ritique of Utilitarianism

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Nietzsche's Critique of UtilitarianismAuthor(s): Jonny AnomalySource: Journal of Nietzsche Studies, No. 29 (SPRING 2005), pp. 1-15Published by: Penn State University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20717848.

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Nietzsche's CritiqueofUtilitarianismJonny Anomaly

Nietzsche's scattered,caustic remarks on utilitarianism pervade his philosophical corpus and tend tobe sweepingly critical.Until recently,however, scholars have generally ignoredNietzsche's critique because it consists

largely of undeveloped arguments and ad hominem attacks against particularutilitarianproponents.1 This is unfortunate, since his critique of utilitarianismis linked in importantways tohis critique ofChristianity, andmoreover it xemplifiesNietzsche's adeptness at attacking views he opposed by exposing concealed assumptions and turningthe assumptions of itsproponents against theprinciples theydefend.This essay examines themain sources ofNietzsche's fierceopposition toutilitarianism,without considering at lengthany alternative normative position hemay have advanced.2 The absence of sustained discussion in thisessay of a positive alternative should not, however, be taken to imply thathe rejectsmoralitytoutcourt.Nietzsche parries thiscommon interpretation nDaybreak by conceding, "in this book faith inmorality iswithdrawn?but Why? Out ofmorality " (D 4).3 Instead of criticizing utilitarianism by contrasting itwith his ownmoral values, however, Nietzsche primarily attacks utilitarianism by queryingits internalcoherence, and by raising thepossibility thatutilitarians are drivenbymotives at odds with theirovert concern with thegreatest happiness of thegreatest number. The charges of theoretical and motivational inconsistency,which I discuss in Sections 1 and 3, respectively, comprise Nietzsche's mainobjections toutilitarianism. In Section 2,1 discuss amore general argument,loosely related toSection 1, ccording towhich Nietzsche criticizesEnglish utilitarians forfailing to countenance the "evil" thatutilitymaximization requires.In Section 4,1 attempt to fortify he interpretation f the firstthree sections byexposing theweaknesses of a recent account ofNietzsche's critique of utilitarianism advanced byFrankCameron. Finally, inSection 5,1 begin by stavingoffanother alternative interpretation fNietzsche's critique of utilitarianism, andthenproceed tocharacterizeNietzsche's hostility towardEnglish utilitarians astypifying is general suspicion of any attemptby a particular group to imposea singlemoral standardon all people.

Journal ofNietzsche Studies, Issue 29,2005Copyright ?2005 The Friedrich Nietzsche Society.

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2 JoNNY nomaly1.The UtilityofNeighborlyLove

In thegolden ruleofJesusofNazareth,we read thecomplete spirit f the thicsof utility. To do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbor as oneself,constitute he dealperfection f utilitarianmorality.4 ?John StuartMill

In interpreting ietzsche's attacks on utilitarianism, it is crucial tounderstandthe (often tenuous) connection Nietzsche makes between utilitarianism andChristianity. Because Nietzsche considers utilitarianism a secular offspringofChristian morality,many of his global attacks on utilitarianism resemble hismore familiar critique ofChristian "slave morality"?the morality of theherd.Inparticular,Nietzsche contends that tilitarianism inheritedChristianity's commitment to the equal worth of each person, and perpetuated its erroneousassumption that timeless, universal criterion formorality is tenable.Nietzsche's preliminary account of the difference between master moralityand slavemorality inBeyond Good and Evil culminates with theconclusion that"[s]lave morality is essentially amorality of utility" (260). Although Nietzschedevelops thenotorious distinction between master and slavemoralitymost fullyin theGenealogy, he articulates the sense inwhich he considers utilitarianisma formof slavemorality ina revealing passage inBeyond Good and Evil. Herehe speculates that thenoble, aristocraticman first identifieshimself and thoselikehim (powerful, proud, distinguishedmen) as good, and thencontrastshimselfwith thosehe contemptuously regards as "the cowardly, thetimid,thepetty"and, above all, "those who thinkonly ofnarrow utility" (BGE 260). The noble'spower consists not only inhis ability toexploit otherswith his superior acumenor physical strength ut also in exercising "power over himself," by refrainingfromacting on the inclinationofpity that haracterizes thosewhom he despises.The slave, conversely, identifieshimself negatively; he ispart of thegroup thatresents those who unabashedly exercise theirpower. Nietzsche scorns slavemorality because itsproponentsmeekly resign themselves towhatever mastermorality isnot, and yet consider their wnmoral principles universally bindingrather thanacknowledging themas narrowly useful formembers of theirowngroup. In theChristian tradition,"pity, the kind and helping hand, thewarmheart, patience, industriousness, humility, friendliness come into honor?forthese are themost useful qualities [forthe slave]" {BGE 260).

