b. it establishes measures/actions of protection/intervention necessary for
lumiting and removing the consequences of a possible major accident on
the site or outside it;
c. it contains the data and information necessary for the economic operator to
make the Security Report.
2. To achieve the identification of major dangers, resulting from normal and abnormal
operation as well as the evaluation of their likelihood and their severity, one tried to approach
the method in the team for the systematic identification of risk and safety in order to adopt and
implement the most appropriate intervention procedures to limit and remove the consequences
of a major accident.
3. The potential danger which the chemical platform represents, (using dangerous
substances in the production process) both for the site and off the site, for the population, is
determined by the coexistence and the possibility of manifestation of several risk factors:
a. the hazard properties of dangerous substances;
b. the occurrence of damages to the equipment at the site.
4. From the implementation of the new identified methods of risk evaluation, it is clear
that the likelihood of emergencies on the site is reduced by equipping the facilities with safety
systems, automation and control of the risk parameters, the training and education of the
operating stafff will possibly limit the consequences of a potential major accident through the
implementation of procedures for emergency management established in the new method.
Regarding the original character of the work
1. Under the new method of risk evaluation proposed, there were studied and analyzed
as novelty and originality elements towards the existing studied methods, the most serious
cases in which, however, could be produced major accidents and it allows for the
implementation of steps to draw up the Safety Report.
2. Making the SWOT analysis of the studied methods and selecting strengths, which were
taken up in the new method of risk evaluation as well as eliminating the weaknesses and threats
has enabled a new method and completing it so that any economic operator, after the
implementation of the method, to be able to draw up the Safety Report established by the law
specialists, without having to implement several methods in the field.
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3. After the checking and the implementation of the method, the economic operator will
prepare concrete procedures to establish clear links between the data of the production of a
major accident and the measures required to be taken to limit and remove the consequences of
its on-site or off-site.
4. The simulation of accidents scenarios involving dangerous substances, using the program
ALOHA, allows the authorities concerned in the National System for Emergency Situations
Management to order, in time, planned measures needed to establish safety distances, to protect
and save the lives of the population and their goods from the areas potentially to be affected by
a possible accident;
5. The method of risk evaluation, CARMIS, proposed in this thesis is a complete
method which establishes, after following the steps of risk, assessment activities to be
carried out on site and off site for the management, limitation and removing the
consequences of an accident and, what is most important, it enables the achievement of
the Report of Security;
6. Some of the results were presented at various scientific conferences and published in
specialty magazines.
Regarding the ways to further develop the research
1. As in Romania there is no single accepted methodology to be used by assessors of risk
on sites where there is the possibility of a major accident involving dangerous substances, you
still need to study and to identify new methods of evaluating risks.
2. The theoretical basis and the results of simulations performed by the selected programs
may constitute a useful material in identifying other methods of risk assessment or even for for
completing the method CARMIS / DS with other steps and measures imposed by the new
technologies of plants on existing sites or those that will be realized.
3. As there was used only the simulation program ALOHA to assess the identified risk
factors and to estimate the direct impact on supplies, staff and infrastructure, it is necessary to
continue and extend the experimental research and other programs of the existing ones, on an
international level, for improving and complementing them.
4. In this paper we studied the behavior of two dangerous substances, namely ammonia
and chlorine stored in tanks of large capacity which can produce the biggest chemical accident in
Romania, without taking into account other dangerous substances in the production of our
country's industry. This aspect can lead to future diversity of research topics to identify new
methods of risk evaluation, the most important dangerous substances on the site of the
economic operators that use, in the production process, dangerous substances such as sulfuric
acid, hydrochloric acid, petrol, diesel, radioactive substances etc.
