Rule+76+(3D+09-10)

3D 2009-2010 SPEC PRO DIGESTS1. Dionisio Fernandez et al v Ismaela Dimagiba | JBL ReyesG.R. No. 23638 October 12, 1967| 21 SCRA 428

FACTS Isamela Dimagiba submitted to the CFI of Iloilo a petition to probate the

1930 will of the late Benedicta delos Reyes instituting her as the sole heir of the decedent’s estate.

Petitioners, Fernandez et al opposed the probated and claimed to be the intestate heirs of the decedent.

OPPOSITION to probate were based on: forgery, vice of consent, estoppel by laches of Dimagiba and implied revocation of the will.

The implied revocation was alleged because according to Petitioners, majority of the estate was sold in 1943-1944, thus revoking the 1930 will instituting Dimagiba as sole heir. Note however that the SC set aside these conveyances in an unpublished case already. (Also, mejo stupid yun ground kasi yun 1940s sale, si Dimagiba din yun buyer/reciepient nung properties sold, so paano magkakaroon ng implied revocation?!)

CFI: allowed the probate of the will and deferred resolving the issues of estoppel and revocation until such time that the proceeding involves determination of the intrinsic validity of the will.

Petitioners insist that the issue of estoppel and revocation should have been resolved during the probate of the will, thus after receiving further evidence, the CFI decided that the will unaffected and unrevoked by the subsequent sales.

Both decisions were (admission for probate of the will and absence of implied revoc/estoppel) separately appealable because the latter is independent of the former, but Petitioners belatedly filed their appeal to the allowance for probate, thus the order became final and unappealable.

Petitioners appealed to the CA (re: denial of revocation and estoppel); CA affirmed CFI decision since no legal revocation resulted from the sales, since the sale was made in favor of the legatee Dimagiba. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS (FOR SPEC PRO) W/N estoppel will stand as a ground to disallow

probate of the will?

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

NO. The doctrine of estoppel does not apply. The presentation and probate of the will is required by public policy. It involves public interest.

Presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy, being primarily designed to protect the testator’s expressed wishes, which are entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedent’s ownership and rights of disposition within legal limits. It is the duty of the custodian of the will to deliver them to the Court. It would be non sequitur (doesn’t follow) to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel. Whether or not the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is still appealable or not, the defense is patently unmeritorious. ( What I deduced her is that the Petitioners wanted the court to ignore all together the will, by claiming that Dimagiba is estopped from claiming the validity of the will since she was party to the subsequent sale. They insist that the decedent died intestate, so that they can still inherit the remaining properties not sold to Dimagiba.)

JUST IN CASE RONALD ASKS:o On finality of the probate of the will: A probate decree finally and

definitively settles all questions concerning the capacity of the testator and proper execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. As such, the probate order is final and appealable, and it is so recognized by the express provision of Sec 1 Rule 109

CA decision, affirmed by the SC.

2. Mercado v. Santos | LaurelG.R. No. 45629 September 22, 1938| 66 Phil 215

FACTS When Ines Basa died, his husband Antilano Mercado (petitioner) filed a

petition for probate of the former’s will and such will was admitted to probate.

Sixteen months later, Rosario Basa de Leon (private respondent) filed a complaint against petitioner for falsification or forgery of the already-probated will of Ines Basa.

Petitioner was arrested, and then released, and then the same cycle happened around four times in total. Eventually, the CFI decided to try the case on the merits.

Petitioner moved to dismiss the case claiming again that the will alleged to have been forged had already been probated and, further, that the order probating the will is conclusive as to the authenticity and due execution thereof.

RTC overruled the motion so petitioner went up to the CA on certiorari but the same was dismissed.

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3D 2009-2010 SPEC PRO DIGESTS

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the probate of the will is a bar to criminally prosecute the

petitioner for allegedly forgery of the said will.


THE PROBATE OF THE WILL IS A BAR TO SUCH CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.

Section 306 of our Code of Civil Procedure provides as to the effect of judgments.

SEC. 306. Effect of judgment. — The effect of a judgment or final order in an action or special proceeding before a court or judge of the Philippine Islands or of the United States, or of any State or Territory of the United States, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows.

1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or relation of a particular person, the judgment or order is conclusive upon the title of the thing, the will or administration, or the condition or relation of the person Provided, That the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate.

Section 333, paragraph 4, of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes an incontrovertible presumption in favor of judgments declared by it to be conclusive.

SEC. 333. Conclusive Presumptions. — The following presumptions or deductions, which the law expressly directs to be made from particular facts, are deemed conclusive.

xxx xxx xxx

4. The judgment or order of a court, when declared by this code to be conclusive.

Section 625 of the same Code is more explicit as to the conclusiveness of the due execution of a probate will. It says.

SEC. 625. Allowance Necessary, and Conclusive as to Execution. — No will shall pass either the real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed in the Court of First Instance, or by appeal to the Supreme Court; and the allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution. (Emphasis ours.)

We hold, therefore, that in view of the provisions of sections 306, 333 and 625 of our Code of Civil Procedure, criminal action will not lie in this jurisdiction against the forger of a will which had been duly admitted to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction.

3. Sumilang vs. Ramagosa | MakalintalG.R. No. L-23135, December 26, 1967 | 21 SCRA 1369

FACTS Mariano Sumilang filed in the CFI of Quezon a petition for the probate of a

document alleged to be the last will and testament of Hilarion Ramagosa which institutes petitioner as sole heir of the testator.

Oppositors questioned the due execution of the document, claiming that it made under duress and was not really intended by the deceased to be his last will and testament.

The y moved for the dismissal of the petition for probate mainly on the ground that “the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject-matter because the last will and testament of the decedent, if ever it was really executed by him, was revoked by implication of law six years before his death.”

They alleged that after making the will, Hilarion Ramagosa sold to petitioner Mariano Sumilang and his brother the parcels of land described therein, so that at the time of the testator’s death the titles to said lands were no longer in his name.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the petition for probate should be dismissed on the ground of

the alleged intrinsic invalidity of the will?


NO. THE PROBATE COURT’S AREA OF INQUIRY IS LIMITED TO THE EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL.

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3D 2009-2010 SPEC PRO DIGESTS The testator’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal

requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions presented for the resolution of the court.

Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature.

True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate.

Probate is one thing; the validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent and distribution.

4. Balanay v Martinez| AquinoG.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975|

FACTS

Leodegaria Julian, died at the age of sixty-seven. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and by their six legitimate children named Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.

Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition for the probate of his mother's notarial will dated September 5, 1970 which is written in English. In paragraph V of the will she stated that after her husband's death (he was eighty-two years old in 1973) her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands (which she described as "my properties") should be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in that part of her will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one half share of the conjugal assets.

Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband and alleged improper partition of the conjugal estate. The oppositors claimed that Felix Balanay, Jr. should collate certain properties which he had received from the testatrix.

Later on Balany, Jr. presented an affidavit that Balanay, Sr had withdrawn his claim from the proceeding. Thereafter, Mrs. Antonio intervened and claimed that the decedent wrongly claimed a certain property which supposedly forms part of her estate but it was denied.

Thereafter a lawyer appeared before the court (Atty. Montana) asking that the probate be discontinued and that a notice to the creditors of the deceased by issued. Balanay, Jr thru new counsel stated that Atty. Montana had no authority to act in his name.

In the end the lower court declared the will void on the basis of its own independent assessment of its provisions.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.


