8/22/2019 Rousseau 2001 - EN INGLÉS http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/rousseau-2001-en-ingles 1/16 Hereditary Stratification in Middle-Range Societies Author(s): Jerome Rousseau Source: The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Mar., 2001), pp. 117-131 Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2660839 . Accessed: 31/07/2013 20:06 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 190.227.63.116 on Wed, 31 Jul 2013 20:06:02 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Hereditary Stratification in Middle-Range Societies
Author(s): Jerome RousseauSource: The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Mar., 2001), pp.117-131Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2660839 .
Accessed: 31/07/2013 20:06
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
.
Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve
and extend access to The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 190.227.63.116 on Wed, 31 Jul 2013 20:06:02 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Hereditary tratifications usually explained in relation to economic complexity.However,the ethnographicevidence does not readily support such explanations. Examples fromSoutheastAsia, Melanesia, Polynesia, nd the West Coast of Canada suggestthathereditarystratificationerives from he social construction f leadership.
The tensionbetween equality nd inequality s a crucial factor n the varietyand evolution of social systems.Anthropologyhas made an importantcontributionto the understandingof hunter-gatherers.tate-formationhas been another focus of anthropological enquiry.Anthropologists ndarchaeologistshave entered into a fruitful ialogue to explain how stateorganizations ome into being (Trigger 1993). In this context,the notionof 'middle-rangesocieties' has been proposed (Feinman & Neitzel 1984;Upham 1987) to draw our attention o the enormous diversity f socialsystems n pre-state sedentarysocieties. Middle-range society' does notidentify social type but a theoretical roblem:why are pre-state edentarysocieties o variable?Much of the literature n middle-rangeocietiesfocuseson the so-called complex chiefdoms' Earle 1991), which constituted olitiesof several housandpeople. This literature as been an important ontributionto our understandingf state-formation.ere, I wantto pay attention o theother end of the spectrum, he small-scale edentary ocieties with popula-tions n thehundreds ather han thousands. address specific uestion:whydo some of these small-scale ocietieshave hereditarytratificationnd othersdo not?
At the outset, need to define my terms. do not use 'stratification'as a synonymfor 'social inequality', but to refer to a conceptual setwhich classifies ll membersof a society nto a limited number of rankedcategories. n addition to ranking, trata have featureswhich distinguishthem fromeach other.Strata are ideally exclusive, o that nobody shouldbelong to more than one stratum. trata are ideally exhaustive, o that allmembersof the society belong to one. Accordingto thisdefinition, trati-fication s present only in some societies; many societies with markedforms f inequality ack a system f stratification.trata are the levels of astratificationystem; heyare by definitionndigenous categories cf. Morris1968).1
C Royal Anthropologicalnstitute 001.J.Roy. nthrop.nist.N.S.) 7, 117-131
This content downloaded from 190.227.63.116 on Wed, 31 Jul 2013 20:06:02 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Some societies, uch as the aboriginal widdeners f the Malay Peninsula,foster galitarianismnd peacefulness, thers, ike the Iban of Borneo, were
warlike and expansionary. he big-man systems f Highland New Guineaemphasize competition between men for influence and power.2 Somesocieties fBorneo,theTrobriand slands, nd Polynesiahave hereditarytrat-ification ystems, hile others n the same areas do not.Why?
Polynesiaprovides he locus lassicus or the economic explanation f strati-fication. ccordingto Sahlins, urplusproduction nd social stratificationredirectly orrelated Nooy-Palm 1976: 87; Sahlins 1958).
On the largervolcanic islands,the territory f a tribe covered an area which extendedfrom the mountains down to the sea ... Those families who lived higher up in themountainouscountry exchanged their products with the inhabitants f the lowlands.Asingleextendedfamily'would not be able to exploitthe differentroducts ver such a largearea.The exploitation nd exchange of goods took place in the framework f the ramage'... The person who received all the goods which were produced and who redistributedthem again,was the chiefof the genealogical group .. The chief enjoyeda certainprestigeby reason of the distribution,s Goldman, too, demonstrated. onversely, ecause of thisprestigehe also exerciseda certain control over particular rocesses, uch as production. nconsequence,the greater he production, he greater he distributive ctivities f the para-mount chief, nd the further is power extended. fthis tructure ecame too complex, thisleads [sic] to a delegation of power, which resultsn social stratificationNooy-Palm 1976:87-8).
Sahlins's rgument s as follows: complex production ystems the basisfor the redistributiveole of the chief,which in turn enhances his power.With an increase in scale, the difference etween chief and follower sformalized nto social stratificationo justifythe position of secondaryleaders.3 Sahlins's explanation has had a major influence on anthropo-logical thinking. o evaluate it, we can place it in a comparative ontext(Table).
Amazonian ocietiesdo not challenge hetraditionalinkagebetween strati-fication nd the economy because, on the whole,Amazonian leadership slimited n scope. The chief is a peacemaker,generous, nd a good orator(Clastres1962: 53, 55). Amazonian leaders gain and maintainfollowersbybeing generouswiththeirfoodproducts,work and material ossessions.. Bycontrast,men with the lowestpoliticalstatus re those who give least,andthusreceiveproportionally ost' Lorrain2000: 302-3). Leadership s acceptedbecause it appears s a serviceto others.Amazonian societiesdo not challengethe economic explanationof stratification;he other three cells of the Tableare more relevant.
