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C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 002546

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2021

TAGS: PGOVGMSUBJECT: SPD IN DRIVER'S SEAT FOR BERLIN ELECTION

Classified By: PolCouns John Bauman. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d)

1. (U) Summary. With three weeks to go, opinion polls and

political commentators and contacts all say Berlin's September 17election of a new parliament is the SPD's to lose. The SocialDemocrats lead the Christian Democrats by over ten percent in allpolls and the ratings gap between the two parties' candidates forMayor is even greater. Real interest is already focusing on whom

the SPD will chose as a coalition partner the Left Party.PDSwith which the SPD now governs the city, or the Green Party. Theelection, which is expected, in essence, to confirm Berlin's leftof center majority, will have no immediate national politicalimplications. However, Mayor Wowereit has signaled his interestin playing a role in national SPD politics in the future. Becauseof the predicted low turnout, concerns have been expressed bysome observers that parties of the far-right will gain seats insome of Berlin's district assemblies. End Summary.

The Campaign: SPD in Charge; CDU in Tatters

--------------------------------------------

2. (C) The state of Berlin leaves much to be desired the weak

school system has been the subject of a steady drumbeat ofcritical headlines for months; the business climate is at beststagnant and high-profile departures or attempted departures ofbig employers are an issue; the city's enormous debt continues togrow steadily and is now at 60 billion euros. Nonetheless,support for the SPD remains strong at 30-35 percent (ahead of the29 percent taken in 2001) and Mayor Wowereit is genuinelypopular. CDU xxxxx admits that the CDU's lead candidate,

Friedbert Pflueger, simply cannot match Wowereit for charisma andcampaign skills. Moreover, the Berlin CDU has been damaged by: 1)years of infighting and tension between modernizers in the party,including Pflueger, and old-school conservatives; and 2) thelingering effects of a banking scandal that drove it from officein 2001. Pflueger, from Lower Saxony, also suffers from acarpetbagger image his last-minute announcement that he wouldgive up his Bundestag membership and Defense Ministry StateSecretaryship to concentrate on Berlin has not helped. The CDUhas been hovering at around 20 percent in polls since even before

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the campaign began.

3. (C) CDU and SPD contacts agree that the turnout for the

election will likely be very low. SPD Berlin Business ManagerRuediger Scholz fears this could hurt the SPD more than the CDUand so the party intends to focus on getting its core supportersto the polls in the final weeks of the campaign. Scholz pointsout that a low turnout is likely to benefit smaller parties withmore ideological voters meaning the far-left WASG and the far-right NPD and Republicans. He and most other interlocutors seemto expect that the far-right will win seats in the districtassemblies in at least some of Berlin's eastern districts whilethe WASG could win seats in Kreuzberg-Friedrichshain. Thethreshold for entry is winning only three percent of districtvotes. Neither far-right nor far-left is given any chance ofclearing the five percent threshold for entry into the stateparliament.

Coalition Politics-----------------

4. (C) The Left Party.PDS, according to Berlin leader Klaus

Lederer, cannot expect a repeat of its 23 percent performance in2001. That showing was the result of the banking scandal, whichbriefly tarred the SPD as well as CDU, and the star quality ofthen-PDS lead candidate Gregor Gysi, now fully occupied in theBundestag. Polls put the LP.PDS at around 15 percent, which iswhere the Greens also stand. Thus, either party could be aplausible partner for the SPD. Mayor Wowereit has stated hisdesire to remain in government with the LP.PDS, though the twoparties have not concluded a formal electoral alliance. The SPD'sScholz, Green Berlin caucus leader Sibyll Klotz, and Berlin FDPleader Markus Loening all agree that the LP.PDS would make themore comfortable partner for Wowereit because of the ease oftheir cooperation thus far and because keeping the LP.PDS ingovernment defuses a large bloc of voters who could be mobilizedeasily to protest the cuts and privatizations which thegovernment has used to try and recover control of the budget.However, Scholz notes that it would probably be better for thecity and for Wowereit given his political ambitions, if he wereto form a coalition with the Greens, who are more centrist(especially on finance) and, at the federal level, presentable.

Green state parliament member Oezcan Mutlu argued strongly thatWowereit will opt for the Greens based on these considerations,though he acknowledged that working with the Greens would beharder. He even said that, given Green fractiousness, they wouldhave to bring a 7-8 seat majority into a coalition to make itstable.

5. (C) If the numbers did not work out for a two-party coalition

(and all our contacts reject the idea of a Grand Coalition), thenthe most likely option seems to be an SPD-LP.PDS-Green alliance.

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However, some in the FDP (now at 8-9 percent in polls) hope thatin such a situation, they might have a chance of sidling intopower. Berlin FDP lead candidate Martin Lindner and Loening havetold us that they believe the Greens would rather work with themthan the LP.PDS. This seems quite a long shot, though, as BerlinGreens stand quite far to the left in the Green spectrum.

Comment-------

6. (C) The Berlin election is unlikely to have major national

significance under any circumstances. The Grand Coalitionrecognizes this and, unlike in the period before the springelections in Baden-Wuerttemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate and Saxony-Anhalt, is not postponing debate on contentious issues. However,in two aspects the elections are noteworthy. First, a victorywill boost Klaus Wowereit's chance of playing a greater role inthe SPD nationally, especially as he is seen as a standard-bearerfor the party left. Second, even very localized success by thefar-right will provoke comment and a measure of consternation and

signal that the particular problem posed by far-rightistideologues in eastern Germany remains to be resolved. EndComment.KOENIG

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Viewing cable 07BERLIN242, AL-MASRI CASE -- CHANCELLERY AWARE OF USG

CONCERNS

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containing the reference ID e.g. #07BERLIN242.

Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin

07BERLIN2422007-02-06

17:05

2010-11-28

18:06SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Berl

VZCZCXYZ0015OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRL #0242 0371748ZNY SSSSS ZZHO 061748Z FEB 07FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6940

S E C R E T BERLIN 000242

SIPDIS

NOFORN

SIPDIS

FOR S/ES-O, EUR AND L

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017TAGS: KJUSPTERPRELPGOVGM

SUBJECT: AL-MASRI CASE -- CHANCELLERY AWARE OF USG CONCERNS

REF: A. BERLIN 230

B. BERLIN 200

Classified By: DCM John M. Koenig for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (S/NF) In a February 6 discussion with German Deputy

National Security Adviser Rolf Nikel, the DCM reiterated ourstrong concerns about the possible issuance of internationalarrest warrants in the al-Masri case. The DCM noted that thereports in the German media of the discussion on the issuebetween the Secretary and FM Steinmeier in Washington werenot accurate, in that the media reports suggest the USG wasnot troubled by developments in the al-Masri case. The DCM

emphasized that this was not the case and that issuance ofinternational arrest warrants would have a negative impact onour bilateral relationship. He reminded Nikel of therepercussions to U.S.-Italian bilateral relations in the wakeof a similar move by Italian authorities last year.