We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization), the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue

BUT the probate court erred in declaring, in its order of February 28, 1974 that the will was void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding notwithstanding the fact that in its order of June 18, 1973 , it gave effect to the surviving husband's conformity to the will and to his renunciation of his hereditary rights which presumably included his one-half share of the conjugal estate.

The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the conjugal lands is contrary to law because, although she was a co-owner thereof, her share was inchoate and proindiviso (. But That illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will). It may be disregarded.

Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share of the conjugal partnership but insofar as said renunciation partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half share in the conjugal, it

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3D 2009-2010 SPEC PRO DIGESTSshould be subject to the limitations prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for his support and maintenance. Or at least his legitime should be respected.

Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on collation, the will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. The distribution and partition would become effective upon the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In the meantime, the net income should be equitably divided among the children and the surviving spouse.

It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's conformity to his wife's will and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal share became a part of his deceased wife's estate. His conformity had the effect of validating the partition made in paragraph V of the will without prejudice, of course, to the rights of the creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory heirs.

Two other errors of the lower court may be noticed. It erred in issuing a notice to creditors although no executor or regular administrator has been appointed. The record reveals that it appointed a special administrator. A notice to creditors is not in order if only a special administrator has been appointed. Section 1, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, in providing that "immediately after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, the court shall issue a notice requiring all persons having money claims against the decedent to file them in the office of the clerk of said court" clearly contemplates the appointment of an executor or regular administrator and not that of a special administrator.

5. Pastor Jr. V. CA G.R. No. L-56340 June 24, 1983

FACTS Alvaro Pastor, Sr. (PASTOR, SR.), a Spanish subject, died in Cebu City

on June 5, 1966, survived by his Spanish wife Sofia Bossio (who also died on October 21, 1966), their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (PASTOR, JR.) and Sofia Pastor de Midgely (SOFIA), and an illegitimate child, not natural, by the name of Lewellyn Barlito Quemada QUEMADA PASTOR, JR. is a Philippine citizen, having been naturalized in 1936. SOFIA is a Spanish subject. QUEMADA is a Filipino by his mother's citizenship.

QUEMADA filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will of PASTOR, SR. with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I (PROBATE COURT). The will contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of QUEMADA consisting of 30% of PASTOR, SR.'s 42% share in the operation by Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation (ATLAS) of some mining claims in Pina-Barot, Cebu.

The PROBATE COURT, upon motion of QUEMADA and after an ex parte hearing, appointed him special administrator of the entire estate of PASTOR, SR..

QUEMADA as special administrator, instituted against PASTOR, JR. and his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of the estate, which included the properties subject of the legacy and which were in the names of the spouses PASTOR, JR. and his wife, Maria Elena Achaval de Pastor, who claimed to be the owners thereof in their own rights, and not by inheritance.

PASTOR, JR. and his sister SOFIA filed their opposition to the petition for probate and the order appointing QUEMADA as special administrator. PROBATE COURT issued an order allowing the will to probate.

On December 5, 1972, the PROBATE COURT issued an order allowing the will to probate. Appealed to the Court of Appeals, the order was affirmed in a decision dated May 9, 1977. On petition for review, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition in a minute resolution dated November 1, 1977 and remanded the same to the PROBATE COURT after denying reconsideration on January 11, 1978.

For two years after remand of the case to the PROBATE COURT, QUEMADA filed pleading after pleading asking for payment of his legacy and seizure of the properties subject of said legacy. PASTOR, JR. and SOFIA opposed these pleadings on the ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit with another branch of the Cebu Court of First Instance. All pleadings remained unacted upon by the PROBATE COURT.

The PROBATE COURT set the hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will for March 25, 1980, but upon objection of PASTOR, JR. and SOFIA on the e ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit, no hearing was held on March 25. Instead, the PROBATE COURT required the parties to submit their respective position papers as to how much inheritance QUEMADA was entitled to receive.1. A. Pastor, Jr. ...................................40.5% 2. E. Pelaez, Sr. ...................................15.0% 3. B. Quemada .......................................4.5%

While the reconveyance suit was still being litigated in Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the PROBATE COURT issued the now

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3D 2009-2010 SPEC PRO DIGESTSassailed Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question of ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect that the legacy to QUEMADA was not inofficious.

The order being "immediately executory", QUEMADA succeeded in obtaining a Writ of Execution and Garnishment, the oppositors sought reconsideration thereof on the same date primarily on the ground that the PROBATE COURT gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the question of ownership of the royalties and ordered the payment of QUEMADA's legacy after prematurely passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS (FOR SPEC PRO) whether the Probate Order of December 5, 1972

resolved with finality the questions of ownership and intrinsic validity of the will?


NO. In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is

restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. (Rules of Court, Rule 75, Section 1; Rule 76, Section 9.) As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.

The rule is that execution of a judgment must conform to that decreed in the dispositive part of the decision

Nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific properties. On the contrary, it is manifest therein that ownership was not resolved. For it confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the win, and the need for and propriety of appointing a special administrator. Thus it allowed and approved the holographic win "with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law." It declared that the intestate estate administration aspect must proceed " subject to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and personal properties in Civil Case 274-T before Branch IX of the CFI of Cebu." [Parenthetically, although the statement refers only to the

"intestate" aspect, it defies understanding how ownership by the estate of some properties could be deemed finally resolved for purposes of testate administration, but not so for intestate purposes. Can the estate be the owner of a property for testate but not for intestate purposes?] Then again, the Probate Order (while indeed it does not direct the implementation of the legacy) conditionally stated that the intestate administration aspect must proceed "unless . . . it is proven . . . that the legacy to be given and delivered to the petitioner does not exceed the free portion of the estate of the testator," which clearly implies that the issue of impairment of legitime (an aspect of intrinsic validity) was in fact not resolved. Finally, the Probate Order did not rule on the propriety of allowing QUEMADA to remain as special administrator of estate properties not covered by the holographic will, "considering that this (Probate) Order should have been properly issued solely as a resolution on the issue of whether or not to allow and approve the aforestated will."

That the Probate Order did not resolve the question of ownership of the properties listed in the estate inventory was appropriate, considering that the issue of ownership was the very subject of controversy in the reconveyance suit that was still pending in Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. What, therefore, the Court of Appeals and, in effect, the Supreme Court affirmed en toto when they reviewed the Probable Order were only the matters properly adjudged in the said Order

It was, therefore, error for the assailed implementing Orders to conclude that the Probate Order adjudged with finality the question of ownership of the mining properties and royalties, and that, premised on this conclusion, the dispositive portion of the said Probate Order directed the special administrator to pay the legacy in dispute.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The Order of execution issued by the probate Court, as well as all the Orders issued subsequent thereto in alleged implementation of the Probate Order dated December 5, 1972, are hereby set aside; and this case is remanded to the appropriate Regional Trial Court for proper proceedings.

6. US vs. Chiu Guimco36 Phil 917/ 1917

FACTS Joaquin Cruz was a chinese merchant who amassed huge wealth

and landholdings in Misamis. He has two wives, one in China and another in Misamis. When Joaquin visited China, Joaquin died there.

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3D 2009-2010 SPEC PRO DIGESTS Before he traveled, he executed a will before the notary public in

which respondent here was named executor. As executor, he made a contract with the Filipino Wife of Joaquin and

the provisions state that the she will relinquish her claims in the property. Subsequently, the wife from China arrived and the properties were partitioned as follows: 40% to the wife from China, 40% to the respondent and another 20% to a brother in China.

