Robert Musil - On Machs Theories

7/29/2019 Robert Musil - On Machs Theories

1/48

Philo sophia Resources Lib raryRep ri nts , Trans la tions an d Commentar ie sRela ting to Austri an In te lle ct ual His tor y

Edi tor s- in-ch ief:I.C. Nyiri Bud ap es t (H )Barr y Smit h Manchester (G B)Edi toral Board :Roderick M. Chisholm . Provide nce, RI (USA)Rudo lf Hailer ' Graz (A)Allan Janik . Wellesley , MA (USA)William M. Jo hnston ' Amher st, MA (USA)Chris tia n Th iel . Er langen

Philosophia Verla g . M iinchen . W ien

Robert Musil

On Mach's TheoriesIntr oducti on by G . H. von Wright

The Catholic Universi ty ofAmeri ca Pres sWashington , D.C.

Philosophia Verlag . M iinchen . W ie n


2/48

CIP-Kurztitelaufnahmeder DeutschenBibliothekMusil,Robert:OnMach's theories/RobertMusil.Mite. Einf. vonG. H. vonWright.[Transl.fromtheGermanbyKevinMulligan).- Washington,D. e. : CatholicUniversityofAmericaPress;Miinchen ;Wien : PhilosophiaVerlag, 1982.(Philosophiaresourceslibrary)Einheitssacht.: BeitragZU IBeurteilungde r LehrenMachs (engl.>ISBN3-88405-044-3 (philosophia-VerI .)ISBN0-8132-0586-7 (Cath. Univ. ofAmericaPress)

Library of Congress Catalogingin PublicationDataMusil, Robert, 1880-1942.OnMach's theories.(Philosophiaresourceslibrary)Translationof: Beitragzur BeurteilungderLehrenMachs.1. Science-Philosophy.2. Knowledge, Theoryof.3. Mach, Ernst, 183S-1916.

1. Title. n. Series.Q175.M982613 1982 501 82-74281ISBN 0-8132-0586-7

Table of Contents

Musil andMachIntroduction by G. H. von Wright 7Introduction: Nature of our task 15

Il The cognitive-psychological and economic approach 20III The opposition to mechanical physics. Criticisms of individualphysical concepts 31IV The polemicagainst the concept of causality; its replacementby the concept of function 44V Thefinal component ofthe concept of 'functional connexion'completed: the denial of natural necessity.The theory of elements.Final contradictions 57

Availablein North and South America from The Catholic University of AmericaPress,Washington,D.e.

Translatedfrom theGerman byKevinMulliganOriginallypublished under the titleBeitragzur Beurteilungder LehrenMachsCopyright 1980by RowohltVerlagGmbH, ReinbekbeiHamburgCopyright1908by RobertMusil

ISBN 3-88405-044-3ISBN 0-8132-0586-7 1982 for the Englishtranslationby PhilosophiaVerlagGnibH, Munchen. .All rightsreserved. No part of this bookmay be reproduced in any m ~ e r , byprint,photoprint. microfilm, or any o ther means wi thou t wr it ten permissionexcept in the case ofquotations in the contextof reviews.Manufactured by PeraDruck,HannsHaugKG,GriifelfingPrinted in Germany 1982

Notes 81


3/48

Musil an d Mach

1In 1903Musilgaveuphis jobas assistantat theTechnischeHochschuleinStuttgart,moved toBerlinandbeganto studyphilosophyandpsychologyat the FriedrichWilhelm University. Five years later he completed hisstudies and got his doctorate with a published dissertation on thephilosophyof science ofErnst M a c h l ~Musil's main teacher in Berlin was Carl Stumpf, a former pupil ofBrentano and Lotze. Stumpf was also a renowned psychologist andauthor of a two volume work on the sensation of musical sound,Tonpsychologie. Part ofMusil'swork inBerlinseems tohavebeen donein Stnmpf'sinstitute forexperimentalpsychology. His talent asengineerproved itself in the invention and construction of a machine(Variationskreisel) for rotatingmonocoloureddiscs so as to produce, tothe eye, impressionso fmixedcolours.Musil's appreciationof Stumpfasa teacheris interestinglyreflected in anentryinhisdiaryofthemid-1930swhen he was livingin Vienna. An assistant of Schlick's, he writes2, hadbeen talking to him about the then current ideas of 'physicalism' in theVienna Circle and their application to psychology. To this Mnsilremarks: "Wievielgenauer ist es dochin der Stumpfschule zugegangen.Diese nuchteme und wissenschaftliche Atmosphiire war doch einVerdienst dieses Lehrers". I t is not surprising that the philosophicalpsychologyoftheWiener Kreis shouldhaveseemedtoMusil artificialandbarren. A contemporaryschoolin psychologywhich impressedhimmorefavourably and probably has also left an imprint on his writings as anauthor of fiction was Gestalt-psychology, associated chiefly with thenamesofWertheimer andKohler3.Musil, however , did not find work in experimental psychologycongenial4Thesubjectmatter ofhisdissertation is purephilosophy.We1 Beitrag zur Beurteilung der Lehren Machs. Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung de lDoktorwilrde. genehmigtvon der philosophischenFakultiitde rFriedrich-Wilhelms-UniversitiitzuBerlin.Berlin-Wilmersdorf:DissertationsverlagCarlArnold, 1908.

2 Robert Musil, Tagebiicher, Aphorismen, Essays und Reden. Heransgegeben von AdolfFrise.Hamburg: RowohltVerlag, 1955,p.451f.

3 See Tagebikher, onameetinginViennain1911withvonHombostelandWertheimer,andp. 291 andp. 631f. on Kohler.4 Tagebiicher, p. 445: 'WenigFrendea mpsychologischenExperiment'.


4/48

have no reasonto think thatthe choiceof topicwas notMusi!'sown. Weknowfrom his diaries that hewas alreadyacquaintedwithand impressedbytheworkofMachbefore hewentto Berlin to studyphilosophy5.Therewas certainly an element of personal concerninvolved in his choice of atheme. Musil wanted to knowwhether Mach'sclaimwas correct that themethods andresultsof exactnatural science, whenproperly interpreted,would give decisive support to the positivistic philosophy which Machwas professing. Musil's answerto the question isNo. Machhad not beenable to defend his claim consistently. An examination of his argumentsrevealed inner contradictions6. Maybethe answerwas a disappointmentto Musil- and a contributory cause to his decision to give up continuedacademicwork.There were external complications too. Stumpf was not too pleasedwith theworkofhisstudent. His own opposition toMachwas deeperandstrongerthanMusi!'s. Hewas hesitantaboutletting the dissertationpass,and we are told that there were controversies? between the two menbefore Musi! eventually, on 14 March 1908, was promoted to thedoctorate.For some years afterhis promotion,Musi! continued to livein Berlin.He was offered a Dozentur in philosophy in the university of Graz inAustria, where Meinong was Professor. Musil, however, declined theoffer. He moved toViennaearly in 1911 andtook up employment intheLibrary of the TechnischeHochschule.After the dissertation, Musi! did not publish anything strictly'philosophical' ofhis own. There are a few reviews of philosophicalandpsychological books , and a long - and at the same time critical andunderstanding - essay from the year 1921 on Spengler's Untergang desAbendlandesS. I t is hardly any longer possible to tell in detail to whatextentMusil followed the changesin philosophy and psychology9 in thedecades betweenthe two wars. I do notknow that he participated in theactivities of the Verein ErnstMach or associated muchwithmembers ofthe Wiener Kreiswhen he was livinginViennain the 1920'sand 30's. Buthe is known to have been a frequent visitor to the house of themathematician-philosopherRichard vonMises, whenhe againresided in5 Cf. Tagebacher, p.37.6 Dissertation, p. 78.7 Karl Dinklage, 'Musils Herkunft uod Lebensgeschichte' in RobertMusil, Leben, Werk,Wirkung, heTausgegeben vonKaTIDi nklage, ZUrich:AmallbeaVerlag.1960. p. 217. Theinformation is from the psychologistJ. vonAlleschwho knewMusH in Berlin. Detailsofthese 'wissenschaftlicheAuseinandersetzungen' arenot known.

8 'GeistundErfahrung, AnmeTkungen fUT LeseT,welche dem UnteTgangdes Abendlandesentronnensind', DerneueMerkur, March 1921.

9 Cf. TagebiJcher, p. 445: 'Geistiges Miterleben deT Wenduug in deT Psychologie undPhilosophie'.

"

Berlin in the years before Hitl er came to power. Von Mises was aprominentmember ofthe circle ofempiricistphilosophersintheGermancapital who closely cooperated with their Viennese colleagues. I t canhardly be doubted that Musil was informed about what was going on inthese circles. (Cf. above onhis reactionto 'physicalism'.)I t would be particularly interesting to knowwhether Musi! had readWittgensteinandwhat his reactionwas tothe authorof TractatusLogico-

Philosophicus. Thereseems to me to exista greatkinship between thesetwo most remarkable men. Also, their life-curves show a strikingresemblance. What Musil writes about feeling (Gefiihl) and relatedpsychological concepts in the unfinished parts of Der Mann ohneEigenschaften is often astonishingly like the 'later' Wittgenstein'swritings on these topics. I have seen one briefmention lO thatMusil hadtaken interest in the changes in Wittgenstein after the Tractatus - but Ishouldregarditas practicallyexcluded that he had seenor readanyofthedictationsormanuscripts byWittgensteinwhichwerein circulationin the1930's. (Nor do I know thatWittgenstein had everreadMusil.)

2The two'philosophers who had most strongly impressed Musi! wereNietzsche and Mach. I fwe had to mention a third, itwould probablybeRalphWaldoEmerson. Musi!'s readingofNietzsche goes back to 1898.