TABLE. Stratificationnd the economic role of leaders
Leaders play a managerialrole Leaders do not playamanagerialrole
While Sahlins'sxplanationascontinuedo be largely cceptedn anthro-pology,t has been challenged y Polynesianpecialistsnd abandoned ySahlins imself1972). t hasbecome clearthat he extended amilys per-fectlybleto organize roductionnd redistribution;ence, here s no needfor amagehiefs oorganizehe conomy.4econdly,hepotentialor urplusdoes not necessarilyeadto social tratification,uchas inUvea (Nooy-Palm1976: 89); conversely, angaia and Mangareva how significantnequalitydespite cological carcityGoldman 970: 481). The correlationought ySahlins oes not hold because he role of the chiefn theeconomys more
complex hanhis analysis asmade t out to be ... The chief's ole n theecononmysdirectedydual nterests,hat fhis honor nd that f thewell-being of his community'1970: 481-2). Strongchiefships epresent heoutcome fseveretatus ivalry,utone cannot redict ow status ivalry illaffectheeconomy 1970: 482).5
Sahlins1972: 140) nowrecognizeshat herelationshipetween urplusandchiefships at leastmutual',f not argely he otherway around.n lessstratifiedolynesianocieties,irst-fruitfferingsnd other ontributionsereredistributedack,but the purpose f redistributionasmorepolitical nd
ideological han conomic: t served o mark hechief's osition.6n otherwords, hiefships the cause of ritual xchange ather han he consequenceofeconomicneeds; heappropriationfsurplus yaristocratsn somestrati-fiedPolynesianocieties s a laterdevelopment.his does not negatetheleaders' conomic role: Leadership ontinually enerates omestic urplus[becauseeaders rganizeabour]. he developmentf rank ndchieftainshipbecomes, aripassu, evelopmentftheproductiveorces'1972: 140).7Therole f eaders oes notderive rom he conomy;tprecedesnd fostersco-nomic ntensification.
Another lawof Sahlins's riginal rgument as to explainPolynesiansocietiestrictlyyreferenceo their resentocales.When hey irstmovedtoPolynesia,roto-Polynesiansrought ith hemnotonly heirgriculturalandtechnologicalnowledge,utalso elementsfsocialorganization.heseinclude patrilinealias, ognatic escent roups kainanga),onical lans, ri-mogeniturebasedon thefundamentalistinctionetween enior nd uniorbrothers),anking,he sacrednessfchiefs supported y the right o tabooresources),ereditaryhiefsariki) ontrasted ithnon-hereditaryarriors(toa) Kirch 984) Hence, olynesiancological onstraintsr their conomicconsequencesannot xplain hese eatures.ne reason orPolynesiantrati-fications thatproto-Polynesiansroughtwiththemconcepts fhierarchyandstratification.ahlins'scological xplanationnd Kirch's istorical odelare schematizedn Figure (A andB).
Goldman1970)makes relatedrgument.orhim, tatusivalry,naspectofhierarchy,as the motor fPolynesianociety. hileprosperityas thegoalforutilitariantems, conomic spects f status perated n a basisofscarcity:fwealthgivesdifferentialtatus,hentheremustnotbe enoughequally or veryone.hisbroughtboutvarious utcomes:ncreasen pro-duction, ighteningf subsistence,aiding, ompetitionetween hiefs or
scarceresources,r converselyeductionn the scale of status-spending
This content downloaded from 190.227.63.116 on Wed, 31 Jul 2013 20:06:02 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
(Goldman1970). In otherwords, he quest for tatus eads to economic trans-formationso produce a contrast etween have and have-not Figure 1, C).In thisview,hereditarytratifications a side-effect,r a tool, of status ivalry.Goldman's explanation is useful in allowing him to present Polynesiansocieties n a coherentfashion, ut it does not explain why therewould bestatus ivalryn thefirst lace.
In his articleon the Trobriands,runton presents differentconomic
explanation f stratification.e argues hat carcity an bring bout the devel-opment of ranking, f limitedopportunities llow a few people to mono-polize valuables.Those who can participaten the inter-island ulabecomearistocrats.9runton (1975: 555-6) supportshis hypothesis y looking at acounter-example.
Despite hehigh griculturalroductivitynd efficiencynd an extremelyighpopulationdensityn many reas,New Guinea]Highlandsocieties avenotdeveloped systemfhereditaryocial tratificationndchieftainship.lthough ighlanders eredependentn
long distancerade or rucialwealth tems shells,alt, xes, tc. thenature f thetraderouteswassuch thatnowherewas it possible o monopolise nd closeup the trade ndexchange ystem.
Brunton's rgument s plausible,but not compelling. t is easy to under-standhow prosperitynd scarcity ould both be harnessed o the develop-mentofhereditarytratification,ut n neither ase can a generally onvincingcase be made for a necessaryrelationship etween prosperity/scarcityndstratification.runton's argumentalso raises questions of culture history.
Hierarchy xistednot
only among proto-Polynesians,ut also in the broader
Austronesian anguage family to which they belong (Blust 1980). Wecannot exclude a relationship etween the presenceof stratificationmongTrobrianders,who are Austronesians,nd its rarity n the New GuineaHighlands,who belong to anothercultural radition.
Borneo
In orderto controlforthe possiblerole of cultural riginson the presence
of stratification,t maybe usefulto compareAustronesian ocietieswith and
This content downloaded from 190.227.63.116 on Wed, 31 Jul 2013 20:06:02 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
without tratification.orneo provides ontrastingxamples:groupswith thesame economic base may or may not have hereditary tratification.he con-
trast s particularlyvidentbetween the Kayan of central orneo and the ban.The Kayan migrated romthe upper reaches of the Kayan river rea in theIndonesian province of KalimantanTimur to the Mahakam basin of Kali-mantanTimur and the basins of the Rejang and Baramin Sarawak. he Ibanoriginatefromthe Indonesianprovinceof KalimantanBarat and expandednorthwards nd then eastwards n Sarawak.