2. (S/NF) The DCM pointed out that our intention was not to

threaten Germany, but rather to urge that the GermanGovernment weigh carefully at every step of the way theimplications for relations with the U.S. We of courserecognized the independence of the German judiciary, but

noted that a decision to issue international arrest warrantsor extradition requests would require the concurrence of theGerman Federal Government, specifically the MFA and theMinistry of Justice (MOJ). The DCM said our initialindications had been that the German federal authoritieswould not allow the warrants to be issued, but thatsubsequent contacts led us to believe this was not the case.

3. (S/NF) Nikel also underscored the independence of the

German judiciary, but confirmed that the MFA and MOJ wouldhave a procedural role to play. He said the case was subject

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to political, as well as judicial, scrutiny. From a judicialstandpoint, the facts are clear, and the Munich prosecutorhas acted correctly. Politically speaking, said Nikel,Germany would have to examine the implications for relationswith the U.S. At the same time, he noted our politicaldifferences about how the global war on terrorism should bewaged, for example on the appropriateness of the Guantanamofacility and the alleged use of renditions.

4. (S/NF) Nikel also cited intense pressure from theBundestag and the German media. The German federalGovernment must consider the "entire political context," saidNikel. He assured the DCM that the Chancellery is well awareof the bilateral political implications of the case, butadded that this case "will not be easy." The Chancellerywould nonetheless try to be as constructive as possible.

5. (S/NF) The DCM pointed out that the USG would likewise

have a difficult time in managing domestic politicalimplications if international arrest warrants are issued. Hereiterated our concerns and expressed the hope that theChancellery would keep us informed of further developments inthe case, so as to avoid surprises. Nikel undertook to doso, but reiterated that he could not, at this point "promisethat everything will turn out well."TIMKEN JR

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Viewing cable 07BERLIN802, SCENESETTER FOR ANGELA MERKEL IN

WASHINGTON: GOALS













07BERLIN8022007-04-20

07:07

2010-11-28

18:06CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Berli

VZCZCXRO1520RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSRDE RUEHRL #0802/01 1100748ZNY CCCCC ZZHR 200748Z APR 07FM AMEMBASSY BERLINTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7989

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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVERUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVERUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000802

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2022TAGS: PRELPGOVECUNEUGM

SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ANGELA MERKEL IN WASHINGTON: GOALSFOR EUROPE, GOALS AT HOME

REF: BERLIN 747

Classified By: DCM John Koenig. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d)

1. (C) Summary. Angela Merkel arrives in Washington in an

enviable position of political strength, both at home and inthe EU. However, she is conscious that her strength deriveslargely from the weakness of her counterparts and otherfactors beyond her control. Achieving her goals for the EU -in the trans-Atlantic context these are focused on climatechange and the Transatlantic Economic Initiative - willreinforce her position at home and in the EU, and serve as aspringboard to success on the larger G-8 stage. A successfor Merkel is also a success for the U.S. Even after the

German EU Presidency, we will want the Atlanticist Merkel toremain a dominant force within the EU. In Berlin, asuccessful summit will strengthen her and othertrans-Atlanticists against those who favor a policy of vocal,public antagonism. End Summary.

Leading in the EU; Muddling Through at Home-------------------------------------------

2. (C) Angela Merkel's role as Germany's and Europe's leader

is undisputed. No other leader of a large member state is

politically fit enough to offer himself up as a leader. Herleadership of the G-8 and Germany's intrinsic weight andeconomic recovery are further boosts. At home, Merkel is notonly riding high in opinion polls (70 percent popularityrating) and enjoying the benefits of leadership at a time oflong-sought economic growth, but has also wrong-footed hercoalition partner Social Democrats with reformist domesticsocial policies. However, in both cases her apparentstrength is not entirely of her own making, but derives inlarge part from her office, the weakness of her counterparts,or from other factors beyond her control. She took the helm

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of the EU at a time when progress on the European project hadlargely come to a halt, when European institutions wereunsure of how or in which direction to move, and (as noted)no alternative leaders were present. In Berlin, her coalitionpartner and rival, the Social Democrats (SPD), are dealingwith weak leadership, a vacuum of ideas, and a challenge fromthe left.

3. (C) Merkel has responded to these similar circumstances

with quite different tactics. In the EU, she has assertedGerman and her personal leadership over the CouncilSecretariat, especially with respect to her goal of

SIPDISdeveloping a road map for furthering the EU constitution.She has sidelined Brussels by putting her own representativeson the road to discuss the constitution in other capitals andhas weighed in personally as needed to find compromises thatkeep the constitutional project moving forward. Likewise,she has vigorously pursued the Transatlantic Economic

Initiative within the EU to remove regulatory barriers, andhas pushed for agreement on the new EU climate change andenergy initiatives. She has not succeeded in all herundertakings -- prospects for a new EU Partnership andCooperation Agreement with Russia remain distant, forexample. Still, the view that we hear from Brussels is ofvigorous and effective leadership. In Berlin, Merkel isknown for her reticence to engage in aggressive politics,preferring to stay in the background until the "correlationof forces" is clear and then engaging to nudge the debate inher preferred direction. Though the SPD is weak, Merkel has

been reluctant to push it hard. Her strategy appears to beaimed at building and consolidating her own and her party'sdominance with a view toward a clear victory in 2009elections, rather than attempting to score victories now thatcould alienate significant voter groups.