His first acquaintancewithMach seemsto have beenin 1902whenhe wasliving in Briinn in Moravia where a yearearlier he had matriculated asengineerfrom the TechnischeHochschule.Itwouldbe temptingtoseeinMachthesourceofinspirationforMusil'sabort ive venture into academic philosophy, and in Nietzsche thephilosopher-poetwho kindledthe spark inMusi! the novelist.This judgementwould not be entirelywrong. Certainly the influence

of Nietzschewas much longerlasting and canbe clearly seen also in themature writings of Musil. Traces of Musil's reading of Mach may bediscernible too - but at least to me they seem accidental and withoutdeeper significanceto the contentofMusil's later thoughts.When se t in the proper perspective of the t ime, however, th,ecombination Mach-Nietzsche is more significant than many a modernreader might suspect. The philosophyofNietzschecanbe associatedwithsuch attributes as 'subjectivist' and 'voluntarist', that of Mach with'phenomenalist' and 'positivist'.Bo th pairs of attributes have an affinity10 ByErvinP. Hexnerin'Musils Interessenkreis' in RobertMusil, Leben. Werk, Wirkung, p.

143. It is not clear from this reference, however.whetherMusil's interest concerned thechanges inWittgenstein's style of life orstyleof thinking.()


5/48

with somethingwhich is sometimes also labelled 'idealism'. Mach andNietzsche were further exponents of a Zeitgeist which can becharacterized aspost-Darwinian 'evolutionism'.Nietzsche made no systematic effort to develop an epistemology ortheory of knowledge. The scatteredremarks on epistemological matterswhich are found inhiswritingsshowsimilaritywiththe 'phenomenalism'or 'sensualism'ofMach. Theparallelismwasnoted in awork of the time,viz. Hans Kleinpeter's Phiinomenalismusl l . Kleinpeter also wrotestudies onMach's philosophyof sciencel2 He is, incidentally, one ofthevery few authors, beside Mach himself, to whom Musil refers in hisdissertation.One sometimes talks of a Hume-Mach tradition in epistemology represented also byBertrandRussellin some ofhiswritings, andlaterbythe logical positivists. As far as theory of knowledge is concerned,Nietzsche too belongsin this tradition.Roundthe turnof the centuryphilosophywitnesseda reactionagainstthe positivist epistemology in the spirit of Hume and Mach, as well asagainst various forms of 'idealism'. In the German-speakingworld thisreactioncan be saidto stern from thephilosophyofpsychologyprofessedbyBrentano. MeinonginAustria, Husserl and Stumpfin Germany, and

the PoleTwardowskiwereoutstandingpupilsofthis remarkableteacher.In the English-speakingworldMoore andthe earlyRussell representedasimilar trend. The first part of Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen hadappeared in 1900. Moore's celebrated 'Refutation of Idealism' waspublished in 1903. In neither is Mach directly a target of attack but thekind of sensualist epistemologywhich he represents certainlyis. A mostviolent attack on Mach's 'idealism' was Lenin's Materializm iempiriokritizizm published the year after Musil's dissertation. In thephilosophy ofphysicsBoltzmann, Mach'scolleaguein Vienna, defendeda 'realist' position in conscious opposition to Mach. Of the two greatinnovators in physics in the earlyyears of the century, Planck followedBoltzmann,whereasthe youngEinsteinwasmore a follower ofMach.

I t is in the setting of these philosophical issues of the time: 'realism'versus 'idealism', 'phenomenology' versus 'phenomenalism' that onealso hasto placeMusil against Mach. LikeBoltzmannand Planck,Musilcan be said to defend a realist position in the philosophy ofphysics. Hecriticizes, in particular, the 'fictionalist' and 'subjectivist' aspects ofMach's thinking. A crucial issue concerns the status of natural lawsandwhether there is a physical necessity ('in nature') or only a logicalnecessity ('in thOUght'). Musil argues against Mach in favour of the11 Der Phiinomenali8mus, emenaturwissenschaf tlicheWeltanschauung. Leipzig:Barth, 1913.12 Die Erkenntni8theorie der Naturforschung der Gegenwart. Leipzig: Barlh, 1905.(Dedicated10 ErnslMach.)

10

notion of natural necessity. But, as we shall see, his argument is notconvincing and contains an obviousnon sequitur.Basic questionsin the generaltheory of knowledge are, on the whole,set aside in the dissertation. There are some very trenchant criticalremarks on Mach's phenomenalism and on his efforts to overcome themind-body dualism. But there is hardly a trace of defence of the actobjec t analysisof states of consciousnesswhich is socentralto Brentanoandhispupilsor, forthat matter, toMoore.ThisisinlinewithMusil'saimas set forth in the concludingparagraph ofthe Introduction to the book.Hisstatementisworth quotinghere infull:"Theonlyaimof thepresentwork is toget as exacta viewaspossibleofthe inner consistency of what Mach says. I f one wanted to take intoaccount the truth of Mach's results rathe r than the r igour of thearguments for his views, a much more broadly based work ofepistemology would be needed. The presentwork is intended only asacontributionto such a broaderwork. I t avoids, as far as possible, taking

up positions which would require justification by reference to anypersonalopinions and limitsitselfto the attempt to demonstrate, bywayof immanent critique, that Mach's account contains, besides numerouspositivefeatures, somanycontradictions or at least obscurities, that it isimpossiMe to accord it anydecisivesignificance."One gets from these lines the impression that Musil was anxious to

stress his unwillingness to commit himself to any alternative to Mach'sphilosophy. Considering this and also the fact that Musil's 'immanentcriticism' ofMach is not alwaysvery convincing, one canwellunderstandthe reserved attitude of Stumpf to the dissertation. The merits of thework, it seemstome, lie in theconcise andlucidpresentationrather thanin the criticismor attempted refutation ofMach's philosophyof science.

3After havingstated inthe Introduction the aimofhisinvestigationandsummarized some of the main tenets of Mach's philosophy, Musilproceeds to examine Mach's 'biological' viewof science as a process foracquiring and systematizing knowledge. This scrutiny is undertaken inthe second chapter of the book. I t leads to an important distinction(p. 24) between what Musil calls an ' indifferent' and a 'sceptical'interpretationofMach's standpoint.On the first interpretation,roughlyspeaking, Mach's emphasis on economy, idealization, and search forinvariance and permanence is only a description of the way science

11


6/48

progresses and scientificknowledge accumulates. Onthe second,Mach'sposition is also thought to warrant far-reaching epistemological andontological conclusions of a 'sceptical' nature about the foundation ofknowledge and the criteria of truth in science. Under the 'indifference'interpretation onecan, onthe whole, agreewiththe accountMachgives.An important aspect of the Werdegang of the exact sciences is therebydescribed in biological and psychological terms l3 . The 'sceptical'iiJterpretation, however, Musil is inclined to reject: in no case does itfollow logicallyfrom Mach's 'denkokonomischeBetrachtungsweise'.Mach himselfis not veryclearabout his own pretensions.But thathe,by and large, saw his position as a sensualist (phenomenalist, positivist)philosophy of knowledge with the 'sceptical' implications traditionallyassociated with such a position is all too obvious from many of hisutterances. I t is ofsomeinterestinthecontexttonoteMusil'sreferencetoKleinpeter (p. 26), who not only gave to Mach's view the 'sceptical'interpretationwhich Musil criticizes but also interpreted Nietzsche in asimilarvein (abovep.10) .In the third chapter Musil gives an account ofMach's criticism ofthe'mechanistic' world-picture of classical physics and of some of its keyconcepts - mass, energy, inertia, space, time, movement, temperature,etc. The accountgivenofMach's'antimechanism'seemsto meextremelygood and Musil 's own, on the whole positive evaluation of it (p. 36)agrees, I think, fairlywellwiththepresentstandpointinthe philosophyofscience. Of Mach's criticism of the key concepts Musil says, rightly Ithink, that it perhaps constitutes the most important part of Mach'sachievement (p. 40).The fourth chapter deals withMach's criticism of causality. The ideathat causalityisobsoleteinscienceandhasto bereplacedbythe notionoffunctional dependence or relationshipcan be said to have beenin the airat the time. To English readersit isprobablybest known fromBertrandRussell's famous paper 'On the Notion of Cause', published in theProceedings ofthe AristotelianSocietyfor 1912-1913.The ideasofMachand (at that time) also of Russell may be characterized as a consistentdevelopment ofthe criticism ofcausalityby DavidHume.Mach's criticism is trenchant and still today of great interest. Musilconcedes that from the point of view of the working scientist Mach'sposition contains much truth. But from the point of view of theepistemologist it leaves open crucial questions. Inwhatway andin whatsense do the functional relationships between the scientist's conceptualidealizations correspond to relationships between 'real' phenomena? Inpar ticular: Does Mach's criticism show that the idea of necessary13 Cf. Husserl's judgementonMachin Logische Untersuchungen, Vol. I. Ch.ix.Thiscomesvery near to Musil's opinion. There is nomentionofHusserl in the dissertation,however.1' )

connections in n a t ~ r ~ must banished from scientific thinking and~ e g a r d e d as a.n ataVIstic remamderfrom amore primitive stage inman'smtellectualhIstOry?The d i s c u s s i o ~ of t h e ~ e questions is pursuedin the fifth andconcludingchapter of the dIssertatIon. The gist of Musil's argument against Mach

~ e e m s to b: thatMach, bydenyingthe existenceof necessaryconnectionsm nature.' IS unable t? ~ c c o u n t the obvious fact - rightly emphasizedby Musil. - that eme 10gIsche Verkniipfung nur dann einenErkenntmsgrund abgeben kann, wenn sie durch eine sachlicheGrundlagegerechtfertigtist" 57). I donotthink thatMusil'sargumentholds water, however. thinks he can accuse Mach of inconsistency.Mach agreed t ~ ~ t s ~ l e n c e canbe successful initspursuitoflawsonlyifthere e X l s t ~ e g u l a n t I : s mnature andtha tthe predictabilityofphenomenaon the basIs of laws IS proof of the uniformity of the world. Now MusiIt h ~ u g h t thatif it is agreed that the equations or functional relationshipswhichare the lawsof naturehave.tocorrespondto regularitiesamongthe

~ h e n o m e n a , then there must eXIst necessary connections in nature. Atfirst. (p. 67) he d o . ~ s n.ot say this e:'Pressly. He says that "solange dieG l : I c h u ~ g e n tatsachhche gesetzhche Beziehungen ausdriicken _weIsen SIe auf reale n ? t w e ~ d i g e Verkniipfungen". This, presumably,onlymeans that there IS an Anschein von Notwendigkeit' in nature (p.67). later goes a s ~ e p further and says (p. 79) that Mach, bypostulating l a ~ h k e connectIonsbetweennaturalphenomena, is therebyalso postulatmg necessary connections in nature. Musil is hereidentifying :lawlike connection'with'necessary connection'I4. Beforehehad onlysaId thatthe first 'hintedat ' the second.For thestepfrom thistoan identification of the two he produced no argument. Yet the questionwhether the notion of natura l law involves the notion of natura lnecessitationis the very questionat stakein the discussion. Machdeniedthis i ~ v o l v e m e n ! . Musil s ~ m p l y a ~ s u m e s it. But thereby he alsobegs thequestIOn - hIS conclusIOn agamstMachis anon sequitur.

