ROLE OF INTERNET

I

ROLE OF INTERNET

Volume 39Number 2

2018

ISSN 1010-9536

135 Blue Economy and Bangladesh: Lessons and Policy Implications Moutusi Islam Lam-ya Mostaque

163 Non-traditional Security Threats of Bangladesh: Challenges and Policy Options

Sheikh Masud Ahmed 187 Exploring the Role of Climate Change as a Threat

Multiplier: Bangladesh in Perspective Md. Riaz Uddin Hasan Mahmud 215 Role of Internet-based Alternative Media in Global

Terrorism and Counterterrorism Md. Jahan Shoieb

235 Book Review

taCon ctsDesignation

Chairman, Board of Governors 88-02-9347914 [email protected]

Director General 88-02-8312609 [email protected] Director-1 88-02-9331977 [email protected]

Research Director-2 88-02-8360198 [email protected]

Research Director-3 88-02-9347984 [email protected]

Telephone (O�ce) E-mail

VOLUME 39

Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS)Dhaka

NUMBER 2 APRIL 2018

DisclaimerThis is a double-blind peer reviewed journal. The views and opinions expressed in this Journal are solely of the authors and do not re�ect the o�cial policy or position of Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS).

Chief EditorA K M Abdur Rahman

EditorMahfuz Kabir

Associate EditorShaheen Afroze

Assistant EditorsMohammad Jasim Uddin

Mahbubur Rashid BhuiyanShanjida Shahab Uddin

BIISS Journal (ISSN 1010-9536) is published quarterly by the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), Dhaka, in January, April, July and October. The journal provides a forum for debate and discussion on international a�airs, security and development issues in national, regional and global perspectives.

Original contributions (along with an abstract of 200-300 words) not published elsewhere may be submitted to the Chief Editor (Director General, BIISS)/Editor in duplicate, typed double-spaced, normally within about 6000 words. Footnotes should be placed at the bottom of the page following the styles given below:

GraphNet Limited95, Naya Paltan, 1st Floor, Dhaka-1000, BangladeshPhone : 9354142, 9354133, e-mail: [email protected]@gmail.com, website: www.graphnet.com

Tk. 250.00 US$ 20.00

US$ 80.00Tk. 1000.00

Fax: (880-2) 48312625, e-mail: [email protected], website: www.biiss.org

VOLUME 39 NUMBER 2 APRIL 2018






235 Book Review

VOLUME 39 NUMBER 2 APRIL 2018






235 Book Review

135

BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 39, NO. 2, APRIL 2018: 135-162

Moutusi IslamLam-ya Mostaque

Blue economy and Bangladesh: lessons and Policy imPlications

Abstract

In recent times, Blue Economy is emerging as an alternative development paradigm that balances economic use of oceans with environmental sustainability. With the depletion of land-based resources, countries around the world are turning their attention to the oceans as a new source of economic development and growth. Following the settlement of its maritime territory, Bangladesh is also working on utilizing oceanic resources with a view to becoming a developed country. In this backdrop, the paper is an attempt to examine the initiatives taken by different countries around the world to develop Blue Economy and identify important lessons that Bangladesh can learn from those experiences. The lessons include formulating a well-articulated Blue Economy plan, developing robust legal and institutional frameworks, emphasizing indigenous capacity development, prioritizing ocean research and innovation, protecting ocean environment as well as pursuing ‘Blue Diplomacy’ among others.

Keywords: Blue Economy, Ocean Economy, Ocean-based Development, Marine Resources, Environmental Sustainability

1. Introduction

In the 21st century, the increased global population and the fast dwindling of earth’s land-based resources have renewed interest in ocean’s economic potential. However, with the growing need and increased capacity to industrialize the oceans, there is a concern that oceanic resources will soon deplete if not handled properly. Thus, a need to reinterpret how oceans can be measured, monitored and managed more effectively has emerged. Against this reality, the concept of Blue Economy was introduced to respond to the new economic demands, ecological needs and the dynamics of global climate change.1 Contrary to previous practices which focused on resource extraction and financial benefits, Blue Economy tries to strike a balance

Moutusi Islam is Research Officer at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). Her e-mail address is: [email protected]; Lam-ya Mostaque is Research Officer at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). Her e-mail address is: [email protected]

© Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2018.

1 Mark J. Spalding, “The New Blue Economy: the Future of Sustainability”, Journal of Ocean and Coastal Economics, Vol. 2, Issue 2, February 2016, pp. 1-21.

136

BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 39, NO. 2, APRIL 2018

between ocean-based development and environmental protection. As Gunter Pauli suggests, the aim of Blue Economy is to ensure that “ecosystems can maintain their evolutionary path so that all can benefit from nature’s endless flow of creativity, adaptation and abundance.”2

Since its introduction after the United Nations (UN) Conference on Sustainable Development or Rio+20 in 2012, Blue Economy is rapidly emerging as development paradigm that provides solution to the limits of growth.3 Blue Economy is a broad concept that encompasses wide variety of issues relating to ocean and coastal economy. Study of numerous documents shows that there are over 25 sectors that have been listed under the Blue Economy. Scholars from a variety of background including natural science, economy, law, engineering and international relations, etc., have dwelled on the issue, resulting significant variation in how the concept is perceived. However, at its core, Blue Economy is based on principles of equity, well-being, low carbon development, resources efficiency and social inclusion.

Countries all over the world are increasingly recognizing the importance of the Blue Economy. Some of the world’s fastest growing economies such as China, India, Australia and South Africa are already actively pursuing Blue Economy, while supra-national authorities like European Union (EU) also has their own Blue Economy strategy. It is not only the major actors; small countries are embracing the concept wholeheartedly as well. The Small Island Developing States (SIDS) have been pioneering number of innovative Blue Economy initiatives. Besides, global governing bodies, e.g., the World Bank and the UN are promoting Blue Economy through financial and policy support.

Following the settlement of its maritime dispute with neighbouring India and Myanmar, Bangladesh has now got 118,813 km2 of territorial sea, 200 nautical mile of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and a substantial share of the extended continental shelf.4 Thus, Bangladesh has maritime zone almost the size of the country itself which has created huge opportunities for ocean-based economic growth and development. The Government of Bangladesh (GoB) has stated its interest to pursue the Blue Economy concept as part of country’s growth strategy. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has remarked, “Blue Economy is a concept which can significantly contribute in the socio-economic development of Bangladesh. The role of marine resources in poverty alleviation, acquiring autarky in food production, protecting environmental balance, facing adverse impacts of climate change and other economic activities is

2 Gunter A. Pauli, The Blue Economy 10 Years, 100 Innovations, 100 Million Jobs, New Mexico: Paradigm Publications, 2010, p. xxix.3 Vishva Nath Attri and Narnia Bohler-Muller (eds.), The Blue Economy Handbook of the Indian Ocean Region, Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2018, p. 1.4 Md Shahidul Hasan, “Maritime Verdicts and Resource Exploration for Bangladesh”, BIISS Journal, Vol. 35, No. 3, July 2014, p. 227.

137

BLUE ECONOMY AND BANGLADESH

unlimited.”5 Experts believe that if Bangladesh utilizes her marine resources actively, it is quite possible for her to be a middle-income country within short time.6 With a view to achieving Blue Economy objectives, the GoB is hosting and joining high level international dialogues. In fact, Bangladesh has been very proactive among the Bay of Bengal littorals to develop Blue Economy. As Vijay Sakhuja observes, “Bangladesh merits a leadership role for the development of Blue Economy in the Bay of Bengal.”7 However, Bangladesh is still in the early stages of embracing the concept and confronts a number of technological and financial constraints to realize the Blue Economy aspirations. So, for Bangladesh, there is scope of learning from the practices of other countries in developing its Blue Economy.

Against this backdrop, the paper seeks to understand, what are the major Blue Economy initiatives around the world and what lessons can be learnt by Bangladesh from those experiences? In order to answer the questions, the paper reviews existing literatures on Blue Economy that include books, journal articles, government and non-government policy papers and documents, newspaper and internet-based articles, etc. Data and information used in the paper are based on secondary sources. In addition, data and ideas have been collected through expert interviews.

The paper is divided into six sections including the introduction. The second section provides a conceptual understanding of Blue Economy and its components. The third section examines the state of Blue Economy in Bangladesh. The fourth section evaluates major Blue Economy initiatives taken by different countries using an analytical framework. The fifth section provides suggestions for Bangladesh based on the Blue Economy experiences of other countries. The last section concludes the paper with remarks.

2. Blue Economy: Conceptual Understanding

Although the Blue Economy has entered the arena of regular international debate and discourse for the past several years, no commonly accepted definition has emerged so far.8 Diversity of views is noteworthy. Therefore, Blue Economy term can be understood as buzzwords.9 In literature, Blue Economy has been used synonymously to ‘marine economy’, ‘coastal economy’, ‘ocean economy’, ‘green economy’ and so

5 Sheikh Hasina, Prime Minister’s address at the International Workshop on Blue Economy in Dhaka, Bangladesh, 31 August 2014.6 Md. Monjur Hasan, B. M. Sajjad Hossain, Md. Jobaer Alam, K. M. Azam Chowdhury, Ahmad Al Karim, Nuruddin Md. Khaled Chowdhury, “The Prospects of Blue Economy to Promote Bangladesh into a Middle-Income Country”, Open Journal of Marine Science, Vol. 8, 2018, p. 355-369.7 Vijay Sakhuja, “Harnessing the Blue Economy”, Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2015.8 Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), Blue Economy Vision 2025: Harnessing Business Potential for India Inc and International Partners, New Delhi: Federation House, April 2017.9 Young Rae Choi, “The Blue Economy as Governmentality and the Making of New Spatial Rationalities”, Dialogues in Human Geography, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2017, pp. 37-41.

138


on. While the basic tenets and goals of these competing paradigms nearly similar, there are basic differences in the approaches and treatment of various elements, e.g., resource management, growth objectives, sustainability and social equality.10

The concept of Blue Economy has emerged in response to the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development or Rio+20. The concept has its roots in the earlier 1992 Rio Earth Summit, which focused on fostering the growth of a ‘green economy’ — “an economy that results in improved human well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities.”11 In response to an international push to ‘green’ the global economy, SIDS began emphasizing the importance of the ocean and marine economy, promoting the concept of a Blue Economy.12 The term “Blue Economy” itself was first introduced in 1994 by Professor Gunter Pauli.13 The introduction of Blue Economy was part of the global transition from traditional economic path to human-centric development, which focused harmony with nature and sustainability.

At the heart of the concept, there is a separation of socio-economic development from environmental degradation.14 In this regard, efficiency and optimization of natural marine resources within ecological limits become paramount.15 Therefore, Blue Economy can maximize the economic value of the marine environment in a sustainable manner that preserves and protects the sea’s resources and ecosystems.16 The Economist, in a report titled ‘The Blue Economy: Growth, Opportunity and a Sustainable Ocean Economy’, provides a working definition as follows: “A sustainable ocean economy emerges when economic activity is in balance with the long term capacity of ocean ecosystems to support this activity and remain resilient and healthy.”17 The Government of Australia in its report titled ‘Marine Nation 2025: Marine Science to Support Australia’s Blue Economy’ defines that “a Blue Economy is one in which our ocean ecosystems bring economic and social benefits that are efficient, equitable and sustainable”.18 Research and Information

10 S.K. Mohanty, Priyadarshi Dash, Aastha Gupta and Pankhuri Gaur, Prospects of Blue Economy in the Indian Ocean, New Delhi: Research and Information System for Developing Countries, 2015, p. 5.11 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Towards a Green Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication, Nairobi: UNEP, 2011.12 Jennifer J. Silver, Noella Gray, Lisa Campbell, Luke Fairbanks and Rebecca Gruby, “Blue Economy and Competing Discourses in International Oceans Governance”, The Journal of Environment & Development, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2015, pp. 135-160.13 Gunter A. Pauli, op. cit. 14 Simon Smith-Godfrey, “Defining the Blue Economy”, Maritime Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2016, p. 2.15 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), The Oceans Economy: Opportunities and Challenges for Small Island Developing States, New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2014, p. 2.16 The Commonwealth Secretariat, The Blue Economy and Small States, London: The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2016.17 “The Blue Economy: Growth, opportunity and a sustainable ocean economy”, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015.18 Oceans Policy Science Advisory Group (OPSAG), Marine Nation 2025: Marine Science to Support Australia’s

139


System for Developing Countries (RIS), a well-known think tank, defines the term as follows:

As a sub-set of the economy, Blue Economy covers all ocean-related activities including direct and indirect supporting activities required for functioning of these economic sectors, while adjusting to the costs of environmental damage and ecological imbalance caused due to exploitation of ocean resources for consumption. Therefore, the scope of Blue Economy is much wider and inclusive.19

One of the earliest attempts to explore the competing discourses around the Blue Economy was conducted by Jennifer J. Silver et al.20 A more recent study by Michelle Voyer et al. has made a cluster analysis of key components of the Blue Economy and identified four dominant discourses through which the Blue Economy is interpreted.21 This study is built upon by earlier analysis conducted by Silver et al. The discourses are: oceans as natural capital, oceans as livelihoods, oceans as good business and oceans as driver of innovations (see Table 1).

Table 1: Conceptual Analysis of Blue EconomyOceans as Natural Capital

Oceans as Livelihoods

Oceans as Good Business

Oceans as a Driver of Innovation

Primary Objec-tives

Ecosystem protection and restoration

Poverty al-leviation and food security

Economic growth and employment

Technological or technical advances

Actors Conservation agencies/ NGOs

Development agencies, SIDS

Industry, larger global economies (EU, OECD, China, etc.)

Academic institutes and governments

Sectors Carbon inten-sive industries (e.g., oil and gas). Focus on economic benefits from conservation (e.g., tourism, blue carbon, etc.)

Primarily focus on Small-Scale Fisheries (SSF), eco-tourism with aspirations for diversifica-tion, especially aquaculture

All sectors included but primarily focusing on large multi-national corporations and sectors (e.g., ship-ping, oil and gas, renewable, etc.)

All sectors but particularly emerg-ing industries like renewables, biotech-nology and deep-sea mining

Blue Economy, Canberra: Government of Australia, 2013.19 S.K. Mohanty, Priyadarshi Dash, Aastha Gupta and Pankhuri Gaur, op. cit, p. 9.20 Jennifer J. Silver et al., op. cit.21 Michelle Voyer, Genevieve Quirk, Alistair McIlgorm, Kamal Azmi, Stuart Kaye and Michael McArthur, The Blue Economy in Australia, Canberra, Australia: Sea Power Centre, 2017.

140


Scale Small-scale, lo-cally based

Small-scale, locally based

Global/ regional and national

Sub-national districts or provinces

Tools Marine Protect-ed Areas (MPA), ecosystem-based manage-ment

Community manages fish-eries, Marine Spatial Plan-ning (MSP)

MSP, economic valuation studies, targeted invest-ment and growth strategies

Innovation hubs/ research institutes, in-novation or competi-tions, investment/ financing strategies

Source: Michelle Voyer et al., The Blue Economy in Australia, Canberra, Australia: Sea Power Centre, 2017, p. 20.

The notion of the Blue Economy as a development model central to the livelihoods of coastal communities is favoured by developing countries and development organizations. It places human well-being and livelihood as a central objective of the Blue Economy, with heavy emphasis on the goal of poverty alleviation. The UN has recognized the potential of the Blue Economy as a development model which it defines as follows: “Blue Economy is a marine-based economic development that leads to improved human well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities. At its core, the ocean economy refers to the decoupling of socio-economic development from environmental degradation.”22 The Blue Economy in this context provides developing countries (particularly SIDS) with a framework through which they can diversify their economic base into alternative and emerging sectors and increase their resilience to external shocks. Therefore, SIDS in the Indian and Pacific oceans and the Caribbean have been at the forefront of this interpretation of the Blue Economy.23 On the contrary, among conservation NGOs, Blue Economy has provided a useful conceptual framework through which economic and development objectives can be tied to environmental considerations. The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), defines Blue Economy as follows:

Blue Economy is a marine based economy that provides social and economic benefits for current and future generations, by contributing to food security, poverty eradication, livelihoods, income, employment, health, safety, equity, and political stability. It restores, protects and maintains the diversity, productivity, resilience, core functions, and intrinsic value of marine ecosystems — the natural capital upon which its prosperity depends. It is based on clean technologies, renewable energy and circular material flows to secure economic and social stability over time, while keeping within the limits of one planet.24

Larger economies, organizations (i.e., EU, OECD), industry and business groups favour a growth-centric interpretation of the Blue Economy. The primary focus

22 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), op. cit., p. 2.23 Meg R. Keen, Anne-Maree Schwarz and Lysa Wini-Simeon, “Towards Defining the Blue Economy: Practical Lessons from Pacific Ocean Governance”, Marine Policy, Volume 88, 2018, p. 333-341.24 World Wide Fund for Nature, Principles for a Sustainable Blue Economy, Gland: World Wide Fund for Nature, 2015.

141


of this interpretation appears to be securing economic growth from the oceans in a manner that is sensitive to environmental constraints. A key tool employed within this lens is economic valuation in order to identify the worth of ocean-based industries to national, regional and global economies. On the other hand, innovation is central to many interpretations of the Blue Economy. This lens focuses on research and development, investment and monitoring which is largely favoured by government and industry groups.

The Government of Bangladesh defines the Blue Economy concept as a sustainable pathway forward for growth of the ocean economy.25 According to the Seventh Five Year Plan, “Blue Economy comprises activities that directly or indirectly take place in the seas, oceans and coasts using oceanic resources and eventually contributing to sustainable, inclusive economic growth, employment, well-being, while preserving the health of ocean.”26 Bangladesh’s approach to Blue Economy also states that Blue Economy “requires a balanced approach between conservation, development and utilization of marine and coastal ecosystems, all oceanic resources and services.”27

Table 2: Components of Blue Economy

Harvesting Living Resources

Extraction of Non-living Resources

Other Economic Activi-ties

Protection of the Sea

Fisheries Mineral, gravels and sand

Maritime transportation Marine surveillance

Aquaculture and Non-traditional species

Oil and gas Ports and related services

Protection of marine and coastal environment

Marine biotechnol-ogy

Desalination (fresh-water generation)

Shipbuilding and ship breaking industry

Waste management

Bio-prospecting Renewable marine (offshore) energy

Coastal and maritime tourism

Blue carbon

Seafood processing Sea-salt generation Marine services Ecological/ecosys-tem reserve

Source: Compiled from various sources.

25 P.G. Patil, J. Virdin, C.S. Colgan, M.G. Hussain, P. Failler, and T. Vegh, Toward a Blue Economy: A Pathway for Bangladesh’s Sustainable Growth, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank Group, 2018.26 General Economics Division (GED), Seventh Five Year Plan (FY2016 – 2020): Accelerating Growth, Empowering Citizens, Dhaka, Bangladesh: Planning Commission, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 2015.27 P.G. Patil et al., op. cit., p. 27.

142


The Blue Economy is a vast topic that covers a wide range of industries and activities. A review of the existing literature shows that the components of the Blue Economy are very diverse in nature, ranging from the fisheries and aquaculture to oil and gas mining and other sea related economic activities such as transportation and Tourism. In addition to those, initiatives to protect of the ocean health have also been included as components of Blue Economy. The next section provides a brief discussion on various components of Blue Economy and current state of Bangladesh’s initiatives regarding those. To make the discussion easier, the components of Blue Economy has been categorized into four major groups based on the nature of the activity. These groups are: Harvesting Living Resources, Extraction of Non-living Resources, Other Economic Activities and Protection of the Sea. Components included in each group are mentioned in Table 2.

3. Blue Economy of Bangladesh

The newly demarcated area of the Bay of Bengal has opened a new economic frontier for Bangladesh. In order to utilize its unexplored marine resources, Bangladesh is already taking initiatives to flourish its Blue Economy. Since 2015, the GoB has undertaken a number of consultations and workshops on Blue Economy. Besides, Bangladesh’s Seventh Five Year Plan has called for twelve actions to be undertaken for maintaining a prosperous and sustainable Blue Economy, which include fisheries, renewable energy, human resources, transshipment, tourism and climate change among others.28 In 2017, the GoB has established the “Blue Economy Cell’ with the mandate to coordinate Blue Economy initiatives across sectoral ministries. According to a World Bank report, the gross value added to Bangladesh in 2014-15 from ocean economy was US$ 6,192.98 million which was around 3.33 per cent of the Bangladesh economy.29 However, Blue Economy has the prospect of contributing to Bangladesh’s economy on a much higher level. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) has identified 26 potential Blue Economy sectors.30 This paper focuses on components of Bangladesh’s Blue Economy like living and non-living resources, economic activities and protection of the sea as mentioned in Table 2.

3.1 Harvesting Living Resources

Fisheries is one of the major sources of income for Bangladesh. Nonetheless, only 15.41 per cent of the total fisheries come from marine sources.31 Furthermore, Bangladesh’s marine fishing is still heavily artisan based, vast majority of its marine

28 General Economics Division (GED), op. cit. 29 P.G. Patil et al., op. cit., p. 36.30 “Blue Economy National Co-ordination Workshop”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), Bangladesh, Official Website, 2018, available at https://mofa.gov.bd/site/press_release/bb5cd232-1529-46db-aa8c-d0c8bc4c0e47, accessed on 10 January 2018.31 Department of Fisheries Bangladesh, Yearbook of Fisheries Statistics of Bangladesh 2016-17, Dhaka: Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock, 2017, p. Xiii.

143


catch comes from artisanal fisheries (out of 6.37 lakh Metric Ton (MT) of marine fishery production in 2016-17, 5.29 lakh MT came from artisan fisheries).32 Compared to inland and freshwater aquaculture, the amount of marine aquaculture is also small and mostly based on tiger shrimp.33 Thus, Bangladesh can increase its fishery production by industrializing its marine fisheries and exploring large pelagic fish harvesting,long line fishing of tuna and tuna like fishes.34 Shellfish, seaweed and algae are known to be great sources of protein, iodine and other vital minerals and there is a huge demand for them in international market. The GoB is taking initiatives in this regard. In 2016, it procured a modern survey vessel named Meen Sandhani,35 which aims to do a stocktaking of available fishing sources in the Bay of Bengal.

Marine biotechnology is a fast-growing field with the potential discovery of new chemical products, enzymes and other ingredients which is expected to bring great advancement in pharmaceutical, biomaterials health care and makeup industries.36 As Bangladesh has a blooming pharmaceutical industry, investments in these areas are sure to bring benefit to the country.

3.2 Extraction of Non-living Resources

Seabed mining and acquisition of minerals are highly valuable for economic purposes. But currently, the data available for seabed minerals in Bangladesh are outdated.37 In terms of sand and gravel, the coastal belt from Patenga to Teknaf has been explored with the discovery of 17 deposits of potentially valuable minerals.38 These valuable minerals can contribute to various industries e.g., glass, paper, etc. Bangladesh’s offshore energy exploration is still far away from reaching its optimal level. According to the MoFA website, 19 exploratory wells were drilled in the Bay of Bengal up until 2014 and it resulted in two gas discoveries, i.e., the Sangu and the Kutubdia.39 Bangladesh is said to have great potential for ocean-based technology such as wind, tidal and wave energy, but no feasibility study has been conducted on the area so far.

32 Ibid., p. 14. 33 M. Gulam Hussain, Pierre Failler, A. Al Karim and M. Khurshed Alam, “Review on Opportunities, Constraints and Challenges of Blue Economy Development in Bangladesh”, Journal of Fisheries and Life Sciences, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2017, p. 38.34 M. Gulam Hussain, Pierre Failler, A. Al Karim and M. Khurshed Alam, “Major Opportunities of Blue Economy Development in Bangladesh”, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2018, pp. 93-94.35 Anwar Hussain, “Bay fish survey from November”, Dhaka Tribune, 07 August 2016.36 Narsinh L Thakur and Archana N Thakur, “Marine Biotechnology: An Overview”, Indian Journal of Biotechnology, Vol. 5, 2006, p. 264. 37 The last report on this issue was published in 1994 by Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission (BAEC). 38 M. Khurshed Alam, Bangladesh’s Maritime Challenges in the 21st century, Dhaka: Pathak Shamabesh Book, 2004, p. 173.39 “Ocean/Blue Economy for Bangladesh”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangladesh, Official Website, 2018, available at https://mofa.gov.bd/, accessed on 10 January 2018.

144


Sea salt generation using traditional methods has been around in Bangladesh for a long time. The government patronized this industry by discouraging import of salt through the National Salt Policy in 2011.40 However, Bangladesh’s salt production predominantly comes from small scale farmers who do not use modern equipment, thus are more vulnerable to unpredictable interruptions like natural disaster.

In many countries of the world, seawater is appropriately desalinated in order to produce fresh water. A recent report says that the global water desalination market is in the path of reaching US$26.81 billion by 2025.41 Bangladesh is heavily dependent on underground water for agriculture (which is quickly reducing in stock). Hence, exploring new avenues of freshwater generation is necessary. Additionally, possibility of exporting water to drier countries in near future cannot be ignored as extreme impacts of climate change loom over the world.

3.3 Other Economic Activities

More than 90 per cent of Bangladesh’s external freight trade is seaborne,42 but Bangladesh scores only 12.07 out of a possible 100 in The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Liner shipping connectivity index.43 Eighty per cent of the US$ 78 billion annual overseas trade of Bangladesh is handled by Chattogram Sea port alone.44 To reduce the burden, the GoB has already invested in several seaport facilities, i.e., Sonadia, Matarbari (which has been reported to be converted into a deep sea port)45 and Payra.46 In addition to upgrading the infrastructure, improving the quality of port services is important. Most of Bangladesh’s seaborne cargo is carried by foreign cargo ships.47 Moreover, the size of the national fleet has gone down to 13.8 per cent in 2016.48 Thus, Bangladesh can benefit greatly if local shipping companies are promoted.

40 Mohammad Ali Zinnat, “Good days for salt farmers”, The Daily Star, 03 February 2016.41 “Water Desalination Market Size Worth USD 26.81 Billion By 2025”, Hexa Research, 10 August 2017, available at https://www.hexaresearch.com/press-release/global-water-desalination-market, accessed on 17 January 2018. 42 M. Khurshed Alam, “Blue Economy”, ICE Business Times, 01 November 2015, available at http://ibtbd.net/blue-economy/, accessed on 22 January 2018.43 UNCTAD Stat, “Liner Shipping Connectivity Index, Annual”, available at http://unctadstat.unctad.org/, ac-cessed on 28 October 2018. 44 Sohel Parvez, “15pc VAT on all port services to hurt businesses, consumers”, The Daily Star, 09 January 2018.45 Dwaipayan Barua, “Matarbari port to be turned into a deep-sea port”, The Daily Star, 07 January, 2018. 46 “Infrastructure spending stimulates growth”, The Daily Star, 28 December 2018.47 M. Gulam Hussain, Pierre Failler, A. Al Karim and M. Khurshed Alam, 2017, op. cit.48 “Maritime Profile: Bangladesh”, UNCTAD, available at http://unctadstat.unctad.org/, accessed on 22 January 2018.

145


Bangladesh’s record in the shipbuilding industry is quite impressive. It is currently able to fulfill 100 per cent of its inland water vessels.49 However, in the global industry, Bangladesh contributes to less than 0.01 per cent.50 On the other hand, the ship breaking industry of Bangladesh is known worldwide. Bangladesh, India and Pakistan represent about 70 per cent of the global ship breaking industry.51 However, the industry is globally criticized for exploitation of cheap labour and environmental violations. Given that the industry plays a great role in Bangladesh’s economy, measures are to be taken to ensure that the ship recycling process is done in an environment-friendly way.

Bangladesh’s coastal and marine tourism is meager and mainly dependent on local tourists. But Bangladesh is home to the largest continued coastline in the world, which has great tourism potential. However, it should be kept in mind that unplanned tourism can often lead to destruction of precious natural resources. Saint Martin’s, Bangladesh’s only coral island is already being burdened by heavy tourist activity.52 Ensuring planned tourism thus is the key. The inauguration of US-based international luxury cruise line ‘Silversea’ in Bangladesh has signalled the beginning of a new era of sea tourism in the country.53

3.4 Protection of Sea

The environmental protection of the sea is a crucial part of the Blue Economy concept. The Bay of Bengal is home to a vibrant and diverse fauna and flora. To protect the health of the sea, it is important to have a good marine waste management system. Bangladesh has undertaken a successful coastal green belt back in the 1990s.54 Recently, the government has initiated programme for greening the new islands in the Bay of Bengal,55 which is a positive initiative. In addition, Bangladesh needs to think about marine waste management to protect its sea. On the other hand, ensuring the security of the Bay is crucial for expansion of ocean-based industries. Therefore, Bangladesh needs to strengthen its maritime surveillance.

Blue carbon is another name for carbon sequestration, which refers to the long-term storage of carbon in plants, soils, geologic formation and the ocean.56 In

49 “Ocean/Blue Economy for Bangladesh”, op. cit. 50 “Maritime Profile: Bangladesh”, op. cit.51 Abdullah Bari and M. Rafiqul Islam, “Our Oceans and Blue Economy: Opportunities and Challenges”, Procedia Engineering, Vol. 194, 2017, p. 9.52 Aparup Chowdhury, “Rethinking Sustainable Coastal and Marine Tourism Development”, paper presented in the PATA Way New Tourism Frontiers Forum, organized by Bangladesh Tourism Board, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh on 23-25 November 2016.53 Tarek Mahmud, “New prospects in Bangladesh Blue Economy”, Dhaka Tribune, 12 March 2017.54 Banglapedia, “Coastal Greenbelt”, available at http://en.banglapedia.org/, accessed on 22 January 2018.55 “New coastal islands to get green”, The Daily Star, 11 January 2018.56 “What is Blue Carbon?”, National Ocean Service, available at https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/bluecar-

146


Bangladesh, Chowdhury et al. estimate that around 3 million tons of CO2 is stored in the mangroves and salt marshes per year, but there is lack of data on seagrass beds, river-estuary and coastal water.57 Even though blue carbon has not been integrated into policy discussions for climate mitigation,58 having a measure of blue carbon may help Bangladesh in future climate negotiations.