Washington: What's In It for Merkel-----------------------------------

4. (C) We sum up Merkel's goal for the U.S.-EU Summit as

being to achieve substantive progress in the U.S.-EU

relationship for its own sake and to build a lastingfoundation for her leadership in the EU and in Germany. Thesubstantive agenda is clear and we need not explore it indetail here. It is focused on our political cooperation inkey areas - climate change and energy security as well as theTransatlantic Economic Initiative. We recognize that inthese and other areas, European goals are not exactly alignedwith our own. Nonetheless, success in these areas, theformer a key concern of European publics and the latterimportant to sustaining European growth, after a long period

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in which trans-Atlantic relations were dominated by negativeheadlines and exchanges focused on other regions, would proveMerkel's particular competence at succeeding in Europe's keyexternal relationship. After success in Washington, Merkel

BERLIN 00000802 002 OF 002

can count on maintaining her position in Europe against any

incoming French President and UK Prime Minister-in-waitingBrown. Success in Washington will also strengthen her handin the follow-on summits with Russia, Canada, and Japan andsets the stage for success in G-8 summit deliberations onclimate change.

5. (C) At home, a Summit success may enable Merkel to end the

SPD's ability to use loud, public "principled" criticism ofthe U.S. as a winning tactic. Gerhard Schroeder won the 2002election with his public attacks on U.S. Iraq policy, but ifMerkel brings home meaningful agreements -- especially on

issues with domestic resonance such as climate change andtrans-Atlantic economic cooperation -- she will have shownthe German public that her policy of constructive engagementwith the U.S. brings real benefits on issues of concern toit. Foreign policy, especially trans-Atlantic relations, isone of the few areas where the SPD still enjoys greaterpublic support than does the CDU/CSU. Success in Washingtonmay undercut the SPD on that theme, as the CDU/CSU hasalready undercut it on many domestic social themes.

A Note on Style

---------------

6. (C) Merkel is pushing for a Summit that is more than a

predictable set-piece, quickly forgotten. She looks for realdecisions to be made during the Summit discussions. Thisdoes more than just ensure that she has something importantto do. It emphasizes her personal commitment to restoringEuropean-American relations and her belief in face-to-faceengagement. We recognize the difficulty of organizingdiscussions in this format, but believe we too stand to gainby such an approach.

What's In This for Washington-----------------------------

7. (C) Post has previously reported on Merkel's risk-averse

approach to foreign policy. We do not expect her to changeher leadership style because of success in Washington. Thereal benefits for the U.S. lie in how success will affect thepublic understanding of how Germany can best build arelationship with Washington and its view of the U.S., the

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changing of which is a frequent theme in conversations withGerman leaders and thinkers. A successful Summit will alsoreinforce our message that the U.S. and EU are naturalpartners, closely bound by common interests. As a cautiousconservative in a difficult coalition, Merkel will not rungreat risks for the U.S. But, if she can show the publicthat cooperation with the U.S. works, the effect will be tocut the risk she runs by cooperating with the U.S. It is amore complex path to a closer and more effective relationship

than we would perhaps like, but our observation of Merkel andour conversations with her advisors lead us to see it as thebest path available.TIMKEN JR

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Viewing cable 08BERLIN122, WELCOME TO BERLIN










Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its uniquereference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible bycopying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messagesfor social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash



08BERLIN1222008-01-29

16:04

2010-11-28

18:06SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Berl


DE RUEHRL #0122/01 0291625ZNY SSSSS ZZHO 291625Z JAN 08FM AMEMBASSY BERLINTO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATERUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0334

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INFO RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATERUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATERUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T BERLIN 000122

SIPDIS

NOFORN

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2018TAGS: PGOVPRELGM

SUBJECT: WELCOME TO BERLIN

Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION JOHN KOENIG FOR REASONS1.4 (B)

AND (D)

------------------------------------------Electoral Fever Puts Pressure on Coalition------------------------------------------

1. (C) NSA Hadley: Mission Germany looks forward to

welcoming you to Berlin January 31 to February 1. Germany iscurrently consumed by the aftermath of bitterly fought stateelections that took place on January 27 in Hesse and LowerSaxony. They are being seen as barometers for next year's

nationwide vote. Although the conservative ChristianDemocrats (CDU) won comfortably in Lower Saxony, the CDUsuffered a major setback in Hesse, where CDUMinister-President Roland Koch ran a divisive electioncampaign that took his party from a commanding lead in earlypolls to a virtual tie with the Social Democratic party(SPD). The country is also digesting the significance of theunexpected political gains by the (neo-Communist) Left Partyand its entry into both Hesse and Lower Saxony parliaments.Over the next several weeks, state and national politicianswill evaluate coalition options, none of which appear to

please any of the major parties. The CDU's poor showing inHesse could energize its competitors and lead to furtherdomestic partisanship, thereby complicating Chancellor AngelaMerkel's goal of solidifying the political center in advanceof the 2009 national elections. On the other hand, thesuccess of CDU Minister-President Christian Wulff'srelatively low-key, centrist re-election campaign in LowerSaxony has been seen as a vindication of Merkel's domesticpolitical strategy.

2. (C) The outcome of these two state elections, and that of

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the February 24 Hamburg elections, will likely reverberate inthe day-to-day functioning of the CDU-SPD coalition.Already, Merkel's conservatives and Foreign MinisterFrank-Walter Steinmeier's Social Democrats resemble theproverbial couple that hated each other but stayed togetherfor the sake of the children: the lack of any other viablecoalition options is what sustains the partnership betweenthe CDU/CSU and the SPD at this point. On key prioritieslike Afghanistan and Kosovo (and on certain aspects of Iran),

the gap between Merkel and Steinmeier is not so wide, andcooperation with the U.S. has not been harmed by domesticpolitics. Differences are becoming more evident on someforeign policy issues however: Steinmeier's January 17meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister Muallem, over strongopposition from the Chancellery, is just the latest example.Increasingly, Christoph Heusgen and the Chancellery's smallstaff are being blindsided by the Foreign Ministry on policymatters that are significant but outside the spotlight.Overall, we can expect Merkel's government to be morehamstrung by partisan and interagency rivalries between now

and the fall of 2009 than was the case in its first two yearsin office.

------------------------------------Steinmeier's Evolving Political Role------------------------------------

3. (C) Steinmeier, who came to office with a reputation as a

technocrat, is increasingly a political rival to theChancellor. Like most of his predecessors, he has benefitedfrom the visibility conferred on the Foreign Minister. He

has become the most popular SPD politician in Germany and thesecond most popular overall, trailing only Merkel. Herecently was named Vice Chancellor, was elected as one ofthree national deputy chairmen of the SPD, and announced hewill run for a federal parliament seat in 2009. Steinmeieris regarded, both within the SPD and among the generalpublic, as an attractive possible chancellor candidate in2009, should SPD Chairman Kurt Beck stumble.