The respondent made a contract of lease of the property of the Chinese wife of Joaquin, but he never paid the said rentals. With the help of a Chinaman, the Chinese wife asked that the respondent will produce the will for lawful proceedings. This he failed to do. Thus the Chinaman filed under the Code of Civil Procedure section 628, charging the respondent for not producing the will within the time required by law.

Pending this, the judge ordered that the Respondent be jailed until he produces the will as per Sec 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N an accused found guilty may be imprisoned?


No

Sec 629 only applies when the court is acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the administration of the estates of deceased person, and where admin proceedings are not ready.

The court before taking action under said section, it should require a petition, information, or affidavit of such character to make action by the court under this section (other words, not moto propio)

The procedure under sec 628 is an ordinary criminal prosecution; it is a special statutory offense which is different from sec 629, which needs jail time. Sec 628 only gives a fine as the penalty, whereas under 629 the accused is imprisoned. It is then not permissible in a prosecution to superimpose the two penalties.

7. Rodriguez v De Borja| ReyesG.R. No. L-2199 June 21, 1966| 17 SCRA 418

FACTS February 12, 1963- Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died in the City of Manila;

March 4, 1963- Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez;

March 8, 1963- Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez, through counsel filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will;

March 11, 1963-Before the Court could act on the petition, the same was withdrawn (by Maria and Angela);

March 12, 1963, 8:00 AM- Maria and Angela filed before the CFI of Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging, among other things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of Parañaque, Rizal, and died without leaving a will and praying that Maria be appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate;

March 12, 1963, 11:00 AM- Pangilinan and Jacalan filed a petition in this Court for the probation of the will delivered by them on March 4, 1963. It was stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Parañaque, Rizal; that he was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan, from the year 1930 up to the time of his death in 1963; that he was buried in Parañaque, and that he left real properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Whether the Intestate Proceedings instituted by Maria and Angela

should take precedence over the Probate Proceedings filed by Pangilinan and Jacalan

o Maria and Angela: since the intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate was filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate.

o Pangilinan and Jacalan: Court of First Instance of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963, and that the case in this Court therefore has precedence over the case filed in Rizal on March 12, 1963.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDINO.

THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT BECOMES VESTED UPON THE DELIVERY THERETO OF THE WILL EVEN IF NO PETITION FOR ITS ALLOWANCE WAS FILED LATERo Upon the will being deposited with the court, the court could motu

proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the

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3D 2009-2010 SPEC PRO DIGESTSwill, and issued corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed.

o Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will was delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only on March 12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable.

Their commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal, after they learned of the delivery of the decedent's will to the Court of Bulacan, was in bad faith, patently done with a view to divesting the latter court of the precedence awarded it by the Rules.

In our system of civil law, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will.

8. VICENTE B. TEOTICO vs. ANA DEL VAL, ETC. | BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.G.R. No. L-18753, March 26, 1965 | 13 SCRA 406

FACTS

When Maria Mortera died, she left a will written in Spanish, which contained certain provisions in favor of several beneficiaries, one of which is Rene A. Teotico, and a declaration that she had neither ascendants or descendants of any kind so she could freely dispose of all her estateo The testatrix bequeath in favor of Rene and his wife (Josefina

Mortera), a niece and the instituted sole and universal heir of Maria, the usufruct of her interest in the Calvo Bldg. while the naked ownership in favor of their children

Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the said will in the CFI, which was opposed by Del Val claiming to be an adopted child of the sister and an acknowledged natural child of the brother of the testatrix

Vicente filed a MTD the opposition on the ground that she had no legal personality to intervene, but the probate court instead of dismissing the opposition allowed her to intervene so she then filed an amended opposition contesting the provision in favor of Rene and Josefina

The probate court rendered its decision admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N the oppositor has the right to intervene in the probate proceedingW/N the probate court erred in ruling that the disposition in favor of the spouses is void


NO. DEL VAL DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE AS SHE HAS NO INTEREST IN THE ESTATE It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to

intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate; and an interested party has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor

Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof, and while she previously had an interest in the Calvo building located in Escolta, she had already disposed of it long before the execution of the will

Even in the event that the will is not admitted for probate, she still has no right to be involved in the intestate proceedingo She would acquire such right only if she was a legal heir of the

deceased, but she is not under our Civil Code. It is true that oppositor claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the deceased, and also an adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, but such claim cannot give her any comfort for, even if it be true, the law does not give her any right to succeed to the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And this is so because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father (remember the doctrine of iron curtain in succession? eto ‘yon)

o The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting

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3D 2009-2010 SPEC PRO DIGESTSparents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter

YES. THE PROBATE COURT HAS A LIMITED JURISDICTION AND CANNOT RULE ON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF A WILL “... The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as

touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions, these may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated. ...”

Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a quo declaring invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will Exhibit A must be set aside as having been made in excess of its jurisdiction. Another reason why said pronouncement should be set aside is that the legatee was not given an opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for he was not allowed to intervene in this proceeding. As a corollary, the other pronouncements touching on the disposition of the estate in favor of some relatives of the deceased should also be set aside for the same reason

9. FERNANDO vs CRISOSTOMOGR no. L-2963-4 | December 27, 1951| J. JUGO

FACTS

These is a consolidation of 2 cases in view of the intimate and necessary relations between them.

CASE 1: Hermogenes Fernando was appointed guardian of Crisostomo Sr. and his 4 minor children as to their persons and properties. Later, Crisostomo Sr. died leaving said 4 minor children under the guardianship of Hermogenes. The value of the properties involved in the two proceedings exceeds P50,000 and the pertinent questions raised are only of law. The guardian filed a motion with the CFI of Bulacan praying for the approval of an extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased parents of the minors who died intestate. The guardian ad litem filed opposition. The SC declared the deed of extrajudicial settlement executed by Hermogenes as null and void. The court held that the guardian is not yet an administrator of the estate of the deceased until and after said

estate has been acquired by or adjudicated to the minors by proper proceedings.

CASE 2: German Crisostomo filed a petition, as next of kin, for the opening of the intestate proceedings of spouses Crisostomo with himself and Pacita Fernando, another next of kin, as co-administrators of the estate. Hermogenes filed opposition to the appointment of the administrators and moved for the dismissal of the intestate proceedings on the ground that the properties left by said spouses were already in his possession as such guardian. The court appointed German and Pacita co-administrators of the estate of the above-mentioned spouses with the appropriate bonds, impliedly denying the reiteration of the motion for dismissal.

The guardian filed a motion for the closing, termination and filing in the archives of the record of the intestate proceedings.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N court erred in appointing German and Pacita as co-administrators even though there was already a guardian appointed previously? NO.


Sometime in 1948 the guardian (hermogenes) filed with the CFI of Bulacan a preliminary injunction to prohibit the said CFI from proceeding with the intestate case. In the petition, substantially the same questions are raised as those discussed in the brief of the appellant herein. The court denied the petition. The MR was likewise denied. The SC held: Respondent judge had jurisdiction and did not exceed it in appointing the other respondent, who are the brother and sister or nearest of kin of the decedent, as administrators of the latter's estate. The jurisdictional facts referred to in section 2 (a) Rule 80, are the death of the decedent, his having left his estate in such province were probate court is sitting, or life he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate in such province. The name or competency of the person or persons for whom letters of administration are prayed is not a jurisdictional fact, it is another additional fact to be alleged in the petition (d); but "no defect in the petition shall render void the issue of letters of administration" that is, shall divest the court of its jurisdiction to appoint the administrator. No partition either judicial or extra judicial having as yet been made adjudicating the said properties to the minors, the properties of the deceased have never been placed under the administration of the guardian of his minor children.