B e f o r ~ hIS f i ~ a l return to the questionof law andnecessity,Musil hadmade dIgreSSIOn (pp. 70-75)into a related, yetclearlydistincttopic, viz.Mach s sensualism(phenomenalism) andTheory ofElements. SomeofMusil's observations in this context are in my opinion very well taken.Mach thought that the laws of nature ultimately describe relationsbetween constituents of reality which he calls 'Elements'. What these' E l e ~ e n t s ' are is, however, not made very clear. As examples, Machmentions colours, tastes, tones, odours, (sensed) temperatures, etc.Hecalls them 'sensations' - but he also insists upon their character as a14 Dissertation, p. 79: "feste , gesetzliche, das sind abeT notwendige Beziehungen in der

Natur".


7/48

'neutral stuff' ou t of which both the mental (psychical) and ~ ~ e m ~ t e r i a l(physical) aspect of reality may be constituted. (The positIOn IS alsoknown as 'neutralmonism'.)Musil acutely observes (p. 71) that the 'elements'which are related toeach other through the equations of physics are not s e ~ s o r y butconceptual units. Evenif the 'rawmaterial' of conceptformatIOn has tobe given in sensory experience, the concepts themselves cannot beidentifiedwith 'bundlesof sensations'.Thisis true of colours and tastesaswell as of the more 'abstract ', quantified concepts which occur i n thefunctional relationshipsofnatural laws.

Musil's criticismof the sensationalism ofMach stands s o m e ~ h a t a p a ~from the rest of the contentof the dissertation. In Mach's p ~ I l o . s o p ~ Y . l toccupiesa centralposition. A few d e ~ d e s a ~ e r .Musil had ,cntIClzed .Itmhis dissertation, it experienced a revival, first m Rus.sell s A . n . a ~ y s l s ofMind (1921) andlater in the doctrines ofsome ofthe lOgIcal P O ~ l t l V l S t S ..Itshistoricalimportance notwithstandingone has: however, ImpressIOnthat it has now receded into obsolescence. ThiS, however, IS no t true ofMach's philosophyof science in the more restricted sense, i.e. ofwhat hehas to say about the character and status of laws of nature, about thecategories of causa li ty and substance , and about the fundamentalconcepts of mechanics, optics, and the theory heat: What makesMusil'sdissertation interesting to amodern reader IS that It c o n c ~ n t r a t e son those aspects of Mach's thoughts which seem most challengmg andfresh todayand probablywill in the long run be regarded asthose o f . m o ~ tlasting importance. Musil is , I think, far from always s u c c e ~ f u l .m hiSefforts to criticizeMach, bu t hisexpositionofMach's though.t IS fair andlucid and the dissertation stillmakesgood philosophical readmg.

4Of all the great writers of this centuryMusil is p e ~ h a p s the one who is

most deeply 'philosophical' in the true sense of thiS w o r ~ . But w?atfertile and original in his thinkingis not found, not even II I germ, m hiSdissertationonMach.Musil'sdigressionintophilosophyafterhe gaveupthecareer of an engineer forwhich he had beentrained ~ r n e d ou t to be ablind alley for his genius. It was on the other road which he entered atabout the same time with thepublication of T6rless (1906) andthe e a r ~ yplans forwhat eventuallybecame Der ~ a n n ohne. E ~ g e n s c h a f t e n that hiScreative talent and genius found fulfIlment. ThiS IS true, also, of thephilosopherinhim.G. H. vonWright, 198214

I Introduction:Nature of our task

Today itis the word of the naturalscientistwhichcarriesweightwhereverepistemological or metaphysical questions come under the scrutiny ofexact philosophy. The times arepastwhen a picture of the world sprangfull-blown from the philosopher's forehead. Making use of all themethods and results of exact inquiry, philosophy today is trying toreorganize its relation to the widespread regIIlarities nature has beenshown to exhibit, to reformulateitspositionon theoldsearchfora correctinterpretation of the concepts of substance and causality and itspositionon the relation between the physical and the psychical, and soon.It i s therefore a matter of some importance When the claim is putforward, and by a natural scientist, that inspite ofits linkwith the naturalsciences, this attempt to bring about a reorientation in philosophy- atleast in the form it usually takes-contains nearlyasmany absurditiesas itdoesphilosophicalassumptions; andwhen he substantiatesthis assertionwith theses like the following, whose aim is to erect a wall between thatviewofthenatural sciencesonwhich the investigations ofphilosphers areusually based andthe natural sciences as they really are:1. Natural science only descr ibes what has happened instead ofexplaining it. Natural laws in particu la r are no more than tabulardescriptions of facts (ormathematicalsymbolswhich arethe equivalents

of suchtables);theories in thenatural sciencesaremerelythe connexionswe establish between suchtables. Consideredas explanations, theoriesare merely more comprehensive intelligibilities in place of lesscomprehensive ones. Neither an individual law nor a theory says morethan would knowledge ofthe experiences they are based on , taken ontheir own.

2. Just as there are no explanations whatsoever, so - in particular _there are no causal explanations. I f causal connexions did exist, theywould, at best, only enable one to establish a certain concatenation ofevents; one would not be able to see what the reasons for theconcatenation were. Exact science has,moreover, shown that there areno such things as causa l connexions. In the earlier stages of theirdevelopment, the natural sciences were obliged to seek such causalconnexions but they are now completelyfree of theneed to do so, except

15


8/48


9/48

be changed the moment our attention turns to the domain of anotherscience"!, weread at one point.Now both this appeal to the natural sciences and the restriction ofknowledge to connexions be tween the 'phenomena ' have beencharacteristic features of positivist philosophy since the days of Comte.

But in part already while Comte 's main work was in the process ofappearing (1830-1842) and in part a lit tle later , Faraday, R. Mayer,Joule, Rankine, Clausius, W. Thomson, Kronig, Grassmann,Redtenbacher amongotherswereat workwith a verydifferent aimfromthat pursued byComte, and even todaythe majorityof physicists are byno means convinced positivists. (Proof of this is the oppositionencountered byMach's view in precisely these circles.)Thus in spite ofoccasional exceptions, positivism has remained more of a matter forphilosophy, its central question has remained the epistemologicaldiscussion ofthe relationbetweensubject and object and its main tenetthe rejectionof everythingwhich is extra-mental.This hasremainedtrueofAvenarius, Laas, Schuppe, Rehmke and otherlike-mindedinquirersofthe present-day.

This situationdetermines our interest inMach. For notonly is hetherepresentative of positivismwith the widest audience, someone who atthe same time has a genuine background in natural science (and. as ascientist ofimportance)- working alone (for the searchfor contactwithrelated i d e a ~ makes a late andinfrequent appearance inhiswritings), heowes the stimulus for most of his ideas to developments in his ownparticular branch of science - but he is also the first person to takeseriously the assertion that his (positivist) convictions were solelyobtainedby applying views which had proven themselves in the naturalsciences and that they are no more than a result of the development ofexactresearch. Mach, therefore,makesgoodinhisownpersonwhathadhitherto beenonlya moreor lessemptyclaimand somakes itpossible tofind out whether positivism lives up to one of its most dazzling andappealing promises, the claim that it is merely the backwardness ofphilosopherswhich explains theirfailureto recognizethe extentto whichexact and fruitful science is already following in the tracks of positivistphilosophy.Our taskwilltherefore be to find out for ourselveswhetherMachdoesin fact arrive at his views as a logical consequence of a true or at leastconsistentviewofnaturalscience.At the same timethiswillshedlight onthe disturbing phenomenonof a naturalscientistwhose rejection ofthat

~ o n t e m p o r a r y philosophywhich looksto the naturalsciencesfor supportIS sototal that hecansayof hisMechanics that "itsaim", inregard to themost important positions of suchphilosophy, "is to enlighten or, to pu t it18

even more clearly, is anti-metaphysical"2. And, "I have aimed atremovingan oldand stalephilosophyfrom science"3.A circumstance which should be mentioned is the fact that Mach'sepistemologicaland eventhe properlymetaphysical commentsare to befound inhiswritings notin a rigorous, methodicalformbutinthe form ofaphorisms. In addition, as in theworks onmechanics and thetheoryofheat, theyaremerelydispersedhere and therethroughoutthetext. Thusin the first place it becomes necessary to single out and bring together allthose ideaswhichbelong together andI should liketo emphasizethat, inmyview, oncethisiscarriedout themostimportantpartofourrealtaskisover. For then the connexions between the different arguments arevisible and a very different view of their strengths and weaknessesemerges from thatwhich is available whenthe individualideas, isolatedone fromanother, lead the somewhatirresponsible life of aphorisms.The only aim of the present work is toget as exacta view as possible ofthe inner consistency of what Mach says. I f one wanted to take intoaccount the tru th of Mach's results rather than the rigour of thearguments for his views, a much more broadly based work ofepistemology would be needed. The present work is intended only as acontributionto such a broader work. It avoids, as far as possible, takingup' positions' which would require justification by reference to anypersonal opinions and limitsitselfto theattempt to demonstrate, bywayof immanent critique, thatMach's account contains, besides numerouspositive features, somanycontradictions or at least obscurities, thatit isimpossible to accord it anydecisive significance.


