The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

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Russia in Syria

Military Buildup and ImplicationsJeffrey White @JeffWhite25

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

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Reasons

• Support the regime• Bolster Russian influence on Syrian situation• Increase Russian role in region• Fight “terrorism”• Divert attention from domestic troubles• Challenge the U.S.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

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Continuing Build-up• Sea bridge: Landing ships,

commercial vessels• Air bridge:

– An-124/Condor, IL62, Tu-154, and IL-76

– RU-IR-IZ-SY route– Masked

• Facilities– Expansion of Basel al-Assad

Airport– Helicopter base at Istamo– Ports of Latakia and Tartus

An-124/Condor Inbound Latakia

Alligator Class Large Landing ShipPhoto courtesy of Yörük Işık, ACTECON International Consulting

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

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Order of Battle• Air

– 4 x Su-30 SM/Flanker-C– 12 x Su-24/Flanker– 12 x Su-25/Frogfoot– Attack and transport helos– Yakovlev Pchela-1T Drones– IL-20/Coot intelligence collector– Possible ABN CP

• Ground – Elements 810th Naval Infantry Brigade– Possible elements 363rd Naval

Infantry Brigade– T-90 tanks– BTR-80 type APCs– Field Artillery– Several thousand troops

• Air Defense– SA-22/Greyhound

• Presumed C2 structure

Su-24/Fencer

SA-22/Greyhound

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Potential Missions• Air

– Reconnaissance– Close air support– Strike– Interdiction– Airborne C2

• Ground– Advising– Embedding– Security– Defense– Offense– SF

Su-25/Frogfoot

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Potential Operational Areas• Selective employment• Key targets

– Priority enemies– Where regime forces/positions are threatened– Tailored packages

• Key areas– Northern Latakia– Northern Hama– Damascus region– Aleppo– Eastern Homs

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Potential Effects on the War

• Direct effects:– Provide decisive edge on select battlefields– Increase the ability of regime forces to hold/take key positions

and territory – Increase the attrition of opposition forces – Restore the regime’s waning offensive capabilities.

• Indirect effects:– Raise the combat effectiveness of regime forces – Raise the morale of regime forces – Depress the morale of opposition forces– Rally Jihadist forces

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

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Conclusions• Quite capable joint/combined

arms force• Russian force tailored for

regime support mission• Intended to fight, but cannot

fight everywhere at once• Can be expanded with air and

sea bridge capabilities• Can have significant effects on

the battlefield• Can give Russia a direct role in

war’s direction• Can have significant political

effects