After examining the record, we do not see any error in the appointment of German Crisostomo and Pacita Fernando as co-administrators as they

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3D 2009-2010 SPEC PRO DIGESTSwere the brother and sister, respectively, of the deceased, no evidence having been presented by the appellant why those persons should not be appointed, either on account of their incompetency or lack of moral qualifications. We, therefore, affirm the order of the court appointing them.

10. Araujo vs. Celis | MapaG.R. No. L-2308, April 30, 1906

FACTS Rosario Araujo inherited from her mother the hacienda called “PangPang. Rosario married Jose Araujo, son of the defendant. Rosario died sometime in 1888 and her husband, Jose Araujo died the

following year. Petitioners are the relatives of Rosario who are now claiming that they

should succeed to the estate of Rosario Araujo and are asking delivery of the Pangpang property which is under the possession of defendant (the husband’s mother)

The defendant alleged that Rosario left a will wherein she bequeathed all of her properties to her husband. Jose Araujo died without a will and so the defendant succeeded to all the properties owned by his son at the time of his death including the Pangpang property.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Whether Rosario Araujo executed a legal and valid will in the form and

manner alleged by the defendant?


NO. Defendant introduced no will as evidence. She offered secondary parol evidence as to its contents under the claim

that the original will had been lost. The loss of the alleged will was not sufficiently established. The principal witness presented by the defense was Calixto Delgado, who

testified that he acted as procurador for the defendant in case involving the same property. But he admitted that he only saw a copy of the will and alleged that the original was kept by the notary public.

the witness further testified that the will, a copy of which he saw and had in his possession, was signed by two witnesses only. A will signed by two witnesses only could not under any circumstances be valid under the law in force at the time referred to by the witness, and legally speaking such will could not then have been probated or recorded.

As to the loss, it was alleged that the insurgents in 1899 burned all the by the papers and archives of the court of Pototan. There is nothing to show that at the time these records were burned by the insurgents there existed in the court-house of Pototan the copy of the will referred to.

The same witness also testified that the notary records were kept in the court-house and were likewise burned.

This statement of the witness is contrary to the provisions of article 60 of the provisional rules for the organization and government of notaries public in the Philippines, approved by the royal decree of the 11th of April, 1890, which provided that: "Notaries shall keep the protocols and books in the same building where they live, in their custody, and shall be responsible therefor." As provided in this section the records and books should have been kept by the notary at his own house, where he lives, and not at the court building as testified to by the witness.

Their testimony is absolutely insufficient to establish in a satisfactory manner the loss of the alleged will of Rosario Darwin, and the court below should not have, therefore, allowed the secondary evidence introduced by her as to the contents of the will.

11. Lim Billian vs. Suntay | Avancena.November 25, 1936

FACTS Jose B. Suntay died in China. He married twice, the first time to Manuela

T. Cruz with whom he had several children now residing in the Philippines, and the second time to Maria Natividad Lim Billian with whom he had a son.

Lim Billian claims that Suntay gave her an envelope containing and a true copy of said will. She claims that when Go Toh (Suntay’s attorney in fact) arrived in the Philippines with the envelope containing the original copy of the will, the children of Suntay from the first marriage snatched the envelope, opened it and threw away the contents. Petitioner now asks the court to compel the children from the first marriage to produce the will

The children answer by stating that they did not have the will Go Toh and Tan Boon Chong testified that the brothers Apolonio and

Angel Suntay took the envelope as narrated above. The brothers did not present any evidence.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the envelope contained the will

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3D 2009-2010 SPEC PRO DIGESTSHOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

YESThe childrens’ answer admits that, according to Barretto he prepared a will of the deceased to which he later became a witness together with Go Toh and Manuel Lopez, and that this will was placed in an envelope which was signed by the deceased and by the instrumental witnesses. In court there was presented and attached to the case an open and empty envelope signed by Jose B. Suntay, Alberto Barretto, Go Toh and Manuel Lopez. It is thus undeniable that this envelope Exhibit A is the same one that contained the will executed by the deceased. These tokens sufficiently point to the loss of the will of the deceased., a circumstance justifying the presentation of secondary evidence of its contents and of whether it was executed with all the essential and necessary legal formalities.

12. Basa vs Mercado |Goddard, J.61 Phil 632 (1935)| July 26, 1935

FACTS

Judge Hermogenes Reyes, judge of the CFI of Pampanga, issued an order that allowed and probated the last will and testament of Ines Basa, deceased.

The judge also approved the account of the administrator of the estate, declared him the only heir of the deceased under the will and closed the administration proceedings.

The petitioner-appellants filed a motion praying that said proceedings be reopened and alleged that the court lacked jurisdiction to act in the matter because there was a failure to comply with the requirements as to the publication of the notice of hearing prescribed in Sec 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Appellants claim that although the trial judge, on May 29, 1931 ordered the publication of the required notice for three weeks successively previous to the time appointed for the hearing on the will, the first publication was on 6 June 1931, the second on the 27th of the said month, only twenty-one days after the date of the first publication instead of three full weeks before the day set for the hearing.

The appellants also contend that the weekly newspaper Ing Katipunan where the notice was published was a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Pampanga.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N the publication should be published for three full weeks before the date set for the hearing on the will? - NO

W/N the Ing Katipunan was a newpaper of General Circulation. – YES


The Supreme Court cited jurisprudence where the last of the three publications was made on December 18, 1919 and the hearing on the administrator’s final account was set for December 19 of that year, only fifteen days after the date of the publication.

In view of the foregoing the Supreme Court that the language used in Sec 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the notice, referred to therein, should be published for three full weeks before the date set for the hearing on the will. In other words the first publication of the notice need not be made 21 days before the day appointed for the hearing.

The fact that there is another paper published in Pampanga that has a few more subscribers (72 to be exact) and those certain Manila dailies also have a larger circulation in that province is not important.

The law does not require that publication of the notice, referred to in the Code of Civil Procedure, and should be made in the newspaper with the largest number of subscribers. No fixed number of subscribers is necessary to constitute a newspaper of general circulation.

13. JOAQUINA R-INFANTE DE ARANZ etal v JUDGE NICOLAS GALING and JOAQUIN R-INFANTE| PadillaG.R. No. 77047 May 28, 1988|

FACTS A petition for the probate and allowance of the last will and testament of

the late Monserrat R-Infante y G-Pola. The petition specified the names and addresses of the petitioners as legatees and devisees.

The order setting the petition for hearing was published in the “Nueva Era” a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila once a week for 3 consecutive weeks. On the date of hearing no oppositor appeared and the hearing was reset to another date, at which time the court issued an

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3D 2009-2010 SPEC PRO DIGESTSorder allowing the petitioner to present evidence ex-parte and further appointing private respondent as executor.

Petitioners then filed an MR of the above order alleging that they were not personally notified of the proceedings in violation of the Rules of Court. MR denied. They then filed a petition for certiorari with SC (which was referred by SC to CA) which was dismissed by CA. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTSWhether a personal notice of the probate proceedings to the petitioners is an optional procedure considering the facts of the case?


NO. Individual notice upon heirs, legatees and devisees is necessary only when they are known or when their places of residence are known. In other instances, such notice is not necessary and the court may acquire and exercise jurisdiction simply upon the publication of the notice in a newspaper of general circulation.

Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court reads:SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally. — The court shag also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at their places of residence, and deposited in the post office with the postage thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days before the hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy of the notice must in like manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if he be not, the petitioner; also, to any person named as co-executor not petitioning, if their places of residence be known. Personal service of copies of the notice at least ten (10) days before the day of hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.

It is clear from the aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the hearing for the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in the Philippines at their places of residence, if such places of residence be known. There is no question that the residences of herein petitioners legatees and devisees were known to the probate court. The petition for the allowance of the will itself indicated the names and addresses of the legatees and devisees of the testator. But despite such knowledge, the probate court did not cause copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners. The requirement of the law for the allowance of the will was not satisfied by

mere publication of the notice of hearing for three (3) weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

14. In re estate of Johnson| Street, J.G.R. No. L-12767, November 16, 1918| 67 PHIL 652

FACTS On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a

naturalized citizen of the United States, died in the city of Manila, leaving a will by which he disposed of an estate valued at P231,800

This document is a holographic instrument, being written in the testator's own handwriting, and is signed by himself and two witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure

This will, therefore, was not executed in conformity with the provisions of law generally applicable to wills executed by inhabitants of these Islands

Thereafter a petition was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for the probate of this will, on the ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of America; that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State; and hence could properly be probated here pursuant to section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Thereafter the document was declared to be legal and was admitted to probate.

Three months after the will had been probated, the attorneys for Ebba Ingeborg Johnson entered an appearance in her behalf and asserted that Ebba is a legitimate heir of the testator. Thus, she cannot be deprived of the legitime to which she is entitled under the law governing testamentary successions in these Islands.

Therefore, she moved to annul the decree of probate and put the estate into intestate administration in order for her to claim the estate as the sole legitimate heir of her father.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the order of the probate can be set aside on the ground that the

testator was not a resident of the State of Illinois and that the will was not made in conformity with the laws of that State.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDINO.

In the testimony submitted to the trial court it appears that, when Johnson first came to the United States as a boy, he took up his abode in the State

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3D 2009-2010 SPEC PRO DIGESTSof Illinois and there remained until he came as a soldier in the United States Army to the Philippine Islands.

Although he remained in these Islands for sometime after receiving his discharge, no evidence was adduced showing that at the time he returned to the United States, in the autumn of 1902, he had then abandoned Illinois as the State of his permanent domicile.

Further, there is no law in force at that time by virtue of which any person of foreign nativity can become a naturalized citizen of the Philippine Islands;

Thus, it was impossible for the testator, even if he had so desired, to expatriate himself from the United States and change his political status from a citizen of the United States to a citizen of these Islands.

This being true, it is to be presumed that he retained his citizenship in the State of Illinois along with his status as a citizen of the United States

SC held that: the probate of the will does not affect the intrinsic validity of its provisions, the decree of probate being conclusive only as regards the due execution of the will.

Further, the intrinsic validity of the provisions of this will must be determined by the law of Illinois and not of the Philippines.

In paragraph 2 of article 10 of the Civil Code it is declared that "legal and testamentary successions, with regard to the order of succession, as well as to the amount of the successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the laws of the nation of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property and the country where it may be situate."

In this case the petition submitted to the lower court was insufficient to warrant the setting aside of the order, probating the will in question, whether said petition be considered as an attack on the validity of the decree for error apparent, or whether it be considered as an application for a rehearing based upon the new evidence submitted in the affidavits which accompany the petition.

Further, in the latter aspect the petition is subject to the further fatal defect that it was not presented within the time allowed by law.

Thus, the trial court committed no error in denying the relief sought. The order appealed from is accordingly affirmed

15. In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Cipriano Abut. Generoso Abut, et al v. Felipe Abut, et al | MakalintalG.R. No. L-26743, May 31, 1972

FACTS

Generoso Abut, one of the children of the deceased Cipriano Abut by his second marriage and the person named as executor in a will allegedly executed by the said deceased, filed a petition before the TC praying that the said will be approved and allowed and that letters testamentary issue in his favor.

TC motu proprio set the petition for hearing and further directed compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court.

Opposition to the petition was filed by the children of Cipriano Abut by his first marriage, namely, Felipe Abut, Presentacion de Rodriguez and Absoluto Abut.

Generoso Abut died. Gavina Abut, a sister of Generoso Abut and an heir and devisee under the will asked the TC to substitute her in lieu of Generoso Abut and to admit an amended petition.

TC in considering the fact that publication of the petition is a jurisdictional matter intended to inform whomsoever may be interested in said petition and to afford him or her an opportunity to assert his or her rights, dismissed the petition originally brought by Generoso Abut, without prejudice to the filing of another petition pursuant to the requirements of the Rules of Court.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the probate court correctly dismissed the petition simply

because the original petitioner — who was the executor named in the will sought to be probated — died before the petition could be heard and/or terminated.

Stated otherwise, after the court had acquired jurisdiction over the case involving probate of the will, did the demise of the original petitioner during the pendency of the proceeding divest the court of such jurisdiction and preclude the continuation of the case.


The probate court erred.

The jurisdiction of the court became vested upon the filing of the original petition and upon compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76.

A proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the deceased. The fact that the amended petition named additional heirs not

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3D 2009-2010 SPEC PRO DIGESTSincluded in the original petition did not require that notice of the amended petition be published anew. All that Section 4 of Rule 76 provides is that those heirs be notified of the hearing for the probate of the will, either by mail or personally.

The court in the case of Perez vs. Perez held that: “At any rate the omission, if any, did not affect the jurisdiction of the court; it constituted a mere procedural error that may or may not be the basis of reversal. Indeed, this Tribunal has ruled that the court acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested in the estate through the publication of the petition in the newspapers.”

Jurisdiction of the court once acquired continues until the termination of the case, and remains unaffected by subsequent events.

The admission of the amended petition, of course, does not mean that Gavina Abut's prayer that she be appointed administratrix with the will annexed is necessarily meritorious. It simply recognizes that since the lower court has acquired jurisdiction over the res, such jurisdiction continues until the termination of the case.

TC order is set aside. Case is remanded below, with direction for the lower court to admit the amended petition and thereafter proceed accordingly.

16. Rodelas vs. Aranza | Relova, J.:G.R. No. L-58509, December 7, 1982 | 119 SCRA 16

FACTSMarcela Rodelas filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of

Ricardo Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The same was opposed by Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla

Treyes, Expedita Bonilla Frias, and Ephraim Bonilla on the following grounds:o Rodelas was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will

by failing to produce the will within 20 days from the death of the testator, as required by Rule 75, Sec. 2

o The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of property after death and not intended to take effect after death, hence, is not a will

o The alleged holographic will itself, and not the alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would produce no effect, as held in Gan vs. Yap

o The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and attested as required by law

The petition was dismissed and the MR denied. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTSW/N a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved

by means of a photostatic copy


YES. If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is

available, the will can not be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will

It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will

But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator

o In the case of Gan vs. Yap, the Court ruled that ‘the execution and contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be prove by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity.”

o But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that ‘Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court.”

Evidently, the photostatic or Xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.

17. Gan v. Yap | GutierrezG.R. No. L-12190, August 30, 1958| 104 PHIL 509

FACTS Felicidad Yap died in Manila. She left a petition for probate of her

holographic will stating that she had properties in Manila and Bulacan. In the petition, she said that Fausto Gan would get 2 parts of the Bulacan property, and that Ildefpnso Yap (the decedent’s husband) was to receive

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3D 2009-2010 SPEC PRO DIGESTSall the Manila property upon the condition that he has a health center built in Felicidad’s name.