The Kayan have fourhereditary trata, he marenrulingstratum), ipuy(lower aristocrats),anyin commoners), nd dipen slaves).Members of theruling tratum wned slaves and received corvees from ower aristocratsnd
commoners. here was a preferenceor tratumndogamy Rousseau 1979a).Kayan stratification as buttressedby secular and supernatural anctions.Distinctions etween stratawere clearlymarked n religion nd in daily ife.By contrast,t is evident even to the casual observer hat the Iban foster nideology of egalitarianism.hey lacked ascribed strata nd do not have here-ditary hiefs.10 ccordingto Freeman 1970: 113), the Iban longhouse eader'has no authority o command othermembers f his community, orare they,in any marked ense,his personal subordinates'.
We cannot account for thiscontrast y reference o the productivebase.Kayan and Iban agriculture how only minor differencesFreeman 1955a;Rousseau 1977). Many differencesn their ocial organizations ppear to beconsequencesof the contrasteduthorityf Iban and Kayan chiefs, ot expla-nations for the contrast. or instance,Kayan communitieswere traditionallylarger nd more stable n membership han ban communities. his is a directoutcome of theKayanchiefs' uthorityver their ollowers, hile Iban leaderscould not prevent thervillagemembersfrom eavingthe community.11tfirstglance, the contrastbetween Kayan and Iban social organizations smysterious, ntil we notice that the distinguishingactor s mobility.Mobilegroups,where the ocal communitytself s an ever-changing ntity,ack strati-fication. ocieties n whichlocal groupingsmaintain heir dentity vera longperiodhave stratification.urthermore,tabilitynd stratificationre inverselyrelated o the mportance f warfare, hich we would expectbecause warfarecan be destabilizing. ence, it is not surprisinghat he Iban should havebeenengagedin warfaremore often thanthe Kayan. Furthermore,mong strati-fied societies of centralBorneo,variationsn the incidence of warfare eemto be related o stratification.he Kayan,whose chiefs ried to limitwarfare,had a more rigidstratificationystem han theirKenyah relatives, ho weremore warlike.12Success in warfare an provide status;by limitingwarfare,
Kayan aristocratsimitedcommoners' bility o gain status. or Kayanchiefs,warfarewas a political ntervention f last resort.
What is the linkbetweenmobility nd hereditarytratification?he causalsequence is as follows:population ncrease mong rice swiddeners uts pres-sure on agriculturaland. Alternatives re available:migrations,r corporateownershipof swiddens by domestic units (or communities).13he latterstrategy rings about geographical stability nd politicallystable groups.Domestic unitscannoteffectively aintain tability y themselves.hey needto form argercoalitions n orderto protecttheir nterests.n Borneo, the
politicalunit is the local community. elationshipsbetweengroupsbecome
This content downloaded from 190.227.63.116 on Wed, 31 Jul 2013 20:06:02 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
a corporatematter; hisenhances the role of the leaders.Leadershipbecomesa specialization: he primary ole of leaders s to represent heircommunity.
Close relatives f the chief re well placed to gain politicalexpertise nd maybe groomed to succeed hin. Leadership becomes the node aroundwhichstratificationan develop. Hereditary ransmission f leadership creates thebasis for stratum f leaders; his, y default,dentifies t least one stratum ffollowers. nce hereditary tratificationas appeared, t can persist n differ-ent conditions, uch as low population density Rousseau 1980; 1990). Thestructure f centralBorneo societieswas developed n theApo Kayanregion,which had a high population density. ispersal to other regions and hencea loweringof density)was a consequence of internecinewarfare. hese early
hereditaryhiefswere the organizers f the migrations; hisplaced them n agood position to retainpower once they had moved to more congenialset-tings, specially ecause inter-communityssues remained ourcesof potentialconflictRousseau 1990).
Many Iban-speaking roupsfollowed he oppositestrategy.aced with pres-sure on land, heymoved to scarcely opulated areaswhere they bsorbed ndsometimeskilled the original nhabitants.Migrationsremainedthe favouriteapproach to resolve nternal onflicts; ommunities roke apart and recom-bined at a rapid rate.Besides the pursuitof resources,he quest forprestige
was the other factorfostering ban mobility.Givena
framework f com-petitive galitarianism,tatuswas to be obtained by warlike nd expansionarydeeds (Sather1996: 92). As long as it is in force, uch a strategy revents hedevelopment fhereditarytratification.eadersvalidate heir ositionbytheirleadershiprole in warfare which valorizes ndividual killsrather hanpedi-gree) and the continual fragmentationf communitiesmakes it difficultorleaders to transmit heir power to their descendants nd to dominate theirfollowers. he two causal sequencesare schematizedn Figure2.
Hovever, the contrastbetweenKayan and Iban is not a culturalone. Itwould be a mistake o saythatthe Iban are,by definition,mobilepopulationswithcompetitive galitarianism.nevitably,redatory xpansion s a phase.Atsome point,because of demographic r political reasons, xpansionceases tobe an option;several banic groupshave faced thatreality. mong them, heMualang ofWest Borneo have developed hereditarytratificationn the sameway as the people of central Borneo (King 1978). By the time Freeman(1955b) described them in the 1950s, the Iban of the Third Division ofSarawakhad not done so,because theywere recentmigrantso the area.Even
Population Corporate Geographical Politically Leaders re Hereditary Hereditaryincrease ownershipf stability> stablegroups often leadership stratification
% swiddens with eaders succeeded w
=> byrelatives
FIGURE 2. Causalfactors f stratification.
This content downloaded from 190.227.63.116 on Wed, 31 Jul 2013 20:06:02 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
so, these pioneer groups were already howing a degree of hereditary rans-missionof power (Sandin 1970).14 he processwas farmore advanced among
theirrelatives f the Second Division,who migrated here ong ago: the atterhad proto-strataMorgan 1968; Rousseau 1980). The differencesre relatedto inter-community elationships: o the extent that peaceful solutions arefavoured o solve inter-communityonflicts nd establish eographical tabil-ity, tratificationan develop.