Just as the components of the Blue Economy are diverse, so is the number of the actors involved in the process. Each of the industries and activity in the Blue Economy framework has their own set of actors involved with them, including their own line ministries, private sector investors and businessmen, and non-governmental organizations working on that specific area. In many industries, there is also involvement of small businesses and root level workers, especially in fisheries, sea-salt generation and ship breaking. On the other hand, issues such as marine surveillance and environmental protection have to be handled by the government as a whole. In addition, because of the necessity of international cooperation in development of the Blue Economy, many regional organizations and other cooperating states are also important actors of Blue Economy.

Each of the group of components has their own set of challenges. While harvesting the living resources, the concern is balancing between economic gain and ecological sustainability. There is also need to explore ways to benefit from the existing bio-diversity in the Bay of Bengal. In the extraction of the non-living resources, there is need to find ways to attract private investment and develop effective regulatory framework that allows Bangladesh to efficiently use its resources. In case of other sea related economic activities, the challenge is to build large scale infrastructure necessary for port and transportation services. On the other hand, in protecting the sea the challenge lies in developing an effective monitoring and evaluation system that will be able to effectively measure the ocean health. Having a strong marine surveillance system is also included in this category, which is a requirement for all other Blue Economy activities to go unhindered. In the following section, examples from other countries are discussed in order to see how they are working on flourishing Blue Economy.

4. Blue Economy around the World

Given the economic potential of oceans and seas, a number of countries are investing enormous financial, technological and human capital to develop Blue

bon.html, accessed on 28 October 2018.57 Sayedur Rahman Chowdhury, M. Shahadat Hossain, S.M. Sharifuzzaman, Subrata Sarker, Blue Carbon in the Coastal Ecosystems of Bangladesh, Dhaka: IUCN Bangladesh Country Office, 2015.58 Iris Monnereau, “Opportunities and Challenges of Developing the Blue Economy in Small Island Developing States in Africa”, Centre for Resource Management and Environmental Studies, available at http://www.climdev-africa.org/sites/default/files/ccda4documents/2.4%20Iris%20Monnerreau.pdf, accessed on 22 January 2018.

147


Economy. This section discusses various Blue Economy policies and initiatives pursued by major powers as well as in countries where Blue Economy activities are prominent. In addition, it analyzes the country-specific Blue Economy initiatives based on the four dominant discourses (oceans as natural capital, oceans as livelihoods, oceans as good business and oceans as driver of innovations) developed by Michelle Voyer et al.

4.1 Australia

Australia is one of those countries that consider the importance of Blue Economy for addressing the major development gaps.59 It has the third largest marine jurisdiction of 13.86 million square km which is larger than its land territory.60 Its Blue Economy is dominated by two sectors, namely offshore oil and gas (50 per cent) and tourism (40 per cent).61 However, Blue Economy covering aquaculture, wild fisheries, marine biotechnology and other also contributes significantly to the economy. The report of the Australian Institute of Marine Science (AIMS) shows that in 2013-14, Australia’s marine industries contributed US$ 74.2 billion to the national economy which accounted for 4.8 per cent of national Gross Domestic Product and directly and indirectly provided almost 400,000 jobs.62 In total, Australia’s marine industries contributed US$ 42.0 billion to value-add in 2013-14, with a further indirect US$ 32.2 billion of value added in other industries.63 By 2025, Australia’s marine industries are forecast to contribute about US$ 100 billion each year to Australia’s economy.64

The intentions and policy priorities of the Australian Government with respect to Blue Economy are lucid and visionary. As earlier mentioned, it has stated, “a Blue Economy is one in which our ocean ecosystems bring economic and social benefits that are efficient, equitable and sustainable”.65 The Government of Australia has implemented several Blue Economy initiatives, e.g., promoting scientific, technological and other innovations and establishing necessary mechanisms for regional cooperation among the neighbouring countries. ‘The National Framework for Marine Research and Innovation’ highlights the critical areas of marine science that offer opportunities for experimentation and investments. The Framework envisages schemes for improving the quality of marine science research; creations of marine

59 S.K. Mohanty, Priyadarshi Dash, Aastha Gupta and Pankhuri Gaur, op. cit., p. 66. 60 Karen Evans, Nic Bax and David Smith, Australia State of the Environment Report 2016, Canberra: Government of Australia, 2016.61 S.K. Mohanty, Priyadarshi Dash, Aastha Gupta and Pankhuri Gaur, op. cit, p. 67.62 Australian Institute of Marine Science (AIMS), The AIMS Index of Marine Industry, Townsville: Government of Australia, 2016, p. 17.63 Ibid. 64 “Australia’s Blue Economy: $100 billion in 2025”, Australian Fisheries Management Authority, 18 August 2015, available at http://www.afma.gov.au/australias-blue-economy-100-billion-2025/, accessed on 23 July 2018.65 Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), Innovation for the Blue Economy: Workshop Summary, Canberra: CSIRO, 2015, p. iii.

148


infrastructure in terms of observe technologies, observe vessels, etc.; reorganization of existing institutions for marine research for better coordination and effective execution.66 In order to build a strong Blue Economy, the ‘National Marine Science Plan 2015-2025’ identifies a number of policy initiatives for future investments which include (1) National Blue Economy Innovation Fund, (2) National Marine Research Infrastructure, (3) National Marine Baselines and Monitoring Program, (4) National Integrated Marine Experimental Facility, (5) National Ocean Modelling Program and (6) Marine Science Capability Development Fund.67

In the Australian context, the ‘oceans as a driver of innovation’ lens is the primary lens used to interpret the Blue Economy and to a lesser extent, the ‘oceans as good business’ lens.68 The ‘oceans as a driver of innovation’ lens in Australia is substantiated through policy documents like the ‘National Marine Science Plan’. This plan, coordinated by the National Marine Science Committee, is built on the AIMS index of marine industries to project future opportunities for growth and how they might be supported by the Australian science community.69 On the other hand, the ‘oceans as good business’ lens is exemplified by a focus on valuation studies that seek to quantify the worth of marine industries in Australia and project their future capacity for growth. For example, AIMS has been developing a regular valuation of existing maritime industries since 2008, known as the AIMS Index of Marine Industry.70

4.2 China

China, the fastest growing economy in the world, is home to rich endowment of blue resources, which could help sustain its high growth spell in the future. It has a vast coastline of 32,000 km including continental shelves and EEZ which has marine oil reserves of 24 billion tons and natural gas reserves of 1.6 billion cubic meters.71 During 2011-2015, China’s ocean economy grew at an annual average growth of 8.1 per cent. In 2015, the marine economy was estimated to be US$ 989.3 billion, which was 7 per cent higher than in 2014. This corresponded to about 9.6 per cent of the national GDP for 2015. Besides, the marine industry employs an estimated 35.9 million people.72

The Government of China emphasizes on marine resources and the oceans to supplement its land resources. The Chinese leadership is aware of the importance of

66 Oceans Policy Science Advisory Group (OPSAG), op. cit.67 National Marine Science Committee, National Marine Science Plan 2015-2025: Driving the Development of Australia’s Blue Economy, Canberra: Government of Australia, 2015, p. 8. 68 Michelle Voyer et al., op. cit.69 National Marine Science Committee, op. cit.70 Australian Institute of Marine Science (AIMS), op. cit.71 Rui Zhao, Stephen Hynes and Guang Shun He, “Blue Growth in the Middle Kingdom: An Analysis of China’s Ocean Economy”, Center for the Blue Economy (CBE), No. 3, 2013, p. 5.72 “China’s marine output up 7% in 2015”, Xinhua, 03 March 2016.

149


the marine economy and has noted: “A developed marine economy is an important part of building maritime power.”73 For the first time, the Chinese government launched the China Ocean Agenda 21 in 1996 with the objective to formulate a comprehensive strategy for sustainable development of marine resources, safeguard state’s marine rights and interests, and protect marine ecosystems.74 Adoption of this agenda was the beginning of Blue Economy in China. In recent years, the Chinese government has been increasingly supportive of the development of ocean economy, implementing several national ocean-related strategies.75 At policy level, Blue Economy assumed significance in the 12th Five-Year Plan for National and Social Development, 2011-15 which for the first time, devoted emphasis to the development of ocean economy. The major objective of the Plan was to optimize the structure of Blue Economy through the development of marine industries.76 In March 2016, the Chinese government announced the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020) which aims to achieve nearly 100 targets in the five-year period, e.g., develop smart ports, construct more ice-breaking vessels, transform the ship equipment industry and engage in deep-sea activities, etc.77 These initiatives will help China to promote the growth of Blue Economy.

In China, Blue Economy has been guided by the development and implementation of Marine Functional Zoning, which has aimed to rationalize governance arrangements, nurture sustainable industries and secure sovereign rights.78 Besides, China has showed a significant growth agenda in relation to its maritime jurisdiction, perhaps best demonstrated through its massive ‘Maritime Silk Road’ project aimed at securing trade routes and opening up new economic opportunities in the Indo-Pacific region.79 Their ocean-based economic agenda also highlights the risks associated with geopolitical and territorial disputes.80 The technique of economic valuation in order to identify the worth of ocean-based industries to national economies has been particularly embraced in China.81 Experts believe that this provides a metric to highlight and communicate the value of these

73 Wang Qian and Zhang Yunbi, “President Xi vows to protect maritime interests”, China Daily, 01 August 2013.74 Rui Zhao, Stephen Hynes and Guang Shun He, op. cit.75 Rui Zhao, Stephen Hynes and Guang Shun He, “Defining and Quantifying China’s Ocean Economy”, Marine Policy, Vol. 43, 2014, p. 164.76 S.K. Mohanty, Priyadarshi Dash, Aastha Gupta and Pankhuri Gaur, op. cit., p. 75.77 Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), op. cit., p. 6. 78 Wen-Hai Lu, Jie Liu, Xian-Quan Xiang, Wei-Ling Song and Alistair Mcilgorm, “A Comparison of Marine Spatial Planning Approaches in China: Marine Functional Zoning and the Marine Ecological Red Line”, Marine Policy, Vol. 62, 2015, pp. 94-101.79 Mohammad Aminul Karim, “China’s Proposed Maritime Silk Road: Challenges and Opportunities with Special Reference to the Bay of Bengal Region”, Pacific Focus, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2015, pp. 297-319.80 Clive H. Schofield, “A Landmark Decision in the South China Sea: The Scope and Implications of the Arbitral Tribunal’s Award”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 38, No. 3, 2016, pp. 339-347.81 Alistair McIlgorm, “Ocean Economy Valuation Studies in the Asia-Pacific Region: Lessons for the Future International Use of National Accounts in the Blue Economy”, Journal of Ocean and Coastal Economics, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2016, p. 10.

150


sectors to society, governments and the business sector in order to grow investment and build social and political support.82

In the Chinese context, the Blue Economy is interpreted through the ‘ocean as good business’ lens primarily. Michael Conathan and Scott Moore rightly point out, “China’s Blue Economy policies have focused on growth of the ocean economy, through a cross-sectoral and spatial planning process for economic development. But China’s emphasis is not on environmental protection”.83 Although the Chinese government has taken a few important steps to better protect marine ecosystems, nevertheless its main focus has been on economic development.

4.3 European Union (EU)

Europe’s vast territory gives it access to a number of sea and oceans and its maritime sector employs over 5.4 million jobs generating almost US$ 569.8 billion a year.84 For the EU, the primary lens used to interpret the Blue Economy is the ‘oceans as a driver of innovation’ lens. However, compared to other countries, significant amount of emphasis is also put on ‘oceans as good business’ and ‘oceans as natural capital’ lenses. In fact, the EU is using innovation to foster jobs and protect the environment, which is aimed at meeting its needs without causing damage to ocean health.

In 2012, the European Commission formulated its “Blue Growth Strategy” to harness the possibilities of Europe’s oceans, seas and coasts for growth and job. The strategy was designed “to steer the EU out of its current economic crisis” as a source of jobs, competitiveness and greater resource opportunity that can be tapped while “safeguarding” the health of European seas. It also identified five focus areas for blue growth, i.e., blue energy, aquaculture, maritime, coastal and cruise tourism, marine mineral resources and blue biotechnology.85 A progress report of implementation of the blue growth strategy was published in 2017. It shows that research and innovation have always been a key focus of EU, with a total of US$ 911.68 million allocated to marine and maritime research and innovation projects from 2014-2016. The report also talked about a European Maritime and Fisheries Fund to help encourage investment (though a lack of public and private risk funding for emerging industries was cited as a continuing challenge), and Coastal and Marine Spatial Planning (CMSP).86 The

82 Charles S. Colgan, “Measurement of the Ocean Economy from National Income Accounts to the Sustainable Blue Economy”, Journal of Ocean and Coastal Economies, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2016, pp. 1-42.83 Michael Conathan and Scott Moore, “Developing a Blue Economy in China and the United States”, Centre for American Progress, 2015, p. 5.84 ECORYS, Blue Growth Study - Scenarios and Drivers for Sustainable Growth from the Oceans, Seas and Coasts, Brussels: European Commission, 2012.85 European Commission, Blue Growth: Opportunities for Marine and Maritime Sustainable Growth, Brussels: European Commission, 2012.86 European Commission, Report on the Blue Growth Strategy: Towards a More Sustainable Growth and Jobs in the Blue Economy, Brussels: European Commission, 2017.

151


EU also has conducted study on specific seas (such as the western Mediterranean) to see its Blue Economy potential. Besides, the EU Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD) has been put in place to protect the marine ecosystem and biodiversity.87 In 2018, the European Commission also funded an expert study on sustainable Blue Economy which suggested pathways for development of Blue Economy in Europe while conserving marine and coastal ecosystem.88

In order to highlight the results of its research and innovation in Blue Economy, the EU published another report in 2017. The report demonstrated how EU-funded research and innovation projects were helping in meeting the main challenges in sustainable Blue Economy development. Moreover, the EU has been focusing on sustainable marine energy and blue biotechnology; both of which require high level of technological innovation.89 In a nutshell, it can be said that the EU’s efforts to flourish its Blue Economy have been focused on generating more jobs through innovation without harming the ocean’s health on which marine-related economic and social activities are dependent.

4.4 India

India is the largest among South Asian countries, and endowed with 7,500 km long coastline and 2.019 million km2 of EEZ, which is a repository of huge wealth of living and employment and contributes to the national economy.90 However, there has not been any attempt to calculate how much the Blue Economy contributes to the country’s GDP, which is understandable as the concept did not gain attention of the government until very recently.

The Indian government stands committed to promoting the Blue Economy. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has spoken about it on several occasions at national and international levels. He observed: “To me the Blue chakra or wheel in India’s national flag represents the potential of Blue Revolution or the Ocean Economy. That is how central the ocean economy is to us.”91 He endorsed Blue Economy as a new pillar of economic activity in coastal areas and linked hinterlands through sustainable tapping of oceanic resources and announced his vision for the seas through Security

87 European Commission, “Environment”, 18 May 2017, available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/marine/eu-coast-and-marine-policy/marine-strategy-framework-directive/index_en.htm, accessed on 15 October 2018.88 M. Pantzar and M. Kettunen, A Sustainable Blue Economy: Adopting the Concept of Ecosystem Services in EU Marine Protected Area Management– A Study of Experts’ Views, Brussels: European Commission, 2018, pp. 11-22.89 European Commission, Investing in the Blue Economy: Unlocking the Potential of the Ocean to Create Jobs and Boost the Economy, Brussels: EU, 2017. 90 Vijay Sakhuja, op. cit.91 Narendra Modi, Prime Minister’s Statement Made at the Commissioning of Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) in Barracuda, Mauritius, on 12 March 2015.

152


and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR). The centerpiece of India’s push for the Blue Economy is the Sagarmala project that includes constructing ports, augmenting coastal infrastructure, developing inland waterways, intensifying fishing, and creating special economic zones and tourism promotion.92 The project envisages doubling the current share of coastal shipping in India’s overall modal mix from 6 per cent to 12 per cent by 2025.93

In addition, India has been actively pursuing oceanic outreach in the near neighbourhood as well as the wider Indian Ocean Region (IOR), couched in terms of the Blue Economy.94 It has launched Blue Economy initiatives with Seychelles, Mauritius, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh among other countries of the IOR. Following Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Mauritius, an India-Mauritius Dialogue on the Blue Economy has been set up and as a follow-up, on 12 April 2016 the Mauritius Minister of Ocean Economy, Marine Resources, Fisheries, Shipping and Outer Islands met with India’s Minister of Science and Technology and Earth Sciences to explore areas of cooperation.95 The most recent visit in 2017 resulted into the signing of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on research and education in marine sciences and technology.96 Furthermore, MoUs have been signed with Seychelles, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh on the Blue and Ocean Economy. For instance, an agreement was signed between India and Bangladesh on 15 November 2015 to commence coastal shipping between Bangladesh and the eastern ports of India through River Sea Vessels.97

Therefore, it is apparent that India’s Blue Economy endeavours are focused on port led economic development which can be explained by ‘oceans as good business’ lens. Some argue that there is absence of an overarching strategic vision which incorporates the elements such as maritime security, environmental sustainability and new and innovative forms of cooperation.98 Besides, there has been limited discussion on the financial viability and social costs of pushing it.

92 Pankaj Sekhsaria, “Many shades of a Blue Economy: Sagarmala project”, The Hindu, 11 November 2017, available at https://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/energy-and-environment/many-shades-of-a-blue-economy-sagarmala-project/article20104312.ece, accessed on 20 November 2018. 93 “India’s Blue Economy Booming”, The Maritime Executive, 16 November 2017, available at https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/indias-blue-economy-booming#gs, accessed on 17 June 2018.94 Jivanta Schottli, “India’s Maritime Turn: A Blue Economy Strategy in the Making?”, ISAS, No. 332, May 2016, p. 5.95 “India-Mauritius Maritime Dialogue on Blue Economy”, Ministry of Earth Sciences, Government of India, 13 April 2016, available at http://www.moes.gov.in/content/india-mauritius, accessed on 17 June 2018.96 “India and Mauritius sign deal on maritime security”, Indian Express, 28 May 2017, available at https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-and-mauritius-sign-deal-on-maritime-security-4677206/, accessed on 20 November 2018.97 “Deal signed to start coastal shipping soon”, The Daily Star, 16 November 2015.98 Sonali Mittra, “Blue Economy: Beyond an Economic Proposition”, ORF Issue Brief, No. 173, March 2017, p. 2.

153


4.5 The United States (US)

The US has thirty coastal states bordering the Atlantic, Pacific, Gulf of Mexico and the Great Lakes.99 It is needless to say that ocean economy contributes to its economy to a great extent. In 2015, the Ocean and Great Lakes economy contributed US$ 320 billion to GDP and supported 3.2 million jobs.100 The growth of the US Ocean and Great Lakes economy continues to outpace overall US economic growth, rising by 5.7 per cent in 2014-15 compared with the 2.7 per cent of overall economy.101 Instead of Blue Economy, the National Ocean Service of the US terms the concept as the “Ocean and Great Lakes economy” and states that it is comprised of six job sectors dependent on natural resources: marine construction, marine transportation, offshore mineral extraction, ship and boat building, and tourism and recreation.102 In the academic world, the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, at the Middlebury college, Vermont, US, has a center for the Blue Economy. The center conducts research on how ocean and coastal resources can support economic development and enhance healthy oceans and well-managed coastlines.103

The ‘oceans as good business’ lens has been the US’s centre of attention, as the country focuses on job creation and economic activity in the sector. In 2010, the then President Barack Obama issued a “National Policy for the Stewardship of the Ocean, Our Coasts, and the Great Lakes” which included some elements of environmental protection. Obama’s 2010 Executive Order also directed federal agencies to implement the recommendations of the Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force (IOPTF) under the guidance of a new National Ocean Council (NOC)104, but since then not much progress has been made. In June 2018, President Donald Trump signed a new executive order detailing a revised oceans policy. This has completely changed the theme from preservation to resource use and extraction,105 further emphasizing the US’s ‘oceans as good business’ lens.

99 Judith T. Kildow, Charles S. Colgan and Pat Johnston, State of the U.S. Ocean and Coastal Economies, Cali-fornia: MIIS, 2016, p. 7.100 The White House, “President Donald J. Trump is Promoting America’s Ocean Economy”, 19 June 2018, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-promoting-americas-ocean-economy/, accessed on 29 July 2018. 101 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association, NOAA Report on U.S. Ocean and Great Lakes Economy, Charleston, SC: NOAA Office for Coastal Management, 2018. 102 Judith T. Kildow, Charles S. Colgan and Pat Johnston, op. cit.103 “Center for the Blue Economy”, available at https://www.middlebury.edu/institute/academics/centers-initiatives/center-blue-economy, accessed 16 October 2018. 104 “United States”, National Marine Spatial Planning Programme, available at http://msp.ioc-unesco.org/world-applications/americas/us/national/, accessed on 16 October 2018. 105 Trump Just Remade Ocean Policy—Here’s What That Means”, National Geographic, 13 July, 2018, avail-able at https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/2018/07/news-ocean-policy-indigenous-sus-tainability-fisheries-industry-economy-marine/, accessed on 16 October 2018.

154


4.6 Small Island Developing States (SIDS)

Blue Economy concept is at the forefront of the development of the SIDS. Target 14.7 of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) also focuses on enhancing the economic benefits to SIDS and LDCs from sustainable use of marine resources, including through the sustainable management of fisheries, aquaculture, and tourism.106 There have been a number of reports by the World Bank and the UN which focus on the prospects of the SIDS in developing Blue Economy, and a number of countries are already taking initiatives to forward the agenda. Some of the SIDS have come forth with innovative initiatives to get a head start in the area. For example, Fiji has shown large marine tourism potential by combining tourist resort development with traditional coastal fishing villages.107

Many SIDS have already formulated national policies on Blue Economy and have designated special government units for it. The Government of Grenada, for example, has developed a Coastal Blue Growth Master Plan and launched its own Blue Innovation Institute. Furthermore, it has partnered with the Government of Netherlands to establish a blue growth partnership named “the Blue Network”.108 Cape Verde, on the other hand, has formulated a government wide agenda called “Blue Growth Charter”, which focuses governance and innovation and sustainable use of its ocean resources. It also has a ‘Blue Growth Intelligence Unit” that supports the Charter and provides policy advice.109

In Seychelles, the government has designated the Ministry of Finance, Trade and the Blue Economy to lead the efforts.110 In 2015, the University of Seychelles established a Blue Economy research institute.111 On 31 January 2018, Government of Seychelles approved a Blue Economy Strategic Framework and Roadmap, which has been described as an integrated approach for ocean-based sustainable development.112 It has also shown innovation in investment ideas, by introducing ‘blue bond’113. The first blue bond was approved by the World

106 World Bank and United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, The Potential of the Blue Economy: Increasing Long-term Benefits of the Sustainable Use of Marine Resources for Small Island, Washing-ton D.C.: The World Bank, 2017.107 Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), Global Blue Growth Initiative and Small Island Developing States (SIDS), Rome: FAO, 2014. 108 “Adopting the Blue Economy: A Viable Path to Sustainable Development in Small Island Developing States”, UN Ocean Conference, 2017. 109 Ibid.110 “Blue Economy Movement Gaining Traction in Africa”, Financial Tribune, 17 July 2018.111 P.G. Patil et al., op. cit., p. 93.112 “Seychelles Blue Economy Strategic Roadmap and Implementation”, The Commonwealth, available at http://thecommonwealth.org/project/seychelles-blue-economy-strategic-roadmap-and-implementation, accessed on 17 October 2018. 113 The blue bond is a debt instrument issued by governments, development banks or others to raise capital from impact investors to finance marine and ocean-based projects that have positive environmental,

155


Bank in September 2017, which will be used for fisheries and marine resources management.114

Mauritius launched a national dialogue on the ocean economy in 2013 for developing a new growth strategy based on its ocean space and resources which was later named “The Ocean Economy: A Roadmap for Mauritius”. In 2015, the government established the “Ministry of Ocean Economy, Fisheries, Marine Resources and Outer Islands” to consolidate various organizations working in the area. The government has also appointed the National Ocean Council as an advisory body.115 On the other hand, Belize’s “national integrated coastal zone management plan” has been noted to be a model for the Central America and Caribbean regions. The plan is very cross-sectoral in nature and serves as the overall framework for sustainable use and development of resources within the coastal zone.116

Despite the diversity in the SIDS geographical location and socio-economic scenarios, the use of “oceans as livelihoods” lens is overarching in developing Blue Economy. Since the SIDS are also among the most vulnerable entities to climate change, ‘oceans as natural capital’ lens receives considerable importance as well. Analysis of the national documents of the SIDS countries shows that, the focus has been on conserving the marine resources and protecting livelihood of their people. Rather than venturing on large scale industrialization, the countries are aiming to use their blue space sustainably.

5. Lessons for Bangladesh

From earlier discussions, it is evident that the Blue Economy priorities vary from country to country, nevertheless, there are some common practices that Bangladesh can follow in order to explore its Blue Economy potentials. Besides, Bangladesh may take note of the innovative ideas initiated by other countries and apply them in viable context. These are discussed subsequently.

Bangladesh needs a national plan to develop the Blue Economy. Countries considered at the forefront of Blue economy implementation, i.e., Ireland, Seychelles,

economic and climate benefits. For details, see, The World Bank, “Sovereign Blue Bond Issuance: Frequently Asked Questions”, available at https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2018/10/29/sovereign-blue-bond-issuance-frequently-asked-questions, accessed on 10 January 2018.114 Catherine Benson Wahlen, “First World Bank ‘Blue Bond’ Approved for Seychelles”, IISD, 29 September 2017, available at http://sdg.iisd.org/news/first-world-bank-blue-bond-approved-for-seychelles/, accessed on 11 October 2018.115 Raffaello Cervigni and Pasquale Lucio Scandizzo, The Ocean Economy in Mauritius: Making It Happen, Making It Last, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2017.116 “The Blue Economy and Climate Change in the Context of Sustainable Development: Reflections from the Perspective of Belize, CARICOM and SIDS”, available at https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/file/32263/download, accessed on 17 October 2018.

156


South Africa and EU have devised their own Blue Economy plan. For example, “The 2012 Harnessing Our Ocean Wealth (HOOW)” policy document of the Republic of Ireland, “the Blue Economy Strategy Roadmap Implementation (BESRI)” of the Republic of Seychelles, the Operation Phakisa policy document of the Republic of South Africa and “Blue Growth Strategy” of the EU were initiated preparatory to the establishment of Blue Economy regimes in the respective countries. Notably, purpose of the Blue Economy plan should be to establish a framework that can guide the planning and development of maritime activities in a rational and sustainable manner for social and economic development of Bangladesh. Thus, for developing the Blue Economy plan in Bangladesh, stakeholders in all potential Blue Economy sectors and coastal communities need to be consulted. However, experts point out that Bangladesh first needs to focus on human resource development and capacity building before developing a well-articulated national maritime policy which will take time.117

It is necessary to formulate and strengthen legal frameworks to better integrate Blue Economy considerations. For Example, to give an effect to her Blue Economy policy, South Africa established the Ocean Act and the Integrated Ocean Governance regime which was necessary to give Operation Phakisa the force of law as a Blue Economy component of South Africa’s national development plan 2030.118 Similarly, the US Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Conservation and Management Act (MSA) of 1976 was amended in 2007 to enable her achieve long term sustainability in fisheries. For Bangladesh, the starting point could be the ongoing efforts to design the Integrated Coastal and Ocean Management Policy119, as well as the various Blue Economy sectoral policies under review or design.120

Developing Blue Economy institutional framework which covers the gamut of administrative and operational maritime entities is required to actualize Blue Economy. However, at present, maritime affairs in Bangladesh are managed without any central coordination. There are many agencies involved, e.g., the Navy, the Coast Guard, Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock, Department of Energy and Mineral Resources, Ministry of Shipping and so on. Therefore, institutions operating independently are yet to have for proper coordination and accountability of the Blue Economy activities. For greater coordination, a central coordinating body is necessary given the increased level of activities in maritime areas. Bangladesh can follow the path of Mauritius and

117 Authors’ interview with Rear Admiral M. Khurshed Alam, Secretary, Maritime Affairs Unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on 24 October 2018.118 Timothy Walker, Securing a Sustainable Oceans Economy: South Africa’s Approach, Pretoria: ISS, 2018.119 Bangladesh’s Integrated Coastal and Ocean Management Policy (ICOMP) is currently under preparation. It organizes amended laws, policies and institutions connected to twenty-seven “blue economic functions” covering six broad areas: (i) maritime trade and shipping; (ii) food and livelihood; (iii) energy; (iv) tourism; (v) coastal protection/artificial islands/greening coastal belts; and (vi) human resource development, maritime surveillance and marine spatial planning.120 Annex 1 shows the policies currently under review or development, related to the Blue Economy in Bangladesh.

157


Seychelles by establishing a designated Ministry of Blue Economy. Experts believe that a separate department for ocean affairs should not be placed in any particular Ministry rather representatives from all other ministries relevant to ocean management should constitute such bodies.121 Nevertheless, the Maritime Affairs Unit at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the launching of a ‘Blue Economy Cell’ at the Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources have been a good start.

Bangladesh needs to develop its resource exploration and extraction capacities. It needs to expand comprehensive technological and technical know-how required for effectively exploring, drilling and extracting marine resources.122 Bangladesh needs to carry out a comprehensive and pragmatic survey of marine resources. It will unveil the vastness of marine resources. The importance of having a satellite for maritime survey and research is of utmost requirement.123 Bangladesh now has its own satellite which can be used for maritime survey along with other expedition in future. Besides, with the help of the satellite, ships and vessels navigating through the country’s rivers and sea will be able to maintain communication with each other and prevent accidents.