Although Nietzsche thinks utilitarians share these values, he does not consider theirvalues coextensive with Christian morality, since hedonistic utilitarianism is concerned withmaximizing thevery sensation that hristianmoralityaims to suppress: pleasure (WP 35).5 The partial coincidence between Christianand utilitarian values results inpart,Nietzsche thinks,from thefact thatutili



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Nietzsche's Critique of Utilitarianism 3

tariansconstrue "utility" inexceedingly familiar terms.The pleasure theyseekis not thatof thevoluptuary or conqueror, but that of the "herd animal"?the"boring" and "mediocre" enjoyment ofpeople who have yet toawaken fromthe"soporific" spell of slavemorality (BGE 228).6What does itmean to espouse thevalues of a herd animal?We have alreadyencountered some of thevaluesNietzsche associates with slavemorality?humility, ndustriousness,pity,but inwhat sense are they"herd" values? If thefundamental goal of an animal within a herd is itsown preservation, and if itsownpreservation depends upon thehealth of theherd ofwhich it is amember, then,Nietzsche supposes, themoral principles of thatgroupwill tendtoreflectthekindofegalitarianism embodied inBentham's dictum, "Everybody counts for ne, andnobody formore thanone."7Nietzsche considers this theessence ofherdmentality: [I]t is the instinct f theherd that inds itsformula in thisrule?one is equal,one takes oneself forequal" (WP 925). According toNietzsche, thisegalitarianformulaoriginates from the enefit that omes fromreciprocal cooperation amongequals ina group, but has been extended byChristianmorality toapply toall people?including wnequals.Nietzsche thusconstrues thegolden rule as a precept of"prudence" ormutual advantage, observing that JohnStuartMill believes in it"as thebasis ofmorality, but thathe fails tograsp itsprudential origin (WP 925).8Nietzsche also portrays egalitarian values asmyopic, dangerous, and potentially self-subverting.This is because, Nietzsche thinks, theopposite of thesevalues?pain, suffering, nequality; inshort, evil"?is equally indispensable forthe survival and happiness of theveryherd that eeks toeradicate it.Accordingly,Nietzsche sharplycriticizes Bentham's hedonic calculus (which correlates happiness maximization with pain minimization) as inconsistent with utilitariangoals. In itsplace, Nietzsche stresses thenecessity ofphysical suffering nd intellectual strugglefor the self-improvementof each and, by extension, thevitalityandhappiness of thegroup.He accordingly rebukes theproponent of anymoralitythatmakes thereduction of suffering tsfundamental goal: "[I]f you experience suffering nd displeasure as evil,worthy of annihilation and as a defect ofexistence, then t sclear that esides your religionofpityyou also harbor anotherreligion inyourheart that isperhaps themother of thereligion of pity: the religion of comfortableness" (GS 338). This religion?or, more specifically,morality?of comfort thwarts itsown goals by attempting to eliminate all suffering(BGE 44).9 In a passage thatanticipates what we now call the "hedonic paradox," according towhich pleasure is diminished when we pursue itdirectly,Nietzsche ridicules thosewho, likeBentham, seek tomaximize individual orcollective happiness byminimizing pain: "[H]ow littleyou know ofhuman happiness, you comfortable and benevolent people, forhappiness and unhappinessare sistersand even twins that ithergrowup together r, as inyour case, remainsmall together" (GS 338).10 He goes on tounderline the idiosyncraticnature ofsuffering nd thesimplemindedness of thosewho heedlessly strivetorelieve the



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4 JoNNY nomalysuffering f others. "It never occurs to them,"Nietzsche adds, "that... thepathtoone's own heaven always leads throughthevoluptuousness of one's own hell"(GS338).Nietzsche's critique of utilitarianism is so faronly as strongas his caricatureof certain of itsadvocates. Even ifsome utilitarians (Bentham perhaps) believedhappiness ismaximized by eschewing pain and directlypursuing pleasure, others (such asMill) have stressed the indirect felicificeffects of intellectual struggle.11Moreover, sophisticated utilitarians sinceMill have been remarkablywilling to ccommodate empirical data by adjusting theirpractical prescriptions.They concede that ifaggregate utilityfails tobe maximized when each persondevotes him or herself tominimizing thepain of others, then utilitariansmustreject the blind benevolence Nietzsche criticizes. Sidgwick even embraces thepossibility that "a Utilitarian may reasonably desire, onUtilitarian principles,that some of his conclusions should be rejected bymankind generally [if theirrejection will ultimately lead to greater aggregate happiness]."12 In short, thefact thatutilitarianismmay require itsown suppression as a basis forpracticaldecision-making does not undermine utilitarianism as a standard of value, evenif itundermines utilitarianism as a decision procedure As we shall see, however,Nietzsche thinks that adherents of utilitarianism are driven by concernsthat re incompatible evenwith theirphilosophical commitment toutilitarianism as a standard of value.

2. The Utility of "Evil"Nietzsche begins The Gay Science with the shocking statement, "Hatred, themischievous delight in themisfortunes of others, the lust to rob and dominate,and whatever else is called evil belongs to themost amazing economy of thepreservation of the species" (GS 1). InBeyond Good and Evil, he confirms that"everything evil, dreadful, tyrannical,beast of prey and serpent inman servesto enhance the species 'man' as much as does itsopposite" (BGE 44).14 Thecarefulway inwhich Nietzsche frames thesepassages indicates thathe is not(straightforwardly)advocating what thepowerless consider evil, buthighlightinghow theirown continued existence as part of thehuman species dependsupon thevery aspects of existence theydenounce as "evil." The utilitarians hecriticizes allegedly accept the arwinian idea that survival isessentially a struggle, concede thatnature is "red in toothand claw,"15yet (subconsciously) strivetoensure the survival of their wn species by minimizing thekind of suffering,exploitation, andmutual tyrannythathas ensured the evolution and survival ofthehuman herd.