Sather 1996: 92) identifies lements f Iban societywhich could facilitatethe developmentof stratification:ompetitive galitarianism, here equalityof potential s, for the Iban, a preconditionfor the attainment f achievedinequality' 1996: 74). Competitionprovided he mpetus orthedevelopment
of hierarchies, oth among men and women. Inequalitywas 'also "histori-cized" and linkedto thepastachievements f ancestral ounderswhose accom-plishments o some degree "freeze" merit,making its rewards vailable tosuccessivegenerations f futuredescendants' 1996: 75). This was consistentwith the principle accordingto which community ounders ormeda coregroup which provided communityeaders on an ongoing basis (1996: 82-3,84); thiswas a reason to memorize engthy edigrees.All these factors educethe apparent ontrast etween the Iban and the Kayan,and Figure2 couldbe developedto takethem nto consideration."5
HighlandNew Guineavs.Borneo
My explanation orBorneo does notapply directlyo HighlandNew Guinea.Land usage is more intensiven New Guinea than n Borneo,but thisdoesnot lead to hereditary hiefship ike the Kayanor to predatory xpansiononthe scale of the Iban.
The high population density f the New Guinea Highlandsmade expan-sion a doubtful trategy. arfarewas sometimestriggered y land conflicts,but territorial ain was not a predominantmotivation Sillitoe 1972). Thisshould not come as a surprise. he Iban of Borneo resorted o predatoryexpansionbecause theymoved to sparsely opulatedareaswherevictorywasall but certainand where they could absorbthe previous occupants. n theNew Guinea Highlands,migrationwould have been a reasonableecologicaladaptation nly ifthe conquered groupswere destroyed.here are examplesof this n the New Guinea literature,ut theyare not the norm.
Ifthemigration lternative as uncommon n the New Guinea Highlands,whatprevented hemfromusingthe centralBorneo alternative? s there reascribedaspectsto New Guinea Highlands leadership,t is not fanciful oexpectthathereditaryhiefshipmighthave arisen n stablecommunities, ithhereditary tratifications a consequence.Another factor s relevanthere.Given settled ommunities hat eek to protect heir nterests,eadershipmaycome in two forms: table office-holders nd competitive eadership. hefavoured pproach n stratified orneo societieswas to delegateto a stratumof leaderstheresponsibilityfmaintaining eace (althoughwarfare ccurred).The favoured pproach n the New Guinea Highlandshas been to resort ocompetition althoughnegotiated ettlementsccur): (a) competition etween
ambitious ndividuals orpositionsofprestigen society; b) warfare etween
This content downloaded from 190.227.63.116 on Wed, 31 Jul 2013 20:06:02 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
groups.Both forms f competition ounteract he tendency o establish ered-itary eadership.
Further nalysis s necessary, ut the greater mphasison competition vernegotiated ettlementsmay be related o other contrastsn the social organi-zationsoftherespective ocieties, or nstance patrilineal ias linkedto men'sattempt o controlwomen (New Guinea Highlands)vs. Borneo domestic ndlocal relations, hich prevent he development f fraternalnterest roups.'6(See Figure 3.)
NorthwestoastofNorth merica
I suggest that stratifications not explained directlyby reference o theeconomy;rather,t derivesfrom pecific oliticalcircumstances. an we applythisargument o other societieswhere stratificationas been explained eco-nomically?NorthwestCoast societies are an example.The traditional xpla-nation has been that the managerialrole of the chief servesas a basis forstratification:atural esources, hich are at the same timeabundant nd dis-tributedunequally in time and space,must be exploited throughthe co-operationof severaldomesticunits,whichbecome corporatekinshipgroups.These large groupsneed a managerto co-ordinateproduction nd distribu-
tion.Kinship organization rovidesa basis forestablishing hereditary uc-cessionof leaders,which in turn eads to stratification.17
The Kwakiutl ase would seem to support his nalysis; wakiutl hiefs er-tainlyused theirmanagerial ole to appropriate urplusfrom he members ftheir orporatekinship roup.However, heKwakiutlmodel is onlyone alter-native on the Northwest Coast. If distinct conomic units ointly controlnaturalresources nd sharethe product n some equitablefashion, hismaynot lead to the development f corporate multi-family inshipgroups withan economic role.Among the Coast Salish, hemanagerial ole of the elite s
more apparent han real (Ames 1995).Their chiefsplaya politicalrole,not a
Pressure n and e Migrationandconquest)
Settled ommunitiesrotectheirnterests
Specialisteaders epresentheir Men ompete or ower. his ounteractscommunities.hey ransmitheir osition thehereditaryransmissionf eadership.totheirffspring.
Stratificationevelops No stratification
FIGURE 3. Alternative esponses o land pressure.
This content downloaded from 190.227.63.116 on Wed, 31 Jul 2013 20:06:02 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
managerial ne. Suttles 1960; 1968) has argued thatthe Coast Salish potlatchis a mechanism or eveningout long-term luctuations ather han a tool for
social differentiations with the Kwakiud. Consequently, alish local groupsare of approximately qual size (because leaders do not compete forfollowers). he Coast Salish have egocentricbilateralkin groupswhich laidgreat emphasison affinal ies' Donald & Mitchell 1975: 341), hence a socialstructurewhich does not call for group consolidation. By contrast, heKwakiutl had non-unilineal, anked, ocal kin groups: descent-oriented ingroups, ven flexiblenon-unilinealones, have a potentialfor growth nd across-generationermanence hat s lacking n ego-orientedunits' 1975: 341).The Kwakiutl are not the prototypeof Northwest Coast societies,but a
variantwhere stratificationas led to exploitation. tratificationannot beexplained as a consequence of the economy; as in Borneo, it arises out ofpolitics.NorthwestCoast leadersrepresent heirfollowers; ecause theydo so,some of them manage to appropriate surplus. n some cases, economicexploitationfollows political representation.igure 4 summarizes he causalsequence; it lacks a crucial variable.The environment oes not determinewhetherthosewho exploit the naturalresourceswill form corporategroupsor flexiblenetworks. his is the result f a politicalchoice by some membersof the society.The natural resourcesoffer ome possibilities hat can beexploited n sociallydifferent ays."8
The Kachin
Friedman 1979) also gives an economic explanation f Kachin hierarchy,uthis approach s much more compatiblewiththepresent rgument, ecause itgives an important lace to ideology.19or him, the initialconditions re (a)local lineageswhich participaten redistributiveeasts nd are articulatedwitha generalized xchangeofwomen,and (b) 'a representationf the world in
which ancestorsmergewith deitieswho controlnature,wealth, nd prosper-ity; nd a swiddenagriculture' Claessen 1981: 161).