Prioritizing higher education and better research facilities is essential in order to utilize sea resources for the economic development of the country. Bangladesh needs to have a strategic plan to prepare skillful human resources for maritime sectors. An economy can never be successfully established unless and until it is cultivated and shaped from the root level. Therefore, the government’s initiative to establish a Maritime University was a significant decision. Besides, Bangladesh should try to build a sea-based scientist community following the examples of Australia and EU which have emphasized on the significance of research and innovation in developing Blue Economy. So, the establishments of the Bangladesh Oceanographic Research Institute (BORI) and Bangladesh Institute of Maritime Research and Development (BIMRAD) by the government are welcoming steps to the creation of marine scientific community.

It is also important to ensure that the new initiatives do not damage the ability of the natural world around us to thrive and continue to provide its critical services. The World Bank says that the changing status of ocean ecosystems may pose a significant threat to the future growth of ocean economy of Bangladesh. The three drivers of change, viz., increasing fishing capacity, coastal development and pollution may have considerable impact on these ecosystems.124According to Charles S. Clogan, two policy frameworks are particularly important for resource and environmental management relevant to the

121 Abul Kalam Azad, “Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries and the Prospect of Blue Economy for Bangladesh: A Critical Overview”, Journal of International Relations, Vol. VI, No. 6, 2015, p. 90. 122 Md. Jahan Shoieb and Md. Muhibbur Rahman, “Emerging Strategic Landscape in the Bay of Bengal and Maritime Capability Building of Bangladesh”, BIISS Journal, Vol. 35, No. 1, January 2014, p. 41. 123 Md Shahidul Hasan, op. cit., p. 240.124 P.G. Patil et al., op. cit.

158


Blue Economy.125 One is integrated coastal zone management (ICZM) and the other, more recent framework is MSP. These policies are all based on the setting of limits on human activity and spatial arrangements of ecosystems. MSP is developing rapidly in many areas, i.e., the EU and Australia. Small island states like Belize also have their own integrated MSP, which prioritizes marine conservation. Unfortunately, Bangladesh is yet to establish ocean governance at the centre of policymaking which is necessary to adopt MSP for sustainable ocean governance in the Bay of Bengal. Therefore, Bangladesh is required to push policies in cooperation with other countries to protect the ocean from the effects of climate change, pollution and overfishing. Thus, development of environmental policies and regulations geared towards conserving, managing, protecting and sustainable use of aquatic and marine ecosystems is necessary. It is worth mentioning that Bangladesh has some environmental laws covering seas (see Annex 1), which experts deem to be inadequate.126

P.G. Patil et al. identified seven key elements of a Blue Economy policy direction for Bangladesh.127 First, developing/strengthening national policies to better integrate Blue Economy considerations, sub-national policy and governance frameworks. Second, implementing policies for a healthy, resilient and productive ocean spaces. Third, raising awareness to better educate stakeholders on what the Blue Economy is and why it matters. Fourth, ensuring ocean wealth is kept national and local. Fifth, constructing infrastructure to support a transition to a Blue Economy. Sixth, transforming research and development and national knowledge or technical centres via institutional links with emerging global experience and platforms to better serve Bangladesh. Seventh, maximizing finance for development approach which can unlock private capital. The study provides a comprehensive listing of recommendations for developing Blue Economy.

Based on a range of international experiences, academics and policymakers suggest four steps to implement Blue Economy, i.e., Measure, Manage, Invest and Monitor,128 which are relevant for Bangladesh as well. First, measure the status of the ocean economy and ecosystems at the national level, as well as external driving forces such as climate change. In this regard, it is necessary to develop an ocean account to maintain a snapshot of the output from the country’s ocean economy. For instance, China has launched an accounting system to measure the ocean economy.

125 Charles S. Clogan, “The Blue Economy: Theory and Strategy”, in Vishva Nath Attri and Narnia Bohler-Muller (eds.), The Blue Economy Handbook of the Indian Ocean Region, Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2018, p. 47.126 Authors’ interview with Syeda Rizwana Hasan, Executive Director, Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association (BELA), on 17 September 2018.127 P.G. Patil et al., 2018, op. cit., p. 69.128 Charles S. Clogan, op. cit.; P.G. Patil, John Virdin, Sylvia Michele Diez, JulianRoberts and Asha Singh, To-ward a Blue Economy: A Promise for Sustainable Growth in the Caribbean, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2016; J.S. Golden, John Virdin, Douglas Nowacek, Patrick Halpin, Lori Bennear and Pawan G. Patil, “Making Sure the Blue Economy is Green”, Nature Ecology and Evolution, 2017.

159


Second, manage the interaction between the ocean economy and ecosystems, and among sectors. The ultimate success of a country in achieving Blue Economy policy objectives for sustainable development of the ocean space and resources under its jurisdiction will depend upon the management decisions of public agencies charged with regulating ocean use. The essential task of these public agencies is to set and enforce rules for the ocean economy that limit resource extraction and pollution levels. Third, invest in the transition to the Blue Economy through clear principles and processes that encourage sustainable growth in private investment. Fourth, monitor the progress towards agreed targets for the country’s Blue Economy policy objective is important.

Finally, there is no alternative to pursuing Blue Diplomacy vigorously as tangible international cooperation is essential for securing meaningful progress in Bangladesh’s Blue Economy. The present government has been making concerted efforts to reach out to the international community using conferences and conclave on Blue Economy. Bangladesh should actively engage with the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), etc. in the development of a regional Blue Economy shared vision and strategic priorities to guide future investment and a means to secure the development interests. More foreign investment should be forthcoming in this respect. If needed, the country can go for foreign assistance in the form of loans and grants. For instance, as mentioned earlier, Seychelles has issued one of the world’s first blue bonds for fisheries management investment based on guarantees from the World Bank and Global Environment Facility. However, experts argue that Bangladesh needs to be cautious with respect to over-reliance on foreign funds and donation.129 While dialogue and cooperation at various multilateral fora will continue, the country’s diplomacy will need to focus, in particular, on the region close to Bangladesh. Therefore, the country should take concrete steps through bilateral or multilateral engagements for information sharing, joint management, joint surveillance and joint disaster management programmes with its littoral neighbours.

6. Concluding Remarks

It is now well recognized that oceans hold an incredible potential for meeting the world’s ever-growing economic demand. The concept of Blue Economy is becoming popular with policy makers globally, and countries are taking various initiatives to adopt it. There is no universally accepted definition of Blue Economy, but it can be said that the Blue Economy is a way to maximize the economic value of marine resources in a manner that preserves sea’s overall health. The components of Blue Economy include different ocean related industries, economic activities as well as measures to protect the marine life and environment.

129 Abul Kalam Azad, op. cit., p. 83.

160


Bangladesh is also interested in advancing its Blue Economy and looking at ways to utilize its vast sea territory. So far, the country has explored only a small number of Blue Economy sectors such as fisheries and aquaculture, shipbuilding, ship breaking, salt generation and port facilities. Nevertheless, most of these sectors are still operating in traditional methods and there are opportunities for introducing innovation and technology for further expansion. Moreover, there are a number of Blue Economy sectors with great economic potential, e.g., seafood processing, marine biotechnology, exploration of oil, gas and other minerals, desalination and blue carbon, where Bangladesh’s exposure is limited or absent. Therefore, exploring these sectors will be beneficial for the country.

The Blue Economy experiences around the world are diverse and context specific, but among them natural capital, livelihood, good business and driver of innovation are major lenses. Blue Economy is regarded as a source of economic growth by the EU, China, India and the US. The terms ‘Blue Economy’ and ‘ocean economy’ are often used interchangeably by these countries. Mostly, their efforts to develop Blue Economy are focused on growing ocean-based industries. Emerging Blue Economy sectors, e.g., aquaculture, ocean-based renewables, deep sea mining and marine biotechnology are given special attention. Ocean economy valuation, governance, sector specific investments and growth strategies are prioritized. Besides, innovation is central to developing Blue Economy in some cases, e.g., Australia and the EU. By contrast, SIDS focus on human welfare and the protection of marine environment as the central part in defining Blue Economy. The traditional sectors, e.g., fisheries, aquaculture, tourism, etc. are emphasized in developing Blue Economy. In addition, efforts to establish Blue Economy have included a policy framework incorporating MSP, expansion of research institutes, development mechanism focusing diversification, creating jobs and ensuring food security.

The Blue Economy experiences of other countries could be the guiding lessons for Bangladesh. For Bangladesh, a national plan is required that will outline the roadmap for Blue Economy initiatives across sectors. The formulation process of such policy has to be participatory and inclusive. Besides, the government needs to formulate laws that will facilitate the Blue Economy industries. Given the broad nature of Blue economy, coordination within and among the various government organs is also crucial. Since the idea of Blue Economy is new in Bangladesh, capacity building across the sectors is essential. In this regard, focusing on education, research and innovation needs to get priority. Lacking indigenous expertise and funds, Bangladesh has to seek partnership with foreign countries to develop its marine sector. It can continue pursuing blue diplomacy and take lead in Blue Economy initiatives in the Bay of Bengal. In addition, it needs to make sure that economic activities do not harm marine environment and ecosystems. Achieving these goals and priorities is difficult and requires time. Nevertheless, the goodwill of the government exhibits that Bangladesh is on the right track.

161


Annex 1: Key Reforms Related to Blue Economy in BangladeshSectors Policies Laws and Acts Responsible Institutions

Coastal Protection

Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP)

National Action Plan for Adap-tation (NAPA)

Climate Change Trust Act 2010

Ministry of Environment and Forests

Disaster Management Informa-tion Centre (DMIC) of Ministry of Food and Disaster Management

Existence of Biodi-versity

Coastal and Wetland Biodiversity Management Plan

Wetland Protection Act, 2000;Environment Conserva-tion Act, 1995, 2000, 2002;Environmental Conser-vation Rules, 1997, 2000, 2001;National Conservation Strategy, 2005; National River Protec-tion Commission Act, 2013;Forest Act 1927;Wildlife Protection and Security Act, 2012

Ministry of Environment and Forests

The Bangladesh National Her-barium

Waste Disposal

Bangladesh Water Act

Integrated Water Re-sources Management (IWRM), 2005

Ministry of Water Resources

Energy Renewable Energy Policy, 2008;National Energy Policy, 2004

Bangladesh Petroleum Act, 1974

Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources (MoPEMR);Sustainable and Renewable Energy Development Authority (SREDA);Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB)Blue Economy Cell

162


Living Resources

National Ma-rine Fisheries Policy;National Aquaculture Development Strategy and Action Plan (2013-2020)National Shrimp Policy, 2014

Fish Hatchery Act 2010Fish Hatchery Rules 2011Fish Feed and Animal Feed Act 2010Fish Feed Rules 2011Fisheries Research Insti-tute Ordinance 1984

Ministry of Fisheries and Live-stock (MoFL)Department of FisheriesBangladesh Fisheries Develop-ment Corporations (BFDC)

Tourism National Tour-ism Policy, 2009

Tourism Board Act, 2010;Bangladesh Tourism Protected Areas and Special Tourism Zone Act, 2010;Bangladesh Tourism Protected Areas and Special Tourism Zone Rules, 2011

Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism

Bangladesh Parjatan Corpora-tion

Shipping and Trans-port

Maritime and Shipping Strat-egy of Bangla-desh

Clean Air Act;Import Policy Orders, 2012-2015;Payra Port Authority Act, 2013;Chittagong Port Author-ity Act, 1995;Mongla Port Authority Act, 1995Navy Ordinance, 1961Coast Guard Act, 1994

Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources (MoPEMR);Infrastructure Financing Facility (BIFF);Inland Water Transport Authority

Ocean Based Industry

Comprehensive Credit Policy for SMEs

Inclusive Digital Finan-cial Systems, 2015

Ministry of Industries (MoI);Bangladesh Standards and Test-ing Institution (BSTI);Bangladesh Small and Cottage Industries Corporation (BSCIC);Bangladesh Chemical Industries Corporation (BCIC);Central Bank

Source: Adapted from P.G. Patil, et al., Toward a Blue Economy: A Pathway for Bangladesh’s Sustainable Growth. Washington, D.C., The World Bank Group, 2018.

163

Sheikh Masud Ahmed

NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY THREATS OF BANGLADESH: CHALLENGES AND POLICY OPTIONS

Abstract

Non-traditional Security (NTS) issues, in recent times, have drawn heightened global attention and achieved undeniable prominence. Since the end of the Cold War, the world has witnessed unprecedented events compelling scholars and analysts to conceptualize or re-conceptualize the changing nature of threats to security in an increasingly interdependent and complex world. The past decades have been stunned by increasing numbers of terrorist attacks, state failures, deadly epidemics, rapidly fluctuating world energy and food prices, a global economic meltdown, and extensive natural disasters like cyclones, earthquakes and flooding. All these events led to the development of an alternative paradigm of security, i.e., NTS that focuses less on conventional military threats which has largely been defined in geopolitical and geostrategic terms and confined to the relationships among nation-states and their military strengths. However, NTS, though is a popular concept, remains ambiguous within and outside the academia; and in whatever context the NTS issues are coined together, Bangladesh as a developing country surely faces numerous NTS threats. Hence, the country needs to prepare itself to counter the challenges emanating from a host of NTS threats it is facing now or likely to face in near future. Against this backdrop, the paper has endeavoured to provide a brief conceptual understanding of the term NTS by delineating different explanations of the concept by renowned scholars and experts. It is argued that NTS is a useful framework of analysis to operationalize the concept of security in economic, social, political and internal security contexts. The paper also provides some arguments as to the need for ‘prioritization’ in curbing various NTS threats of Bangladesh, given the country’s limited resources and capabilities. Keeping this point in view, the paper finds that Bangladesh is apparently managing the challenges well, but it needs to undertake proactive measures and policy options incorporating a dynamic and adaptive security framework, seek international cooperation and devise a comprehensive approach to meet the present and future NTS challenges of the country more effectively.

Keywords: Non-traditional Security (NTS), Comprehensive Security Approach, International Cooperation, Dynamic and Adaptive Security Framework


Sheikh Masud Ahmed, SPP, psc is Research Director at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). His e-mail address is: [email protected]


164


1. Introduction

In the 20th century, the world experienced earthshaking swings in the form of two devastating world wars. Thereafter, it witnessed a balance of powers in effect among global powers with the emergence of bipolar world order despite having numerous proxy wars. With the end of the Cold War, the same century had to watch and accept the emergence of the US as the lone superpower. In the following decades, people of the world were obsessed with having a tension-free globe immersed in peace and prosperity. Instead, there were more conflicts, although, of different nature, more sufferings of the people and as a result, prospect for perpetual peace remains elusive. For security analysts and scholars, these developments have once again brought to the fore the debates about re-thinking and re-conceptualising security.1

Since the beginning of the new millennium, the international security environment has changed dramatically. Although the risks of major armed conflict and interstate wars are now on decline, the world is increasingly confronted with a number of security challenges, which are non-traditional in nature.2 Non-traditional security challenges that threaten the well-being and security of states and societies include but certainly not limited to climate change, food and water scarcity, environmental degradation, natural disasters, pandemics, irregular movements of people, human and drug trafficking, violent extremism, terrorism, and transnational crimes, cyber security, etc. Some of these threats are proving to be more severe and pervasive having the potential to cause more damage to a greater number of people than conventional wars and conflicts.3 Faced with such consequences, the global concerns about security have also changed, compelling global community to find new and innovative ways to appropriately respond to these new security challenges.4

The rise of NTS issues, therefore, presents new challenges that demand for developing new security architecture to ensure the national security. Traditional responses by nation-states are often ineffective against NTS threats, particularly threats to a state that are posed by non-state actors and threats arising from non-human sources.5 A common trend that has been observed by a number of security scholars is the growing tendency to highlight and designate any security concern that is non-

1 Mely Caballero-Anthony, “Non-Traditional Security: Concept, Issues, and Implications on Security Governance”, Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs, Policy Forum, Vol. 3, No. 1, Fall 2016, p. 5.2 Human Security Centre, Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.3 Mely Caballero-Anthony, “Nontraditional Security and Multilateralism in Asia: Reshaping the Contours of Regional Security Architecture?”, Stanley Foundation, Policy Analysis Brief, June 2007, p. 1.4 Mely Caballero-Anthony, “Non-Traditional Security: Concept, Issues, and Implications on Security Governance”, op. cit. 5 Rita Parker, “Resilience as a Policy Response to Non-Traditional Security Threats”, available at http://www.ipedr.com/vol44/020-ICSHH2012-W00032, accessed on 14 December 2017.

165

NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY THREATS OF BANGLADESH

military in nature as a non-traditional security issue.6 Contemporary trends and events in the environmental, food, energy, health, development and other sectors that had traditionally been considered as matters outside the purview of ‘security’ have now been incorporated into the policy strata of many states, international organizations and civil society institutions. These shifts have led to the language and conceptual underpinnings of ‘security’ being applied in a comprehensive way and in new areas as tools for understanding and addressing contemporary challenges.7 Moreover, designating as security concern implies that an issue should receive immediate, priority attention and if necessary, governments may employ lethal responses.8

As far as Bangladesh is concerned, when security is discussed, thoughts about military security immediately come to mind. Bangladesh, due to its geopolitical environment and current state of economic, political and societal developments, encounters both traditional and NTS threats.9 Traditional security concerns emanate predominantly from the distinctive geographical location of the country, i.e., being surrounded by India, the dominant power in the region, on three sides of its border. The other neighbour, Myanmar, also remained at distance due to limited connectivity between the two countries. As for NTS threats, Bangladesh faces a wide and diverse range of threats, viz unemployment, poverty, food insecurity, natural disasters, climate change consequences, environmental degradations, transnational crimes, terrorism and violent extremism, water scarcity, energy shortages, etc, to mention a few.

As already noted, traditional responses by nation-states are often ineffective against non-traditional security threats,10 the same is applicable for Bangladesh as well. Security policy options so far followed by Bangladesh including military deterrence, diplomatic manoeuvring and short-term political arrangements have been rendered inadequate in addressing some of the more pressing NTS issues. New policy innovations including use of non-military means as well as comprehensive political, economic and social responses are required to properly address NTS threats in Bangladesh. Moreover, such issues also require national leadership to look

6 Mely Caballero-Anthony, Ralf Emmers and Amitav Acharya (eds.), Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas in Securitisation, available at https://www.amazon.com/Non-Traditional-Security-Asia-Dilemmas-Securitization/dp/ 0754647013#reader_0754647013, accessed on 12 December 2017.7 J. Jackson Ewing and Mely Caballero-Anthony, “Non-Traditional Security 20 Years On: Assessing the Place of the Field”, available at https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/NTS, accessed on 09 November 2017.8 John Bailey, “Nontraditional Security Threats in the U.S.-Mexico Bilateral Relationship: Overview and Recommendations”, Washington D.C: Georgetown University, 25 January 2005, p. 5, available at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Nontraditional%20Security%20Threats%20in%20the%20U.S.-Mexico%20Bilateral%20Relationship.pdf, accessed on 11 January 2018.9 Md Iftekhar Ahmed and M Ashique Rahman, “Non-Traditional Security Threats of Bangladesh: Scope of Responses and Challenges for Its Land Forces”, in Chowdhury Hasan Sarwardy and A K M Abdur Rahman, Exploring New Areas of Coopertion in the Asia Pacific Region, Dhaka: Pacific Armies Management Seminar XXXVIII, Bangladesh Army and Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2015, p. 51.10 Rita Parker, “Resilience as a Policy Response to Non-Traditional Security Threats”, op. cit.

166


not only inwards to execute internal socio-economic and political reforms but also outwards, with an open outlook to cultivate international cooperation.11 Inexorably, there are lacking and limitations in the capability of states to counter and/or contain both traditional and non-traditional security alone, and thus, require cooperation not only between governments but also with the private sector, non-governmental and international organisations. For, they enable state actors to take advantages of geographical, technological, and knowledge resources, which the states would be unable to muster alone.12

Against this backdrop, this paper endeavours to answer the question as to what non-traditional issues can be considered as ‘immediate/priority’ security threats for Bangladesh and how the challenges can be met with to ensure the national security of the country? In doing so, the paper seeks to delineate a set of recommendations for appropriate measures as well as the ways in which the concerned stakeholders can better contribute to improve the overall security of Bangladesh. Following introduction, the second section focuses on a brief understanding of non-traditional security threats. The third section discusses the priority non-traditional security challenges of Bangladesh. The fourth section outlines the measures that Bangladesh may adopt in curbing NTS threats including future policy options. The paper argues for a comprehensive approach in countering NTS threats in Bangladesh to ensure the nation’s security. Section five concludes the paper.

2. Understanding Non-traditional Security Threats

Any understanding of NTS needs to be preceded by an understanding of ‘traditional’ security concept, that is, the notion of security that dominated international relations and security studies thinking during the Cold War period. Walter Lippmann, an American political commentator, argued in the early-1940s that, “a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war.”13 Another renowned scholar of security studies, Arnold Wolfers defined security in same fashion as “security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.”14 Even during the closing years of the Cold War, the traditional meaning of security dominated as Lawrence Krause and Joseph Nye defined security as “the absence of acute threats to the minimal acceptable levels of the basic values that people consider essential to

11 Saurabh Chaudhuri, “Defining Non-Traditional Security Threats”, available at http://globalindiafoundation.org/nontraditionalsecurity.html, accessed on 29 November 2017.12 “Armed Non-State Actors: Current Trends & Future Challenges”, DCAF Horizon, Working Paper No. 5, 2015.13 Walter Lippmann, US Foreign Policy: Shield for the Republic, Boston: Little Brown, 1943, p. 51.14 Arnold Wolfers, “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol”, in Arnold Wolfers (ed.), Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics, Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962, p. 150.

167


its survival.”15 In these definitions, terms, such as ‘core values’, ‘acquired values’ and ‘basic values’, in the context of national security are essentially interpreted as the independence and territorial integrity of a state that must be protected and preserved. Hence, the meaning of security during the Cold War remained focused on the protection of the state and its vital interests from attacks by other states.16 Traditional (or conventional) security threats, therefore, refer to outbreak/potentiality of conventional war/battle/engagement between two countries where armed forces, intelligence services or proxy actors are employed to carry out offensive actions. In such conflicts, the targets are typically another country’s important civil/military leadership, armed forces, intelligence services, key government agencies, and key point installations (KPIs). It also poses a threat to self-chosen mode of existence and moral stance of a state, of course, with respect to the rest of the world.17 Traditional security threats may also endanger the survival of states, unhindered development, pursuit of national goals, and protection of basic national interests. The complexities of the Cold War witnessed the divide of the global order into two geopolitical and ideological blocks in which the concept of security remained strongly knit around the traditional model. State security remained pre-eminent over security of individuals. This kept the discipline of security mainly limited to conventional concept seen through a narrow prism of state facing external military threats.18

However, since 1989, the majority of conflicts have been internal.19 The changed nature of conflicts has influenced evolving theoretical approaches and understandings of security, as well as practical responses.20 The conceptual understanding of national security started reshaping itself focusing on individual citizens and peoples’ way of life, with of course, emphasis on the integrity and interests of the state. The difference between traditional and NTS, however, lies mainly in the source of existential threats. Unlike traditional security, NTS emphasizes basically the non-military character of security threats. It can also be distinguished in terms of the security referent. Caballero-Anthony argues that NTS includes additional security actors such as communities or individuals in addition to the state actors.21 However, when non-traditional security challenges increase the likelihood of conflict or war, the most important security referent remains the state.22

15 Joseph S. Nye Jr. and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field”, International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4, 1988, p. 5.16 Mely Caballero-Anthony (ed.), Introduction to the Non-Traditional Security Studies. A Transnational Approach, London: Sage Publications, 2016, pp. 3-19.17 Katarzyna Marzęda-Młynarska, “Non-Traditional Security Challenges and Regional Governance: EU and ASEAN Answers to the Migration Crisis”, paper presented in CEEISA-ISA Conference 2016, Ljubljana, 23-24 June 2016, p.3.18 Ehsan Mehmood Khan, Human Security in Pakistan, Islamabad: Narratives Pvt. Ltd., 2013.19 Ibid.20 S. E. Sachs. “The Changing Definition of Security”, available at http://www.stevesachs.com/papers/paper _security.html, accessed on 18 December 2017.21 Caballero-Anthony (ed.), op. cit.22 Marzęda-Młynarska, op .cit.

168


Since the inception of humans on earth, NTS threats have existed all along. But the issue has come to the forefront with the economic and social development of the people and change in mindset where the possibility of total war against a nation state has become bleak and unsustainable. Since the 1990s, there has been a growing interest in the study of NTS, especially in the light of emerging challenges brought on by a host of factors, including the effects of globalization.23 ‘Security-framing’ appears to be an effective way to bring attention to these threats, convey urgency and command governmental resources to address the complex challenges that arise as one responds to them.24

Non-traditional security threats share ‘conceptual spaces’ with ‘comprehensive security’ and ‘human security’.25 In the contemporary world and according to the UN, ‘Human Security’ has become an inseparable and complementary part of overall security.26 Even during the inception of the UN, the concept of human security was there although in an implicit manner. For instance, in 1945 the US Secretary of State, Edward Reilly Stettinius Jr., reported to his government on the result of the conference in San Francisco, which established the UN, in these words:

“The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security front where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front where victory means freedom from want. Only victory on both fronts can ensure the world of an enduring peace…”27

Hence, the concepts of “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” have been there in mid-1940s, decades’ back, when in 1990s, we formally started to talk about them. The human security concept highlights that everything should be subject to the human’s benefits and needs.28 Therefore, it is important to counterbalance the divergence of security understanding and bridge the gap with a view to bringing the two concepts of traditional and non-traditional security at converging point. Only then a comprehensive approach can be adopted to address the challenges of both traditional security and NTS objectively.

23 Annegret Bendiek, “Regionalisation and the Taming of Globalisation? Economic, Political, Security, Social and Governance Issues”, available at http://lib.znate.ru/docs/index-148167.html accessed on 30 October 2017.24 Nirmala Joshi, “Responses to Non-Traditional Threats and Challenges”, available at https://silkroadstudies.org/resources/pdf/Monographs/1004Joshi-VI-Responses, accessed on 30 0ctober 2017.25 Mely Caballero-Anthony, Understanding Non-traditional Security, London: Sage Publications, 2016. 26 Human Security Centre, op. cit.27 Okubo Shiro, “Freedom from Fear and Want’ and ‘the Right to Live in Peace’, and ‘Human Security’”, Kyoto: Ritsumeikan University, Institute of International Relations and Area Studies, 2007.28 Ibid.

169


Now, before delving into an elaborate discussion of the characteristics and ramifications of NTS threats, it is important to note that interestingly, the evolution of the concept of security has been buttressed by the onset of various theoretical approaches or schools of thought of international relations, i.e., realism, liberalism, constructivism, etc.29 Realism and liberalism are the two most dominant schools of thoughts of international relations which while striving to explain why and how states have sought security also essentially revealed the meaning of security. Realists argue that states seek security in an anarchic international environment through a process of ‘security maximization’ that ultimately led to the competition and most often than not to conflict between and among the states. Liberalists, on the other hand, while maintain state as the unit of analysis, place importance on domestic actor’s power and preferences and uphold that the recognition among state leaders that they have common, shared values means that they can agree to come together to cooperate than to compete, thereby, creating a secure environment. As far as traditional and NTS dichotomy is concerned, both realists and liberalists’ explanations basically reflected on traditional security since they remain fused with ‘state-centrism’. It is only after the emergence of alternative approaches in the post-Cold War era, viz., Critical Security Studies (CSS)30 that include constructivism, post-positivism, post-structuralism, etc, ‘human security’ and ‘comprehensive security’ approaches that discussion of NTS issues has been made possible. However, it is not the objective of the paper to dig deep into this relationship between the emergence of various approaches of international relations and the evolution of security understanding. Rather, the intention is to highlight the fact, which is also noted by Alan Collins31 that the theoretical approach one takes towards examining security will essentially determine the type of subject matter that one consider constitutes security. A realist can never agree to the importance of security of an individual over the state while a CSS scholar can widen and deepen the meaning of security to the extent of including any threat to human well-being far less than endangering human life as a security concern.

NTS threats can originate from a variety of non-state human and natural causes and they can affect both government institutions and civilian populations.32 Mely Caballero-Anthony argues that the NTS concept is based on five assumptions. The first and most important one is: the non-traditional challenges or threats could lead directly to conflict or war. Secondly, that the narrow state perspective is insufficient for dealing effectively with NTS challenges. Third, that the states as well as communities and individuals are actors responsible for ensuring security. Fourth,

29 Alan Collins in the introduction of his edited book has emphasized the crucial importance of different approaches in establishing what constitutes security. See, Alan Collins, “Introduction: What is Security Studies?”, in Alan Collins (ed.), Contemporary Security Studies, (3rd Edition), Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 3 30 Daved Mutimer, “Critical Security Studies: A Schismatic History”, in Alan Collins (ed.), Contemporary Security Studies, op. cit., pp. 67-86. 31 Alan Collins, “Introduction: What is Security Studies?”, op. cit., p. 6.32 John Bailey, op. cit.