Although Nietzsche's critique of theutilitarian concern to reduce collectivesuffering (BGE 225) often seems cruel or barbaric, his central criticisms are



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innocuous; hemerely underscores the inconsistency ofutilitarianismwith otherbeliefs thatmany of itsexponents hold dear. For example, settling intoa critical Darwinian perspective at thebeginning of The Gay Science, Nietzsche speculates that nnovation is essential for theadaptation and survival of any species.Yet slavemoralities suspiciously brand cultural novelties "evil" because theythreatentoperturb theexisting social order (GS 4). This criticism chimes withNietzsche's account of slavemorality (according towhich "evil" is a signification for all thingsfearedby thepowerless) in thesense that novel idea orphysicalmutation is the cultural orbiological analogue of a noble's ostensive power;itmay be used toharm thepowerless, but this "harm"may ultimatelyhelp them.Nietzsche explains:

Nowadays there s a profoundly rroneousmoral doctrine that s celebrated inEngland: thisholds thatjudgments f "good" and "evil" sumup experiencesofwhat is "expedient" and "inexpedient." One holds that what is called good preservesthespecies,whilewhat is called evilharmsthespecies. In truth, owever,the vil instinctsreexpedient, pecies-preserving,nd indispensabletoas higha degreeas thegood ones; their unction smerelydifferent.GS 4)The crucial point to consider in interpretingthispassage is thatNietzsche initially surrounds the terms"good" and "evil" with quotationmarks toemphasizethathe is referringto thejudgmentsmade by utilitarians as exemplars of slave

morality.16The problem Nietzsche raises is general but important. Ifwe takenatural selection forgranted, as didmany of theEnglish utilitarians Nietzschehas inmind, itseems naive todismiss each novelty?especially those thatproduce inequalitybetween individuals?as an evil tobe eliminated.Nietzsche suggests that theutilitarian conviction in theequal value of each personmight leadtoan evolutionary catastrophe,notmerely theexaltation ofmediocrity and comfort which he finds distasteful).Thus Nietzsche thinksutilitarians are committed toensuring the survival andhappiness of human beings, yet they fail to grasp theunsavory consequenceswhich that commitmentmay entail. Inparticular, utilitarians tend to ignore thefact that ffective long-runutility promotionmight require the forcible destructionof people who either enfeeble thegene pool orwho have trouble convertingresources intoutility?incurable depressives, the severelyhandicapped, andexceptionally fastidious people all seem potential targets.Nietzsche also, however,criticizes utilitarianismby questioning thepsychological possibility of thesortof disinterested altruismhe thinksutilitarians endorse.

3.EgoisticAltruismIn an improving tateof thehumanmind, the influences re constantly n theincrease, hich tendtogenerate neach individual feeling funitywith all the



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6 JoNNY nomalyrest; which feeling, ifperfect, would make him never think of, or desire, any beneficialconditionforhimself, nthe enefits fwhich they renot included.17?John Stuart ill

Utilitarianism, according toNietzsche, is predicated upon the delusion thatpurely disinterested altruistic action ispossible. Nietzsche expresses suspicionabout thiskind of altruism by rhetorically asking, "Our love of our neighbor?is itnot a lust fornewpossessions ?" (GS 14).He explicates themetaphor of subjugating our neighbor by benefiting him in a passage ironically entitled Thegood-natured: "What is the difference between those good-natured peoplewhose faces radiate good will, and other people?" Nietzsche answers, "[W]hatdistinguishes [the 'good-natured' fromothers] is a rapid succession of the following states: thewish toappropriate (theydo not scruple over theworth of theotherperson), quick appropriation, delight in theirnew possession, and actionfor thebenefit of their latest conquest" (GS 192). His claim is thatneighborlylove is (often, at least)merely an oblique expression of the universal drive toconquer, an alternativemanifestation of thewill topower?a label Nietzscheattached to theunderlying force thatdrives all biological phenomena.

In a section ofDaybreak dubbedMorality of sacrificial beasts, Nietzscheexplicitly links thisprimordial drivewith theself-sacrificial beneficence praisedby Christians and utilitarians alike:

By devoting yourselves with enthusiasm and making a sacrifice of yourselvesyou enjoythe cstaticthoughtfhencefortheingatonewith thepowerful eing,whether a god or aman, towhom you dedicate yourselves: you revel in the feelingof his power, towhich your verysacrifice san additionalwitness.The truthof thematter is that you only seem to sacrifice yourselves: in reality you transformyourselvesintogods and enjoy yourselvesas such. (D 215)Nietzsche augments this analysis of altruismwith theobservation that"[t]hepraise of the selfless . . .certainlywas not born from the spiritof selflessness.The 'neighbor' praises selflessness because itbringshim advantages" (GS 21).18Accordingly, Nietzsche suggests that themotives of thismorality standopposedto itsprinciple" (ibid.). It is importanttonote thatNietzsche is not criticizingbenevolence as an impossibility.After all, he occasionally praises powerful ornoble people for theirability tochannel theirimpulse tocrueltyback onto themselves?to "sublimate" it n the formofgenerosity?rather thanusing ittodominate theirneighbors (BGE 229).19 His criticism seems rather to be that theproponents of altruism (including utilitarians) are not straightforwardlymotivated by the interestsof others.This criticism seems inconsistentwithNietzsche's previous postulation of anunconscious motivation among utilitarians tobenefit theherd.20The problem is



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thatNietzsche often rebukes utilitarians forexpounding a principle?the greatest happiness of the greatest number?that conflicts with their supposedlyunconscious desire to secure the safety and strengthof theherd, yet he alsoimplicitly ccuses utilitarians (as champions of altruism)ofbeing unconsciouslymotivated by self-interest.Nietzsche confirms this puzzling accusation in asection ofDaybreak inwhich he begins by alleging that "in England [itwas]John StuartMill who gave thewidest currency to the teaching of the sympathetic ffects and ofpityor theadvantage of others as theprinciple of behavior"(D 132),21 and thenproceeds to characterize pity (which he considers thepri

mary motive for altruistic action) as an indirectmanifestation of self-interest."The truth s: in the feeling of pity?I mean in thatwhich is usually andmisleadingly called pity?we are, tobe sure, not consciously thinkingof ourself[sic] but are doing so very stronglyunconsciously" (D 133). If this is so, howcanNietzsche also maintain thatutilitarians are unconsciously driven by concern for thegood of theherd?There are severalways of resolving thisapparent contradiction.One is to saythatNietzsche posits a number of conflictingdrives atwork in thehuman psyche. He might argue that (most) people are unconsciously driven by a concernfor the"herd," but that thisconcern is amanifestation of a stilldeeper drive toensure their wn preservation and power. Indeed, thehypothesis thatboth conscious and unconscious concern for othersmust have arisen from thebenefiteach tends toget fromparticipating inmutually beneficial endeavors has gainedcurrency among contemporary evolutionary biologists.22Another, less satisfactoryway of resolving theapparent conflict between thewidely shared and largelyunconscious drives tobenefit both theherd and theself is to argue thatNietzsche did not believe eitherhypothesis, but thathewassimply stepping into theperspective of a psychologist inorder to criticize theutilitarian proponent from differentviewpoints?if one explanation seemedweak, perhaps his readerswould accept another.While it is truethatNietzscheoftennimbly vacillates between incompatible perspectives in order to opposeparticular prejudices his philosophical opponents harbor, thetwopsychologicalexplanations in question seem tobe stable features ofNietzsche's thought.23This is not to say thathe was unwilling to revise eitherhypothesis, but ratherthat theparadox of supposing thatNietzsche deliberately and perpetually contradicted himself is even greater than theprima facie paradox engendered byNietzsche's complex remarksabout theunconscious concern forboth social andselfish ends. The upshot ofNietzsche's dissection of altruism (which he considers thecentral utilitarian value) is thatutilitarians are driven by inconsistentmotives: each claims thatwe ought tobe concerned with thehappiness of others, but each actually does act to increase thehappiness of others onlywhen itleaves him or herself feeling better.24



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8 JoNNY nomaly4. Perfection and Culture

This setof interpretations hallenges recentNietzsche scholarship. InNietzscheand the "Problem" ofMorality, Frank Cameron argues thatNietzsche attacksutilitarianism, likeChristianity, not because it involves theoretical ormotivational inconsistency,but rather"on account of itsharmful consequences for theexemplary human being."25 Inhis discussion ofNietzsche's attitude toward utilitarianism,Cameron cites a passage inThe Will toPower inwhich Nietzscherebukes utilitarians because they "have not considered the conditions underwhich theperfectman will be in themajority" (WP 339). Cameron goes on tostate that ietzsche's "emphasis on the 'perfectman' orhigher type is, Ibelieve,the centralmotivation underlying his critique of utilitarianism, as I had arguedwas thecase for his general critique ofmorality."26The evidence with which Cameron supportshis interpretation smisleadingand ambiguous. For instance, in thepassage cited above inwhich Nietzschementions "theperfectman," he is in factcriticizing utilitarians alongwith socialists for their faith in an ideal human type rather thanadvancing his own ideal.Nietzsche confronts"theveryobscure and arbitrary dea thatmankind has a single task toperform,"and concludes that, lthough today"one believes one knowswhat theultimate desideratum iswith regard to the idealman,... thisbelief...isonly theconsequence of a dreadful deterioration throughtheChristian ideal"(WP 339). The context of thefragmentcited byCameron?"utilitarians haven'tconsidered the conditions under which theperfectman will be in themajority"?makes it clear that ietzsche isnot exhortingus to substitute theallegedutilitarian saintwith his own vision of theperfectman, but arguing that ll suchideals are equally naive.There is, however, better evidence for Cameron's interpretation.Cameroncites a passage in an earlywork inwhich Nietzsche explores Schopenhauer'sproposition that the goal of "culture" is "to promote the production of thephilosopher, theartist and the saintwithin us and without us and therebytoworkat theperfecting of nature" (SE 5). Nietzsche argues thatutilitarian and socialistmoral theories oppose thiswidely shared ethic of self-realization: "[Everythingresists this conclusion: here the ultimate goal is seen to lie in thegreatesthappiness of all or thegreatestnumber [utilitarianism], there n thedevelopmentof great communities [socialism]" (SE 6). Although this statement ismerely adescriptive assessment of allegedly incompatible normative theories,Nietzschequickly proceeds tocriticize utilitarianism and socialism by taking forgrantedthe truth f Schopenhauer's teleological view of culture.Nietzsche announceshis allegiance to Schopenhauer in answering a question posed tohis readers:"[H]ow can your life, the individual life,receive thehighest value, thedeepestsignificance?How can itbe least squandered? Certainly only by your living forthegood of therarestandmost valuable exemplars, and not for thegood of the