10/48

II The cognitive-psychological andeconomic approach

As a resultof the aphoristiccharacterofMach'swritings the assessmentone makes ofmany of hisclaimswill varyfrom contextto context, so thatsometimes thesamestatementshaveto be analysedfromdifferent pointsof view.

We shall begin with the point of view put fo:(Ward by Mach andmentioned under (4) in the Introduction, according to which scienceshouldbe consideredasa phenomenonofeconomicaladaptation,a pointof view which is also closely connected with a cognitive-psychologicalmode of approach.

This approachto knowledge is important;for itlends afascinatingedgeto everything Mach says from the verystart. I t is also related to familiarscepticalcurrentsof recenttimesand is thuswellfittedto attractandkeepthe reader's attention. I t is, then, clearly important for us to determinewhether all this is matched by the epistemological importance of thisapproach. And itcan, I think, be easilyseenthatthis isnot thecase. It isthe refor e quite possible t o follow with great. interest Mach'scharacteristically stimulating und plastic approach to the developmentand nature ofnaturalscience withoutfeeling tempted to assume that thisapproach in any way prejudices decisions about the results of theepistemology and metaphysics to which Mach is opposed. In otherwords, the successesof a biological-psychological approach are withoutany further consequencesfor anythingelse.

Fundamentalto this approach is the assumption-anassumptionwhichwe shall examine againin other contexts- that only knowledge of facts isof value for the physicist, that this is the main goal of physics, and thateverythingelse is merely a roundaboutintellectualway ofobtainingandrepresenting knowledge of this kind l . Thus we read: " If all individualfacts about which we desire to gain knowledge were immediatelyaccessible to us, no science would ever have arisen. Only because thememory of theindividualis limited mustthe materialbe ordered2." Thisorder is the goal of science3 . The goal was originally a practicalone andalthoughspecificallytheoreticalinterests evolvedsubsequently, theytoocan be reduced to practical interests and considered merely as aroundabout way of satisfying these. "Every scientific interest may beviewed asa mediate biologicalinterest",weare told420

The strong emphasis on the practicaltask of science turns out tobe adirect consequence of the fact that Mach treats science, and indeed allhuman activity, from the point of view of self-preservation5 , in no waydifferent fromthe activities ofthe lowestorganisms. "Allthe processesofa living individual are reactions in the interestof self-preservation,.andchanges in ideas are merely part of changes in reactions6" . But once thegeneral notionof evolution is applied to science itseJf7 it clearly followsthat sciencehasto be considered from the point ofviewof continuity andeconomyfor these are integral parts of evolutionarytheory;on the otherhand, the very applicability of these points of view to thought i t ~ e l fprovides retrospective justification for invokingthe theory of evolutIonhere.Asfar as the first pointis concerned, it is characteristicofthe theory ofevolution that it attempts to understand a creature's properties andreactions by reference to selective adaptation to the processes in itsenvironment. it proves to be an empirical fact that this adaptation iseconomical and continuous: i. e. that once a property exists it cannotsimply be pushed out of existence by other propert ies under newcircumstances, but is rathersubjectto agradualtransformationwhich, ineconomiscal fashion, does not extend any further than is absolutelynecessaryS.Astothesecondpoint,itisfairtosaythatthewholeofMach'swork is an attempt to demonstrate that scientific thought and itsdevelopment do in fact illustrate these consequences of the theory ofevolution.

Themostimportantpointscan be summedup as follows:

1. The genesis of conscious life shows it to have the role of aninstrument of economy; for if self-preservation reqnires the adaptationof a creature's reactions to external processes, then where theenvironment has reached a certain level of complexity the range offactualdiversitywill easilyoutstrip the number of biologically significantreactions, so that a whole group of loosely related facts, regardless ofactualdifferences, will meetwith one and the same reaction. Wherethisundifferentiated {reaction suffices as an answer to the practical needsinvolved, the process as awhole is economic and economical. Our initialuses of concepts follow the same pattern. Facts "of like reaction" aregrasped under one idea and associated with a singlesign. Consciousnesshere belongs to the type of an imperfect physical apparatus whichresponds to the processes in the external world only to a limited extentand in certaindirections9

21


11/48

2. Further functions of consciousness also showit t o b e a n instrumentof economy:for onceinpossessionofacertain number of ideasit doe snotconstruct newideas when faced with newfacts but rather adapts to thenew tasks those ideas already at its disposal. An d this is done with theleastpossible expenditure of effortby retaining th e originalthoughtsan dmodifying them only to the extentrequiredin orderto dealwith the newdemands. Mach descr ibes this behaviour as corresponding to theprinciple of continuity or , t o t he principle of permanence an d sufficientdifferentiation1o.

In this connexionMach distinguishes:a) th e adaptation of thoughts to facts (which was mentioned above).In particular, he describes this as a picturing an d modelling of facts inthoughts. Fo r this iswhatmakes possible an adequateadaptation t o t h eenvironment, the relationrequiredforself-preservation; "i n order to pu tourselves into a relation with ou r environment", says Mach, "we needsomepictureof the world"ll.b) the adaptation of thoughts to on e another: "Ideas graduallyadaptto facts by picturing them with sufficient accuracy t o m ee t biologicalneeds"12 b u t " o fcourse th e accuracy goes no further than is required byimmediate interests an d circumstances. Since these however, vary fromcase to case th e results of adaptation do no t match oneanotherexactly. I tis biological interest which goes o n t o bring about mutualcorrection ofthe resulting picturesso that deviations are adjustedin the best an d mostprofitableway."13 Mutual adaptation of thoughtsis therefore the furthertask thought must solve ifit is to attain full intellectual satisfaction14an d" thi s requi rement is satis fied by combining the principle of thepermanence of ideaswith that of their sufficientdifferentiation."

3. If human thought is generally of the same sort as the behavioursketched above i t must follow t ha t t he principles of economy an dcontinuity ar e applicable to science. Mach nevertheless never tires ofrepeatedly citingexamples to supportpreciselythisimportantpoint. Th efollowing ar e typical.a) Scientific though t itself is characterized by economy andcontinuity. Thus Newton imagines the planets to be projectiles thrown

into th e air an d simply modifies the notion of constant gravity to obtaint h at o fgravitation dependent on distance15. Fourierconstructs a theoryo f h e at conduction by modifying for his own purposes a theory of thevibrations of strings; a theory of diffusion is subsequently modelled onthis, an d so on16. Just as th e notion of the rectilinear propagationof lightwas being entertained, refraction an d diffractionwere discovered. Th eoriginal notion was retained an d extended with the assumption of anindex of refraction; bu t this inits turn ha d to be further specifiedwiththe

assumption that a specialindex isnecessaryfor eachcolour. Scarcelyhadit become known that light added to light increases its intensity whensuddenly a case of total darkness was observed, etc. "Ultimately,however, we see everywhere in the overwhelming multifariousness ofoptical phenomena the fact of the spatial an d temporal periodicity oflight,with itsvelocity of propagationdependent on the medium andtheperiod. This goal-to surveya given domainwiththe leastexpenditureofthought and to represent all the facts in it with some one single mentalprocess- may be justlytermed an economical goal1?"Scientific progress through the formationof hypotheses is characterizedasawholebycontinuityand economy. Fo r hypotheses ar e initially drawnfrom the available stock of familiar experiences, their deductiveconsequencesare then comparedwith thenewfact and the hypothesis ismodified to takeinto account the result of this comparison18.b) All the aids and devices on which natural sciencedraws contributeto its economic character. This is particularly true of mathematics, thefruitfulness of which is due to " the great economy of its thoughtoperations"19, bu t it is no less true of all heuristic methods. Their basicmethod isthatofvariation.20"Themethodofchangeor variationpresentsus with like cases of facts, containing components which are partly thesame an d partly different. I t is only by comparing different cases ofrefracted light at changing angles of incidence that th e common factor,the constancyof therefractiveindex,is disclosed. Andonlybycomparingth e refractions of l ight of different colours does the difference, theinequality of the indices of refraction arrest the attention. Comparisonbased on change leads the mind simultaneously to the highestabstractions and to the finest distinctions21." Because comparison22 .forms the core not only of all inductive procedure23 bu t also of allexperiments, all scientific methodology has continuity as its goal. Fo rcomparison aims at the recognition that the newconsists of components,whethermodifiedor not, ofthe oldandiseconomicin justthe samesenseinwhich, aswasnoted above, theformation of hypotheses iseconomic.c) Scientific results - concepts, laws, theories - are characterized byeconomy and continuity. Th e economic task of a law of nature is toeliminatethe need to knowmere individual facts24. A lawdispenseswithth e need to payattention to individualcases by bringingtogether typicalcaseswith the helpof one thought.Whencertainconditionshold, what ist o b e expected is limited and regulated by a law25 ; this law functions asaschemainto which only the particularconditions have to be inserted. Torecognizethat a law isa specialcaseof a moregenerallawis to substituteamore inclusive schema for a less inclusive schema26 . Where i t is onlynecessary to pay attention to such a schema the memory is freed of anunnecessary burden; it possesses directions for deriving from the given