There were testimonies by a certain Felina Esguerra of the will’s existence. She said that the will was executed in her presence. She also said that Felicidad wanted to keep the will a secret from her husband. And that the will was entrusted to Felina, which she kept in her handbag

Felina also stated that Ildefonso checked out the contents of her handbag while in UST Hospital where Felicidad was confined a few days before Felicidad’s demise.

Fausto Gan submitted this petition to the court for the holographic will to be propated. However, the will itself was lost and could not be presented in court.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the presentation of a holographic will in the probate

proceedings is necessary.


YES. IF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL IS LOST, ORAL AND SECONDARY EVIDENCE CANNOT BE INTRODUCED TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE AND CONTENTS OF SUCH BECAUSE THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE SIGNATURES CANNOT BE RPOVED BY ORAL TESTIMONY. The execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will

may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The ill itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity.

Remember in succession: The only thing that needs to be proven in holographic will is the authenticity of the handwriting. Without the will, there is nothing to be proven.

18. Estate of Mamuyac, Gago v. Mamuyac et al | JohnsonG.R. No. L-26317, January 29, 1927 |

FACTS Obtain the last will and testament of Miguel Mamuyac who died in

January 1922, in Agoo, La Union. July 27, 1918 is the date that Mamuyac executed a last will and testament

according to the record. Gago presented the will for probate. It was opposed by Mamuyac et al.

On 21st Feb 1925 action was commenced to secure probation of will of 16 April 1919. Oppositions were again presented because (a) will is a copy of a second will executed by Miguel Mamuyac, (b) said will has been cancelled and revoked during the lifetime of Mamuyac (c) said will was not the last will and testament of Mamuyac.

Revocation was witnessed by a certain Fenoy (typist of the will) and Bejar actually cancelled by Mamuyac on 30 Dec 1920 because Mamuyac sold a house and lot to Bejar.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N The will had been cancelled


Yes will had already been cancelled Original of the will of 1919 could not be found after the death of the

testator. There is also positive proof that the same had been cancelled. Burden of proof in probate is on proponent, if proven by proponents then

burden rests on contestants to disprove the execution of the will or its validity or it has been revoked.

Majority of revocations occur without witnesses and usually all evidence of the same perishes with testator. Copies of the will should be admitted with great caution.

When it is proven by testimony that a will has been executed in duplicate and each was executed with all the requirements then the duplicate may be admitted in evidence.

After examination we are convinced that the will was revoked in 1920. Judgment appealed from is affirmed.

19. Aldanese vs. Salutillo | OstrandG.R. No. L-55960, November 24, 1988 | 167 SCRA 736

FACTS Salome Avila died a resident of Cebu. Her will appears to be executed by

Moreta, Borromeo, and Rafols, all residents of Manila. Since Avila left no ascendants or descendants, under her will she disposed the greater part of her estate in favor of petitioner Aldanese and his sister.

The petition for probate was filed in the CFI of Cebu. The respondents surnamed Salutillo and Llanos appeared as opponents, alleging that the will should be denied probate on the ground of fraud, undue influence,

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3D 2009-2010 SPEC PRO DIGESTSand testamentary incapacity of Avila at the time of execution. They also alleged that they were the nearest relatives of Avila and should thus succeed to her estate by operation of law.

Aldanese filed a motion asking the court to authorize the taking of the depositions of the witnesses to the will, since they were unable to appear personally before the CFI of Cebu – granted.

The Salutillos then filed a motion asking to the court to revoke the order authorizing the taking of depositions on the ground that it has not been sufficiently shown that it was impossible for the witnesses to appear personally before the court – and this was also granted. However, by the time that notice of this order was sent to Aldanese, the depositions had already been taken.

After hearing, the CFI denied probate of the will, holding that the depositions were inadmissible in evidence. Hence this petition.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the CFI erred in declaring that the depositions taken were

inadmissible as evidence in the probate proceedings.


YES. THE CA ERRED IN DECLARING THE DEPOSITIONS AS INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE.

While the rule in this jurisdiction is that when a will is contested the attesting witnesses must be called to prove the will, that does not necessarily mean that they must be brought bodily before the court. It is their testimony which is needed, not their actual presence.

Section 355 of the (old) Code of Civil Procedure provides:“The testimony of a witness in the Philippine Islands may be taken by deposition…in a special proceeding, after the question of fact has arisen therein, in the following cases:

2. When the witness resides out of the province in which his testimony is to be used.”

Section 406 of the same Code reads:“A witness is not obliged to attend as a witness in a civil action before any court, judge, justice, or other officer out of the province in which he resides, unless the distance be less than thirty miles from his place of residence to the place of trial by the usual course of travel, but his testimony may be taken in such case in the form of a deposition.”

In the present case, the will was presented for probate in Cebu, and the

attesting witnesses were living in Manila. The required notice was duly given, and so the depositions would ordinarily be admissible.

However, the record indicates that the failure of the opponents to be present at the taking of the depositions was due to the fact that they were misled by petitioner’s action in seeking a special authorization from the court. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the depositions should be retaken, to give the opponents another opportunity to examine the witnesses.

It must also be noted that when the depositions of subscribing witnesses to a will are taken, a photographic copy of the will may be presented to them on their examination, and they may be asked the same original will.

Order reversed. Case remanded.

20. DOROTEA CABANG vs. MARTIN DELFINADO | TRENT, J.G.R. No. L-8954 March 21, 1916| 34 Phil. 291

FACTS

Celestino Delfinado died leaving an alleged will, which when presented for probate by his widow, Cabang, such petition was opposed by Martin Delfinado, the son from the first marriage of the deceased alleging that the purported will cannot be the will of his fathero According to the witnesses presented by the proponent, the will was

executed after the decedent dictated the provisions in his dialecto The dictation was then typewritten and thereafter, the provisions were

translated into Spanish so that the decedent can understand the provisions in the typewritten version

o After the translation, the decedent affixed a cross after his name was written in the will, in the presence of the witnesses and of each other

o But according to Delfinado, his father could read, write, and sign his name

Cabang, after presenting witnesses to prove the due execution of the will, presented a motion asking that the case be reopened for the purpose of receiving the testimony of the other two subscribing witnesses, who were then living in Manila and Nueva Ecija, but such witnesses were not presented

The probate court admitted for probate the alleged will of Celestino Hence, this appeal

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

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3D 2009-2010 SPEC PRO DIGESTS W/N the court erred in admitting the will to probate without having two of the subscribing witnesses called, although they were living within the jurisdiction of the court, or for not requiring any showing why they were not produced


YES. THE COURT FOLLOWED THE DECISIONS WITH REGARD TO THE INTENT OF THE LAW IN REQUIRING THE PRESENTATION OF THE SUBSCRIBING WITNESSES WHEN THE WILL IS CONTESTED Our code provides, as we have indicated, that non-contested may be

admitted to probate upon the testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses, but is silent as to the manner in which they shall be proved when contested. Provisions are also made for supplying the testimony of the three subscribing witnesses when they cannot be called. The provisions of the Vermont Statutes are essentially the same. We therefore, call to our aid the decisions of the supreme court of that State and the law upon which those decisions rest in determining the intention of the Philippine Legislature in enacting the provisions of Act No. 190, above referred to