170


that threats, such as climate change or pandemics are transnational in nature and require non-military responses. Fifth, because of the transnational character of these challenges, international cooperation is essential.33 Moreover, she also highlighted six distinctive characteristics of NTS threats. These are:

• Theyhaveatransnationalcharacterunderstoodintermsoftheirorigins,conceptions, and effects;

• Theyaredefinedinpoliticalandsocioeconomicterms;

• Theycausesocietalandpoliticalinstabilityandbecomesecuritythreats;

• Theireffectsaredifficulttoreverseorrepair;

• Theyrequireregionalandmultilateralcooperationduetotheinadequacyof national solutions; and

• Theyconstituteathreattobothstates(theirterritoryandsovereignty)and peoples (individuals and societies).34

NTS issues are, however, complex in nature and often debated by scholars and academia. Through NTS, the very concept of ‘security’ has been extended to become comprehensive that includes individual and personal needs. In this case personnel security could be endless, hence, critical analysts argue that extending ‘security’ in such a way may render security discourses out of context.35 There remains a growing tendency to lengthen the list of NTS issues, and to put almost everything into the basket. Indeed, all issues threatening human well being can be included under the canopy of NTS, once they are considered serious enough. At the same time, it is important to understand whether or not there is a certain limit to distinguish NTS from traditional ones, because security always has special implications in the overall context of a country. One may argue that some conditions can be identified as a security issue at a certain geographical area whereas the opposite may be regarded as security issue at particular time and place. For example, shortage of water in the desert countries may be a security issue, but the flood water in monsoon may be regarded as security issue in a deltaic country like Bangladesh due to crop damage, epidemics and loss of food grains. Moreover, NTS threats are often interlocking, with the occurrence of one NTS emergency leading to others. For example, Indonesia witnessed widespread social unrest and instability following the Asian financial crisis.36 In western Africa, many are concerned that the widespread transmission of Ebola has inflicted severe

33 Caballero-Anthony, op. cit.34 Ibid.35 O. Waever, “Securitization and Desecuritisation”, in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), On Security, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, pp. 46-86.36 Brian Lucas, “Indonesian Financial Crisis (1997-1998)”, available at http://gsdrc.org/publications/indonesian -financial-crisis-1997-1998/, accessed on 21 December 2017.

171


economic and social trauma, affecting the success of local peacebuilding efforts.37 It is argued that time and place can have implications for considering the NTS threats.

There is little disagreement that the conceptualisation of NTS has brought about a new era in the security affairs, shifting the focus away from military power alone as the core determinant of international order and security.38 It, however, implies that the political leaderships and national security policy now have greater role to play in ensuring security of a state since, it essentially involves combating both traditional and non-traditional security threats.39 According to Caballero-Anthony, there are many times the NTS issues are transnational in scope, defying unilateral remedies and requiring comprehensive – political, economic, social responses, as well as humanitarian use of military force.40

Finally, it can conveniently be inferred with Frans-Paul van der Putten and others41 that NTS is a comprehensive way of conceptualising security that include economic security meaning the ability to function without disruption as an effective and efficient economy; environmental security that is concerned with ensuring a safe natural living environment; physical security encompassing the ability of individuals and groups of individuals to function safely within society; and social and political stability, which is about maintaining a social climate in which the core values of democracy and the rule of law are observed. In a developing country like Bangladesh, NTS issues involve all dimensions and varieties of NTS threats ranging from environmental degradation, food insecurity, climate change to lack of social and political instability and economic vulnerability.

3. Non-traditional Security Challenges of Bangladesh

A wider approach needs to be taken while discussing the NTS issues in Bangladesh, without being either extreme or simplistic, since different countries have different NTS issues. For example, the US government now puts priority on international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction among the list of NTS issues,42 while, the poor households of developing countries are concerned

37 Available at http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/ebola.shtml, accessed on 22 December 2017.38 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998.39 Saurabh Chaudhuri, “Defining Non-Traditional Security Threats”, accessed at http://globalindiafoundation.org/nontraditionalsecurity.html, accessed on 11 December 2017. 40 Mely Caballero-Anthony, ‘An Introduction to Non-Traditional Security Studies: A Transnational Approach’, op. cit.41 Frans-Paul van der Putten, Minke Meijnders and Jan Rood, “Deterrence as a security concept against non-traditional threats”, Clingendael Monitor, June 2015.42 Sara Z. Kutchesfahani, “Preventing nuclear terrorism should remain a top U.S. priority”, available at http://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/356439-preventing-nuclear-terrorism-should-remain-a-top-us-priority, accessed on 25 November 2017.

172


about the lack of fixed income. Some people in the Middle East are concerned with water resources while the forcibly displaced Palestinians are concerned with whether they can return to their home land or not. Even for the same country, there will be different NTS issues or different priorities at different stages of development. The NTS threats may also vary geographically. And NTS issues are time sensitive as well, meaning problem of today may appear differently tomorrow. All these factors are applicable in case of Bangladesh. For example, with a large number of populations depending on the agricultural contribution, Bangladesh may suffer from food insecurity and adverse effect on ecological environment due to fast industrialization and urbanization. Drying up of major rivers may further aggravate the situation and pose severe threats leading to human insecurity, ecological imbalance, and demographic displacement. In this respect, the water sharing of international rivers may be put on the top of the list while dealing with various NTS issues of Bangladesh.

Furthermore, the security challenges of Bangladesh can be inferred with Barry Buzan’s concept of security where it is stated that domestic threats to a weak state can almost never be isolated from the influence of outside powers, thus entangling domestic security problems with its external relations.43 Buzan also states that the tyranny of geography is the most important factor in the defence-vulnerability of the small states. Surrounded by big and problematic neighbours all around, Bangladesh is vulnerable to transnational NTS threats. Transnational organized crime networks are especially a potent threat to the national security44 and Bangladesh needs to do away with the threat. The geographical proximity of the golden triangle45 and golden crescent46 makes Bangladesh a vulnerable route for arms and drug trafficking/smuggling.

The rise of non-state actors, intra-state conflicts, environmental degradation and climate change, demographical changes and cyber-crime pose a greater security threat to the nation-states in the 21st century than militaries of other states47 and Bangladesh is gravely vulnerable to most of such phenomena. However, the problem of prioritisation is always there. Some may argue to put the priority on economic

43 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations’, Brighton, Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd, 1983.44 Divya Srikanth, “Non-Traditional Security Threats in the 21st Century: A Review”, International Journal of Development and Conflict, Vol. 4, 2014, pp. 60–68.45 A United Nations report in December revealed that opium production in the Golden Triangle had tripled since 2006, with the illegal drugs trade in the region worth $16.3 billion. The area produced 762 tonnes of opium in 2014, making about 76 tonnes of heroin, the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime said in its Southeast Asia Opium Survey stated. See, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/welcome-to-the-golden-triangle-the-centre-of- the-worlds-drug-trafficking-10100420.html accessed on 13 January 2018.46 The clandestine land routes of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan collectively constitute the Golden Crescent, also called the silk route of drugs. Heroin, poppy husk, opium, and synthetic drugs are the four kind of drugs entering India. See, https://www.indiatimes.com/news/india/golden-crescent-the-route-through-which-drugs-are-making-thei r- way-into-punjab-256556.html accessed on 13 January 2018.47 Ibid.

173


security (including energy security, financial security, food security) followed by environmental security (or ecological security), cyber/information security, and human security. Some may argue for alleged three ‘societal evils’, i.e., religious extremism, radicalism and terrorism.48 Yet another group of experts may view NTS issues of Bangladesh from economic, social and political dimensions as well. Indeed, given the versatile demographic characteristics of Bangladesh, people from different cultural and need based orientation will possibly have completely different opinions about NTS issues. For example, the rural populace would think about the hazards of cultivation, the environmentalists would regard environmental pollution from the industrial urban area as more pressing whereas, the educated youths may think about unemployment and other related problems as non-traditional issues; the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) might give more priority to issues related to different ethnic groups or how to preserve its ethnic diversity; and the South-eastern tip (Teknaf ) would probably include arms/drug trafficking, illegal money transaction and illegal immigrants as the most dangerous non-traditional issues. The elite intellectuals would be more willing to emphasize on economic security issues like population migration, poverty or societal disharmony like emerging conflicts among polarized political and social groups. However, a comprehensive list of non-traditional security concerns of Bangladesh can be formulated as depicted in diagram 1.

Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish and integrate all NTS issues within national security efforts, put them in order of priority, realistically measure and assign due weights to them. Bangladesh is yet to see a broad consensus on issues about which should be considered as NTS threats or what should be included as key objectives of the government to face the challenges of NTS. The reasons are obvious, because the NTS issues are often contextually defined. However, the paper argues following NTS issues of Bangladesh as priority security concerns that require immediate attention and coordinated measures to deal with them more effectively.

48 Divya Srikanth, op. cit.

174


Diagram 1: Non-Traditional Security Threats of Bangladesh

Referent object: State and People Insecurity drivers: National and Transnational Security Provider: Internal–State & Non-state Actors External –States & Non-state Actors

Threats to State by Non-state Drivers Human Security (HS)Threats to People by State &

Non-state Drivers

Political SecurityGovernance Issues; Democratic De�cit;

Confrontational Politics, etc.

Economic SecurityEconomic Development; Poverty;

Unemployment; Food Security, etc.

Societal SecurityGender Issues; Child Security; Drug Abuse

and Narcotics Control; Crime; Terrorism, etc.

Health SecurityEpidemics; HIV/AIDS; Drug Administration,etc.

Environmental Security

Environmental Degradation; Industrial Waste;Climate Change Impacts; Natural Disasters, etc.

Cross-border Security Tra�cking in Small Arms, Drugs andWomen and Children; Trans boundaryWater Issues; Cross-border Movements of - Criminals, etc.

Energy SecurityScarcity/Availability of Energy

Resources; Optimum Utilisation, etc.

Source: Md Iftekhar Ahmed and M Ashique Rahman, “Non-Traditional Security Threats of Bangladesh: Scope of Responses and Challenges for Its Land Forces”, in Chowdhury Hasan Sarwardy and A K M Abdur Rahman, Exploring New Areas of Coopertion in the Asia Pacific Region, Dhaka: Pacific Armies Management Seminar XXXVIII, Bangladesh Army and Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2015, p. 52.

175


3.1 Transnational Crimes

Due to the globalization processes, a new transnational space is created and, societies and individuals are no longer limited by national territory. They can undertake actions, which transcend national borders.49 In case of Bangladesh, far from popular belief that it will remain unaffected from all small arms and light weapons since Bangladesh is neither fighting a ‘classical’ war nor faced with any insurgency movement like its neighbours, the effect of arms trafficking on security has proven otherwise.50 As already noted, the geographical proximity of the golden triangle and golden crescent makes Bangladesh a viable route for arms and drug trafficking/smuggling.51 Such transshipment has a dangerous impact since, some of the weapons, originally trafficked into the neighbouring countries, leak into the local black and grey markets and fall into the hand of local criminal syndicates. The rise in crime in the cities and border areas and the “weapon-power” of the thugs and goons has led to the deterioration of law and order in Bangladesh. Moreover, border conflicts, infectious disease, cross-border criminal movements, extortion, human trafficking among the labour and sex industries, money laundering, etc., remain other transnational threats for Bangladesh.52

Due to push factors like poverty, limited job prospects compared to large population seeking jobs and the enticement for becoming wealthy quickly, a large number of people in Bangladesh are still vulnerable and fall prey to human traffickers and often end up in situation of forced and exploitative labour, and in case of female workers sexual exploitation. The demand for cheap labour and the existence of the informal sectors, including domestic work and prostitution in the countries of destination, are also important pull factors of human trafficking. Although, there is no reliable statistics of the actual number of men, women and children who are being trafficked, it is, however, considered significant. Moreover, the large scale forced migration of Rohingya people in the last two years especially, after August 2017, is also proving to be a very difficult security problem to manage. The potentiality of Rohingya radicalization and their integration with the local and transnational terrorist groups are all becoming pressing security issues for government and communities to tackle.

49 M. Pietraś, “Globalization as the Process of Changing the International Community”, in M. Pietraś (ed.), The Faces of Globalization, Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS, pp. 35-64.50 A K M Nazrul Islam, Neila Husain and Mahbubur Rashid Bhuiyan, “Small Arms Trafficking in Bangladesh: Threat to National Security”, in Golam Mohammad (ed.), National Security Bangladesh 2009, Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 2010, p. 214. 51 Ibid.52 Mohammad Humayun Kabir, Neila Husain and Segufta Hossain, “Non-Traditional Security of Bangladesh”, in Mufleh R Osmany (ed.), Whither National Security Bangladesh 2007, Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 2008, p. 255.

176


3.2 Environmental Security and Climate Change as National Security

Ecological crises have been responsible for killing and injuring substantially larger numbers of people over time than conventional military threats, and therefore represent a parallel and arguably more important source of insecurity.53 Due to Global warming, the coastal areas of Bangladesh will be at great risk owing to flooding and tidal upsurge; warming may force pests and pathogens to move beyond their traditional regions with tropical diseases; and the disruption of ecological equilibrium may increase conflict between societies especially along the long coastal belt of Bangladesh. The pollution in the upstream across the border can cause ecological damage to the downstream land mass of Bangladesh.

Table 1: Climate Change Consequences in BangladeshCause Consequences Phase I Consequences Phase II Consequences Phase III

Climate Change

Shortage of fresh water availability

Lose of biodiversity Livelihood contraction

Increase natural extreme events

Risk to human health and lives

Food insecurity

Intrusion of saline water Migration and conflicts

Source: National Security Index Bangladesh 2009.54

Due to the ongoing climate change, consequences on environment of Bangladesh have been divided into three phases. In the first phase there are shortages of fresh water availability, increased natural extreme events and intrusion of saline water. In the second phase there are lose of biodiversity and risk to human health and lives. The third phase includes livelihood contraction, food insecurity, migration and conflicts (see Table 1). Bangladesh has seen its fair share of unpredictable and devastating climate and weather events in recent years: temperature extremes, cyclones, tornados have taken thousands of lives and affected millions more. The environmentalists argue that the climate change is turning out to be the most fundamental non-traditional security threat for Bangladesh and its impacts are already felt in the forms of floods, droughts, cyclones and sea level rise.

53 Dennis Pirages, “Ecological Security: A Framework for Analyzing Non-traditional Security Issues”, available at http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Preview/SR28_EcoSecuritySouthAsia_preview, accessed on 29 November 2017.54 Shaheen Afroze, Sufia Khanom and Akand Muhammad Faisal Uddin, “Climate Change and National Security of Bangladesh”, in Golam Mohammad (ed.), National Security Bangladesh 2009, op. cit., p. 158.

177


3.3 Water Security

Water is most essential to life and it is also an integral part of economy, society and ecology. Water resources dominate the natural system of Bangladesh, indeed, water is a key natural resource of the country. The major sources of available waters are however, trans-boundary rivers accounting for 76.5 per cent of total water availability of the country. Rainwater and groundwater account for only 23 per cent and 1.5 per cent respectively. Withdrawal and obstruction of water flow by India of the trans-boundary rivers, particularly in the dry season, makes the problems for Bangladesh critical and pervasive. The consequential impacts on the socio-economic life, ecology, environment, and river morphology in Bangladesh are severe. Refraining from equitable sharing of trans-boundary rivers by India has severely affected the natural flow of the downstream rivers and its distributaries, having adverse effects on agricultural production, fisheries, forestry, industrial activities, inland navigation, biodiversity, wetlands and so on.

Hence, from NTS perspective, the water sharing of international rivers may be put on the top of the list while dealing with various NTS issues of Bangladesh. The Ganges and Teesta waters continue to be a thorny issue between Bangladesh and India since long. This is a glowing example of not just a trans-boundary issue with potentially serious ramifications, but also of how a shared resource can have contending interests on two sides of an international border. Here from Indian perspective, the importance of Farakka Barrage lies in serving the Northeast India as a lifeline to its economic activities; the barrage is also crucial for preservation and maintenance of the Kolkata Port by improving the water regime and navigability of the Bhagirathi-Hooghly river system.55 However, from Bangladesh perspective the concern is about ecological and agricultural impact. How this issue is finally resolved will have serious consequences for both the countries and the millions of people who depend on these important international rivers.

Moreover, the deltaic Bangladesh is affected with another hotspot problem, such as arsenic contamination. It is a global problem, which now appears to be a serious problem in Bangladesh as well. It is estimated that two-thirds of Bangladesh’s groundwater is contaminated by arsenic. As the groundwater table goes down more and more, arsenic contaminated water will come up, increasing the risk of arsenic poisoning throughout the country.56 This poses a major health security challenge since many people still consume arsenic-contaminated water.57

55 Priyadarshi Siddhanta, “Farraka Barrage: The tale of two countries and one river”, available at http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/farraka-barrage-the-tale-of-two-countries-and-one-river/,aceeseed on 11 December 2017. 56 Mohammad Humayun Kabir et. al., “Non-Traditional Security of Bangladesh”, op. cit., p. 261.57 Abbas Bhuiya, “Health Threats as Nontraditional Security Challenges for Bangladesh”, available at http://nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=591, accessed on 23 December 2017.

178


3.4 Terrorism and Violent Extremism

Until very recently, terrorism was considered to be political and military threat to be addressed by the state alone. The fact that terrorism and human insecurity are closely interlinked dawned much later in the minds of policymakers. Now, some may believe that the threats of violent extremism and terrorism need special attention and should be put on the top of the security agenda. The internal social, political and economic dynamics of Bangladesh have given birth to this non-traditional security issue in the form of violence, extremism, and terrorism. The main threat of terrorism lies in its potential to cause wider social unrest, which can in turn lead to further social polarization and radicalization of various population groups. These, in turn, have profound implications on the nature of security cooperation among the various security agencies, as well as between the policy makers and other stake holders. The recent terrorist attacks during 2014-2016, in various parts of Bangladesh have brought the debates about re-thinking and re-conceptualizing terrorism as the top security agenda to the fore front. Especially, the 2016 Holey Bakery attack wrecked havoc in the country killing 20 foreign nationals for the first time in the history of Bangladesh. The incident rattled the whole nation and questioned the very moderate fabric of the society of Bangladesh. However, the government has very successfully tacked the post Holey Bakery situation. Due to various counterterrorism measures and legal and institutional setups, the country has not witnessed any major terrorist incident since 2016.

However, terrorism in contemporary times is not only a domestic phenomenon but a global phenomenon. In spite of successful and effective counterterrorism measures and stringent legal and institutional setups, terrorist outfits are continuously striving to re-group and re-organise themselves taking advantage of various structural causes as well as enabling environment. There are numerous reports of new arrests, law enforcing agencies information and reports suggesting possibilities of militant organisations re-grouping and re-organising themselves cannot be ruled out. Hence, terrorism and violent extremism remains a major non-traditional security threat for Bangladesh.

3.5 Natural Disasters

Extreme weather events have caused havoc in Bangladesh since its independence. Sometimes, it had experienced longest dry spell causing water shortage, huge water pollution, depleting fish stocks in some major rivers as well as tropical cyclones like Sidr, Aila, etc. On the evening of 15 November 2007, Cyclone Sidr hit the low-lying and densely-populated coast of Bangladesh. The cyclone devastated 30 southern districts of both Barisal and Khulna divisions. Hundreds of people perished as houses and buildings collapsed because of the 240 km per hour wind. Thousands of others drowned in tidal surges that were over 15 feet high in many

179


villages. The cyclone caused 3,363 deaths, injured 55,282, damaged or destroyed 1.5 million homes, and 2.5 million acres of cropland.58 On 25 May 2009, Aila hit 14 districts on the south-west coast of Bangladesh. It was the second major natural disaster for the region in less than two years while many of these areas were still recovering from the effects of 2007’s cyclone Sidr. Cyclone Aila caused 190 instant deaths, injuries to 7,103 people, damage to 6,000 kilometres of roads, collapsed more than 1,700 kilometres of embankments, leaving more than 500,000 people homeless. It is estimated that about four million people have been affected during and after cyclone Aila.

On the other hand, the country has been victims of flood since the recorded history due to its topography – basically a floodplain of three of the greatest rivers of the world, the Ganges, the Brahmaputra and the Meghna (GBM). About 80 per cent of its landmass is flood prone while about 20-30 per cent is inundated regularly which sometimes reached up to 70 per cent in extreme years. The country has experienced severe flooding in the years of 1974, 1987, 1988, 1998, 2004, 2007 and very recently in 2017. Flood caused havocs in Bangladesh in terms of loss of life and property (see Table 2).

Table 2: Major Floods of BangladeshYear Area Inundated (% of the

country)Total Deaths Estimated Damage in Million US$

1974 36 28,700 57.9

1987 39 2055 1000

1988 61 2300 1200

1998 68 1100 2800

2004 38 750 2200

2007 43 831 1800

2017 40 157 1975

Souce: Sajid Karim and Mahbubur Rashid Bhuiyan, “Sustainable Flood Management in Bangladesh: Addressing the Challenges”, BIISS Journal, Vol. 39, No. 1, January 2018, p. 8.

Over the years, government in association with various development partners, intergovernmental bodies, NGOs and community people has been implementing various measures both structural and non-structural to better deal with floods. As can be seen from Table 2, the country has been successful in drastically reducing loss of life during floods. However, the economic loss remains high. In fact, as noted by one study, “nowadays, it is worsening due to unplanned urbanization and development activities, rapid population growth, faulty structural interventions and adverse impact of climate change, with more intensity and frequency than ever before.”59 Hence,

58 Available at https://www.unicef.org/bangladesh/4926_4990.htm, accessed on 13 December 2017.59 Sajid Karim and Mahbubur Rashid Bhuiyan, “Sustainable Flood Management in Bangladesh: Addressing the Challenges”, BIISS Journal, Vol. 39, No. 1, January 2018, p. 1.

180


natural calamities due to environmental degradation and climate change are most crucial NTS challenges that are persistent in Bangladesh.

3.6 Economic Security

Economic capability of countries is being determined by a range of internal and external factors. Among internal factors, there are: size of the country, existing resource base, political and social stability, level of technological and institutional development, ability to adapt to the changes occurring in the internal and external economic and socio-political situations, human resource capability, etc. The external factors include level and nature of international trade, relationships with other countries, international political and economic order, international economic environment, etc.60

A great challenge facing Bangladesh today is how to raise the living standards of the marginalized poor and integrate them into the national economic system by ensuring that people from all walks of life can claim their share of economic opportunity. However, the appropriation of the security label attached to these concerns and threats has been a significant development. Because it is important to draw concentration to these NTS challenges, put across necessity, and mobilize government resources to address them. It, therefore, becomes imperative for the government to develop a comprehensive NTS framework that will either supplement or go side by side with the national security framework. Unfortunately, very less has been done in this field in terms of contribution to policy formulation and drawing up of appropriate strategy.

4. Policy Options for Bangladesh

For properly addressing the NTS threats, Bangladesh should learn to adopt new approaches and positive outlook about dealing with its own NTS issues. It has to realise that most of the NTS issues as Sebastian Biba noted, usually require mitigation and adaptation strategies, instead of preventative measures.61 In the context of limited resources and capabilities, the country needs to prioritize, in order of importance and urgency, virtually endless list of non-traditional issues that Bangladesh is facing today and likely to face in near future. Today, a nation’s security, international legitimacy, and sovereignty rest not only on territorial control, but also on the integrity of its services and its ability to fulfil the basic rights of its citizens.62 Therefore, it is suggested

60 Abul Kalam Azad, Mohd. Mahfuz Kabir and Benuka Ferdousi, “Global Economic Crisis and Its Impact on Bangladesh”, in Golam Mohammad (ed.), National Security Bangladesh 2009, op. cit., p. 76.61 Sebastian Biba, “New Concerns, More Cooperation? How Non-Traditional Security Issues Affect Sino–Indian Relations”, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, Vol. 45, No. 3, 2016, p. 4.62 Mely Caballero-Anthony and Alistair Cook, “Non Traditional Security in Asia: Issues, Challenges and

181


in this paper that the national security stakeholders of Bangladesh should develop a three-pronged policy – (a) devising a comprehensive security approach; (b) boasting international cooperation; and (c) crafting a dynamic and adaptive security framework – for addressing NTS threats more effectively. These are briefly elaborated below.

4.1 Devising a Comprehensive Security Approach

Bangladesh government needs to formulate the strategy of ‘comprehensive security’ to address the challenges of NTS. The comprehensive security goes beyond (but does not exclude) the military to embrace political, economic and socio-cultural dimensions.63 While comprehensive security provides a broader conceptualization of security beyond military threats, the main security referent still remains the state. A comprehensive view of security helps to ensure the stability of a regime and as a consequence, reinforce the state as both the primary unit of analysis as well as the main actor that defines and provides security.64

In whatever form NTS threat appears, Bangladesh needs to realize that under certain conditions the threats caused by some NTS issues could be even more dangerous than the traditional security issues. The recent terrorist attacks that bewildered the foreign investors and the recent Rakhine crisis that have shaken the national economy and raised the level of social insecurity, are some crucial examples of such kind. The concerns of government and relevant policy makers must not lose sight of the NTS issues and must not fall short of timely response to NTS threats. Therefore, faced with new NTS challenges, Bangladesh government should have new approaches and formulate new strategy to confront the emerging threats. Once any phenomenon is identified as a security issue, it should have a special significance that would necessitate government’s attention for subsequent action(s). Besides, policy makers must bring forth the issue at the top of the agenda incorporating an awareness programme taking on board the people, civil society, NGOs and the mass media.

Moreover, as a practical approach, Bangladesh needs to assess and analyze security issues from a comprehensive need and rights-based perspective rather than from a purely statist or military-based understanding. Terrorism, climate change issues (mitigation and adaptation) as well as humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief operations demand high priority on the agenda of Bangladesh.

frameworks for Action”, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISAS), 2013. 63 Muthiah Alagappa, Asian Security Practices: Material and Ideational Influences, Stanford University Press, 1998.64 Mely Caballero-Anthony, “Re-visioning Human Security in Southeast Asia”, Asian Perspectives, Vol. 28, No. 3, 2004, pp. 155-189.

182


4.2 Boosting International Cooperation

Bangladesh cannot deny the NTS issues that emanate from trans-boundary phenomenon. For example, the trans-nationality of NTS challenges was illustrated by the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2002 and 2003, when the epidemic was transmitted from Beijing to Hong Kong, and then to Southeast Asia and rest of the world.65 The 2009 swine flu pandemic in northern India claimed many lives as it moved to neighbouring Pakistan and Nepal. It was reported that the flu impacted the daily lives of millions of people as well as the economies of the affected regions.66 Bangladesh needs to develop the mechanism to oversee and constantly monitor the peripheral and regional as well as global NTS issues that may affect the country and remain prepared to respond timely if needed.

The trans-boundary nature of the issues makes it difficult for a country to effectively deal with NTS challenges alone. Thus, for the effective governance of NTS issues, Bangladesh needs cooperation and coordination among states, international organization/institutions as well as between state and non-state actors. The good offices of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bangladesh need to continue their outstanding efforts to rally the international community behind the cause of Bangladesh by highlighting their economical, social, environmental and human security implications. The Rakhine Rohingya crisis needs to be dealt with this way. Mass media campaign including national, regional and international seminar, symposium, workshop, roundtable may be useful for this purpose.

In a globalized world, geo-political diversities of Bangladesh are significantly important to security and well-being of the nation. It is critically important to build an inclusive nation, bound together by legitimate freedom, fortified by the rule of law, and prospering through balanced development. The geography of Bangladesh demands for natural economic relationships with global community especially with its neighbours. Because the internal insecurity in the economic domain comes mainly from massive poverty while the external ones emanate mainly from the process of globalization.67 The economic relationships are vital but would demand careful attention as well. For both political and security interests, it is imperative to have strong, democratic neighbours working together to secure the borders and defend shared interests and values to defuse the potentiality of NTS threats arising from trans-border vested groups. Bangladesh needs to be engaged effectively with

65 Melissa Curley and Nicholas Thomas, “Human Security and Public Health in Southeast Asia: The SARS Outbreak”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58, No.1, 2004, pp. 17-32.66 Zahir Janmohamed, “Deadly Outbreak of Swine Flu in India May Be Due to a Mutated Strain”, Al Jazeera, 23 March 2015.67 Khaled Sarwar and Md. Saifullah, “Economic security in the context of Bangladesh”, available at http://www.newstoday.com.bd/index.php?option=details&news_id=2377105&date=2014-05-04, accessed on 20 December 2017.

183


global community in fighting the menace of terrorism, and climate change in terms of intelligence sharing regarding terrorist movements/plans and mobilizing the fund to reduce the effect of climate change respectively.

4.3 Crafting a Dynamic and Adaptive Security Framework

Time demands that the security framework of Bangladesh should be dynamic and adaptable, addressing not just conflict between and within states, but also the societal challenges of the 21st century. In many countries today, corruption and inefficiency have stunted economic development and spawned disenchantment with free market prescriptions. These factors combined are likely to stir up popular dissatisfaction and, in some cases, violent outbursts, which may be difficult to control by relatively weak and unprepared institutions of government. For example, in many of the middle-eastern countries there are organized violent protests against the sitting regime for democratic freedom and economic enhancement. Ultimate result is pervasive civil war or near civil war. So the levers by which Bangladesh can ensure human security and remove the obstacles to growth are in the hands of its leadership. Sound policies with economic opportunity to all, ensuring social justice and good governance are important. It is also important to recognize that the fundamental protective measures against all these threats lie on strong democracy and harmonious society. Democracy, of course, goes hand in hand with the protection of human rights. Economic development and prosperity are important underpinnings of democracy as well.

Most of the NTS challenges faced by Bangladesh are not new and are not unique as well. How these issues are framed, approached, addressed, and understood will have significant bearing on how many will be affected by the menaces or how few will have less suffering. The appreciation and acceptance of NTS as a national security challenge with global implications will also guide Bangladesh to create mechanisms to deal with such issues. The policy makers of Bangladesh should be engaged regarding the importance of NTS in guiding political response to face the crisis and developing strategies to lessen or eliminate the threat to its citizens. Bangladesh government needs to develop the institutional competence to engage the regional and international organizations to address these challenges. If viewed from complicated and volatile context of global and peripheral security environment, and the national perspective as well, all the issues should be placed in the big basket of decision-making of the government policy makers targeting national consensus and national unity.

The country needs to work with a broad spectrum of actors to address the range of insecurities affecting the nation. It has to forge partnerships among different stakeholders to improve multi-level governance with a view to addressing NTS challenges and promoting human security. For instance, the vulnerability of

184


rural people to emerging health threats can be diminished through renewed public health efforts that involve social movements and collaborations on global health promotion.68 Bangladesh may take initiative for creating regional food bank, storing disaster management resources at calamity prone areas, and creating a regional pool of physicians and pharmaceuticals to deal with diseases and medical matters in time of crisis. Strong mechanism of acquiring early warning to mitigate or prevent the effects of natural calamities that befall the nation will also assist in identifying and preventing problems, thereby, ensuring enhanced preparedness. Incorporating such adaptive framework in the policy process will definitely enhance the capability and resilience of Bangladesh against diverse NTS threats.