23


12/48

schema thewholerange of individual facts andmore specific laws.Whatis true oflawsholdstooofconcepts.A conceptwhich hasbeenbroughttoa high levelof precision inscience contains pastworkin a condensed andeconomic form27 , all relevantconceptualmarks are incorporatedinto itsdefinition and, since these are connectedwithone another by laws, thespecificationofone markwhichhas diagnosticsignificancecan representthe wholecomplex. Thusone cansay: "Allphysicallawsand conceptsareabbreviated directions, frequently containing subordinate directions,for the employment of economically ordered experiences, ready foruse"28, and in this economical order ing all "the puzzl ing power ofscience" is to befound29 At the same time these theoretical formations also correspond to the

need for permanence. For it is inthem- inconstantlawsand equationsaswell asin thefixedmarksof concepts- thatthoughtseeks to grasp thoseideas which can be held onto permanentlywhatever individual changesmay occur, ideas without which changewould be incomprehensible andincoherent3o Comment: Insofar as it is possible to comment on these points withouttouching on speciallinesof thoughtwhich all require separate treatmentlater, t he following needs t o be said. From the point of view ofepis temology, an approach like the above, with its emphasis ondevelopmental, cognitive and psychological factors as well as on the\economy of thought, maybe eithersceptical or indifferent. I shall callitindifferent whereit is conceivedof as an approachrunningalongsidetheproperly epistemological investigation of the grounds and criteria ofknowledge. I would call i t sceptical the moment it is asserted that thelatter investigation cannotfor somereason be carried out and that onlyfrom the point of view of economy or by reference to biological andpsychological reasons is it possible to decide what knowledge is. Thegerms of both views canbe foundin the above.a) Indifference of the principles. This viewfollows already from thefact that it is possibleto agreewiththese stimulatingobservationswithouteither holding that the tasks ofepistemology are thereby disposedof or,perhaps, thatthey areeven remotely involved.The very statementof theproblem suffices to bring out the difference. For i f one wants to makesuch claimsat thislevel of generalityat all, then ithastobe admittedthatthe psychologicalcourse of all correct andincorrectthought, judgementand prejudice, illustrates the principle of continuity wherever unusualcircumstances do not interfere. But thequestion when a train of thoughtshould be considered to be continuous and the question what externaland internal circumstanceslead to the continuousdevelopment ofa trainof thought , together with the quest ion when the result of a train of24

thought - no matter whether its development is continuous ordiscontinuous, that is, economical or non-economical - should beaccepted as true, these all express so many inner differences that theassumption that what we have here are two partially intersecting butmutually indifferent sets of questions must certainly be conceded to bepossible.But then the insight that natural laws serve to free memory of theburden of a number of individual facts and that the same is t rue o fscientificconcepts canhavenothing to dowith the questionhowsuchlawsand conceptsmust beconstructed ifthey arereally to serve this purpose,

or what sortof status or adequacy they acquire when the facts on whichthey arefounded aretakenintoconsideration. And similarly thefact thatthese laws are alsoconnected one with another certainly has a practicalvalue and one which it is economical to make use of, yet a number ofquestionsremainunanswered. How,for example, domatters standasfaras the relation between the respective guarantees of such interrelatedlaws is concerned? What underlying real relations are involved whenthere exists a similarity between the laws obtaining in two otherwiseseparate groupsoffactswhich allows themto be broughtundercommongeneral equations (light, electricity and magnetism, for example)?Whether or how such questions are thought to be answerable, they arequite definitely not to be dealt with by pointing to the agreeableness ofour beingable to fit lawsofnature intodifferenttheoreticalcontexts.Thesame holds of the concepts of thing, causality, force and so on. Eitherfacts require the formation of such concepts or they conflict with theconcepts. The question is always whether one or the other can beestablished. But independently of this question and prior to any answeragreementcan easilybe reachedconcerningthe instinctiveoriginoftheseconcepts and their economicvalue.b) Bu t there are also indications of a more radical, sceptical position.Consider for example the principle of permanence, according to whichthere are cer ta in basic, instinc tive assumptions which are simplygiven31and which are subsequently adapted to our knowledge of factswith a minimum ofmodification. We are told thatthe kinetic theory ofheat and the conceptionof electricityas a substanceowe the appearance

of justification they possess and on which their existence is based to amere historical accident. Even those theories which involve nometaphorical hypotheses, but are purely conceptual and quantitative,are coloured by the models which precede them just because theydevelop by refining already existing ideas32 Occasionally, i t may beadded, the direction taken by the development of a whole disciplinemight have been different had it n ot been for some relatively slighthistoricalcircumstance; quitedifferentconcepts andsystems ofconcepts


13/48

mighthave resulted33, andsoforth; sothat, onthis perspective, even themost exact sorts of concept formation appear to be "accidental andconventional".In the face of sucha demonstration - andI have noreason to doubt itsvalidity- one mightfeel tempted to take a completely sceptical viewofscience an d to connect the principles with this view. Obviously, if theproducts of science in the course of their development depend onindividual, psychological influences and accidents and if even the

factually given factor of adaptation can steer this development in quitedifferentdirectionsdependingon thedifferentparticularconstellations34(i. e. on thosefacts and aspectsoffacts available forcomparison) then thesuggestionmight well be that science, asthe outcomeofsuchadaptation,is no t somethingwhichcouldonly exist in oneform and not in another.Indeed, experience shows rather that adaptation allows its results acertainmarginof freeplaywithouttherebybeingobligedto renounceitspractical purpose; ifeverythingwhichmakesupourknowledgeofnatureis merely such a product of adaptation then it is no longer somethingdefinite and unambiguous but merely one historically understandableresult amongmany other possible results. On e might try to contrastthiswith the everyday opinion which demands truth of the results of thenatural science, i.e. just that objective definiteness (in certain respectswhich have to be made precise) justifiedby objectivenecessity, which ishere denied. On such a view, there would then be no solid, so to speakabsolute truthbutonlytruthwhich is relativeinthesensethatanyopinionwill count as true provided it fulfills its purpose'of providing adequateorientation. Inot he rwords, there is nO,truthat all in the authenticsensebu t onlya practical convention contributing to self-preservation.

In favour of thisscepticalinterpretation there is thefact thatMachsaysof a book by H. Kleinpeter, "The Epistemology of ContemporaryResearch in th e Natural Sciences", that itis an accountwith which, in allessential respects, he is in agreement35 The general epistemologicalpartsof this bookare fullof justthose trains of thoughtwe haveoutlinedabove36 Were one to argue that Mach's endorsement was perhapsoverhasty, the fact nevertheless remains that his ownwritings contain anumberof statementswhichtend tomoveinthe sameradicaldirection ora re a t least ambiguous37 Such aview, then, is bynomeansafreephantasyabout possible interpretations of Mach's principles but has to be takenseriously.Thus no t only are there indications pointing to both of the views wehave outlined but each enjoys a degree of textual support. Bearing ourtask in mind, we can proceed as follows. We want to knowwhether andho w far these considerationsprovide ageneralfoundation forthespecificlimitationsMachimposeson inductiveknowledge.The interpretationof26

the principles according to which they are indifferent is ofitsverynaturecompletely irrelevant. As to the sceptical interpretation, whatinterestsus is not whether it is or mightbe Mach's opinion, but only the questionwhether it can serve as a foundation or only as a background for whatcomeslater,in otherwordswhetherthe general epistemologicalpositionis itself so firmly established that the sceptical attitude can or cannotsimplybe derived from itin particular cases.There is absolutely no doubt aboutthe answerto this question.For, first, were these principles to be decisive by themselves theywould have to be sharplyformulated withjust thisend inviewand theirscopeexactly defined. I twouldhave to be shown ina systematicwaythatthe principles suffice to guarantee at least one practically adequateinductive inference. And finally reasons would have to be broughtforward whichwouldexclude everyothe r theoryofinductionaimingat ahighercognitive ideaP8. No suchgeneral investigation, however, isto befound inMach'swritings. The textualevidenceshowsonly that incertaincases Mach is inclined to make agressive epistemological use of hisprinciples, aswhen, for example, hesaystha t the questionwhetheror notphysical appearancesare to be explainedby referenceto thingsand theirrelations is to be decided merelyon the basisof the economiesthiswouldyield; although for certainproblems itis, he thinks,moresuitableno t todo so. Th e texts do not show what the justification is for any givenapplication of his principles. (Or, where attempts at justification aremadethey relyon specialreasonswhichrequire separateexaminationineach particular case.) As long as the exclusive justification of theeconomical-biological approach is not demonstrated however, allappeals to i t in the face of other methodological arguments remainirrelevant. Errors arise when conclusions are drawn on the assumptionthat it alonedeserves considerationwhenallthat hasreallybeenshown isthatittoo is relevant.Secondly,it isalsoclearthattheprinciplesby themselves do no tsufficeto secureeven that degree of scientific stability demandedbyMach; andthat, on the otherhand,when one takes thisas abasisforinterpreting theprinciples their supposedlyscepticalsignificance disappears, leavingthetextual support which forced us to mention this possibility in the firstplaceas a numberof isolatedcontradictions.

On the onehand,Machsaysthat everydevelopmentof ascientificideaiseconomicalprovideditis continuous. Butontheotherhandhesaysthatevenwherethe samedegreeof continuity is presentit is quitepossible forvery different results to be obtained. He therefore also calls for the bestpossible adjustmentbetweenthe results of different adaptatiorts39 Thismeans, however, that continuity byitself and the economyit guaranteesare no longer decisivefor Mach, an d where theymight still appearto be

27


14/48

decisive he would be caught in a contradiction. For, as he repeatedlymakesclear, hedoesnot wishhisepistemology toprovideanysupportforepistemological nihilism. "All points of view which are of value for thespecialsciences retain their validity", he saysexplicitlyat onepoint40 , andwherever one looks in his scientificworks one finds him concernedwithjust that unambiguous definitenesswhich canbe established in somanydifferent ways but never bymere continuity since, as he admits himself,continuitycharacterizesthe developmentofbothknowledge anderror41.And although this continuity is admittedly not an unambiguouslydecisive requirement,Machexplicitly requires of science unambiguousness or univocity42andat one point refersto the latteras no more nor lessthan the aim ofcontinuous adaptation43 .