4. (C) With Steinmeier's evolution from technocrat to

political leader, he must cultivate much greater

rank-and-file support within the SPD. This is a particularchallenge for him, because on domestic issues he is seen asrelatively conservative. He was a key architect of GerhardSchroeder's economic reforms and stood by with a studieddetachment as Kurt Beck and the SPD's left wing began to rollthem back last fall. This is all the more reason forSteinmeier to seek out foreign policy issues like armscontrol and disarmament on which he can strike chords thatresonate with SPD voters (regardless of the shortcomings wefind in these ideas). Similarly, in policy toward Russia,

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the former Soviet republics, and the Middle East, Steinmeiermisses no opportunity to evoke the legacy of Willy Brandt,elevating dialog and economic engagement above openexpression of disagreement as tools of diplomacy.

5. (C) These internal factors amplify the tendency of

Steinmeier and his Foreign Office to pursue initiatives notin harmony with the Chancellor's instincts or policypreferences. Germany has a weak foreign policy coordinationprocess and the German constitution grants broad autonomy toministers. Therefore, the ability of the Chancellor and herstaff to rein in the Foreign Office is limited. A result isthat Germany does not always speak with a single, clear voice.

---------------------------------------------IRAN: Importance of International Cooperation---------------------------------------------

6. (S) Although Merkel and the Chancellery have more

consistently toed our common firm line on Iran, both theChancellery and the Foreign Office are firmly committed tosecuring a third UNSCR sanctions resolution as a basis formore biting EU autonomous measures. MFA officials called theJanuary 22 P5 1 Ministerial a success in demonstrating unityamong the members, both by producing a new UNSC resolutiontext and by showing a unified strategic approach in dealingwith Iran. MFA officials have told us in private that EUautonomous sanctions would not be discussed at the January28-29 GAERC. In conversations prior to January 22, Germanofficials have emphasized the importance of the broadestpossible international coalition, and thus highly valueefforts to keep all members of the P5-plus-1 on board,deploying this argument when approached about eitherunilateral or EU autonomous measures. However, they point topressures from their business community (as well as from theFinance and Economics Ministries) as constraints on adoptingstronger unilateral action against the Iranian regime.Privately, senior officials in the Chancellery and ForeignOffice have expressed frustration that the NIE hascomplicated international diplomatic efforts. On December 4,FM Steinmeier said the NIE on Iran offered the chance "injectnew momentum" into the nuclear negotiations and called on all

sides not to squander this opportunity. Merkel said publiclyon January 15 that the NIE had slowed the momentum behindfurther UN sanctions; she simultaneously underscored theseriousness of Iran's nuclear activities and the need forinternational solidarity.

----------------------------------------AFGHANISTAN: Need for Broader Deployment----------------------------------------

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7. (C) Encouraging greater German involvement in Afghanistan

is a key priority of Mission Germany; we have made someprogress, but the Germans remain very reluctant aboutdeploying combat forces outside of the North. In advance ofthe April NATO Summit, Germany will increase its involvementin the training of the Afghan National Army and will probablyagree to take over responsibility for the 150-man quickreaction force (QRF) in the north. We should welcome the QRFdecision, because it would represent the first German ISAFcontingent deployable on short notice (including possibly inexceptional and temporary circumstances outside the north),which would be a qualitatively new and significant steptoward greater involvement in kinetic operations. SecretaryGates' recent written request to Defense Minister Jung todeploy German Special Operations Forces (SOF) under ISAF inthe south of Afghanistan is likely to be very controversialhere, but may prove acceptable in the end if, in return, wewere to offer Germany the option of ending its current offerof SOF for OEF. Moving the German SOF commitment from OEF toISAF would also have the benefit of allowing us to shift the

considerable diplomatic resources and attention we devotedlast fall to getting the German OEF mandate renewed toactivities that may yield more practical benefits, such aspressing Germany to increase its contributions to ISAF.

8. (C) We should encourage greater German leadership in the

EUPOL effort to train Afghanistan's civilian police force.EUPOL is led by German Juergen Scholz, and Germanycontributes more police trainers than any other EU country,but the program has been slow to start and the plannedceiling of 195 EU police trainers is inadequate for the job.Furthermore, activities are not currently planned at thedistrict level where the need is greatest. Germany should beurged to accelerate the deployment of EU trainers toAfghanistan, increase the number of trainers, and broaden thegeographic range of activities.

------------------------RUSSIA: Split Approaches------------------------

9. (C) There are significant differences between the

Chancellery and the Foreign Office on Russia, which invitesRussian wedge-driving. Merkel has never shied away fromplain talk about disturbing trends inside Russia. Steinmeierwas the first foreign visitor to get a meeting withpresidential candidate Medvedev after his nomination (ameeting with President Putin was thrown in as well). Lately,the combination of Russian CFE suspension, backsliding ondemocracy, and intransigence on Kosovo has pushed even somein the SPD to offer criticism. Still, the Foreign Ministrywill likely continue to seek an unhelpful bridging role with

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Russia, in particular on CFE and other matters related toarms control. The Chancellery can help constrain theseimpulses, but we will also need to keep up pressure among theQuad partners as well as from other key allies (e.g. Turkeyand Norway) to make clear that German unilateral initiativesput transatlantic solidarity at risk.

-------------------------KOSOVO: Close Cooperation

-------------------------

10. (C) We discern very little daylight between the

Chancellor and Steinmeier on Kosovo, and there is keeninterest in working closely with the U.S. to resolve statusand seal the EU's leadership role. While the Bundestag willengage in intensive debate following an anticipatedcoordinated declaration of independence, we expect themultiparty consensus in favor of independence and the KFORand ESDP missions to hold.

-------------------------------------COUNTERTERRORISM: Building on Success-------------------------------------

11. (C) Your visit comes at a time when U.S.-German bilateral

cooperation on security issues is as close as it has everbeen. The successful cooperation surrounding theSeptember 4 arrests of three individuals planning large-scaleattacks and the upcoming conclusion of a new bilateralagreement on fingerprint, DNA and other data sharing are thelatest evidence of this trend. Furthermore, no German seniorofficial pushes as hard, or argues so publicly, for closerbilateral cooperation on security issues as Interior MinisterWolfgang Schaeuble. Should the opportunity arise, you shouldinform German officials that we are eager to build on oursuccessful record of counterterrorism cooperation and explorehow we might work together to address threats such asEuropean residents who seek terrorist training at overseascamps and become jihadists in Iraq or Afghanistan.