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The exploitation of the realised researches
The realised researches in this paper were published in articles and presented at
conferences, or are awaiting to be published:
Papers published in ISI:
1. Daniel-Cătălin Felegeanu, Valentin Nedeff, Radu Cristian, Mircea Horubeţ, Risk
management for ammonia tank failure at ,,S.C. SOFERT S.A.” Bacau, Environmental
Engineering and Management Journal, vol. 13, No. 7, pp. 1587-1594, July 2014;
2. Doina Capşa, Mirela panainte, Dana Chiţimuş, Marius Stănilă, Daniel-Cătălin Felegeanu,
Accidental pollution with ammonia. Influence of meteorogical factors, Environmental
Engineering and Management Journal, vol. 13, No. 7, pp. 1573-1580, July 2014;
3. Daniel-Cătălin Felegeanu, Gigel Paraschiv, Mirela Panainte-Lehaduş, Mircea Horubeţ,
Mihai Belciu, Mihai Radu, Ovidiu Leonard Turcu, A Combined Method for the Analysis
and Assessment of Risks and Industrial Safety, Environmental Engineering and
Management Journal, vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 553-562, March 2016.
Papers published BDI
1. Daniel-Cătălin Felegeanu, Valentin Nedeff, Mirela Panainte, The prevention of hazardous
substances major accidents, Journal of Engineering Studies and Research, vol. 18, No. 3,
61-68, July – September 2012;
2. Daniel-Cătălin Felegeanu, Valentin Nedeff, Mirela Panainte, Analiysis of technological
risk assessment methods in order to identify definitory elements for a new
combined/complete risk assessment method, Journal of Engineering Studies and Research, vol.
19, No. 3, 32-43, July – September 2013.
Papers published in Proceeedeingurile international or national conference
1. Daniel-Cătălin Felegeanu, Valentin Nedeff, Prevent major accidents involving hayardous
substances, First International Conference on MOLDAVIAN RISKS – FROM GLOBAL to
LOCAL SCALE, 16-19 May 2012, Bacău, România, pp.86;
2. Daniel-Cătălin Felegeanu, Valentin Nedeff, Panainte Mirela, Security management in the
context of integrated management at S.C. SOFERT S.A. Bacău. Caze stuy – the dammageof
the ammonia tank from ,,S.C. SOFERT S.A.” Bacău, The X th International Conference
CONSTRUCTIVE AND TECHNOLOGICAL DESIGN OPTIMIZATION IN THE MACHINES
BUILDING FIELD – OPROTEH, 23-25 May 2013, Bacău, România, pp.55;
3. Daniel-Cătălin Felegeanu, Valentin Nedeff, Panainte Mirela, Study of the methods
assessment of the technological risk for identification a combined-complete method
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assessement of risk, The X th International Conference CONSTRUCTIVE AND
TECHNOLOGICAL DESIGN OPTIMIZATION IN THE MACHINES BUILDING FIELD –
OPROTEH, 23-25 May 2013, Bacău, România, pp. 55;
4. Panainte Mirela, Valentin Nedeff, Moşneguţu Emilian, Felegeanu Daniel-Cătălin, An
analyze of the occupational health, safety and security system at the „Vasile Alecsandri”
University of Bacau, EEA&AE’2013 – International Scientific Conference, 17-18.05.2013,
Ruse Bulgaria, pp. 322-329.
5. Daniel-Cătălin Felegeanu, Valentin Nedeff, Mirela Panainte-Lehaduş, Mircea Horubeţ,
Marius Stănilă, Mihai Radu, An analysis of the risk assessment methods in establisments
where dangerous substances are used in the processing activities, Second International
Conference on Natural and Anthropic Risks ICNAR 2014, (04-07 iunie 2014) Bacau, Romania
– poster.
Referate:
1. Felegeanu Daniel-Cătălin, Studii şi cercetări cu privire la factorii care influenţează riscul
şi securitatea industrială , Universitatea ,,Vasile Alecsandri” din Bacău;
2. Felegeanu Daniel-Cătălin, Referatul nr.1, Stadiul actual privind managementul riscurilor şi
securităţii industriale, Universitatea ,,Vasile Alecsandri” din Bacău;
3. Felegeanu Daniel-Cătălin, Referatul nr.2, Stabilirea bazei tehnice de cercetare a riscurilor
şi securităţii industriale, Universitatea ,,Vasile Alecsandri” din Bacău;
4. Felegeanu Daniel-Cătălin, Referatul nr.3, Rezultate experimentale obţinute, Universitatea
,,Vasile Alecsandri” din Bacău.
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