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Nietzsc he's Critique of Utilitarianism 9

majority" (SE 6). This apparently corroborates Cameron's interpretationthatNietzsche opposed utilitarianismprimarilybecause it impedes thedevelopmentof those rare specimens thatSchopenhauer considered thegoal of culture, andforwhom Nietzsche shared Schopenhauer's reverence: the artist, thephilosopher, and the saint.Nietzsche's somewhatmystical account of the"purpose" of culture as a handmaiden tonature is,however, asKaufmann has said, "atbest poetic,"27 and probably notpart of hismature philosophy. Nietzsche uses words like "melancholy"and "extravagance" toexplainNature's inefficiency t "producing" therare specimenswho "redeem" the culture thatgives birth to them.Similarly,modern scientists often use such teleological metaphors as "parsimonious" and"economical" todescribe thepaucity of natural laws governingphysical objects,without implyinganybelief ina designed or purposive nature.Nevertheless, theyoungNietzsche does seem to indicate his faith inSchopenhauer's conceptionof a natural telosby statingthat, although the artist nd thephilosopher are evidence against thepurposiveness of nature as regards themeans itemploys,...they re also first-rate vidence as tothewisdom of itspurpose" (SE 6).Nietzschesurelycame torepudiate Schopenhauer's teleological notion of culture as ametaphysical theory, ven ifhe continued toembrace the (elitist)values itexpresses.Long afterhe had distanced himself fromSchopenhauer, Nietzsche describedthe"higher types" produced by culture as "fortunateaccidents," rather than theintended consequences of a natural process (A 4, 5).

Regardless of whether Nietzsche had ever accepted Schopenhauer's teleological conception of culture as ametaphysical doctrine, a close reading ofSchopenhauer as Educatorreveals a deep ambiguity inNietzsche's superficiallynormative claims. Nietzsche's language often obscures whether he is treatingSchopenhauer's theoryas a reflectionofhow we experience culture,orwhetherhe accepts itas a correct account of the antecedent goal of culture thatwe discover throughour participation in it:[A]llwho participate nthe nstitution ave ... tohelp topreparewithin themselves and around them or thebirth f thegenius and theripening fhis work.Not a few, including some from the ranks of the second- and third-rate talents,are destined for the task of rendering this assistance and only in such a subjection o they ome tofeel they ave a duty nd that heir ivespossess significanceandagoa/. [SE6]2*This passage suggests that he"goal" ofwhichNietzsche speaks is something thatisfelt ratherthanunderstood; that s,a description ofhow we think bout culturerather thanametaphysical fact about it.Whether he takesSchopenhauer's theoryof culture in thefirst r secondway?as a phenomenal account ofhowwe experience culture or a teleological theoryabout the goal of culture?Nietzsche'sstrongest argumentsdo not depend on the truth r superiority f his own views.Instead, as I have argued in thefirstthreesections,hismost important riticisms



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10 JoNN Anomalyattempt tohighlight the inconsistency between theovert goal of utilitarianismand theultimate motives and goals of itsproponents.