The community pirit s the superior unitywith which individuallineages can identify.It is the ideological correlate of the village and its territory.. In the transitiontochieftainship, lineage which before only represented he community t each feastgradu-allytakeson the ob permanently.. Proper manipulation imply dentifies he ancestor pirit
Resources are Kingroup leaders Leaders take Competition or
Plentiful, nevenly owned by develop a advantage of their leadership eads
distributed esources corporatekin managerialrolew managerialrole to to stratification
can be optimally groups 4 control urplusw
exploitedby groups
larger han domestic Bilateral 4 Kin group eaders Flexiblearrangements revent
units networks elp enhance co- stratifcationmatchresources operationw
and people
flexibly
FIGURE 4. Economy and stratificationn the NorthwestCoast.
This content downloaded from 190.227.63.116 on Wed, 31 Jul 2013 20:06:02 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
of the lineage with the spiritof the village who is, afterall, only a more remote andpowerful ncestor. his is not simplya question of manipulation,however, nd there s aninternal ogic linking ncreasing ank to gradual dentification ith the village spirit.As tihe
ability ofeast mplies reaterurpluses hich pparentlyepenidn one's nfluence ith he higherspirits,ndsince his nfluencean onlybe interpreteds closer inship,ne's ncestors ust nideed egenealogicallyloser o the territorialpirit hat s the necessaryirst ink n thechainofcomnmunica-tion with he upernaturalowers.. The result s a very specificset of relationships etweenthe chiefly ine,the spiritualworld and the community Friedman 1979: 42).
This is an economic explanation n so far as control over wealth andexchangestransforms religioushierarchy spirits re superior) to a humanhierarchy chiefs are hereditarily uperior because of their contacts withspirits). riedman's nalysis s consistentwithmy argument hat the transfor-mation of leadership s an essential actor n hereditarytratification.he riseof Kachin hereditaryeaders s not an inescapableconsequence of economicconditions. t requires the presence of a religious hierarchy,n which thesuperiority f spirits ver humans serves s a model for the development fa human hierarchy. riedman (1979: 40) does not accept Leach's viewthat the spirituals simply he reflection r restatementf "real" social rela-tions',but rather sserts hathierarchys inherentn the relationship etweenspirits nd humans (1979: 41). In thatsense,he givesan infrastructuraloleto the belief in spirits cf. Schwimmer 1981: 227). This seems speculative.
It is unnecessary o give a special causal role to religion: With regard tothe feasting ystemn "democratic"groups [of highlandmainland SoutheastAsia],we findthat there s highmotivation o perform he "feasts f merit"which simultaneouslyaise one's secular and one's religious tatus(es)' Kirsch1973: 25).
This raises anotherquestion.Looked at froma distance, outheastAsianfeasts f merit eem to have a lot in common with the competitive eastingofHighlandNew Guinea. There are severaldifferences.outheastAsian feastsof meritare closer to Kwakiutlpotlatches, eing devices forascendingthe
levelsof a hierarchy.hese feasts stablish status hat s acquired for good,while the big man's status s maintained nly as long as he is active n feastexchange.For all SoutheastAsian societies with feasts f merit, notion ofhierarchyspresent,n the same way as with the Kwakiutl.20 riedman s rightto identify ierarchynd controloversurplus s antecedents f chieftainship.It is clear that feastsof merit are intimatelyinked to these two factors.However; theydo not automatically ive rise to chieftainship. nly whenleaders have succeeded in presenting hemselves s indispensable an here-ditarystratificationevelop. Despite appearances,this perceived indispen-
sability s not directly conomic. This does not deny the fact that chiefs,Kachin or Kayan, are involved n the economy,but their economic role isnot the cause of their hereditary osition. t only looks that way to theirfollowers.
Conclusion
A comparisonof ethnographic ases suggests he following onclusions:First, conomic factors uch as surplus, carcity,rade, r settlementatterns
are not directly he cause of stratification,lthough theyestablish imits to
This content downloaded from 190.227.63.116 on Wed, 31 Jul 2013 20:06:02 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
what is possible.Demographic, conomic,and politicalfactorswhich broughtan end to Iban mobility layed crucial rolein weakening strategy f com-
petitionbetween eaders, ut the previouspossibility f mobility id not causethis ompetition.The ame kind of mobilitywas equally available o the Kayanand othercentralBorneo groups, ut theymade other choices. On the otherhand,Polynesian xamples show thateconomy and stratificationre linked nso far s theintensificationf production an be a consequencef stratification.