----------------------------ECONOMICS: Commitment to TEC

----------------------------

12. (C) Merkel highly values the U.S.-EU Transatlantic

Economic Council (TEC) -- a centerpiece of her 2007 EUpresidency -- aimed at reducing regulatory barriers totransatlantic trade and investment. She is concerned,however, about maintaining the momentum in the TEC and fearsthat the European Commission and future EU presidencies(including France) may lose enthusiasm for the project.German officials also worry that a changing U.S.

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Administration could derail what they regard as a highlysuccessful new transatlantic economic instrument; we shouldemphasize our continued commitment to the TEC, and encouragethe Germans to maintain a leading role in it. The Germaneconomy is expected to grow at only 1.7 percent this year.Previous higher estimates were lowered due to rising oilprices, the strength of the Euro, slower U.S. growth, andcontinuing turmoil in financial markets. German economistsand business leaders are also worried about the possibility

of a national minimum wage as well as increased labor uniondemands for wage increases, both of which could affect theeconomy adversely. Merkel plans to highlight employmentgains -- as opposed to minimum wages -- as the focus of hereconomic plan looking ahead to the 2009 national elections.

-----------------------------------CLIMATE CHANGE: Aggressive Measures-----------------------------------

13. (C) Chancellor Merkel and the rest of Germany's political

leadership remain serious about pursuing aggressiveinternational measures to meet the challenges of globalwarming. Merkel has made climate change a priority of herChancellorship and enjoys the overwhelming domestic supporton this. Merkel's support for mandatory, targeted globallimits on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and an internationalcap-and-trade regime reflects a deep-seated belief that onlydrastic, concerted efforts on the part of the internationalcommunity can slow -- and ultimately reverse -- the humancontribution to global warming. If anything, Steinmeiersupports tougher standards. While the Germans have been

willing to consider alternative solutions, such as newtechnologies for clean coal and renewables, fundamentaldifferences in our approaches to the issue of climate changeremain, and could lead to more public disagreement in thefuture. For example, while Germany will send a delegation tothe January 30 Major Economies Meeting (MEM), the GermanGovernment remains skeptical about the value that the MajorEconomies Process (MEP) adds to the UNFCCC track. The Germansare particularly concerned about the need to avoidduplication of effort in the various other climatechange-related forums, including the UNFCCC and the G-8.

TIMKEN JR

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Viewing cable 08BERLIN531, GERMAN GRAND COALITION FACES STRAIN OF

UPCOMING













08BERLIN5312008-04-25

09:09

2010-11-28


VZCZCXRO7856OO RUEHBW RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSRDE RUEHRL #0531/01 1160925ZNY CCCCC ZZHO 250925Z APR 08FM AMEMBASSY BERLINTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1036

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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATERUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE


SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2018TAGS: PGOVPRELGM

SUBJECT: GERMAN GRAND COALITION FACES STRAIN OF UPCOMING2009 ELECTIONS

REF: A. BERLIN 313B. 07 BERLIN 0674

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission John Koenig for Reasons

1.4 (b)and (d)

-------Summary-------

1. (C) The German Grand Coalition will increasingly face

tensions created by the need for the lead candidates toposition themselves for the 2009 national electoral campaign.Chancellor Angela Merkel and Foreign Minister Frank-Walter

Steinmeier both remain highly popular. Merkel, however,faces political risks if the economy turns for the worse. Inthe second half of this year, as the Social Democratic Party(SPD) moves closer to a decision about its chancellorcandidate, potential candidate Steinmeier will likely facescrutiny and criticism from his own party's left-wing. It istoo early to predict the likely coalition outcome in 2009 --although Merkel's Christian Democrats (CDU) and the ChristianSocial Union (CSU) are likely to come out ahead, they may nothave a better coalition option than continuing the currentGrand Coalition with the SPD. U.S. foreign policy is not

likely to play a central role in the campaign leading up toGermany's national elections in fall 2009. ImprovedU.S.-German relations under Merkel and German fascinationwith the vibrant democratic process in the U.S. primaryelections have played significant roles in improving Germanattitudes towards the U.S., thereby dampening the likelihoodthat the SPD will use anti-American rhetoric to rally votersas former chancellor Gerhard Schroeder did in 2002. Endsummary.

---------------------------------------------

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Merkel's Possible Archilles Heel: The Economy---------------------------------------------

2. (U) Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) remains highly popular

among Germans, who view her as an effective leader with astrong international stature. Her approval rating is 71percent. In large part due to Merkel's popularity, the CDUhas held a commanding 8- to 14-point lead over the SPD inpolls over the last year.

3. (C) Although Merkel's high popularity is expected to

continue, she faces diffuse risks on economic issues. CDUparliamentarians suggest that an economic downturn would bethe principal threat to Merkel's high popularity Economicforecasts currently favor Merkel, with projections of 1.6 to1.8 percent growth for this year (though slightly lower for2009), but with no real evidence of recession despite theglobal slowdown.

4. (C) Among CDU leaders there is a sense that the CDU may

have peaked (perhaps too early) and that caution is thewatchword. Merkel, who campaigned in 2005 on a program ofeconomic liberalization and watched a commanding lead in thepolls nearly vanish during the campaign, appears to be movingtoward the political center in an attempt to expand her baseand consolidate centrist support that the SPD is losingbecause of its leftward shift. She is demonstratingever-greater focus on domestic policy and espousing popularmiddle class enticements such as pension increases, a longerduration of unemployment benefits for older workers, andenhancement of nursing care insurance. While many considerthis move to be politically smart, some on the CDU'sright-wing have criticized the Chancellor for abandoning coreCDU values.