But if one looks a t this passage what one actually finds is acorresponding restriction in the principle of continuity as a resultof therequirement of 'sufficient' differentiation. This is the genuinelydecisivefactor; an adaptation which is not sufficient or adequate is not anadaptation at all andso it seems thatharmony amongstMach'sopinionshas been restored. But what does the emphasis on 'sufficient' mean? Itmaymean, as wehave seen, that the degree ofadaptationis nevermoreexact than is strictly necessary. But this means no more than tha tknowledge inthe inductive sciencesmustin a sense be gainedby workingfrom the ground up, that what passes as truth today may be seen as anerror tomorrow, thatinductionprocee(Isasymptotically,so to speak.Butthis is a generally admitted fact and has no specific connexion with thebio-genetic approach. The ordinary theory of induction is normallyconcerued to establish, what, at least at any given moment, is to count assufficient. But here too there is no conflict with the consequences ofMach's principles of adaptation. For, according to Mach, adaptation isonly adequate if it makes possible the reproduction and modelling offacts, i.e. if there is no contradiction between the intentions of thoughtand the facts to which they relate. It is just this agreement which isrequiredbythe normalview. Similarly,absolutely adequate adaptation-which should be considered as an ideal limit - could only be thatadaptationwhichnever leads to contradictions andwhich corresponds toall familiarand newlydiscoveredfacts initsdomain.But thisisjustwhat isnormally calledknowledge or a truth. Only adaptationof thissortcan beeconomicadaptationpure andsimple, foranyother sortmustfail to dealwith certaincases, must be insufficient, mislead thought and so becomeuneconomic. Furthermore, the criterion of economy is here of onlysecondary importance, for one must first knowwhether an assumptionagreeswithallexperience,which justmeans that onemustknowwhetherit is true; onlythencan it unreservedly be said to be economical. Thus28

every trace of an account which would conflict with the usual theory ofinduction is abandoned.What then remains of the second role attributed to economy, over andabove mere continuity, has absolutely no specific character of its ownwhich would distinguish it from ordinary views of the matter. Theadaptation ofthoughts to facts need not take place in only one way butwillbe carried out by different peoplein differentways. But "wewill beable to compare these different scientific approaches with one another

andto decidewhich ismore economicalthan the others. Considerationsof economy provide uswith a valuable point of view enabling us to findour way around and organize our scientific activities"44. Thus, whencontrasted with repeated application of the sine theorem, Gauss'sdioptrics provides an example of economy45. Mach calls only the mostcomplete andsimplestdescriptioneconomic,tha t iswhen the smallestsetof simpleindependentjudgementshasbeen found fromwhich all therestcan be deduced as logical consequences46. For, as he puts it, "the mindfeels relieved"notonly"wheneverthe new andunknown is recognized asa combinationofwhat is known, or the seeminglydifferentis revealed asthe same" but also when " the number of sufficient leading ideas isreduced andthey are arranged accordingto theprinciplesofpermanenceand sufficient differentiation"47so that the "economizing, harmonizingand organizing of thoughts are felt as a biological need far beyond thedemand for logical consistency" and, on the other hand, "everyavoidable incongruity or incompleteness, logical differentiation orsuperfluityof the describingthoughtsmeans a lossand is uneconomic"48.Now insofar as it is not merely a confirmation of the previous train ofthoughtdiscussed above, this is nomorethanareferenceto thefact that,over and beyond questions of truth andfalsity, there is an areato whichbelongsuch useful distinctionsas those betweensimple andcomplicated,clearand obscuretheoreticalformations49.But then, asa resultof the use he himselfmakes of them, the objectivescope of the consequences ofMach's principles turns out to involve nomore than ordinary views on the matter and their specific value is nolongerthat theyground knowledge butthat theyillustrateitpost festurn.And Mach himself says: "As a natural scientist I am accustomed toinvestigating individual questions ... and to move from these towardsmore general questions. I adhered to this custom in investigating thegenesis of physical knowledge. I was obliged to proceed in this waybecause a general theory of theories was a task which was beyondme . . . I therefore concentrated on individual phenomena: theadaptation of thoughts to facts and to one another, thought economy,comparison, thought experiments, constancy and continuity of thoughtand so on. I found it both profitable and soberingto consider ordinary

29


15/48

thought and all science as a biological and organic phenomenon withlogical thought as an ideal limit case. I would not want to doubt for aminute that investigation can begin at either end. And, as this makesclear, I am perfectly capable of dinstinguishing between logical andpsychological questions, a distinction I think everyone is capable ofmaking who is interested in the light psychology can throw on logicalprocesses. Someone whohas oncelooked carefullyat the logical analysisofwhatNewtonsaysinmy 'Mechanics'willfinditdifficulttoreproachmewith the attempt to run together blind , natural thought and logicalthought. Even if we had the complete logical analysis of all sciencesbefore us, the biological and psychological investigation of theirgenesis . . would still be needed; although this would not excludesubmitting the latter inits turn to logical analysis50 ."Butwith this Mach has said everythingwe wanted to hearon thistopicandwe can note once again thatnothing has been demonstrated whichwould enable us to move on from the principles to whatfollows. Wheresuch a step cannevertheless be made outin Mach'sworkthereis, first, alack of any objective justification and, secondly, he contradicts himselfand the consequencesof important componentsof hisaccount.

III The opposition to mechanical physics.Criticisms of individual physical concepts.

"My exposition always starts from physical details and from there risestowardsmore general considerations",saysMach!; andsince, aswe haveseen inthe lastchapter, thesegeneralreflections provideno clarificationof thequestionwhether andto whatextentknowledgeofnatureissubjectto more significant limitations than is normally assumed, we too shallfollow the path which beginswith the details. For evenif no restrictionson the domain ofknowledge, neither inbreadth nor in depth, could beshown to follow from the general view of knowledge as a product ofadaptation, the reverse nevertheless remains possible, that is, thatparticular restrictions placed on the natural sciences invest the moregeneral points ofview with a certain, perhaps high, degreeof scepticism.There are two trains of thought which we want to discuss first in thisconnexion: Mach's hostile attitude towardsso called mechanicalphysicsand his criticism of individual physical concepts. According to Mach,these theories, which are based on mechanical presuppositions, andtheseconceptslack all independent explanatoryvalue; theyexistmerelyas indifferent, economicrepresentatives ofthe facts, as indicated above.In contrast both to the view which hopes to find in the hypotheses ofmechanicalphysics the truecourse ofeventsbehindthe phenomena2 andto the (quite independent) attempts to grasp the true structure of thiscourse of events by progressively refining the concepts derived fromphenomena, this view of Mach's involves setting a limitto the cognitiveidealinthe sense thatwhat previouslycounted as anend is downgradedtothe status of a mere means. Theoryand conceptualsystemsare nolongerthe goals of enquiry but a means of mastering the facts; and with thedemonstration thatanyfunctionwhichgoesbeyond thisis impossibleandcontradictory, the claimthat science is merely a matter of an economicrelat ion to facts - and that more than this is not possible - acquires aspecificmeaning.Newton separatedthe resultof analytic investigations of phenomena,that which can be derived withcertaintyfrom securelyestablished facts,fromthe hypotheseswhichserve to explainphenomena butwhichare notthemselves proven. It was in this sense that he considered gravitationalacceleration- the inverse square law - and the agreementbetween thecase where bodies fall to the earthand motion in theplanetarysystem tobe the result of analytic investigation; whereas the question how the

31


16/48

action at a distance thisinvolvedcould be more fullyexplained he took tobe a hypothesis and a matter of mere speculation3 "But hitherto I haveno t been able to discover the cause of these properties of gravity fromphenomena,and Iframenohypotheses; ... And to usitisenoughthatgravity does really exist, and act according to the laws which we haveexplained, and abundantly serves to account for all the motions of thecelestial bodies and of our sea 4." But where he nevertheless inventshypotheses, as i n th e case of his theory of emission, he excuses hisarbitrary assumptions on the grounds that his discoveries remainuninfluenced by theory and that he himself only adopts his theory as auseful explanatory device- no t as an account of realitys.

I t is difficult to say whether this Newtonian hypotheses non lingosh6uld be taken to signify no more than a methodological attempt toseparate the secure goals of physico-analyticenquiry from the uncertainresults of the philosophico-physical considerations erected on top ofthese - such a boundary would correspond to the level of knowledge atthat time, bu t could gradually be changed to incorporate the"hypotheses" into what had already been proven. Or whether it is tobetaken as dismissinghypotheses once and for all to asubordinateposition6.Whatever the truth ofthe matter even Newton's famous contemporary,Huygens, had a quitedifferentviewof the importanceof hypotheses andit was hisviewwhichwas to prevail duringmostof the subsequentperiod.He wrote in his Traite de lumiere7: "There can be no doubt that lightconsists of t h e ~ motion of a certain substance. For i f we examine i tsproduction, we find t ha t here on ear th it is principally fire and flamewhich engender it , both ofwhichcontainbeyonddoubtbodieswhicharein rapid movement, since they dissolve and destroy many other bodiesmore solid than they: while ifwe regard itseffects,we see thatwhen lightis accumulated, say by concavemirrors, it has thepropertyof combustionjust as fire has, that is to say, it disunites the parts of bodies, which isassuredly a proofofmotion, at least in the true philosophy, in which thecauses of all naturaleffects are conceivedas mechanicalcauses.Whichinmy judgement must be accomplished or all hope of ever understandingphysics renounced."