Secondly,n all these cases, the natureof leadership s crucial to the pres-ence or absence of stratification.f it becomes accepted that a leader'srela-tives are better suited to occupy the position, this entails a conception ofhuman naturewhere differentategories f human beings nherit ocial char-
acteristics.his ideological kernel s a necessary ut not sufficientonditionfor stratification.Thirdly, deological factors re as important s ecological, economic, and
demographicvariables. n all the cases we have seen, ideological constructsplay a crucial role: for instance,we should not be surprised that manyAustronesian ocietiesexperimentedwith hereditarytratification,ecause thenotion of hierarchywas alreadypart of their culturalbaggage. n the NewGuinea Highlands, he ideology of competitiveness as acted as a brake tothe development f stratification,lthough t has certainly ot prevented hedevelopment fhierarchical onstructsGodelier 1982). In theTrobriands,hedefinition f what is valuable (established y the kula)is also ideological.
Fourthly, set of initialsocio-economic conditions does not necessarilybringabout a singleoutcome. Economic explanations dentify eterministiccauses outsidetheconsciousness f social actors. uch explanations re some-timesvalid,but theydo not seem to applyto social features uch as stratifi-cation. fstratificationerivesfrom oliticalpractice, hen t is at least n parta consequenceof consciouschoices, nd alternativesf which actors re awarehave a chance of being tried out.2' The Iban and Kayan of Borneo werefaced with similar nitialconditions,but favoureddifferenttrategies. hus,it is hopeless to posit mechanisticmodels. On the other hand, it is oftenpossible to explain after the fact what alternativeswere selected and theconsequencesof thesechoices.22
NOTES
tIn this definition,social stratum' s not a synonym or social class'.2Gender relations also vary significantlyn middle-rangesocieties. Despite their other
differences,he aboriginal swiddenersof the Malay Peninsula, the Iban, and central Borneogroups resembleeach otherin de-emphasizinggender inequality, y contrast o New GuineaHighland societies.
'In his 1958 book, Sahlins'snotion of stratificationonflateshereditary tratawith economiccomplexity. ence, forhim,a Polynesian ociety s less stratifiedf t has few or no hereditarystrata nd liniited econoniic differentiation;t is more stratifiedfit has both.
4'Finney .. has demonstrated hat an "extended family", hat s, a group much smallerthanthe ramage,can indeed successfully atherand then redistribute he productsof one wholeterritory tretching rom the higher mountainous districts o the coastal zone' (Nooy-Palm1976: 88).
5Similarly,he recognition f specialists tohutnga)s not a consequence of technologicalneces-
sity, ut follows from desire to honour people. Specializationwas in factcostlynot because
This content downloaded from 190.227.63.116 on Wed, 31 Jul 2013 20:06:02 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
the specialist eased to be a food producer- food productionwas not thattightly rganized- but because work undertakenby specialistswas honorific nd had to be ceremonializedbyfeasts nd gifts' Goldman 1970: 492).
6In the Traditional ocieties, he religious ide of production was either the province of thehighest evel ariki, r ariki n concert with priests, r of priests alone. The technicalities fproduction were the exclusive prerogativef low-level chiefs .. The religious managementofproduction s more honorable than its technical management; nd managementof circulationis more honorificthan the managementof production generally. nderlyingtheseprinciplesis the valid enough assumptionof an appropriatedivision of the economy in such a way thatthe commoners bring food into being and freely [?] honor their chiefs with offerings.The chiefsput theirhonorable mark, o to speak,on the produce,send it into circulation shonorably marked produce, and the populace - having started the cycle with food as rawmaterial receives t back in a new and honorificform' Goldman 1970: 483-4).
7The relationship f chiefsto the economy is ambiguous: the separation f the highest riki
from production is relatedto their status. n order to maintain their exalted position, theymust not be involved directly n production. n practice,they need to have an interest nproduction because this s a requirement f power, but they delegate theireconomic role tosubordinatesGoldman 1970: 485).
8The *fono, r political assembly of people (especially adult males), is also a term ofProto-Polynesian ncestry, hich suggests hat,despite the hereditary hieftainship, ecision-making n AncestralPolynesia was based on consensus within the *kainanga s a whole. (Suchan interpretations in keeping with the idea thatthe *'ariki was more of a sacred, hansecular,ruler n AncestralPolynesian Society.)The physical pace upon which such *fotiowere held,and where the*'arikiprobably nvokedtheancestral eities,was the*malae or ceremonialplaza'(Kirch 1984: 66). This does not imply that they simplybroughtover an existing ulture:The
culturalpatterns haracteristic f AncestralPolynesia were not carried intact along migrationroutes,but developed in the islands themselves,n response to the challenges of oceanic exis-tence' (1984: 42). For a discussionof core' Polynesiansocial schemasand theirrealization nHawai'i, see Hommon (1995).
"Where conditionsare such thatmen can act to limitstrategic xchange items and pre-empt othersfromgainingaccess to them,then the stage is set forthe developmentof rankand chieftainship'Brunton 1975: 556). For Brunton,the causal sequence is SCARCITY -e
RANKING; forGoldman, t is STATUS RIVALRY -- CONSTRUCTION OF SCARCITYTO MARK INEQUALITY.
10I addressed he question of Iban inequality n an earlierpublication Rousseau 1980). Thisstarted controversy hich shed more heat than ight. ather 1996) makesan important on-tribution o the ssue,but he sometimesmisunderstands y argument. ollowing Morgan (1968)and Sandin (1970), whom Satherdoes not cite, pointedout that ll Iban are notequal atbirth,but that person'sbackgroundmakes a difference.While he absence of named strata acilitatedmobility,hedescendants nd relatives fleaderswere considerablymore likely o be leaders cf.Jensen1974: 27; Sandin 1970), and descendants f slavecaptiveswere likelyto be slavesforafewgenerations cf.Sandin 1967: 125). Likewise, he familieswhich incurreddebts had limitedalternatives s long as the debt was not repaid.As Sather 1996: 105) points out, the existenceof a status f ong-term ebt-liability osesa seriouschallengeto Freeman's iew of ban society'.In practice, hese factors dentified hree unnamed status evels,those who had 'the inheritedobligationto seek personal prestige',ordinarypeople who ... would remain followers', nd a'lower class' (Morgan 1968: 146-7). This is the basis on which I stated that Iban society wasdivided nto three tatus evels .. which were to a largeextenthereditary,lthoughthe absenceof clear boundariesbetween them facilitated ocial mobility' Rousseau 1980: 59-60). Sather'silluminating aper is consistentwith my earlier nalysis, iven his argument hat ban society s'structured roundan articulation f principlesof both "egality" nd "hierarchy"' 1996: 102),although t is fair o saythat he is keen to emphasizethe egalitarian spect.