To curb violent extremism and terrorist acts, drug, arms and human trafficking, Bangladesh may engage regional stakeholders, and global communities and countries for intelligence exchange and trans-boundary cooperation. Bangladesh government may take the initiative to set up ‘Regional Intelligent Cell’ for acquiring and sharing information on the movement, plans and strategy of the terrorist groups and outfits within and beyond the region. To address other issues like Rohingya crisis, common rivers’ water sharing, and environmental hazards, Bangladesh needs to intensify and enhance bilateral and multilateral engagements and launch mass awareness campaign targeting national unity. Moreover, appropriate responses to NTS issues will require constant vigilance and instantaneous or even pre-emptive action in order to protect and preserve the security, prosperity, and lives of people.


In the post-Cold War era, the concept of ‘security’ has undergone tremendous transformation. Although intense debate continues to persist among the scholars of ‘security studies’ regarding the boundaries and the range of issues of its subject matter, meaning of security no longer confined within the traditional conceptualisation of security i.e., protection of the state and its vital interests through military means is the prime concern of ensuring security. Since 1989, the changed nature of conflicts has influenced evolving theoretical approaches and understandings of security and there has been a shift from traditional security. The difference between the two lies mainly in the source of existential threat, as NTS unlike traditional security emphasises basically on the non-military and non-state characters of security threats. Hence, an exhaustive list of NTS might include but certainly not limited to climate change, food and water scarcity, environmental degradation, natural disasters, pandemics, irregular movements of people, human and drug trafficking, violent extremism, terrorism, and transnational crimes, cyber security, etc.

68 Abbas Bhuiya, op. cit.

185


Bangladesh as a developing country is very much vulnerable to NTS threats emanating from global, transnational and national phenomenon. However, one needs to take a wider approach while discussing NTS issues in Bangladesh as many factors – geography, length of time, and context – impact a country’s sources of NTS threats. A comprehensive list may include numerous NTS threats for Bangladesh, however, a priority list subsumes transnational crimes, environmental degradation, climate change, water scarcity, natural disasters, economic security and terrorism and violent extremism as more significant NTS threats requiring urgent attention and measures.

Traditional responses by nation-states are ineffective against NTS threats. Security policy options traditionally followed by nation-states, viz military deterrence, diplomatic manoeuvring and short-term political arrangement rendered inadequate in addressing some of the NTS threats. New policy innovations including use of non-military means as well as comprehensive political, economic and social responses are required to properly address the NTS threats in Bangladesh. Moreover, the NTS issues also require the national leadership to look not only inwards to execute internal socio-economic and political reforms but also outwards, with an open outlook to cultivate international cooperation. The paper suggested undertaking three-pronged policy options for Bangladesh, i.e., devising a comprehensive security approach, boasting international cooperation, and crafting a dynamic and adaptive security framework. Failure to address the challenges timely and appropriately will only increase the sufferings of its people and ultimately endanger the survival and safety of both people and the state. Finally, seizing the opportunity of economic progress and development, security policy of Bangladesh must be forward-looking, constructive, and optimistic. Moreover, it has to be comprehensive enough to address the NTS challenges appropriately with a view to bolstering broad-based economic growth in the country with sustained peace and security.

186


187

Md. Riaz UddinHasan Mahmud

eXPloRing the Role oF climate change as a thReat multiPlieR: Bangladesh in PeRsPectiVe

Abstract

It is agreed by the academia that climate change is happening and according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the reason is primarily anthropogenic. The focus of this study is the role of climate change as a threat multiplier in the context of Bangladesh. A conceptual framework presented by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) linking climate change and security in the Sahel region is used as the basis of this study. The cases of Darfur and Nigeria, where impacts of climate change are liable for accelerating instability in the respective areas, are analyzed in details to get hold of the threats associated with climate change and implications of such threats for vulnerable states. According to many indices, Bangladesh is highly susceptible to changes in climatic events due to its unique geographic location and socio-economic condition. This paper finds that impacts of climate change stir up different phenomena that can multiply instability in Bangladesh. Moreover, such impacts may turn out to be oblique threats to national security of the country in the long run. Based on the findings of the research, this paper presents a new framework linking climate change with national insecurity and proposes that further study can improve the precision and usability of components affiliated with this framework.

Keywords: Climate change; Security; Threat multiplier; Destabilization; Bangladesh

1. Introduction

“There is every reason to believe that as the 21st century unfolds, the security story will be bound together with climate change”.

— John Ashton.1

Md. Riaz Uddin is Intern at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). His email address is: [email protected]; Hasan Mahmud is MSS degree pursuer at Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka. His email address is: [email protected]


1James R. Lee, “Global Warming Is Just the Tip of the Iceberg”, The Washington Post, 04 January 2009.


188


The above quotation alludes to the potential nexus of climate change with the security paradigm. Climate change is already considered as a threat to the safety and wellbeing of people all around the world. Throughout the globe, sea level rise, rapid desertification, increased salinity and the growing frequency of natural disasters are turning out to be common phenomena. Exactly when climate change started to occur due to anthropogenic reasons is up to debate. According to a recent study published in the Nature journal, greenhouse gases began warming the world’s oceans in the early 1800s.2 Since 1901, earth’s surface has warmed by 0.7–0.9°C, but the rate of warming has nearly doubled since 1975 to 1.5–1.8°C.3 By 2020, it is projected that global surface temperature will be more than 0.5°C (0.9°F) warmer than the 1986-2005 average.4 Thus, it is undeniable that climate is changing more rapidly now compared to the past.

Climate change can be linked with security concern of nation states in the modern era. For Bangladesh, climate change is already a vital issue because the country is in fear of losing more in the near future due to the changing climate. A research reveals that “a sea-level rise of 0.5 meters over the last 100 years has already eroded 65% landmass of 250 square kilometers of Kutubdia, 227 square kilometers of Bhola and 180 square kilometers of Sandwip islands”.5 According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a 45 cm sea-level rise will inundate almost 10.9 per cent of the territory of Bangladesh.6 Moreover, the issue of climate change-induced cross-border migration has already created tension with India.7 Against this backdrop, the objective of this paper is to understand whether climate change can be considered as a significant threat multiplier for Bangladesh. With this objective, this study looks forward to answering some research questions: What are the prevailing impacts of climate change in Bangladesh? Among these impacts, which ones can potentially cause a significant level of insecurity in Bangladesh and how?

In order to address these research questions, there are six sections in this paper. Section two examines the prevailing literature on the climate change-security nexus. Section three highlights the analytical framework based on which this study progresses. Section four discusses the cases of Darfur and Nigeria where the impacts

2 Roz Pidcock, “Scientists clarify starting point for human-caused climate change”, available at https://www.carbonbrief.org/scientists-clarify-starting-point-for-human-caused-climate-change, accessed on 31 October 2018. 3 Gail Hartfield, Jessica Blunden and Derek S. Arndt, “State of the Climate in 2017”, Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, Vol. 99, No. 8, 2018.4 Rebecca Lindsey and LuAnn Dahlman, “Climate Change: Global Temperature”, available at https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/climate-change-global-temperature, accessed on 31 October 2018.5 Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS) and Saferworld, Climate Change and Security in Bangladesh: A Case Study, Dhaka, 2009.6 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.7 BIISS and Saferworld, op. cit.

189

EXPLORING THE ROLE OF CLIMATE CHANGE

of climate change have already led to crises resulting into instability and widespread insecurity. Section five explores the threats associated with changing climate which aggravate vulnerabilities of Bangladesh and can potentially challenge the security and survival of the country in the long run. Section six summarizes the findings of this study and concludes the paper.

2. Literature Review

The following discussion is the review of the existing literatures which directly or indirectly address climate change and security within their scope. The existing scholarly works on the role of climate change as a threat multiplier are insufficient, and they are more hypothetical rather than empirical in nature. Hence, the primary purpose of this discussion is to address the gaps in existing studies and to fill up the prevailing literary vacuity. At first, the concepts of climate change and national security are depicted and later, the climate change-security nexus in the existing literature is analyzed.

2.1 Climate Change

Climate change is a highly contested concept and there is no universal definition of it. For this reason, the term is subjectively defined in the academic arena. According to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), “Climate change is a change in the usual weather found in a place. This could be a change in how much rain a place usually gets in a year. Or it could be a change in a place’s usual temperature for a month or season”.8 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) uses the term ‘climate change’ to refer to “a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods”.9 In this study, the conceptualization of climate change by the IPCC is followed, which identifies climate change as “a change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g. using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer. It refers to any change in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity.”10 This particular definition is adopted in this study because it takes both natural and human variables into consideration, which helps to get rid of any parochial view of climate change.

8 “What is Climate Change?”, available at https://www.nasa.gov/audience/forstudents/k-4/stories/nasa-knows/what-is-climate-change-k4.html, accessed on 01 November 2018.9 “United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)”, available at https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/conveng.pdf, accessed on 01 November 2018.10 IPCC, op. cit.

190


2.2 National Security

National security is another contested concept which is defined subjectively in different studies. Walter Lippmann defines national security saying that “a nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war”.11 This view can be considered as parochial because it considers only military threats. Harold Brown has enhanced the concept by including elements such as economic and environmental security. According to him, “National security then is the ability to preserve the nation’s physical integrity and territory; to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to preserve its nature, institution, and governance from disruption from outside; and to control its borders.”12 This definition is not much inclusive in the sense that it only considers external threats. For this study, Mario Nobilo’s view of national security is followed, who defines national security as “an intricate interaction between political, economic, military, ideological, legal, social and other internal and external social factors through which individual states attempt to ensure acceptable provisions to maintain their sovereignty, territorial integrity, the physical survival of its population, political independence and possibilities for a balanced and rapid social development on an equal footing”.13 As per this definition, national security can be jeopardized by both internal and external facets. Any threat to either one or multiple components of national security according to this view, namely, sovereignty, territorial integrity, survival of the population, political independence and social development, put national security at stake. It is worth noting that national security is something that needs to be ensured in a full-fledged manner. As General Jacob L. Devers puts it nicely, “National security is a condition which cannot be qualified. We shall either be secure, or we shall be insecure. We cannot have partial security. If we are only half secure, we are not secure at all”.14

2.3 Climate Change-Security Nexus in the Literature

The scientific basis for climate change is already well established and there is continuous progress in the amount of research being undertaken on the biophysical effects of climate change regarding the rising sea level, distorted rainfall patterns, more recurrent and violent storms and the likely corollaries of all these phenomena

11 Walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, Boston: Little, 1943.12 Harold Brown, Thinking About National Security: Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1983.13 Mario Nobilo, “The Concept of Security in the Terminology of International Relations”, Political Thought, October-December, 1988, pp. 72-73.14 Bernard Brodie, “National Security Policy and Economic Stability”, available at https://books.google.com.bd/books/about/National_Security_Policy_and_Economic_St.html?id=_borAAAAYAAJ&redir_esc=y, accessed on 02 November 2018.

191


for human well-being.15 The following table summarizes the existing works on the climate change-security nexus which will be discussed in details afterward:

Table 1: Selected Literature on Climate Change-Security NexusAuthor(s) Methodology Findings

BIISS and Safer-world

A combination of desk and field research was adopted. Field research included key informant interviews and focus group dis-cussions in case study locations.

Migrating away from the climate change-affected areas can have negative impacts on the economic and social situa-tion of the destination areas, which may lead to increased tension, crime and violence and the risk of serious social disturbances – leading in the worst-case scenario to violent conflict.

Jon Bar-nett and W. Neil Adger

Secondary ma-terials included books, journal papers and news-paper articles.

Climate change undermines human security by reducing people’s access to natural resources that are important to sustain their livelihoods. Climate change is also likely to undermine the capacity of states to provide the opportu-nities and services that help people to sustain their liveli-hoods, and which help maintain and build peace. In certain circumstances, the direct and indirect impacts of climate change on human security and the state may in turn in-crease the risk of violent conflict.

UNEP The study fol-lowed a unique mapping process analyzing climate trends over a 24 to 36-year period in the 17 coun-tries included in its geographical scope.

Climatic change trends are observed over the last 40 years in the Sahel. Changes in climatic conditions exacerbated issues linked to the availability of natural resources essen-tial to livelihoods in the region, as well as food insecurity. The impacts of changing climatic conditions on the avail-ability of natural resources have led to increased competi-tion over scarce natural resources and resulted in tensions and conflicts between communities and livelihood groups. Some adaptation policies in the region recognize the link-ages between changing climatic conditions and behav-ioral responses, such as migration and conflict.

15 Oli Brown, Anne Hammill and Robert McLeman, “Climate Change as the ‘New’ Security Threat: Implications for Africa”, International Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 6, 2007, p. 1146.

192


Mayowa J Fasona and AS Omojola

A geographic in-formation system (GIS) approach that permits the analysis of mul-tiple data layers was used.

The Sahel region recorded deficit rainfall over a period of six-decade (1940-2000). There is a clear indication of loss of prime arable lands resulting from climate change. This is correlated with the pattern of communal clashes and con-flicts over land resources. The situation is a zero-sum game where each participant’s gain is the others (and collective) loss. This is a situation where all will be losers at the end.

The Center for Strategic and Inter-national Studies (CSIS) and the Center for a New American Security (CNAS)

The study was focused on a col-laboration which engaged climate scientists and national security specialists in a lengthy dialogue on the security implications of future climate change.

With climate change, a number of phenomena are likely to happen. Soft power and North-South tensions will increase. Migration and immigration will rise, producing a strong backlash. Public health problems will grow. Re-source conflicts and vulnerabilities will intensify. Nuclear activity will increase, with attendant risks. Domestic politi-cal repercussions and state failure will occur. The balance of power will shift in unpredictable ways.

Jon Bar-nett

Secondary ma-terials included books, journal papers and news-paper articles.

Climate change is a security problem for some states and people. National security has an internal dimension in that it is partly a function of state legitimacy. Governments in states where the material well-being of people is highly variable to external forces or where material wellbeing is declining, tend to be more prone to internal violent con-flicts. The possibility of violent conflicts may lead to welfare and livelihoods less secure. On the basis of existing envi-ronment-conflict research there is simply insufficient evi-dence and too much uncertainty to make anything other than highly speculative claims about the effect of climate change on violent conflict.

Source: Authors’ compilation.

Back in 2009, a study on climate change and human security in Bangladesh was conducted by BIISS and Saferworld.16 According to that study, “The relationship between climate change and security is not necessarily direct, but depends on a chain of consequences. For example, climate change causes environmental degradation. In areas where this phenomenon occurs, it undermines livelihoods, reducing basic human security and creating increased tension as competition for dwindling resources becomes more intense. This tension can lead to crime and violence, increasing social instability. The deteriorating economic and social situation also drives people to migrate from these areas to towns and cities in search of a better life. However, this migration away from affected areas can have

16 BIISS and Saferworld, op. cit.

193


negative effects on the economic and social situation in destination areas, which may again lead to increased tension, crime and violence and the risk of serious social disturbances – leading in the worst-case scenario to violent conflict”.17

Although this study mentions that climate change can reduce human security and possibly lead to violent conflict, it has not thoroughly assessed how such impacts may affect the national security of Bangladesh through its repercussions.

Barnett and Adger argue that climate change undermines human security and this may, in turn, increase the risk of violent conflict.18 They mention, “Climate change undermines human security in the present day and will increasingly do so in the future. It does this by reducing people’s access to natural resources that are important to sustain their livelihoods. Climate change is also likely to undermine the capacity of states to provide the opportunities and services that help people to sustain their livelihoods and help to maintain and build peace. In certain circumstances, these direct and indirect impacts of climate change on human security and the state may in turn increase the risk of violent conflict”.19

While this study argues that impacts of climate change on state and human security holds the potential for increasing conflicts, it does not provide ample evidence to support the view.

The UNEP conducted a study in 2011 to assess the impacts of climate change on the Sahel region.20 This study analyzed historical climate trends across this region to explore the link between the impacts of climate change on livelihoods and behavioural responses such as migration and conflict. The findings of this study are as following:

(i) Climatic change trends can be observed over the last 40 years in the Sahel in terms of temperature, rainfall and floods. In addition, the recurrence of drought and the potentially severe impacts of sea-level rise are increasing livelihood vulnerability.

(ii) Alterations in climatic orders are aggravating issues related to the accessibility of natural resources crucial for livelihoods and food security in the area. Coupled with vital social, economic and political issues, this can result in migration and conflict.

(iii) The way the accessibility to natural resources is hindered by fluctuating climatic conditions, coupled with phenomena, such as population

17 Ibid.18 Jon Barnett and W. Neil Adger, “Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict”, Political Geography, Vol. 26, No. 6, 2007.19 Ibid, p. 651.20 UNEP, Livelihood Security: Climate Change, Migration and Conflict in the Sahel, Geneva: UNEP, 2011.

194


growth, weak governance and land tenure challenges, has led to greater competition over scant natural resources – most remarkably fertile land and drinking water – and resulted in tensions and clashes among different communities.

This study has found a strong link between the impacts of climate change on livelihoods and behavioural responses. Migration and conflict can be great security threats not only for individuals but also for the nation-states in the Sahel region. However, this study has only considered the vulnerability of individuals and ignored the vulnerability of the nation-states during the evaluation.

According to Fasona and Omojola, climate change is undermining human security in Nigeria which, in turn, might be fueling communal clashes.21

The researchers used a geographical information system approach to collect data and based on best available data, their study has found a very strong connection between climate change and the pattern of communal clashes in the country. According to the researchers, “The pattern of land cover changes between 1976 and 1995 strongly indicated loss of prime arable lands resulting from climate change, which is in turn leading to opening up of new virgin lands towards the south. This is correlated with the pattern of communal clashes and conflicts over land resources which are more common in the guinea savannah zone, rainforest belt and the mangrove ecology”.22

This study has excellently linked climate change with communal clashes in Nigeria. That being said, any analysis of climate change as a threat multiplier for the national security of Nigeria is absent in their work.

The CSIS and the CNAS jointly conducted a research on the foreign policy and national security implications of global climate change. The study found that, “the United States can expect that climate change will exacerbate already existing north-south tensions, dramatically increase global migration both inside and between nations (including into the United States), spur more serious public health problems, heighten interstate tension and possibly conflict over resources, challenge the institutions of global governance, cause potentially destabilizing domestic political and social repercussions, and stir unpredictable shifts in the global balance of power”.23 The study also expressed in its concluding remarks that some of the challenges of climate change “have the potential to overwhelm national governments and international institutions. It is difficult to anticipate how that will ultimately

21 Mayowa J Fasona and AS Omojola, “Climate Change, Human Security and Communal Clashes in Nigeria”, paper presented in the International Workshop on Human Security and Climate Change, organized by Centre for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), Oslo, on 21-23 June 2005.22 Ibid, p. 20.23 “The Age of Consequences: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Global Climate Change”, available at https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/071105_ageofconsequences.pdf, accessed on 01 November 2018.

195


unfold, but the prospects for destabilizing global effects are clearly on the horizon”.24

This research puts national security in perspective while exploring the implications of climate change worldwide. Nevertheless, the study still remains an anticipatory work rather than an exploratory one.

Some scholars hypothetically argue that sea-level rise, ice-free Arctic region and climate change-induced migration may pose a significant threat to the survival of nation-states. Barnett states, “Because sovereignty over delineated territory is the material substrata of national security, then physical processes such as sea-level rise may undermine national security in serious ways”.25 He also argues that climate change may create legitimacy crisis for the government and destabilize the internal harmony and thus undermine national security.26 Though he portrays climate change as a national security issue in his study, he offers little evidence in this regard.

The literature review indicates that only a few scholars have considered the impacts of climate change on national security so far. Nonetheless, their arguments are not based on empirical data. Most scholars in the academic arena still put emphasis on human security while discussing impacts of climate change and thus ignore the insecurity of nation-states. The present and predicted climate trends, as illustrated in the scientific reports, such as Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) and Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) by IPCC, project that it is time for us to think out of the box. The scarcity of theoretical and empirical studies in this issue, coupled with the alarming reports on the tentative grim impacts of climate change on Bangladesh, infers new questions and research areas to be explored. In this regard, this study proceeds with a determination to unfold security implications of climate change in the context of Bangladesh.

3. Analytical Framework

In 2011, a conceptual framework was presented by UNEP in a report titled “Livelihood Security: Climate Change, Migration and Conflict in the Sahel” where an assessment of the linkage between climate change and security in the Sahel region was conducted.

24 Ibid.25 Jon Barnett, “Security and Climate Change”, Global Environmental Change, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2003, p. 9.26 Ibid.

196


Figure 1: Climate Change and Its Possible Security Implications27

Climate ChangeImpacts

(temperature, rainfall, drought�ood, sea-level rise)

VulnerabilityFood securitywater securityhealth issues

Natural resourceavailability

Possible responses/outcomeMigration

Resource competitonPolitical destabilization

Con�ict

Non ClimaticFactors

Economic

Social

Political

Depmgraphicperssure

Land degradation

Threat multiplier

Source: UNEP, 2011.

This conceptual framework is based on the report of the UN Secretary-General on climate change and its possible security implications. This framework identifies five channels through which climate change could affect security. Those channels are as below:

Vulnerability: Climate change jeopardizes food security and human health, and upsurges human exposure to extreme events.

Development: If climate change decelerates the development process, the subsequent vulnerability may weaken the aptitude of states to preserve stability.

Coping and Security: Migration, resource competition and other coping responses of households and communities faced with climate-related risks could upsurge the danger of national conflict and have international consequences.

Statelessness: There are repercussions for rights, security and sovereignty with the loss of statehood due to disappearance of territory.

27 UNEP, op. cit., p. 14.

197


International conflict: The effect of climate change on shared or un-delineated international resources may disturb international cooperation. 28

According to this framework, climate change can exacerbate political, economic and social instabilities which may, in turn, lead to conflict and political unrest. This framework has been used throughout the research to assess the role of climate change as a threat multiplier for national security. The strength of this framework is that whereas most theoretical frameworks of climate change and security only highlight the climatic factors and overlook non-climatic ones, this framework takes both of them into consideration. Therefore, this is an inclusive model unlike the other ones and is better able to explain the linkage between climate change and security more effectively compared to other frameworks.

4. Climate Change as a Threat Multiplier – Two Contemporary Cases

This section aims to analyze two contemporary international cases where climate change has already played the role as a threat multiplier. The cases of Darfur and Nigeria are analyzed in this respect. The reason behind selecting African cases is that, according to the AR5, Africa’s climate is changing more rapidly compared to the rest of the world and the impacts of climate change on both human and national security are already felt here.29

4.1 The Case of Darfur

The Darfur crisis is an unfortunate legacy of fierce competition over land rights and limited resources. The competition originated from the Darfurians’ demand for land and water.30

Increased tribal friction, deriving from clashes over resource control, led to intertribal disputes.31

The disputes resulted in clashes among settled tribes, mostly African, and nomadic tribes, mostly Arab, who were competing for resources for a long time after a prolonged drought in 1983.32

28 Ibid, p. 14.29 IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report, Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2015.30 Hamdy A Hassan, “Dimensions of the Darfur crisis and its consequences: An Arab perspective “, African Security Review, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2010, p. 21.31 Ibid.32 Carin Zissis, “Darfur: Crisis Continues”, available at https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/darfur-crisis-continues, accessed on 03 November 2018.

198


In the meantime, the Muslim government of the north was busy with a civil war with insurgents in the Christian and animist dominated south.33 The government of Sudan backed Darfur’s Arab paramilitaries to keep the rebels cornered. This deteriorated Arab-African friction even more and eventually, President Omar al-Bashir transformed a competition over scarce resources into a far-reaching violent conflict shaded with grave racial and ethnic connotations.34

According to former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, “Almost invariably, we discuss Darfur in a convenient military and political shorthand - an ethnic conflict pitting Arab militias against black rebels and farmers. Look to its roots, though, and you discover a more complex dynamic. Amid the diverse social and political causes, the Darfur conflict began as an ecological crisis, arising in part from climate change”.35

In other words, he considers climate change as one of the significant factors behind the emergence of the Darfur crisis. The following discussion will assess the validity of his statement based on empirical data.

4.1.1 The Impacts of Climate Change

A June 2007 report by UNEP suggests that the climate of Darfur has been changing drastically since 1970s.36 Recurrent droughts and floods, desertification and scarcity of rainfall have borne the testimony of the changing climate in this region. According to the report of UNEP, the following events occurred as direct impacts of climate change:

Drought: During the period of 1980-2006, Darfur experienced several droughts which adversely affected the populace of this area.37 The frequency and intensity of droughts have increased due to climate change. The droughts of 1980-1984, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993 and 2000 indicate that the frequency of droughts has been quite high in the recent decades.38

Desertification: Desertification is considered as the greatest environmental problem of Sudan because of the fact that 29 per cent of Sudan is already desert.39

The UNEP report says, “An estimated 50 to 200 km southward shift of the boundary between semi-desert and desert has occurred since rainfall and vegetation records were first held in 1930s. This boundary is expected to continue to move southwards due to declining precipitation”.40 This report also indicates that the

33 Ibid.34 Ibid.35 Ban Ki Moon, “A Climate Culprit in Darfur”, The Washington Post, 16 June 2007.36 UNEP, Sudan: Post-conflict Environmental Assessment, Nairobi: UNEP, 2007.37 Ibid.38 Ibid.39 Ibid.40 Ibid, p. 9.

199


rate of desertification has been increasing since 1980s due to the rapidly changing climate in Sudan.

Flood: Though there is a serious water shortage in Darfur and in its adjacent areas, flood is a common phenomenon around here. During the period of 1980-2006, several floods took place in the region. The frequency of flood during this period was quiet high. The UNEP report says, “The sequence of severe Nile floods – which were recorded in 1878, 1946, 1988, 1994, 1998 and 2006 – clearly shows that the frequency of flooding has increased dramatically over the last twenty years”.41

The Scarcity of Rainfall: The average annual rainfall during the period of 1946-1975 was 564.20mm which significantly reduced during the period of 1976-2005 to only 427.70mm.42 In other words, rainfall decreased in Darfur by 24 per cent during the period of 1976-2005 compared to the period of 1946-1975.43

4.1.2 Impacts of Non-Climatic Factors

In the case of Darfur, climate change did not act as a single factor which led to food insecurity, water insecurity or scarcity of natural resources. Rather there have been several other political, social and economic factors. Non-climatic factors which contributed to this crisis were:

Population Growth: Population growth has led to food shortage, water scarcity and scarcity of other natural resources to a great extent. A census in 1973 counted 1.4 million people in Darfur; in 2003, it was almost 6.5 million, a nearly fivefold increase.44 This rapidly rising population has acted as a significant factor in this crisis.

Rainfed Agriculture: 75 per cent of the agriculture in this area is rain-fed.45 So, the shortage of rainfall during the period of 1976-2005 has greatly contributed to the demise in agricultural activities in Darfur and that ultimately led to food insecurity.

Bad Governance: Bad governance is another non-climatic factor that contributed heavily in creating the crisis situation in Darfur. The government did not take any step to adapt to the changing climate or to address the problems of water, food and natural resource shortages.

41 Ibid, p. 66.42 Ibid.43 Ibid.44 Schuyler Null and Lauren Herzer Risi, “Navigating Complexity: Climate, Migration, and Conflict in a Changing World”, available at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ecsp_navigating_complexity_web_0.pdf, accessed on 11 October 2018.45 Global Military Advisory Council on Climate Change, Climate Change & Security in Africa: Clear Risks, Nuanced Impacts, Hague: Institute for Environmental Security, 2014.

200


The Fault Line Between Farmers and Herdsmen: There are broadly two groups in Darfur – the African settled farmers and the Arabian nomadic herdsmen. These two groups have been fighting against each other for more than seventy years, but the severity of conflict increased after 1980s due to the impacts of climate change like soil erosion, desertification, shortage of rainfall, floods and droughts.

4.1.3 Outcomes

Greater water and food insecurity coupled with shortage of natural resources have ultimately led to the following outcomes in Darfur:

Resource Competition: Climate change has made natural resources much more scarce which led to competition over water, agricultural land and other resources. A strong link between resource competition and climate change is found by the UNEP report.

Conflict: Resource competition between local groups, especially between Arabian nomadic herdsmen and African settled framers, has transformed into at first local, then national conflict. This conflict has spilled into neighbouring Chad and the Central African Republic in the aftermath.

Migration: Food and water shortage, natural resource scarcity, local level conflicts and several other economic, social and political factors have motivated the people of Darfur to migrate to the adjacent places and in many cases, to the neighbouring Chad and the Central African Republic.

Political Destabilization: Drought, desertification and deficient rainfall created food and water insecurity that eventually destabilized Darfur at first and then the rest of Sudan.

4.1.4 The Role of Climate Change as a Threat Multiplier

Climate change impacts, such as droughts, desertification, scarcity of rainfall and floods have exacerbated the pre-existing problems of Darfur that eventually created food and water insecurity and natural resource shortage which, in turn, led to local level conflicts and political destabilization. Afterwards, local conflicts have transformed into national crisis of Sudan and that crisis has spilled into neighboring countries. Thus, climate change along with several other social, political and economic factors has created a security problem not only for the individuals but also for the state in the case of Darfur. Therefore, Ban Ki-moon’s argument which linked Darfur crisis with climate change is valid in the light of this discussion.