--------------------------------------------- -----Steinmeier Could Get Roughed Up by SPD's Left Wing--------------------------------------------- -----

5. (C) Social Democrats have speculated in recent months that

SPD Chairman Kurt Beck will eventually defer to the much morepopular Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier as theparty's eventual chancellor candidate (ref A). SPD insidersconsider this a 50-50 proposition. Kurt Beck's recentvictory in guiding competing factions of the SPD to agreementon privatization of the railway monopoly Deutsche Bahn mayhelp shore up his position (septel). It is uncertain whetherSteinmeier would choose to accept the SPD nomination at atime when the SPD is hovering in the mid 20's in the pollsand its electoral prospects seem poor. Note: In any case,Steinmeier will run for political office, a federalparliament seat from Brandenburg City, for the first time in

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it was around the time of the Iraq war, and therefore willnot likely be a decisive factor in next year's nationalelections. It is also important to note that Germanattitudes towards the U.S. have improved over the past yeardue to our improved bilateral relations and Germanfascination with democracy on display in the U.S. primaryelections. The current improvement is evidenced by a recentHarris poll which showed a dramatic 21 percentage-pointincrease in the number of Germans who regard the U.S. as a

trustworthy partner. Also, the German federal electioncampaign will occur during what is expected here to be anextended popular "honeymoon" for the new U.S. administration.Consequently, German politicians might perceive lesspolitical advantage in a critical stance toward the U.S. Endcomment.TIMKEN JR

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Viewing cable 08BERLIN643, s) germany requests information concerning










Discussing cables




08BERLIN6432008-05-16

10:10

2010-12-05

12:12SECRET Embassy Berlin

Appears in these articles:http://www.spiegel.de

VZCZCXRO6021PP RUEHDEDE RUEHRL #0643 1371014ZNY SSSSS ZZHP 161014Z MAY 08FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1230INFO RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVERUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0151RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 0195RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 0154RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0105

S e c r e t berlin 000643

Sipdis, isn/mtr, eur/ags and eur/pra

E.o. 12958: decl: 05/16/2033Tags: parm, prel, ettc, mtcre, ksca, ir, gmSubject: (s) germany requests information concerningiranian procurement of xxxxxxxxxxxx test chamber

Ref: a. 07 state 75839b. State 15220c. Berlin 195d. State 40087e. Berlin 511

Classified By: Glbal Affairs Unit Chief Don L. Brown forreasons 14 (b) and (d).

1. (u) this is an action request. Please see para 5.

2. (S) On May 13, MFA Export Control Division Desk Officer

Wiebke Wacker provided Global Affairs Oficer with a

German-language nonpaper requesting nformation from U.S.concerning an Iranian natioal, xxxxxxxxxxxx, in connection withthe Iranianprocurement of a German origin environmental test chamberfrom the firm xxxxxxxxxxxx. In support of acurrent investigation, the Germans are specificallyinterested in knowing whether the USG has any informationindicating that xxxxxxxxxxxx was aware that the Iranianfirm Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (SBIG) would be theactual end-user of the environmental test chamber.

3. (S) In a May 5 meeting, Wacker provided Global AffairsOfficer with further background information concerning thisinformation request. According to the German Customs Officeof Criminal Investigation (Zollkriminalamt, or ZKA), Wackersaid, xxxxxxxxxxxx was confronted (and possibly detained)by U.S. authorities in February 2008 while applying for avisa at AmConGen Dubai. Wacker said the ZKA has assessedthat information concerning xxxxxxxxxxxx business contacts withxxxxxxxxxxxx is a critical piece of evidence needed tosupport the ZKA's ongoing investigation into xxxxxxxxxxxxand Iranian efforts to procure an environmental

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chamber from xxxxxxxxxxxx.

4. (S) Begin informal Embassy translation of German-language

nonpaper:

With reference to the Non-Papers from June 1, 2007, August 3,2007, December 18, 2007, February 15, 2008, and April 21,2008 regarding the procurement of an environmental testchamber by the Iranian xxxxxxxxxxxx from the German xxxxxxxxxxxxvia Romania and Croatia, we take this opportunityto ask the U.S. authorities about the following points:

The German export control authorities have learned thatxxxxxxxxxxxx was approached by U.S. authorities aboutthese matters. Because the German authorities have alsoundertaken investigative measures, we are interested ininformation concerning the results of these conversations.

The U.S. authorities reported in their Non Paper from April21, 2008, that the Iranian firm SBIG is the actual intended

recipient of the test chamber. The German export controlauthorities are accordingly interested in knowing whether theGerman citizen xxxxxxxxxxxx had knowledge of thisend-user.

We thank you for the information in connection with theSBIG's procurement attempts and we look forward to continuingour excellent cooperation in the area of export controls.

End text of informal Embassy translation.

5. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Post requests Department guidancein responding to the questions posed in the German nonpaper.Timken jr

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Viewing cable 08BERLIN1068, s) germany requests release of xxxxxxxxxxxx










Discussing cables




08BERLIN10682008-08-06

07:07

2010-12-05

12:12SECRET Embassy Berlin


VZCZCXRO4409PP RUEHDEDE RUEHRL #1068 2190727ZNY SSSSS ZZHP 060727Z AUG 08FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1851INFO RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVERUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0154RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0107

S e c r e t berlin 001068

Sipdisstate for isn/mtr (herrmann), eur/ce, and eur/pra (hardiman)

E.o. 12958: decl: 08/06/2033Tags: parm, prel, ettc, mtcre, ksca, ir, aec, gmSubject: (s) germany requests release of xxxxxxxxxxxxnonpaper to the german criminal customs office (zka)

Ref: a. State 77660b. Berlin 1000

Classified By: Global Affairs Unit Chief Don L. Brown forreasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (u) this is an action request. Please see para 4.

2. (S) The German MFA requested USG permission to release

the REF A nonpaper to the German Customs Office of CriminalInvestigation (ZKA) (not/not for further dissemination) insupport of a continued investigation. It appears as thoughthe ZKA investigation into xxxxxxxxxxxx is still active,contrary to a previous MFA statement, but this case has not

progressed to the German court system.

3. (S) On August 4, German MFA Export Control Division Desk

Officer, Wiebke Wacker, told Global Affairs Officer that theZKA had asked her office for additional information regardingthe business dealings between xxxxxxxxxxxxbusiness and Iran's primary solid fuel missile developer, theShahid Bakeri Industrial Group (SBIG). (Comment: Wacker hadpreviously indicated (REF B) that the ZKA halted theirinvestigation into xxxxxxxxxxxx due to a lack ofevidence linking xxxxxxxxxxxx with SBIG. End Comment). In

response to the ZKA request, Wacker informed the ZKA of theREF A nonpaper passed to her on July 21 but told them thatshe could release the information due to a restriction onthird party dissemination stated in the nonpaper's caveat.She informed the ZKA that she would make the appropriaterequest through U.S. Embassy Berlin. (Comment: It should benoted that the REF A nonpaper was classified as SECRET//RELGERMANY, so there might not be any issue releasing thisnonpaper to the ZKA. End Comment).

4. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Post requests Department guidance

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in responding to the dissemination request posed in paragraph

3. Koenig

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Viewing cable 08BERLIN1387, GERMANY: BUNDESTAG SET TO RENEW A BEEFED-

UP ISAF













08BERLIN13872008-10-10

17:05

2010-12-02

21:09

CONFIDENTIAL//

NOFORN

Embassy

Berlin



DE RUEHRL #1387/01 2841731

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ZNY CCCCC ZZHO 101731Z OCT 08FM AMEMBASSY BERLINTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2351RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATEINFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0564RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITYRHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY

RHMFISS/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITYRHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITYRHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITYRUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001387

NOFORN

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2018TAGS: PRELMARRPGOVAFGM

SUBJECT: GERMANY: BUNDESTAG SET TO RENEW A BEEFED-UP ISAFMANDATE AND A SCALED-DOWN OEF COUNTERPART

REF: A. BERLIN 1045B. SECDEF MSG DTG 301601z SEP 08

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JOHN KOENIG. REASONS: 1.4 (B)

AND (D).

1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: The Bundestag is expected to approve on

October 16 a 14-month extension of the parliamentary mandatethat authorizes Bundeswehr participation in the NATO ISAFmission in Afghanistan. The renewed ISAF mandate willcontinue to limit German forces essentially to the north ofAfghanistan, although provisions for deploying somenon-combat support in the rest of the country will be spelledout for the first time. The renewed mandate will have asignificantly higher troop ceiling (an increase from 3,500 to

4,500), allowing Germany to fulfill its commitments on ANAtraining and offering additional flexibility in responding tocrisis situations and in surging forces in support of theAfghan presidential election. The renewed ISAF mandate willnot include authorization to participate in the planned NATOAWACS mission, thereby requiring the government to seek aseparate stand-alone mandate once there is a NATO decision.The new mandate will also not include expanded authority toconduct counternarcotics interdiction, as has been requestedby SACEUR. Meanwhile, Chancellor Merkel, FM Steinmeier andDefMin Jung have agreed to eliminate the German Special

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Forces (KSK) element from the separate OEF parliamentarymandate when it comes up for renewal in November. Steinmeierand the SPD have been spinning this in the media as an SPDsuccess, much to the annoyance of the Chancellery.Eliminating the controversial KSK element -- which has goneunused for the past four years -- was seen as a price to payto ensure strong parliamentary support (especially in theSPD) for renewal of the ISAF mandate. The elimination of theKSK element from the OEF mandate may open opportunities for

the USG to press Germany to increase its Special Forcescapability within ISAF. END SUMMARY.

Large majority expected for mandate renewal

2. (SBU) The German cabinet agreed October 7 to seek a

14-month extension of the parliamentary mandate thatauthorizes Bundeswehr participation in the NATO ISAF missionin Afghanistan. This longer mandate (the normal mandateperiod is one year) is intended to ensure that themandate will not come up for renewal until after the seating

of the new Bundestag following the September 2009parliamentary election, diminishing Afghanistan as a campaignissue next year. The Bundestag held the first reading of thedraft mandate right after cabinet approvaland is scheduled to vote on it October 16. All indicationsare that the mandate extension will be approved by a widemargin, with all the Bundestag parties supporting it, exceptfor the small Left Party, which opposes all overseasdeployments and which has consistently voted as a solid blockagainst the mandate. Most Green Party parliamentarianseither abstained or voted against the mandate last year, but

are expected to support it this time around, given that theirconcerns about the possible combat role of the German Tornadoreconnaissance aircraft under the mandate have notmaterialized.

Rolling-over the previous mandate

3. (C) The proposed mandate is similar to the existing one,

which essentially limits German forces to the north ofAfghanistan. The mandate technically allows deployments,limited in time and scope, outside the north on an

exceptional basis, if deemed by the German defenseminister to be absolutely essential to the ISAF mission. Butup to now, the German government has been very reluctant toexercise this authority in regard to combat forces. Forexample, the government still does not allow GermanOperational and Mentoring Liaison Teams (OMLTs) toaccompany their assigned Afghan National Army (ANA) units ondeployments outside the north. With less than a year to gobefore Bundestag elections, we anticipate the government willremain exceedingly cautious and conservative in making use of

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the exception in the mandate.

New features in renewed mandate

4. (SBU) While the renewed mandate will be mostly unchanged,

there are a few notable improvements:

-- Increase in the troop ceiling from the 3,500 to 4,500:Germany is currently right up against the 3,500 troop ceilingbecause of the need over the past several months todeploy additional troops to respond to the deterioratingsecurity situation in the north, to fill in for departingAllied troops (primarily Czech and Danish soldiers whore-deployed to the south and east), and to take on new tasks(like the 200-man RC-North Quick Reaction Force). DefenseMinister Jung has emphasized that the increase in the troopceiling does not mean Germany will be sending an additional1,000 soldiers to Afghanistan immediately. While there maybe a small increase in troops right away (up to 3,800 or3,900) so that Germany can fulfill its previous ANA training

commitments, the rest of the additional troop authorizationwill be held in reserve. It will be used to give militaryleaders additional flexibility in responding to crisissituations and in surging forces in support of the 2009Afghan presidential elections.

-- Blanket authorization to exceed the troop ceiling duringrotations: This will give the Bundeswehr more flexibility inmoving units in and out of Afghanistan without having toworry about temporarily exceeding the troop ceiling.

-- Explicit permission for certain units and assets tooperate throughout Afghanistan: Some 30 radio operators havebeen based in Kandahar for more than a year under theexception in the mandate that allows time-limited deploymentsoutside the north. Under the new mandate, theywill be covered as a permanent deployment. Other assets andpersonnel that will be included in this category:Psychological operations personnel, Tornado reconnaissanceaircraft, C-160 aircraft providing intra-theater airlift, andMEDEVAC helicopters.

No authorization for awacs

5. (C) After much hand-wringing over the summer about the

potential impact on maintaining a strict divide betweenOperation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and ISAF (ref A), thegovernment was prepared to include an authorization in therenewed ISAF mandate for German air crews toparticipate in the proposed NATO AWACS mission inAfghanistan. But those plans were dashed in late Septemberwhen France blocked a NATO decision giving the green light

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for planning the mission. MFA officials have rejectedincluding language in the renewed ISAF mandate that wouldanticipate a future NATO decision on AWACS, claiming that theBundestag would oppose this as a "blank check." As a result,the renewed ISAF mandate will be completely silenton the issue, requiring, therefore, the government to seek aseparate stand-alone mandate on AWACS later once there is aNATO decision authorizing the mission. We have been assuredby senior sources in the Chancellery (protect) that Germany

will approve the required mandate for the deployment ofGerman AWACS crews, once NATO approves the AWACS mission.