5.Moral CriteriaIn a late note tohimself,Nietzsche provisionally answers thequestion What isthe criterionofmoral action? by identifyingtwofeatures: universal validity anddisinterestedness (WP 261). Such considerations may underlie Tracy Strong'ssuggestion that ietzsche criticizes utilitarianism because itspractical principlesmay conflictwithwhat he takes tobe an essential featureofmorality: universalizability.According to Strong,Nietzsche "implicitly accepts Kant's argumentthat the structure fmoral actionmust be universalizable."29 IfStrong isright,Nietzsche rejects utilitarianism simply because it lacks the requisite theoretical structure to qualify as amoral doctrine. Inmaking this claim, however,Strong fails todisentangle Nietzsche's many uses of "morality"?most notably,Nietzsche's generic use of "morality" as an anthropological concept, incontrasttohis frequentuse of "morality" torefertoone ormore of a handful of contemporaryEuropean moral theories thatpurportedlydescend fromChristianity.30Nietzsche follows up his question about the criterion ofmorality with thecomment that this is armchairmoralizing. One must studypeoples to seewhatthe criterion is in every case" (WP 261). This does notmean thathe thinkswewill find a common criterion ifwe look hard enough, but rather thatwe mustexamine each cultureorpeople tounderstand thegenesis of theirparticularmoralprinciples. Nietzsche's chief complaint against utilitarians concerns their nsistence that single setofmoral principles,which arise from the interestsof particulargroups ofpeople, isuniversally applicable, not thatmorality essentiallyconsists of universalizable principles of action. Since Nietzsche does not considerKant's universalizability requirement formaxims constitutive ofmorality,itcan innoway motivate his rejection of utilitarianism as amoral theory.Nietzsche often connects thealleged universality (as opposed to theKantianuniversalizability) requirement formorality with what he takes tobe distinctively nglish morality. Indeed, one of themore strikingwars Nietzsche wagesagainst utilitarianmorality might be characterized as a rebellion against Englishmoral imperialism.He warns thatalthough "morality inEurope today is herdanimalmorality," it is "only one kind of humanmorality beside which, beforewhich, and afterwhich many other, above all higher,moralities are possible"(BGE202). InTheGay Science, Nietzsche associates thephilosophical tendencytoreifymoral doctrines thatserve a localized and often transitory unction intopractical principles thatare universally and timelessly binding with thevanityofEnglish genealogists: "These historians ofmorality (mostly Englishman) donot amount tomuch.... Their usual mistaken premise is thattheyaffirm ome



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Nietzsche 1sCritique of Utilitarianism 11

consensus of thenations, at least of the tamenations, concerning certain principles ofmorals, and then they infer from this that these principles must beunconditionally binding also foryou and me" (GS 345). Nietzsche elaboratesthispoint elsewhere with specific reference toutilitarians:

Ultimately they llwantEnglish morality toprevail: inasmuch smankind,or"the general utility," or "the happiness of the greatest number," no the happinessofEnglandwould best be served;they ould likewithall theirmight toprove tothemselves that to strive after English happiness, Imean after comfort and fashion .. . indeed that all virtue there has ever been on earth has consisted in justsucha striving.BGE 228)31In criticizing theEnglish attempt to impose itsprovincial moral principles onall people, Nietzsche implicitlycondemns every attempttogenerate a universalcriterion ofmorality as a contrivance arising from thewidespread desire for acomprehensive moral standard. Nietzsche observes, "[E]verywhere today thegoal ofmorality isdefined inapproximately thefollowingway: it is thepreservation and advancement ofmankind; but thisdefinition is an expression of thedesire fora formula, and nothingmore" (D 106). The need for a formula is aprecarious psychological quirk, not a justification for requiringuniversality ofany possible moral theory.On this interpretation, ietzsche objects not to thetheoretical structureof utilitarianism, but rather to the utilitarian aspiration touniversalize itsprinciples by grounding them in somethingmore than thecontingentneeds of a particular group.32

Concluding RemarksInstead of emphasizing Nietzsche's vitriolic (and sometimes personal) attacksonMill and Bentham, I have tried to synthesize some of hismost provocativecriticisms intoa coherent setof challenges toutilitarianism. These include contesting theutilitarianpretension to ethical universality (Section 5), raising theoretical doubts about thesortofdisinterested orpurely altruisticaction onwhichhe believes utilitarianism isultimately predicated (Section 3), and questioningwhether utilitarianswould be willing to take theunpleasant steps thattheirgoalof long-run utilitymaximization actually requires (Sections 1 and 2).

Tulane UniversityNotes

1.For example, Nietzsche unfairly accuses Bentham's followers inEngland of having "not anew idea, no trace of a subtler version or twist of an old idea, not even a real history ofwhat hadbeen thoughtbefore" (BGE 228), and refers toMill as "the flathead John StuartMill" (WP 30).2. This essay is essentially exegetical. It sketches an interpretation of Nietzsche's critique ofutilitarianism as he understood it,rather than attempting to refute utilitarianism with Nietzsche's



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12 JoNN Anomalyhelp. As I later indicate, sophisticated versions of utilitarianism, such as those developed bySidgwick and Smart, can only be refuted by denying the validity or authority of the moralintuitions on which they are based, not by pointing out?as Nietzsche often does?an apparentconflict between themoral commitments and the nonmoral beliefs and concerns of its adherents.

3. This interpretation often stems from his polemical portrait of himself as an "immor?list"inBGE 226 et al. Nietzsche's self-declared "immorality" is usually an abbreviated or impassionedway of expressing his opposition toChristian morality and itskindred brands of slave morality.Foot argues that Nietzsche opposes all morality in her essay "Nietzsche's Immoralism" (inNietzsche, Genealogy, Morality, ed. Richard Schacht [Berkeley and Los Angeles: University ofCalifornia Press, 1994]). But thismay be a semantic dispute. In her essays "Morality and Art" and"Moral Relativism," Foot defends a view ofmorality that takes for granted the common conceptscurrently associated with the word "morality" as delimiting its possible extension. However,Nietzsche seems willing to extend the common usage of "morality" to express virtually any strongpersonal conviction. See, for example, GS 338: "mymorality says tome," and BGE 202.Kathleen Higgins and Robert Solomon distinguish Nietzsche's use ofmorality (lower-case m)as an anthropological concept, fromMorality ("capital M") as a "bourgeois" doctrine ofmodernEuropean culture that conceives of moral principles as universally binding. They claim thatNietzsche only attacks the latter.What Nietzsche Really Said (New York: Schocken Books, 2000),103-5.

