Who 3D Prints What in 2033?

ABOUT USWikistrat is the world’s first crowdsourced consultancy. It leverages a global network of subject-matter experts via a patent-pending “Collaborative Competition” methodology to provide a variety of analytic services. Scenario generation, policy planning, risk assessment and red-teaming exercises are conducted by Wikistrat on a real-

time, interactive online platform.

Russia’s decision to annex Crimea and provide military support to insurgents in eastern Ukraine prompted the United States (U.S.) and European Union (EU) to impose economic sanctions and expel it from the G8. In response, Russia has cut off cooperation on previously apolitical topics such as nuclear security, used its air force to conduct probes of Western airspace, and issued thinly veiled threats against NATO members. Collectively, these developments represent the most significant deterioration in East-West relations since the end of the Cold War.

Past history, however, demonstrates that an estrangement between East and West does not negate future cooperation. The initial wave of Cold War arms control mechanisms, such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), were signed within a few years of the Warsaw Pact’s occupation of Czechoslovakia, a move condemned by Western leaders and populations. Likewise, the West has often shown flexibility in its efforts to institute policies of economic isolation. For instance, the U.S. rescinded its nuclear-test sanctions against both India and Pakistan within a week of the 9/11 attacks in order to inaugurate cooperation on counterterrorism issues.

Seen through these lenses, the durability of the current standoff is questionable. To explore what would need to happen for Western actors to consider greater cooperation with Russia as being desirable or necessary over the next three years, Wikistrat – the world’s first crowdsourced consultancy – conducted a week-long simulation with more than 60 analysts collaboratively creating more than 50 scenarios.

The findings focused on a number of key themes. Analysts were clear in their assessment that Western nations would be unlikely to maintain a permanently hostile relationship with Russia, and would repair ties if given a suitable opportunity. The emergence of a common security threat was considered the most likely prompt for a rapid improvement in relations. In outlining this view, analysts placed significant emphasis on the potential for turmoil in the Asia-Pacific region, focusing heavily on the role China may play in the coming years. In addition, a satisfactory resolution of the Ukraine issue was considered a virtual prerequisite for any rapprochement, given the damage the ongoing crisis has already caused. Lastly, significant attention was given to the possibility of a change in European politics impacting East-West relations. Shifts in domestic politics, coupled with Russia’s determination to exploit them, were a key focus of analysis.

Russia and the West: Reset, Retrograde, Rebound?

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COMMON THREATS

The emergence of a common security threat represents the most compelling reason for a renewal or re-establishment of cooperation in the next three years. Russia will either lack resources or it will be in such geographic proximity to affected countries that it will be ideally placed to assist. The West’s rationale for cooperation in these circumstances may include disinterested incentives such as preventing a major humanitarian catastrophe, or using Russia’s weakened position to advance other economic or geopolitical interests. Russia may cooperate under these conditions due to an outright need for immediate assistance, a desire to prevent instability in its immediate neighborhood or a willingness to compromise in order to obtain technological and know-how benefits for future use.

Common security threats may arise from natural causes or man-made ones, with an epidemic or a natural disaster being the most likely with respect to the former. Threats caused by humankind may derive from asymmetric threats (such as terrorist attacks or ISIS’s encroachment into Eurasia) or conventional ones (e.g., the re-implosion of Afghanistan, renewed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh or a failed nuclear deal with Iran). Such threats drive a necessity for Western actors (above all, the U.S.) and Russia to rediscover each other in the international arena and make use of their combined powers. In all cases, cooperation is seen to be inspired by the inability of any one actor to achieve success on its own.

SECURITY THREATS FOR ONE OF THE TWO ACTORS

Of secondary likelihood are those security developments that would endanger one of the actors. No scenario explores the possibility of a Western actor being significantly weakened by this kind of event, as such occurrences are both highly unlikely and capable of being addressed without requiring significant policy concessions to Moscow. However, in the case of Russia being threatened by a third party such as China or North Korea, the West is likely to offer a hand to either use the weakened position of Russia for other gains or to prevent the destabilization of the country.

In one such scenario, Chinese immigrants to Siberia threaten to unbalance Russia’s sensitive demographic in its interior. Interestingly, analysts did not foresee threats to Russia’s stability and security originating from the west or south where Russia’s current security focus is currently placed, suggesting a mismatch between Russia’s perception of security threats and the strategic reality outlined by analysts. More importantly, it suggests that security threats coming from the east may be more serious for the country’s stability because Russia, with its resource limitations, is not as well prepared to respond to them.

Indeed, China is the most significant geopolitical threat to Russia’s internal integrity and external position. Regardless of geopolitical theater, a more assertive China in Africa, Central Asia or the Asia-Pacific would be an inevitable catalyst for deeper and more meaningful cooperation between Russia and the West. China’s increased assertiveness is not a challenge to the West that would make cooperation with Russia more desirable. Instead, all scenarios posit a Sino-Russian standoff that would put Western actors in the position of a “knight in shining armor,” doing Russia a favor by helping it curb the excesses of its malevolent eastern neighbor. The West is mostly interested in potential gains from a weakened and/or indebted Russia rather than in limiting the power of China.