201


4.2 The Case of Nigeria

Nigeria, where more than 150 million people reside within an area twice the size of California, suffers from grave ethnic divisions, challenges towards development and an incapable leadership.46 The state faces numerous impediments in fulfilling its resource demand. Most of the violent conflicts that arise from failure to share limited resources characterize the country’s social landscape — neighbour fighting neighbour, Muslims fighting against Christians, patrons fighting against clients, citizens fighting the state.47

The rising temperature and declining rainfall due to the changing climate have led to frequent drought and desertification in Nigeria. The Sahara Desert is annually expanding 1-10 km to all directions and trying to engulf the Sahelian region of Africa.48 The shifting sand dunes have buried vast arable lands, thus reducing crop production. This has instigated large-scale migration and relocation of people to areas less vulnerable to desertification. Such migration has social effects like reduction of social values and dignity. The most common outcome is communal clashes among herdsmen and farmers and such conflicts resulted in the mortality of 186 people in 6 northern states of Nigeria between 1998 and 2006.49 Against this backdrop, the security implications of climate change in the case of Nigeria are analyzed below.

4.2.1 The Impacts of Climate Change

The climate of Nigeria is changing rapidly and the following impacts are vivid in the country:

Reduction in Rainfall: Parts of the country, especially the arid north, are experiencing an intense combination of more heat and less rain. Some parts of the northern Sahel region have witnessed less than 10 inches of rainfall on average in a year in the past decade, 25 per cent less than that of thirty years back.50

Desertification: Due to less rainfall in the northern part of Nigeria, desertification has been increasing rapidly. Since 1900, the Sahara has moved to north and south a total of about 150 miles and now covers an additional 3,750 square miles. Nigeria loses thousands of acres of grazing and agricultural land to the growing desert every year.51

46 United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Climate Change Adaptation and Conflict in Nigeria, Washington, DC: USIP, 2011.47 Ibid.48 Peter AO Odjugo, “General Overview of Climate Change Impacts in Nigeria”, Journal of Human Ecology, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2010, p. 50.49 Ibid.50 USIP, op. cit.51 John Campbell, “National Security Implications of Climate Change”, available at https://www.cfr.org/blog/national-security-implications-climate-change, accessed on 15 October 2018.

202


For this very reason, desertification was identified as one of the significant security threats to the 11 northern states of Nigeria by the Federal government in 2002.

Flood: Though there is a scarcity of rainfall in the northern part of Nigeria, the southern part has been experiencing much rainfall since 1970s. According to a study conducted by Odjugo, in the past forty years, recorded volumes of torrential rains increased 20 per cent across various southern states, some of which already witness up to 160 inches of rainfall a year, with wet seasons persisting eight to ten months.52 For the increased rainfall, the southern part has experienced several numbers of floods over the past forty years.

Salinity Intrusion: According to the Federal Ministry of Environment, the sea level along the southern coastline has increased by about 30cm in the last fifty years.53 For the increased sea level, the low-lying 800 Km coastline of Nigeria faces the problem of salinity intrusion.

4.2.2 The Impacts of Non-Climatic Factors

Climate change, along with several other social, political and economic factors, has created food and water insecurity and scarcity of other natural resources in Nigeria. The following non-climatic factors have contributed significantly in creating an unstable scenario there:

Population Growth: Nigeria is populated with more than 200 million people and it is already greater than that of the Russian Federation. This population is fastly growing and it has augmented by 17.35 per cent over the last five years.54

Rain-fed Agriculture: Some 85 per cent of all Nigerian agriculture is rain-fed and many crops are sensitive to even tiny shifts in rainfall and temperature.55 This very fact makes Nigeria highly vulnerable to climatic changes.

Societal Fault Lines: There are more than 260 ethnic groups in Nigeria and there are many differences among them which feed ethnic tension and strengthen societal fault lines across the country. Moreover, the Nigerian government has hardly taken any step to resolve this issue.

52 Peter AO Odjugo, “An Analysis of Rainfall Pattern in Nigeria”, Global Journal of Environmental Science, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2005, pp. 139–145.53 Ibid 54 Campbell, op. cit.55 USIP, op. cit.

203


4.2.3 Outcomes

Food and water insecurity, land loss and natural resource scarcity in Nigeria have ultimately led to:

Competition: Due to desertification and other climate change impacts, arable land has been reducing in Nigeria for a long time which instigates competition over such land.

Conflict: Arable land loss due to climate change has been generating most of the communal clashes since 1990s. According to Fasona and Omojola, 19 of the 37 cases during the period of 1991-2005 were basically crises/clashes triggered by competition over land resources.56

Migration: In the northern part of the country, expanding desertification—referring to the degradation of land productivity in dryland areas—has caused 200 villages to disappear.57 Thus, desertification has pushed people to become involuntary migrants.

4.2.4 The Role of Climate Change as a Threat Multiplier

Desertification, recurrent floods, droughts, acid rain, sea level rise, salinity intrusion and reduction of rainfall along with various social, economic and political factors have created food and water shortage, shortage of arable land and other natural resources in Nigeria. Moreover, food and water insecurity and natural resource scarcity have triggered communal clashes in the country. For such clashes, more than 10,000 people were killed within less than a decade.58 So, the outcomes of climate change have had intense adverse effects on the security and stability of Nigeria.

Climate change has acted as a threat multiplier in the cases of Darfur and Nigeria, and it has exacerbated the pre-existing vulnerabilities in those regions. The analysis of these two cases will be helpful to understand the impacts of climate change on security and stability of Bangladesh in the following discussion.

5. Climate Change as a Threat Multiplier – The Case of Bangladesh

The following subsections analyze the impacts and role of climate change as a threat multiplier in Bangladesh. The outcomes are evaluated in details later with

56 Fasona and Omojola, op. cit.57 Center for American Progress, Climate Change, Migration, and Conflict in Northwest Africa: Rising Dangers and Policy Options Across the Arc of Tension, Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, 2012.58 Vivan Ezra Lekwot, Ali Andesikuteb Yakubu, Okafor Christian I. and Micheal Kingsley Balasom, “Climate Change and Its Effect on National Security in Nigeria”, International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research and Innovations, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2014, pp. 6-10.

204


relevant empirical data. Finally, the climate change-security nexus in the context of Bangladesh is examined thoroughly.

5.1 The Impacts of Climate Change on Bangladesh

Climate change impacts such as temperature rise, sea level rise, recurrent droughts and cyclones, salinity intrusion, erratic rainfall, etc are already visible in Bangladesh.

Temperature Rise: According to IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report, the earth surface is now 0.8°C warmer than the pre-industrial era.59 Along with the rest of the world, the temperature of Bangladesh is increasing rapidly. According to Hasan and Rahman, monthly mean temperature shows a positive trend of increase at a rate of 0.8°C per 100 years.60 Their study also confirms that the temperature of Bangladesh has increased significantly over the last 21 years (1990-2010) than last 63 years (1948-2010).61

Figure 2.a: Trend of Monthly Mean Temperature, 1948-2010 62

( erutarepmeT

0)

C

26.40

26.00

25.60

25.20

24.80

24.401948 1956 1964 1971 1979 1987 1995 2002 2010

Y= 10.480+0.008xR-Square = 0.239

59 IPCC, op. cit.60 A. B. M. Shamim Ul Hasan and M. Zillurr Rahman, “Change in Temperature over Bangladesh Associated with Degrees of Global Warming”, Asian Journal of Applied Science and Engineering, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2013, p. 162.61 Ibid.62 Hasan and Rahman, 2013, op. cit.

205

EXPLORING THE ROLE OF CLIMATE CHANGEFigure 2.b: Trend of Monthly Mean Temperature Using Last 21 Years’ Data, 1990-201063

Figure 2.b: Trend of Monthly Mean Temperature, 1990-201063

( erutarepmeT

0)C

26.25

26.00

25.75

25.50

25.25

25.001990 1993 1995 1998 2000

Year

Y=-15.563+0.021 xR- Square = 0.246

2003 2005 2008 2010

The above mentioned figures clearly illustrate that the overall temperature in Bangladesh has increased more rapidly in the recent years compared to the past.

Sea Level Rise: The AR5 of the IPCC confirms that Bangladesh is highly vulnerable to rising sea level.64 A report of the Climate Change Cell reveals that the range of sea level rise on Bangladesh’s coast over the past 30 years is 6-21mm/year.65 The rate of sea level rise in Bangladesh is much higher than the global average. Moreover, about 10 per cent of its territory is below 1 meter sea level. The rapidly rising sea level and the low elevation of its land make Bangladesh more vulnerable compared to other countries.

Salinity Intrusion: Several studies have confirmed that climate change is one of the main reasons behind salinity intrusion in the coastal area of Bangladesh. The rate of soil and water salinity is increasing rapidly here. Out of about 1.689 million hectares (30 per cent of the total cultivable land of Bangladesh) of coastal land, 1.056 million hectares are affected by soil salinity of varied degrees. In fact, during the period of 1973-2009, about 0.223 million hectors of land (26.7 per cent of total land in Bangladesh) was affected by varied degrees of salinity.66

Intense and Frequent Cyclones: Due to temperature rise and several other factors, intensity and frequency of cyclones have increased significantly. 26 major cyclones hit Bangladesh in the period of 1970-2015, with 18 of them occurring in the

63 Ibid.64 IPCC, op. cit.65 Ministry of Environment and Forests, Assessment of Sea Level Rise on Bangladesh Coast through Trend Analysis, Dhaka: Ministry of Environment and Forests, 2016, p.53.66 Soil Resource Development Institute (SRDI), Saline Soils of Bangladesh, Dhaka: SRDI, 2010, pp. 4-5.

206


last 20 years.67 Increased number of cyclones indicates that frequency has increased rapidly. At the same time, intensity is also on the rise. The devastating cyclones of 1985, 1991, 1997, 2007 and 2009 indicate the validity of the previous statement.

Erratic Rainfall: In recent years, Bangladesh has experienced erratic rainfall patterns and climate change is regarded as the main catalyst behind this. As per the data of Bangladesh Meteorological Department (BMD), from 2010 to 2014, the country experienced about 44,000mm of rainfall on average during the months of June, July and August.68 But in 2015, BMD recorded 19,475mm of rain in June, 29,281mm in July and 15, 231mm in August.69 That was 63,987mm of rain in total over those three months. In 2017, in the first three weeks of April, nearly 8,904mm of rain was recorded against the April average of 4,053mm, which is 119.7 per cent higher.70

Figure 3: Rainfall Pattern in Bangladesh (mm), 2010-2015 71

Rainfall (mm)

35000

30000

25000

20000

15000

10000

5000

02010

JuneJulyAugustSeptember

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Chart Area

Recurrent Floods: Bangladesh is a flood prone country. According to the government’s Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan, in an ‘average’ year, approximately one quarter of the country is inundated. Every four to five years, there

67 Md. Selim Reza, “Climate Change Induced Migration: Future Challenges and Opportunities for Bangladesh”, available at http://fairbd.net/climate-change-induced-migration-future-challenges-and-opportunities-for-bangladesh/, accessed on 15 October 2018.68 Sujit Sarker, “Unusual Rain: Climate Change to Blame”, available at https://www.thedailystar.net/country/unusual-rain-climate-change-blame-136609, accessed on 15 October 2018.69 Ibid.70 Moinul Hoque Chowdhury, “Bangladesh Sees Highest Rainfall for 35 Years Recorded in April”, available at https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2017/04/25/bangladesh-sees-highest-rainfall-for-35-years-recorded-in-april, accessed on 15 October 2018.71 Sarker, op. cit.

207


is a severe flood that may cover over 60 per cent of the country.72 The extent and frequency of floods are likely to increase in the upcoming days due to sea level rise, erratic rainfall and melting of Himalayan glaciers.73

Droughts: Northern Bangladesh is a drought-prone area and due to temperature rise, prolonged summer and changing rainfall pattern, the livelihood of the common people in this area is now at stake to a great extent.74

5.2 The Role of Climate Change as a Threat Multiplier

Like the Darfur and Nigerian crises, impacts of climate change multiply food shortage, water scarcity, health insecurity and natural resource scarcity in Bangladesh. Although non-climatic factors, such as overpopulation, poverty and rain-fed agriculture play a significant role in these regards as well, climate change plays the most prominent part.

Food Insecurity: Erratic rainfall, recurrent floods, droughts, frequent cyclones, sea level rise and salinity intrusion have already affected food production in Bangladesh due to the fact that the agricultural sector here is heavily climate sensitive. Crop production has declined significantly in many parts of Bangladesh due to the changing climate. For instance, soil salinity decreases crop production about 0.13 million tons every year.

In future, increased frequency of extreme weather events, water scarcity, sea level rise and salinity intrusion will certainly create greater food insecurity.75

Water Scarcity: In the southern and northern regions of Bangladesh, a good number of people already suffer from water shortage. For instance, in the southwestern coastal region, around 2.5 million of the poorest people already suffer from scarcity of water.76 The water shortage will be acute in future due to droughts and salinity intrusion. Moreover, the glacier of the Himalayas is melting more rapidly compared to the past. The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) have found that this glacier had receded 4,340 meters since 1965 and had split into multiple

72 Robert Glennon, “The Unfolding Tragedy of Climate Change in Bangladesh”, available at https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/the-unfolding-tragedy-of-climate-change-in-bangladesh/, accessed on 02 November 2018.73 Ahsan Uddin Ahmed, Bangladesh Climate Change Impacts and Vulnerability: A Synthesis, Dhaka: Climate Change Cell, 2006.74 Abu Reza Md. Towfiqul Islam, Anjum Tasnuva, Subaran Chandra Sarker, Md. Masudar Rahman, Md. Sanaul Haque Mondal and Md. Mujahid Ul Islam, “Drought in Northern Bangladesh: Social, Agroecological Impact and Local Perception”, International Journal of Ecosystem, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2014, pp. 150-158.75 Md. Mizanur Rahman and Amartya Kumar Bhattacharya, “Saline Water Intrusion in Coastal Aquifers: A Case Study from Bangladesh”, IOSR Journal of Engineering (IOSRJEN), Vol. 4, No. 1, 2014, pp. 7-12.76 Lia Sieghart and David Rogers, “Why Climate Change is an Existential Threat to the Bangladesh Delta”, available at http://blogs.worldbank.org/endpovertyinsouthasia/why-climate-change-existential-threat-bangladesh-delta, accessed on 15 October 2018.

208


valley glaciers resulting in the total loss of 10 per cent of glacier area.77 For the rapidly melting glaciers, number of floods will increase in short-term, but it will ultimately create greater water insecurity in Bangladesh in long run.

Land Loss: Land is one of the most important strategic resources for Bangladesh. It is already scarce in this overpopulated country. Moreover, salinity intrusion, sea level rise, coastal erosion and river erosion make land much more insufficient. Due to sea level rise, more than half of Kutubdia, Bhola and Sandwip islands have already submerged under water.78 On top of that, agricultural lands in the coastal area of Bangladesh suffer from high salinity intrusion which prevents crop production in the dry season and thus, reduces the usability of these lands.79

Health Issue: Climate change impacts like erratic rainfall, recurrent floods, droughts, frequent cyclones, sea level rise and most importantly, salinity intrusion create health insecurity for a number of individuals in Bangladesh. According to IPCC’s AR5, Bangladesh is very vulnerable to climate-sensitive diseases like cholera, dengue, diarrhea, hypertension, etc.80

5.3 Outcomes

Climate change is a significant factor to create health insecurity, greater water and food shortage and resource scarcity in Bangladesh. Such problems, in turn, lead to:

Migration: There were approximately 25 million environmental refugees in the world back in 1995 but this number is estimated to rise to 200 million by 2050, many of them as a result of climate change.81 Bangladesh is one of those countries which are severely affected by climate-induced migration. Such migration has increased in this country since 2006 because of the frequent disasters in the coastal belt.82 Thirty five million people reside in the coastal area in Bangladesh and they are primary victims of climate change.83 With one-meter sea level rise, 15 million people are potentially

77 “Recession of Himalayan Glaciers Alarming: ISRO”, available at https://indianexpress.com/article/technology/science/recession-of-himalayan-glaciers-alarming-isro-scientists-4747260/, accessed on 15 October 2018.78 BIISS and Saferworld, op. cit.79 Mohammed Abdul Baten, Lubna Seal and Kazi Sunzida Lisa, “Salinity Intrusion in Interior Coast of Bangladesh: Challenges to Agriculture in South-Central Coastal Zone”, American Journal of Climate Change, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2015, p. 249.80 IPCC, op. cit.81 Reazul Ahsan, Jon Kellett and Sadasivam Karuppannan, “Climate Induced Migration: Lessons from Bangladesh”, available at https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Dr_S_M_Reazul_Ahsan/publication/281549970_Climate_Induced_Migration_Lessons_from_Bangladesh/links/55ed527a08ae3e121847ff82/Climate-Induced-Migration-Lessons-from-Bangladesh.pdf, accessed on 04 November 2018.82 Ibid, p. 7.83 Ibid.

209


affected.84 Moreover, 8000 km of roads, 13 per cent of the total agricultural land and 2 major cities could be impacted.85 Most of the populace in these vulnerable coastal districts will have no choice but to migrate to other parts of the country and find alternative livelihood.86 It is obvious that seasonal migration has been a recognized trend in Bangladesh for decades. But this seasonal migration is gradually turning into permanent migration.87

Resource Competition: Water shortage, land loss and other resource scarcity lead to resource competition in Bangladesh. Competition over arable land and water is already seen in the coastal region. For example, although livestock do not suffer death during droughts in Bangladesh, lack of drinking water multiplies their susceptibility to diseases.88 The density of livestock in the coastal area is significantly lower than other parts of the country due to high level of saline water.89 Rise in salinity has increased competition for freshwater resources remarkably over time in the region.90 On top of that, shrimp farming became an adaptation policy in the face of salinity intrusion in the coastal southwest.91 No matter how economically sound such farming may look, the benefits are not shared among all members of the local community equally.92 Majority of profits is earned by a small percentage of large absentee landholders and by urban-based processing factory owners. The salinization of agricultural lands via the intrusion of saline water used in shrimp ponds compromises the fertility of the soil for current and future agricultural cultivation.93 Besides, the extremely low amount of labour required for shrimp production relative to rice farming causes a labor surplus. It leads to displacement from agricultural livelihoods, forcing many landless labourers to shift to cities in search of work. As a result, there is significant opposition to shrimp farming among local residents who perceive it as a threat to their continued habitation in this region.94 Competition over land usage now continues without any viable solution in the near future. Any possibility that competition over resources, freshwater and land for example, will fade out seems unrealistic in the face of increasing climate change impacts.

84 Ibid.85 Ibid.86 Authors’ interview with Mohammad Rashed Alam Bhuiyan, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Dhaka, 2017.87 Bahauddin K.M, Marianne Joan Dutkiewicz and Mrinal K Nath, “Climate Change-induced Migration in Bangladesh: Realizing the Migration Process, Human Security and Sustainable Development”, available at https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/1014764_Bahauddin_Climate Change-induced Migration in Bangladesh_Realizing the Migration Process_Human Security and Sustainable Development.pdf, accessed on 15 October 2018.88 Ahmed, op. cit.89 Ibid.90 Ibid.91 Kasia Paprocki and Saleemul Huq, “Shrimp and Coastal Adaptation: on the Politics of Climate Justice”, Climate and Development, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2017, p. 2.92 Ibid.93 Ibid.94 Ibid.

210


Political Destabilization: Climate change-induced migration may turn out to be a great threat to political stability of Bangladesh. Internal harmony can be hampered in a serious way. In September 2010, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh stated that the mass movement of up to one billion climate change migrants, including 30 million in Bangladesh, “would cause social disorders, political instability, cross-border conflicts, and upheavals”.95 In an interview conducted by the authors, an expert on climate change opined: “Economic development is one of the most prioritized issues for Bangladesh and climate change poses a great challenge to such development by undermining the main drivers behind it - natural resources and human resources. Economic underdevelopment may exacerbate the existing vulnerability of Bangladesh by aggravating the poverty situation and that may, in turn, hamper the internal harmony of this country which can ultimately lead to social and political destabilization”.96

It is evident from these two statements that the changing climate may very well be responsible for political destabilization in Bangladesh in the days to come.

Economic Underdevelopment: Climate change and its associated impacts increasingly pose a significant threat to economic development of Bangladesh. During the period of 1994-2013, Bangladesh was affected by 228 weather-related hazards, resulting in losses of US$3,128.8 million.97 During the past 35 years, the government of US has invested more than US$10 billion to make the country less prone to natural disasters.98 In spite of these efforts, the direct annual cost of natural disasters over the last 10 years is projected to be between 0.5 and 1 per cent of Bangladesh’s GDP.99 The economic ramifications of the impacts of climate change in the future are predicted to be higher and could even reverse recent gains in areas of economic development. It is predicted that climate change will have disturbing impact on agriculture which is a key economic driver in Bangladesh, accounting for nearly 20 per cent of the GDP and 65 per cent of the labour force.100 Crop yields are estimated to fall by up to 30 per cent as a result of the changing climate.101 It is undeniable from these statistics that economic development in Bangladesh can be highly jeopardized by climate change in the near future.

95 “Hasina Highlights Unfortunate Plight of Climate Migrants”, The New Nation, 25 September 2010.96 Authors’ interview with Ms. Monzima Haque, Lecturer, Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka, 2017.97 Sieghart and Rogers, op. cit.98 “Bangladesh: Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change Study – Bangladesh”, available at https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/bangladesh-economics-adaptation-climate-change-study, accessed on 04 November 2018.99 Ibid.100 Md. Nurul Islam, “Climate Change and its impact on Bangladesh”, available at http://www.bmet.org.bd/BMET/resources/Static%20PDF%20and%20DOC/publication/Brief%20on%20Climate%20Change-%20Impact%20on%20Bangladesh.pdf, accessed on 04 November 2018.101 Ibid.

211


Climate change, along with socio-economic and political factors, has the potential to play a significant role in migration, resource competition, political destabilization and economic underdevelopment in Bangladesh.

5.4 The Climate Change-Security Nexus in the Context of Bangladesh

The above discussion reveals that climate change and national security can be closely linked with each other in the case of Bangladesh. The possible linkages between them are as following:

(i) Sea level rise already submerged more than half of three islands in Bangladesh. As sea level is rising rapidly (6-21mm/year) compared to the rest of the world, it is in fear of losing vast territory in future. According to IPCC, a 45cm sea level rise will submerge 10.9 per cent of its territory and force about 20 million people to relocate. Sea level rise has the potential to adversely affect national security of Bangladesh.

(ii) Climate change impacts, such as temperature rise, sea level rise, recurrent droughts and cyclones, salinity intrusion, erratic rainfall, etc act as threat multipliers to create food and water shortage and resource scarcity.102 Human security is undermined by all of them significantly. Ensuring human security through providing sufficient food, water and other resources to its ever growing population is one of the biggest challenges for the state apparatus of Bangladesh.103

(iii) A leading scholar on climate change in the context of Bangladesh mentioned that, “Bangladesh has 118,813 square kilometers area in the Bay of Bengal. But, it does not have effective control over the vast area and climate change may make it difficult for Bangladesh to establish effective control over there. The Bay of Bengal is gradually becoming stormy and violent and for this very reason, Bangladesh needs robust naval infrastructure. But, it is very difficult for a poor country like Bangladesh to fulfil this requirement”.104

It is clear from the statement that impact of changing climate is making it difficult for Bangladesh to control and secure its territory.

102 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, Climate Change, Water and Food Security, Rome: FAO, 2011; “Climate change and resource scarcity”, available at https://www.pwc.co.uk/issues/megatrends/climate-change-and-resource-scarcity.html, accessed on 31 October 2018.103 James Michel, “Human Security and Social Development Comparative Research in Four Asian Countries”, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/Michel.rev.pdf, accessed on 31 October 2018.104 Authors' interview with Dr. Niaz Ahmed Khan, Professor, Department of Development Studies, University of Dhaka, 2017.

212


Based on all the issues discussed so far, it is evident that several components of national security are at stake to varying extents due to climate change in Bangladesh. Sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bangladesh are likely to be jeopardized in the cases of Kutubdia, Bhola, Sandwip and the Bay of Bengal. The safe and sound livelihood of the population is challenged by competition over resources like freshwater and arable lands. Political stability is estimated to get disturbed through climate change-induced migration and economic underdevelopment. Last but not the least, social development in Bangladesh can suffer from extreme-weather events.

The research questions put forward at the very beginning of this paper have been answered throughout the study. To sum it up, unregulated migration, resource competition, political instability and economic underdevelopment are the prevailing impacts of climate change in Bangladesh, all of which can obliquely threaten the country’s national security by instigating social tensions, local clashes, and adverse consequences to GDP.

The authors of this paper would like to propose a climate change-national security nexus framework based on the findings of this study. The framework is as follows:

Figure 4: The Climate Change-National Security Nexus Framework

Sea Level Rise, Salinity Intrusion, Temperature Rise Frequnt Cyclones

Threat

Food InsecurityWater Seacity

Natural Resource ShortageLand Loss

Resource CompetitonUnderdevelopment

Migration

Political Destabilization Social Unrest

Destabilization in Governmental Intitutions

National Insecurity

Multiplier

Source: Authors.

213


The proposed framework outlines that climate change acts as a threat multiplier and creates food insecurity, water scarcity, natural resource shortage and land loss, and these phenomena lead to migration, resource competition and economic underdevelopment. These factors, in turn, can lead to political destabilization, social unrest and destabilization in governmental institutions which will ultimately result in national insecurity. Since this framework is solely based on available data and expert opinions in Bangladesh, the accuracy and practicability of its components can be advanced through further studies, specially through quantitative research.


Climate change creates different realities for different countries based on their political, social, geographical and economic conditions. It is a question of adaptation for the developed countries but a question of survival for developing and underdeveloped ones. This has already posed a serious threat to the security and stability of Nigeria and Sudan. In these countries, climate change has acted as a threat multiplier, exacerbated pre-existing vulnerabilities and ultimately created national security problems. Like Nigeria and Sudan, climate change may pose a great challenge to the envisaged development of Bangladesh in the long run because of the country’s unique social, economic, political and geographical features. Bangladesh has already lost some of its territory due to sea level rise and is in fear of losing more in coming days. The research undertaken for this paper is an initiative to understand climate change as a threat multiplier in the context of Bangladesh. This study is not a comprehensive one, rather an initial step to advance the existing literature on the linkages between climate change and security. It recommends further inquiries and scientific assessments for the advancement of the proposed framework. Future studies may employ the framework in order to explore the climate change-security nexus more flexibly and rigorously.

214


215

Md. Jahan Shoieb

Role oF inteRnet-Based alteRnatiVe media in gloBal teRRoRism and counteRteRRoRism

Abstract

Global terrorism is a multi-dimensional concern. Nowadays, terrorists use multifaceted tactics in order to avoid various counterterrorism operations. In recent years, a comprehensive drone campaign by the United States and death of some top leaders pushed Al Qaeda, Islamic State and other terrorist groups to find out alternative ways to convey their messages to their followers and sympathizers. Terrorist groups are resorting to internet-based alternative media to spread terrorism. Internet is also helping terrorist groups in training, fundraising, recruiting manpower, planning and executing terrorist attacks. Lone-wolf terrorists are also taking advantage of internet-based media in communication technologies. Internet has brought a shift in the spectra of global terrorism. An understanding of the linkage between terrorism and internet-based alternative media can help in formulating a counterterrorism strategy. This paper examines the role of the internet-based alternative media in global terrorism and counterterrorism. The research finding suggests that terrorist groups are quite successful in using internet-based alternative media to reach their audiences. It is also evident that the internet also can play an important role in global counterterrorism efforts.

Keywords: Alternative Media, Internet, Terrorist group, Terrorism, Counterterrorism

1. Introduction

Modern communication technology has profound impacts on every aspect of daily life. Global terrorism has also manipulated the advantages of the modern communication system, which helped terrorist groups reach their audiences independently bypassing the mainstream mass media. In fact, one of the pressing challenges for the global community is the use of internet-based alternative media by terrorists to inspire, incite and direct their followers and sympathizers. History suggests that previously terrorists faced difficulty to spread their messages and, therefore, their scope was limited. There are two main reasons behind this. Firstly, they had no control over whether their images of violence and messages of terrorism would be covered by news media in real time. Secondly, they could not control the two-step process of mediated communication. Thus, there was no guarantee that the mainstream media would cover their news. Even if any media covered their story, editor of the respective media would choose the angle by which the news was presented to the audience.1

Md. Jahan Shoieb is Research Fellow at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). His e-mail address is: [email protected]


1 Bruce Klopfenstein, “Terrorism and the Exploitation of New Media”, in Anandam P. Kavoori and Todd Fraley


216


For a better discussion, it is important to distinguish mainstream and alternative media. Generally, commercial or mainstream media are controlled, operated and funded through large conglomerate businesses. This characteristic is absent in the case of alternative media. They are primarily funded through donations of different kinds. While differentiating the two terms, most of the literature suggest that alternative media outlets function without the influence of corporate power and work as resistant to the conventional media outlets and their perspectives.2 There are different uses of the term alternative media ranging from community radio to an organization’s own website. Probably the most popular definition of alternative media is all media which are somehow opposed to or have tension with mainstream media.3 In recent times, the use of internet has complicated the difference between mass and alternative media. However, the use of internet has opened a vast arena for alternative media channels. A classic example of this can be found in Indymedia.org, an internet-based media found during 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) protests in Seattle. Notably, the Indymedia allows anyone to upload news content of different types (photos, print, audio or video) to the website. With the explosion of the blogosphere, this kind of ‘do it yourself’ (diy) media is increasing rapidly.4 In this article, mainly, the internet-based media is considered as alternative media, which also includes terrorist groups’ own websites. And the internet means all communication, content or activity which takes place in the world wide web (www).

In the past, reliance on mass media for disseminating terrorist ideology to mass people and terrorists’ sympathizers was one of the key features of global terrorism. In fact, some people still believe that there is an intrinsic relationship between terrorism and mass media. Apparently, without media’s involvement, the impact of terrorism is wasted, remaining narrowly to the immediate victims rather than reaching a wider target audience at whom the terrorist group’s violent act is aimed.5 Thus, most of the terrorist groups previously used media as a part of their tactics. Terrorist groups needed the help of the media, and media, on the contrary, had to rely heavily on them to get sensational news for boosting up their Target Rating Point (TRP). Terrorist groups sought publicity for their acts and they believed that mass media can quickly spread their news and views to a wide range of audience, which they could not do by themselves. However, heavy reliance on mass media started to decline with the invention of the internet and more specifically with the wide expansion of internet-based social networking websites.