An examination of the subsequent adjudicated cases and the statutes fails to disclose any modification of this rule in the State of Massachusetts. In Evans vs. Evans (18 Miss., 402), the court, following the rule adopted in Massachusetts, said: o We are inclined to hold that no will can be proved, unless all the

subscribing witnesses, alive and within the control of the process of the court, are produced to testify

The rule that no will shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, unless "attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses," is a matter of substantive law and an element of the will's validity. The rule that the attesting witnesses must be called to prove a will for probate is one of preference made so by statute. This rule of evidence is not to be confused with rules of quantity

The law places these witnesses "around the testator to ascertain and judge of his capacity" for the purpose of preventing frauds. The soundness of the rule is well illustrated in the case under consideration. Here the attesting clause was omitted and the testator signed by mark. The petitioner produced only one of the attesting witnesses. Had there not been a contest, this would have probably been sufficient under section 631. While there is no testimony in the record to the effect that the testator could neither read nor write, there is conclusive evidence that he could sign his name. This fact is established by the production of Exhibit 1, which all agree the testator did sign. The testator's signature to the

document shows that he could write, at least his name, in a plain, clear manner, indicating a fairly good knowledge of writing

Had the proponent shown that the other two subscribing witnesses were not within the jurisdiction of the court and could not, therefore, be called, the due execution of the will would still be very doubtful. Believing, as we do, that it was the intention of the Legislature that the subscribing witnesses must be called or good and sufficient reason shown why they could not be had, and being supported by the authorities above cited and quoted, we must conclude that the proponent did not comply with the provisions of the law in the presentation of her case

21. Avera vs Garcia and Rodriguez |Street, J.42 Phil 145 (1921)| September 14, 1921

FACTS

Etiquia Avera instituted for a probate of the will of one Esteban Garcia. Contest was made by Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez, the latter in the

capacity of guardian for the minors Jose Garcia and Cesar Garcia. During the hearing, the proponent of the will presented a witness who

testified that the will was executed with all necessary external formalities, and that the testator was at the time in full possession of disposing faculties.

Upon the latter point the witness was corroborated by the person who wrote the will at the request of the testator.

Two other witnesses were not introduced nor was their absence accounted for by the proponent of the will.

The attorney of the opposition presented one witness showing in a vague and indecisive manner that at the time the will was made the testator was so debilitated as to be unable to comprehend what he was about.

After the cause had been submitted for determination, the trial judge found that the testator at the time of the making of the will was of sound mind and disposing memory and that the will had been properly executed.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N a will can be admitted to probate, where the opposition is made, upon proof of a single attesting witness, without producing or accounting for the absence of the other two?

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3D 2009-2010 SPEC PRO DIGESTSW/N the will in question is rendered invalid by reason of the fact that the signature of the testator and of the three attesting witnesses are written on the right margin of each page of the will instead of the left margin?


Upon the first point, while it is undoubtedly true that an uncontested will may be proved by the testimony of only one of the three attesting witnesses, nevertheless in Cabang vs Delfinado, the court declared after an elaborate examination of the American and English Authorities that when a contest is instituted, all of the attesting witnesses must be examined, if alive and within reach of the process of the court.

However, this point was not raised by the appellant in the lower court either upon submission of the cause for determination in that court upon the submission of the cause for determination in that court or upon the occasion of the filing of the motion for a new trial.

If the appellant raised this question in the lower court, either at the hearing or upon a motion for new trial, that court would have had the power, and it would have been its duty, considering the tardy institution of the contest, to have granted a new trial in order that all the witnesses to the will might be brought into court. But instead of calling the error to the attention of the court and his adversary, the point is first raised by the appellant in this court. The court held that it was too late and appellant cannot raise the issue first time on appeal.

The court in its decision cited a jurisprudence stating that “on the other hand, one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator’s last will must be disregarded.”

For the signatures, the court held that where ingenuity could not suggest any possible prejudice to any person, as attendant upon the actual deviation from the letter of the law, such deviation must be considered too trivial to invalidate the instrument.

The legal errors assigned are not sustainable, and the judgment appealed from was affirmed by the Supreme Court.

22. 22 Celedonia Solivio v CA, Concordia Javellana Villanueva | MedialdeaG.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990| 182 SCRA 119

FACTS

Esteban Javellana Jr., a novelist, died a bachelor with 2 aunts as nearest of kin. Celedonia Solivio was the decedent’s maternal aunt while Concordia was the paternal aunt. Esteban was a posthumous child (Esteban Sr. died when the decedent’s mother, Salustia, was 4 mos pregnant), raised by his mother and Aunt Celedonia.

During his lifetime, Esteban Jr, inheriting his mother’s properties (which were paraphernal properties inherited also by Salustia) wanted to build a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students to obtain a college degree. Esteban died however from a heart attack without having set up the foundation.

After the funeral, Celedonia and Concordia agreed to build the foundation, and that Celedonia would take care of the proceeding to form the foundation, so she filed for a spec pro for admin of estate of Esteban Jr.

CFI of Iloilo Branch 23 declared Celedonia the sole heir of Esteban. Celedonia sold the properties to pay the taxes, obligations and to set up the SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION.

Instead of appealing the this decision to claim that Concordia was herself an heir, Concordia filed a separate action for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages in Branch 26 of the CFI of Iloilo.

Concordia got a favorable judgment. Branch 26 ordered execution pending appeal, requiring Celedonia to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate. In Celedonia’s MR, she raised that all the properties were already in the name of the foundation. MR DENIED. APPEAL to the CA DENIED. Hence, Celedonia now files this petition for review.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS (FOR SPEC PRO) W/N Branch 26 had the jurisdiction to entertain the

partition and recovery suit even while the probate proceeding was pending?


NO. Branch 26 lacks jurisdiction. The settlement of the said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the

same court, there being as yet no orders for the submission and approval of the administratix’s inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir and terminating the proceeding.

It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate proceedings, puts an end to the administration and thus far relieves the administrator from his duties.

The order of Branch 23 did not toll the proceeding, but merely directed the administratrix to “hurry up the settlement of the estate.”

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3D 2009-2010 SPEC PRO DIGESTS Concordia’s remedy when her motion, to set aside the order declaring

Celedonia as the sole heir, was DENIED, was to elevate the denial to the CA for review on certiorari. Instead, she filed more than 1 year later, a separate action for the same purpose in Branch 26 of the court. The SC held that the separate action was improperly filed for it is the probate court that has the exclusive jurisdiction to just and legal distribution of the estate.

Petition granted. CA decision set aside. Concordia was also declared an heir, but the entire estate was conveyed to the foundation as ealier agree upon by both aunts. Celedonia was ordered to submit to the probate court an inventory and accounting of the estate of the deceased preparatory to terminating the proceeding

23. Manalo v. Paredes | Villa-RealG.R. No. 24168 September 22, 1925| 47 Phil 938

FACTS When Fernando Villegas died, his surviving spouse Laureana Hidalgo

filed an application for letters of administration of the former’s estate, alleging therein that he died intestate.

However, Justina Mendieta et al. filed a motion with the court, praying for the probate of the supposed will of the decedent. Publication was duly performed because of this.

When the court asked Mendieta to produce the will, she withdrew her petition for probate, saying that she merely coerced the husband in signing the will. The court then denied the petition for probate.