In factthis goalof a 'truephilosophy' remainedfora longtime thatof allwho sough t to 'understand' natural phenomena8 Throughout tIieeighteenth century and nearlyall of the nineteenth century the majorityof the leadingphysicistswere occupied in providingmentalmodelsof theprocesses behind appearances, processes which would explain theseappearances. The main ideas employed in this attempt were force,

m o ~ e m e n t and mat te r, t he l at te r a ppe ar ing i n t he different guisesattnbnted to fluids, whichwere initially accepted and thenrejected, and32

in the manifold forms corresponding to atomism, the continuityhypothesis, and as aether and so on.It was indeed the great number of such theories', each different from

the others,whichdisturbed the credibilityof eachindividualtheory.Andthe conflicts between these ideas reveal the remarkable fact that,wheretheorieswere given up,the downfallof an ideawasonly infrequentlydueto a demonstration of its impossibility; it was much more likely to beabandoned merely because alternatives were more suitable for themathematicalmodellingwhichwas desired at all costs. A defect of eventhose theorieswhich remainedwas that, although theybecamemore andmore complicated in orderto deal with ever increasing numbers of newfac ts , they were unable to provide an adequate explanation of these.Thus on the one hand hopes placed in these theorieswere increasinglydisappointed and i t b ecame eas ie r to see their most fundamentalweaknesses - the obscurity ofthe concepts offorce, matter and motionthey employed as explanations. On the other hand, the retrospectiverecognition that theconcern to produce mathematical modelshadbeenhistorically decisive made it seem reasonable to regard only thecharacteristic of economy - which they quite definitely had - as of anysignificance rather t han any exp lana to ry value . In t hi s way, theconfidential aspirationsof anearlieragegaveway totheverymuchcoolerattitudes of the present day, typical of which is the attitude of Maxwell.Oneof the greatest promoters ofthe scientific modelling of mechanicalhypotheses, he nevertheless wanted the intuitive representations theymade use of to be considered asmere pictures. An evenmore pregnantformulation ofthe same point is due to Hertz,who expressly restrictedthe only remaining function of hypotheses to the requirement that theyneed be no more than pictures of the facts which , because theconsequences of the pictures are pictures of the consequences of thefacts, make possiblea unified representationof the facts.

What Mach has to say on this subject is no exception to this generaltendency and, historically, should be regarded as having contributedtoit. His writings, however, containlittleexplicit opposition to hypothesesbased on pictures. It was not necessaryfor him todo this because, asweshallsee,he directly attacks thephysicalconceptsonwhichthese theoriesare based, and with the demolition of its foundations the collapse of abuilding follows immediately. This has tobe borne inmind ifa seriesofoccasional attacks9 is t obe properly appreciated. Apart from these, hisremarks can be grouped objectively as follows. Mostimportantof all is,certainly, the repeated demonstration t ha t one and the same group offacts can equal ly wel l be explained by different, even contradictorypictorial hypotheses, so that the question of the truth or falsity of suchhypotheses cannot be decided1o Bu t this means that they leave one

33


17/48

completelyfree and soMachadds to thisdemonstration the requirementthat one shouldin fact only allowoneselfto be guidedby theirusefulness(for a description of the phenomena) when choosing betweenhypo theses , particula rly since he says, t he favourite models ofmechanical physics do not contr ibute in the slightest to ourunderstanding of phenomena evenwhere there are no other competingmodels ll .Provided this is borne in mind, Mach's general remarks about theessence and nature of picture-hypotheses are immediately intelligible.Mach also employs the expression "indirect description" for thesehypotheses, and one has such a description, he claims, when one says"fact A behaves not in just one but in manyor all of its features like analr.eady familiar fact B" , whereby one appeals , "as it were , to adescriptionwhich has already been formulated elsewhere, or one whichhas still to be precisely formulated"12. Thus one says that lightbehaveslike a wave-motion or an electric vibration, a magnet as thoughit werecharged with gravitating fluids and so on 13 These are then essentiallyanalogies,for "factA is alwaysreplacedinthought by a different,simpler

or more familiar fact B, which can rep resent A in thought in somerespects but,for theveryreason thatitis different, cannotrepresentitinothers"14. This isboththe attraction andthe danger of such hypotheses.They offer definite advantages as far as representation is concerned, inthat theymake possible a unified conception;and as far asthe progressofinductionisconcerned, in theirheuristicvalue."What a simplification it involves if we can say, the fact A now underconsideration behaves in many or all of its parts like an already wellknownfactB. Insteadof asinglefeature of resemblanceweare facedwitha whole system of resemblances, a familiar physiognomy, by means ofwhich the newfact is immediately transformedintoan old acquaintance.Besides, itis in the power of the idea to offer usmorethanwe actuallyseein the newfact initially, itcan extend the fact andenrich itwith featureswhichwe are first induced to seek from suchsuggestions andwhich areoften actuallyfound. It is this rapidityinextendingknowledge that givesto theory a quantitative advantage over simple observation"15.On the other hand, there is alsoa dangerin the assertion that twogroupsof facts are essentiallyidenticalwhen theyare demonstrablyonlyrelatedtoone anotherby analogy. ThusMach says:"Apart from the elements essential for representing the facts fromwhicha hypothesis has been derived, the latter always or at least usuallycontains other elements that are not essential. For the hypothesis is34

framed onthe basisof an analogy,an analogywhose pointsofidentityanddifference are incompletely known, since otherwise there would be noneedfor enquiryhere. For example, the theory of light speaks ofwaves,whereas only periodicity is needed to understand it. These further,accessoryelements, beyondwhat isnecessary,a re precisely the ones thatare subject to change inthe reciprocalactionofthought and experience,untilthey are gradually eliminated infavour of necessaryones,,16."I f now, as mayreadilyhappen, sufficient careis not exercised"17 - if, inother words, too much faith is placed in the hypothesis and one is notprepared to abandonitin the face of contradictoryfacts - "then the mostfruitful theory may under certain circumstances become a downrightobstacle to inquiry"17, somethingwhichhas infact happened in a seriesofhistorical cases18.

I f errors of this sor t are avoided, there emerges in the course ofhistorical development what Mach calls "the function of hypotheses"which "is, partly, to be reinforced and sharpened and, partly, to bedestroyed"19.What this means is thatwhendifferenthypotheses succeedone another all that remains is that i n which they all agree , what isessential - the conceptual expression of the facts freed of all pictorialtraces20 . For anything more than this is in danger, as we have seen, ofcoming into conflict with new facts. The following examples may helpillustrate the way this transformation proceeds. I f two similar bodiesstand in a relation of heat transfer then the following relation holds: theproduct ofthemass andthe gainorlossoftemperature ineachbodyis thesame. This iswhatsuggested toBlack thatheatcouldbe seenasa fluid;asmatters developedfurther this notion of heat as a stuff hadto be all butcompletelyabandoned; all thatwasvalid inwhatremainedwaspreciselythe abovementionedrelation21 .Similarly, Carnot's viewofhiscyclicprocessestook as itsstartingpointBlack's notion of 'caloric' but the validity of his resul ts remainedindependent of the latter22 . Similarly, the idea that coloured lights areindependent, invariable andconstantcomponents ofwhitelightsurvivedin justthe formdiscoveredby Newton; but the viewofthemasa stuff, anidea added byNewton, was discarded23 And, as we have alreadyseen,nothing remainedofHuygens' wave theoryofiight but thefactthat "theperiodic properties of rays behave like geometrically summablesegments in a two-dimensionalspace"24 In the sameway, "thepropertiesof the aether, or light-propagating space, which behaves in part like afluid and in part like a rigid body, gradually found conceptualexpression"25.Such a purelyconceptual grasp of the facts, one no longer containing


18/48

anything inessential, Mach calls a 'direct description'26. Once one hasgrasped the t rend of the development in this direction, i t is alwaysadvisable to replace the indirect description by a direct description assoon as i t is possible to dispense with the heuristic services of thehypothesis27 ."When a geometer wishes to understand the form of a curve, he firstresolves it into small rectilinear elements. In doing this, however, he isfully aware that these elements areonlyprovisional and arbitrarydevicesfor comprehending part bypartwhat he cannotcomprehendas a whole.

When the law of the curve isfound he no longer thinks of the elements.Similarly, it would not becomephysical science to seein the changeable,economical tools it itselfhas forged .. . realities behind the phenomena;. " , as the intellect , by contact with its subject-matter, grows moredisciplined, physical science givesup its jig-saw puzzlewithpebbles andseeks out the boundaries and forms of the bed in which the living streamof thephenomenaflows. The goalwhich ithas setitselfisthe simplestandmost economicalabstract expressionof the facts"28.Of course, the originalpictures do leavecertaintraces, especiallyin themore important theoretical contexts. But this conceals no dangers,provided the fact that such theories are essentiallybased on analogies isemphasized sufficientlyclearly. By ascertainingexactlyin what respectsa picture does and does not correspond conceptually29 to a fact30 there is

no danger of taking it t obe something reaP!. Used in this way analogyactuallybecomes anexcellentmeansofmasteringheterogenousfieldsoffacts with the help of one unified conception and shows the lines alongwhich a general phenomenology can be developed. Once madeconceptuallyprecise in the wayrequired, analogy combines the essenceof direct descriptionwith the convenience of pictoriality32.The most important aspect of these comments, as far as we areconcerned, is thattheydisplayin a sharplyfocussedformonemeaningof

the principleof economy(or of continuity). As was alreadymentioned atthe beginning of this chapter, Mach considers the original goal ofmechanical physics t obe asunattainable as it is without any purpose,sothat only the economical suitability of its theoretical constructions forrepresenting phenomena remains ofvalue anddeservesconsideration.Apresuppositionwhich is here taken to be self-evident is that hypothesesmust agreewith the facts a's faras theirconsequencesare concerned; andthis of courseis decidednot byreference tothe point of viewof economybut on the basis ofthe normal epistemological criteria.Butbeyondthis iti s economy which is decisive and nothing else and this involves aconsiderable narrowingofthecognitiveideal comparedwitholderviews.lf i

Mach's position is nevertheless probably the prevailing one today andeven ifasfar asmechanicalphysics is concernedthe lastwordhasperhapsstill not been said on the subject, it involves somany questions that thescope ofour taskmakes further commentimpossible. Currentopiniononthe matter is so much in Mach's favour that we want simply toacknowledge this.