(eds.), Media, Terrorism, and Theory, Maryland, USA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006, p. 108. 2 Michael Kenny, “Beyond the Internet: Mtis, Techne, and the Limitations of Online Artifacts for Islamist Terrorist”, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 22, No.2, 2010, pp. 204-222.3 Victor W. Pickard, In Todd M. Schaefer and Thomas A. Birkland (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Media and Politics, Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2007, pp. 12-13. 4 Ibid. 5 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, p. 174.

217

ROLE OF INTERNET

Since 1980s, internet has become one of the most popular and effective means of communications, reaching a larger group of audience worldwide. Internet made it possible for an individual to transfer his or her messages with anonymity, effectively and quickly to an almost huge and limitless audience. Nowadays, terrorist groups can disseminate their activities bypassing mainstream media outlets by using internet and different social networking websites. This has helped them reach their audiences in a more clandestine, subtle and safer way. Thus, the volume of recruitment of new terrorists as well as terrorist incidents have increased profoundly in recent years. Although the total number of casualties from terrorism has decreased in recent years, the impact of it remains omnipresent. In 2017, 67 countries witnessed at least one death due to terrorism, which is the second highest number of countries experiencing one death in the past twenty years. In the same year, 19 countries experienced hundred deaths from terrorism and five countries recorded more than a thousand.6 Online radicalization is a big threat for the countries as online platforms amplified radical messages throughout Western Europe and North America containing Islamophobia and xenophobic sentiments by 50 far-right organizations.7

Notably, in 2007, the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS) published a report titled Trends in Terrorism: 2006. In that report it identifies three new trends of global terrorism: a) the advent of micro-actors with capability of becoming terrorist groups, i.e., reducing the operational capability of terrorist groups, but increase their propaganda, ideological and motivational capability; b) promotion of the sophisticated operational capacity of terrorist groups using modern technology and global information flow (many analysts think that terrorism is becoming a web-directed phenomenon); and c) the increasing nature of overlapping terrorist activities with transnational crime, using same supply, transport and money-transferring networks.8

The existing literature on global terrorism suggests that the goals and motivations of terrorist groups vary widely from the particular aim of re-establishing or reuniting a national homeland to the unification of a separated nation. The rapid pace of globalization, the expansion of internet and other communication technologies have helped overcome the time-space constraints for terrorists and brought their war to the ‘virtual’ level. The current generation is massively influenced by telecommunication technologies, such as internet, mobile phone, and computer. Nowadays, internet and various social networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube have become the main sources of communication for terrorist groups.

6 Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2018: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism, Sydney, November 2018, available at http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2018/12/Global-Terrorism-Index-2018-1.pdf, accessed on 09 January 2019, p. 2.7 Ibid, p. 47.8 Raphael Perl, “Trends in Terrorism: 2006”, CRS Report for Congress, 12 March 2007, available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL33555.pdf, accessed on 01 November 2018.

218


Terrorists and insurgents can use such sites to reach their audience bypassing mainstream media. Arguably, a website used by any terrorist group is organized quite similar to any other organization’s virtual presence. For instance, website Al Hesba Discussion Forum (www.alhesbah.org) or Syrian Islamic Forum works as platforms from where viewers from around the world can receive breaking news from Iraq, get links to videos of active extremist campaigns, watch motivational imagery of martyr operatives in heaven, and also download subject-based discussions and speeches.9 Weimann identifies that today, almost all terrorist groups (more than 40) have their own website and even many terrorist groups maintain more than one website and use different languages.10 Moreover, terrorist groups nowadays find it difficult to convey their messages through mainstream media channels because of governments’ constant vigilance. For example, in 2016, the Government of Singapore banned a newspaper published by a media agency affiliated with the Islamic State (IS).11 This type of incident may also work as a catalyst for terrorists’ resorting to the internet-based alternative media.

On the contrary, the internet-based media also has the potential to work in the global counterterrorism endeavour. For example, in May 2012, the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications of the United States (US) responded within a very short time (48 hours) to counter advertisements promoting extremist violence posted on various internet sites by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The center came with counter-advertisements on the same websites featuring an opposite version of that same message. It also uses various websites, such as Facebook and YouTube, for disseminating counter-narrative messages.12

Given this context, the objective of this paper is to examine the role of internet-based alternative media in global terrorism and counterterrorism. The key research questions the paper addresses include: How terrorist groups use internet as an alternative media to reach their audiences? Why terrorist groups resort to the internet-based alternative media? Can internet also be used in countering terrorism? To answer these questions, the paper is divided into five sections. After the introduction, the second section discusses how terrorist groups use internet to reach their audiences. The third section elaborates the causes behind terrorist groups using internet-based alternative media. Section four focuses on the use of alternative media in countering terrorism. The fifth and final section concludes the paper with

9 Jarret M. Brachman, “High-Tech Terror: Al-Qaeda’s Use of New Technology”, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 2, Summer 2006, p. 151.10 Gabriel Weimann, “Virtual Disputes: The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Debates”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 29, No. 7, 2006, p. 624. 11 Lim Yan Liang, “Government bans newspaper published by ISIS”, The Straits Times, 22 July 2016, available at https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/government-bans-newspaper-published-by-isis, accessed on 08 January 2019. 12 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes, New York: United Nations, 2012, p.13.

219

ROLE OF INTERNET

concluding remarks. The paper is primarily a qualitative research based on various secondary sources, including books, journal articles, newspapers and online resources.

2. How Terrorist Groups Use Alternative Media to Reach Their Audiences?

The first terrorist group to exploit the benefits of internet was the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) which is popularly known as the Zapatistas. Notably, the group is an insurgent movement. It first started using internet to convey its messages in 1990s, and later other insurgent movements and terrorist groups emulated the group’s tactics. Nowadays, almost without exception, all major terrorist and insurgent groups have their own websites. A researcher of the US government’s Foreign Broadcast and Information Service (FBIS), who works in the effectiveness of internet, has observed, “These days, if you are not in the web, you don’t exist”.13 Gabriel Weimann mentioned that “the story of the presence of terrorist groups in cyberspace has barely begun to be told”.14 He found that in 1998, less than half of the thirty terrorist groups that the U.S. State Department designates as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) had their own websites, but by the end of 1999, nearly all of them have.15 In 1990s, some technological developments offered terrorist groups an ample opportunity to break the monopoly of commercial and state-owned media. These developments include the use of internet, different types of electronic cheap, video production and editing system and private radio and television stations owned by terrorist groups.16 Among these developments, the internet undoubtedly brought a phenomenal change for the terrorist groups. The figure below illustrates various usages of internet by terrorists and terrorist groups.

13 Bruce Hoffman, op. cit., p. 206.14 Gabriel Weimann, Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2006, p. 16. 15 Ibid. 16 Bruce Hoffman, op. cit., pp. 200-201.

220


Figure 1: Terrorists’ Use of Internet

Propaganda

CommunicationPlanning

and Execution

Financing Training

Radicalizationand

Recruitment

Terrorists’Use of the

Internet

As can be seen in Figure 1, terrorists mainly use internet for five purposes. These include spreading propaganda through different websites, radicalize potential individuals and recruit them to the respective group, provide training to group members, financing or fundraising and last but not the least communication, planning and executing a particular attack.

Terrorists and insurgent groups utilize internet and use their own media in a subtle way to fulfill their objectives. They use internet for different purposes ranging from disseminating of propaganda to the recruitment, training, financing, planning and execution. In today’s world, terrorists can easily broadcast their messages in a simple way. For example, using simple video cameras, terrorists can easily articulate their own messages and then can publish them on their own websites or social media. Moreover, they have ample opportunities to publish whatever they want on their internet sites. There are three major tasks terrorists are doing using the internet: a) adoption of a violent extremist ideology or online radicalization, b) recruitment in

221

ROLE OF INTERNET

terrorist groups or movements and c) planning and preparation of an attack.17 Jarret M. Brachman identifies four different ways of using internet by different terrorist groups which include: planning and coordinating movement actions, events and activities, disseminate propaganda and training materials to educate sympathizers, raise and discuss particular topics of interests and news with followers, recruit new members and socialize them, and finally, collect and exploit information about their opponents.18

Despite the fact of diversity and multiplicity of terrorist websites, there are a number of common characteristics among them. Usually, these websites have well-designed, colourful, and visually attractive graphics content. These websites chart a particular group’s name and its brief history as well as its aims and objectives. In many cases, these sites also contain short biographies of its founders, leaders and key personnel. Terrorist websites usually target three types of audiences: potential and current supporters, global public opinion and enemies.19 Interestingly, despite comprehensive counterterrorism campaign and the war on terror, the number of extremist websites has grown significantly. Next few paragraphs will shed light on how terrorist groups use internet as an alternative medium to convey messages to their audiences bypassing mainstream media outlets.

2.1 Spreading Propaganda and Messages to Wider Audience

Terrorism is a violent action which is conceived primarily to attract public attention and then through the publicity to communicate a specific message. This particular message is called propaganda which is a crucial component of any terrorist group. Indicating the importance of propaganda for a terrorist group, Bruce Hoffman noted, “The terrorist must parlay this illumination (e.g., publicity) into a more effective vehicle of elucidation (propaganda). The centrality of propaganda to this communication process and its importance to the terrorist are self-evident”.20

In fact, one of the most important and primary purposes of using internet by terrorist groups is to disseminate their propaganda. Terrorist groups usually transform different types of propaganda by providing justifications or promotion of terrorist activities, disseminating ideological or practical instructions and explanations.21 Their propaganda includes presentations, virtual messages, magazines, audio and video files, treatises and video games prepared by terrorist organizations or their sympathizers. It

17 Maura Conway, Moign Khawaja, Suraj Lakhani,Jeremy Reffin, Andrew Robertson and David Weir, “Disrupting Daesh: Measuring Takedown Of Online Terrorist Material And Its Impacts”, 2017, p. 8, available at http://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol_publication/DCUJ5528-Disrupting-DAESH-1706-WEB-v2.pdf, accessed on 20 September 2018. 18 Jarret M. Brachman, op. cit. 19 Gabriel Weimann, “How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet”, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 116, March 2004, p. 1. 20 Bruce Hoffman, op. cit., p. 198. 21 UNODC, op. cit., p. 3.

222


is crucial for any terrorist group to communicate its ultimate intentions behind terrorist activities. In many cases, the mere threat of terrorist acts can serve the same purpose of an actual incident if it can generate the similar fear in the psyche of a target audience. In fact, without properly disseminating the terrorists’ causes, the corresponding impact would be substantially reduced.22

A common feature of terrorism-related propaganda is the promotion of violence. Internet provides terrorist groups with multiple opportunities to convey their messages, which reduce their reliance on traditional media channels and news services. Internet-based propaganda is handy for terrorist groups and it may include various contents, such as video footages of terrorist acts or video games developed by terrorists, it may encourage their audiences to engage in a role-play experience by acting the same role as a virtual terrorist. Another aspect of their propaganda is the promotion of extremist rhetoric, which is another common trend of ever-growing internet-based platforms. The use of propaganda by terrorists is mainly aimed at their actual supporters or followers who may focus on incitement or radicalization to terrorism, recruit new personnel to their network, convey their messages to others and accomplishment in extremist goal. Moreover, their propaganda is also crucial to demonstrate the effective execution of terrorist activities to their financial supporters. For instance, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was one of the first groups to spread the group’s propaganda.23 When the civil war broke out between the LTTE and Sri Lankan government, it led to a large number of Tamil diaspora around the world, particularly in countries like the US, the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, France and Canada. In this regard, the internet played a vital role for the LTTE to inform the situation to the diaspora and simultaneously spread the group’s propaganda. The Tamil diaspora also spreads the group’s propaganda to the world.24

2.2 Radicalization and Recruitment of Manpower

Different terrorist groups use internet not only as a means of passing their extremist rhetoric, ideologies and videos but also to develop a relationship with the solicit support base for their targeted group. Usually, terrorists use platforms, such as password-protected websites and restricted chat groups as a clandestine means of personnel recruitment. Access to internet has helped the extremist and terrorist groups recruit a new workforce from a global scope of potential recruits. Prior to the recruitment, terrorist groups primarily target marginalized segment of a society and the process of radicalization and recruitment generally capitalizes on individual sentiments of exclusion, injustice or humiliation.

22 Bruce Klopfenstein, op. cit., p. 107. 23 Jasmine Jawhar, Terrorists Use of the Internet: The Case of Daesh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Malaysia, 2016, p. 33.24 Peter Chalk, “The Tigers Abroad: How the LTTE Diaspora Supports the Conflict in Sri Lanka”, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer/Fall), 2008, pp. 97-104.

223

ROLE OF INTERNET

Notably, terrorist groups spread propaganda to the targeted segment of a society through various innovative ways. Popular music videos, cartoons and computer games are considered to be the most popular means used by terrorist groups to recruit new personnel to their gang. They make cartoons and stories with messages that glorify the act of terrorism, which inspire newcomers to perpetrate terrorist and suicide attacks. Some terrorism experts opine that online forums help novices to virtually interact with ‘trainers’ which help them successfully separate the wheat from the chaff and help them to gather experience on bomb-making and to some extent weapon handling.25 Since the 9/11 incident, a new trend is evolving as terrorist groups inspire their potential recruits through different types of online communications and motivate them to execute terrorist activities. Moreover, along with aiding in planning and executing terrorist attacks, today’s terrorist groups provide a database of information to internet to know more about terrorist organizations and their aims and objectives.26

It is also evident that online recruitment materials are often translated into different languages including English and French. Terrorist groups usually do it to attract supporters in western countries. This method used by Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups has been proven much effective and terrorist groups have become successful in transforming many ordinary people into obedient actors who carry out terrorist acts on command.27

2.3 Financing for Terrorist Activities

Nowadays, terrorist groups use internet as a fundraising platform for acts of terrorism. Sympathizers of terrorist groups usually undertake the fundraising activity in four different ways: e-commerce, direct solicitation, through charitable organizations and through hacking or exploiting of various online payment tools. Hence, e-commerce refers to the online-based businesses run by terrorist groups, stores offering audio and video recording, books and other items for their supporters. Direct solicitation refers using the websites, mass mailings, chat groups and selected communications to request donations from sympathizers and supporters of terrorist groups. Fund transfer to certain terrorist groups is usually done electronically between different groups in various ways, including electronic wire transfer, credit card or alternative payment facilities available via services like Skype or PayPal. Terrorist groups sometimes exploit payment methods through

25 Michael Kenny, op. cit. 26 Dana Janbek and Valerie Williams, “The Role of the Internet Post-9/11 in Terrorism and Counterterrorism”, The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. XX, Issue 11, Spring/Summer 2014, p. 298.27 Rosanna E. Guadagno, Adam Lankford, Nicole L. Muscanell, Bradley M. Okdie and Debra M. McCallum, “Social Influence in the Online Recruitment of Terrorists and Terrorist Sympathizers: Implications for Social Psychology Research”, Revue internationale de psychologie sociale, Vol. 23, No. 1, 2010, pp. 25-56, available at https://www.cairn.info/revue-internationale-de-psychologie-sociale-2010-1-page-25.htm, accessed on 07 October 2018.

224


identity theft, credit card theft, stock fraud, wire fraud, auction fraud or intellectual property crimes.28

To find out a potential donor, terrorists or terrorist groups take the assistance of internet user demographics which allow them to identify users having sympathy to a particular issue or cause. Then these people are asked to make donations, usually through emails sent by a front group (an organization which supports the terrorists’ aims, but operates legally and publicly having no direct link with the terrorist organization).29 Mentionably, financial support to some charity organizations are also used for illicit purposes. Terrorist groups claim humanitarian support hiding their identity while they use the fund for terrorist purposes. Some groups who use their charitable organizations for terrorist funding include the Global Relief Foundation, Benevolence International Foundation and the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development. All of these groups use fraud method to finance terrorist groups in the Middle East.30 Even for Irish Republican Army (IRA), visitors can make credit card donations in the group’s own website.31 In a nutshell, internet offers a global reach and a certain degree of security and anonymity for both donors and recipients.32

2.4 Providing Training Terrorist groups often resort to internet for providing training to terrorists.

Brynjar Lia considers that training is very important for terrorist groups and she labels it as the primary vehicle using which different terrorist groups become able to transform their radical ideologies to violent attack.33 The most organized terrorist group in producing training material for the new recruits in the online is AQAP. It has been publishing its own magazine named Al-Battar Camp (mu’askar al-battar) on the bi-weekly basis since 2004. The magazine usually provides both ideological articles and articles on the first-hand military skills.34 AQAP also published an online newspaper named Inspire with the objective of inspiring young people to train terrorist tactics from their home. The newspaper contains a good amount of ideological material and incorporated inspirational messages of the top Al Qaeda leadership, Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and other key figures. The newspaper is an inspirational platform for terrorists, which, for example, motivates an individual to launch an indiscriminate attack from a tower or kill a government official to draw more attention.35

28 UNODC, op. cit., p. 7. 29 Gabriel Weimann, “How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet”, op. cit., pp. 7-8.30 UNODC, op. cit., p. 7. 31 Gabriel Weimann, “How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet”, op. cit., p. 7. 32 Michael Jacobson, “Terrorist Financing on the Internet”, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 2, Issue 6, June 2009, p. 17. 33 Brynjar Lia, “Doctrines for Jihadi Terrorist Training”, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 20, Issue 4, pp. 518-542. 34 Thomas Hegghammer, “Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi Arabia”, Middle East Policy, Vol. XIII, No. 4, Winter 2006, pp. 39-60. 35 UNODC, op. cit., p.8.

225

ROLE OF INTERNET

Although terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and IS have no virtual training camps, online training courses organized by the Jihobbyists provide an opportunity for newcomers to learn more about the operational activities of global jihad. In these days, the e-learning courses of Al Qaeda are more organized than the past, which contain more audio-visual materials, as well as written learning materials. Previously, Al Qaeda transmitted its ideology and training through direct contact but from the 1990s, the terrorist group started documenting its training materials. The most notable work is the Encyclopaedia of Jihad, which is the first collection of that type. This one is primarily a collection of all written experience of the veterans of the Afghan-Soviet jihad to make sure that their knowledge is not lost for the future jihadists.36 The Encyclopaedia of Preparation probably is a comprehensive collection of internet-based training manual. The editor of this encyclopedia is a person whose nickname is Ibn Turab, who was previously an active member of Al Qaeda’s radical forum al-Ma’sada al-Jihadiyya.37 The editor of the encyclopedia mentioned that the purpose of writing the encyclopedia is to improve the military knowledge for mujahedeen to enable them to re-establish the Caliphate (Encyclopedia of Preparation). The online training material provided in this encyclopedia was not prepared for a specific region or group. The origin of the documents used in the encyclopedia comes from diversified sources: manuals written mainly by the Afghan war veterans and some other written by the Palestinian veterans and a couple of internet activists with the least battle experience. However, there are many instructional videos available online are mainly produced by another group, Hezbollah.38

The Islamic Media Centre (IMC) is another well-known media outlet to issue training materials for terrorists. It has been working since the 1990s and broadcasting training materials on CDs and later through internet. Oussama Kassir, one of the key figures of the IMC has an allegation of taking training from Lebanon, Afghanistan and Kashmir and fighting in Afghanistan against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). He visited the US in 1999 with a view to setting up a training camp in the US, along with some other key figures like Abu Hamza and others. Moreover, since 2002 he has been operating various websites linked with the IMC.39 The IMC had wide network and access to numerous materials written by experienced commanders. Moreover, for their sympathizers, they translated a large number of US Army Field Manuals into the Arabic language.

Online instruction materials also include various tools to facilitate counterintelligence and hacking tactics to ensure the safety and security of illegal communications and online activity with available encryption materials and anonymizing

36 Ali H. Soufan, The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War Against Al-Qaeda, New York: Norton, 2011. 37 Anne Stenersen, “The Internet: A Virtual Training Camp?”, Journal of Terrorism Research, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 218.38 Ibid.39 Thomas Hegghammer, op. cit., p. 41.

226


tactics. Internet network helps terrorist groups build a sense of virtual community among individuals from all over the world, encouraging the creation of new networks for the distribution of instructional and inspirational materials.

2.5 Communication, Planning and Execution

The history of criminology suggests that nowadays almost every terrorist incident involves the use of internet technology. Use of internet becomes crucial for terrorist groups when planning of a terrorist incident involves remote communication among multiple actors. In some cases, terrorist groups use internet to successfully identify a potential target for a terrorist attack. The planning and execution process includes obtaining instructions of attack to collect available information from different sources about the possible target. Multiple uses of internet to bridge distances and scattered geographical areas and a vast amount of public information on internet made it a key tool in planning and executing terrorist activities.

Use of internet has also facilitated terrorist groups to execute different terrorist activities with more accuracy. For instance, explicit threats of violence, including the threat of using weapons may be transmitted through internet to generate fear or panic among mass people. Internet technology also has facilitated the acquisition of weapons, explosives or other materials necessary for the execution of an attack. Sometimes terrorists use e-commerce service to purchase required materials. In some cases, terrorist organizations undertake cyber attacks by deliberate exploitation of the computer networks.

Terrorists also use internet while communicating during the process of planning a particular attack. An example can be provided in this regard. Najibullah Zazi, responsible person for planning an attack on the New York subway system in 2009, communicated with his contact in Pakistan using email to outline the attack. In addition to that, another person involved in the incident from the UK exchanged messages regarding the making of bombs and the progress of the plot using coded language. This example illustrates that internet was used by terrorists to communicate details of planning and executing the attack.40

3. Why Terrorist Groups Use Alternative Method to Promote Their Causes?

Although in recent years, terrorist groups get most of the instructions and training materials from online sources, till date there has been few numbers of empirical criminology researches have been done on the topic. However, one key aspect is clear that both terrorism and internet impact profoundly in contemporary terrorism studies and they often shake our everyday life and the functioning of the micro and macro level

40 Dana Janbek and Valerie Williams, op. cit., p. 301.

227

ROLE OF INTERNET

economic, social and political systems.41 Previously, terrorist groups used three main ways to conduct their communication process: a) clandestine or rebel radio stations b) underground posters, newspapers, flyers and other publications, and c) commercial, conventional or state-owned media (e.g., radio, television and newspaper).42 Gabriel Weimann identifies some reasons which work as catalysts for terrorist groups in using internet. These are:

• Anonymitywhilecommunication;

• Easyaccess;

• Devoidofregulation,censorshiporanysortofgovernmentcontrol;

• Easytoreachhugeaudiencesthroughouttheworld;

• Fastandfreeflowofinformation;

• Inexpensivedevelopmentandmaintenanceofawebpresence;

• Interactivemedium;

• Amultimediaenvironment;and

• The ability to shape coverage in the traditional mass media, whichincreasingly uses internet as a source for stories.43

In the post 9/11 era, numerous counterterrorism campaigns have forced terrorists to rely more on online methods rather than practical training courses. In recent years, terrorist groups in the West and elsewhere are using internet to collect information and communicate among themselves. Previously, different terrorist groups transferred their knowledge and training through direct contact in a training camp or similar settings. However, nowadays, terrorist organizations are trying to do that in an alternative way. There is a good number of websites which provide terrorist groups’ a platform for disseminating various online resources: audio and video clips, online manuals, advice and information, etc. To some extent, internet-based platforms provide instructional materials in an easily accessible multiple language and multiple formats; topics such as the way to join terrorist groups; instructions for preparing home-made explosives, weapons, firearms or other hazardous materials; and ways to successfully plan and execute a terrorist incident.44 In the next few paragraphs, some background causes of using internet by terrorists and terrorist groups are discussed briefly.

41 Gary LaFree, “Terrorism and the Internet”, Criminology & Public Policy, Vol. 16, Issue 1, 2017, pp. 1-6. 42 Bruce Hoffman, op. cit., p. 199.43 Gabriel Weimann, “Virtual Disputes: The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Debates”, op. cit., p. 624. 44 UNODC, op. cit., p. 8.

228


3.1 Maximizing Safety and Avoiding Counterterrorism Campaign

Maximizing safety and security of terrorists and avoiding the pressure of counterterrorism campaigns are perhaps the main reasons for adopting more online-based training exercises. Terrorist groups, nowadays, can use many sophisticated methods which make it difficult to identify a perpetrator, content or recipients of a particular internet-based communication. Identity hiding options like encryption tools and some anonymizing downloadable software can be found on internet. These types of modes usually hide the unique Internet Protocol (IP) address and help to conceal a user’s identity, location, a route to access the internet and other important information. These types of activities make it difficult for organizations and people engaged in counterinsurgency activities to find out the perpetrators of terrorist incidents. In some instances, terrorists use steganography, which helps them transfer messages hiding in images.

In these days, numerous counterterrorism campaigns have forced terrorists to rely more on online methods rather than practical training courses. In recent years, terrorist groups in the west and elsewhere are using internet to collect information and communicate among themselves. Previously, different terrorist groups were used to transfer their knowledge and training through direct contact in a training camp or similar settings. However, nowadays, terrorist organizations are trying to do that from an alternative way. There are good number of websites, which provide terrorist groups a platform for disseminating various online resources: audio and video clips, online manuals, advice and information, etc.

Even before the 9/11 incident, Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups had a tendency of exploiting the advantages of modern technologies. Al Qaeda leaders Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri recognized the importance of these developments. Especially, Osama Bin Laden noted the satellite-based propaganda and rhetoric, both are equally important as cruise missiles and unmanned bombers.45 Al Qaeda’s virtual dependency even became more central to its strategy after losing its Afghan base. Peter Bergen, therefore, labelled this strategy of Al Qaeda as “Al Qaeda 2.0.” 46

3.2 Easy Mode to Transfer Terrorist Ideology

Internet has become one of the easiest and safest modes to spread terrorist ideology. Nowadays, the battlefield is no longer the primary place for war. Rather the net-based warfare is now the eminent battleground. Anyone using internet can connect YouTube and other social networking websites from anywhere around the world to upload as well as download videos to share an ideology with local communities, diaspora and to the rest of the world. The online-based media provides a comparatively safe mode

45 Marc Lynch, “Al Qaeda’s Media Strategies”, The National Interest, No. 83, Spring 2006, pp. 50-56. 46 Ibid.

229

ROLE OF INTERNET

for the dissemination of radical ideas unlike conventional communication tools, such as books, newspapers, leaflets or VCDs as it does not leave any kind of physical evidence and is a more reliable mode to reach a much wider range of audience.47 Nowadays, internet is flooded with contents pertinent to extremism and terrorism. Table 1 provides an idea about the quantities of radical materials available online:

Table 1: Google Search Results of Critical Keywords Related to Extremism

Search Term Number of Results

“how to make a bomb” 1,830,000

“beheading video” 257,000

‘Salafi publications” 46,200

Source: Ines von Behr, Anaïs Reding, Charlie Edwards and Luke Gribbon, Radicalisation in the Digital Era: The Use of the Internet in 15 Cases of Terrorism and Extremism, 2013, available at https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR453/RAND_RR453.pdf, accessed on 14 November 2018, p. 3.

The table indicates that these days internet is flooded with terrorist contents easily accessible to all. If terrorists have access to internet, they tend to get the advantage of technology. By using online method they can reach a wide range of their audience, which is quite impossible through the oral tradition developed over the years. For example, terrorist groups in Iraq pass their messages through online that constantly goes up and down. They try to convince the Iraqi population that their insurgency method is doing better. This is how terrorist groups manipulate the advantages of internet.

Similar to Al Qaeda, terrorist group IS is also harnessing the advantages of internet technology. The group controls a small territory in Syria and Iraq. However, social media connects it with the whole world within the reach of every cell phone, desktop and laptop computer.48 In fact, IS also extracts the benefits of advanced technologies to reach its audiences in a more effective way. The group has several thousand online activists to support their causes who work in a more disciplined way. For example, if any one of the group posts a particular content to internet–say an authentic video of the beheading, then the second tier of online activists take it to Twitter to retweet the content with a hashtag and also retweet each-other’s tweet and this type of online hashtag campaign ultimately creates a “Twitter storm”. In addition to that, other members of the group upload the content to other online platforms that it remains available on internet. This online campaign has favoured them a lot and attracted supporters from all over the world.49

47 Virginie Andre, “Neojihadism’ and YouTube: Patani Militant Propaganda Dissemination and Radicalization”, Asian Security, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2012, pp. 27-53.48 Christopher S. Stewart and Mark Maremont, “Twitter and Islamic State Deadlock on Social Media Battle-field”, The Wall Street Journal, 13 April 2016, available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/twitter-and-islamic-state-deadlock-on-social-media-battlefield-1460557045, accessed on 08 January 2019. 49 Hisham Melhem, “Keeping Up with the Caliphate: An Islamic State for the Internet Age”, Foreign Affairs, November-December 2015.