Later on, a cousin of the deceased, Gelacio Malihan filed with the court another petition for probate, presenting the same will which was already denied probate before.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N mandamus will lie to order the publication of the petition for the

probate of the will of the deceased Francisco Villegas


MANDAMUS WILL NOT LIE. The proceeding for the probate of a will is a proceeding in rem and the

court acquires jurisdiction over all the persons interested through the publication of the notice prescribed by section 630 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, and any order that may be entered is binding against all of them. Through the publication ordered by the Court of First Instance of Laguna of the application for the probate of the supposed will of Francisco Villegas, filed by Justina Mendieta et al. said court acquired jurisdiction over all such persons as were interested in the supposed will, including Gelacio Malihan. The court having tried said application for probate, hearing all the testimony of the attesting witnesses of the said supposed will, the applicants Justina Mendieta et al., on the one hand, and Laureana Hidalgo, widow of Francisco, on the other, having submitted a stipulation wherein the former withdrew her application and the latter reserved certain rights over the estate left by Francisco Villegas in favor of Justina Mendieta and her minor children; and the court having approved said stipulation and declared that Francisco Villegas died intestate according to said agreement, all the parties became bound by said judgment; and if any of them or other persons interested were not satisfied with the court's decision, they had the remedy of appeal to correct any injustice that might have been committed, and cannot now through the special remedy of mandamus, obtain a review of the proceeding upon a new application for the probate of the same will in order to compel the respondent judge to comply with his ministerial duty imposed by section 330 of the Code of Civil Procedure; because this remedy, being extraordinary, cannot be used in lieu of appeal, or writ of error especially when the parties interested have agreed to disregard the testamentary provisions and divide the estate as they pleased, each of them taking what pertained to him.

24. Riera vs. Palmaroli | MakalintalG.R. No. 14851, September 13, 1919 | 40 Phil. 105

FACTS Juan Pons, a Spanish subject resident in the Philippines, died in the city

of Manila. Petitioner Riera, is the widow of the deceased and was at the time of her

husband’s death residing in Palma de Mallorca in the Balearic Islands1. Respondent Vicente Palmaroli, Consul General for Spain in the

Philippines, produced in the CFI of Manila a document purporting to be the will of Juan Pons and asked that it be admitted to probate.

An order was entered admitting the will to probate. Owing to the great distance between Palma de Mallorca and the city of

Manila and to the lack of adequate means of communication between the

1 The Balearic Islands are located in the Mediterranean off the east coast of mainland Spain.

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3D 2009-2010 SPEC PRO DIGESTStwo places – a difficulty greatly exaggerated by conditions incident to the European War – the petitioner received no information of the probate proceedings.

Petitioner filed a petition to the SC for the purpose of vacating the order of the CFI of Manila admitting to probate the will of Juan Pons and to cause the application for probate to be set for rehearing in the CFI.

She claimed that she is entitled to be heard in the probate of the will, as a party interested in the estate.

She also alleged that the will should be treated as void for failure to comply with various requirements of the Spanish laws in respect to the manner of execution of wills.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N there should be a rehearing of the probate of the decedent’s

will?


NO. It is not alleged that any fraud has been attempted or committed, or that

the document probated is any other than a testamentary memorial in which the decedent actually gave expression to his desires with regard to the disposition of his property.

The action of the court in admitting a will to probate has all the effect of a judgment; and as such is entitled to full faith and credit in other courts.

The proceeding by which this is accomplished is considered to be in the nature of a proceeding in rem, and upon this idea the decree of probate is held binding on all persons in interest, whether they appear to contest the probate or not.

The proceeding is not a contentious litigation; and though the persons in interest are given an opportunity to appear and reasonable precautions are taken for publicity, they are not impleaded or required to answer.

The probate of a will, while conclusive as to its due execution, in no wise involves the intrinsic validity of its provisions.

If, therefore, upon the distribution of the estate of Juan Pons, it should appear that any provision of his will is contrary to the law applicable to his case, the will must necessarily yield upon that point and the disposition made by law must prevail.

The petitioner is free to appear in the CFI at the proper juncture and discuss the question of the validity of such provisions of the will as affect her interests adversely.

But if the will in question was in fact proved as the will of a Spanish subject, the intrinsic validity of its provisions must be determined under the Spanish law applicable to this testator.

25. Manahan v Manahan| ImperialG.R. No. 38050, September 22, 1933|

FACTS

On August 29, 1930, Tiburcia Manahan instituted special proceedings No. 4162, for the probate of the will of the deceased Donata Manahan, who died in Bulacan, Province of Bulacan, on August 3, 1930. The petitioner herein, niece of the testatrix, was named the executrix in said will. The court set the date for the hearing and the necessary notice required by law was accordingly published. On the day of the hearing of the petition, no opposition thereto was filed and, after the evidence was presented, the court entered the decree admitting the will to probate as prayed for. The will was probated on September 22, 1930. The trial court appointed the herein petitioner executrix with a bond of P1,000, and likewise appointed the committed on claims and appraisal, whereupon the testamentary proceedings followed the usual course. One year and seven months later, that is, on My 11, 1932, to be exact, the appellant herein filed a motion for reconsideration and a new trial, praying that the order admitting the will to probate be vacated and the authenticated will declared null and void ab initio. The appellee herein, naturally filed her opposition to the petition and, after the corresponding hearing thereof, the trial court erred its over of denial on July 1, 1932. Engracia Manahan, under the pretext of appealing from this last order, likewise appealed from the judgment admitting the will to probate.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N 1) That she was an interested party in the testamentary proceedings and, as such, was entitled to and should have been notified of the probate of the will; (2) that the court, in its order of September 22, 1930, did not really probate the will but limited itself to decreeing its authentication; and (3) that the will is null and void ab initio on the ground that the external formalities prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure have not been complied with in the execution thereof.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI NO! NO and NO.

She was not entitled to notification of the probate of the will and neither had she the right to expect it, inasmuch as she was not an interested party, not

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3D 2009-2010 SPEC PRO DIGESTShaving filed an opposition to the petition for the probate thereof. Her allegation that she had the status of an heir, being the deceased's sister, did not confer on her the right to be notified on the ground that the testatrix died leaving a will in which the appellant has not been instituted heir. Furthermore, not being a forced heir, she did not acquire any successional right.

The court really decreed the authentication and probate of the will in question, which is the only pronouncement required of the trial court by the law in order that the will may be considered valid and duly executed in accordance with the law. In the phraseology of the procedural law, there is no essential difference between the authentication of a will and the probate thereof. The words authentication and probate are synonymous in this case. All the law requires is that the competent court declared that in the execution of the will the essential external formalities have been complied with and that, in view thereof, the document, as a will, is valid and effective in the eyes of the law.

The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof and it cannot impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or independent action or proceedings

But there is another reason which prevents the appellant herein from successfully maintaining the present action and it is that inasmuch as the proceedings followed in a testamentary case are in rem, the trial court's decree admitting the will to probate was effective and conclusive against her, in accordance with the provisions of section 306 of the said Code of Civil Procedure which reads as follows:

SEC. 306. EFFECT OF JUDGMENT. — . . . .

1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or relation of a particular person the judgment or order is conclusive upon the title of the thing, the will or administration, or the condition or relation of the person: Provided, That the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate; . . . .

On the other hand, we are at a loss to understand how it was possible for the herein appellant to appeal from the order of the trial court denying her motion for reconsideration and a new trial, which is interlocutory in character. In view of this erroneous interpretation, she succeeded in appealing indirectly from

the order admitting the will to probate which was entered one year and seven months ago.

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