4. Danto likewise construes Nietzsche's Immoralism as an attack largely directed againstJudeo-Christian morality. He cites a passage in which Nietzsche says, "without the errors whichlie in the presuppositions ofmorality, man would have remained an animal" (H 40), in order toshow thatNietzsche thinks some kind ofmorality?some "noble lie" about human purpose?isnecessary for human advancement. Nietzsche as Philosopher (New York: Columbia UniversityPress), 160. See note 30 formore on Nietzsche's variegated use of "morality."

Utilitarianism, inThe Basic Writings of John StuartMill, ed. Dale Miller (New York: ModernLibrary, 2002), 250.5. I use "values" in this section tomean moral or character virtues, as opposed to valuejudgments.6. Nietzsche more explicitly associates Christian and utilitarian concepts of the good whenhe claims thatMill's "insipid and cowardly concept 'Man'... is still the cult ofChristian moralityunder a new name" (WP 340).7. Quoted by Henry Sidgwick in The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett,1981), 417, and again byMill inUtilitarianism, 299. To bolster Nietzsche's characterization ofutilitarianism as a species of slave morality with the values of a herd animal, we might note thatBentham defines the interest of each in relation to thegroup inwhich he or she lives: "The interestof the community is . . . the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it." ThePrinciples ofMorals and Legislation, chap. 1,4.8. The fact that Nietzsche associates the Golden Rule with Mill (which I quoted at thebeginning of this section) suggests that he had in fact read Mill's Utilitarianism firsthand.However, in the relevant passage, Nietzsche misleadingly attributes toMill and Christianity thesilver rule?"do not do unto others as you would not have them do unto you"?rather than thegolden rule?"do unto others as you would be done by." Nietzsche's contention that the goldenrule is founded in prudence would apply much better to the rule in its negative ("silver")formulation, as Thomas Hobbes characterized it in Leviathan.

9. Philippa Foot makes a similar point about Nietzsche's critique of Christian morality: itsaim or function is undercut by its own norms, which encourage the expression of power in theform of pity. Pity in turn fosters parasitism and complacence ?both of which decrease one'spower. See "Nietzsche: The Revaluation ofValues," inNietzsche: A Collection ofCritical Essays,ed. Robert C. Solomon (New York: Doubleday, 1973).



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Nietzsche1 s Critique of Utilitarianism 13

10. I should emphasize that Nietzsche does not name Bentham in the passage cited in thisparagraph. However, he does explicitly associate utilitarianism primarily with Bentham (BGE228), and characterizes the fundamental utilitarian goal as a desire to "abolish suffering" (BGE225). The evidence suggests thathe never read Bentham orMill directly. See Frank Cameron,Nietzsche and the "Problem" ofMorality (New York: Peter Lang, 2002), 129n.11. Utilitarianism, 240-42. Mill also acknowledges that an unhappy but noble character?adissatisfied Socrates?might contribute to the collective happiness of mankind: "the utilitarianstandard ... is not the agent's own happiness, but thegreatest amount of happiness altogether; andif itmay possibly be doubted whether a noble character is always thehappier for itsnobleness, therecan be no doubt that itmakes other people happier, and that the world in general is immensely againer by it.Utilitarianism, therefore,could only attain its end by thegeneral cultivation of noblenessof character" (244). The problem with Mill's assertion isnotmerely thatutilitarians can only tolerateor encourage thedevelopment of noble individuals of whom Nietzsche might approve to theextentthat they really do tend tomaximize aggregate happiness, but that?unless he is committed to theview that some kinds of character (like some kinds of pleasure) are intrinsically superior to others,hemust redefine "nobleness" tomean something like "that which maximizes aggregate utility."Butin this case the compatibility between utilitarianism and nobleness of character is vacuous.12. The Methods ofEthics, 490.13. In a deeply ambiguous note (WP 724), Nietzsche seems to suggest the possibility thatutilitarianism's emphasis on outcomes rather than intentions or goals makes it a kind of shammoral theory.Derek Parfit, however, correctly notes that although such consequentialist theoriesare "self-effacing" they are not ipsofacto self-undermining, since "it is not the aim of a theory tobe believed." See Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 24.14. In several places Nietzsche suggests that natural selection operates on the level of speciesrather than clans, individuals, or genes. This idea is no longer scientifically credible. Theimportant points are thatNietzsche attributes a concern for theherd, however we demarcate it, ndthategalitarian and utilitarian moralists seem particularly motivated by this concern.15. We owe this famous quotation not to Darwin, but to his contemporary Alfred LordTennyson. Bentham, of course, died before Darwin published The Origin of Species, but utilitarianism inEngland flourished afterDarwin's publication. Regardless of Darwin's influence, it issafe to say thatmost utilitarians were naturalists who understood the ruthless competition betweenorganisms for scarce resources.16. Itmight be thought that I am applying Nietzsche's classification of "master" and "slave"morality anachronistically since he does not articulate this distinction until BGE 260. But this isnot so. First of all, Nietzsche introduces the conceptual distinction (without naming it) as far backas 1878 inHuman, All-Too-Human (45); second, even if the contrast between master and slavemorality was not in theback of his mind while composing thispassage, he stipulates that thenoveladaptations in question are feared by those who might be "conquered" and who therefore deemthem "evil," thus anticipating the distinction which he more fully develops in theGenealogy.17. Utilitarianism, 266-67.18. GM .18, D 215 contain similar accounts of the connection between cruelty andbenevolence. Cameron stresses the important point thatNietzsche's psychological egoism doesnot entail ethical egoism. See his Nietzsche and the "Problem" ofMorality, 63. It is unclear,however, what kind of psychological egoism Nietzsche actually defends. Sometimes he seems tothink thatpeople only benefit others when they anticipate some benefit for themselves. On otheroccasions, however, he suggests a less cynical view, likeAristotle's, according towhich people'sdesire to benefit others stems from a self-interested mechanism, but is not a desire to benefitoneself. I am not sureNietzsche made any such distinctions himself.19. This point is highly problematic. We have already seen thatNietzsche often praises, or atleast acknowledges, thenecessity ofmore powerful people exploiting theweak in various ways.