230


In recent years, along with various terrorist groups, lone wolf terrorists50 are also using internet to spread terrorism. Notably, lone-wolf terrorism has become one of the fastest growing terrorist categories in recent years. Europol published a terrorism situation and trend report in April 2012, which highlighted the propensity of using internet by terrorists. The report narrated that for extremist groups, internet has become the ‘principal means of communication’, therefore, their ‘substantial online presence’ is viewed. Besides the use of propaganda, fundraising, planning and recruitment, terrorist groups use internet for ‘cyber attacks’ on the operating systems of the European Union (EU) member states.51

Terrorists and terrorist groups tend to harness the opportunities of the interactive capabilities of internet, including instant messenger, blogs, chat rooms, video sharing websites and other social networks. A statistic suggests that in these days about 90 per cent of the terrorist incidents occur using the social networking websites whether it is Paltalk, independent bulletin boards or Yahoo.52 These social networking sites help terrorists to hide their identities and create direct contact with perpetrators or mastermind of a terrorist attack. The massive expansion of the lone-wolf terrorists in these days poses a major challenge to the issue of counterterrorism steps. In fact, the lone-wolf terrorists offer a nightmare for organizations who work for counterterrorism. According to Global Terrorism Index 2017, terrorist groups exploit internet and social media, mainly to influence public opinions, instigate communal tensions, radicalize young people and recruit cadres and cyber warriors to carry out cyber espionage, cyber-attacks and hacking.53 A RAND corporation research outcome suggests that internet enhances opportunities to make people radicalized as it is easily accessible to many people. The second aspect it found that internet acts as an ‘echo chamber’ for extremist beliefs.54

There are some other reasons for using internet by terrorist groups. Bilveer Singh states that internet helps terrorists bypass national laws. Terrorists tend to take advantage of the weak legal system to spread terrorism where internet works as a unique platform for them.55 He gave an example of Indonesia and noted that

50 This type of terrorists are individuals or a small group of individuals who are radicalized through the internet and are ready to plot the preparation for attacking in the dark. In recent years, the lone-wolf terrorists are flourishing in many countries, including the US, France, Germany, Canada, Italy, Spain, Denmark, Portugal, Great Britain, Sweden, Norway and Poland.51 Gabriel Weimann, “Lone Wolves in Cyberspace”, Journal of Terrorism Research, Vol. 3, Issue 2, Autumn 2012, p. 80.52 Ibid., p. 84. 53 Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2017: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism, p. 100, available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Global%20Terrorism%20Index%202017%20%284%29.pdf, accessed on 01 November 2018. 54 Ines von Behr, Anaïs Reding, Charlie Edwards and Luke Gribbon, Radicalisation in the Digital Era: The Use of the Internet in 15 Cases of Terrorism and Extremism, 2013, available at https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR453/RAND_RR453.pdf, accessed on 14 November 2018. 55 Bilveer Singh, “Countering Online Extremism – A Perspective on the IndonesianCase”, Lecture given at the Workshop on Extremism and Terrorism Online: A Multidisciplinary Examination

231

ROLE OF INTERNET

the country’s legal system is relatively weak to deal online radicalization which led to terrorists taking advantage of the situation.56 According to Jasmine Jawhar, many reasons why terrorist groups use internet including: easy access to internet with little technical knowledge of making a website, anonymity of communication, communicating with like-minded people, an easy source of revenue where donations can be obtained bypassing national law, etc.57

4. Use of Alternative Media in Counterterrorism

Despite the fact that terrorist groups have developed many routes to use internet as an alternative media, it also provides an ample opportunity for gathering intelligence and other activities to prevent and counter the threats of terrorism. Internet helps gather evidence for bringing terrorists under jurisdiction. Moreover, frequent use of internet by potential terrorists unintentionally makes themselves visible in front of the national and international counterterrorism community.58

The EU model can be a good example for countries using internet as a tool in combating terrorism. The EU Internet Forum was launched in 2015 with a view to stopping the use of internet by terrorists. Notably, the EU Internet Forum was comprised of EU Home Affairs Ministries, the internet industry and all other related stakeholders with a view to working in a partnership to address the complex problem and protect the citizens of the EU. The forum started its journey with two main objectives: to restrain accessibility to terrorist content online and to enable the civil society that it can help increase the volume of effective counter-narratives online. On December 2016, at the EU Internet Forum, internet companies announced the creation of a shared ‘Database of Hashes’ to detect more proficiently terrorist elements on social media. On the same occasion, the EU Civil Society Empowerment Programme was initiated to develop effective counter-narrative campaigns. To that end, the EU allocated €6 million in support of those campaigns.59

The US also deployed its law enforcement, intelligence and different security agencies in countering terrorism by increasing surveillance on communications and online activity. Particularly the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) has increased partnerships from 35 to over 100. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), “JTTFs have been instrumental in breaking up cells…[and] they’ve foiled attacks on the Fort Dix Army base of New Jersey, on the JFK International Airport in New

of Current Trends and Challenges, 14 October 2014, Singapore, cited in Jasmine Jawhar, op. cit, p. 19. 56 Ibid. 57 Jasmine Jawhar, op. cit. 58 Dana Janbek and Valerie Williams, op. cit.59 European Commission, “Fighting Terrorism Online: Internet Forum Pushes for Automatic Detection of Terrorist Propaganda”, 06 December 2017, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5105_en.htm, accessed on 01 October 2018.

232


York, and on various military and civilian targets in Los Angeles.”60 Moreover, the FBI has taken its investigative approach to more intelligence-led strategies and proactive nature to combat terrorist attack prior to the real incident. It implements a number of undercover tactics on internet. For example, it creates parallel terrorist recruiting websites which are convincing enough to attract potential terrorists. A testimony of the US’ proactive role can be found from Abdella Ahmad Tounisi’s case. When the 18-year old young man was searching internet for terrorist group Jabhat al-Nusra, an Al Qaeda branch in Syria, he found a site which was created and maintained by the FBI. When Tounisi communicated the website’s recruiter, who was originally an FBI agent, both of them exchanged email messages and the teen revealed his plan to engage in jihad in Syria. In the end, the FBI became able to arrest Tounisi in 2013 at Chicago O’Hare International Airport just before his departure to Syria.61 However, online surveillance has become a concern for citizens and civil society organizations in the US. The National Security Agency (NSA) of the country was accused of engaging in online surveillance without any specific allegation or merely based on individual suspicion and spying on the country’s citizens despite its commitment to monitoring only specific foreign citizens.62

Sometimes, terrorists are well-prepared and have better technological know-how than law enforcement agencies. Even the bureaucracy of the US government could not protect the country’s cyberspace from the terrorists’ hand. Notably, the current US government strategy to combat terrorist use of internet started in 2007 when Twitter was in its initial age and earlier than Snapchat, WhatsApp, Telegram and many other popular social networking sites were created. According to the FBI website, the bureau could not get access to the contents of about 7,800 devices in 2017 due to encryption blockage, it was more than half of the device it attempted to access during that time frame.63 Therefore, a new form of counterterrorism cyber strategy is needed to combat this new challenge. In this regard, governments can form special intelligence units where researchers and experts need to be included along with anti-terrorism agencies which may prove effective in preventing and controlling the online-based terrorism. For example, the Government of Bangladesh has introduced ‘Digital Security Act 2016’ to prevent internet-based crimes committed using a computer, computer system or network, mobile phone or any kind of digital communication media whether voice or data. This Act also enables the government to establish a Digital Forensic Lab for properly investigating internet-based crimes.64

60 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), “Joint Terrorism Task Forces”, available at https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism/joint-terrorism-task-forces, accessed on 02 October 2018. 61 Dana Janbek and Valerie Williams, op. cit., pp. 302-303. 62 Alex Adbo and Jameel Jaffer, “How the NSA’s Surveillance Procedures Threaten Americans’ Privacy,” Free Future, 21 June 2013, available at https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/secrecy/how-nsas-surveillance-procedures-threaten-americans-privacy, accessed on 05 February 2019. 63 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), “Director Addresses ‘Going Dark’ Problem at Cyber Conference,” available at https://www.fbi.gov/audio-repository/ftw-podcast-wray-going-dark-iccs-011118.mp3/view, accessed on 18 November 2018. 64 Md Sazzad Hossain, “Social Media and Terrorism: Threats and Challenges to the Modern Era”, South Asian

233

ROLE OF INTERNET

Arguably, tackling the terrorists’ use of cyberspace requires a multi-faceted approach involving governments, civil society, international organizations and the private sector. Realizing the importance of the fact, on 20 September 2017, Italy, France and the UK co-hosted a United Nations High-level Meeting on Preventing Terrorist Use of the Internet. And the participants were French President Emmanuel Macron, Prime Minister of Italy Paolo Gentiloni, British Prime Minister Theresa May and Senior Vice President and General Counsel of Google Kent Walker. Mentionably, the meeting was held on the sideline of the 72nd UN General Assembly. The effort was initiated by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) of UN Security Council, and for the first time, the global community witnessed an initiative where the global leaders and technology executives addressed at the United Nations on a very important issue.65 The high-level meeting encouraged governments and civil society to engage with the Global Internet Forum for Counter Terrorism (GIFCT) which was launched by Microsoft, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube on 26 June 2017. Since its inception, GIFCT has been playing the role of a global focal point in combating terrorism in the digital battlespace. This type of initiative is setting the tone of combating terrorists in the cyberspace. UK Prime Minister Theresa May commented that the initiative works “as evidence of the commitment held by governments, companies, and civil society in collaborating to protect citizens against the use of internet by terrorists to spread their ideology”.66

The global initiative is also reflected in the activities of the UN Security Council. The Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee is working to address various problems emanated from the abuse of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) by terrorists and terrorist groups. To that end, the committee is guided by several Security Council Resolutions. Among the resolutions, probably the most important one is the Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) which calls on all members of the UN to find ways to enhance and accelerate the exchange of information regarding the use of ICT by terrorist groups and to suppress terrorist recruitment. Microsoft also informed the committee that it had made provisions to prohibit the posting of terrorist contents by organizations included in the Consolidated United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Sanctions List.67

Survey, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2015, pp. 148-149.65 Security Council Counter-terrorism Committee, “CTED Initiated Process Results in High-level Meeting on Preventing Terrorist Use of the Internet”, available at https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/news/2017/09/21/cted-initiated-process-results-high-level-meeting-preventing-terrorist-use-internet/, accessed on 19 November 2018. 66 Ibid. 6 7 Security Council Counter-terrorism Committee, “Information and Communication Technologies (ICT)”, available at https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/focus-areas/information-and-communication-technologies/, accessed on 19 November 2018.

234



Use of internet-based alternative media for terrorist purposes is one of the key features of contemporary terrorism studies. This study reveals that in these days terrorist groups are more dependent on internet for spreading their terrorist ideology than the mass media to disseminate their causes. Especially, the ‘lone-wolf’ terrorists are motivated and trained by the social media to conduct terrorist incidents on a larger scale. Terrorist organizations use their own media for several purposes, which include spreading terrorist propaganda, radicalization, recruit and train a new workforce, fund mobilization, communication, planning and executing terrorist operations. It is also evident that most of the online materials are produced by sympathizers rather than the key leaders of Al Qaeda, IS or other terrorist groups. Particularly, in recent years, due to extensive counterterrorism initiatives and drone strikes, terrorist groups are using internet to train their sympathizers on bomb-making and other operational activities. To that end, Al Qaeda, IS and other terrorist groups are using their own websites as well as various social networking sites to reach their audiences independently from mainstream media outlets.

Although internet is considered to be a prime platform for training and spreading the terrorism, internet or online mode is yet to completely replace the offline or practical mode for spreading the terrorism and to become a virtual training camp. In reality, internet has more inspirational role than the operational impact to the sympathizers. Till date, terrorist groups rely heavily on offline methods to recruit and train a new workforce because practical technological knowledge is more important than theoretical knowledge, which is available on internet. Further studies in this field can reveal the implications of internet on spreading terrorism.

Terrorism, in every aspect, affects the whole global community. The use of internet by terrorist groups disregards national borders, amplifying the potential impact on the sufferers. However, there is no scope to deny the fact that the terrorist sympathizers are using internet and social networking sites to attract the young generation. Therefore, to prevent the dissemination of terrorist and violent extremist ideology, international actors along with industry and law enforcement agencies need to work together to make the cyberspace a hostile environment for the terrorists. And it is also evident from empirical evidence that internet-based alternative media also can help in counterterrorism endeavours.

235

BooK ReVieW

analysing china’s soft Power strategy and comparative indian initiatives by Parama Sinha Palit, published by SAGE Publications, India Pvt Ltd, New Delhi, 2017, XXIV+368 pages.

In global discussion on international and strategic relations, soft power has gained considerable currency. A country’s soft power is not only dependent upon its global image but also global image of a country is enhanced by it. Currently, great power, rising power as well as small power are exploring their soft power to play a major role in global affairs. As rising powers, China and India are trying to develop their soft power. China uses different soft power tools, such as setting up Confucius Institute across the world, undertaking regional connectivity initiatives, granting more scholarship for foreign students, investing in infrastructure, providing humanitarian assistance, etc. to gain its foreign policy objectives. Likewise, India also uses various soft power tools, e.g., Bollywood movies, diaspora community, cuisines, tourism, secular values, etc. Thus, Analysing China’s Soft Power Strategy and Comparative Indian Initiatives brings to light China’s consummate efforts in correcting adverse global perception produced by its strategic rise through extensive use of soft power. In this book, Parama Sinha Palit inclusively focuses on the vigorous deployment of China’s soft power, the distinct nuances and variation visible across countries and regions. Moreover, to provide a comparative understanding of India and China's soft power initiatives, it also reflects on the recent developments of soft power initiatives in Indian foreign policy.

The book spans a total of 368 pages, including a preface followed by eleven chapters divided into three parts. It is the outcome of Parama Sinha Palit’s motivation to study modern China’s extensive deployment of soft power to gain its core strategic goals during her visit to various parts of China and fascinating interaction with Chinese scholars and experts.

The central theme of the book is evolution and application of China’s soft power. Though China is the context, subject and discussion of the book, it also provides a comparative analysis of China and India’s soft power initiatives to understand Sino-Indian relations. In the preface, the author gives several important arguments: China’s soft power coexists with hard power which reflects a duality inherent in Chinese diplomacy and foreign policy, Chinese soft power is characterized by its pronounced economic content and Chinese soft power has entailed more of cultural diplomacy than public diplomacy, India’s soft power will encounter formidable challenges, probably more than what China does, etc. Following the preface, part one ‘Soft Power and China’ comprehensively discusses the concept of soft power. Part two ‘Chinese Soft Power: Regional Studies’


236


illustrates the regional variations of China’s soft power strategies. Part three ‘Soft Power, China-India Engagement and Comparative Dimensions’ focuses on various India’s soft power initiatives and compare them with China's initiatives. It also analyses Sino-Indian relations from the perspective of soft power.

To set the context of the analysis of China’s soft power, the author devotes a significant concentration on the concept of soft power. It argues that although the term soft power was first coined by Joseph Nye Jr., it can hardly be described as a product of contemporary western thinking. In this respect, on the one hand, it provides ample evidences of the historical existence of soft power in the foreign policy of China and India. It explains the root of soft power as an idea in China’s foreign policy can be traced during spring and autumn era 771-476 BC, a period known as the ‘Hundred School of Thoughts’. Thinker of that period like Kong Zi, Confucius and Mencius denounced war and preferred diplomatic maneuvering over military confrontation in achieving state interests. In ancient Chinese literatures, ideas such as ‘culture winning over an enemy’ and ‘winning a battle before it is fought’ are rampant. Similar to Chinese literatures, ancient Indian literatures, e.g., Mahabharata, Manu Smriti and Arthashastra provide a peek into ancient Indian cultural tradition and practice of diplomacy for conducting international relations. Noted scholars of the time like Kautilya and Kamandak have also referred to soft diplomacy for achieving progress. On the other hand, little illustration is provided on the concept of western influential thinkers, such as E.H. Carr, Foucault, Bourdieu, Gramsci, Habermas and particularly Nye who have variously articulated soft power, albeit in implicit and contextual fashions. As the author tries to de-Americanize the concept of soft power, greater exemplification on both western and non-western concept of soft power is crucial. Thus, extensive discussion on western soft power concept by identifying similarities and dissimilarities between the two discourses could enrich the conceptual part of the book further.

The book is mostly dedicated to trace several tools of China’s soft power to gain foreign policy objectives. It identifies several tools of China’s soft power, e.g., economic engagement (investment, aid, loan and grant); cultural diplomacy; public diplomacy; education and media, etc. It argues culture as the core of soft power finds increasing resonance in China’s conduct of external engagement. Culture has been inseparable from politics in China and also considered as third pillar of Chinese diplomacy after economics and politics. Thus, the book highlights the prominent role of culture in China’s approach to soft power. Apart from culture, by posing as the locomotive for regional growth and prosperity, China has effectively employed economic tools as one of its major soft power instruments. It further explains the unique approach of China’s soft power strategy in combining the ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ tools for connecting to people. China has imparted the typical Chinese flavour to soft power by combining cultural

237

BOOK REVIEW

initiatives and public diplomacy with economic engagement, buoyed by efforts to build people to people contacts through education and an active role of its media agencies. Parama delves into China’s pursuit of cultural diplomacy and several other soft power tools in connecting China with rest of the world but additional observation on public diplomacy could be considered given the fact that public diplomacy had a somewhat late start and is progressing recently in China.

A big focus of the book is discussion of the regional variations of China’s soft power strategies. Part two of the book goes on to explain that these regional variations have interesting nuances in securing China’s fundamental strategic objectives of providing economic progress to a huge populations, accessing to critical natural resources, maintaining a stable external environment particularly in neighbourhood, projecting a ‘benign’ external images, etc. Part two of the book also subsequently describes that Chinese urge for untapped resources and new market for generating economic momentum in its landlocked western region or Western Development Strategy encourages China’s deeper engagement in South Asia, Central Asia and Middle East. Imperatives of resources and markets drive engagement with Africa and Latin America too, where cultural forays till now are less conspicuous than economic engagement. While both culture and economics, along with public diplomacy, are visible in Southeast Asia, culture dominates other forms of engagement in Northeast Asia and even in USA, Canada and Latin America as these countries do not offer room for strategic gains through economic aid and investment in infrastructure. Specific regional and multilateral imperatives such as recognition of Taiwan and support in the United Nations also drive the engagement with the Pacific Island countries. While writing on so many regions and countries, some of the regions like, such as Oceania, South Pacific, Central Asia, Mongolia lack extensive analysis and other regions, e.g., South Asia and Southeast Asia get rigorous analysis of the various initiatives of Chinese government. In addition, few regions, e.g., Africa and Southeast Asia end with a conclusion on the challenges, successes and failures in terms of leveraging soft power initiatives in the conduct of Chinese foreign policy. Qualitatively, equal analysis of China’s soft power initiatives in different regions, its challenges, successes and failures could add value to the book.

In order to compare China’s soft power strategies with India, the book reflects on India too. It highlights India’s rich endowment of captive soft power stemming from ancient history, civilization, assimilative and cosmopolitan culture, democratic institutions and religious plurality. Although India’s soft power efforts have been limited and less conspicuous compared to its larger eastern neighbour, under Modi government Indian foreign policy is increasingly adopting soft power tools. Under two sub-heading ‘State-driven Initiatives’ and ‘Non-state-driven Initiatives’ chapter nine goes on to explain different soft

238


power tools, e.g., cultural initiatives; Buddhism; public diplomacy (viz. social media, Bollywood; TV channels; food; cricket; connecting to diaspora and high level visits) and economic initiatives (viz. regional connectivity, offering aid for infrastructure building and humanitarian assistance). Of these tools, culture has been employed as an important tool of soft power. The author, however, emphasizes on India’s foreign policy, particularly the thrust on highlighting cultural virtues in articulating soft power can be somewhat a risky approach to adopt, given that aggressive emphasis on culture and civilization might give birth to fear of cultural colonization among the recipients. It also brings to the fore an explanation on the core strategic objectives, e.g., maintaining a benign external environment; facilitating peaceful conditions for economic growth; advancing its ambition of being a major global or regional power and correcting negative impression of Indian state ability to effectively govern and deliver a decent quality of life to its people that Indian soft power is meant to achieve. Though Parama highlights India’s soft power across various regions, India’s soft power initiatives in different regions could be broadly explained as the latter part of the book’s title implies "Comparative Indian Initiatives”.

The book also highlights the Sino-Indian bilateral engagement. While the two countries have been resorting to soft engagement with the rest of the world, such engagement is not exclusive of each other and has been growing in recent years. It shows that robust economic ties and enhanced people-to-people contact through historical linkages like Buddhism and new connection created by state and non-state initiatives in culture and education are establishing the foundation for wider and deeper bilateral engagement. Of different tools of soft power, trade has been the biggest driver of bilateral economic engagement. During the last decade, China became India’s largest merchandise trade partner, while India also became one of China’s top10 trade partners. However, this perspective on engagement must note an aspect that India is yet to figure as high in China’s priorities as China does in India’s. By analysing Sino-Indian engagement, an extremely relevant contribution of the book is to trace out the persistence of contradictory position over several issues, e.g., border dispute; India’s non-commitment to Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); China’s intention to accommodate Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Forum for Regional Cooperation (BCIM) within BRI; China’s ethnic heterodoxy and chaotic democracy; competitive outlook towards each other; trade imbalance and visa policy between China and India that creates hindrance in their deployment of soft power with respect to each other. It reflects that Chinese interest in contemporary India has increased manifold due to Bollywood films and music, Indian accomplishments in Yoga and IT. On the other hand, Indian younger generations are displaying a more open and receptive attitude towards China, which is evident from the rising number of Indian students in China as well as a steady increase in inflows of tourists. The book goes on to analyze the changing perception of India and China with regard

239

BOOK REVIEW

to each other and the growing pattern of constructive engagement between the two through the application of various soft power tools. But a brief analysis on whether the sense of pragmatic collaboration and the emphasis on constructive engagement through greater use of soft power creates more benign impressions on both sides by denting the trust deficient could enrich the book.

In order to compare China’s soft power strategies with India, the author argues India’s soft power efforts have been limited and less conspicuous compared to China. To establish this argument author gives two structural differences between India and China’s soft power. Firstly, whether it is culture or economic engagement, China is engaging with the rest of the world through soft power on a much bigger scale and faster pace than India. In this regard, author gives an example of India and China’s efforts to capitalize soft power through education. Among major Asian countries, India has only nine universities figuring among Asian top one hundred compared with twenty-one from China. Secondly, the difference in scale, pace and intensity between soft power strategies of China and India are also attributable to the degree of involvement of the state in exercising soft power. India has been happy to allow its non-state actors to be more proactive in advancing its soft power. In contrast, China’s soft power initiatives are state-driven.

In line with the former argument the author also argues that India’s soft power will continue to encounter formidable challenges than China. To strengthen this argument, author identifies several challenges of India’s soft power, e.g., religious pluralism; multilingual and multiethnic features; resource constraints; adverse impression over Indian’s state inability to provide better quality of lives to its majorities; ineffective communication with the rest of the world and incoherent coercive diplomacy with neighbours like Pakistan. In contrast with India, author also identifies some challenges of China’s soft power, e.g., local resentment in Africa, Asia and Latin America, hard postures in the South China Sea and ambiguous postures in the Middle East. It argues, unlike India, China’s soft power will not encounter such challenges. In this respect, it also gives an interesting comparison of India’s soft power challenges with respect to China’s soft power, such as, due to the multilingual and multiethnic feature of India no language of India has attracted as much global attention and inclination to learn as Mandarin has. As China’s soft power analysis is the main objective of the book, thus more emphasis on the challenges of China rather than India might enrich it more.

The book also attempts to assess the strategic dividends of China’s soft power. It mentioned about different opinion surveys that point to its increasing recognition by the global community. But these opinion surveys might not reveal the true picture, given that positive perceptions do coexist with negative ones.

240


Therefore, it highlights the adverse impressions range from discomfort over the high cost of Chinese development assistance and indebtedness to China, China’s businesses displacing local jobs and livelihoods, Chinese investments being primarily resource-seeking in Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America. The author is skeptical about whether political and strategic support for major initiatives such as the BRI and the AIIB, expanding a territorial agenda in the South China Sea or containing many countries from diplomatically recognizing Taiwan necessarily imply a ‘benign’ perception of China. With skepticism, author opines that if it is indeed so, then more than soft, it is approximately smart power that is earning strategic capitals.

The book is thematically well-organized, rich in information and empirical evidence and is also written in a reader-friendly style. As far as the objectives are concerned, the book is a commendable initiative. The title of the book is also consistent with the basic ideas, argument and subject. The rich historiographical account of the book including Kong Zi; Confucius; Mencius; Loa Zi; Zhuang Zi; Sun Zi; Shaohua Hu; Xiang Shu Yong; Zhao Chang Rong; Kautilya; Kamandak; Rabindranath Tagore as well as many scholarly references from E.H. Carr; Joseph Nye; David Leheny; Gallarotti and Gramsci; Habermas will help politician, policymaker, academician, researcher in international relations, political science, non-traditional security studies and other related disciplines of social sciences to understand soft power discourse from a non-western perspective or Asian perspective. The book will, no doubt, have significant contribution to the existing literatures on soft power, China and India's soft power strategies and foreign policies.

The book is not without its limitation. Considering editorial mistakes there are a few spelling and grammatical errors that should be revised in its second edition. The main criticism lies in conceptual stance exclusively. Though, the book is focused on China’s soft power it also asserts that China’s soft power co-exists with hard power. To justify this assertion, author gives the example of Asia-pacific, Southeast Asia and USA where China’s nuanced engagement has been marked by a combination of hard and soft power strategies. It further argues that China’s both active employment of soft and hard power might be interpreted as an effective demonstration of smart power. In this respect, chapter one of the book could consider providing some accounts of the concept of hard power and smart power relating to the soft power discourse. Further, an intense discussion about the prospects and strategic outcome of Chinese soft power could ameliorate the book more.

Finally, Analysing China’s Soft Power Strategy and Comparative Indian Initiatives is an important contribution in the discourse of soft power as it marks several exceptions compared to the prevailing perspectives. For instance,

241

BOOK REVIEW

in contrast with the western academic discourse on soft power, this book conceptualizes soft power from non-western and Asian perspective. The book, by de-Americanizing the concept of soft power, is a significant contribution to the contemporary discourse of soft power in international relations discipline. Likewise, it also adds value to the study of China’s soft power as there is lack of focused attention on modern China’s extensive deployment of soft power.

Reviewed by Syeda Tanzia Sultana

Research OfficerBangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS)

• BIISS Journal (Quarterly)• Bangladesh Foreign Policy Survey (Quarterly)• BIISS Papers (Monograph series) The Assam Tangle : Outlook for the Future (1984) The Crisis in Lebanon: Multi-dimensional Aspects and Outlook for the Future (1985) India's Policy Fundamentals, Neighbours and Post-Indira Developments (1985) Strategic Aspects of Indo-Sri Lanka Relations (1986) Indo-Bangladesh Common Rivers and Water Diplomacy (1986) Gulf War : The Issues Revisited (1987) The SAARC in Progress : A Hesitant Course of South Asian Transition (1988) Post-Brezhnev Soviet Policy Towards the Third World (1988) Changing Faces of Socialism (1989) Sino-Indian Quest for Rapprochement: Implications for South Asia (1989) Intifada : The New Dimension to Palestinian Struggle (1990) Bangladesh : Towards National Consensus (in Bangla, 1990) Environmental Challenges to Bangladesh (1991) The Gulf War and the New World Order : Implication for the Third World (1992) Challenges of Governance in India : Fundamentals under Threat (1995) Bangladesh in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (1998) Nuclearisation of South Asia : Challenges and Options for Bangladesh (1998) The Middle East Peace Process and the Palestinian Statehood (2000) Pakistan and Bangladesh : From Con�ict to Cooperation (2003) Integrated Coastal Zone Management in Bangladesh : A Case for People's Management (2003) WTO Dispute Settlement System and Developing Countries: A Neorealist Critique (2004) State Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention : Does One Negate the Other? (2006) Unipolarity and Weak States: The Case of Bangladesh (2009) Japan's Strategic Rise (2010) The Fallacy of Fragile States Indices: Is There a 'Fragility Trap'? (2017)

• BIISS Seminar Proceedings Contemporary Development Debate: Bangladesh in the Global Context Moving from MDGs to SDGs: Bangladesh Experience and Expectation SAARC at 30: Achievements, Potentials and Challenges Bangladesh’s Relations with Latin American Countries: Unlocking Potentials Civil-Military Relations in Democracy: An E�ective Framework Recent Extremist Violence in Bangladesh: Response Options 25 March – Gonohottya Dibosh (Genocide Day) Reconciling Divided Societies, Building Democracy and Good Governance: Lessons from Sri Lanka Promoting Cultural Diversity of Small Ethnic Groups in Bangladesh Upcoming 45th Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers of OIC, Dhaka: Revisiting A Shared Journey ‡ivwn½v msKUt evsjv‡`k KZ©…K M„nxZ c`‡¶c I ch©v‡jvPbv (Rohingya Crisis: Measures Taken by Bangladesh and An Appraisal) Bangladesh Delta Plan 2100

• BIISS Country Lecture Series BIISS Country Lecture Series: Part- 1 BIISS Country Lecture Series: Part- 2

Energy Security in South Asia Plus: Relevance of Japanese ExperienceChanging Global Dynamics: Bangladesh Foreign Policy

244


The Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS) is a statutory institution established in 1978 under the administrative control of the Ministry of Foreign A�airs, Government of Bangladesh, for undertaking and promoting research and deliberation on international a�airs, security and developmental issues.

The priority areas of the Institute's research activities are: foreign policy, security and strategic issues with speci�c relevance for Bangladesh; regional, inter-regional and international cooperation, sustainable development with focus on resource management and environmental issues; con�ict studies, peace keeping, disarmament, non-proliferation and area studies.

Contemporary issues of South Asian politics, security and development are the focus of research activities of the Institute. Ethno-religious issues, regional and sub-regional cooperation, globalisation and environmental issues are of special research interests. Problems of institutionalisation of democracy, economic liberalisation, trade and investment links, challenges of governance and strengthening the civil society receive signi�cant scholarly attention.

The general guidance and superintendence of the Institute a�airs are vested upon the Board of Governors, headed by a Chairman and consisting of representatives of ministries, armed forces, academics and professionals. The Director General is the Member-Secretary of the Board and Chief Executive of the Institute. The main activities of the Institute are carried out by the Research Faculty consisting of a team of full-time researchers with varied social sciences background.

Mailing Address

1/46, Old Elephant Road (West of Ramna Police Station), Dhaka-1000, Bangladesh.Fax: 88-02-48312625, [email protected], website: www.biiss.org

Date post:	29-Oct-2021
Category:	Documents
Upload:	others
View:	1 times
Download:	0 times

ROLE OF INTERNET

Documents