INTERNAL POLITICAL SHIFTS

A significant political shift in Moscow during the next three years is unlikely, and elections within major Western actors (e.g., the U.S. or U.K.) are unlikely to prompt re-evaluations of existing priorities and policies towards Russia. Still, two scenarios emerge from the simulation dealing with such “what if” situations. In a scenario exploring the effect of a coup d’état in Moscow on potential re-establishment of cooperation between Russia and the West, low oil and gas prices combined with sanctions and international isolation bring an end to Putin’s era by making those close to him realize the only coin left for trade with the West is Putin’s seat itself. While Russia’s core interests and policies – or the people leading them – would not change if such an event were to take place, Putin’s removal on its own would create an excuse for both sides to re-establish cooperation to mutual benefit. The West would prefer to avoid prolonged

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hostility with Russia and thus jump at the first chance for improvement, providing face-saving guarantees before their own publics (e.g., Putin’s demise).

Another scenario deals with the possibility of a dramatic political realignment in Western Europe, with “fringe” parties such as the National Front in France gaining governmental power. An anti-elitist shift in European domestic politics here leads to new political establishments much more averse to EU policies, including the effort to isolate Russia. Cooperation is renewed as a result of the existing sanctions and diplomatic isolation being rescinded. A significant breakdown in EU structures is possible, brought about by a Greek withdrawal from the Eurozone or a British exit from the EU entirely. Under such circumstances, Russia will seek to utilize such developments to break out of its political isolation.

ECONOMIC INTERESTS

All but a few scenarios dealing with the economic interests of both Russia and the West focus on energy issues, as expected. One scenario posits a government-led energy-efficiency drive conducted to enable a greater portion of Russian oil and gas production to be designated for export. Western firms brave sanctions and regulations to reap the benefits of an unexpected glut of available energy. In another scenario, European countries retreat from their confrontational commercial posture. Fearing a return to high prices, EU states broker a resolution of the Ukrainian payments issue, helping to increase the certainty of supply. In a third scenario, re-engagement with Iran brings significant capacity back into the marketplace, allowing negotiations for the EU to secure preferable terms with Moscow that prove too tempting to resist.

ARCTIC

Global warming has brought the Arctic closer to the front line of geostrategic considerations in both East and West. According to analysts, Russia will benefit regardless of whether the West pursues a confrontational or cooperative approach to Russian activities in the “High North,” since only cooperative measures bear a chance for the success of Western endeavors. Whether an initial confrontation occurs between Canada, the U.S. and Russia in the Barents Sea or new shipping lanes are opened in the High North, cooperation arises from attempts to avoid the costs (political as well as financial) of potential militarization and hostility.

UKRAINE

As expected, the crisis in Ukraine is both a key determinant of possible cooperation and an essential negotiable on both sides. Three scenarios encapsulate the manner in which the issue could cease to poison East-West relations as a whole. The first is a change in the Western position, with support for the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity giving way to geopolitical realism over time. In this scenario, cooperation comes about as a result of Western support for restructuring the country into a pro-Western West and a Russian-leaning yet autonomous East. Such an evolution is predicated upon Ukraine’s inability to overcome structural economic deficits despite copious amounts of Western aid.

A second scenario posits the inverse outcome, in which Moscow’s willingness to provide support to the rebels in the East begins to fade, making renewed cooperation a politically feasible option for Western states. The final scenario explores the possibility of critical changes occurring within Ukraine itself. Political pragmatists are elected who are prepared to sacrifice the country’s territorial integrity in exchange for an end to hostilities and a focus on consolidating the country’s long-term future, especially its economic outlook and living standards. This shift provides political cover for Western states to re-engage with Russia, citing the fact that the Ukrainian authorities have already done so. Notably, the latter two scenarios reflect the findings of an earlier Wikistrat report, which found that both Ukraine and Russia may be “fighting the wrong war” in their effort to control the Donbass.

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NEGOTIABLES

The Ukrainian crisis is a focal point of negotiations for both sides. Regardless of the motivating force behind the cooperation, the West and/or Russia will demand significant revision of the other side’s position as a prerequisite for a deal. Interestingly, neither party will offer concessions regarding the Ukrainian crisis as part of negotiations, nor will negotiations prove successful without a satisfactory solution to that matter first. Ukraine remains a deal-breaker for geopolitical cooperation between Russia and the West for the foreseeable future. Absent the willingness of either side to change its position, only a disastrous common threat is likely to bring this cooperation about. Even then, only the prospect of instability pertaining to nuclear weapons (e.g., North Korea and Iran) and the further rise of ISIS are of sufficient gravity to meet this threshold.

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ATTRIBUTIONS

[Cover] This work, “cover”, is a derivative of “Saviour tower of Moscow Kremlin. Moscow, Russia.” by Alex Zelenko, under the GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.2; “Normandy format talks in Minsk (February 2015): Alexander Lukashenko, Vladimir Putin, Angela Merkel, Francois Hollande, and Petro Poroshenko take part in the talks on a settlement to the situation in Ukraine.” by The Russian Presidential Press and Information Office, licenced under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported Licence, www.kremlin.ru; “Oil pumpjack, Togliatti, Russia” by ShinePhantom TexasRaiser, licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license. “Cover” is licensed under CC by Lala Elizan.

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June 2013