" Other social differences re not directlyrelevant n this context.For instance, he Ibanstudiedby Freemanpractiseuterolocality, hile the Kayan I studied are uxorilocal. However,this s not an 'ethnic' or a 'cultural'difference,ut rather n adaptationto differentopulationdensities.n areas of centralBorneo with high population density, he Kayan have abandoneduxorilocality oruterolocality,ecause,when population density ncreases, omestic units startretaining wnershipof their widdens. n such circumstances,t is more advantageousfor newcouple to move in with the domesticunit thathas more swiddens;this eads to uterolocality.
This content downloaded from 190.227.63.116 on Wed, 31 Jul 2013 20:06:02 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
12Most, maybe all, Kenyah sub-groups are descendantsof nomadic hunter-gatherers hoadopted agriculture nd hereditary tratification nder Kayan influence.More precisely, neKenyah group, he Lepo' Time, became sedentary nder Kayan influence nd then became the
model for most other sedentarizingnomads. As population increased n the Apo Kayan (theupper reaches of the Kayan river), here was an increase n warfare, nd most Kayanic com-munities Kayan, Busang, Segai, Modang) migrated o otherriverbasins.
13At a later stage, he scarcity f agricultural and could lead to agricultural ntensification.This is not relevant o my Borneo examples.
14Per se, the transmission f leadership roles does not automatically ntail inequality. omeform of hereditary eadership s present n egalitarian ocieties such as the Penan of Borneoand the Bushmen; tspurpose is to guaranteethat the group has a leader. On the other hand,hereditaryeadershipoffers potential for social inequality Rousseau 1985). The Iban startedmoving to the Rejang basin in the first nd second decades of the nineteenth entury Freeman1970). By the middle of that century, he Brooke Raj progressivelyonstructed n administra-tivestructure hich served n part as a substitute or n indigenous, ndependent, olitical orga-nization.Among Third Division Iban, it may have prevented he developmentof stratification,while proto-strata ad alreadyappeared in the Second Division Iban before Brooke rule. It isalso interestingo note that it is widely believed thatthe descendantsof former laves weredisproportionately epresented mong those who migratedduring the nineteenth nd earlytwentieth entury from he Saribas] to the former hird, Fourth and FifthDivisions' (Sather1996: 92).
15I am not suggesting hat a social system uch as thatof the Iban must necessarily volveinto one of hereditary tratification,iven the right' circumstances,r that stratified ocietiesof Borneo evolved from society similar o the Iban. While theseare possibilities,lternativescenarios are also plausible. n particular, he presence of hereditary trata mong the IbanicMualang was certainly acilitated y the features f competition and hierarchy resent mongall Iban,but it is also plausiblethattheywere influencedby neighbouring tratifiedocieties.
16Some form of stratification as apparently resent mong the Melpa (Feil 1987;Vicedom& Tischner 1943), but its significance nd form are unclear. Strathern 1987), who has doneextensive ieldwork mong them,disagreeswithVicedom's description,nd it is difficulto dis-entanglehistorical hanges, specially fter he Second WorldWar,from deological frameworkswhich could have clouded descriptions.Given the argumentof this article, he presence ofstratificationmong some New Guinea Highland groups would be unsurprising. hope toreturn o this ssue later.
17The uneven distribution f resourceson the NorthwestCoast and the more even distri-bution of resources n Borneo are correlatedwith the presenceof corporate kinshipgroups nsome Northwest Coast societies (e.g. the Kwakiutl) and their absence among the Iban andKayan (Rousseau 1979b). For Borneo's swidden rice agriculture,he household is the ideal unitof productionand consumption.There is no benefit n establishing arger corporate groupsexceptfor the longhouse community, hich has the politicalrole of protecting he interestsfits members o that ts constituent omesticunits an carry n profitably ith their utonomouspursuits.
"8Bishop (1987: 74) provides an alternativeexplanation: Following Brunton's (1975)argument, suggestthathereditary ositionson the coast developed where the exchange ofluxury goods could be monopolized by a few individuals nd transmittedntergenerationally'.I have alreadydiscussed Brunton'sargument.Bishop's formulationmakes it easy to see that,
while the control over luxury goods maybe a concomitantfactor,t is not a causalfactor. or
it to operate, the possibilityof monopolizing luxury goods must already have becomelegitimate.
"9I deal only with a small aspect of his argument.His book is more concernedwith suchissues as the oscillationbetween gumsaand gumilaoand the emergenceof Asiaticsocial forma-tions from umsa-like ystems. or both issues,hereditary hieftainships a given, nd it wouldbe unfair o criticize Friedman forproviding n incompleteexplanationof stratification.isanalysis s quite sufficientor his purposes.
20This is not a general eature f potlatches.We saw that Coast Salishpotlatchesdo not bringabout social differentiation,ut prevent t in a processof redistribution.
21For thesame reason,Ames'sargument bout theoriginofranking n the NorthwestCoast
is useful but incomplete. He (1981: 789) suggeststhathierarchywas adaptive in providingIimproved monitoringof the environment nd improvedresponsesto environmental hifts
This content downloaded from 190.227.63.116 on Wed, 31 Jul 2013 20:06:02 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
through nformation low'; this makes sense,but the adaptive advantages f increased nforma-tion flowsdo not inescapably ead to hierarchy.