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14 JoNNY nomalyThis need not take the form of cruelty, but would not (indeed could not, so long as Nietzscheadvanced considerations like those above) involve purposely benefiting those deemed physicallyor mentally inferior. On Nietzsche's concept of sublimation, see chapter 7 of Kaufmann'sNietzsche. It is also worth pointing out the parallel between Nietzsche's concept of sublimationand Aristotle's virtue ofmegalopsychia.20. Nietzsche's use of unbewusst, which Hollingdale usually translates as "unconscious," isequivalent towhat we more often call "subconscious" inEnglish. I use the terms interchangeably.21. Nietzsche's characterization of Mill seems fairly accurate. Here is an apposite examplefromMill: "[EJducation and opinion, which have so vast a power over human character, should souse thatpower as to establish in themind of every individual an indissoluble association betweenhis own happiness and thehappiness and good of thewhole,... so thatnot only hemay be unableto conceive the possibility of happiness to himself, consistently with conduct opposed to thegeneral good, but also thata direct impulse topromote thegeneral good may be in every individualone of the habitual motives of action" {Utilitarianism, 250).22. See especially Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989);and Robert Trivers, "The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism," The Quarterly Review of Biology 46(1971). Of course, such evolutionary speculation invites the charge that even ifNietzsche isrightabout the origin of our concern for others, he has not shown that such concern is unjustified. Inresponse, Nietzsche might agree that his hypothesis about the genesis of altruism cannot invalidateit (for this is like tryingtoprove the nonexistence ofGod by showing the supposition that She doesexist is founded inwishful thinking). But by emphasizing the contingency of the concern thatwe?most of us?have for others, he has illuminated the presumptuousness of the utilitarian principlethatwe?all of us?ought to concern ourselves with the good of the group.23. As the range ofmy quotations suggests, these opinions are expressed at least as early as

Daybreak (1881), and theypepper his writings until the end of his productive life (1889). Solomonand Higgins claim thatNietzsche rejects consistency as a virtue. They cite Nietzsche's tendencyto contradict himself in addition to his veneration for Emerson (who said in an essay Nietzscherevered: "[W]ith consistency a great soul has nothing to do") as their primary reasons. WhatNietzsche Really Said, 45, 181. However, even if it is true thatNietzsche (in an artistic pose)eschewed theoretical consistency in his writings, ifwe are to extrapolate a distinctively Nietzschean set of objections toutilitarianism, it seems best to do so from a perspective he consistentlyoccupied.24. Although Mill, for example, argues that altruism is only an instrument to aggregatehappiness maximization?that "self-sacrifice must be for some end; it is not its own end" {Utilitarianism, 248), he also declares self-sacrifice a fundamental utilitarian virtue: "Though it is onlyin a very imperfect state of theworld's arrangements thatany one can best serve thehappiness ofothers by the absolute sacrifice of his own, yet so long as the world is in that imperfect state, Ifully acknowledge that the readiness tomake such a sacrifice is the highest virtue which can befound inman" {Utilitarianism, 249). Were a utilitarian utopia of the sortMill alludes to ever comeintobeing, itwould apparently be achieved by cultivating enough fellow feeling to render altruismsuperfluous.25. Nietzsche and the "Problem" ofMorality, 84.26. Ibid., 133.

27. Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1950), 146.

28. P. 176. (emphasis added).29. Tracy Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and thePolitics of Transfiguration (Berkeley and LosAngeles: University of California Press, 1988), 93.30. Schacht identifies at least five distinct ways inwhich Nietzsche uses "morality," one ofwhich refers to principles with which people like Nietzsche identify themselves; i.e., "human



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