We pass now to the second part of our task, the discussion of Mach'scriticism of individual physical concepts. First , a word about theirimportance. Mach speaks, as we have seen, about direct and indirectdescription. Occasionally direct description is opposed to indirectbecause it is conceptuaP3; this is misleading since both are of courseconceptual.What isimportant aboutdirectdescription is rather that itisthe simplest conceptual descr iption, i. e . a descr iption no longercontaining any inessential additions. But by inessential and accessoryadditions are meant those which are not guaranteed by experience andwhich may therefore also contradict experience. The sense of thedistinction is therefore more exactly rendered by opposing whatcan befactually ascertained as the content of directdescription to what is takenas a merelyhypothetical basis or contributedby thought, on the basisofanalogy, as an unproven extra comple ting the content of indirectdescription. The significance of the distinction lies entirely in thedemonstrabilitywhichbelongs to directdescription. Thereis stillno traceof any implication that facts, understood e. g. in the sense ofwhatis realand is perceivable with the senses, shouldmake up the content of directdescription. On the contrary, the exact ascertainment of an analogy(think of the definit ion of analogy reproduced above!) is expresslyreferred to as beingthe objectof direct description34 , as forexamplein theanalogy between the behaviour of theplanets and that of bodiesswunground on a str ing with a cer ta in tension35 . By 'fact', then, is to beunderstood all secureknowledge andby directdescription a propositionwhose meaning does not in any way go beyond what is actuallyguaranteed.But a t this point a second train of thought intervenes and moves theemphasis even more in the direction of what can be sensed or intuited.

Forwhatiscommonlytakentobe factually ascertainedhasin manycases,according to Mach, no claim to this status. Even direct, conceptualdescription of facts, free of anyhypotheticalfoundation isstillnot reallywhathe calls the simpleor simplestsortof conceptualdescription. Thisisonly the case when the scientific concepts employed satisfy certainrequirements.One needonlythinkof theproblemof causalitywhichhasbeen important ever since Hume, for whom only the spatio-temporal

37


19/48

connection between certain events was factually demonstrable; thenecessity of the connexionand ofwhateverelsebelongsto the concept ofcausality is, according to Hume, something merely added by thought.Mach extends this Humean position to other physical concepts - mass,energy, motion, temperature and quantityof heat amongst others. Theeveryday meanings of these concepts contain more than can beempirically demonstrated; the reasons for this are historical,psychological and economic. But if one wants to construct with theseconceptsa pictureof theworld which is correct,th en thissurplus,which iswithout any justification, and this picture must be kept apart. Thisseparation is carriedthrough by Machfor a number ofexamplt, and wewantnow to summarize his results.Mach always has two points in mind in the following examples: first,the ascertainment of the factual basis of the concepts he is examining;second, the demonstrationthat all attempts to go beyondthisbasisand allarguments basedon the resultsof such attemptslead tovagueness36 Thus inthecase ofthe lawof conservationof energy the factual basis isthe observation that itis impossible that workbe producedfrom nothing.In other words the most varied changes in physical states are broughtabout by mechanicalwork andwherethese canbe completely reversedtheyyield the quantity of work required for their production37 . But thefact that the energycan be converted intodifferentforms assertsnomorethan just such an equivalence. To interpret this observation as if anindestructible something-energy- reallyremainedconserved, andonlythe forms of its manifestations changed, is to interpret it as though asubstance were involved. It is an interpretation which correspondsmerelytothe needin our thoughtsforastableview,an interpretationthatwe bring to the facts which, although they lend themselves to theinterpr etation, do not make it necessary38. Even as a possibleinterpretation its value cannot be rated very highly; the equivalencewhich was its factualbasis depends entirely on the appropriatechoice ofthe concepts of measurement for the magnitudes of the physical stateswhich, together with work, are t o be considered. Were certainmagnitudes to be measured differently (and this seems to be a matterwhich is historically determined) not even this equivalence would beavailable and all support for the interpretationwouldbe wanting39 .Verymuch thesameholdstrue inthe case of the conceptof quantity ofheat; for certain vanishing thermal reactions equivalents occur40 i. e.again, reactions whichallow themselves to be consideredasequivalents.But as in the opposed kinetic casethere is a complete absence ofany basisfor an interpretation of this fact in terms of an underlying substance4! .Each such interpretation is therefore to be kept apart from a simplereproduction of the facts. I f clarity is to be obtained here it is necessary38

above all to putthe concept of temperature on a firm footing, erroneousviews of which have been the source of many sterile deliberations. Theobjection here42 is to every sort of search for a 'natural' measure oftemperature , for a ' real ' temperature which is only incompletelyexpressedby the temperaturewe read off;the emphasis is on the factthatthe measure of a body's thermal state- i. e. itsbehaviour in connexionwith sensations of warmth - by any thermoscopic method is merelyconventional, so that inferences from such measurements can only bedrawn withthisreservation inmindiftheyare notto lead to absurdities43 .The elucidation of the concepts of space, t ime and motion is alsoextremelyimportant. Accordingto Mach, it is onlyas relations that theyare guaranteedby experience. Whethera motion is uniform is a questionthat can only be answered with respect to another motion. WhetJ:I.er amotion is in itselfuniform is therefore a senseless question44 . Newton'sattempt to distinguish between absolute and relativemotionon the basis

of the presenceor absence of centrifugal forces45 fails, since all he does isto distinguishbetween two groups of relativemotion46 . Since, therefore,all dynamic criteria drop out of consideration and since, from a purelykinematic point of view, absolute orientation is impossible, all thatremains given for experience is relativemotion47.

But then this also knocks the bottom out of the concept of absolutespace. It is admitted byNewton asfar asabsolutespace is concerned thatonly relative positions are given in experience and the necessity ofassuming an absolute space as the correlate of real motion is deducedmerely from the dynamic differences of motion . But since Machconsiders that these differences do not exist no support is t obe found inexperience for the concept of an absolute space; to insist on advancingthisconcept is to go beyondthe boundaries of experience48 .The same is true of time. Here too Newton distinguished betweenrelative and absolute; relative time he regarded as the not quite exactmeasure (hour, day, year) of the absolute, true or mathematical timewhich appears in mathematical equations. Mach's objections to this isthat the onlyfactual, physical basis of the concept of time is thefact thatthe circumstances ofsomething A changewith those ofsome otherthingB anddepend onthese. Thus, forexample, the factthattheoscillations ofa pendulum take place in time means no more than that its excursiondependson the positionof theearth49 .Butit is utterlybeyond our power

to measure the changes of things by time alone5o. Similarly there isnothing by reference to which an absolute time - independent of allchange - could be measured; it is, therefore, a notion of no scientificvalue5!. Absolute motion, absolute space and absolute time are meremental constructs that have no demonstrable counterpartin experience.

39


20/48

To operate with concepts like these is to go beyond the boundaries ofexperience, which is illegitimate as well as meaningless: for there isnothingwhich can be said aboutsuch transempiricalthings52 .Mach's attitude towards the concepts of mass and inertia is alsoimportant for what follows. To the Newtonian definition of mass as aquantity of matter, which is closely connected with the concept ofsubstance, he opposes a demonstration that from such a not ion i t isimpossible to obtain the meaningofthe conceptof mass: forthisonlytheexperienceprovidedby certainexperimentswill suffice53 .Allthatcanbesaid is that mass m is assigned to a body ifit imparts to another body,whichis assumedto be a unity,m timesthe accelerationit receivesundercertain conditions54; and experience shows that this is the case for twobodieswhich turnout tohaveequalmasswithrespecttoa thirdbodyandalso with respecttoeachotherand to otherbodies55. "Insucha conceptofmass no theoryis involved; the quantity ofmatter is unnecessary; all theconcept contains is afact whichhasbeen exactlyfixed" 56; "recognition ofthisfact is the furthestwe shall goifwe arenot to fallinto obscurity", saysMach57 .And the entire significanceof the lawof inertiacanbe reducedtothe samesorts of experience58 .The law assertsnomorethan this,thatitisaccelerations which reciprocally determine bodies, under certaincircumstances to be specified by experimental physics59; that in theabsence of these circumstances there is no acceleration60 ; and that bothpropositions hold not onlyfor thebehaviourof terrestrial bodiesrelativeto theearthbut alsofor behaviourof the earth relative to distantcelestialbodies61. I t will be clear, after what has already been said, thatacceleration here is alwaysto be understoodas relative acceleration62These accounts make up what is perhaps the most importantpart ofMach's achievement, although the scope of the present work makesimpossible anything more than the brief description given here. For inspite oftheir great interest andthe factthat theytake the reader straightto the heart of questions whichare still hotly debatedby specialists, ourconcern is onlywith their epistemological significance. And the positionwemusttake on this is clearlyand plainly indicated.What has been demonstrated? That the central part of the content ofcertain physical concepts is gained from experience. But this is atriviality; as is the claim that the definition of sucha concept"containsin aconcentrated form a sumof experiences"63 and that"allphysicallawsandconcepts are abbreviated directions, which themselves frequentlyinvolve subordinate directions, for the employment of economically

ordered experiences, readyfor use"64. Mach has also demonstratedthefailure of certain actual attempts to make a connexion betweenexperience and physical concepts. These attempts sought to secure forcertain physical concepts a meaningwhich, although it issupposedto be40

derived from experience (and may in this sense be said to count astherepresentative of this experience) does not merely express experiencebut alsowhat isdeduced from suchexperience(which need not, as is thecase with absolute space, by any means belong to immediate senseexperience)65 .Butwhat is the objectof this demonstration?Thefirst thing thatneedsto be said is thatits function may be to connect upwith the requirementthat too hasty experimentation should be followed by attempts to formconcepts inwhich for the time being one sticks as closely as possible toexperience; and that oneshouldgo beyond the securebasis this provides

as little as possible. Such acautioncanneverdo anyharmandmayevenincertain circumstances become a methodological requirement. We shallsee lat er that this does in fact have point s of contact with strikingtendencies in modern physics. As a result of certain experiences, someaspects of which have already been menti

Date post:	14-Apr-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	erich262
View:	233 times
Download:	0 times

Robert Musil - On Machs Theories

Documents