22Ethnographic omparisons help in documenting the available alternatives iven certain
initial conditions,but computer simulationswill be necessary n order to work out possiblealternativeswhich may not be available ethnographically.
REFERENCES
Ames, K.M. 1981. The evolution of social ranking n the NorthwestCoast of North America.American nitiquity6,789-805.
1995. Chiefly power and household production on the Northwest Coast. In Founda-tions f social nequalityeds) T.D. Price & G.M. Feinman, 155-87. New York: Plenum.
Blust, R.A. 1980. Early Austronesian ocial organization: the evidence of language. CurrentAnthropology1, 205-47.
Brunton,R. 1975.Why do the Trobriandshave chiefs?Man (N.S.) 10, 544-58.Claessen, H.J.M. 1981. Review ofJonathanFriedman'sSystem, tructure,nd contradictionn
the evolution of "Asiatic" social formations'.American nthropologist3, 161-2.Clastres, . 1962. tchange et pouvoir: philosophiede la chefferie ndienne.L'Homiie 2: 1, 51-
65.Donald, L. & D.H. Mitchell 1975. Some correlatesof local group rank among the Southern
Kwakiutl.Ethnology 4, 325-46.
Earle,T.K. 1991. Chiefdonis:ower,conomynd ideology. ambridge: University ress.Feil, D.K. 1987. The evolution f HighlandPapua New Guinea societies. ambridge: University
Press.Feinman,G.M. & J. Neitzel 1984. Too many types: n overview of sedentary restate ocieties
in the Americas. n Advances narchaeologicalethodnd theory,ol. 7 (ed.) M. Shiffer,9-102.New York: Academic Press.
Freeman,J.D. 1955a. Iban agriculture: reportn the shfftingultivationf hill riceby the ban ofSaratvakColonial Research Studies 18). London: HMSO.
1955b. Report n the ban of Sarawak.Kuching: Sarawak GovernmentPrintingOffice.1970. Report 01 the Iban. LSE Monographs on Social (Anthropology 1). London:
Athlone Press.
Friedman,J.1979. System,tructureind ontradictionn theevolution f Asiatic' ocial ormationis.Copenhagen: National Museum of Denmark.
Godelier,M. 1982. Social hierarchies mong the Baruyaof New Guinea. In Inequalityn NewGuineaHighland ocietiesed.) Aj. Strathern,-34. Cambridge: University ress.
Goldman, I. 1970. Ancient olynesian ociety. hicago: University ress.Hommon, R.J. 1995. Social complex adaptive systems: ome Hawaiian examples (Santa Fe
InstituteWorking Papers 95-07-066). http://wwwsantafe.edu/sfi/publications/95Jensen, .H. 1974. The Iban and their eligion.xford: Clarendon Press.King,V.T. 1978. The Mualang of Indonesian Borneo: neglected sourcesfor ban studies.Borneo
Research ulletin 0, 57-73.Kirch,PV 1984. The evolutiotnfthePolynesian hiefdomns.ambridge: University ress.
Lorrain,C. 2000. Cosmic reproduction,conomics and politics among the Kulina of southwestAmazonia.Journal ftheRoyalAnthropologicalnstituteN.S.) 6, 293-310.
1979b. tratificationnd chiefship:comparisonf Kwakiutl nd Kayan. n Challeng-ing nthropologyeds)D.H. Turner G.A. Smith,29-44.Toronto:McGraw-Hill yerson.
1980. Iban inequality. ijdragen otdeTaal-,Land- en Volkenkunde36, 52-63.
1985. The ideologicalprerequisitesf inequality.n Developnemitnd decline:heevolution f ociopoliticalrganizationeds) HJ.M. Claessen,P. van de Velde & M.E. Smith,36-45. SouthHadley,Mass:Bergin& Garvey.
1990. Central orneo: thnicdentitynd social ife n a stramtfiedociety. xford:ClarendonPress.
Sather, .A. 1996. All threadsre white': banegalitarianismeconsidered.n Origins,ncestryand alliance:explorationsn Austronesianthnographyeds) Jj. Fox & C.A. Sather,70-110.
Canberra: epartmentfAnthropology,ustralian ationalUniversity.Schwimmer,. 1981.Le mystereesrizieresa propos e J.Friedman) nthropologietsocietes
5: 2, 223-31.Review article.Sillitoe, . 1972.Warfaren New Guinea: a comparativetudy.M.A. thesis, niversityf
Durham.Strathern,.J. 987.Social classesnMountHagen? he early vidence.thniology6,245-60.Suttles,W 1960. Affinal ies, ubsistencend prestige mong the Coast Salish.American
Anthropologist2, 296-305.1968.Copingwith bundance:ubsistencen theNorthwest oast. n Manthehunter
(eds)R.E. Lee & I. DeVore, 6-68.Chicago:Aldine.Trigger, .G. 1993. Early civilizations: ncient gypt n context. airo: The AmericanUniversity
in Cairo Press.Upham,S. 1987.A theoreticalonsiderationf middlerange ocieties.n Chiefdomsn the
La stratificationhereditaire dans les societes intermediaires
Resume
La stratificationereditaire st souvent expliquee par rapport la complexite de 1'economie.Cependant les donnees ethnographiquesn'appuient pas d'emblee de telles explications.Desexemplestires d'Asie du Sud-Est,de Melanesie et le la Cote Ouest du Canada suggerentque la stratificationereditaire st derivee de la construction ociale de la chefferie.
Dept. of Anthropology,cGill University,55 SherbrookeW, Montreal,H3A 2T7, Canada.