6. (C) Current thinking in the MFA is that the government

will not seek a AWACS mandate until the end of the NATOdecision-making process, when all the details over financingand stationing of the NATO AWACS have been worked out. Thisensures that there will be a decent interval between approvalof the ISAF mandate and the need for the government to goback to the Bundestag for the stand-alone AWACS mandate. MFAofficials acknowledge that waiting until the end of the

process to seek Bundestag authorization also ensures thatthey do not waste political capital on obtaining a mandatethat may never be used because of possible problems or delaysin NATO decision-making.

No additional authority on counternarcotics

7. (C) The renewed ISAF mandate will also contain no expanded

authorization for the Bundeswehr soldiers to engage incounternarcotics (CN) interdiction in Afghanistan. Accordingto xxxxxxxxxxxx, the Chancellery supportedincluding language to expand ISAF CN tasks in the Bundestagmandate, but was pushed back by DefMin Jung. At this stage,

German officials remain opposed to a Bundeswehr lead role inCN interdiction operations. xxxxxxxxxxxxtold the DCM that Germany would try to support the temporary"opt in" arrangement endorsed by NATO Defense Ministers attheir October 9-10 meeting in Budapest. He saw potentialproblems, including with the Bundestag, if Allies that "optin" need to draw on common ISAF capabilities. He saidassurances on this score would be helpful. The MFA has also

stressed its reservations about other Allies or ISAFcontributors taking a lead role in CN operations, for fear ofthe knock-on effects for German forces. As a result, underthe renewed ISAF mandate, the Bundeswehr will be limited tothe CN support activities already outlined in the currentISAF Operations Plan (OPLAN).

No deadline for withdrawal

8. (U) Peter Ramsauer, the Bundestag leader of the Christian

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Social Union (CSU), the Bavarian sister party of ChancellorMerkel's CDU, had publicly advocated adopting an "exitstrategy" and setting a timeline for the eventual withdrawalof the Bundeswehr from Afghanistan, but this was rejected byboth Merkel and Steinmeier. A government spokesman said theChancellor and Foreign Minister "were agreed that it would beirresponsible to discuss a withdrawal deadline or an end ofthe mandate now."

Oef mandate

9. (C) There is a separate parliamentary mandate that covers

the Bundeswehr's participation in OEF, the renewal of whichwill be debated and voted on in November. The currentmandate authorizes the deployment of up to 100 German SpecialForces (KSK) in Afghanistan as well as the deployment ofnaval personnel and ships around the Horn of Africa. Thecurrent OEF troop ceiling is 1,400, but only about 250Bundeswehr military personnel are now deployed under themandate, all of whom participate in the maritime mission; the

KSK reportedly has not been deployed to Afghanistan under OEFin the last four years. Jung announced months ago that heplanned to seek a reduction in the OEF ceiling to 800 duringthe next mandate renewal.

10. (S/NF) One of the most dramatic developments in recent

weeks has been the decision of the government to eliminatethe German Special Forces (KSK) element from the separate OEFparliamentary mandate when it comes up for renewal inNovember. Steinmeier and his Social Democratic Party (SPD)have spun this to the public as their achievement.Eliminating the controversial KSK element -- which has goneunused for the past four years -- was seen by the governingcoalition as a price to pay to ensure strong parliamentarysupport, especially in the SPD, for renewal of the ISAFmandate. xxxxxxxxxxxx While deleting theKSK from the OEF mandate will have no practical effect on theground in Afghanistan, it will formally end Germany'sparticipation in OEF in Afghanistan, which could bemisconstrued by some as a symbolic step back from supportingthe war on terror.

Total cost of mission: over 1 billion euros per year

11. (SBU) Germany's military deployment is expected to cost

almost 700 million Euros over the next year. Combined withthe 140 million Euros that it has budgeted forreconstruction, development and humanitarian assistance, pluswhat it spends on the police training mission, Germany'stotal outlay per year for the mission in Afghanistan is nowmore than 1 billion Euros.

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Comment

12. (C) Germany remains committed to the ISAF mission

without time limits or conditions and has steadily increasedits overall contributions and filled all the shortfalls inits region. However, up to now, it has remained unwilling todeploy combat troops outside the north. The elimination ofthe KSK element from the OEF mandate may open opportunitiesto seek greater use of German Special Forces on acountry-wide basis under ISAF. The KSK is, in fact, alreadydeployed in Afghanistan, and has been for months, but isapparently there under German national control to track downthose responsible for recent attacks on the Bundeswehr. Asfar as we are aware, the KSK has not yet been made availableto COMISAF for ISAF missions outside the north, even thoughsuch missions could be covered under the exception in theISAF mandate. Convincing the Germans to make the KSKavailable for country-wide missions under ISAF would taketime and would probably require direct engagement withChancellor Merkel and FM Steinmeier. Even after general

approval was received, each specific deployment outside thenorth would likely require the consent of DefMin Jung asspecified in the ISAF mandate.Koenig

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Viewing cable 09BERLIN168, GERMAN ECONOMICS MINISTER THROWS IN TOWEL










Discussing cables




09BERLIN1682009-02-11

06:06

2010-11-28


VZCZCXRO8118PP RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSRDE RUEHRL #0168/01 0420612ZNY CCCCC ZZHP 110612Z FEB 09FM AMEMBASSY BERLINTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3262INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

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RUEHRL/AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF PRIORITY 0187RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT PRIORITY 7859RUEHAG/AMCONSUL HAMBURG PRIORITY 0263RUEHMZ/AMCONSUL MUNICH PRIORITY 1988RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC PRIORITYRUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY


STATE FOR EUR/AGS(SCHROEDER), EEB/IFD/OMA, AND DRL/ILCSRLABOR FOR ILAB(BRUMFIELD)TREASURY FOR ICN(KOHLER) AND OASIASIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2019TAGS: EFINPRELPGOVGM

SUBJECT: GERMAN ECONOMICS MINISTER THROWS IN TOWEL

BERLIN 00000168 001.2 OF 002

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JOHN KOENIG. REASONS: 1.4 (B)AND (D).

1. (C) SUMMARY. The sudden resignation of Economics Minister

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